


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Special Warfare

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PSYOP


WAGING WARFARE FOR THE MIND

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From the Commandant



Special Warfare

In the arsenal of warfare, one of the oldest weapons is psychological operations. Since Biblical times, destroying the enemy's will to fight has been an important element of battle, and U.S. history records PSYOP's contributions to military operations from the War for Independence through Desert Storm.

Honoring its ancient lineage, PSYOP remains important in contemporary military activities as a means of reducing conflict and saving lives. Broadcast and leaflet campaigns in Panama and Desert Storm demonstrate PSYOP's continued value in supporting combat forces. In peacetime, PSYOP has an equally important role in winning foreign public support for U.S. forces engaged in FID and humanitarian-assistance missions. In fact, its role in low-intensity conflict promises to make PSYOP an even more powerful weapon in the conflicts and crises we will face in the future.

To prepare for that future, Army PSYOP plans to reorganize into a structure emphasizing functional and regional orientation and the integration of active and reserve-component PSYOP forces. Subject to final approval by Department of the Army, this new plan reflects the current provisional organization of the 4th PSYOP Group, a structure tested and validated during Desert Storm. The Special Warfare Center and School assisted the Army CA and PSYOP Command and the 4th PSYOP Group in the development of this concept, and we are now reviewing the necessary changes in employment and organization of PSYOP forces prior to developing tables of organization and equipment and new doctrine.

Current doctrine is reflected in the revised FM 33-1, *Psychological Operations*, now being fielded. It includes recent changes in technology, lessons from recent operations and integrates PSYOP into the concept of AirLand Operations. A how-to manual, FM 33-5, *PSYOP Techniques and Procedures*, is scheduled for publication in 1993; it will link doctrine to the day-to-day operations of the PSYOP force.

Along with doctrine, we are updating training to include recent lessons learned. SWCS training for psychological operations runs from the enlisted advanced individual training, through PSYOP NCOES and the PSYOP Officer Course to the



Joint PSYOP Staff Planners Course. Nor does PSYOP training end at SWCS: the Army has now integrated PSYOP into courses at the Command and General Staff College and exercises at the Joint Readiness Training Center and in the Battle Command Training Program.

Key to modern PSYOP techniques has been the development of printing and communications technology in the 20th century. Equipment to be fielded in the near future will make use of the latest technological advancements and allow PSYOP to broadcast over longer ranges, using the full range of media. Lighter-weight systems will allow easier transportation and deployment.

Recent changes in the world order and U.S. defense structure point to a rapidly changing and uncertain future, but some things remain constant. Nearly 2,400 years ago, Sun Tzu said, "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence." Despite the passage of centuries, PSYOP remains a formidable weapon of persuasion which, used with other SOF or conventional forces, can play a key role in keeping the peace and protecting U.S. interests around the world.

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

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Cover: Computer graphic by Bruce S. Barfield

Training the PSYOP Force

by Maj. Jay M. Parker

The end of the Cold War, lessons from recent operations and advances in technology have dictated changes in the training and doctrine of modern U.S. PSYOP forces

The U.S. Army has undergone tremendous changes in recent years and faces even greater changes in the years ahead. The end of the Cold War, the dramatic realignment of the international order, and the reduction of the U.S. defense budget have all reshaped the Army and the world in which it must serve.

Psychological operations is prepared to meet the challenges of this new world as a potent and cost-effective combat multiplier. This requires a PSYOP force trained to understand the dramatic changes in communication and media technology, a force able to capitalize on recent lessons learned, and a force fully integrated with the AirLand Operations construct. Training that force, and preparing the doctrine on which its training is based, is the responsibility of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School's 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group.

Doctrine

As existing PSYOP doctrine has been tested during Operations Just

Cause, Desert Shield/Storm, and numerous other deployments, the lessons learned have been gathered and analyzed. From those lessons, the Special Warfare Center and School, together with the PSYOP force, began the process of preparing the doctrine that will take PSYOP into the 21st century. The result is both a new basic doctrine manual and a manual on PSYOP tactics, techniques and procedures.

The revised FM 33-1, *Psychological Operations*, is now being fielded. FM 33-1 is designed to be a user-friendly doctrinal manual that will encourage corps and division commanders to incorporate PSYOP into the planning and operations process. It captures the lessons learned from Desert Shield/Storm and other recent operations, recognizes the dramatic changes in communication technology and integrates them with AirLand operations.

FM 33-5, *PSYOP Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*, is scheduled for release in 1993. It provides the basis for PSYOP execution and training development and is the first effort to link doctrine to the

real day-to-day operations of the PSYOP force. Together, FM-33-1 and FM 33-5 will provide the SOF community and the Army with the tools and information necessary to plan for and use PSYOP on the modern battlefield.

Training

The link between doctrinal manuals and the PSYOP force is PSYOP training. This training ranges from enlisted advanced individual training through PSYOP NCOES and the Psychological Operations Officer Course up to the Joint Psychological Operations Staff Planners Course. The SWCS has developed a fully integrated training plan that links PSYOP soldiers to the doctrine and to every level of PSYOP practice.

PSYOP Officer Course

Third Battalion is responsible for PSYOP officer training through the Functional Area 39 (PSYOP and Civil Affairs) training program. FA 39 training has four pillars: language training, training in the SWCS Regional Studies Course, graduate training, and CA or PSYOP-specific training.

PSYOP training in the Psychological Operations Officer Course gives PSYOP officers the tools to influence not only the services, but the entire interagency arena in planning and conducting a wide range of PSYOP.

The POOC prepares captains and majors for command and staff positions in the PSYOP group or in other staff-level positions throughout the Army and the joint arena. This six-week course not only teaches psychological-operations doctrine and skills, but also how to apply the doctrine and skills to the missions of the supported unit commander, country teams and senior staff planners.

In essence, POOC teaches captains and majors to be division and corps command-resident PSYOP experts. They also gain the confi-

dence to address PSYOP at the highest levels of joint planning and execution.

New instruction in the POOC takes advantage of lessons learned in recent operations, new PSYOP doctrine, and integration of the doctrine of other SOF and the Army's battlefield operating systems. Current instruction also places greater emphasis on collateral activities and AirLand Operations with coalition forces.

Instruction in the POOC is divided into six areas:

- Social and behavioral sciences – Students learn to identify potential target audiences and the dynamics of the communication process. Instruction places emphasis on understanding cultural biases and learning those of the target audience in order to execute effective PSYOP.

- The PSYOP process – Students learn to execute the processes involved in conducting PSYOP. They cover the role of PSYOP studies and intelligence collection in the research phase, the psychology of persuasion and its use in the target-audience analysis phase, and prod-

uct-development and program-control processes in the execution phase. Students will also learn to integrate PSYOP planning into the military decision-making process.

- Doctrine, organization and employment – Students study U.S. PSYOP policy formulation and PSYOP doctrine. They also learn U.S. PSYOP capabilities, limitations and methods of employment.

- PSYOP techniques and procedures – Students learn to apply various PSYOP media and techniques involved in evaluating PSYOP products, analyzing propaganda and conducting counterpropaganda.

- Course exercises – Students test their knowledge and practice PSYOP decision-making and the application of the PSYOP process in simulated exercises. The course now includes a two-day field-training exercise which requires students to live and work in the exercise environment and a two-day command-post exercise.

- Contemporary issues and PSYOP – Field trips, guest speakers and seminars expose students to the various forms of media and discussions of general PSYOP subjects.



photo by Keith Butler

Enlisted students learn printing techniques at the JFKSWCS during advanced individual training for MOS 37F, PSYOP specialist.

Students study the concept of PSYOP, historical examples of its use and the importance of the PSYOP dimension of military operations.

Joint PSYOP Course

The Army is the DoD proponent agency for joint PSYOP training, and the Joint Psychological Operations Staff Planners Course is designed to institutionalize PSYOP among the services. The two-week course trains selected commissioned and noncommissioned officers and mid-level officers from key civilian agencies. Students learn to coordinate PSYOP in support of a unified or specified command and to employ PSYOP assets in support of joint operations in peacetime, crisis or open hostilities.

The course is divided into four areas: introduction to PSYOP, PSYOP techniques and procedures, joint planning and a two-day end-of-course command-post exercise. The course is taught through a combination of lectures, small-group instruction and discussion seminars, most of which are taught by guest instructors with experience in their field. Practical exercises reinforce training objectives throughout the course.

37F AIT

SWCS also teaches advanced individual training for MOS 37F, psychological-operations specialist. During this 11-week course, active and reserve-component soldiers receive technical training in PSYOP skills and related social sciences while taking part in Army common-core subjects which continue the soldier development begun in basic training. Here, too, instruction integrates doctrine of other SOF and battlefield operating systems.

In the past, 37F AIT consisted largely of classroom instruction; tactical training was limited. Course instruction has been improved to teach technical skills in sequential building blocks. There

MTT Trains PSYOP Soldiers During Desert Shield

Not all PSYOP training takes place in classrooms and training areas at Fort Bragg.

During Operation Desert Shield, four members of the SWCS 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, deployed to Saudi Arabia as a **mobile training team** to instruct U.S. officers in tactical PSYOP. Their students were to be members of the 8th Psychological Operations Task Force assigned as PSYOP liaison officers to some of the larger conventional units in Saudi Arabia. These liaison officers needed the training to better support the conventional commanders.

Maj. John Bantsolas and SSgt. Ronald Roberts deployed to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, from Dec. 6-23, 1990. After spending three days familiarizing themselves with the PSYOP situation to learn the needs of the students, Bantsolas and Roberts assisted members of the 4th PSYOP Group to instruct 12 students in a five-day course in tactical PSYOP. They taught subjects including PSYOP mission analysis, PSYOP in support of the AirLand Battle, target analysis, program and product development, psychological actions, loudspeaker and field-team operations and evaluating the impact of a PSYOP campaign.

Two other members of the battalion, Lt. Col. Russell Howard, the battalion commander, and Capt. Linae Brush, an instructor in the battalion's Regional Studies Course, deployed to Saudi Arabia on Dec. 15 to teach and to observe the 8th PSYOP Task Force's organization for Desert Shield in order to gain early lessons learned which might be included in future PSYOP instruction.

The MTT members also visited G-5s and PSYOP and Civil Affairs liaison officers in several units to get their views of CA and PSYOP support to Desert Shield as well as suggestions for improving course content in SWCS training. Members brought back suggestions for changes in planning PSYOP campaigns, cross-cultural communications and language training.

While there, Brush, an Arabic linguist, evaluated U.S. PSYOP products from the Arab point of view and provided assessments of Saudi perceptions published in Arabic-language newspapers. She proposed means of making PSYOP products more effective and suggested a focus of PSYOP programs for consolidation scenarios. She also coordinated with the political-military adviser of the U.S. Central Command to obtain training materials for PSYOP, Civil Affairs and Regional Studies classes taught at SWCS.

is also a greater emphasis on hands-on tactical training, including a command-post exercise set in a foreign-internal-defense scenario. Tactical training culminates in a tactical airborne operation (for active-component students) and a four-day field training exercise. In keeping with the most recent PSYOP doctrine, 37F AIT is designed to produce a PSYOP soldier able to operate effectively with

combat, combat-support, and combat-service-support units in a variety of operations.

Training the force

A central and equally important SWCS mission is the PSYOP training of the remainder of the Army. The first step in this process has been the integration of PSYOP training in the Command and Gen-

eral Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. Fort Leavenworth is the crossroads of Army training and provides a means of reaching future operations officers, and, eventually, battalion commanders who must use PSYOP in AirLand operations. Students at CGSC are now using psychological-operations doctrine as it is being developed. They are required to integrate PSYOP into all of their mission planning.

SWCS also participates in several other training programs that help to institutionalize PSYOP throughout the Army and the joint arena:

- Battle Command Training Program – SWCS officers serve as observers/controllers at division- and corps-level exercises to evaluate a unit's ability to integrate PSYOP into its mission-planning and execution process. They also coordinate with the unit prior to the evaluation and provide both a general presentation of psychological-operations capabilities and specific suggestions on how the unit can best integrate PSYOP into its mission analysis and planning.

- Joint Readiness Training Center – Where BCTP provides the opportunity to integrate PSYOP into mission analysis and planning at the operational level, JRTC provides the opportunity to integrate PSYOP at the tactical level. SWCS soldiers work with both the evaluated units and the PSYOP liaison officers at JRTC to make the employment of PSYOP a routine part of every unit commander's planning process.

- Joint exercises – In a recent joint exercise conducted as part of Display Determination, PSYOP per-

sonnel from the SWCS Third Battalion and the 4th PSYOP Group worked with their Turkish counterparts to develop joint PSYOP doctrine and training. Participation in joint exercises allows PSYOP personnel to evaluate and influence the use of PSYOP in joint operations.

- Mobile training teams – Third Battalion soldiers in support of their 4th POG counterparts have participated in such recent exercises as Panther II, a wartime exercise in South America. The value and viability of MTTs were most evident after the successful MTT in Desert Shield which trained PSYOP officers in a theater of war. (See pg. 4.)

Within the last year, SWCS has made aggressive efforts to establish lines of communication with all key PSYOP players. The Center and 4th POG have coordinated MTTs and joint exercises, and SWCS personnel are in constant touch with Army, joint and other services' staffs, key civilian agencies and the various theater commands. Representatives from all these activities frequently serve as guest instructors in the FA 39 training program.

Conclusions

In 1985, the Department of Defense responded to a presidential directive "to revitalize DoD PSYOP and integrate it into other ... programs of the United States Government." The resulting 1985 PSYOP Master Plan was aimed at making DoD PSYOP "One of the strategic instruments of national security policy" and requiring "consideration and use of PSYOP in peacetime, crisis, and war." Since 1985, the Army has put PSYOP to the test in Pana-

ma, in the Persian Gulf, and as a key player in a wide range of peacetime deployments. In every case, PSYOP soldiers have served with distinction, and the Army's PSYOP force has validated the imperatives of that visionary plan.

SWCS is proud of its role in preparing that force and of the role it continues to play in taking that force into the future. With that pride, however, come a sobering awareness of its responsibility to ensure that training and doctrine not lag behind the needs of the force, a firm commitment to continue to take the valuable lessons of PSYOP to the field, and the resolve to institutionalize PSYOP as a key player in the Army of the future. ✕

Maj. Jay M. Parker is currently commander of Company A, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. His previous assignments include duty as an infantry platoon leader, company commander and brigade training officer, and as assistant professor of social sciences at the U.S. Military Academy. His military training includes the Infantry Officer Basic Course, the Engineer Officer Advanced Course, Airborne School, Air Assault School, the Foreign Area Officer Course and the PSYOP Officer Course. Major Parker holds a BA in speech communication from the University of Arizona, MAs in political communication and public policy from Arizona State University, an MA in international relations from the University of Southern California, and an MA and Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University.

PSYOP Support to Operation Desert Storm

by Maj. Jack N. Summe

Shortly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on Aug. 2, 1990, a special planning cell from Fort Bragg's 4th Psychological Operations Group deployed to the headquarters of U.S. Central Command at MacDill AFB, Fla. Its mission was to plan the PSYOP support for what was to become the most extensive deployment of U.S. troops and logistics since World War II — Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Those plans were only the beginning of the 4th POG's involvement. In late August, the commanders of the 4th POG and its subordinate 8th PSYOP Battalion left for Saudi Arabia to spearhead the deployment of 4th POG assets. As the strategic-propaganda-development battalion for the Middle East region, the 8th was task-organized with elements of the POG's PSYOP Dissemination Battalion, or PDB, to form the 8th Psychological Operations Task Force. The POTF's deployment on Sept. 8 and 23 began

what was to be a highly successful use of PSYOP in support of conventional combat operations in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq.

Organization

The deployed 4th POG organization evolved over time to include more than 650 personnel — comprising active, reserve, and National Guard units. Under the operational control of U.S. Central Command, the organization included a strategic PSYOP battalion; the PDB; and the 6th and 9th Tactical PSYOP Battalions augmented by loudspeaker teams from the 18th, 19th, 244th, 245th and 362nd Reserve Tactical PSYOP Companies. Other elements included liaison officers supporting the CENTCOM component commands as well as VII and XVIII Corps (including British and French forces); the 13th PSYOP Battalion, a reserve-component unit supporting enemy-prisoner-of-war operations; a detachment

in Turkey; and elements supporting special-operations forces and U.S. Marines.

The combined PSYOP effort included Saudi, Egyptian, Kuwaiti, and British interpreters who were collocated with a U.S. propaganda-development cell, as well as Saudi and Kuwaiti linguists supporting front-line loudspeaker operations. The 8th POTF was located in Riyadh with USCENTCOM and the component headquarters, while the PDB, tactical-support battalions, and PSYOP-support elements were stationed in the east near Dharhan and King Fahd International Airport. Upon the forward deployment of the VII and XVIII Corps and Marine Corps units, all tactical-support elements accompanied the headquarters they supported.

Mission

The mission of the 4th POG and 8th POTF was taken from and directly reflected the missions of

U.S. Central Command in Saudi Arabia. These were to demonstrate U.S. resolve and improve the image of U.S. forces in-theater, to support the defense of Saudi Arabia, and to support offensive, consolidation, and enemy-prisoner-of-war operations throughout Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq.

The 4th POG and the 8th POTF accomplished all three missions through various means, all of which involved establishing direct communication with enemy or civilian elements through the media of print, broadcast and loudspeaker operations.

Planning and execution

Initial planning was directed toward easily coordinated and obtainable PSYOP dissemination methods. Such methods include airborne distribution of leaflets by C-130 aircraft or broadcast of selected news and information items by EC-130 Volant Solo aircraft. These efforts formed the nucleus of an operation that eventually distributed more than 29 million leaflets by MC-130, F-16, B-52 and F/A-18 aircraft and 155mm leaflet artillery shells.

The operation also performed an almost continuous broadcast of a daily two-hour radio program and the regionwide broadcast of a multinational-power videotape designed to demonstrate U.S. resolve and encourage support for coalition efforts in the region. In addition, the operation supported tactical ground commanders through the forward deployment of 66 loudspeaker teams using man-pack or vehicle- and helicopter-mounted systems.

Leaflet operations

Extensive leaflet operations during both Desert Shield and Desert Storm formed the main thrust of PSYOP support to the war. Throughout the build-up period of September to December 1990, the majority of the effort consisted of campaign development, product

development, product review and pretests. Pretests used Kuwaiti soldiers and refugees as the first test group, followed by Iraqi EPWs after the start of the air campaign. Campaign themes focused on futility of resistance; inevitability of defeat; surrender, desertion and defection; abandonment of equipment; and blaming the war on Saddam Hussein.

Leaflets were initially disseminated prior to combat operations by C-130 aircraft; they were dropped from high altitude along the southern Kuwaiti border and followed wind patterns to cover the majority of front-line Iraqi units in Kuwait. Once the air campaign began, leaflets were distributed by F-16 and B-52 aircraft, using the M-129A1 leaflet bomb, against targets such as Baghdad, Republican Guard units in southern Iraq, and deception targets throughout the Kuwaiti theater.

C-130 distribution of leaflets continued during Desert Storm and was the heaviest-used means of dissemination during the war. Statistics on leaflet distribution are: 19

million by C-130, eight million by F-16, and two million by B-52. Other means included hand-carried leaflets and posters, 155mm leaflet artillery rounds, and water bottles used to float leaflets to the Kuwaiti shore.

Leaflets were used to support both combat and deception operations across the entire theater and had a significant impact in degrading enemy morale and will to fight. Post-testing on Iraqi EPWs found that 98 percent of the test group was exposed to leaflet products, 80 percent believed the PSYOP message, and 70 percent were influenced by the leaflets to defect or surrender.

The credibility of the overall PSYOP effort was improved by coordinating leaflet operations with B-52 bombing along enemy front-line positions. Leaflets were dropped telling the enemy force that bombing would begin against a specific unit on a specific day and encouraging them to desert or defect. This was followed by the bombing and another leaflet drop predicting the next strike. Post-tests showed that



U.S. Army photo

An aircrewman prepares to load an M-129A1 leaflet bomb aboard a waiting F-16. Aircraft distributed approximately 29 million leaflets during Desert Storm.



Leaflets such as this one were used to support both combat and deception operations during Desert Storm.

the campaign was highly credible among Iraqi soldiers and produced large numbers of desertions and defections.

Broadcast operations

Broadcast operations supported strategic, operational and tactical efforts across the theater. Initial broadcast efforts consisted of developing a multinational-power videotape which described and projected the resolve, strength and technological superiority of the coalition forces arrayed against the Iraqis. The videotape was intended to encourage support of coalition objec-

tives in the region and to degrade the Iraqi will to fight by emphasizing the futility of standing against such a force. The videotape was produced and distributed throughout the Middle East, even in inaccessible areas such as Baghdad.

Other broadcast operations were limited primarily to radio broadcasts. Programs were broadcast from two sites in Saudi Arabia, Abu Ali and Qaysumah, and two EC-130 Volant Solo aircraft flew broadcast orbits over specific areas of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Broadcasts consisted of a two-hour radio program of Arabic

music, selected news items, information and various PSYOP spot announcements. The emphasis here was to attract an enemy audience through the accuracy of the program's news items concerning the Gulf conflict.

Indications of the operation's success were the continual jamming efforts of Iraqi ground commanders and the ban on radios in Iraqi combat units. Post-test operations also indicated that 58 percent of all Iraqi soldiers questioned were exposed to broadcast operations — 46 percent believed the PSYOP message, and 34 percent were induced to surrender or defect.

Loudspeaker operations

Although loudspeaker operations were not highly publicized, they were extensive, and they played an important role in the overall PSYOP effort. Designed to support specific corps- and division-level tactical operations, loudspeaker operations focused on communicating with the enemy and reinforcing leaflet and broadcast messages of futility and surrender.

Loudspeakers were also used in deception operations to simulate the movement of heavy combat equipment in an effort to disclose enemy artillery positions to counter-battery and TAC air fire. Marine Corps units were particularly successful with both types of loudspeaker operations, and the XVIII Airborne Corps used loudspeakers successfully to encourage enemy surrender prior to the beginning of the ground campaign.

Loudspeaker operations used Kuwaiti and Saudi linguists attached to the tactical-support PSYOP battalions as well as linguists organic to the 4th POG. Of the EPWs post-tested, 34 percent were exposed to loudspeaker operations, 18 percent believed the PSYOP message, and 16 percent stated that loudspeaker operations induced surrender or defection. Such response proves that loudspeaker operations are not obsolete

in a large, armor-heavy ground operation.

Impact indicators

Other than the impact indicators already discussed, there were significant intelligence reports concerning the impact of PSYOP in the Gulf conflict. These showed that the Iraqi soldiers and command structure were highly susceptible to PSYOP efforts. Other than TV coverage showing surrendering Iraqi soldiers vigorously waving leaflets at U.S. and multinational forces, the following represents the most compelling anecdotal evidence of a significant PSYOP impact:

- Iraqi soldiers routinely abandoning their equipment in response to the PSYOP campaign to separate soldiers from their systems while under attack.
- Iraqi soldiers firing their weapons at falling leaflets.
- Repositioning of Iraqi units in an effort to counter the U.S. deception campaign.
- Searches for leaflets and radios among Iraqi units.
- Reports by an Iraqi general that leaflets were a significant influence on soldiers' desertion. Most desertions were caused by

radio and leaflet reports of future B-52 bombings.

• Iraqi "death squads" patrolling the neutral zone in an effort to stop the large number of defections prior to and during the air campaign.

• An Iraqi division commander's report that leaflets telling of plentiful food and water caused soldiers to desert south.

Although this is not a comprehensive list, it is indicative of the success of the PSYOP effort and the credibility of PSYOP in peace and war.

Conclusion

While PSYOP did not win the war, it played a significant part in the victory by playing on the preconceived fears and concerns of Iraqi soldiers in both front and rear areas. In many ways, U.S. PSYOP in Desert Storm was more successful than ever before — it was planned, coordinated and executed in a joint, multinational and multitheater effort. Its success was tangible, measured in desertions, defections and surrenders by the thousands. In the final analysis, PSYOP saved tens of thousands of American, Coalition and Iraqi lives. PSYOP came of age as a force mul-

tiplier in support of large-scale, conventional operations. It should be integrated in all future operations to minimize loss of life on both sides. ✕

Maj. Jack N. Summe is currently a student in the Command and General Staff Officer Course at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. He previously served as chief of Plans, Programs and Force Development for the 4th Psychological Operations Group at Fort Bragg, as executive officer for the 4th POG's 8th PSYOP Battalion, and during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, as executive officer for the 8th PSYOP Task Force. Major Summe was the PSYOP representative to the U.S. Special Operations Command-U.S. Central Command Joint Mission Analysis at MacDill AFB, Fla. A Military Police officer and a graduate of the MP Officer Advanced Course, the PSYOP Officer Course and the Regional Studies Course, he holds a master's degree in international relations from the University of South Carolina and a bachelor's degree in psychology from Purdue University.

Total PSYOP Integration:

Reorganizing active and reserve-component PSYOP forces

by Maj. Jack N. Summe

A new concept pending final Army approval would reorganize and integrate active and reserve-component PSYOP forces.

The new organization was developed by the 4th PSYOP Group to deal with flaws in the L-series table of organization and equipment and the concept of employment that it dictates. The LTOE's capstone affiliation of PSYOP units to combat maneuver units, versus a regional orientation, creates problems when the maneuver unit is assigned to operate in a region outside that of the PSYOP unit's cultural and language orientation. The LTOE also decentralizes PSYOP-specific equipment, often leaving units without enough of any one kind of equipment to support their operations.

Following Operation Just Cause in December 1989, the 4th PSYOP Group reconfigured under a provisional table of organization and equipment, or PTOE, in an effort to

correct LTOE problems encountered in that operation. Subsequent experience during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm proved the effectiveness of the PTOE and convinced PSYOP force integrators of the need to expand the configuration to reserve-component PSYOP forces, an effort dubbed Total PSYOP Integration, or TPI. Representatives from the 4th POG, the Army Civil Affairs and PSYOP Command and the JFK Special Warfare Center and School formed a TPI working group to examine such issues as the focus of the PSYOP force, force structure and operational doctrine concerning active- and reserve-component PSYOP integration during both peace and war.

Focus of the force

The 1991 demise of the Soviet threat in Europe led to a serious PSYOP cultural and linguistic

imbalance: Nearly 60 percent of the PSYOP force was focused toward missions supporting the European theater. With the reduction of the threat in Europe, more than half of the PSYOP force focused there could be oriented toward other regions to support to all five unified commands. The working group studied this problem and emerged with a balanced force based on regional or functional alignment. **The new concept divides the world into thirds — a Western region, encompassing U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S. Southern Command; a Pacific region, including both U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Central Command; and an Atlantic region, covering U.S. European Command (Europe to the Urals and Africa).** This division takes into account the cultural and regional expertise required of PSYOP units to support these areas.

Force structure

The current PSYOP LTOE structure was based on the concept of a fully capable PSYOP unit assigned at the division level of military operations. Under this concept, the division commander approved all PSYOP in his area of influence. In practice, however, approval and coordination of psychological operations has been centralized at theater-CINC level to ensure that U.S. national objectives are met and to eliminate the potential for contradictory information being produced by PSYOP and other information programs. During Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm, for instance, the PSYOP campaign and all product prototypes were coordinated through the J-3 for final approval. Dissemination of these approved products was then delegated to lower levels, based on individual unit requirements.

The TPI team proposed a force structure that could be task-organized to meet any contingency requirement while maintaining realistic functional and regional ori-

entations. The proposed structure incorporates such functionally oriented units as the headquarters, tactical- or regional-support group, the PSYOP dissemination battalion, and the enemy-prisoner-of-war PSYOP battalion. The change in force structure requires a significant decrease in non-PSYOP MOSs; at the same time, it increases the strength of PSYOP MOSs 37F and 97E by 233 soldiers. This change also increases the number of loud-speaker teams available to support the CINC in war.

This reorganization encompasses a number of changes for the reserve PSYOP force, including the loss of a PSYOP group headquarters and an increase of two PSYOP battalions. The remaining two group headquarters will maintain a functional orientation, with emphasis on command and control of subordinate battalions and preparation for their wartime missions.

Subordinate to the tactical PSYOP group are three tactical

PSYOP battalions consisting of five tactical PSYOP companies each. The tactical group also is assigned a PSYOP dissemination battalion, designed along the lines of its active-component counterpart, and a battalion whose sole mission is to provide PSYOP support for enemy-prisoner-of-war operations.


The regional PSYOP group consists of three regionally oriented PSYOP battalions consisting of two regionally oriented propaganda-development PSYOP companies and one research-and-analysis company. Finally, the regional group is assigned a small strategic dissemination company. All battalions, tactical and regional, are oriented culturally, based on the regional divisions mentioned earlier.

Operational doctrine

The TPI working group looked at the integration of active and reserve PSYOP units and the doctrine which drives it. The USSOCOM Joint Mission Analysis has identi-

fied the requirement for U.S. PSYOP forces to be able to engage two regional contingencies and simultaneously support other theaters. The relatively small size of the active PSYOP force means that active and reserve forces would have to be integrated to meet the JMA requirement, and they would need compatible force structure. Further, the current national military strategy recognizes that the active component would most likely deploy to theater first and be reinforced later by reserve forces.

The working group designed an employment concept which incorporates the PSYOP force structure and the national security strategy. The concept calls for the engagement of AC PSYOP forces augmented by selected RC PSYOP forces during peacetime support operations. Upon deployment of a large portion of the active PSYOP force in support of a major regional contingency, the reserve force would activate as required and deploy to the-



ater to augment the active force. Reserve units would also assume the responsibility for the peacetime support mission in the absence of the active regionally oriented units.

Finally, the reserve-component PSYOP forces would be primarily called upon to engage a second major regional contingency, with selected augmentation from the active component. Putting the TPI concept into effect required that reserve PSYOP forces be reorganized to parallel the structure of the active forces, whose organization had proven effective during Desert Shield/Storm.

Conclusion

Upon completion of the basic concept and the development of a straw man depicting the final organization, the TPI team began a series of briefings and coordination efforts necessary for concept approval. The TPI concept has been briefed and approved by the commander of USSOCOM and the ASD-SO/LIC; the team is now working with the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations for final Army approval. A force structure and doctrine review concerning the employment and organization of PSYOP forces is also under way at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. This review will complete development of the TOE and

PSYOP Reorganization Part of USACAPOC Restructuring

Reorganization of the PSYOP force is part of an overall restructuring of the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command which was effective Oct. 1.

USACAPOC's Civil Affairs units, which had already changed to the L-series table of organization and equipment Sept. 16, have also restructured to better support theater commanders and contingency missions, according to Lt. Col. Robert M. Tuttle, inspector general for USACAPOC.

Under the restructure, two CA units, the 358th CA Brigade, Norristown, Pa., and the 361st CA Brigade, Pensacola, Fla., have been upgraded to major subordinate units of USACAPOC to support U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S. Southern Command, respectively. The former 422nd CA Company, Greensboro, N.C., has been upgraded to a battalion and will report directly to USACAPOC as an independent unit supporting the one active-duty CA battalion, the 96th, based at Fort Bragg.

revised doctrine reflecting the TPI concept.

Pending Department of the Army approval, the commander of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command directed that the reserve PSYOP force provisionally organize under the TPI concept effective Oct. 1, 1992, and have all logistical requirements and support relationships in place by May of 1993.

Total PSYOP Integration represents the future of PSYOP in peace

and war. In future PSYOP missions of the unified commands, success will depend on the application of the TPI structure to a trained force capable of accomplishing its mission. ✕

Maj. Jack N. Summe also contributed the article "PSYOP Support to Operation Desert Storm" in this issue of Special Warfare.

Upheaval in Europe: PSYOP Communications Lessons Learned

by Lt. Col. Frank J. Stech

In the last two years, the Eastern European nations of the former Warsaw Pact have revolted against communist control, replaced their leaders and planned free elections. Their revolutions and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact's cohesion, seemingly overnight, provide several lessons on the future use of communications media for psychological operations.

For many decades Western nations sponsored radio broadcasts directed at the populations of Eastern Europe. Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Voice of America, and the British Broadcasting Company transmitted news, analysis and commentary in the languages of Eastern Europe, often narrated by well-known expatriates who had fled repression in their homelands. For much of this period the Soviets and their satellites jammed these broadcasts and arrested any of their countrymen caught listening to them. Under Gorbachev and *perestroika*, the Soviets largely stopped their jamming, and western trans-

missions were widely available to Eastern European listeners. As the drama in Eastern Europe intensified through the fall and winter of 1989, Western radio increased its broadcast coverage of the unfolding revolutions. For example, Radio Free Europe's Romania service began broadcasting round-the-clock after the Timisoara massacre on Dec. 17, 1989, when Romanian secret police (the Securitate) and soldiers slaughtered civilian protesters shielding a dissident Lutheran minister from arrest.¹

Mass-media impact

Eastern Europe was also increasingly accessible to Western mass media, and Western media was increasingly beamed into the East as events unfolded. Those Pact nations bordering the West also received Western television broadcasts such as the American Cable News Network and Austrian, French and West German news programs. Viewers in Timisoara tuned in television from Yugoslavia and

Hungary, including 12 hours of daily CNN broadcast from Belgrade.² Transmitters in East European nations "pirated" and rebroadcast Western television, increasing the transmission range beyond the border areas. Echo TV, Channel 28 in the southwestern Polish city of Wroclaw, illegally rebroadcast U.S. Music Television, Sky News and the Eurosport Channel to an estimated 700,000 viewers.³ These radio and television broadcasts provided revolutionary links between the East European nations, kept the East Europeans abreast of events in their own countries, and informed them of the dissent of their compatriots.

A Romanian engineering student in Bucharest told *Washington Post* correspondent Blaine Harden: "We listened to the radio every day and night. When the revolution happened in Czechoslovakia, I listened every hour." A Bucharest physician commented that, despite Nicolae Ceausescu's total censorship of the Romanian press, "Everybody knew

(of the East European revolutions). Everybody knew from the radio.”⁴

When the Romanians took to the streets that December chanting slogans, they mimicked what they had heard in the Western shortwave radio reports from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. *Post* correspondent Harden observed, “They seemed to be imitating what they had heard about the ‘gentle revolution’ of chanting and song on the streets of Prague a month earlier. ... The shortwave broadcasts helped shape a revolution among people who dared not even speak to each other.”⁵

There was a striking similarity from country to country in the symbols used in the East European street demonstrations, reflecting the influence of the media. Flag waving spanned all the countries, often with the hammer and sickle, or the red star, cut from the emblem. Universal symbols, such as the two-fingered V-sign, were used widely. Candles commemorated martyrs in Romania, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Simple, but clever symbols also proliferated, such as the clocks showing the length of the Czechoslovak worker strikes, or the jingling of keys in Prague and Bucharest to symbolize release from captivity. Western icons were adapted to local messages: one East Berlin demonstrator’s sign read “For exchange: East Germany for Mickey Mouse.”

Fateful step

Perhaps the greatest irony of the Eastern European uprisings was the role of Romanian television in the overthrow of Ceausescu. The Romanian dictator maintained absolute control of the media, and all work stopped so Romania could watch or hear whenever the “Genius of the Carpathians” harangued his people in lengthy speeches.

On the morning of Dec. 21, 1989, in the wake of the massacre at Timisoara, Ceausescu appeared on the balcony overlooking Palace Square in Bucharest and raged in a

nationwide broadcast against the uprising. What was to be the usual totally controlled pro-Ceausescu rally, however, quickly tilted out of control. From the back of the square, people began to shout “Freedom!” and “Democracy!” At first, Ceausescu seemed to believe these were endorsements; he was accosted to leading the crowd with his own cheerleaders. But, as the entire nation watched the dictator on television, they could hear the people in the square picking up the chants. Western eyewitness reporters described what then happened:

Ceausescu first looked puzzled, then annoyed. He closed his mouth.

“There was a striking similarity from country to country in the symbols used in the East European street demonstrations, reflecting the influence of the media. Flag waving spanned all the countries, ... Universal symbols, such as the two-fingered V-sign, were used widely.”

His hands slowed, and his eyes darted back and forth, searching the crowd. He stepped back.

Live television coverage of the speech was interrupted before Ceausescu left the balcony, but the damage was done. That tiny retreat — a public showing that Ceausescu, for the first time in 24 years, seemed stunned, vulnerable and did not have the situation in hand — was a crucial turning point in the Romanian uprising.

That afternoon, citizens flooded the streets, shouting “Down with Ceausescu.”⁶

Ceausescu fled the capital the

next day. Within three days of his televised lapse he was captured, tried and executed.

Covert communications

Broadcasts may have been used as a covert means of communication between underground leaders in oppressed areas, much as radio was used during the Second World War as a channel between the Allies and underground forces in occupied Europe. *Washington Post* correspondent Jonathan Randal reported that underground leaders in Romania used the 19th-century Romanian patriotic song “Pui de Lei,” or “Lion Cubs,” broadcast from Radio Bucharest by dissident staffers on the morning of Dec. 21, 1989, as a signal for the national uprising throughout Romania.⁷

After the Romanian uprising, dissidents interviewed by Western reporters related that an underground free-labor movement had existed in Romania since 1976. Movement members Decebal Petcu and Mircea Bozan traced the formation of the underground to a Radio Free Europe broadcast describing the arrest of Romanian Orthodox priest accused of founding an underground resistance organization. This report was taken as confirmation that the underground resistance was valid and not a Ceausescu front to trap dissidents.⁸

Romanian dissidents such as Doina Cornea, a Cluj University teacher, and Silviu Brucan, former Romanian ambassador to the U.N., knew of each other’s opposition via Western radio coverage of their activities and protests. After Ceausescu’s overthrow, the Dutch ambassador to Romania observed that the new 39-member provisional government council was able to form only because its members were aware of each other from knowledge gleaned from Western radio broadcasts.

Psyoperators will need to closely coordinate with other special-operations forces, intelligence and counterintelligence organizations to ensure that the PSYOP use of com-

munications can effectively and appropriately serve covert and clandestine signalling functions.

Impact indicators

There are several indicators of the impact radio and television broadcasts had on the evolution of revolt in East Europe. During a fall 1989 visit to Warsaw by U.S. broadcast officials, former Polish Politburo member Jozef Czyrek was quoted as greeting them: “Well, I must say it’s an honor to meet with an organization as powerful as Radio Free Europe.” The translator selected by Polish Solidarity leader Lech Walesa for his address to the U.S. Congress was RFE’s Polish correspondent, Jacek Kalabinski.⁹

The ease with which East Germans could use television to compare their life styles and economic prospects to their counterpart Germans in the Federal Republic and the growing disparity of those comparisons contributed importantly to the massive exodus of workers from the DRG. The images of “Hans” buying a television in the West or carrying a VCR back to East Germany trivialized this contrast but also underscored the unfavorable contrasts between life in the West and the East.

Such contrasts were greatly reinforced by the exponentially expanded access to Western television. As Walesa noted in his speech to Congress: “The communist economy has failed in every part of the world. One result of this is the exodus of the citizens of those countries.” One writer characterized this exodus as a hemorrhage from the “spine of Europe’s middle classes — young couples with babies and marketable skills.”¹⁰ The direction taken by that exodus was significantly influenced by the contrasting images sustained by Western television.

Perhaps the most dramatic indication of the effectiveness of these Western broadcasts on events in the Warsaw Pact nations occurred during the brief February 1990 visit to Washington of Vaclav Havel, the

dissident playwright who had recently been selected president of Czechoslovakia. En route between the White House and the Library of Congress, Havel visited the offices of VOA, to meet and thank those he had listened to for many years. Havel told the 30 members of VOA Czechoslovak staff, “You will have to inform us about how to create democracy, because we are now beginning to build it, to renew it

“Psyoperators will need to adapt mass-market analysis techniques and audience-assessment measures to identify the rapidly shifting constellations of dissidents, demonstrators, strikers, radicals, political prisoners, party functionaries and government bureaucrats that seem to supply leaders or influence their selections during upheavals.”

after many long decades, and we have a lot to learn.”¹¹

Audiences

The selection of Havel as president of Czechoslovakia, only three months after he had been jailed by the Communist regime, underscores the effect of communications on the rapid, unpredictable and temporary shifts in influence during the upheaval in East Europe. With few exceptions, the present leaders in East Europe were obscure unknowns a short time ago. Their rapid rise to influence was in no small part due to the speed and widespread impact of modern media. This trend suggests that traditional PSYOP methods of identify-

ing effective and influential target groups, categories and aggregates may need to be improved to keep pace with the dynamic nature of modern revolts and revolutions.

Psyoperators will need to adapt mass-market analysis techniques and audience-assessment measures to identify the rapidly shifting constellations of dissidents, demonstrators, strikers, radicals, political prisoners, party functionaries and government bureaucrats that seem to supply leaders or influence their selections during upheavals.

New tools for PSYOP

After the revolutionary changes in the East, Western radio broadcasts directed there offered programming unlike the traditional informational broadcasting. Voice of America provided Russian service call-in talk shows. Soviet listeners could call a telephone number in London and be relayed to the Washington VOA studios via satellite. VOA also provided *glasnost* roundtable exchanges between East and West European experts on various subjects. RFE and RL provided “news-you-can-use” on subjects ranging from free enterprise to democratic voting. VOA broadcast a series on small business in America.¹²

Such departures from the traditional format of straightforward information and comment suggest several new tools for the future psyoperator. Talk shows could provide a means for real-time campaign-impact assessment, as hosts discuss how listeners reacted to events, themes or symbols. Request programs could be used to identify audience vulnerabilities and susceptibilities.

Modern communications are an essential component of modern economies. Rapid, flexible, uncensored exchange of information is essential to transacting business or reforming economies. As the countries of East Europe moved to reform economically, communications and information, the bow

waves of Western business methods, increased beyond the control of government censorship. One observer characterized this trend as business communications "faxing out frontiers."¹³

Psyoperators will need to develop sensitivities to reform movements beyond the political realm and develop an awareness of the media involvement and communications impacts of economic, environmental, cultural, racial and other reform events.

Media control

The lesson that reforms of all kinds open the way to greater communications access and information flow was not lost on the regime in Beijing during and after the student uprisings in the summer of 1989. During the student demonstrations, Beijing pulled the plug on satellite television transmissions. This failed to prevent the escape to the West of dramatic digital still photographs of a lone Chinese student confronting and stopping a column of tanks, transmitted from Beijing via telephone modem, and then broadcast and printed worldwide within hours. In the subsequent crack-down, the Chinese Communist Party resumed jamming of VOA and began monitoring fax machines to prevent democratic materials from being sent in from overseas.

Preventing the transmission of broadcast communications is increasingly difficult, however, as economic reform proceeds to "fax out borders," opening the way for Western media technology and coverage, and oppressed peoples seek alternative perspectives on events and even life in general.

Former Secretary of State George Shultz has written: "Today, the meaning of borders is changing and so is the notion of sovereignty. The irrepressible movement of ideas, people and goods requires political and economic openness from leaders. ... In today's world, peoples will have a right to define themselves, but not to wall themselves off."¹⁴

Postscript: The Soviet Coup

On Sunday, Aug. 18, 1991, Communist hardliners arrested Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, barricaded the Russian Parliament and seized power. The coup was opposed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the mayors of Moscow and Leningrad and reformers throughout the USSR.

The hardliners shut down Soviet television and several radio stations and censored some of the Soviet press, but they failed to shut off the international news media¹⁵ or close down AT&T's 67 telephone circuits to the USSR. Calls and faxes skyrocketed during the coup to 100 times the normal volume.¹⁶ Westerners read on-the-scene reports from Moscow and Leningrad of coup events sent real-time via computer electronic mail.¹⁷ Yeltsin's forces smuggled videotapes to CNN and CBS news for broadcast to the Soviet military, appealing to the soldiers not to support the coup. In the first hours of the coup, Yeltsin faxed appeals to the U.S. Center for Democracy, pleading for strong statements over the Voice of America by President Bush opposing the coup. Later, the director of Russian State Broadcasting faxed an effusive note of "deep appreciation and thanks" to VOA for "your effective coverage of the tragic events."¹⁸

The impact of electronic mass communications on events during the 1989 collapse of communism in Eastern Europe was repeated during the Soviet coup attempt, with similar results: democratic reform triumphed over repression. Events and their media coverage become an intertwined cycle that psyoperators must enter and put to their use.

David Hoffman wrote, "The United States and its allies found the lines were open — and worked furiously to exploit those channels over the next 72 hours to undermine the junta."¹⁹ BBC, VOA and Radio Liberty shifted to round-the-clock news broadcasts, exposing the Soviet people to the extent of opposition to the hardliners.

Highly symbolic images were flashed around the world: protesters cutting the hammer and sickle from the USSR flag, defiant throngs unfurling an enormous Russian tricolor before an indomitable Yeltsin on the balcony of the besieged Parliament building, unarmed citizens and wooden barricades facing ranks of Soviet tanks, and the toppling of giant Soviet statuary icons. Within four days, the coup plotters were also toppled, nationalist reformers regained control, and by the end of the year the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its leadership had passed into history.

— Lt. Col. Frank Stech

The flow of communications is accelerated by this openness as the mass media gain access to previously closed societies. Attempts to enhance PSYOP by closing off that access are likely to be counterproductive. A PSYOP campaign conducted against a backdrop of openness to the mass media is far more likely to be perceived as credible than a campaign conducted through censorship and control of the mass

media.

Future PSYOP needs

PSYOP campaign appeal, impact and effectiveness will depend heavily in the future on psyoperators integrating their themes and symbols with media coverage of unfolding events, in effect "piggy-backing" on the mass-media communications. In particular, psyoperators need to integrate broadcast and televised

material into their own products. Few images will have the impact of a dictator faltering before his citizens, or an unarmed student stopping tanks. Psyoperators cannot create such dramatic historic moments, but it is essential that they understand how to identify and use them quickly and appropriately.

But more critically, psyoperators will need to integrate their campaigns conceptually at both superficial and substantive levels with the events portrayed by the media. For example, at the superficial level, media coverage spread the chanting and singing of symbolic slogans and songs during the street demonstrations in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria.

Such media-spread symbols should be considered by future psyoperators in designing campaign themes and selecting symbols. Audiences familiarized with these symbols by media coverage will respond positively to the same symbols incorporated in the psyoperators' products. By measuring the subsequent spread of "piggy-backed symbols" or themes, the psyoperator derives useful indicators of campaign effectiveness.

At a substantive level, the revolts in Eastern Europe generally fol-

lowed (with the exception of Romania) a pattern of conscientious non-violence, a "velvet revolution" as it was characterized in Czechoslovakia. The nonviolent approach served deep moral, emotional, psychological, political and even military purposes.

The depth of feeling and meaning of this approach was not superficially obvious, but was discernible in the massive Monday-night vigils at Leipzig's St. Nicolas Church, in the key-jingling marches in Prague's Wenceslas Square, in the million Berliners pouring through the breached Wall, in the protective human cordon around the house of Timisoara's dissident Lutheran minister, and in the chant of the Bucharest masses under fire from the Securitate secret police — "We will die, but we won't go away."

Psyoperators must sense the deep significance of such movements, detect them quickly and characterize their significance accurately despite the superficialities of the mass media, and relate such movements to the psychological objectives the psyoperator is hoping to achieve.

Future psyoperators will need to rapidly analyze and use ongoing media coverage of events. Target audiences are far more likely to be exposed to mass-media broadcasts

and telecasts than to the media under the psyoperators' control. Psyoperators cannot possibly duplicate the extent and effectiveness of mass-media coverage. They will need to capitalize on and leverage target-audience exposure to mass-media coverage by quickly integrating, symbolically and conceptually, their PSYOP products with the flow of mass-media communications. To consolidate the gains won in the upheaval of Eastern Europe, psyoperators need to learn the lessons those events can teach us about PSYOP and modern communications. ✕

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Army Psywarriors: A History of U.S. Army Psychological Operations

by Stanley Sandler

Soon after World War I, the Kaiser's Army Chief of Staff, Field Marshall Paul von Hindenburg, grumbled:

In the shower of pamphlets which was scattered by enemy airmen our adversaries said and wrote that they did not think so badly of us; that we must only be reasonable and perhaps here and there renounce something we had conquered. Then everything would soon be right again and we could live together in peace, perpetual international peace. As regards peace within our own borders, new men and new Government would see to that. What a blessing peace would be after all the fighting. There was, therefore no point in continuing the struggle.

The old field marshal's outburst can serve as a quite adequate description of the contents of U.S. (and British) military psychological warfare directed against the Germans in World War I. As German Army discipline wavered or broke, these leaflets became responsible for defections on a large scale. Not

surprisingly, Adolph Hitler termed Allied military psywar "psychologically efficient."

Beginnings

U.S. Army psychological operations can be dated back at least to the beginnings of the War for Independence. Even before the Declaration of Independence, patriot forces used leaflets against British troops in Boston just before the Battle of Bunker (Breed's) Hill. These leaflets compared life on "Prospect Hill" (the American side): "freedom, ease ... and a good farm," with that on British-held Bunker Hill: "scurvy, poverty, want."

The leaflets show a sophisticated knowledge of what can move troops. The Americans were well aware of the fact that in Great Britain the term "land-owning classes" was synonymous with "ruling" or "wealthy" classes. They also knew it was obvious to British troops that almost anyone of reasonable means could own land in British North America. Thus they could believably promise

what would be almost unattainable to the common man in almost any European nation.

The leaflet and others like it were used throughout the war and were apparently successful in attracting thousands of British and Hessian deserters at a time when desertion was punishable with death by flogging. Oddly enough, this early and successful tactical effort was apparently not repeated through America's wars of the 19th century.

Philippine Insurgency

However, in the wake of the Spanish-American War, U.S. forces found themselves in the rebellious former Spanish colony of the Philippines. And there they were compelled to devise psychological operations — or "propaganda," as it was termed at the time, against Filipino rebels. Although no leaflets of the time seem to have survived, evidence indicates that the Army emphasized its work in bringing a better life to the Filipinos. The Army constructed and publicized

farm-to-market roads, clinics, wells and, above all, schools for the education-hungry people.

Gradually, this approach, added to the promise of self-government and eventual independence, with a sophisticated counterinsurgency campaign, brought the Philippine Insurrection to an end by 1902. And by that date the Industrial Revolution had made possible high-speed printing presses, cheap paper, transport and communications necessary for the large-scale psychological operations of this century.

World War I

Because the United States participated in World War I for only 19 months, a mere 20 different propaganda leaflets were drawn up by the Propaganda Section of the Army general staff. But several million copies were dropped over German lines by aircraft and balloon. The leaflets set a pattern for what was to become classic and successful U.S. psychological operations in that war and the conflicts to come. One, for example, asserted that German POWs would receive the same rations as the American doughboy, and detailed them down to the tinned fruit, fresh bread, coffee and sweets. To verify the message, according to some accounts, American forces staged local "retreats," uncovering a treasure trove of U.S. troop rations. German soldiers filling their stomachs and pockets had all the proof they needed that the leaflets were not lies, as their officers had claimed.

Other U.S. leaflets in World War I contrasted the miserable conditions of the troops and civilians with the insensitive luxury of the Kaiser's court. Some provided surrender postcards so that defectors might be reassured that their loved ones at home would soon learn of their safety. The German High Command's response to U.S. and Allied psychological operations was almost ludicrously inept: troops were absolutely forbidden to read the leaflets, thus ensuring them a

readership, then the High Command offered payment for each leaflet delivered from the front lines, thus guaranteeing an even keener interest in them.

World War II

World War II witnessed the development of sophisticated electronic psychological operations for the first time, and the production of leaflets on a magnitude many times that of World War I.

Despite its First World War legacy and the undoubted successes of the Nazi propaganda machine, the U.S. only reluctantly entered the field of psychological operations in the Second World War. It took the personal intervention of Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy to establish, in June 1941, the Army's Psychologic Branch, as it was then called (later changed to Psychological Warfare Branch, G-2).

First U.S. units

In the autumn of 1942, the Army developed its first draft training manual for psychological operations, *Combat Propaganda Company*. But in December 1942, it dissolved the Psychological Warfare Branch and turned over its responsibilities to the civilian Office of Strategic Services. In December 1942, the first Army psychological-warfare units, the 1st and 2nd Radio Service Sections, were activated. Together they formed the 1st Combat Propaganda Company.

But the same JCS directive that had dissolved the Psychological Warfare Branch gave theater-army commanders control of psychological warfare in their jurisdictions. Eventually each theater designated its own Psychological Warfare Branch.

Through the remainder of the war, the basic U.S. psychological-operations unit was the mobile radio broadcasting company. These units were responsible for far more than radio broadcasting, being equipped also with public-address systems, loudspeakers, mobile printing press-

es and leaflet bombs. They were the first tactical psychological-warfare units in U.S. history.

European theater

In the field, U.S. Army psychological operations relied primarily on the leaflet, that "footsoldier of psychological operations." In the European theater alone, billions of leaflets were showered on Germany's soldiers, and when those soldiers were in retreat or weary, the leaflets proved quite successful. At the Italian front, on the other hand, where the war seemed to pose nothing but a weary battering of one German defense line after another almost to VE Day, U.S. and Allied psywar probably achieved little.

But in France and Germany, particularly the latter, skillful and sophisticated U.S. psywar took its toll of the *Wermacht*. U.S. leaflets pounded home the message that America combined its well-known humanitarianism with strict adherence to the Geneva Conventions, emphasized the "happy POW" theme and assured Germans that there would indeed be a place in the concert of nations for a post-war Germany purged of Nazism and militarism.

The most effective were the two leaflets that played upon the Germans' innate respect for order and discipline. One was simply entitled *Befel* (orders). The "orders," signed by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, were to surrender as soon as possible. The other was the *passierschien*, or safe-conduct pass, justly famous as one of the most successful psywar leaflets of all time. It was even more imposing a piece of work than the *Befel* leaflet, resembling, with its fishnet borders, multilingual text, Allied coats of arms, and Eisenhower's signature, an instrument of state.

Interviews of German POWs indicated that many of the Reich's soldiers carried the *passierschien* hidden on their persons against the day when they might have to sur-

render to save their lives. Finally, the entire Allied PSYOP effort in the European theater benefited enormously from the joint Anglo-American psychological-warfare staff under the supreme Allied commander, General Eisenhower.

Pacific theater

In the Pacific theater, U.S. Army psywarriors were slower off the mark than in Europe. One early leaflet simply ran long quotations by President Roosevelt countering equally lengthy quotations by the Emperor Hirohito. Another, obviously drawn up by a non-Oriental, showed a happy ex-POW returning to the ecstatic embrace of his family in what looked like a post-war American suburban home. Even worse was the "I surrender" U.S. leaflet. Japanese soldiers, particularly at that early victorious stage of the war, rarely if ever surrendered.

By 1943 the effort had improved markedly: The enemy now needed only to "Cease Resistance." The time-tested themes of the "happy POW" and nostalgia for pre-war home life predominated, and by the time of the Okinawa campaign, they began to attract some success.

The most effective psywar against Japan, however, was directed at its civilian population. The Army Air Force's terrible fire raids themselves put the lie to claims that the imperial government was winning the war. But judging from surveys carried out soon after the end of hostilities, the so-called "City" leaflet did the most to convince Japanese civilians of the futility of continuing the war.

This leaflet simply named a Japanese city, with a date and time, against the background of a flight of B-29s unloading their bombs. And, on schedule, the fearsome Superfortresses dropped their loads against weak opposition. The leaflets could be interpreted in two ways, neither particularly favorable to the Japanese continuing the war: 1) The humane Americans wished to avoid innocent civilian casualties;

or 2) The Americans were so strong that they could "telegraph their punches."

Immediately after the war millions of young Americans rapidly demobilized. The draft ended and America put its trust in its small nuclear arsenal and the theories of "push-button war." But five years later many of those same Americans found themselves in a new war not at all like those predicted.

Korean War

As early as June 29, 1950, four days after North Korean invasion forces struck across the 38th Paral-

"The so-called 'City' leaflet did the most to convince Japanese civilians of the futility of continuing the war. It simply named a Japanese city, with a date and time, against the background of a flight of B-29s unloading their bombs. And, on schedule, the fearsome Superfortresses dropped their loads against weak opposition."

lel, the U.S. Army Far East Command's small Special Projects Branch of the Headquarters G-2 (Intelligence) Division had begun radio broadcasting and leaflet drops over the Republic of Korea (South Korea).

But it was not until the fall of that year of desperate battle that the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company arrived in South Korea. The 1st L&L would serve as the 8th Army's tactical psychological-warfare unit to the end of the war in 1952. These tactical psywarriors relied on vehicle and aircraft-

mounted loudspeakers to get their verbal messages across. But, as in all previous U.S. wars, the leaflet was still the major medium.

This was America's first "ideological war." In such a conflict, psychological warfare would be of supreme concern. In theory, at least, each side was fighting to establish the superiority of its driving ideology, although it did seem that in most cases the U.S./UN side was the more diffident of the antagonists. And yet, in the end, that side could be said to have strategically and tactically "won" the psychological Korean war.

The most impressive psychological weapon of the U.S. Army in Korea, or at least the one that has left the best evidence, was the leaflet. Probably at no time before or since has the Army fielded such effective printed propaganda. One reason was the many lessons learned from World War II's giant effort, only a few years previous. The other was the calling up of Army Reservists who brought their advertising skills from Madison Avenue.

Korean War Army leaflets used the time-tested themes of the "happy POW," "good soldier-bad leaders," "surrender and you will be well-treated," "we can crush you," and nostalgia for home, family and women. In addition, Army psychological warriors cleverly worked on latent Chinese anti-Russian feeling, harping on the brutal Soviet "liberation" of Manchuria in 1945, and proclaiming that "Stalin will fight to the last Korean."

U.S. leaflets also adopted some unique themes. In one leaflet they solicitously noted that the Chinese Peoples Volunteer Army was about out of tobacco; the UN Command couldn't help there, but it could provide at least the cigarette paper — and a surrender message. Another leaflet simply displayed the flag of the Chinese People's Republic on one side and a few words of respect on the reverse. A similar leaflet displayed a portrait of the honored

20th-century Chinese liberator, Sun Yat Sen, followed by a discreet message of peace and brotherhood. One of the most effective leaflets showed a map of the powerful China of two centuries previous, contrasted with a contemporary map indicating (in red) the vast territories lost to Russia by the notorious "unequal treaties."

Surveys taken in UN POW camps documented the effectiveness of these leaflets in the field, as well as of loudspeaker broadcasts. But the most stunning psychological-warfare victory for the UN was the refusal of no less than 33,000 enemy POWs to return to their homelands. In contrast, a mere 21 U.S. military personnel refused repatriation.

After the Korean armistice in July 1953, U.S. Army psywar assets were once again drastically reduced, and yet they became the nucleus from which Special Forces emerged in 1952 from the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. In 1957, the term "psychological warfare" was replaced by "psychological operations," in recognition that such operations did not require a state of war and that they could also be directed toward civilians.

Vietnam War

Less than a decade later, Vietnam demonstrated the need for psychological operations against another ideological enemy. The 4th Psychological Operations Group became the principal unit coordinating Army tactical psychological operations. However, all U.S. PSYOP fell under the control of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, JUSPAO, headed by the chief of the United States Information Service-Vietnam.

Unfortunately, there was no U.S. Army PSYOP commander, and JUSPAO was unrepresented at the command level. Consequently, allied PSYOP suffered from a lack of coordination and duplication of effort. U.S. psychological operations

were conducted by no less than 10 organizations: JUSPAO, the U.S. Embassy Mission PSYOP Committee, Military Assistance Command-Vietnam, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, U.S. Army-Vietnam, 4th and 7th PSYOP Groups, force commanders and senior advisers, U.S. Naval Forces-Vietnam, and the 7th U.S. Army Force. This was in addition to the PSYOP of the Republic of Vietnam and that of America's allies. Not surprisingly, PSYOP of Vietnam was sometimes termed "a many-splintered thing."

For all this variation, the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong

became targets of what would prove to be the largest and most sophisticated psychological operation to date. In 1969 alone, for example, no less than 10.5 billion leaflets were distributed by JUSPAO.

In 1967 psychological operations became the responsibility of the Army's PSYOP Division of the International and Civil Affairs Directorate of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations. And since that year, instruction in psychological operations has been furnished by the Army's John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.

In the field, the 4th POG ham-



A selection of U.S. PSYOP leaflets produced during the Vietnam War. Themes included self-criticism of VC cadre and VC losses to Allied firepower.

mered home the themes of Allied might, of Soviet or Chinese imperialism, the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) defector program, and the good life of the POW. Apparently the most effective of the 4th's leaflets were those photocopies of the actual "self-criticism" diaries of defected or killed VC cadre, outlining their occasional "impure thoughts," but more to the point, their wartime misery and homesickness. The leaflets were then dropped over their comrades' units. Army PSYOP also documented the terrible VC cadre losses to Allied firepower during the 1968 Tet Offensive.

Tactical PSYOP was directed, for the first time on a large scale, toward the civil population, emphasizing communist atrocities, land reform, village defense, health measures and Vietnamese tradition.

Television was used on the strategic level and was directed primarily toward the civil population. Once JUSPAO had established a television network, it was careful to have its programs produced and broadcast by the government of Vietnam, avoiding for the most part the taint of U.S. manipulation. The programs featured messages from defectors, women's concerns, music and cultural events, and they kept the propaganda message low-key. Television programming had reached nearly 81 percent of South Vietnam's villages by 1971.

Certainly the enemy seemed to believe in the effectiveness of allied PSYOP. A secret report from a district unit commander to his district committee frankly admitted, "Defection occurs frequently in various armed forces ... Some have killed our cadres and soldiers, destroyed weapons and stolen secret documents before surrendering to the enemy." The political department of the National Liberation Front issued a directive complaining plaintively, "Enemy propaganda penetrates our minds day after day and will cause disastrous consequences." A 1967 report captured from the Iron Triangle area north of

Saigon made the astounding claim that, "In some areas the number of soldiers and cadre workers who deserted or defected to the enemy as a result of the appeals of their family amounted to 80 percent, and the number of village guerrillas, hamlet guerrillas and cadres and civilians were 70 percent."

Special Forces were particularly successful in their psychological operations directed toward the Montagnards of the Central Highlands. SF PSYOP was more a matter of deeds than of words. Special Forces lived among the mountain

"Certainly the enemy seemed to believe in the effectiveness of allied PSYOP. A secret report from a district unit commander to his district committee frankly admitted, 'Defection occurs frequently in various armed forces ... Some have killed our cadres and soldiers, destroyed weapons and stolen secret documents before surrendering to the enemy.'"

tribespeople, and in addition to giving military training and leadership, dug wells, ran medical clinics and improved agriculture. A bond was forged between the Montagnard Civilian Irregular Defense Groups and Special Forces that has remained even to this day.

Vietnamese and U.S. Special Forces also organized combined CIDG Civil Affairs/PSYOP teams that went into the countryside holding face-to-face meetings with the tribes, conducting sick calls, dis-

tributing school supplies and health kits, organizing athletic contests, and generally attempting to demonstrate their concern for a previously neglected people. Gen. William Westmoreland credited the work of Special Forces with preventing massive defections from the Saigon regime during the abortive Montagnard uprising of September 1964.

Another indication of the effectiveness of JUSPAO's work was the Chieu Hoi program, which garnered no less than 200,000 lower-level defectors over the years. Many of them were organized into the Kit Carson Scouts, where they made excellent unconventional-warfare troops, using their knowledge of the land, language and culture of their people.

North Vietnam

JUSPAO also conducted extensive strategic PSYOP against North Vietnam. Again, billions of leaflets were drawn up, emphasizing such themes as the legitimacy and strength of the Saigon government, the good life in the South, and the historic enmity between China and Vietnam. In addition, Allied aircraft scattered toys and novelty items over the countryside. A "Voice of Freedom" radio station promoted the allied cause and thoughtfully programmed its prime time from 10 p.m.-1 a.m., after workers and peasants had completed their labors and obligatory evening indoctrination lectures.

Nonetheless, the JUSPAO campaign against North Vietnam probably enjoyed only minimal success. It was hard to argue against the air-raid sirens, which seemed to proclaim the ferocity of U.S. "air pirates." JUSPAO leaflets warning the population to stay away from target areas could do little to deflect this resentment.

In summary, it could be safely asserted that the allies won the tactical but lost the strategic PSYOP war. Worldwide images of screaming napalmed children, VC terrorists shot dead on the spot, and of

flattened "worker's homes" in Hanoi proved far more enduring than accounts of land reform or regional protection forces.

Urgent Fury

In Grenada's 1983 Operation Urgent Fury, each of the U.S. armed services involved used psychological operations. Elements of the Army's only active-duty psychological operations unit, the 4th PSYOP Group, distributed leaflets giving the Grenadian population guidance and information, and a newly-deployed 50-kilowatt transmitter, "Spice Island Radio," broadcast news and entertainment throughout the island.

Loudspeaker operations proved particularly effective in bringing in enemy troops and keeping civilians out of harm's way. The work of PSYOP personnel was immeasurably aided by the fact that most Grenadians spoke English. The population also strongly resented the government which had gunned down former Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and scores of his supporters just before the U.S. landings.

Just Cause

During Operation Just Cause in December 1989, Army PSYOP troops jumped into Panama with most initial combat forces. Using Spanish-speaking troops and taped Spanish-language messages, they broadcast appeals to Panamanian forces. The taped messages soon had to be discarded, however, since they lacked Panamanian accents and idiomatic expressions.

Ethnic Panamanian U.S. soldiers filled the gap; alone in the midst of a threatening riot as a particularly brutal Noriega-regime officer was apprehended, a resourceful Panamanian-American trooper of the 4th POG snapped a Panamanian salsa music tape into his loudspeaker and soon had the crowd distracted and the prisoner in safe custody. Loudspeaker PSYOP troops, who accompanied most combat units into the



photo by Michael W. Toney

PFC James P. LaSpino, 6th PSYOP Bn., 4th PSYOP Group, talks with children in a Kurdish refugee camp during Operation Provide Comfort. Mobile loudspeaker teams warned residents to stay clear of roads being used by coalition forces.

field, also made the point of not demanding that Panamanian soldiers "surrender or die." Instead, they informed the enemy that he had fought bravely and could now cease resistance with dignity.

After the fighting, PSYOP troops mobilized support for the new democratic government, issued leaflets offering monetary rewards for turned-in weapons and looters, provided public information and published a newsletter until local journals could get back into production.

Desert Storm

A little more than a year later, Army PSYOP soldiers found themselves in harm's way again in a combat environment, this time in Southwest Asia's Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm and Provide Comfort. In these operations, unlike Just Cause, entire reserve-component PSYOP units were called up in addition to the 4th POG.

A sample of U.S. broadcast and leaflet tactical psychological operations against Iraqi troops reveals an emphasis upon nostalgia and home-

sickness; Arab brotherhood; the coalition's great united strength; the fate awaiting Iraqi troops who did not become "line-crossers;" and how to safely become a line-crosser. Most of these themes had been used by U.S. psywarriors since at least World War I.

Leaflet designers further showed insight into the enemy's mentality when they pictured Iraqi line-crossers and their Arab Coalition brothers sitting down to a feast in which bananas were prominent: Iraqis were fond of bananas, which the UN embargo had made unobtainable.

PSYOP troops were unusually successful in the field; on at least two occasions, Iraqi troops surrendered to PSYOP troops armed only with sidearms and their loudspeakers. Desert Storm may well have been the first time U.S. PSYOP troops participated in target selection, suggesting targets that would yield the greatest psychological dividends and calling for the avoidance of religious, cultural or historical structures.

But, as in all U.S. wars of this century, the official surrender leaflet proved the most effective, judging from interrogations of enemy prisoners of war, the new and more accurate term replacing "prisoner of war." Army PSYOP authorities claimed that almost every EPW came across the line waving a surrender leaflet. An added twist in this war was the B-52 leaflet, which told specific Iraqi divisions when they would be bombed, then later reminded them that they had been bombed as scheduled and urged the survivors to cross the line or at least clear out. This leaflet was an update of World War II's classic B-29 "city" leaflet.

PSYOP troops found themselves with a new duty in this war: assisting military police in the EPW camps. Reserve and active-component PSYOP soldiers used their linguistic and cultural experience to quiet agitated enemy prisoners as well as to quietly identify trouble makers and potential informal leaders. They even ran entertainment films to help keep the camps calm.

U.S. PSYOP units continued their work after the liberation of Kuwait, providing public-service announcements about public health, law and order and public services, and posting some 6,500 signs warning of unexploded bombs. Their primary mission, however, was to assess and report on the attitudes of the civilian population.

Provide Comfort

PSYOP troops had actually begun to redeploy to the U.S. when selected units were redeployed, beginning in early April 1991, to Turkey and northern Iraq. Their new mission was to provide protection and humanitarian aid to the Kurds of the region, who were being brutalized by Iraq's dictator, Saddam Hussein. Operation Provide Comfort was a combined operation consisting of Coalition

Readings in PSYOP

Although there is no single history of U.S. Army psychological operations, the following studies are the most useful:

- Murray Dyer. *The Weapon on the Wall: Rethinking Psychological Warfare*. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959.
- M.F. Herz, "Some Psychological Lessons from Leaflet Propaganda in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XII (1949).
- Adolph Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (unexpurgated text), James Murphy, ed., London, Melbourne, 1971.
- Daniel Lerner, ed. *Propaganda in War and Crisis: Materials for American Policy*, New York, 1951.
- _____, *Sykewar: Psychological Warfare Against Germany, D-Day to VE Day*. New York: George W. Stewart, 1949.
- Paul M.A. Linebarger. *Psychological Warfare*. 2nd ed. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1954.
- R.D. McLaurin, *Military Propaganda: Psychological Warfare and Operations*. New York, 1982.
- Al Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins, Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1982.
- Lawrence Soley, *Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda*. New York: Praeger, 1989.
- U.S. Army Publications:
- W.E. Daugherty with M. Janowitz, "A Psychological Warfare Casebook," U.S. Army Tech Memo, Operational Research Office (ORO), Chevy Chase, Md., 1958.
- L.A. Kahn and J. Segal, "Psychological Warfare and Outside Factors Affecting the Surrender of North Korean and Chinese Forces," ORO-T-40 (Far East Command), February, 1953.
- _____, "An Investigation of Individual Factors Relating to the Effectiveness of Psychological Warfare," ORO, 1952.
- W. Kendall, "Eighth Army Psychological Warfare in the Korean War," ORO, December, 1951.
- P&W Section, 12th Army Group, "Report of Operations" (Final After-Action Report), XIV, typescript, no date (c. 1945).

— Stanley Sandler

forces, the United Nations, private relief organizations, the Red Cross and Red Crescent.

U.S. PSYOP troops put their linguistic, technical and cultural skills to work among the Kurdish refugees, providing leaflet information about the operation, safe evacuation routes, warnings of mines, medical and sanitation information, camp regulations and even translations of the contents of the Army's field rations.

Overall, U.S. Army PSYOP in Provide Comfort worked to convince the Kurds that coalition forces would protect them, even as they fulfilled the goal of the operation: the safe return of the displaced tribespeople to their villages inside Iraq. It is a good measure of the success of the psychological-operations phase of Provide Comfort that by midsummer of 1991 most of the Kurdish refugees were indeed back in what

was left of their villages in northern Iraq.

Enemy failures

Interestingly, the American serviceman has proved, through the years, to be almost uniquely impervious to the persuasion of his enemies. Even World War II's defenders of Bataan, surrounded, starving and cut off from even the hope of rescue, still apparently never considered individual surrender.

Some sociologists and psychologists have speculated that, growing up in a society which invented Madison Avenue, the average American soldier has become immune to, or at least extremely wary of, anyone trying to sell him something. It could also be pointed out that our 20th-century enemies have been imbued with ideologies that have seemed to the average U.S. servicemen so alien (communism, fascism, Nazism) or so incomprehensible (Bushido, Ba'athism), and have been led by such improbable figures (the Kaiser, Hitler, Tojo, Mussolini, Mao Tse Tung, Ho Chi Minh, Saddam Hussein) that Americans have made most unlikely line-crossers.

But most of America's opponents were supposed to have been masters of propaganda, in contrast to the "naive" and politically unsophisticated American troops. World War II German propaganda was sophisticated enough, accurately quoting President Franklin Roosevelt before Pearl Harbor: "Your boys are not going to be sent to fight in foreign wars," or showing a beautiful all-American young woman waking up, while a strange male hand reaches over to shut off the alarm clock. But Axis propaganda does not seem to have snared one U.S. serviceman.

It is even more surprising that our communist enemies seemed to have devoted so little talent to successful tactical psywar. North Korea could not do much more than exhort U.S. troops not to "die for Wall Street." Later in the war, the

communists did improve their product. One leaflet informed GIs that "Your Buddies are Doing Fine Here in a POW Camp Come Over" (*sic*). Communist PSYOP directed toward UN prisoners, however, rarely rose above exhortation and Marxist stereotypes. One propaganda "expert" informed his POW audience, dreaming of their orphaned hot rods and garaged Studebakers back in the States, that in America, "Only the rich have automobiles." Not surprisingly, despite all the post-war blather about "brainwashing," a mere 21 U.S. former prisoners of war, for whatever reasons, refused repatriation. (Most of them eventually returned after the war.)

Vietnamese communist leaflets could often be almost incoherent, and showed little knowledge of informal American language or culture. One leaflet addressed to "American serira men!" lamented that "U.S. warmongers and their Thieu Ky Hong puppet clique" would cause "suffering mourning and hare hip to our people." Another exhorted "Up, men! Struggle for Yourselves!" Communist propagandists also committed the basic blunder of deprecating their enemy's courage when they proclaimed "U.S. troops' Shameful Withdrawal from Khe Sanh Base," or alleged that the 1st Air Cavalry Division had "abandon[ed] a number of positions in order to shrink back, but also in escaping heavy losses."

Another leaflet, labeled, "Is This Fair?" was more straightforward, but still missing something. This effort depicted a U.S. enlisted man dolefully picking at a single small C-ration can, contrasted to a photo of grinning officers around a table full of C-rations.

In the Gulf War, U.S. commanders did not have to worry much about effective enemy propaganda. In fact, "Baghdad Betty" unwittingly provided some comic relief from Operation Desert Shield by solicitously warning U.S. servicemen that their wives or sweethearts were sleeping with Burt Reynolds,

Paul Newman or *Bart Simpson*. Surviving Iraqi leaflets from that war show, among other themes, a U.S. jet fighter taking off past a row of coffins, and a weeping Statue of Liberty. Most were rather crudely drawn and reproduced.¹

In summary, U.S. Army psychological operations have a grand and successful tradition stretching from Bunker Hill to Kuwait, applying, wittingly or not, Sun Tzu's famous dictum: "To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence. Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting." ✕

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Notes:

¹ Material on U.S. psychological operations in Desert Shield/Storm drawn from oral interviews with 4th PSYOP Group personnel, after-action reports and leaflets in SWCS archives.

PSYOP in Support of Low-Intensity Conflict

by Maj. Joe E. Kilgore

The emphasis in recent years on low-intensity conflict has resulted in wholesale revision in our thinking about how the United States will fight a future war. One ancient option, now being brought up-to-date, is psychological operations.

Sun Tzu wrote of psychological operations, and they have been practiced throughout history in conjunction with wars and endeavors falling short of war. But despite its ancient lineage, PSYOP remains uniquely able to influence the outcome of modern conflicts.

Psychological techniques have been recorded as early as 500 B.C., when armies beat drums throughout the night to unnerve their adversaries. Through the ensuing centuries, PSYOP techniques have been constantly refined, but they have truly come into their own with the advent of mass communications in the 20th century. The age of mass media has generated some of the most notorious and some of the most successful PSYOP efforts in history. These include such dis-

parate psychological operations as Tokyo Rose and Lord Haw Haw of World War II fame, the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, the Radio Marti programs targeted at Central America and the Caribbean basin, the use of loudspeaker broadcasts in Operation Just Cause, and leaflet drops during Operation Desert Storm.

U.S. PSYOP capabilities

Modern U.S. PSYOP programs are complex operations, with objectives set by the National Command Authority. The Department of Defense has a PSYOP mission, and all military services are required to maintain a PSYOP capability. Besides PSYOP units themselves, Army Special Forces are uniquely qualified for this type of warfare. SF personnel are extensively trained to employ PSYOP in unconventional-warfare and foreign-internal-defense programs — two activities of enormous political interest to the United States.

In the past, U.S. Navy, Marine,

Air Force and Coast Guard units have rarely trained in PSYOP or worked with PSYOP units. This training deficiency is being partially corrected by the Joint PSYOP Staff Planners Course at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. In this course, mid-level officers from all services and key civilian agencies learn to include PSYOP in their missions and contingency planning.

To support an insurgency, or work in a counterinsurgency role, the commander must understand the principles and techniques of PSYOP. It is an inherent part of foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare, and the commander must be prepared not only to employ PSYOP, but also to counter PSYOP measures used by the enemy. Just as history clearly demonstrates PSYOP's utility, it also demonstrates the definite possibility that the lack of psychological planning can lose the war — especially when the conflict is not an all-out war. It is necessary to look back only a few years for an ex-

ample: Even though the village-level tactical PSYOP programs of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese were largely unsuccessful during the Vietnam War, the United States did not fare well against their strategic PSYOP programs, and we paid for it with a loss of public and international support.

The primary responsibility for military PSYOP has been assigned to the Army, which has units to support the theater unified commander, the CINC, in peacetime, limited-war and general-war scenarios. The one active-duty PSYOP group, the 4th, based at Fort Bragg, provides peacetime and limited-war capabilities, including those necessary in LIC. Its 9th Battalion has the primary mission of tactical support, while its 1st, 6th and 8th Battalions provide support to the CINCs across the operational spectrum. Currently, the three PSYOP groups in the Army Reserve, the 2nd, 5th and 7th, provide additional support as required. (See "Total PSYOP Integration," on p. 10 for proposed changes to the RC PSYOP organization — Ed.)

PSYOP units have the responsibility to plan and conduct PSYOP in support of military operations, informing or teaching other units about PSYOP and its implications, and planning or conducting PSYOP in support of U.S. national objectives abroad. So significant is PSYOP, and its potential impact, that all PSYOP programs are approved and controlled at the national level. (In time of war, control passes to the theater CINC.)

PSYOP support in LIC

Critical to understanding the value of PSYOP is an appreciation for the multiplicity of support roles it can play. PSYOP units may be tasked to support SF or other SOF units in unconventional warfare. Even though the SF operational detachment may be the implementing element, PSYOP personnel provide invaluable assistance in the ultimate accomplishment of an

unconventional-warfare mission.

One of the most important PSYOP roles is providing psychological-warfare support to host countries in foreign-internal-defense missions. This mission can be executed by means of mobile training teams, technical-assistance teams — both small trainer teams organized to perform specific missions under the U.S. Security Assistance Act — or a forward operational detachment working in general support to a country team or in conjunction with combat units.

Unconventional warfare

When supporting SF UW operations, PSYOP elements are used to assist the operational detachments in their unconventional warfare operational area, or UWOA. The

“Just as history clearly demonstrates PSYOP’s utility, it also demonstrates the definite possibility that the lack of psychological planning can lose the war — especially when the conflict is not an all-out war.”

operational detachment must be able to advise the area commander on psychological warfare, plan campaigns in his particular area and be able to train selected members of the resistance in psychological techniques.

Basically, PSYOP units use two approaches to plan operations in the UWOA. The first is passive: the mere presence of SF units has an adverse effect on enemy morale and bolsters morale of resistance fighters. PSYOP is also used to bolster the image of the resistance fighter and SF adviser.

In a more active role, PSYOP per-

sonnel may use publicity to inform the populace of successful military operations by the resistance and promote civic-action programs, such as the provision of medical assistance or supplies. They can warn the populace of impending attacks and urge the people to assist the resistance movement. PSYOP personnel can also plan the psychological campaign for operational detachments to implement in their area of operation. PSYOP elements provide guidance to the team prior to deployment and during the mission through the SF operational base, which controls and supports deployed SF teams.

PSYOP units may use several methods to get their message across. Mass media, such as television, radio and leaflets, are particularly effective, but whispering agents and word of mouth also get the message to those in the target audience.

Propagandists strive to win support in all areas surrounding the UWOA. They target common beliefs, prejudices and fears to alter attitudes and to lower enemy morale. Through the media, they encourage the rest of the world to support the resistance cause.

Throughout the implementation of the plan, PSYOP elements follow certain guidelines. They must identify the target audience, determine the message, establish credibility and select the appropriate method of communication. Although people cannot be persuaded to think or behave in a certain manner unless they are at least willing to adopt new views, PSYOP assists in persuading people to view their world in a way that best benefits the resistance movement.

PSYOP elements begin their planning when the operational detachment receives a mission. Normally, the initial effort is to prepare the inhabitants of the target area for the introduction of SF units among them. PSYOP elements make contacts among exiled inhabitants of the country, sympathizers

inside the country and resistance forces. They prepare and update background work for the SF units. As the initial phase begins, the SFOB becomes operational, but PSYOP personnel continue planning with the SF-group operations officer. Together, the two elements devise the PSYOP campaign plan.

When the SF detachment moves into its isolation phase to plan and prepare for a mission, PSYOP units provide area orientations and target briefings. The SF detachments receive all pertinent data on the psychological campaign and propaganda efforts, while area-specialist teams prepare to provide continuous planning assistance. The detachments provide additional material or services needed to prepare for their mission.

When the detachment begins its infiltration of the mission area, the area assessment begins. Propaganda campaigns may be stepped up and supported by tangible evidence such as incriminating weapons or money. The media or propaganda campaign continues, stressing goals common to the people, their government and U.S. forces.

After the detachment completes infiltration, the propaganda effort will be expanded to recruiting resistance forces and encouraging disparate elements to unify. Motivational campaigns and psychological-indoctrination programs will be directed at the general populace. Legitimacy of the resistance movement can be enhanced by identifying and emphasizing common goals of the resistance fighters and the population. These may be implemented either by the operational detachment or by PSYOP elements.

At the same time, PSYOP units will develop campaigns to ensure the full exploitation of the resistance potential, encourage young people to join the resistance and encourage the general populace to support the movement. These units will begin to direct their efforts toward members of the resistance movement, to fortify their determi-

nation and collective will. A significant aspect of this phase is the stress that will be placed on the rules of engagement, which are extremely important to UW, where laws are not clearly defined. By ensuring that the resistance fights in accordance with the law of land warfare, PSYOP can support U.S. policy and increase the legitimacy of the resistance movement.

Once the resistance force is fully operational, PSYOP elements will concentrate on exploiting friendly-force successes and publicizing enemy reprisals against innocents. They will assure the populace of success and strengthen the support structure. Press releases targeting

“Active PSYOP programs should be developed to support the guerrilla movement from the early phases of conventional warfare through assimilation back into the mainstream upon conflict termination. After the war, it may take years to evaluate the PSYOP program.”

both the international community (for support) and enemy forces (to sap morale) will emphasize the popular will. Plans to further exploit success and highlight enemy weaknesses will be stepped up.

By this point, the civilian populace should be prepared to accept and cooperate with conventional troops in the area. Now the SF detachment can brief resistance leaders and prepare them to be incorporated into regular units. After link-up, when unconventional forces join conventional forces, PSYOP personnel move into the area to continue the effort, stressing

an orderly transition back into civilian life and support of the new government.

One of the missions for PSYOP groups is demobilization from unconventional warfare. PSYOP units routinely train to support unconventional forces in guerrilla warfare and conventional or special-operations units in conventional conflicts, regardless of the intensity scale. However, the demobilization phase of resistance fighting is almost impossible to exercise. Irregular forces must be molded into regular units of the host nation's armed forces or disbanded. SF advisers may be of assistance in training the irregulars to be soldiers or in disarming them and aiding in their transition into civilian life.

Unfortunately, throughout this entire process the potential for Murphy's Law to work is high. Trained unconventional forces can very quickly destabilize a government that is recovering from, or still engaged in, conflict. These forces must be made to believe that the government understands their needs and that they have made a substantial contribution to the overall success of the war effort. PSYOP units can assist in this process by publicizing the success of the guerrilla forces in the overall campaign plans during the conflict, while protecting their identities.

This type of action increases the self-esteem of the fighters and protects their families from retribution. Follow-on coverage after the transition to overt warfare continues this process. Publicity of the government's projected reforms and inclusion of guerrilla fighters in post-war settlements and benefits preclude follow-on problems. In other words, active PSYOP programs should be developed to support the guerrilla movement from the early phases of conventional warfare through assimilation back into the mainstream upon conflict termination. After the war, it may take years to evaluate the PSYOP program.

PSYOP programs require careful planning and diligent implementation, but they greatly assist the operational detachment and resistance forces as a force multiplier.

Foreign internal defense

FID is defined as actions undertaken in support of a friendly or allied nation to achieve balanced economic, social and political development. FID strengthens the roots, function and capabilities of the government and the viability of national life of a country. Its goal is internal independence and freedom from conditions fostering insurgency. PSYOP in support of this type of mission is based on positive actions taken by the government to gain popular support.

Specifically, the use of PSYOP in FID operations consists of propaganda and civic-action programs. Effective combinations of the two influence the attitudes and behavior of the populace and weaken the enemy, paving the way for integrated military, economic, political, social and ideological actions.

FID programs focus on successful tactical operations, downplaying insurgent successes, appealing to the people through objectives demonstrably more beneficial to them than those of the insurgents and convincing the people of the government's intent to implement proposed changes. The themes must seek to remove credibility for the rebel causes through government-inspired changes. They should be planned to support all operations, not just tactical ones. These operations play an important role in gaining the support of the population and denying that support to the insurgents.

The propaganda aspect of FID is developed in three phases: gaining, holding and influencing the audience. Each propaganda theme is targeted to a specific group. For example, the enemy is targeted in a manner that will cause dissatisfaction and disaffection among his units. Desired results might include

surrender or cessation of guerrilla activities.

Alternatively, propaganda themes may target directly the enemy infrastructure to discredit enemy political indoctrination or cause their forces to surrender. Civilian populations should be convinced that they are better served by supporting the government and ceasing to support the enemy. This will necessarily include countering enemy propaganda. It is also necessary to prepare government and assistance units for the tasks they must perform. Unit preparation includes country indoctrination for U.S. troops, cultural training for any

“Civilian populations should be convinced that they are better served by supporting the government and ceasing to support the enemy. This will necessarily include countering enemy propaganda. It is also necessary to prepare government and assistance units for the tasks they must perform.”

troops working with the populace, and training in the psychological themes and programs in the area. Host-nation forces could also be targeted — this could range from teaching soldiers to treat civilians with more respect to influencing the minister of finance to adopt a better fiscal policy for the country.

The second prong of FID, civic-action, is an important part of the overall PSYOP campaign. These programs are used to provide tangible evidence of government intentions. Good relationships must be established with the civilian popu-

lation to defeat an insurgency. Favorable actions undertaken by the host-nation military will assist in gaining the respect and support of the people. Such actions include: medical aid, relief aid, traffic control, engineering projects and humanitarian projects (well construction, agriculture assistance, schooling, etc.). These programs should foster military-civilian relations and demonstrate government concern for the well-being of the population. The greatest successes are achieved when follow-on projects are increasingly beneficial and self-help is stressed. The population should get involved in helping itself, and the host government's interest should be emphasized.

In a FID environment, PSYOP may support either conventional forces, SOF or other government agencies. The basis for most conventional FID programs is the infantry-brigade task force. Augmentation to the brigade and battalion staffs must come from the PSYOP group and CA units, which, unfortunately, are not organic below division level in peacetime. To be effective, PSYOP support of conventional units requires that individual soldiers be indoctrinated into the PSYOP programs prior to employment. This applies to host-nation forces as well as U.S. advisers or assistance units. Anyone who comes in contact with the population must understand the consequences of personal actions on the national policy.

Training

U.S. conventional forces, regardless of their branch of service, have traditionally been poorly trained in PSYOP and civil-military operations, and there has been a general lack of integration of PSYOP in planning, training and exercises. This is changing somewhat with the integration of PSYOP into exercises at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Chaffee, Ark. However, long train-up periods still detract from the ability to accom-

plish the FID mission in the short term, and poor execution invariably results in a long-term disadvantage that the host nation may spend years trying to overcome.

U.S. Army Special Forces are the only units (other than PSYOP and CA units) that routinely train for planning and implementing PSYOP and PSYOP assets. Planning and conducting PSYOP and civil-military operations are included in the mission-training plans for SF groups, battalions, companies and operational detachments. These tasks are evaluated on an annual basis during the units' Army Training Evaluation Program field exercises. These exercises are usually evaluated by U.S. Army Special Operations Command, which is the Army headquarters for SF, CA and PSYOP units — units that routinely train and exercise together.

These units are practiced at integrating PSYOP and civil-military operations into FID through mobile-training-team deployments, joint and combined exercises and actual missions in Central America, South America, Africa and Asia. PSYOP area studies and country briefings are part of the standard operating procedure for SF and Rangers, and most deployments of company-size or larger include PSYOP and CA augmentation.

Potential missions

Although legal restrictions prohibit applications of PSYOP in the United States, the potential in LIC for missions outside the U.S. is bounded only by the imagination. Geographically oriented PSYOP units are organized to support unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, security-assistance programs, contingency operations and conventional warfare. The ability to organize these elements to fit different requirements, from task force to detachment size, allows a flexible response.

The commander who is preparing to deploy to an unfamiliar area on short notice will find a basic PSYOP

study invaluable. Other PSYOP assessments tailored to his needs will include a psychological operations campaign plan in support of the national objectives underlying his deployment. Depending on the direction of the National Command Authority, propaganda can be developed, printed, distributed, broadcast on radio or television or provided to the host government, military units or other U.S. agencies.

Army Special Forces are uniquely able to employ PSYOP. The organization and training of A-detachments enables them to deploy with

“Geographically oriented PSYOP units are organized to support unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, security-assistance programs, contingency operations and conventional warfare. The ability to organize these elements to fit different requirements, from task force to detachment size, allows a flexible response.”

only 12 men, but these 12 have the capability to train and equip a battalion of approximately 1,500 guerrilla fighters, advise a host nation's armed forces, provide training on military subjects or nation-building, and carry out combat operations. The A-detachment possesses skills in each staff functional area as well as a knowledge of the host country.

The intimate working relationships established by SF personnel make them ideal to implement PSYOP. These teams routinely live, eat and work with the people of the

host nation. By understanding the way of life, they gain invaluable insight from the people's perspective. SF personnel can better use the entire spectrum of psychological warfare to counter guerrilla propaganda, attack the insurgent strategy, support friendly government programs, and influence the populace to support the U.S.-backed government or government in exile.

Integration of CA assets further increases the efficiency of SOF in LIC. Civic-action programs enhance the image of the U.S. and the host nation. With an integrated program in support of the PSYOP plan, the effect of individual programs is significantly increased. CA civil-government elements can provide assistance to the government to help curtail abuses and void the resistance's strategic plans. Public-utilities specialists can assist in providing basic governmental services to areas that may never have benefited from them. These elements can also provide a presence long after combat forces have departed. Examples of this teamwork were found in Grenada, where SF and CA units remained behind to help rebuild the entire infrastructure, and the Virgin Islands after Hurricane Hugo, when special-operations forces and conventional military-police units restored order and provided disaster relief.

This type of assistance can span the entire low-intensity spectrum, from civil unrest to civil war. Foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare have already been discussed; other collateral missions are based on the capabilities of special-operations forces and include missions such as drug interdiction. The unique capabilities of SF to conduct special reconnaissance can be applied to intelligence-gathering and surveillance of airfields or manufacturing and growing areas. PSYOP can assist by exploiting the intelligence collected by these elements, countering terrorist acts by drug traffickers, supporting host-nation governments in propaganda

campaigns and educating the populace in agricultural alternatives. PSYOP elements can provide similar support to other agencies, such as the Drug Enforcement Agency or Customs Service.

PSYOP techniques used during the campaign in Panama may be helpful in understanding what PSYOP units can do to assist the tactical forces of all services. Early in the operation, soldiers from the 4th PSYOP Group at Fort Bragg, N.C., began to transmit prepared messages over the frequencies used by the Panamanian government television stations. These messages were attempts to persuade forces loyal to Manuel Noriega to lay down their arms and surrender. The 4th POG broadcast additional messages to the Panamanian people, providing instructions and information from the new government.

PSYOP forces used another technique at the Vatican Embassy to cover communications and possibly harass Noriega: They set up loudspeakers outside the building and directed loud music into the compound. After several days, the personnel inside requested the practice be discontinued. Although the operation was considered by some critics to have been a mistake, interviews in the news media indicate that the technique was a factor in Noriega's eventual surrender. Additionally,

rumors of bloodthirsty mobs demanding Noriega be turned over to them were passed to Papal emissaries who may have viewed the U.S. criminal process as the preferable alternative. The success of these actions assisted in accomplishing the missions assigned U.S. forces deployed to Panama.

Conclusion

PSYOP is an integral part of low-intensity conflict. While it can have a strong effect on the target audience, it is not performed in isolation. PSYOP is a support element; when used as a force multiplier for other SOF, it provides an option short of war. If combat forces are committed, PSYOP can support defensive or offensive operations of conventional and unconventional forces. Flexible in scope, PSYOP can be tailored to the situation and the commander's needs.

While PSYOP is routinely planned and exercised by SOF units, in the past it has been poorly understood by conventional forces. Additional training is the key to understanding PSYOP's capabilities and limitations, and training programs currently under way at the SWCS and CGSC promise to increase PSYOP's effectiveness through a greater awareness.

From Sun Tzu to Desert Storm, PSYOP has been proven as a means

to save lives and bring an end to hostilities. It offers a powerful weapon for the brush fires we face in the 90s, but only if commanders at all levels understand its concepts and units train for its employment.



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PSYOP-unique Equipment: Special 'Weapons' of Communication

by Capt. Chris Bailey

The U.S. PSYOP community requires a number of special equipment systems in order to accomplish its mission of PSYOP dissemination.

These systems are the tools used to communicate messages to designated target audiences, and according to their intended use, they can be grouped into the categories of strategic, operational and tactical assets.

Strategic

Strategic assets include radio and television broadcast, high-volume print and advanced automated database systems. The strategic broadcast assets include the AN/TRT-22, a 50-kilowatt, Vietnam-vintage AM radio system used for long-range commercial broadcast coverage. It was deployed during Operation Urgent Fury to replace the destroyed radio station on Grenada and was most recently used in Saudi Arabia, supporting

Desert Storm, to broadcast PSYOP messages throughout Kuwait and well into Iraq.

The AN/TSQ-171 television system was fielded in September 1990 and subsequently deployed to Saudi Arabia in support of Desert Storm. While it was not used to broadcast, it was used extensively to produce PSYOP television products.

The Media Production Center is the fixed radio and television production center located at Fort Bragg, N.C. It is used to develop PSYOP audio-visual products and pre-programmed presentations to support war and peacetime PSYOP programs. MPC equipment is also used to train PSYOP audio-visual specialists.

Strategic print assets include the heavy print center, a fixed facility at Fort Bragg. It provides high-quality, high-volume capabilities for print products such as PSYOP studies, newspapers and leaflets. It also supports contingency production requirements prior to the

deployment of an operational print system.

The PSYOP Automated Data System is a mainframe computer located at Fort Bragg with remote-terminal access throughout the Department of Defense. It is used to store and access important PSYOP studies and operational data. This system is used by numerous U.S. government agencies for regional and area analysis, background studies and collection of demographic information on nations throughout the world.

Operational

Operational systems within the PSYOP inventory include commercial radio and television broadcast transmitters and deployable print assets. Two special broadcast systems, the Psychological Operations Airmobile Dissemination System, or PAMDIS, and the TAMT-10 are unique to active-duty Army PSYOP. Both are trans-

portable and designed for short-range transmissions.

The TAMT-10, a 10-kilowatt, AM commercial broadcast transmitter, was developed to satisfy shortfalls identified during 1983's Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada. It was used effectively during Just Cause in 1989, boasting the highest audience in Panama at that time, and was again deployed during Desert Storm, targeting Iraqi front-line units. Enemy-prisoner-of-war interrogation reports indicated that the system's broadcasts were responsible for mass desertions, low morale and enemy surrenders.

PAMDIS was also developed as a result of Urgent Fury. It is an air-deployable television and radio broadcast system designed to operate from an air platform or ground station in support of contingency operations. It was deployed during Desert Storm for use with the TAMT-10.

Operational print assets include the Light Print, Medium Print and Modular Print Systems. The Light Print is the most deployable of the three and is used as a stand-alone asset for low-volume, high-quality PSYOP printing in remote areas.

The Medium Print is the oldest of the systems and was originally intended for high-quality, medium-volume production and print output. It is being phased out of the Army inventory and replaced by the Modular Print System, which can be deployed in phases.

The Modular Print System includes a lightweight printing plant module which can be deployed early in any operation. As the level of conflict and PSYOP requirement increases, the press-section module and finishing-section modules can be deployed to increase the volume and the number of products.

All three print systems were used during Desert Storm, printing 29 million leaflets which were dropped on Iraqi forces throughout the operation. The Modular Print System was also used in Kuwait to print handbills, newspapers and posters

in support of consolidation operations during the defense and restoration phase of Desert Storm.

Tactical

Three unique assets represent tactical PSYOP equipment — loudspeakers, the Mobile Audio-visual Van and the leaflet artillery round.

Loudspeakers received recognition for their contributions during Just Cause and again, to a greater degree, during Desert Storm. Since their modern combat application by U.S. forces in World War I, loudspeakers have been used in several configurations. The current PSYOP inventory includes man-portable, vehicle-mounted and aircraft-mounted systems. They are used for pre-recorded or live-sound broadcasts during crowd-control, surrender-appeal or deception operations. The newest man-portable system, the AN/PIH-1, was fielded in October 1990 and proved highly effective during tactical combat and consolidation operations in Desert Storm.

The Mobile Audio-visual Van, AN/MSQ-85B, was conditionally fielded to PSYOP forces during Desert Storm to support remote-

media distribution. It was used by PSYOP specialists to broadcast entertainment and information in enemy-prisoner-of-war camps in Saudi Arabia. Its equipment can capture and produce audio and audio-visual products for editing and can use pre-approved, pre-recorded products for further dissemination with screens and projectors. It can also be used to support PSYOP teams during peacetime engagements by providing them a means to collect, produce and distribute military information to friendly target audiences in denied areas.

The experimental 155mm leaflet artillery round, XM951, was conditionally fielded to support PSYOP during Desert Storm. It replaces the 105mm leaflet artillery round and was used in limited quantities, by VII Corps, just prior to the ground campaign.

Future equipment

Several PSYOP equipment projects are pending development and delivery to the field. These include:

- Family of Loudspeakers — to replace PSYOP's older, less efficient



U.S. Army photo

Shelters such as this one house the press-section and finishing-section modules of the Modular Print System, which are employed with the lightweight printing plant module as the need for PSYOP products increases.



U.S. Army photo

This photograph shows the control facility for the TSQ-171 transmitter (foreground), the tent which houses camera and TV crews, and one section of the 330-foot antenna tower.

systems.

- Electronic Filmless Camera System — to provide PSYOP and other SOF with a tool to capture and transmit, via radio or telephone, still-photo images for near-real-time intelligence gathering and product development.
- Family of Translators — to provide PSYOP and other SOF with the means to communicate verbally and create written materials in designated target languages.
- Unmanned Aerial Vehicle — to

provide a remote-controlled platform for carrying the electronic filmless camera, loudspeakers or leaflets and improve capabilities for collecting and distributing PSYOP materials.

- Leaflet Balloon System — to provide an organic, passive means of distributing leaflets.
- Special Operations Media System — to provide a deployable, high-quality media production and distribution system to replace the AN/TRT-22, PAMDIS, TAMT-10

and the AN/TSQ-171 systems.

The PSYOP community has served its country and the combined armed forces since the founding of this nation, and with the advent of the information age, PSYOP has become even more critical. With the skills of its specialists, its modern PSYOP-unique equipment and the prospect of even more modern and effective systems to come, PSYOP will continue to provide essential support as a combat multiplier. ✕

Capt. Chris Bailey is currently attending the Ordnance Officer Advanced Course at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md. His previous assignments include serving as the commander of the Maintenance Company, 528th Special Operations Support Battalion, and as the PSYOP equipment support officer for the 4th PSYOP Group. During Desert Shield/Storm, he served as a PSYOP operations officer in the Special Operations Support Office - PSYOP of the ARCENT G-3. Capt. Bailey is a graduate of the Ordnance Officer Basic Course, the PSYOP Officer Course, the Joint PSYOP Course at Hurlburt Field, Fla., and the Joint PSYOP Staff Planners Course at Fort Bragg. He holds a BA in mechanical engineering from Idaho State University.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, many threats to world peace have disappeared. "Warsaw Pact" has become a term of the past, and one-half million Americans have fought and won a war to defeat a dictator in the Persian Gulf. Yet, despite this, threats remain, and the largest looms north of Korea's 38th parallel.

Currently there are more than 40,000 members of the U.S. military services assigned to the Republic of Korea, located in the southern part of the Korean peninsula.¹ The peninsula remains an environment of turbulence and uncertainty. There is perhaps no place in the world where tension is higher or the risk of war greater, and as long as Kim Il-sung is in charge of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, it is unlikely that it will renounce its goal of forcible unification of the two nations.

Ever since the national division in 1948, the DPRK has pursued the conquest of the ROK by means of

North Korean Special-Purpose Forces

by Maj. Douglas S. Watson

force. It has made numerous attempts to overthrow the ROK government through internal violence, seeking to achieve unification on communist terms.² It was through an outright attempt to communize all Korea by force of arms that the DPRK provoked the Korean conflict in 1950. Nevertheless, the DPRK, even after the armistice, did not discard its stated aim of unifying the Korean peninsula under communism: *It is our supreme task of struggle for the Korean Peoples' Army to expel American aggressive forces from the southern half, to liberate our compatriots and achieve the reunification of Korea.*³

The 1950 invasion is not the only reminder of the aggressive nature of the DPRK. Armistice violations abound, and intentional armed provocations and accidental incidents have been common occurrences during Korea's 41 years of conflict. Despite recent talks between North and South Korea, no agreement has been reached, and

the possibility of war remains great. Provocative DPRK pronouncements cannot be discounted as mere rhetoric, since the Korean People's Army, the KPA, is approximately 930,000 strong, making it the fifth largest in the world.⁴

One of the least-understood aspects of the DPRK's military organization is its use of the Special Purpose Forces. The SPF represents one of the world's largest bodies of highly trained soldiers. Its operations are not limited to the Korean peninsula, but have taken on an international aspect. As such, the SPF is of considerable concern to U.S. and ROK military planners protecting the Republic of Korea.

Background

Doctrine for the KPA is a mixture of Maoist and Soviet ideas on war. Both the Maoist principles of protracted guerrilla struggle and Soviet-style heavily armored formations can be found. Within this doctrine there is an unorthodox mixture of

conventional and unconventional forces which make it highly unusual. Its revolutionary-warfare strategy is a result of lessons learned during the Korean War, primarily from the unique constraints of the Korean topography.⁵

Other lessons-learned include the need for rear and reserve units, an adequate air force, a military staff trained in basic strategy and tactics, and soldiers sufficiently prepared in military and ideological matters. The Korean War also demonstrated that total adherence and reliance on Soviet-styled conventional tactics is inappropriate. As a result, the KPA now claims one of the world's largest unconventional-warfare forces,⁶ and the ROK faces the world's largest offensive UW threat.

A constant element in DPRK's unification policy since the 1950s is the "strategy of three revolutionary forces."⁷ This strategy calls first for a dynamic and powerful revolutionary base in the DPRK. Next is to stimulate and support revolutionary forces in the ROK. Finally, international revolutionary forces are earmarked for support.

Terrain and environment

The climate on the Korean peninsula varies widely, with average annual precipitation ranging from 20-60 inches.⁸ Military operations there are greatly influenced by hot, wet summers and cold, dry winters.

As American soldiers who fought in the Korean conflict can attest, the Korean peninsula is composed of inhospitable terrain. Mountains and uplands cover 80 percent of the peninsula. From Mount Paektu on the Manchurian border, a huge mountain range runs southwest along the east coast, which is often referred to as the "backbone" of the country.⁹

The eastern and northern parts of the country are mountainous, while the western and southern parts abound with narrow plains. Thus a majority of large rivers are in the


southern and western parts of the country.¹⁰

It is important to note the location of Seoul, the capital of the ROK, which is approximately 22 miles from the DMZ. This makes it impossible for the ROK to trade space for time.

The KPA strategy is to fight a two-front war against the ROK aimed at sweeping the entire peninsula in 5-7 days.¹¹ This strategy focuses on a "one blow, non-stop attack" which would be spearheaded by mechanized formations and complemented by SPF units.

If the DPRK leadership makes the decision once again to invade the ROK, the KPA's SPF will be actively employed from the beginning. SPF's would conduct both conventional and unconventional warfare. They would be employed on the forward edge of the battle area to isolate U.S. and ROK units deployed there. They would seek out and interdict U.S. and ROK forces and attempt to secure tactically important terrain objectives. SPF's would also be deployed to the rear to create confusion and panic.

Synchronization of shock action



computer graphic by Bruce S. Barfield

and UW operations is a key element of the KPA doctrine. KPA UW forces would use air, sea and ground infiltration. The KPA would also attempt to have UW forces in place in the Republic of Korea before initiating any conflict. KPA regular units close to the DMZ are in a high state of readiness: 65 percent of the ground force is within 50 miles of the border and in position for attack.¹² These forces are capable of launching a major offensive with little warning.

Special Purpose Forces

The army of the DPRK has two functions: the coordination of land combat forces and the operations of the SPF. The term "Special Purpose Forces" was coined by the U.S. during the early 1980s to provide a single name for that group of KPA combat-related units which are highly trained and uniquely structured.

All SPF units possess ranger/commando and special-forces-type capabilities, clearly meeting these definitions. SPF units receive instruction and training in which considerable emphasis is placed upon the use of initiative and political activities behind the enemy lines.

Training includes such things as martial arts, demolitions, suicide-type terrorist attacks against buildings and military equipment, swimming, mountain climbing, map reading and rigorous physical activity. The majority of all SPF units have operational missions in peace and war. In the event of UW operations, DPRK SPF would be infiltrated into the ROK by air, sea and ground. Their ground-infiltration capability is best evidenced by the lengthy tunnels that have been dug under the DMZ. SPF units train on full-size mock-ups of key ROK and U.S. military installations.¹³

Missions and capabilities of the SPF are roughly comparable to those of U.S. Special Forces and SEALs, and former Soviet *spetsnaz* units. SPF units have the equipment, capability and training to achieve the fol-

lowing missions:

- Seizure or destruction of major military targets located in the enemy rear area.
- Intelligence and reconnaissance operations in support of offensive operations.
- Unconventional warfare and special operations (including direct-action and diversionary operations).
- Conventional-warfare operations behind the lines.
- Assaults and destruction of major fortified defensive positions, lines or zones.

"The majority of all SPF units have operational missions in peace and war. In the event of UW operations, SPF would be infiltrated into the ROK by air, sea and ground. Their ground-infiltration capability is best evidenced by the lengthy tunnels that have been dug under the DMZ."

- Destruction of important man-made military or civilian facilities.
- Sabotage of communications facilities, logistics systems and military installations.
- Interdiction of reinforcements by attacking lines of communication.
- Seizure or destruction of U.S. or ROK nuclear, chemical, and command, control, communication and intelligence assets.¹⁴

In addition to these missions, SPF units are trained, equipped and capable to conduct theater- and global-level missions.

Organization

The KPA is the "armed might of

the Korean Workers' Party."¹⁵ Effective control resides with the top KWP leadership through the Military Commission of the KWP's Central Committee. Command of the KPA is exercised by Kim Il-sung, chairman of the KWP. General policy, direction and strategic planning are determined at this level under Kim Il-sung's guidance and routed through the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces, or MPAF, to the General Staff Department. Operational command flows from the General Staff Department, through its various bureaus and command headquarters, to the operational units.¹⁶

The MPAF has three principal divisions: the General Staff, which exercises operational control over the armed forces; the General Political Bureau, which directs all political activity and indoctrination within the armed forces; and the General Rear Services Bureau, which is charged with logistical and support services.¹⁷

Within the armed forces there are separate army, navy, air force, artillery, armor and missile commands. The VIII Special Purpose Corps provides all special-purpose units with administrative and technical support and exercises peacetime operational control over all airborne light-infantry brigades, amphibious light-infantry brigades and those reconnaissance and light-infantry brigades which are not located within the forward corps areas. During peacetime, the brigades are subordinate to the area headquarters in which they are stationed. During wartime, full control of these units reverts to the VIII Special Purpose Corps.¹⁸

There are times when elements of any SPF units may be temporarily detached and subordinated to another headquarters for special missions.¹⁹ Additional administrative and technical support for all special-purpose units is provided in varying degrees by the National Intelligence Committee, Cabinet Intelligence Committee, KWP-Lia-

son Department, General Staff Department's Reconnaissance Bureau, General Political Bureau and the Political Security Department.²⁰

Size and composition


The SPF's have undergone significant changes in size and composition during the last decade. Readings at the unclassified level which depict size and composition differ drastically. The differences are probably attributable to the different methods used in calculating SPF assets.

The units which comprise the SPF total more than 100,000 troops and represent 15 percent of the total KPA strength. This analysis organizes the SPF into 27 light brigades, including airborne, reconnaissance, light-infantry and amphibious-type brigades, 35 division-level light-infantry battalions and five combined-arms brigades.²¹

All SPF units are deployed throughout the DPRK and organized into four general groupings:

- Combined-arms brigades, directly subordinate to the General Staff Department and deployed within VII Corps.²²
- Divisional light-infantry battalion, organic to each of the KPA's 35 infantry/mechanized-infantry divisions.²³
- SPF brigades directly subordinate to VIII Special Purpose Corps.²⁴
- SPF brigades subordinate to I, II and V-forward Corps.²⁵

The elite of the SPF consists of four reconnaissance brigades that have been specially trained to carry out covert and overt land, sea and air operations. For covert operations, the SPF unit most frequently employed is the reconnaissance brigade's direct-action unit. Its mission objectives are kidnapping, hijacking, assassination, intelligence and special operations beyond the Korean peninsula. The DPRK is one of the few countries of the world that supports terrorism, and kidnappings, assassinations and



computer graphic by Bruce S. Barfield

kidnappings have all been attributed to these SPF direct-action units.²⁶

Exporting terror

The use of terrorism by a state entails few risks and constitutes strong-arm, low-budget foreign policy.²⁷ The history of the DPRK's use of terrorism is long and bloody and actually predates the June 24, 1950, attack on the ROK. There are a number of examples of the DPRK's use of terrorism, which has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of ROK civilian and military personnel, as well as a number of American servicemen stationed on the peninsula:

- November 1987: The government of the Republic of Korea concluded that communist North Korean agents had planted the bomb that exploded aboard a Korean

Airlines plane, killing all 115 passengers and crew.²⁸

- October 1983, Rangoon, Burma: The DPRK attempted to murder ROK President Chun Doo Hwan during his state visit to Rangoon. A powerful bomb exploded during a wreath-laying ceremony at a national shrine for Burmese war victims, killing four visiting ROK officials (the deputy prime minister, the foreign minister and the ministers of commerce and energy) and 17 other ROK citizens. These terrorists were identified as a major and two captains in the KPA's SPF, assigned to a special terrorist unit. Their unit is affiliated with the Reconnaissance Bureau of the North Korean Ministry of People's Armed Forces.²⁹
- 1968: An estimated 31 SPF com-

mandos infiltrated the ROK and assaulted the Blue House, the presidential compound near central Seoul. All but one commando was killed by ROK defenders.³⁰

These are only a few of a series of provocative and destabilizing actions that the DPRK has conducted. They give evidence that state-controlled terrorism is a major element of national policy and that the DPRK appears to be committed to terror as an inexpensive and acceptable weapon system.

Because of the capability of the SPF and the DPRK state sponsorship of terrorism, it can be concluded that the SPF either is responsible for these acts or trains the personnel for these acts of terrorism. Richard Walker, U.S. ambassador to the ROK from 1981-1986, said: "In the past 15 years, North Korean diplomats have been expelled from Scandinavia, Africa, Latin America and even the U.S.S.R. for smuggling, black marketing and drug dealing. It is disturbing that there has not been more attention to the threat to the civil world order posed by the weird and violent regime in North Korea."³¹

This interest in worldwide operations has a foundation within Article 16 of the DPRK constitution, which calls for unity with "all the people of the world opposed to imperialism" and support for the "struggle for national liberation and revolution." To fulfill this call for unity, SPF members have traveled abroad to teach tactics of terrorism and guerrilla warfare. An indication of the extent of these activities is that an estimated 7,000 SPF personnel have been dispatched to some 47 countries.³² An additional 5,000 terrorist recruits, from 25 countries, have received training at camps within the DPRK.³³

The DPRK's terrorist allies have included Italy's Red Brigades, West Germany's Baader-Meinhof Gang (now the Red Army Faction), the Japanese Red Army and the Palestine Liberation Organization.³⁴ A recent European intelligence report

indicates that although relatively inactive for more than a decade, the Japanese Red Army has resumed action in international terrorism and claims that some Red Army terrorists have been trained at camps in North Korea.³⁵

Within this context of worldwide operations, it is important to note that the DPRK is one of the leading arms exporters to the Third World, particularly to nations in crisis, such as Iran and Nicaragua.³⁶ The DPRK is one of the most militarized, despotic and terrorist regimes in the world today,³⁷ and it has proclaimed that the highest

"SPF members have traveled abroad to teach tactics of terrorism and guerrilla warfare. ... An estimated 7,000 SPF personnel have been dispatched to some 47 countries. An additional 5,000 terrorist recruits, from 25 countries, have received training at camps within the DPRK."

policy goal of both the Korean Workers' Party and the state is to achieve unification.³⁸ The use of arms or violence by the DPRK to achieve its goal of unification poses many implications for U.S./ROK military planners.

U.S./ROK response

The ROK response to the DPRK threat is simply to prepare itself for self-defense. It realizes that in any future war, the decisive battle will probably have been fought before major U.S. ground-force reinforcements reach Korea. The ROK strategy is one of forward defense, based

on the premise that the KPA must be halted along the DMZ and not allowed to enter Seoul. To support this strategy, ROK and U.S. forces are integrated into a combined organization. The ROK also treats the UW threat seriously, and rear-area protection is a vital mission at all levels of command.

Today Korea is a region of vital interest to the U.S. The primary goal of U.S. forces, forward-deployed within the ROK, is to deter war; this has been a part of U.S. deterrent strategy since the end of World War II. Deployment of U.S. troops within the ROK renders them immediately available for coalition warfare and honors treaty obligations. This forward deployment also provides a warning to the DPRK that these U.S. forces are only an advance party, and that should they attack, the U.S. is prepared to become fully committed to that theater.

With regard to DPRK acts of terrorism, the current U.S. policy on terrorism can be found in the Public Report of the Vice President's task force on combatting terrorism: "The U.S. position on terrorism is unequivocal: firm opposition to terrorism in all its forms and wherever it takes place,"³⁹ and in national-security-decision directives: "The U.S. Government is opposed to domestic and international terrorism and is prepared to act in concert with other nations, or unilaterally, when necessary, to prevent or respond to terrorist acts."⁴⁰

The ROK has the primary responsibility for providing security to U.S. citizens and facilities on its soil. Its ability to monitor and control terrorist activities, as well as to participate in cooperative measures with the U.S. to collect and share intelligence, is extremely important.

Policy alternatives

The U.S. cannot avoid the question of deterring DPRK adventur-

ism. U.S. service personnel may become targets of DPRK violence, as they have been in the past. In addition, establishment of a credible U.S. deterrence to DPRK terrorism against ROK and other U.S. allies must be an integral component of the U.S. Asian policy.

Deterring DPRK activities has proved extremely difficult. The United States does not maintain direct contact with the DPRK, and since the DPRK has historically played its two major allies, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, against each other, both tended to acquiesce to DPRK violence, rather than risk damaging their relationships with the Kim Il-sung regime.

Based on the situation, several options, both unilateral and bilateral, are postulated for the United States:

- Continued military presence, as currently configured.
- Use of U.S. influence upon the Japanese government to insure that all forms of economic aid to the DPRK are cut off. (The DPRK government has traditionally relied on Japan for economic aid in the form of loans and business investments.)
- Continued efforts to isolate the DPRK within the world community by urging other nations to take similar measures.
- Encouragement of China to use its influence in curtailing DPRK activities as a component of future U.S./PRC relations.
- Use of all means available to the U.S. government to encourage economic and diplomatic sanctions to press the DPRK to cease its sponsorship of violence.
- Urging the United Nations' International Civil Aviation Organization to act against DPRK terrorism.
- Vigorous condemnation of all DPRK terrorist acts.
- Pressing DPRK communist allies to condemn DPRK aggression

North Korean SPF Included in Schools' Wargaming

The buildup of special-operations forces in North Korea is now being included in wargaming at U.S. senior service schools.

In 1989, the schools, which include the National Defense University, the Army War College, the Air War College, the Naval War College and the Marine Corps War College, inaugurated an exercise called the Joint Land, Aerospace and Sea Simulation, or JLASS. JLASS is a two-sided, computer-assisted operational planning exercise played at the field army, task force and tactical air force level. An elective for students, it also includes members of the schools' faculties. The exercise is played at the Air Force Wargaming Center at Maxwell AFB, Ala.

The scenario for this year's JLASS, held from April 2-9, 1992, depicted a conflict in the northern Pacific-northeast Asia region involving forces from the U.S., the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Republic of Korea and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, according to Lee McKinney, an analyst in the Threat Branch of the SWCS Intelligence and Security Office. The simulation included both friendly (blue) and enemy (red) special-operations forces, and made use of the latest information on tactics, doctrine and order of battle for blue and red forces.

McKinney was part of a team of SOF subject-matter experts/controllers sent from the SWCS to integrate special-operations activities into the exercise. "This year SOF was looked at more closely, and all the students and faculty were keenly aware of the impact blue and red SOF had in the campaign effort," he said. "The U.S. is carefully monitoring the tremendous SOF buildup in the DPRK. Based on what I've seen at JLASS '92, the senior service colleges are also watching it closely and preparing our services to meet the evolving threat."

and dissuade Kim Il-sung from using such tactics in the future.

Conclusions

U.S. and ROK military planners cannot presently dispose of the threat, but they can lessen its impact. First, there is a need to know as much as possible about the KPA and its SPF. Second is the need to increase vigilance and intelligence — a first-rate strategy must have accurate information about the enemy. Third, active measures must be accelerated by increasing aerial and coastal surveillance, and counterintelligence operations in ROK and elsewhere. Fourth, passive measures must be reinforced to make military installations and buildings less vulnerable, and the

U.S. and ROK should adapt doctrine to incorporate operations dealing with the SPF threat. Fifth, there is need to increase civil awareness and preparedness to the SPF threat. Sixth, both U.S. and ROK forces need to strengthen alliance cohesion, enhance interoperability, improve combat effectiveness and demonstrate joint and combined capabilities which increase deterrence.

The DPRK has a reputation of being a wild card, and despite its recent rhetoric, it will remain one. Policy alternatives for the U.S. are limited, but they must be explored. Increased international pressure on the DPRK is vital if a reversal in DPRK attitudes toward international violence is to be achieved. The

most effective weapon against the SPF threat is knowledge. As Sun Tzu wrote: "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."⁴¹ ❧

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Notes:

¹ "Where They Serve," pg. 26.

² *The White Paper on the South/North Dialogue in Korea*, (Seoul, Korea: National Unification Board, Republic of Korea, 1982), pg. 195.

³ As quoted by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., *North Korean Special Forces*, (United Kingdom: Jane's Publishing Company Ltd., 1988), pg. 2.

⁴ U.S. Department of the Army, *North Korean People's Army Operations*, FC 100-2-99 (Fort Leavenworth, Kan., 5 December 1986), pg. 3-1.

⁵ *North Korean People's Army Operations*, pg. 3-1.

⁶ "Weapons and Tactics of Republic of Korea," *Jane's Defence Review*, Volume 3, Number 1, 1982, pg. 60.

⁷ Byung Chul Koh, "Unification Policy and North-South Relations," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *North Korea Today: Strategic and Domestic Issues*, (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Institute of East Asian Studies, 1983), pp. 274-275.

⁸ *Korea Annual 1982*, (Seoul, Korea: Yonhap News Agency), 1982, pp. 319-320.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ General William J. Livsey, "Task in Korea: Convince North Attack is Futile," *Army*, October 1985, pg. 135.

¹² General Louis C. Menetrey, "Training for War Under Guns of Hostile Neighbor," *Army*, October 1988, pg. 74.

¹³ "Weapons and Tactics of Republic of Korea," *Jane's Defence Review*, Volume 3, Number 1, 1982, pg. 60.

¹⁴ Bermudez, pp. 2-3.

¹⁵ *North Korean People's Army Operations*, pg. 2-9.

¹⁶ Bermudez, pp. 4-5.

¹⁷ U.S. Department of the Army, *North Korean Military Forces*, FM 34-71, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982), pg. 3-1.

¹⁸ U.S. Department of the Army, *North Korea: A Country Study*, DA Pamphlet 550-81, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), pp. 225-228.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *North Korean People's Army Operations*, pp. 3-4, 3-5.

²² Bermudez, pg. 7.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ See 'North Korea,' *U.S. Naval Institute Military Database*, (Arlington, Va.: Military Data Corporation), December 1988.

²⁷ Vice President of the United States, *Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), pg. 3.

²⁸ "Finding of the investigation conducted by the Government of the Republic of Korea concerning the destruction of Korean Air Flight 858," Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, 2 February 1968.

²⁹ "Terrorists enter Rangoon as 'sailors,'" *The Korea Herald*, (United States Edition, New York), 27 November 1983, pp. 1-4.

³⁰ "North Korea: Exporting Terrorism," *Backgrounder*, February, 1988, pp. 5-6.

³¹ "The Weird and Violent Regime in North Korea," *The Washington Post*, March, 1988, pg. A21.

³² Bradley Hahn, *Korea's Impact Upon Major Power Geostrategic Activities in East Asia*, 17 January 1987, pg. 8.

³³ "North Korea: Exporting Terrorism," pg. 2.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *The Washington Times*, 13 January 1988, pg. 8.

³⁶ "North Korea: Exporting Terrorism," pg. 2.

³⁷ *Defense* 88, pg. 32.

³⁸ *A White Paper on the South-North Dialogue*, National Unification Board, Republic of Korea, 31 December 1982, pg. 196.

³⁹ *Public Report of The Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism*, pg. 7.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Samuel B. Griffith, *Sun Tzu: The Art of War*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), pg. 84.

Special Forces Command and Control: Running an Operational Base

by Retired Maj. Ed Sayre

Whether they are in unilateral, combined or joint operations, Special Forces often require unique measures to accomplish their missions, especially in the areas of command, control, communications and intelligence.

Command elements of each subordinate headquarters and deployed operational detachment, for example, are often separated by extensive distances. In order to effectively command and control these elements, the Special Forces group organizes a series of operational bases, from the **group level (Special Forces operational base, SFOB)**, to the **battalion level (forward operational base, FOB)**, to the **company level (advanced operational base, AOB)**. Operational bases are command, control and support bases which prepare, deploy, control and

Techniques described in this article are those which have been successful in the author's experience. While they are not "doctrine," they are doctrinally grounded in FM 31-20, FM 100-25 and Joint Pub 3-05. — Editor

support SF teams in specified operational areas. They vary with the duration and scope of operations and the requirements for security, communications, intelligence and combat-service-support.

An FOB launches and controls SF detachments in contested or denied territory. It is normally the lowest operational headquarters with all the assets necessary to accomplish the mission. Additional subordinate **special-operations command-and-control elements, or SOCCE**, can also be **placed at conventional brigade-level and higher headquarters.**

Mission planning

SF operations encompass a wide range of missions and can last from several days to several weeks or longer. Missions require detailed planning through all levels of command, with decentralized execution at the SF-detachment level. **A typical SF-detachment mission is dependent upon air or maritime infiltration and exfiltration, timely intelligence, communications, and accurate reporting and directing throughout the duration of the mis-**

sion. By identifying activities which must be accomplished before, during and after the mission, the operational base must plan, direct and support the SF detachment and manage the mission to completion.

In joint operations, the early deployment of Special Forces is dependent upon strategic objectives, the total force and the depth of the battlefield. As the level of involvement increases and a joint task force is required to accomplish the objective, a number of factors greatly affect the ability of the special-operations command to accomplish its Special Forces missions. A few of these factors are:

- Prioritization of missions.
- Increased mission load.
- Reconciliation of missions to resolve any conflict in interest, such as targeting.
- Coordination of joint assets.
- Resources available — personnel, equipment, and aviation assets, both rotary and fixed-wing.
- Communications requirements — within the JTF, communications requirements can easily quadruple for Special Forces missions after deployment of the JTF on D-Day.
- Synchronization of the battlefield.
- Contingency plans.

Operational planners must deal with these factors and be able to maintain an objective focus in order to command and control their forces. How well the operational base manages these demands can pre-dispose the mission to success or failure.

SF command, control and communications is a complex problem which needs to be managed and closely directed from isolation until return of the team to the FOB. All complex problems can be effectively broken down into smaller elements, phases or intermediate objectives. Deficiencies can be identified early on in the planning process, and staff planners can focus on these potential mission-stoppers. Standing operating procedures support

the process by detailing the setup and internal workings of each FOB center, inter-FOB message handling, and the use of journals, message logs and operational folders.

Time management

Within the SF planning process there are established windows for specific events to take place. The time-sensitive and deliberate planning process presented in **FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations**, depicts a **96-hour planning process** which links the requirements to support a mission. The process starts with a **mission tasking, or MITASK**, from the SFOB, which in turn is analyzed by the FOB for mission planning and the appropriate **mission concept, or MICON**.

The SFOB also coordinates and approves mission-support requests. The mission-planning process integrates many critical factors, including intelligence products and U.S. Air Force fixed-wing and special-operations-aviation rotary-wing air support. **(The Air Force requires 72 hours for mission planning, and SOA requires 48 hours' notice prior to time-on-target.)**

A standard mission-planning scenario would have to meet the following gates in order to allow enough time for the SF detachment, FOB, SFOB and mission-support assets to fully coordinate the mission:

- 120 hours: FOB receives MITASK from SFOB.
- 96 hours: SF detachment gets FOB mission brief.
- 72 hours: Mission-support request arrives at USAF.
- 48 hours: Mission-support request arrives at SOA.
- 24 hours: SF detachment brief-back to FOB commander.
- Time-on-target: SF detachment arrival in the operational area.

This planning time sequence can be compressed; however, it requires close coordination and

advance planning in a future-operations cell at the FOB. Specific guidelines for the MITASK/MICON process are outlined in the **JCS Pub 3 series**.

FOB center directors and operational planners must provide clear and concise orders, be well-versed in parallel planning, experienced in SF mission-peculiar techniques, and provide complete and comprehensive mission-planning folders. In short, the SF detachment in iso-

"By assigning operations schedules depicting each phase of the missions, the FOB can direct and coordinate critical activities for each detachment. The OPSKEDs, when organized into a matrix format, allow the FOB to quickly identify, collate, reconcile and synchronize all SF-detachment missions currently in any one phase of the mission profile."

lation is not a training aid for inexperienced FOB staffers.

Coordination

Missions for SF detachments can be reduced to six phases which form the standard SF-detachment mission profile:

- Isolation planning
- Infiltration
- Operations and execution
- Support/resupply
- Exfiltration
- Debriefing

Each phase of the mission requires timely coordination through all FOB centers so that the FOB can pass critical information to subordinate operational bases and

the command-and-control headquarters, the SOCCE.

Missions with as many as six committed SF detachments represent a significant problem in command, control, communications and intelligence, C3I, for an FOB which is responsible for the isolation, launch, support and recovery of each one. By assigning operations schedules depicting each phase of the missions, the FOB can direct and coordinate critical activities for each detachment. The **OPSKEDs**, when organized into a matrix format, allow the FOB to quickly identify, collate, reconcile and synchronize all SF-detachment missions currently in any one phase of the mission profile.

The OPSKED formats also provide a master linkage to implement the **message formats of the Standard Services Supplement, called SAVSERSUP**, to request, direct, confirm, support and provide post-mission assessments for all SF detachment operations.

Through each phase of the mission, FOB planners can visualize significant activities, coordinate and provide assistance to the SF detachments.

Code names

The use of code names for Special Forces operations simplifies complex missions and improves control of deployed SF detachments. Code names provide brevity and clarity of message encryption/decryption, voice communications and operational graphics displays. **By using a letter-indicator method in concert with SAVSERSUP formats, both the operational detachment and base benefit in overall command and control and communications security.**

The assignment of **code names** should meet the following guidelines:

- **Use only five-letter names.**
- **Do not use more than two instances of the same letter in the code name.** (Some planners prefer that no letters are repeated).

OPSKEDS

Operations Schedules at a Glance


- Identify critical mission activities and provide mission planners with a means of managing and coordinating missions.
- Matrix format allows immediate visual monitoring of missions.
- OPSKEDS are based on the six phases of a standard SF detachment mission.
- They provide a format consistent with, and in support of, SAVSERSUP.
- Code names are employed and must meet established guidelines in order to maintain clarity and consistency.
- The JSOA depicted has been assigned the code name Blade and is sub-divided into smaller OA's, each with code names.

- Critical activities are identified for each OPSKED and are necessary for the successful completion of that phase of the mission.
- OPSKED #3 illustrates the critical activities that have been identified for the execution phase.

- The execution OPSKED employs a progressive color coding system and a priority numbering system.
- In this example, Team Hamer has been assigned a yellow mission status due to loss of contact with RS team #1. As a result, SOCCE and FOB initiate a recovery plan.

OPERATIONS SCHEDULE							
EXFILTRATION (OPSKED #5)							
UNIT	MISSION	DPT LOC AND DTG	PLAT-FORM	PRI LOC AND DTG	ALT LOC AND DTG	LT/DZ CODE NAME	ENROUTE CHECK POINTS
							CHECK #1: TBD CHECK #2: TBD
OPERATIONS SCHEDULE							
EXECUTION (OPSKED #3)							
UNIT	MISSION	COMMO MSG DTG	FIRE SPT PLAN	MISSION TOT DTG	MSS/ORP/RS LOC	MISSION STATUS	REMARKS
ODA-052 HAMER	RS-01	6 HOUR INTERVAL 12 300Z	RFA #1 0900Z	NAI HELIX 12 1300Z	MSS (UTM COORD) RS (UTM COORD)	YELLOW	PRIORITY #1 NO COMM W/ RS TM #1 2 PAX MISSING
ODA-061 CANDY	RS-02	6 HOUR INTERVAL 12 1120Z	RFA #2 RFA #3 0700Z	NAI CANTO 12 1120Z	MSS (UTM COORD) RS (UTM COORD)	GREEN	PRIORITY #2
ODA-095 FRUIT	DA-04	12 HOUR INTERVAL 16 0800Z	NFA #3	TGT TOT FISHY 19 0600Z	MSS (UTM COORD)	GREEN	PRIORITY #4 TRANSIT ONE-WAY 2 HRS TOTAL EXFIL: 4 HRS
ODA-543 EAGLE	DA-05	12 HOUR INTERVAL	NFA #5	TGT TOT ERASE 19 0600Z	MSS (UTM COORD)	GREEN	PRIORITY #5
ODA-155 SHARK	TG-02	4 HOUR INTERVAL	RFA #4	TGT TOT SHUNT 19 0500Z	MSS (UTM COORD)	GREEN	PRIORITY #3
ODD-140 BUCKY	SOCCE	MONITOR SFODA COMMO	COORD RFA 1-4 NFA 3 & 5	MONITOR TGT TOT	DECONFLICT SFODA POSITIONS	GREEN	ACTIVATE RECOVERY PLAN TM HAMER TM SHARK LINK-UP W/ 2 PAX TM HAMER

- The exfiltration OPSKED tracks all exfiltrations within the JSOA and eliminates any potential for conflict.
- Here, Team Shark is instructed to link up with the missing personnel from Team Hamer in their designated area of recovery. They are to then move to their own exfiltration beach-landing site.



- OPSKEDS typically list all detachments and their respective missions within the JSOA.
- OPSKED #3 depicts one B-detachment and five A-detachments on a variety of missions. Included are reconnaissance/surveillance (RS), direct-action (DA) and terminal-guidance (TG).

The following alphabetical letter indicator code name samples are used in the OPSKED examples and JSOA scenario map. Note that they begin with the same first letter as that of the OA code name.

- | | | |
|-----------------|----------------------|-----------------|
| SFODA-543 EDDIE | Designaed activity | SFODA-155 SATIN |
| EAGLE | Operational Area | SHARK |
| ELOPE | SF detachment | SAMMY |
| ELBOW | Primary Infil Site | SMITH |
| ERASE | Alternate Infil Site | SHUNT |
| EJECT | Target | SOUPY |
| ELDER | Primary Exfil Site | SHOUT |
| | Alternate Exfil Site | |

- Each name must either be a word or approximate a word in the English language. Example: We could use *exess* (five letters) instead of *excess* (six letters).

- Do not duplicate any code words in SAVSERSUP or ones already in use by SF detachments.

- Do not use numbers, cardinal directions or the phonetic alphabet. Example: *eight*, *north* or *bravo*.

- Avoid code names in the same mission that only differ by one letter, such as *witch* and *watch*.

In contrast, conventional forces assign code names to simplify areas of operation, objectives and phase lines. For example, **all AOs are named after states (California), objectives after animals (deer), and phase lines after colors (black).**

A higher headquarters, normally the SFOB, assigns the FOB a joint special-operations area in which to conduct operations. The FOB divides this **JSOA** into smaller operational areas for its SF detachments. Once a detachment is committed to an operational area, the FOB operations center provides it with a series of code names. For example, the SFOB provides the FOB with JSOA BLADE to conduct its assigned missions. The FOB subdivides JSOA BLADE into two operational areas, OA EDDIE and OA SATIN. **Subsequent SF-detachment code names repeat the first letter of the OA code names.**

SFOBs, however, frequently do not use five-letter code names because of the interface at joint-planning headquarters and operations associated with the JTF. In these instances, **the SOC issues numerical mission numbers to ensure reconciliation and reduce confusion.** This can be critical when missions are being executed on a theater-wide basis.

Once the FOB has met its requirements for code names, the FOB OPCEN should designate 15 - 20 spares for use by the SF detachment as individual code words. Not all SF-detachment code words need to be assigned by alphabetical-letter

indicator. Some operational code words may be standardized by the FOB — for example, the “abort” or “recall” code words that are used for a specified time period. (Special-category missions may be directed to use separate mission-specific code words that do not follow the alphabetical-letter-indicator method because they often involve joint-level planning. They may have two separate words, for example: *Broken Arrow*.)

The graphics on pages 44-45 demonstrate the use of OPSKEDs in relation to Special Forces C³I. They illustrate one SF B-detachment and five SF A-detachment missions tasked to the FOB. These include two **reconnaissance/surveillance (RS)**, two **direct-action (DA)**, one **terminal-guidance (TG)** and one SOCCE missions. The designations RS, DA, and TG are used in JCS publications as mission identifiers and are followed by a number designating a specific mission. The SOCCE is a relatively new term and is not currently in use in the mission-identifier process; however, it is included as a specific FOB mission tasking for an SF B-detachment to execute.

By organizing the unit, mission and critical activities in a linear-matrix format, the FOB simplifies and can easily coordinate and reconcile these activities among the FOB center directors and staff.

All six mission phases mentioned earlier should be covered by the OPSKEDS, with the following considerations:

Mission planning

The mission-planning OPSKED is the initial coordination and reconciliation schedule for multiple SF A-detachments and B-detachments. It incorporates code names, missions and critical activities for the FOB staff to accomplish in concert with the operational detachments. Operational code names are also used to designate the special operations area.

Headings for the mission-plan-

ning OPSKED should include unit, mission, operations-area code name, and date-time groups for mission brief, intel brief, comms check, escape-and-evasion brief, air brief and briefback.

Infiltration

The infiltration OPSKED reconciles all infiltrations through the assignment of resources, planned flight routes, times and locations. The SOCCE can be shown as deployed to a conventional headquarters to further coordinate, reconcile and synchronize SF missions. It will receive operational control of SF detachments as directed.

Headings for the infiltration OPSKED should include unit, mission, departure location and date-time group, platform and number of personnel, primary infil location and date-time group, alternate location and date-time group, landing-zone or drop-zone code name and enroute check points.

Execution

All missions in execution need to be reconciled and constantly tracked by both the FOB and SOCCE. To maintain a focus on mission status, **the matrix uses a color code of green/yellow/red along with a priority numbering system.**

- Green: Mission accomplishment on course with the SF detachment mission statement and commander's intent.

- Yellow: Mission accomplishment on course but has limiting factors — explain.

- Red: Mission accomplishment doubtful — explain.

The FOB commander can assign a priority numbering system to allow for allocation of limited resources. For example, exfiltration of a recon team could take precedence over that of a direct-action team, depending on the situation.

The communications schedule, fire-support and team locations are continuously tracked by both the FOB and SOCCE to ensure synchronization on the battlefield. The

assignment of the yellow color code to Team Hamer, as shown in the illustration, alerts the SOCCE and FOB planners to take a planned action and coordinate the results. In this instance, Team Hamer does not have communications or contact with one of the RS teams. The SOCCE then activates a pre-planned recovery point and coordinates a restricted-fire area.

Headings for the execution OPSKED should include unit, mission, comms message date-time group, fire-support plan, mission time-on-target date-time group, mission-support site/objective rally point/resupply location, mission status and remarks.

Support/resupply

The support/resupply OPSKED commits resources in support of SF-detachment missions and reconciles planned operations. Both the FOB and the SOCCE track this process.

Headings for the support/resupply OPSKED should include unit, mission, departure location and date-time group, platform, primary resupply location and date-time group, alternate resupply location and date-time group, type of resupply (either on-call, emergency, automatic or cache), LZ/DZ code name and enroute check points.

Exfiltration

The exfiltration OPSKED reconciles all exfiltrations and allocates resources according to the mission priority assigned by the FOB commander. In the illustration, Team Shark has received a fragmentary order from the FOB to conduct a link-up with the two missing team members from Team Hamer in their designated recovery point and then move to their exfiltration beach-landing site. This form of self-recovery saves the FOB from flying an aircraft to a location without knowing whether or not any personnel would actually be there. It also keeps the remainder of Team Hamer conducting its primary mis-

sion of reconnaissance. This planned and directed action was in turn coordinated and reconciled by the SOCCE.

Headings for the exfiltration OPSKED should include unit, mission, departure location and date-time group, platform, primary exfil location and date-time group, alternate exfil location and date-time group, LZ/DZ code name and enroute check points.

Debriefing

Upon successful exfiltration of the SF detachment, the FOB conducts a detailed debriefing according to its SOP. It quickly passes critical items of information to both higher and lower headquarters, with more detailed information included in the FOB daily intelligence summary.

Each SF detachment reports information related to its primary intelligence requirements/information requirements, which will be disseminated for further collection planning. All information is collated at the FOB and placed into intelligence channels for evaluation. Any successful exfiltration is a valuable asset for the FOB planning staff and contributes both to SF detachments currently in mission planning and to all future SF-detachment missions.

Headings for the debriefing OPSKED should include unit, mission, operations-area code name, debriefing date-time group, mission status, primary intelligence requirement, intelligence requirement and area assessment.

Special Forces C³I is a dynamic process which is constantly changing as SF detachments move from one phase to the next. At any given time, several SF detachments are being directed, monitored and tracked by the FOB and SOCCE. Through the use of OPSKEDs, all commanders and their staff can coordinate, synchronize and reconcile operations regardless of the number of their detachments involved. ✕

Author's note: The OPSKED process with the SF C³I model can be significantly improved using the Special Forces communications-electronics operation instructions which will be included in the new SAVSERSUP V, scheduled for release in fall 1992.

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Communal Strife:

The Insurgency of the Future

by Norvell B. DeAtkine

Much of the U.S. Army interest in internal defense and counterinsurgency is focused on the Southeast Asian and Latin American insurgencies of the 1960s and 70s. This type, usually termed revolutionary war, or simply insurgency, is, however, only one type of insurgency. In the book, *Insurgency in the Modern World*,¹ Bard O'Neill has identified six types: secessionist, revolutionary, restorational, reactionary, conservative and reformist.

It is on revolutionary warfare, however, that we have concentrated much of our study of the politico-military aspect of counterinsurgency. Based on the experiences of past wars — the French in Indo-China and Algeria, various Latin American insurgencies and other conflicts around the globe, researchers have constructed numerous models² on the premise that instability is rooted in problems of income distribution, the absence of political participation and a host of other social inequities. If only the existing government could reform itself, execute programs for the welfare of the disenfranchised — so the theory goes — all would be well. The legitimacy of the government would be established, and the favorable environment that the guerrilla requires to survive would disappear.

Although few of the social inequities that spawned revolutionary insurgencies have been eradicated, throughout much of the world, insurgencies are increasingly becoming ethnically, religiously or linguistically based. Most of these communal conflicts would fall into O'Neill's "secessionist" category; other observers have termed them "traditional" warfare.

In essence, communal insurgencies are wars between peoples, e.g., Kurds vs. Arabs, Jews vs. Arabs, Eritreans vs. Ethiopians, Christian and/or Black Africans vs. Arab Muslims in Sudan, Baluchis vs. Pakistanis or Iranians. Communal wars are usually based upon some ethnic, linguistic or racial cleavage in soci-

ety, but they can also be based upon very tenuous self-identification, often founded more in mythology than reality. The primary point is simply that people create their own identity which by definition entails exclusivity and the resulting fragmentation of multicultural societies.

In examining the insurgencies in the Middle East, for example, only one can be singled out as somewhat revolutionary: the 1970-75 Dhofari revolt in Oman. It is difficult, however, to assign that conflict a strictly revolutionary status. It was a revolt by a group of tribesmen who considered themselves ethnically and linguistically different from their neighbors,³ and their efforts to expand the revolt beyond the Dhofari territory into central Omani areas failed. The Dhofari revolt, like many others, disguised its communal basis by application of a strong dose of Marxist rhetoric.⁴

Throughout the Middle East, insurgent groups, such as the Kurds and Sudanese and Palestinian insurgents, make liberal use of revolutionary rhetoric, but with the exception of some fringe Palestinian organizations, they are fighting ethnic or religious wars with nationalist overtones. For example, Israelis often point out that the standard of living for Israeli Arabs is higher than that of Arabs in neighboring countries,⁵ and that Palestinians of the West Bank are probably better off economically than most of their Arab brothers in Egypt or Syria.

But these are meaningless assertions — Palestinians are not looking for civil reforms or greater participation in the Israeli power structure.⁶ Even if offered Israeli citizenship, and the same degree of rights as their Arab compatriots in Israel, few would take them. Nor does the fact that West Bank Arabs probably have more freedom of speech than their brethren in Syria, Iraq or the Gulf states make any difference. Separation from and not integration into Israel is the objective of the Palestinian movement.⁷

In many Third World nation-

states, ethnic or cultural diversity is a time bomb requiring only the mildest of tremors to set it off. We are very much aware of the "ugly American" syndrome, yet we are seemingly surprised when other societies exhibit blatant ethnocentrism well beyond that of the most obtuse American tourist. A few examples will suffice: Muammar Khadafy, in an interview with an Iranian correspondent, was reported as saying: "The mistake (Lebanon) is due to the presence of Arab Christians. An Arab must not be a Christian. The basic call of

"Communal strife is growing throughout the world, with global political developments acting as a catalyst. Within the Third World, there are currents which are on a collision course and which in the coming years will cause repetitive ethnic conflicts, i.e., the erosion of great-power control or influence, and the growth of religious fundamentalism."

Islam is that Arabs must be Muslims. Arabs must fight against each other until they adopt Islam."⁸

Nor is this "special peoples" concept confined to the Arabs. One of the more radical but influential Judaic fundamentalists, the late Meir Kahane, wrote:

"The Arabs of Israel represent a desecration of the Divine Name. ... Their removal, therefore, is much more than a political matter. It is a religious matter, a religious obligation, (a fulfillment of the) commandment to do away with the desecration of the Name. ... Let us remove

the Arabs from Israel's midst as to bring redemption."⁹ (Kahane's "Israel" includes Judea and Samaria, or as we know it, the West Bank.)

In a more civil ethnocentric fashion, Menachem Friedman capitalized the traditional Jewish conception as being, "That Jewish history is essentially unique. The Jewish people, God's elect, is perpetually subject to Divine Providence."¹⁰

The Iranians are no less ethnocentric, as evidenced in this statement by the former Shah of Iran: "Iran was an early home of the Aryans from whom most Americans and Europeans are descended, and we are racially quite separate from the Semitic stock of the Arabs."¹¹

The Khomeini government which succeeded the Shah was much less tolerant of non-Muslim minorities, particularly the Bahai sect, which has been virtually eradicated in Iran.¹²

Although these examples concentrate on the Middle East, communal strife is growing throughout the world, with global political developments acting as a catalyst. Within the Third World, there are currents which are on a collision course and which in the coming years will cause repetitive ethnic conflicts, i.e., the erosion of great-power control or influence,¹³ and the growth of religious fundamentalism as a political ideology in a Third World with growing ethnic separatist tendencies and assertiveness. There is also a perceived diminished usefulness of secular humanism and/or political ideologies as a vehicle for human aspirations.¹⁴ The common thread in all of this appears to be an increasing intolerance toward ethnic, cultural or linguistic minorities within these Third World (or in the case of the Balkans, Second World) nations.

In the classic FID situation, we provide the assistance, encouragement and cajoling needed by the host country to provide the required security and development for its people. Groups such as the

Sudanese southerners, Kurds, Baluchis or even Palestinians would not necessarily be indifferent to greater life-support facilities, freedom of political life or a chance at greater participation in decisions affecting their lives. But outside the usual small numbers of the minority elite who are co-opted by the government with power, money or prestige, the majority of the rebellious peoples would not find new clinics or better roads and schools as anything more than contemptible palliatives. Nor would they view greater participation in the central government as anything more than involvement in their own cultural self-destruction.

Ted Robert Gurr points out that the nation-building approach does not solve the problem of ethnic conflict, but often exacerbates it.¹⁵ National reforms, however well-intentioned, entail an increasing centralization and tighter central-government control, which increase the cultural, ethnic or linguistic awareness and aggravate communal differences. As the government pursues its goal of achieving control, the more significant minorities often become increasingly resentful, and political violence results.

Before we can deal with the problems of communal struggle, there are five aspects of it we need to comprehend:

- First, we need to understand for whom the insurgents fight and to what degree their struggle is supported by their people. The assumption that a rebel minority in a traditional insurgency is united in its demands is seldom correct.

The history of the Kurdish movement attests to this. The Kurds have fought each other as viciously as they have the Iraqis, Iranians or Turks. Even in a period of great opportunities, the Kurds align themselves with competing tribal chieftains and effectively block any close Kurdish coordination. Many side with the government of whatever country they are in.¹⁶

- Second, we need to understand

the society and culture of the traditional insurgent and the attachment of the land to him. For example, it has often been advanced by the Israelis that the Palestinians already have a home, called Jordan.¹⁷ This completely misses the point that the Palestinians want their home on land to which they have a powerful attachment.

- Third, we need to assess and understand the attitudes of other peoples within the rebelling communal region. Should the area become an independent state under the insurgents, how would other minorities fare? All too often the answer is, "badly." The Assyrian

"The unsettling fact which seems to be emerging from long-standing communal struggles is that the rebels are not amenable to political settlement unless they are convinced of the futility of further military resistance. This seems to appear only after one-sided, crushing military defeats."

and Turkoman communities within the Kurdish areas are an example,¹⁸ or the numerous smaller Sudanese animist tribes under the numerically stronger Nuer or Dinka tribes.

- Fourth, we need to recognize that once widespread communal violence begins, the longer it lasts, the less likely the possibility of a peace without national division. Allowed to continue in a protracted fashion, the conflict will admit only one of two endings — one in which the rebellious peoples are allowed to go their own way or one in which the central government is prepared to use overwhelming force to crush

the spirit of the people.

The unsettling fact which seems to be emerging from long-standing communal struggles is that the rebels are not amenable to political settlement unless they are convinced of the futility of further military resistance. This seems to appear only after one-sided, crushing military defeats. The most inhumane and radical execution of this strategy was Saddam Hussein's use of chemical agents against the Kurds and the follow-up mass deportations of the Kurdish population from mountainous areas, as well as numerous other measures taken with the long-term goal of destroying the Kurdish identity. However, in every case an integrated political-military strategy is imperative.

- Fifth, the area expertise so necessary for special-operations forces to operate successfully in a revolutionary scenario will be even more critical in a communal insurgency. The depth and detail of knowledge required will be much greater. For instance, nothing could be more harmful than to launch a civic-action or PSYOP campaign based on the assumption that the Kurds are a monolithic group with common aspirations, or that the Shia Arab villagers of southern Iraq could be lumped together with Sunni Arab tribal confederations or their Persian Shia neighbors.

Since in the not-too-distant future, the U.S. will very likely be faced with situations in which trusted, long-time allies will be wracked by internal communal disputes, we must begin to articulate our philosophical and national approach to the issue of independence movements. What do we do when an old ally is involved in a bitter, protracted guerrilla war against a minority movement seeking autonomy or independence? Today's world of some 170 countries has only 20 without pluralistic societies.¹⁹ Does every communal group claiming a difference on grounds of ethnic origin, language,

culture, etc., have a right to self-determination? Is it immoral or somehow un-American that we be involved in defeating an independence movement? These questions will need to be dealt with squarely, or U.S. public support, which is essential, will be lacking. And if we can convince our populace of the rightness of our course, how can we assist an ally engaged in a communal-insurgency war?

While these questions require solution at a national level, we in the SOF community need to restructure our political-military education in the insurgency field. Some initial steps we should take are as follows:

- Ensure that we maintain some minimal linguistic capabilities in minority peoples' languages, e.g., Kurdish, etc.
- Re-emphasize the study of minority subcultures within a dominant culture, e.g., Copts in Egypt,

Druze in Syria, the many minorities in Balkan and Eastern European countries.

- Most of all, we as Americans must go back and do something we are generally loath to do — learn and absorb the lessons of history. In this regard, some of the jargon and formula-laden tomes of current political science are much less edifying than the older, more reflective studies. An example that comes to mind in viewing the current Balkans conflict is *History of the Balkans*, written by Ferdinand Schevill, originally published in 1921.²⁰ Only by understanding the historical evolution of these communal conflicts will we understand the issues — real or imagined — which have instigated them. ✕

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School. A retired Army colonel, he served more than 26 years as a member of the field artillery branch and as a foreign-area officer. His assignments included service with the 38th Air Defense Brigade in Korea; with the 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam; as commander of the 1/16th Field Artillery, 2nd Armored Division, in Germany and at Fort Hood, Texas; as deputy commander of the III Corps Artillery Brigade at Fort Sill, Okla.; and eight years as an attaché and security-assistance officer in Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt. A 1956 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, he completed the Army War College in 1981. In addition to his bachelor's degree from West Point, he holds a master's degree in Middle East studies from the American University in Beirut.

Notes:

¹ Bard E. O'Neill, "Insurgency: A Framework for Analysis," *Insurgency in the Modern World*, ed. Bard E. O'Neill, William R. Heaton, and Donald J. Alberts (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980).

² For example, Douglas Blaufarb and George K. Tanham, "Fourteen Points: A Framework for the Analysis of Counterinsurgency," (McLean, Va.: BDM Corporation, 1984.)

³ J. B. Kelly, *Arabia, The Gulf and the West; A Critical View of the Arabs and Their Oil Policy* (New York: Basic Books, 1980), p. 133.

⁴ In fact, the imposition of Marxist ideology on an ethnic rebellion was one of the reasons for the failure of the insurgency. See Roy L. Cleveland, "Revolution in Dhofar Sultanate of Oman," *Middle East Forum*, vol. 48, nos. 3-4 (1971), pp. 99.

⁵ The Kurds, long associated with Marxist philosophy and the USSR, nevertheless remain first and foremost a tribal group with a strong feeling of ethnic distinctiveness from the Iranian, Arab and Turkish nations in which they live. See C. L. Edmonds, *Kurds, Turks, Arabs*. (London: Oxford University Press, 1957).

⁶ Based on data in the *World Fact Book 1989* (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1989), passim. But their standard of living is far lower than that of the Israeli Jews. See Hussein Abu Hussein, "Israel's Arabs and the Intifada," *Middle East International*, no. 320 (28 May 1988).

⁷ On this point one could select from volumes of references. A fairly recent and more scientific elucidation of this point is in Mohammed Shadid and Rick Saltzer, "Political Attitude of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 42 (Winter 1988), pp. 25-32.

⁸ Foreign Broadcast Information Service daily report: Near East and South Asia. 10 September 1989.

⁹ Aviezer Ravitesky, "Roots of Kahanism: Consciousness and Political Reality," *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, no. 39 (1986), p. 95.

¹⁰ Menachem Friedman, "The Haredim and the Holocaust," *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, no. 53, (Winter 1990), p. 112.

¹¹ Mohammed Reza Shah Pavlevi, *Mission for My Country*. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1961), p. 18.

¹² *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Middle East and North Africa*. (Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 37. See also James A. Bill and Carl Leiden, *Politics Middle East* (2nd ed.) (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1983), p. 73.

¹³ Richard Hass, "The Superpowers and Regional Conflicts in the Post-Cold War Era." Address given before the SOREF Symposium, 29 April 1990, Washington, D.C., contained in "Proceeding of the Washington Institute: The Middle East in an Era of Changing Superpower Relations," (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute, April 1990), pp. 9-10.

¹⁴ Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," *The Atlantic*, September 1990, pp. 48-60.

¹⁵ Ted Robert Gurr, "Ethnic Warfare and Changing Priorities of Global Warfare," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol. 1, 1990, p. 87.

¹⁶ See Nader Entessor, "The Kurdish Mosaic of Discord," *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 11, no. 4 (October 1989), pp. 88-100.

¹⁷ Kathleen M. Christison, "Myths About Palestinians," *Foreign Policy*, no. 66 (1987), pp. 113-114.

¹⁸ Munir H. Nasser, "Iraq: Ethnic Minorities and their Impact on Politics," *Journal of South Asian and Middle East Journal*, vol. 8, no. 3, (Spring 1985), p. 29.

¹⁹ Gurr, "Ethnic Warfare and Global Security," p. 85.

²⁰ Reprinted by Dorset Press, New York City, in 1991.

Functional Area 39:

Guidelines for Training and Professional Development

by Maj. Jose M. Martinez

The Army is revising its career guidance for officers in Functional Area 39, and it is important that officers currently in or considering election to FA 39 understand the latest guidelines which will affect their designation, training and professional development.

DA Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Utilization*, is being revised to contain the latest information on FA 39, created by the Army in 1988 to offer progressive and sequential assignments to active-duty officers in Civil Affairs

DA Pamphlet 600-3 is currently under revision and subject to final approval. Information in this article is presented as a guideline for FA 39 officers, based on current personnel policies. Soldiers may refer comments to Maj. Hugh Perry or Jose Martinez in the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office (address and phone number listed at end of article). — Editor.

and to active and reserve officers in PSYOP assignments.

Officers are selected for FA 39 during their fifth year of active federal commissioned service as part of the Armywide functional-area designation for their year group. Early designation is possible for officers who have graduate degrees in qualifying disciplines or a foreign-language ability demonstrated by a score of 1/1 or higher (reading/listening, rated in increments from 1-3) on the Defense Language Proficiency Test. Officers who wish to apply for early designation should send their request with a copy of their graduate transcript and/or DLPT score to the FA 39 assignments officer at the Total Army Personnel Command.

Training requirements

Officers will not be accepted for training until they are branch-qualified, less the Combined Arms and Services Staff School, CAS³. Officers must also have a score of 85 or

better on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (or demonstrate language proficiency by scoring at least 1/1 on the DLPT) and complete airborne training before they can begin FA 39 training. To be fully trained, FA 39 officers must attend the PSYOP or CA Officer Course (depending on area of concentration) and the Regional Studies Course; they must also have a foreign-language ability demonstrated by a DLPT score. Because the functional area is new, year-group 85 is the first year-group that will have all officers fully trained. Officers from earlier year-groups should work with the FA 39 assignments officer at PERSCOM to obtain as much training as possible.

Airborne training — Because most FA 39 positions on staffs and in PSYOP and CA units are designated as airborne, a non-airborne officer will find it difficult to remain competitive in the functional area. Officers from year groups prior to 1985 who have already received FA 39 training or an FA 39 assignment

will not be required to complete airborne training to remain in the functional area. Those who have received no previous FA 39 training or assignments may be. Officers from YG 85 and later will be required to take airborne training. If a year group is overstrength in FA 39 officers, airborne qualification may be used as a discriminator in dropping personnel from the functional area.

Academic courses — The Regional Studies Course is a four-month seminar in which the officer studies all five geographic regions of the world, with a concentration in one: Latin America, Asia/Pacific, Africa, Europe or the Middle East. This course, along with a language and graduate degree, provides the broad base of knowledge common to both FA 39 areas of concentration. Officers who graduated from the long Foreign Area Officer Course prior to July 1986 are considered regional-studies-qualified.

In the six-week Civil Affairs and PSYOP Officer Courses, students study subjects peculiar to Civil Affairs or PSYOP. As a minimum, officers from a year-group prior to 1985 must either have completed one of these courses to be designated 39B (PSYOP) or 39C (Civil Affairs), or they must have a strong FA 39 assignment pattern to justify award of either area of concentration based upon experience without actual course attendance. Officers from YG 85 and later must complete all training (less advanced degree) to have a designated area of concentration. Designation is based on the needs of the Army and individual preference. Some officers may become qualified in both areas.

Language training — Initial language training lasts from 6-12 months. Depending on the language, many officers will take language training at Fort Bragg; others will be sent to the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, Calif. The goal for a DLPT score in initial language training varies with language category because of the diffi-

culty involved. For Category I and II languages, the goal is 1+/2/1+ (listen, read and speak); for Category III and IV, the goal is 1+/1+/1+. Throughout their careers, officers should strive to improve their language ability to the 3/3 level; officers who fail to maintain foreign-language skills may be dropped from the functional area.

As an additional incentive, foreign-language proficiency pay is now authorized for all PSYOP and CA personnel, regardless of whether or not they occupy a duty position requiring language. The authorization is in MILPER mes-

“Officers will not be accepted for training until they are branch-qualified, less the Combined Arms and Services Staff School. Officers must also have a score of 85 or better on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery and complete airborne training before they can begin FA 39 training.”

sage number 91-225, dated 261100Z Jul91, Subject: Foreign Language Proficiency Pay Program for Total Army.

Graduate school — A graduate degree is highly recommended for the FA 39 officer, but at present funding levels, less than half of the officers in YG 85 and later can expect to obtain a fully funded degree. The opportunity will be even lower for more senior officers. Officers not chosen for a fully funded program should earn a degree during off-duty time to remain competitive.

Active-component FA 39 officers are usually generalists with a regional orientation — they can

expect to have specialists working for them. The ideal degree is an interdisciplinary social-sciences degree combining political science, international relations, economics, social psychology, area studies and marketing (for PSYOP) or public administration (for Civil Affairs). To meet this need, there is a 12-month full-time, fully funded program at Fort Bragg leading to a master's in international relations.

However, a wide range of degrees obtained off-duty, including many much more specialized than the fully funded program, is acceptable to the functional area. Acceptable advanced degrees include business, economics, engineering, government, agriculture and foreign affairs, to name a few. Officers with questions concerning approval for an advanced degree should contact the PERSCOM FA 39 manager to obtain the list of approved degrees.

Developmental goals

Captains should contact the FA 39 assignments officer at PERSCOM as soon as they begin their final branch-qualifying assignment, such as company command. This will allow time for PERSCOM to schedule them to begin FA 39 training immediately upon completion of that assignment. They should also arrange to take the Graduate Record Examination as soon as possible after functional-area designation and complete, as a minimum, the nonresident phase of CAS³ before the end of their final branch-qualifying assignment. If not completed earlier, resident CAS³ can be scheduled in conjunction with functional-area training. FA 39 training should normally begin no later than the seventh year of commissioned service.

Because of the length of the training program (up to 2 1/2 years if an officer is accepted into a fully funded degree program and sent to study one of the more difficult languages), an officer may start train-

ing early. FA 39 officers will not normally be considered for nominative assignments as captains because of the length of their training and the need to work as captains in their functional area. After training, a senior captain will usually be assigned to a PSYOP or CA unit, or to another position where a field-grade FA 39 officer is available to serve as adviser and counselor.

Majors or promotable captains may attend the Command and General Staff College or its equivalent. Following an initial tour in a PSYOP or CA position, officers not selected for a resident course must complete training by correspondence to bring them to Military Education Level 4.

Officers should seek qualifying assignments in their basic branch as junior majors. Following a branch tour, FA 39 officers will normally return to fill CA or PSYOP positions as senior majors. There are command, battalion S-3, battalion executive officer, and high-level staff positions available to FA 39 majors in both areas of concentration. An officer who does not have an advanced degree should complete one as a major.

Lieutenant colonels who hold FA 39 may be selected to command in either their basic branch or FA 39. Other positions are available on division and corps staffs, as well as on Department of the Army, joint, unified, specified and combined staffs.

FA 39 colonels have a role to play at the highest levels of the military. There is one PSYOP group command; other FA 39 positions are typically found on corps or higher staffs such as Department of the Army, the Joint Staff or at USSOCOM. Self-development goals for FA 39 colonels include improvement of language proficiency and completion of senior service college.

Qualification

To be considered fully qualified, an FA 39 must be fully trained and

complete at least 12 months in an FA 39-coded assignment at each pay grade.

Officers in YG 85 or later must be fully qualified as an FA 39 to be qualified for promotion to lieutenant colonel in the functional area. Officers from earlier year groups may not all have the opportunity to become fully trained, but they will be promoted on a best-qualified basis. Field-grade officers may be dropped from FA 39 if they have received no training or assignments in the functional area.

Officers who meet the criteria for promotion to lieutenant colonel in FA 39 and have strong performances as lieutenant colonels in FA 39 assignments are qualified for promotion to colonel in the functional area. Certain FA 39 assignments are more influential than others. Officers who serve successfully in key jobs should be considered more qualified for command than officers who have not. However, it is the manner of performance that ultimately distinguishes an officer and postures him or her for promotion and command selection.

Most FA 39 officers will dual-track in their branch and functional area. However, officers may single-track in the functional area if they are FA 39-qualified and have an advanced degree in an approved discipline. This advanced-degree requirement can be waived for year groups 84 and earlier. Officers who single-track will compete for promotions, schools, etc., without being penalized for time away from their branches.

Reserve officers

The only FA 39 officers found in the USAR are PSYOP officers. Civil Affairs is a separate Army Reserve branch.

In order to be considered qualified in the functional area, Reserve officers must be branch-qualified and complete the PSYOP course in residence or by a combination of resident and nonresident instruc-

tion. They should strive to serve in PSYOP assignments that yield the same opportunities for development as those of their active-component counterparts. Completion of the Regional Studies Course is highly desirable, but since the resident course is 15 weeks long and the course is not currently available by correspondence, the course is not required for Reserve officers.

Foreign-language ability and a graduate degree in an appropriate discipline are highly desirable. To be selected for battalion and group command, officers should meet more than the minimum requirements and serve in a qualifying position in a PSYOP unit just as the active-component FA 39s.

For further information concerning FA 39, contact either the Special Operations Proponency Office; JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Fort Bragg, NC 28307; phone DSN 239-6406/2415, commercial (919) 432-6406/2415; or the PERSCOM FA 39 assignments officer at : Commander, USPERSCOM; Attn: TAPC-OPB-A; 200 Stovall Street; Alexandria, VA 22332-0411; phone DSN 221-3115, commercial (703) 325-3115. ✕

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Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

MOS 37F now airborne-dependent for active-duty soldiers

Effective Mar. 19, 1992, active-duty MOS 37F (PSYOP) became airborne-dependent, meaning soldiers must now be airborne-qualified to hold the MOS. The change has no effect on reserve-component 37F soldiers, and its effect on junior active-component PSYOP soldiers will be small, according to MSgt. Phillip Snyder, 37F Proponent Manager in the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office. Most PSYOP soldiers in grades through staff sergeant are already airborne-qualified, since SWCS, supported by the Army Recruiting Command, has for several years accepted only airborne AC soldiers for 37F training. The greatest impact will be on sergeants first class and master sergeants, Snyder said: They came to 37F many years ago, and only a few have attended airborne training. Non-airborne 37F have a two-year window in which to attend airborne training, but they will still be competitive for promotion in the meantime. If they choose not to attend, they will have two options: soldiers with more than 20 years' service may have to retire at their next ETS date; those with less than 20 years may be reclassified into a shortage MOS. "Non-airborne soldiers holding MOS 37F need to start thinking about their careers," Snyder said. "If they elect to stay (in the MOS), then airborne school is definitely in their future." The change should improve 37F promotions as non-airborne senior NCOs leave the Army or reclassify. Promotion is already showing some improvement: At the last promotion boards, six PSYOP NCOs were selected for E-8 and nine were selected for E-7. This easing of promotions should continue to filter down through the ranks, Snyder said.

Reserve-component CA soldiers to reclassify into MOS 38A

Reserve-component soldiers holding Civil Affairs skill-qualification identifier "D" may now reclassify to the new RC MOS 38A (Civil Affairs), according to MSgt. Phillip Snyder, 37F Proponent Manager in the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office. Besides holding the SQI, RC soldiers must also have been assigned to a CA unit for at least one year, have attended at least one session of annual training and have the approval of their unit commander. The Army CA and PSYOP Command began handling mass reclassification by command in June, but soldiers may also request reclassification individually. To apply, soldiers should submit a DA Form 4187 through their local personnel administration center; they should also ensure that they are on the unit list for reclassification. SWCS plans to have exportable 38A advanced individual training developed by the first quarter of FY 94, Snyder said. Because of enlisted force-structure increases with the conversion to the Civil Affairs LTOE in 1992 and the delay in fielding the exportable AIT, SWCS will continue SQI "D" training by mobile training teams and the resident course. Prior-service soldiers who wish to reclassify should expect to attend one of these courses, Snyder said. Upon meeting the requirements listed above, they will be reclassified 38A by their units. Non-prior-service soldiers will be required to attend the resident AIT at Fort Bragg beginning in January 1993. Exportable 38A Basic and Advanced NCO Course packages are scheduled for fielding in the first quarter of FY 94.



Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

DCSPER approves increased accessions for SF Branch

Despite the downsizing of the Army, Special Forces Branch continues to grow. Because of increased authorizations caused by new positions at the Joint Readiness Training Center, the activation of the 3rd SF Group and other personnel initiatives, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel has approved an increase in the Special Forces Branch Accession Model to 130 officers per year group, according to the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office. Previously, the accession model goal was 90-100 officers per year group. On the 1991 promotion list for major, released Feb. 11, 1992, Special Forces Branch had a primary-zone selection rate of 70.6 percent, higher than any other branch.

SWCS rewriting SOF chapters in DA Pam 600-3

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School is rewriting chapters on the **Special Forces Branch (18)**, **Civil Affairs Branch (38)** and the **Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs Functional Area (39)** in DA Pamphlet 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Utilization*. This is a stand-alone document designed to be used by individual officers, commanders, career managers, assignment officers and DA selection boards, according to the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office. It specifies standards by grade for schooling and operational assignments which officers must meet to ensure that they have acquired the necessary skills, knowledge and attitudes to be proficient at that grade and to be fully qualified for promotion and retention in their branch or functional area. Publication is scheduled for late 1992.

SOPO loses two officers

The SWCS **Special Operations Proponency Office** recently lost two of its officers to PCS moves. Maj. Jean-Luc Nash, formerly the SOPO Special Forces branch manager, left June 15 to begin training as the defense attache designee to Chad. Maj. Rick Matthews, the Special Forces officer recruiter, left May 1 for an assignment with the 7th Special Operations Support Command in Germany. Capt. Scott Peters has replaced Matthews as the SF officer recruiter.

SF officers should plan for joint-duty assignments

The SF Branch reminds officers of the need to plan for joint-duty assignments in light of the large number of JDAs the SF branch must fill — as an example, at any given time, the Branch has approximately 25 percent of its SF lieutenant colonels in joint-duty positions. Joint duty is regulated by public law (Title IV of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act and Chapter 38, Title 10, U.S. Code, Joint Officer Management). Title IV is complex and places significant restrictions on the flexibility of SF Branch assignment officers. The Army senior leadership has also approved the concept of sending the maximum number of majors to joint-duty assignments. Not all SF officers will serve in JDAs, but for those who do, the timing of the assignment is critical.

WOMA affects pay, promotion for warrants

On Dec. 5, 1991, the President signed the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal years 92 and 93. The Warrant Officer Management Act was part of that bill and became effective Feb. 1, 1992. WOMA amends Titles 10 and 37 of the U.S. Code with statutory changes necessary to implement the following provisions:

- Creation of a new rank of CWO 5 for warrant officers, pay grade of W-5, with a five-percent cap for active components for each of the services. W-5 pay is established at 12 percent above that of W-4. Allowances are increased while special and incentive pays remain the same as the W-4 rate.
- Instead of the previous promotion system using AUS and RA boards, WOMA creates a single active-duty promotion system with flexible zones. Though there will no longer be below-zone consideration for promotion to CWO 3, there will be BZ zones for consideration for promotion to CWO 4 and CWO 5. There are also provisions for officers twice non-selected for promotion, and those not selected for voluntary-indefinite status to remain on active duty until the first day of the seventh month following board approval. This compares with the previous policy, whereas officers non-selected for VI or those twice passed over for promotion had 90 days following board approval to leave the service.
- WOMA provides Army active-duty warrant officers the opportunity to remain on active duty for 24 years of warrant-officer service. CWO 5s may remain on active duty for 30 years of warrant-officer service or until age 62.
- WOMA, as passed, does not apply to the U.S. Coast Guard.

SOF officers selected for colonel-level command

The following personnel have been selected for FY 93 colonel-level command in special-operations units: Jeffrey B. Jones (11/39), Ronald M. Calvert (18/54), Kenneth W. Getty Jr. (18/54) and Frank J. Toney Jr. (18/54).

CAS³ requirement for CGSC approval

The SWCS Proponency Office reminds officers that the **Combined Arms and Services Staff School** is mandatory military training for officers in year groups 1979 and beyond. This applies to officers managed by the Officer Personnel Management Division of PERSCOM and officers from selected special branches. Without completing CAS³, these officers cannot be approved for attendance at the Command and General Staff College. Officers remain eligible for CAS³ attendance until the beginning of their 10th year of service. This is the last year for officers in year group 1984 to attend CAS³ without a waiver; those already beyond their 10th year (year groups 79-83) should request schooling as an exception to policy through their local personnel office. Waivers will be processed to PERSCOM for approval and must include an explanation of why the officer was unable to attend during the past five years of service.



Foreign SOF

Special Warfare

New Colombian special police units to combat kidnapping and extortion

After 937 kidnappings by the summer of 1991 in Santa Fe de Bogota, Colombian President Gaviria's government announced the creation of a new hostage-rescue force, the *Unidad Antisecuestro y Extorcion* (UNASE), or Anti-Extortion and Kidnapping Unit, for exclusive use in Colombia's capital city. According to the Aug. 30, 1991, issue of the Bogota newspaper *El Espectador*, UNASE is composed of 35 personnel: a colonel-commander, four other officers, 15 NCOs and 15 special agents, all volunteers. The unit is said to be capable of responding to any type of hostage-rescue situation in urban or rural environments. Training for the unit was conducted by members of the Police Center for Special Operations; eight members of the group also received specialized hostage-rescue training in Madrid from the Spanish Civil Guard. UNASE has the latest weapons and equipment in the Colombian police-force inventory, including 9mm Beretta pistols; AR-15, G-3 and Galil rifles; voice-secure communications equipment; various types of transport vehicles; and special equipment like fast-rope for rappelling. Following an Aug. 29, 1991, capabilities demonstration in which the unit staged a hostage-rescue operation, General Fabio Campo Silva, commander of the Metropolitan Police, announced the creation of two similar units in the northern Colombian cities of Bucaramangara and Barranquilla. On Oct. 7, 1991, in its first real mission, UNASE rescued a Colombian businessman taken hostage by a local gang, killing two of the hostage-takers.

Mexican 'Force F' handles antiterror, bomb-disposal missions

In June 1983, then-chief of Mexico's Capital Police, Col. Ramon Mota Sanchez, proposed the creation of a special police unit to combat organized crime and criminal violence. Once established, however, the unit evolved into an organization charged with high-risk missions requiring the special training, equipment and skills associated with urban counter-guerrilla actions and antiterrorism. The unit, designated "Force F," is known more familiarly as the "Zorros." Commanded by a colonel directly subordinate to the Secretary General for Protection and Highway Administration of the Federal District, it is based north of Mexico City, close to the Secretary's headquarters. The force's approximately 350 men are armed with weapons including M-16A1s, CAR-15s, 12-gauge shotguns, 30-06 rifles, HK-33 machine guns, 9mm MP-5 machine guns, 9mm pistols, hand grenades and tear-gas guns. Zorros wear military battle dress, body armor and military load-bearing equipment, all in black. Helicopters and special vehicles provide transport. Personnel-selection criteria focus on physical condition, weapons-handling capabilities and the capacity to learn basic and specialized skills. The unit's internal structure is along military lines; it is organized into urban-commando squads, antiterrorist squads, emergency-ordnance-disposal squads and snipers. Usually they carry out 5-6 actions a day, including those dealing with deactivating explosives, rescuing hostages, capturing terrorists and violent criminals, and raiding houses and buildings. They are said to operate with a degree of autonomy and authority not possessed by other security elements. A few specific Force F actions have come to light: In 1986, for example, during the World Soccer

Failed Soviet coup highlights KGB spetsnaz roles

Championship in Mexico, the Zorros were in charge of supervising and protecting all sport installations, press centers, hotels, embassies and the Mexico City Airport. They also helped dismantle a bomb placed close to the U.S. embassy in April 1986. In July 1988, they rescued 20 hostages being held in a commercial enterprise, and the officer in charge, Armando Duarte Badillo, was promoted to commander of the group within months for "heroic" actions. (He was killed in December 1988 during an assault on the Tepic jail.) In September 1988, the Zorros were involved in a controversial action: They assaulted their own judicial building and freed two fellow Zorros being held legally on charges of aggression and bribery. While the assault was publicly condemned, no further judicial action is known to have been taken. Since then, however, the unit has received less publicity. Force F most recently surfaced in the press in late March 1992, when it deactivated a bomb in Mexico City.

Voluminous reporting in the wake of the August 1991 coup debacle in the former USSR has revealed information about two KGB special-operations units and their roles in behalf of the "coup plotters." According to senior Russian Republic spokesmen and a number of KGB special-operations personnel interviewed, KGB *spetsnaz* forces were assigned to storm the Russian Parliament building early on Aug. 21 and seize key leadership personnel, including Boris Yeltsin. Units assigned this mission included the *Alfa* (Alpha) counterterrorist group subordinate to the KGB's Seventh Main Directorate (Surveillance), and commanded by Hero of the Soviet Union, General Major Viktor Karpukhin. The other heretofore unknown group was under the KGB's First Chief Directorate (Foreign Operations) and intended principally for operations abroad. It was commanded by an officer identified only as Col. Boris B. According to a combination of sources, Alpha has been involved in many counterterrorist and internal-security missions since its formation in 1974 and was heavily active in special-operations tasks in Afghanistan. Among its more recent missions was the seizing of a multi-story criminal-detention facility held by armed prisoners who had taken hostages. The FCD group was formed in August 1981 with external reconnaissance, sabotage, training and security missions, and it seems to have been particularly active in internal-security actions. Commanders of both units said they could have accomplished their mission, but only at the cost of many defenders' lives. The assault was to have been commanded by Karpukhin, who controlled not only KGB assault groups, but elements of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) Dzerzhinsky Motorized Rifle Division, the "Moscow Special Army Task Force," and elements from an MVD Militia Detachment of Special Designation (OMON) that in combination totaled some 15,000 personnel. The OMON and other MVD elements were to clear a path through the crowd around the building with gas and water, with the assault groups following by ground and helicopter. Events surrounding the decision not to execute this plan have several variations. Clearly the decision was made by KGB special-operations participants on the scene, and some Alpha subgroup commanders and personnel refused to take part in the action. Karpukhin's role is less clear, but he evidently supported the idea of preventing unnecessary slaughter. He was later relieved from command, and the Alpha and FCD groups resubordinated directly to Soviet President Gorbachev, and secondarily to Russian President Yeltsin. The ultimate status and disposition of these units is uncertain.



Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Maj. Arnaldo Claudio of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Update

Special Warfare

SOF units get new commanders

Some SOF units at Fort Bragg have recently received new commanders.

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow, former commander of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command, **took command of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School** July 24 from Maj. Gen. David J. Baratto. Baratto is now commanding general, U.S. Army Southern European Task Force and 5th Theater Army Area Command, based in Vicenza, Italy.

Brig. Gen. Harley C. Davis, former deputy commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, **took command of the Army Special Forces Command** July 24. **Brig. Gen. Richard W. Potter Jr.**, formerly commander of Special Operations Command-Europe, U.S. European Command in Vaihingen, Germany, **is now the USASOC deputy commanding general.**

Brig. Gen. Joseph K. Kellogg Jr., formerly assistant division commander for operations, 82nd Airborne Division, replaced Potter as **commander of SOCEUR.**

Col. Philip R. Kensinger Jr., former chief of special programs and deputy division chief of USSOCOM at MacDill AFB, Fla., **took command of the 3rd SF Group** July 23 from **Col. Peter Stankovich**, now assigned to the **J-3, SOCEUR.**

Military Free Fall instructor earns Soldier's Medal

A military free fall instructor at the Special Warfare Center and School has received the Soldier's Medal for saving a student's life during a free-fall parachute jump.

SFC Carlos S. Sanchez Jr. of Company B, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group received the award April 22 from Lt. Gen. Wayne A. Downing, commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

The Soldier's Medal is the highest medal awarded to troops who distinguish themselves through heroism involving extreme personal haz-




photo by Keith Butler
SFC Carlos S. Sanchez

ard or life-threatening circumstances during peacetime.

On Aug. 2, 1991, Sanchez was in free fall when he noticed a student descending over another jumper about to open his parachute.

"If a jumper in free fall hits or is hit by a deploying parachute while falling 120 mph, the impact is life-threatening," said Maj. Robert L. Snyder, commander of the Military Free Fall Course and Co. B.

Seeing a collision was near, Sanchez moved toward the upper

student by snapping his arms and feet together to go into a "track," a high-speed dive. He latched onto the student's leg and pulled him away. During the maneuver, the lower jumper's opening parachute slapped into Sanchez's left side.

"I was stunned," said Sanchez, a 13-year Army veteran. "Three of us could have been killed. I felt like I was running full speed into a brick wall."

The impact damaged two of seven air cells in the lower jumper's MT1-XX military parachute, while Sanchez's left arm was bruised.

"The blow threw Sanchez out of control momentarily," Snyder said. "But due to his excellent skills in the air, he was able to regain control of his free fall and deploy his main parachute." Sanchez and both student jumpers managed to land safely. — *SSgt. Keith D. Butler, SWCS Public Affairs Office*

1st Special Forces Regiment appoints officers

The 1st Special Forces Regiment appointed officers at the Special Forces Ball, held in Fayetteville, N.C., April 10.

Retired Col. Aaron Bank was reappointed the honorary colonel of the regiment; retired CWO 4 Harry Rider was reappointed honorary warrant officer of the regiment; and retired Sgt. Maj. Stephen Holmstock was appointed the new honorary sergeant major of the regiment, replacing retired Sgt. Maj. Calvin Thomas.

DoD consolidates oversight of PSYOP

Responsibility for psychological operations within the Department

of Defense has recently been consolidated in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.

The change was effective May 1, according to Lt. Col. Terry Meehan of the DoD Public Affairs Office. Previously, oversight of PSYOP was divided between OASD(SO/LIC), for special operations, low-intensity conflict, resource and Program 11 issues, and the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Security Policy, which oversaw broader PSYOP policy issues.

Consolidation will produce savings in overhead and administrative costs, Meehan said. Three personnel slots have been transferred from ODUSD(SP) to OASD(SO/LIC), but no additional manpower authorizations are involved.

Military-free-fall simulator completed

Construction has been completed at Fort Bragg on a \$5-million facility to be used for training parachutists in military free fall.

The Military Free Fall Simulator Facility contains an enclosed, vertical wind tunnel to simulate the effects of free fall for students in the Military Free Fall Parachutist Course, taught by the Special Warfare Center and School. Suspended in a column of moving air, students will learn and practice body-stabilization maneuvers in relative safety.

The wind tunnel's fan generates winds up to 132 miles per hour within the training chamber, which is approximately 18 feet high and 14 feet in diameter. The moving air will support two jumpers with equipment, approximately 375 pounds, according to John B. Funderburk, military free fall instructor and operations chief for Co. B, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group. Winds will approximate the effect of falling at the rate of about 200 feet per second.

The 11,000-square-foot facility also contains a 32-student classroom, an operator control room,

communications and equipment rooms and a parking area, according to Catherine Cook, chief of the Engineer Branch at the SWCS.

Students in the Military Free Fall Course had previously trained in the vertical wind tunnel at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. SWCS will save an estimated \$100,000 yearly in TDY and transportation costs by having its own free-fall facility, Funderburk said.

SWCS unit receives Army Superior Unit Award

The 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, received



photo by Keith Butler
Soldiers train in the vertical wind tunnel of the SWCS Military Free Fall Simulator.

the Army Superior Unit Award July 16 during a streamer ceremony and change-of-command at Fort Bragg.

"This award is really a product of the efforts by all the soldiers and civilians in the 3rd Battalion," said Lt. Col. Russ Howard, the outgoing battalion commander. With a training-load increase of more than 100 percent, the battalion, with an average strength of 118 people, trained 3,425 students in 27 different courses during 1991. It also supported Operations Desert Shield/Storm and Provide Comfort, and exercises Display Determination in Turkey,

Panther in Peru and Safe Harbor in Cuba, Howard said.

Lt. Gen. Wayne A. Downing, commander of the Army Special Operations Command, called the award significant, adding that only 30 have been awarded in the last year from among the thousands of eligible battalions and companies Armywide.

The 3rd Battalion provides instruction in Army psychological operations (including advanced individual training for MOS 37F), civil affairs and civil-military operations, regional studies and Special Forces functional language training in 13 languages.

SWCS opens new academic facility

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School has opened a new academic facility which will allow it to handle heavier student loads and consolidate training previously scattered across Fort Bragg.

Ribbon-cutting for the \$19.5-million building, located behind the JFK Memorial Chapel and across Community Access Road from the SWCS headquarters, was July 24. Construction of the facility began in the fall of 1989.

The four-story building, 180,000 square feet in all, contains 54 classrooms which can accommodate more than 2,000 students, according to Lt. Col. James F. Johnson, special projects officer for the SWCS. Classrooms range in size from 15-student rooms to a tiered, 250-student room which will be used for instruction and lectures. The building also houses a 10,000-square-foot library.

\$11.8 million contract awarded for Key West facility

The Department of the Navy has recently awarded an \$11.8 million contract for construction of a **Special Forces waterborne-operations training facility at Key West, Fla.**

A joint effort by the Army and

Navy, the facility will be built on land belonging to Naval Air Station-Key West with funding from the Military Construction Army budget, according to Thomas Shipp of the Special Warfare Center and School Engineer Branch. Construction will be managed by the Navy.

Seven buildings will be built to replace World War II-era buildings now in use. The new facility will consolidate training at one site, with some buildings serving multiple uses, Shipp said.

"The new barracks building will have a day room, orderly room and dining facility, with a boat-storage area underneath the building. Classroom and administration areas are planned in one building," Shipp said. A parachute-drying and dive tower will be built adjacent to the existing swimming pool, and a covered training area will be built on the south end of the pool.

The facility will include a medical aid station and boat-maintenance and compressor-and-generator buildings. Construction began this summer and should take about two years, Shipp said. — Carol Jones, SWCS Public Affairs Office

6th SOSC uncases colors at Fort Bragg

A unit established for theater support of Army special-operations forces has recently uncased its colors at Fort Bragg.

The 6th Special Operations Support Command will plan and coordinate logistics, communications and intelligence support for SOF in the Atlantic and Caribbean, said Lt. Col. Walker Broadhurst, 6th SOSC commander.

"We support and sustain all ARSOF operations in the theater, including contingency operations, training and exercises," Broadhurst said. "We are not a command-and-control element; we are the focal point for coordination."

A theater-army asset, the 6th reports to Forces Command but is under the operational control of the

Special Operations Command-Atlantic. Since the XVIII Airborne Corps is the executive agent for contingency operations involving Atlantic Command, the 6th works closely with XVIII Corps and its 1st Corps Support Command.

"We coordinate SOF needs with the highest level of corps staff. We only go to Corps for what is common: beans, bullets, fuel, maintenance. SOF-specific items would have to come from the special-operations command," Broadhurst said.

"We (SOF) are almost always in-theater before there is an infrastructure to support us," Broadhurst said, "And there are no forward elements in the Atlantic area, so there's a real need for somebody to do this job."

The 6th is one of five such theater-Army assets. The 4th SOSC supports SOF in the Pacific; the 7th, Europe; the 5th, the Middle East; and the 3rd, Latin America.

The 6th unfurled its flag April 20, two weeks prior to the beginning of joint exercise Ocean Venture '92, the largest military operation since Desert Shield. The 6th supported SOF units involved in the Caribbean exercise.

"I think this (flag) came at a good time," said Broadhurst, former commander of the 3rd SOSC in Panama, "it put us in the front of the Corps staff's mind, a good reminder, just before Exercise Ocean Venture."

The 6th has 10 people at Fort Bragg — a commander, sergeant major, and two-person staff sections for personnel, intelligence, operations and logistics. A four-person intelligence-support element is located at Atlantic Command headquarters in Norfolk, Va.

Activated at Fort McPherson, Ga., in September 1990, the 6th moved to Fort Bragg in August 1991, but had no official flag.

USASOC breaks ground for new headquarters

A ground-breaking ceremony for the new home of the U.S. Army Spe-

cial Operations Command was held July 1 on Fort Bragg.

The new headquarters building will contain 157,000 square feet and will house USASOC and two of its major subordinate commands: the Army Special Forces Command and the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command.

Total cost of the building project is estimated at more than \$26 million. In addition to the three-story headquarters, the project includes a single-story headquarters-and-headquarters-company facility and the widening of Yadkin Road into five lanes. The project is scheduled for completion in 1994.

CMH publishes historical maps

The Army Center for Military History has recently published "Operation Just Cause" and "Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm," 24-by-30-inch commemorative color maps which depict the Army's role in the two operations.

The maps are available to Army publications-account holders from the Army Publications Distribution Center; 2800 Eastern Boulevard; Baltimore, MD 21220-2896. Account holders may requisition up to 100 copies of "Just Cause" (CMH Pub 70-33) and up to 1,000 copies of "Desert Storm" (CMH Pub 70-34).

The maps are available to the public through the Superintendent of Documents; Government Printing Office; Washington, DC 20402. GPO stock numbers are 008-029-00222-1 (Just Cause) and 008-029-00223-0 (Desert Storm). Maps cost \$5 each.

Units should establish publications accounts

SOF units having trouble obtaining publications may need to establish or modify publications accounts.

Since Jan. 1, 1990, the Army Publications Distribution Center in Baltimore, Md., no longer sends publications to units on an automatic basis. Instead, units must establish

publications accounts to tell the Army what they need.

To establish an account, the unit publications officer should prepare a DA Form 12, *Requirements for Publications*. To request initial distribution of new or revised publications, units must also complete DA 12-series forms to identify the titles and quantities of publications they will need. These should be forwarded to Commander, USAAGPC; Attn: New Account Processing; 2800 Eastern Boulevard; Baltimore, MD 21220.

For further information on publications accounts, consult DA Pamphlet 310-10, *The Standard Publication System Users Guide*.

New equipment will improve PSYOP production

Equipment currently being developed at the Special Warfare Center and School will take advantage of the latest communication technology to improve the production of PSYOP products.

The *Special Operations Media System* is configured as two separate but interoperable units, radio and television, capable of producing and broadcasting PSYOP products. SOMS will be two separate systems, A and B. Both will be vehicle-mounted for greater mobility and ease of transportation. "These are modular-designed systems. Both systems are designed to fit on a C-130 to give us a drive-on, drive-off rapid-deployment capability," said Maj. LaRoy Slaughter, PSYOP branch chief in the SWCS Directorate of Combat Developments.

SOMS B is a short-range tactical radio-and-TV system. Its radio section will monitor, transmit and receive AM, FM and short-wave signals. Its TV section will transmit and receive TV signals over short distances, and it includes a mobile camera system for electronic news gathering. Its products can be fed to Air Force Volant Solo aircraft or through satellite to a "host" system such as the SOMS A, a strategic dissemination company or the 4th

PSYOP Group's media production center at Fort Bragg.

The SOMS A will be more powerful, have longer-range output for strategic and operational applications and be capable of simultaneous production of different media. Each module will be capable of airlift by one C-130. Like the SOMS B, it will be capable of transmitting, receiving and monitoring and can be connected by satellite link to worldwide target audiences.

The system will replace the AN/TRT-22 radio transmitter, a



U.S. Army photo
Equipment rack inside the shelter of the Mobile Audio Visual System.

Vietnam-vintage 50-kilowatt AM radio transmitter which requires seven C-130s to deploy, requires a fixed facility and is limited to commercial AM frequencies. SOMS also replaces the current PSYOP Airmobile Dissemination System, a television- and radio-broadcast system, which does not have organic transportation. SOMS B is scheduled for fielding during the fourth quarter of FY 94. SOMS A is scheduled for fielding in FY 97.

The *Transportable AM Transmitter - 50 kw*, TAMT-50, is a 50-kw medium-wave transmitter which will be used to extend the range of the current TRT-22 AM radio system. It will be compatible with exist-

ing TRT-22 power, antenna and studio facilities. The TAMT-50 can be mounted on either a 2 1/2- or 5-ton truck. It will be fielded as an interim measure until the SOMS is available, Slaughter said, and afterward will continue to be used in situations which do not require rapid deployment. It is scheduled for fielding during the second quarter of FY 93.

The *Mobile Audio Visual System*, AN/MSQ-85B, will be used to provide audio-visual programs in remote areas and to local civilians and enemy prisoners of war. It can receive television, FM, AM or short-wave signals for editing, storage and local presentation. It has video and audio tape recorders and film-processing capabilities, and its output devices include loudspeakers and large-screen still-picture and projection TV. The MSQ-85 will be contained in a shelter carrier and mounted on a 1 1/4-ton truck. Power will come from the system's towed 5-kw diesel generator. Limited fielding began in late 1990 but was temporarily suspended. Fielding is scheduled to resume in late 1992.

Military Group-EI Salvador commended for service

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has awarded the Joint Meritorious Unit Award to personnel assigned to the U.S. Military Group-EI Salvador between Jan. 1, 1990 and Jan. 16, 1992.

The award is contained in Joint Staff Permanent Order J-1SO-0168-92, dated June 3, 1992. It applies to military personnel who were permanently assigned to joint billets and members of the armed forces who were present at the time and participated in the unit's achievements for 30 days or more, according to Peter McGuire of the Joint Staff Personnel Services Division.



Book Reviews

Special Warfare

THE COMANDANTE SPEAKS

Memoirs
of an
El Salvadoran
Guerrilla
Leader

edited by
Courtney E. Prisk

Westview Studies
in Regional Security

The Comandante Speaks: Memoirs of an El Salvadoran Guerrilla Leader. Edited by Courtney E. Prisk. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991. ISBN 0-8133-1066-0. 145 pages. \$25.

Yes, this is yet another book on the struggle in El Salvador, but take another look. The editor, Courtney E. Prisk, has written some of the definitive works on our troubled ally to the south, and this is another fine effort. Additionally, when so small a country loses more than 60,000 people and has an internal struggle which lasts so many years without resolution, we as professional soldiers should welcome any new opportunity for greater insight.

This book will surprise even jaded "experts" on El Salvador, Latin America and insurgency in general. It is, above all, the personal view of a former Salvadoran rebel leader

who changed sides. It gives his innermost motivations and analysis, but it never slips into being a polemic either for or against the FMLN. It looks at the ground level of the insurgency but still deals with ideas and ideals. It is very short, but it is still meaty, with information, charts and insights.

The book is organized simply enough, with two introductions and six chronological chapters. The first introduction is weak: It is a former U.S. ambassador's testimonial to the now-deceased former comandante. But the second introduction, Prisk's four-page synopsis of the war, is excellent. The six chapters follow the ebb and flow of the war and make this synthesis of three separate interviews blend well. Prisk's prefaces to each chapter provide an excellent transition and are the glue that holds the whole thing together.

The book's interview style leaves much to be desired. Prisk has done a laudable job of trying to make the text flow, but the result is still very broken-up. This is the major shortfall, but the book should not be discounted for this reason. Also, the author uses only endnotes. Since the vast majority of the notes are explanatory in nature, footnotes would have been much better.

Overall, the book is well worth the time. It allows the reader to see the development of a revolutionary movement from its infancy. The best part is that this is not a theoretical discourse, but a personal testimony of what the developers did, how they did it and what motivated them along the way. Politics aside, the account is one of dedication, sacrifice and continual internal evalua-


tion on the part of the rebels. We must realize and account for such traits in our opponents, or we will underestimate their tenacity and quite possibly be defeated.

The Comandante's bottom-line analysis of the Salvadoran insurgency is not complimentary, but he avoids the "ex-smoker" syndrome. In other words, he never says, "all those guys doing exactly what I used to do are wrong/stupid/evil." However, by looking at what he does say, one sees a potentially successful revolution gone bad. Between poor organization, internecine fighting, political differences and an overreliance on Cuban support, Cuban advice, and the hope of the Cuban model of revolution, they failed.

The critical lesson for the Salvadoran rebels, and the U.S. as a counterinsurgency adviser, is exactly the same: An overreliance on military means, and military solutions at the expense of political mobilization, will eventually fail. We must realize that the battle is waged first and foremost in the minds of the people. To lose there means defeat.

If you are CA, PSYOP, or SF, you need to read this book. If you are one of those categories and are aimed at SOUTHCOM, it should be required reading. We do not often get to pick the mind of an "enemy." The Comandante's defection provided just such a situation, and we should all take advantage of the opportunity.

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The Secret War with Germany: Deception, Espionage, and Dirty Tricks 1939-1945. By William B. Breuer. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1988. ISBN 0-89141-298-0. 318 pages. \$17.95.

Radio Warfare: OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda. By Lawrence C. Soley. New York: Praeger, 1989. ISBN 0-275-93051-3. 249 pages. \$24.95.

Breuer's book, *The Secret War with Germany*, lends credence to Gustave Lancon's observation that "Scholars are often tainted by the idiocy that they study." As a student of deception, Breuer has somehow become a practitioner himself, for his eye-catching title offers much and promises very little. An amateur historian who has published other works on World War II, the author entices the reader further with intriguing chapter titles such as "A Ghost Army Arises," "Radar Duel of Wits" and "Trojan Horse of Saint-Nazaire," which disappoint the reader for their lack of substance on deception, espionage and dirty tricks, the announced topics of the book.

The Secret War contains 28 such short chapters, vignettes the author apparently chose because he found

them interesting. Most readers will probably not share his enthusiasm. The stories are not well-told and may not even serve well as entertainment or bedtime reading. Even the most casual reader might like to know the context and significance of an episode other than that it was one of many stories that took place during World War II.

Because the book lacks analysis, the more serious student of psychological operations will find little of value in *The Secret War*. Although the author claims to have "collected a mass of pertinent information from books by qualified authors," documents, periodicals, interviews and site visits, he fails to share his experience either in the narrative or in the bibliography. The notes are sparse, no more than eight per chapter, and the works cited consist essentially of the most general secondary works.

Lawrence Soley also practices a bit of deception in *Radio Warfare*, albeit in the subtitle, *OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda*. The CIA is hardly mentioned in this book except for the last five pages. Perhaps the author or the publisher thought that the mention of the CIA on the cover might sell a few more copies. Be that as it may, Soley presents a work of extensive scholarship that is of value to the student of psychological operations.

A professor of journalism and mass communication at the University of Minnesota, Soley has taken advantage of the recent declassification of World War II documents that are now accessible in the National Archives and the British Public Record Office. He has also consulted the papers of key actors such as President Roosevelt; William Donovan, head of the OSS; and Charles Hazeltine of Eisenhower's Psychological Warfare Branch.


Because of its extensive mining of archival materials, *Radio Warfare* offers a wealth of fresh information on U.S. radio propaganda activities, shedding new light on organizations, personalities and operations.

The book treats this material in three chapters: Chapter 3 deals with the North African and Italian campaigns; Chapter 4, Europe 1944-5; and Chapter 5, Asia 1942-5. The chapter on broadcasting in Asia is especially informative, as it involves a subject discussed less thoroughly in earlier works.

Despite its value to the study of propaganda, *Radio Warfare* is not the definitive study of U.S. broadcasting during World War II. The author has shown the way for more work to be done, but he might well have written more here himself.

Instead of concentrating on U.S. broadcasting, he chose to fill approximately one-third of the book with chapters that could almost be called filler. The first chapter randomly surveys subversive radio broadcasting, the second makes a feeble effort to show that U.S. broadcasting imitated the British, while the last chapter, instead of presenting a conclusion, describes Soviet broadcasting and briefly, the birth of the CIA.

Furthermore, *Radio Warfare* would have been more valuable if it had a more solid analytical structure. At times it appears as if the author were trying to attract a wider, more popular readership with



a less demanding narrative style. Perhaps that explains why he often eschews technical terminology.

Nevertheless, *Radio Warfare* is a valuable contribution to the study of psychological operations. It contains useful information on U.S. broadcasting during World War II, and its bibliography and citations point the way for further study.

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Company Command: The Bottom Line. By Col. John G. Meyer Jr. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1990. 235 pages.

Although hundreds of books have been written on leadership and command, few books take the nuts-and-bolts, common-sense approach to solving the problems of the most critical leadership position in which an Army officer can be placed: company command.

Meyer's book addresses the key issues of commanding a company. His knowledge and advice come from a solid foundation as an Army officer. Meyer has commanded at

the company level in combat, during the Vietnam conflict, as well as having been a training-company commander. His advice also comes from commanding a Military Police battalion in Germany and serving on division and Army-level staffs.


The book begins with the first days of command, developing a relationship with the first sergeant and other members of the battalion, followed by the day-to-day operations of the company. A particularly interesting point in the book is the use of personal "war stories" and real-life examples on the challenges of command. No area of commanding a company is left out. Personnel, maintenance, supply, training and legal aspects are all discussed.

Company Command: The Bottom Line is an excellent desk reference that takes some of the guesswork out of commanding a company for the first time.

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America's Small Wars: Lessons for the Future. By John M. Collins. Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1991. ISBN 0-08-040583-5 (hardcover). 288 pages. \$30.

America's Small Wars is the best book out so far on American involvement in low-intensity conflict. Commissioned as a study by the Library of Congress for the House of Representatives, then reprinted by Pergamon-Brassey's for sale to the public, the text is far from the ordinary committee report. Author John M. Collins, a renowned military researcher, has done an excellent job of sorting out concepts, definitions and history. His two-page case studies of 60 low-intensity conflicts are succinct and well-researched. Although one may disagree with some of the author's terms and divisions, one must appreciate the tremendous value of the overview this book presents in a



subject area where most experts tend to argue about details. The book is an easy, fascinating read, and John Collins is to be commended for a significant contribution to American understanding of low-intensity conflict. Although the publisher's \$30 price tag is steep, the book is a valuable addition to the library of any serious student of low-intensity conflict and other "small wars."

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On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War. By Harry G. Summers, Jr. New York: Dell Publishing, 1992. ISBN: 0-440-21194 (paper). 302 pages. \$4.99.

Retired Col. Harry Summers' first book, *On Strategy*, blames the American failure in Vietnam on its strategists' pathological failure to follow the principles of war. His second book, *On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War*, picks up the theme of his earlier work, this time arguing that America's military success in Southwest Asia derives from a military renaissance in which, among other things, the Clausewitzian fundamentals of war returned to U.S. military doctrine

and practice.

The book begins with a discussion, following Clausewitz, of how the public and the government influence the conduct of war. Summers then briefly examines the roles and behavior of both entities with respect to Vietnam and the Gulf War. He notes that successive American presidents failed to galvanize public support for the war in Vietnam, and that Congress timorously avoided either declaring war and cutting off its funding. Summers credits President Bush with developing public support for military action in the Gulf by clearly and forcefully, if belatedly, articulating the importance of U.S. action. The author goes on to mark Congress' eleventh-hour vote to authorize the use of force against Iraq as the end of Congress' "Vietnam syndrome."


In what is easily the best part of the book, Summers next considers the military's response to the Vietnam War. Determined that the military errors of Vietnam not be repeated, Summers argues, those who commanded there launched the U.S. armed forces on a martial renaissance, a two-decade revival in the study of the art of war that led to a thorough overhaul of doctrine, equipment and training.

Key to this revival, Summers claims, was the reintroduction of Clausewitz's *On War* to the curriculum at the nation's war colleges, beginning with the Naval War College in 1976. Its study was a factor in the Navy's development of an offensive maritime strategy, as well as the Army's rediscovery of the principles of war and operational art — both keys to the development of AirLand Battle doctrine.

In the book's final section, Summers follows the pattern of his first volume, measuring U.S. military performance against the principles of war. In contrast to his evaluation of its performance in Vietnam, Summers claims that in the Gulf War the military fought with clearly defined objectives and unity of

purpose. General Schwartzkopf achieved swift and overwhelming success by massing his combat power at the critical place and time through surprise, maneuver and a premium on the offensive. Summers' analysis reaches a very simple conclusion: The strategic mistakes in Southeast Asia were corrected 20 years later in Southwest Asia.

But the ease with which Summers draws this conclusion should raise an eyebrow. There are still too



many differences between the two wars to suggest that the strategic principles that prevailed in the latter could also have in the former. The war in Vietnam, as Summers notes, occurred under the shadow of superpower confrontation, and thus a number of strategic and tactical options were impossible because of their political implications. But Summers doesn't consider other important differences between the two conflicts. The deserts of Kuwait favored American high-tech weapons, especially precision-guided munitions and long-range tank fire; in the jungles of Vietnam the infantry shot it out at close range. The Iraqis had virtually no combat

intelligence aside from CNN; the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese seemed to know the U.S. Army's every move. The will of the North Vietnamese to keep fighting, even after major tactical setbacks, contrasts sharply with the crowds of surrendering Iraqis.

The book's failure to look at this sort of detail points to its greatest shortcoming. Published quickly after the war's end, the book lacks the critical detachment that would allow it to live up to its billing as a "critical analysis" of the Gulf War. The bulk of the book's endnotes cite newspaper and magazine articles, syndicated columnists and statements by politicians — hardly the spadework of true military history or analysis. Further, the book arrives at its conclusions without the sensitive handling of complex issues and conflicting evidence that marks authentic criticism.

The book is worthwhile reading for the special-operations community because it indirectly poses some problems worth pondering. If Summers is correct about the close link between the American people and the military, SOF's peacetime-engagement missions may be destined to fail, as they may never receive the wholehearted support of the American people. Foreign internal defense and counterinsurgency missions inherently require long-term involvement in nations whose governments may have questionable human-rights records and little commitment to reform, something the U.S. public may not be willing to stomach. Further, such missions may be perceived as another instance of throwing money into foreign countries when it could be used on domestic problems.

The book poses a second problem for special operators, even if they can demonstrate success in peacetime engagement. Summers has the ear of the conventional Army — his first volume has become mandatory reading in some service schools, his weekly column is widely read, and, as the present volume's cover

reminds us, he was "seen on NBC news as [a] Gulf War Expert." Summers' doctrinaire presentation, and, in particular, his summary dismissal of counterinsurgency strategy, will no doubt continue to influence military planners and doctrine developers for years — and perhaps exacerbate the unfortunate rift between conventional and special-operations forces.

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From Shield to Storm: High-Tech Weapons, Military Strategy, and Coalition Warfare in the Persian Gulf. By James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1992. ISBN: 0-688-11034-7. 512 pages. \$20.


James Dunnigan and Austin Bay have produced one the first of many books on Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield. From the outset, readers should understand that this effort is neither academic nor scholarly. Nothing is footnoted or referenced, and serious researchers will no doubt shy away from it. Even with that limitation, it is an enjoyable analysis of the steps leading up to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and subsequent events.

The volume is well-organized to provide the reader with an extraordinarily diverse range of information. This includes examinations and analyses of the Arab state system; Saddam Hussein's rationale for risking the invasion; an overview of United States interests; the role played by the United Nations; an account of the possible reasonings of coalition partners; and a historical review of events that led to the biggest global military event since the end of World War II.

The authors obviously did their homework. The data are well presented and reasonably accurate. Each Arab country involved is

examined in what Dunnigan and Bay call "data capsules." These provide readers unfamiliar with the Gulf region with enough information for a basic understanding of an extremely complicated area of the world. Middle East specialists will likely scoff at the hip-pocket analyses, yet, more often than not, the authors hit the mark. The work also contains concise explanations of the workings of prominent air and ground battlefield weapons used in the conflict.

Those who are looking for analyses of tactics and the operational



art should look elsewhere. Although the authors provide an overview of such things as the joint-warfare aspect of the war, there is insufficient depth to be especially useful. Maybe the best way to describe Dunnigan's and Bay's effort is by using the analogy of an enormous jigsaw puzzle. The authors attempt to provide as much information, political and military, as possible, with only the smallest amount of explanation concerning each piece of the puzzle. Although that sounds like criticism, surprisingly, the technique works. This reviewer's understanding of the events before, during, and after the Gulf War was improved because of their approach. The authors make a number of

important points throughout the text. For instance, "The war in the Persian Gulf was the first war in American history that its armed forces were actually trained and prepared for." Dunnigan and Bay recognize that AirLand Battle doctrine worked because tenets of initiative, agility, depth and synchronization had been fully integrated into American military thinking, and that thinking paved the way for ultimate coalition success on the desert battlefield.

The authors provide lots of numbers — numbers of tanks, aircraft and aircraft sorties, ships and troops. Although the data may well be correct, it is a major weakness that Dunnigan and Bay chose not to tell us where their information came from. *From Shield to Storm* is written with a broad perspective, by the authors' own admission. Some of the chapters are transplanted, although reworked, from Dunnigan and Bay's other book, *A Quick and Dirty Guide to War*. It is clear that they capitalized on previous research to bring this book to press so quickly.

Frankly, despite its warts, *From Shield to Storm* is enjoyable reading. More volumes on the Gulf War will follow, and much of that work will be highly footnoted and laboriously academic, but for clarity and ease of reading, Dunnigan and Bay will be hard to beat.

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
Special Forces at War: An Illustrated History, Southeast Asia 1957-1975. By Shelby Stanton. Charlottesville, Va.: Howell Press, 1990. ISBN 0-943231-28-0. 383 pages.

Do not be misled by the appearance of this book. Cover and format to the contrary, this is not another "coffee table" volume. The author is a combat veteran of Vietnam, with extensive archives of photos and

documents of his own to draw upon. Shelby Stanton has long since established his credentials as a military historian, particularly of the Vietnam-U.S. conflict, with his authoritative studies *Vietnam Order of Battle*, *Green Berets at War*, and *The Rise and Fall of an American Army*.

Special Forces at War begins with World War II's Office of Strategic Services, and concludes with the fall of the Republic of Vietnam. Stanton deals with the Laos Bright Star operations, the early SF years in South Vietnam, the U.S. military buildup, and the SF Civilian Irregular Defense Groups. He also includes a fairly detailed narrative and analysis of the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam Studies and Observation Group, which, while not a Special Forces organization, included a number of SF troopers in its covert offensive missions.

The book includes superb maps of corps tactical zones, South Vietnam's ethnic groups and Special Forces in Laos, as well as the terrain and topography of those portions of South Vietnam of prime interest to special-operations forces. It is rounded off with a selection of Special Forces' psychological-operations leaflets for Cambodian, Thai, Laotian and lowland-Vietnamese civil society, as well as for the Mon-



tagnards. This is a work that should be read by veteran members of the SOF community as well as by anyone who wants to learn about a Vietnam success story — the "other war."

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
OSS Against the Reich The World War II Diaries of Colonel David K.E. Bruce. Edited by Nelson Lankford. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1991. ISBN 0-87338-427-X. 257 pages. \$28.50.

After many years, many of the wartime secrets of the OSS and the British SOE are now coming to light, revealed by declassification and the publication of veterans' memoirs.

In 1986, the Virginia Historical Society received the papers, medals and orders of Col. David Bruce, formerly the head of the OSS-Europe branch. This portion of his estate was placed on exhibit, and Nelson Lankford managed to obtain Bruce's private wartime diaries.

Bruce was chosen by Col. "Wild Bill" Donovan to run much of the infant OSS operation in Europe. The British were very much interested in the shaping, direction and leadership of the new agency, and Bruce's job required endless liaison work and travel. The diaries, lacking the sort of vanity that often characterizes diaries or autobiographies, are of interest to those who wish to know what it meant to be a strategic planner and liaison at a time when the OSS was just starting.

The diaries are a wealth of information and observations. They run, with some exception, from May 1942 until December 1944. While he does not see much combat, Bruce observes much more. His account of the invasion of Normandy is first-rate, one of the better eyewitness accounts from a strategist's point of view. His account of the invasion of



Sicily is also very good, with a description of the introduction of Civil Affairs into the U.S. Army and an interesting comment on the finding of the battle plans of the Germans.

Another excellent account is of the formation and control of agent networks and problems of recruiting and placement. Bruce also makes some interesting strategic observations on the Germans and their will to resist the invading allies.

The book is good for those who are interested in the personalities who began the OSS and the pace of the times. Readers looking for a great number of lessons learned will be disappointed, but those interested in Sicily and D-Day, as well as Civil Affairs, will find many items of interest. Lankford has done a commendable job in bringing this rightly distinguished, yet obscure, historical figure to light.

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Special Warfare

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