From the Commandant

Special Warfare

In the arsenal of warfare, one of the oldest weapons is psychological operations. Since Biblical times, destroying the enemy's will to fight has been an important element of battle, and U.S. history records PSYOP's contributions to military operations from the War for Independence through Desert Storm.

Honoring its ancient lineage, PSYOP remains important in contemporary military activities as a means of reducing conflict and saving lives. Broadcast and leaflet campaigns in Panama and Desert Storm demonstrate PSYOP's continued value in supporting combat forces. In peacetime, PSYOP has an equally important role in winning foreign public support for U.S. forces engaged in FID and humanitarian-assistance missions. In fact, its role in low-intensity conflict promises to make PSYOP an even more powerful weapon in the conflicts and crises we will face in the future.

To prepare for that future, Army PSYOP plans to reorganize into a structure emphasizing functional and regional orientation and the integration of active and reserve-component PSYOP forces. Subject to final approval by Department of the Army, this new plan reflects the current provisional organization of the 4th PSYOP Group, a structure tested and validated during Desert Storm. The Special Warfare Center and School assisted the Army CA and PSYOP Command and the 4th PSYOP Group in the development of this concept, and we are now reviewing the necessary changes in employment and organization of PSYOP forces prior to developing tables of organization and equipment and new doctrine.

Current doctrine is reflected in the revised FM 33-1, Psychological Operations, now being fielded. It includes recent changes in technology, lessons from recent operations and integrates PSYOP into the concept of AirLand Operations. A how-to manual, FM 33-5, PSYOP Techniques and Procedures, is scheduled for publication in 1993; it will link doctrine to the day-to-day operations of the PSYOP force.

Along with doctrine, we are updating training to include recent lessons learned. SWCS training for psychological operations runs from the enlisted individual training, through PSYOP NCOES and the PSYOP Officer Course to the Joint PSYOP Staff Planners Course. Nor does PSYOP training end at SWCS: the Army has now integrated PSYOP into courses at the Command and General Staff College and exercises at the Joint Readiness Training Center and in the Battle Command Training Program.

Key to modern PSYOP techniques has been the development of printing and communications technology in the 20th century. Equipment to be fielded in the near future will make use of the latest technological advancements and allow PSYOP to broadcast over longer ranges, using the full range of media. Lighter-weight systems will allow easier transportation and deployment. Recent changes in the world order and U.S. defense structure point to a rapidly changing and uncertain future, but some things remain constant. Nearly 2,400 years ago, Sun Tzu said, "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence." Despite the passage of centuries, PSYOP remains a formidable weapon of persuasion which, used with other SOF or conventional forces, can play a key role in keeping the peace and protecting U.S. interests around the world.

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

Joint PSYOP Staff Planners Course. Nor does PSYOP training end at SWCS: the Army has now integrated PSYOP into courses at the Command and General Staff College and exercises at the Joint Readiness Training Center and in the Battle Command Training Program.

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Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow
Training the PSYOP Force

by Maj. Jay M. Parker

The U.S. Army has undergone tremendous changes in recent years and faces even greater changes in the years ahead. The end of the Cold War, the dramatic realignment of the international order, and the reduction of the U.S. defense budget have all reshaped the Army and the world in which it must serve.

Psychological operations is prepared to meet the challenges of this new world as a potent and cost-effective combat multiplier. This requires a PSYOP force trained to understand the dramatic changes in communication and media technology, a force able to capitalize on recent lessons learned, and a force fully integrated with the AirLand Operations construct. Training that force, and preparing the doctrine on which its training is based, is the responsibility of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School’s 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group.

Doctrine

As existing PSYOP doctrine has been tested during Operations Just Cause, Desert Shield/Storm, and numerous other deployments, the lessons learned have been gathered and analyzed. From those lessons, the Special Warfare Center and School, together with the PSYOP force, began the process of preparing the doctrine that will take PSYOP into the 21st century. The result is both a new basic doctrine manual and a manual on PSYOP tactics, techniques and procedures.

The revised FM 33-1, Psychological Operations, is now being fielded. FM 33-1 is designed to be a user-friendly doctrinal manual that will encourage corps and division commanders to incorporate PSYOP into the planning and operations processes. It captures the lessons learned from Desert Shield/Storm and other recent operations, recognizes the dramatic changes in communication technology and integrates them with AirLand operations.

FM 33-5, PSYOP Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, is scheduled for release in 1993. It provides the basis for PSYOP execution and training development and is the first effort to link doctrine to the real day-to-day operations of the PSYOP force. Together, FM 33-1 and FM 33-5 will provide the SOP community and the Army with the tools and information necessary to plan for and use PSYOP on the modern battlefield.

Training

The link between doctrinal and the PSYOP force is PSYOP training. This training ranges from enlisted advanced individual training through PSYOP NCOES and the Psychological Operations Officer Course up to the Joint Psychological Operations Staff Planners Course. The SWCS has developed a fully integrated training plan that links PSYOP soldiers to the doctrine and to every level of PSYOP practice.

PSYOP Officer Course

Third Battalion is responsible for PSYOP officer training through the Functional Area 39 (PSYOP and Civil Affairs) training program. FA 39 training has four pillars: language training, training in the SWCS Regional Studies Course, graduate training, and CA or PSYOP-specific training.

PSYOP training in the Psychological Operations Officer Course gives PSYOP officers the tools to influence not only the services, but the entire interagency arena in planning and conducting a wide range of PSYOP.

The POOC prepares captains and majors for command and staff positions in the PSYOP group or in other staff-level positions throughout the Army and the joint arena. This six-week course not only teaches psychological-operations doctrine and skills, but also how to apply the doctrine and skills to the missions of the supported unit commander, country teams and senior staff planners.

In essence, POOC teaches captains and majors to be division and corps command-resident PSYOP experts. They also gain the confidence to address PSYOP at the highest levels of joint planning and execution.

New instruction in the POOC takes advantage of lessons learned in recent operations, new PSYOP doctrine, and integration of the doctrine of other SOF and the Army’s battlefield operating systems. Current instruction also places greater emphasis on collateral activities and AirLand Operations with coalition forces.

Instruction in the POOC is divided into six areas:

- Social and behavioral sciences – Students learn to identify potential target audiences and the dynamics of the communication process.
- Instruction places emphasis on understanding cultural biases and learning those of the target audience in order to execute effective PSYOP.
- The PSYOP process – Students learn to execute the processes involved in conducting PSYOP. They cover the role of PSYOP studies and intelligence collection in the research phase, the psychology of persuasion and its use in the target-audience analysis phase, and production of PSYOP products.

Instructor’s Notes

- The end of the Cold War, lessons from recent operations and advances in technology have dictated changes in the training and doctrine of modern U.S. PSYOP forces.

Enlisted students learn printing techniques at the JFKSWCS during advanced individual training for MOS 37F, PSYOP specialist.

October 1992
Students study the concept of PSYOP, historical examples of its use and the importance of the PSYOP dimension of military operations.

**Joint PSYOP Course**

The Army is the DoD proponent agency for Joint PSYOP training and the Joint Psychological Operations Staff Planners Course is designed to train in support of PSYOP among the services. The two-week course trains selected commissioned and noncommissioned officers and mid-level officers from key civilian agencies. Students learn to coordinate PSYOP in support of a unified or specified command and to employ PSYOP techniques and procedures in support of joint operations in peacetime, crisis or open hostilities.

The course is divided into four areas: introduction to PSYOP, PSYOP techniques and procedures, joint planning and a two-day end-of-course command-post exercises. The course is taught through a combination of lectures, small-group instruction and discussion seminars, most of which are taught by guest instructors with experience in their field. Practical exercises reinforce training objectives throughout the course.

**37F AIT**

SWCS also teaches advanced individual training for MOS 37F, psychological-operations specialist. During this 11-week course, active and reserve-component soldiers receive technical training in PSYOP skills and related social sciences while taking part in Army common-core subjects which continue the soldier development begun in basic training. Here, too, instruction integrates doctrine of other SOF and battlefield operating systems.

In the past, 37F AIT consisted largely of classroom instruction; tactical training was limited. Course instruction has been improved to teach technical skills in sequential building blocks. There is also a greater emphasis on hands-on tactical training, including a command-post exercise set in a foreign-intelligence-defense scenario. Tactical training culminates in a tactical airborne operation (for active-component students) and a four-day field training exercise. In keeping with the most recent PSYOP doctrine, 37F AIT is designed to produce a PSYOP soldier able to operate effectively with combat, combat-support, and combat-service-support units in a variety of operations.

**Training the force**

A central and equally important SWCS mission is the PSYOP training of the remainder of the Army. The first step in this process has been the integration of PSYOP training in the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. Fort Leavenworth is the crossroad of Army training and provides a means of reaching future operations officers, and, eventually, battalion commanders who must use PSYOP in AirLand operations. Students at CGSC are now using psychological-operations doctrine as it is being developed. They are required to integrate PSYOP into all of their mission planning.

SWCS also participates in several other training programs that help to institutionalize PSYOP throughout the Army and the joint areas:

- **Battle Command Training Program** — SWCS officers serve as observers and trainers in multinational- and corps-level exercises to evaluate a unit’s ability to integrate PSYOP into its mission-planning and execution process. They also coordinate with the unit prior to the evaluation and provide both a general presentation of psychological-operations capabilities and specific suggestions on how the unit can best integrate PSYOP into its mission analysis and planning.
- **Joint Readiness Training Center** — Where BCT components the opportunity to integrate PSYOP into mission analysis and planning.
- **Mobile training teams** — SWCS personnel and joint exercises, and PSYOP personnel are in constant touch with Army, joint and other services’ staffs, key civilian agencies and the various theater commanders. Representatives from all these activities frequently serve as guest instructors in the FA 39 training program.

**Conclusions**

In 1985, the Department of Defense responded to a presidential directive “to revitalize DoD PSYOP and integrate it into other ... programs of the United States Government.” The resulting 1985 PSYOP Master Plan was aimed at making DoD PSYOP “one of the strategic instruments of national security policy” and requiring “consideration and use of PSYOP in peace time, crisis, and war.” Since 1985, the Army has put PSYOP to the test in Panama, in the Persian Gulf, and as a key player in a wide range of peacetime deployments. In every case, PSYOP soldiers have served with distinction, and the Army’s PSYOP force has validated the imperatives of that visionary plan.
PSYOP Support to Operation Desert Storm

by Maj. Jack N. Summe

Shortly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on Aug. 2, 1990, a special planning cell from Fort Bragg’s 4th Psychological Operations Group deployed to the headquarters of U.S. Central Command at MacDill AFB, Fla. Its mission was to plan the PSYOP support for what was to become the most extensive deployment of U.S. troops and logistics since World War II — Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Those plans were only the beginning of the 4th POG’s involvement. In late August, the commanders of the 4th POG and its subordinate 8th PSYOP Battalion left for Saudi Arabia to spearhead the deployment of 4th POG assets. As the strategic-propaganda-development battalion for the Middle East region, the 4th was task-organized with elements of the POG’s PSYOP Dissemination Battalion, or PDB, to form the 4th Psychological Operations Task Force. The POTF’s deployment on Sept. 8 and 23 began what was to be a highly successful use of PSYOP in support of conventional combat operations in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq.

Organization

The deployed 4th POG organization evolved over time to include more than 650 personnel — comprising active, reserve, and National Guard units. Under the operational control of U.S. Central Command, the organization included a strategic PSYOP battalion; the PDB; and the 6th and 9th Tactical PSYOP Battalions augmented by loudspeaker teams from the 180th, 19th, 244th, 245th and 362nd Reserve Tactical PSYOP Companies. Other elements included liaison officers supporting the CENTCOM component headquarters, while the PDB and tactical-support battalions, and PSYOP-support elements were stationed in the east near Dhahran and King Fahd International Airport. Upon the forward deployment of the VII and XVIII Corps and Marine Corps units, all tactical-support elements accompanied the headquarters they supported.

Mission

The mission of the 4th POG and 8th POTF was taken from and directly reflected the missions of U.S. Central Command in Saudi Arabia. These were to demonstrate U.S. resolve and improve the image of U.S. forces in-catcher, to support the defense of Saudi Arabia, and to support offensive, consolidation, and enemy-prisoner-of-war operations through various means, all of which involved establishing direct communication with enemy or civilian elements through the media of print, broadcast and loudspeaker operations.

Planning and execution

Initial planning was directed toward easily coordinated and obtainable PSYOP dissemination methods. Such methods include airborne distribution of leaflets by C-130 aircraft or broadcast of selected news and information items by KC-130 Volant Solo aircraft. These efforts formed the nucleus of an operation that eventually distributed more than 29 million leaflets by MC-130, F-16, B-52 and F/A-18 aircraft and 155mm leaflet artillery shells.

The combined PSYOP effort included Saudi, Egyptian, Kuwaiti, and British interpreters who were collocated with a U.S. propaganda-development cell, as well as Saudi and Kuwaiti linguists supporting front-line loudspeaker operations. The 8th POTF was located in Riyadh with USCENTCOM and the component headquarters, while the PDB, tactical-support battalions, and PSYOP-support element were stationed in the east near Dhahran and King Fahd International Airport. Upon the forward deployment of the VII and XVIII Corps and Marine Corps units, all tactical-support elements accompanied the headquarters they supported.

Leaflet operations

Extensive leaflet operations during both Desert Shield and Desert Storm formed the main thrust of PSYOP support to the war. Throughout the build-up period of September to December 1990, the majority of the effort consisted of campaign development, product development, product review and pretests. Pretests used Kuwaiti soldiers and refugees as the first test group, followed by Iraqi EPWs after the start of the air campaign. Campaign themes focused on futility of resistance; inevitability of defeat; surrender, desertion and defection; abandonment of equipment; and blaming the war on Saddam Hussein. Leaflets were initially disseminated prior to combat operations by C-130 aircraft; they were dropped from high altitude along the southern Kuwaiti border and followed wind patterns to cover the majority of front-line Iraqi units in Kuwait. Once the air campaign began, leaflets were distributed by F-16 and B-52 aircraft, using the M-129A1 leaflet bomb, against targets such as Baghdad, Republican Guard units in southern Iraq, and deception targets throughout the Kuwaiti theater. C-130 distribution of leaflets continued during Desert Storm and was the heaviest-used means of dissemination during the war. Statis- tics on leaflet distribution are: 19 million by C-130, eight million by F-16, and two million by B-52. Other means included hand-carried leaflets and posters, 155mm leaflet artillery rounds, and water bottles used to float leaflets to the Kuwaiti shore. Leaflets were used to support both combat and deception operations across the entire theater and had a significant impact in degrading enemy morale and will to fight.

Post-testing on Iraqi EPWs found that 98 percent of the test group was exposed to leaflet products, 80 percent believed the PSYOP messages, and 70 percent were influenced by the leaflets to defect or surrender.

The credibility of the overall PSYOP effort was improved by coordinating leaflet operations with B-52 bombing along enemy front-line positions. Leaflets were dropped telling the enemy force that bombing would begin against a specific unit on a specific day and encouraging them to surrender or defect. This was followed by the bombing and another leaflet drop predicting the next strike. Post-tests showed that...
Leaflets such as this one were used to support both combat and deception operations during Desert Storm. The campaign was highly credible among Iraqi soldiers and produced large numbers of desertions and defections.

Broadcast operations

Broadcast operations supported strategic, operational and tactical efforts across the theater. Initial broadcast efforts consisted of developing a multinational-power videotape which described and projected the resolve, strength and technological superiority of the coalition forces arrayed against the Iraqis. The videotape was intended to encourage support of coalition objectives in the region and to degrade the Iraqi will to fight by emphasizing the futility of standing against such a force. The videotape was produced and distributed throughout the Middle East, even in inaccessible areas such as Baghdad. Other broadcast operations were limited primarily to radio broadcasts. Programs were broadcast from two sites in Saudi Arabia, Abu Ali and Qayyarah, and two EC-130 Volant Solo aircraft flew broadcast orbits over specific areas of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. Broadcasts consisted of a two-hour radio program of Arabic music, selected news items, information and various PSYOP spot announcements. The emphasis here was to attract an enemy audience through the accuracy of the program’s news items concerning the Gulf conflict.

Indications of the operation’s success were the continual jamming efforts of Iraqi ground commanders and the ban on radios in Iraqi combat units. Post-test operations also indicated that 58 percent of all Iraqi soldiers questioned were exposed to broadcast operations — 46 percent believed the PSYOP message, and 34 percent were induced to surrender or defect.

Loudspeaker operations

Although loudspeaker operations were not highly publicized, they were extensive, and they played an important role in the overall PSYOP effort. Designed to support specific corps- and division-level tactical operations, loudspeaker operations focused on communicating with the enemy and reinforcing leaflet and broadcast messages of futility and surrender.

Loudspeakers were also used in deception operations to simulate the movement of heavy combat equipment in an effort to disclose enemy artillery positions to counter-battery and TAC air fire. Marine Corps units were particularly successful with both types of loudspeaker operations, and the XVIII Airborne Corps used loudspeakers successfully to encourage enemy surrender prior to the beginning of the ground campaign.

Loudspeaker operations used Kuwaiti and Saudi linguists attached to the tactical-support PSYOP battalions as well as linguists organic to the 4th POG. Of the EPWs post-tested, 34 percent were exposed to loudspeaker operations, 18 percent believed the PSYOP message, and 16 percent stated that loudspeaker operations induced surrender or defection. Such response proves that loudspeaker operations are not obsolete in a large, armor-heavy ground operation.

Impact indicators

Other than the impact indicators already discussed, there were significant intelligence reports concerning the impact of PSYOP in the Gulf conflict. These showed that the Iraqi soldiers and command structure were highly susceptible to PSYOP efforts. Other than TV coverage showing surrendering Iraqi soldiers vigorously waving leaflets at U.S. and multinational forces, the following represents the most compelling anecdotal evidence of a significant PSYOP impact:

• Iraqi soldiers routinely abandoning their equipment in response to the PSYOP campaign to separate soldiers from their systems while under attack.
• Iraqi soldiers firing their weapons at falling leaflets.
• Repositioning of Iraqi units in an effort to support the U.S. deception campaign.
• Searches for leaflets and radios among Iraqi units.
• Reports by an Iraqi general that leaflets were a significant influence on soldiers’ desertion. Most desertions were caused by radio and leaflet reports of future B-52 bombings.

Iraqi “death squads” patrolling the neutral zone in an effort to stop the large number of defectors prior to and during the air campaign.

Although this is not a comprehensive list, it is indicative of the success of the PSYOP effort and the credibility of PSYOP in peace and war.

Conclusion

While PSYOP did not win the war, it played a significant part in the victory by playing on the preconceived fears and concerns of Iraqi soldiers in both front and rear areas. In many ways, U.S. PSYOP in Desert Storm was more successful than ever before — it was planned, coordinated and executed in a joint, multinational and multithread effort. Its success was tangible, measured in desertions, defections and surrenders by the thousands. In the final analysis, PSYOP saved tens of thousands of American, Coalition and Iraqi lives. PSYOP came of age as a force multiplier in support of large-scale, conventional operations. It should be integrated in all future operations to minimize loss of life on both sides.
The new concept divides the world into thirds—an Eastern region, encompassing U.S. European Command and U.S. Central Command, and an Atlantic region, covering U.S. European Command (Europe to the Urals and Africa). This division takes into account the cultural and regional expertise required of PSYOP units to support these areas.

**Force structure**

The current PSYOP LTOE structure was based on the concept of a fully capable PSYOP unit assigned at the division level of military operations. Under this concept, the division commander approved all PSYOP in his area of influence. In practice, however, approval and coordination of psychological operations has been centralized at theater-CINC level to ensure that U.S. national objectives are met and to eliminate the potential for contradictory information being produced by PSYOP and other information programs. During Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm, for instance, the PSYOP campaign and all product prototypes were coordinated through the J-3 for final approval. Dissemination of these approved products was then delegated to lower levels, based on individual unit requirements. The TPI team proposed a force structure that could be task-organized to meet any contingency requirement while maintaining realistic functional and regional orientations. The proposed structure incorporates such functionally oriented units as the headquarters, tactical- or regional-support group, the PSYOP dissemination battalion, and the enemy-prisoner-of-war PSYOP battalion. The change in force structure requires a significant decrease in non-PSYOP MOSs; at the same time, it increases the strength of PSYOP MOSs 37F and 97E by 233 soldiers. This change also increases the number of loudspeaker teams available to support the CINC in war.

This reorganization encompasses a number of changes for the reserve PSYOP force, including the loss of a PSYOP group headquarters and an increase of two PSYOP battalions. The remaining two group headquarters will maintain a functional orientation, with emphasis on command and control of subordinate battalions and preparation for their wartime missions. Subordinate to the tactical PSYOP group are three tactical PSYOP battalions consisting of five tactical PSYOP companies each. The tactical group also is assigned a PSYOP dissemination battalion, designed along the lines of its active-component counterpart, and a battalion whose sole mission is to provide PSYOP support for enemy-prisoner-of-war operations.

The regional PSYOP group consists of three regionally oriented PSYOP battalions consisting of two regionally oriented propaganda-development PSYOP companies and one research-and-analysis company. Finally, the regional group is assigned a small strategic dissemination company. All battalions, tactical and regional, are oriented culturally, based on the regional divisions mentioned earlier.

**Operational doctrine**

The TPI working group looked at the integration of active and reserve PSYOP units and the doctrine which drives it. The USSO/COM Joint Mission Analysis has identified the requirement for U.S. PSYOP forces to be able to engage two regional contingencies and simultaneously support other theaters. The relatively small size of the active PSYOP force means that active and reserve forces would have to be integrated to meet the JMA requirement, and they would need compatible force structure. Further, the current national military strategy recognizes that the active component would most likely deploy to theater first and be reinforced later by reserve forces. The working group designed an employment concept which incorporates the PSYOP force structure and the national security strategy. The concept calls for the engagement of AC PSYOP forces augmented by selected RC PSYOP forces during peacetime support operations. Upon deployment of a large portion of the active PSYOP force in support of a major regional contingency, the reserve force would activate as required and deploy to the...
PSYOP Reorganization
Part of USACAPOC Restructuring

Reorganization of the PSYOP force is part of an overall restructuring of the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command which was effective Oct. 1.

USACAPOC’s Civil Affairs units, which had already changed to the L-series table of organization and equipment Sept. 16, have also restructured to better support theater commanders and contingency missions, according to Lt. Col. Robert M. Tuttle, inspector general for USACAPOC.

Under the restructure, two CA units, the 358th CA Brigade, Norristown, Pa., and the 361st CA Brigade, Pensacola, Fla., have been upgraded to major subordinate units of USACAPOC to support U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S. Southern Command, respectively. The former 422nd CA Company, Greensboro, N.C., has been upgraded to a battalion and will report directly to USACAPOC as an independent unit supporting the one active-duty CA battalion, the 96th, based at Fort Bragg.

In the last two years, the Eastern European nations of the former Warsaw Pact have revolted against communist control, replaced their leaders and planned free elections. Their revolutions and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact’s cohesion, seemingly overnight, provide several lessons on the future use of communications media for psychological operations.

Eastern Europe was also increasingly accessible to Western mass media, and Western media was increasingly beamed into the East as events unfolded. Those Pact nations bordering the West also received Western television broadcasts such as the American Cable News Network and Austrian, French and West German news programs. Viewers in Timisoara tuned in to an estimated 700,000 viewers.3 These radio and television broadcasts provided revolutionary links between the East European nations, kept the East Europeans abreast of events in their own countries, and informed them of the dissent of their compatriots.

A Romanian engineering student in Bucharest told Washington Post correspondent Blaine Harden: “We listened to the radio every day and night. When the revolution happened in Czechoslovakia, I listened every hour.” A Bucharest physician commented that, despite Nicolae Ceausescu’s total censorship of the Romanian press, “Everybody knew...
Everybody knew from the radio. Post correspondent Harden observed, “They seemed to be imitating what they had heard on the radio, chanting slogans from the streets that December chanting slow, wide-reaching.” 

When the Romanians took to the streets in December to protest Ceausescu’s regime, broadcasts helped shape a revolution among people who dared not even speak to each other. There was a striking similarity from country to country in the symbols used in the East European street demonstrations, reflecting the influence of the media. Flag waving spanned all the countries, often with the hammer and sickle, or the red star, cut from the emblem. Universal symbols, such as the two-fingered V-sign, were used widely. Candles commemorated martyrs in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Simple, but clever symbols also proliferated, such as the two-fingered V-sign, Pages 14

“His hands slowed, and his eyes darted back and forth, searching the crowd. He stopped here. Live television coverage of the speech was interrupted before Ceausescu left the balcony, but the damage was done. That evening, a public showing that Ceausescu, for the first time in 24 years, seemed stunned, vulnerable and did not have the situation in hand — was a crucial turning point in the Romanian uprising. “In the afternoon, citizens flooded the streets, shouting “Down with Ceausescu.” Ceausescu fled the capital the next day. Within three days of his televised lapse he was captured, tried and executed. 

Cove...
waves of Western business methods, increased beyond the control of government censorship. One observer characterized this trend as business communications "faxing out frontiers."19

Psyoperators will need to develop sensitivity to reform movements beyond the political realm and develop an awareness of the media impacts of economic, environmental, cultural, racial and other reform events.

Media control

The lesson that reforms of all kinds open the way to greater communications access, to massive opposition even in closed societies. Attempts to close borders, opening the way for Western media technology and coverage, and oppressed peoples seek alternative perspectives on events and even life in general.

Former Secretary of State George Shultz has written: "Today, the meaning of borders is changing and is the notion of sovereignty. The irrepressible movement of ideas, people and goods requires political and economic openness from leaders. ... In today's world, no people will have a right to define themselves, but not to wall themselves off."20

Postscript: The Soviet Coup

On Sunday, Aug. 18, 1991, Communist hardliners arrested Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, barricaded the Russian Parliament and seized power. The coup was opposed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, the mayors of Moscow and Leningrad and reformers throughout the USSR.21

The hardliners shut down Soviet television and several radio stations and censored some of the press, but they failed to shut off the international news media or close down AT&T's 67 telephone circuits to the USSR. Calls and faxes skyrocketed during the coup to 100 times the normal volume.22 Westerners read on-the-scene reports from Moscow and Leningrad of coup events sent real-time via conventional electronic mail.23 Yeltsin's forces smuggled videotapes to CNN and CBS news for broadcast to the Soviet military, appealing to the soldiers not to support the coup. In the first hours of the coup, Yeltsin faxed appeals to the U.S. Center for Democracy, pleading for strong statements over the Voice of America by President Bush opposing the coup. Later, the director of Russian State Broadcasting faxed an effusive note of "deep appreciation and thanks" to VOA for "your effective coverage of the tragic events."24

The impact of electronic mass communications on events during the 1989 collapse of communism in Eastern Europe was repeated during the Soviet coup attempt, with similar results: democratic reform triumphed over repression. Events and their media coverage became an intertwined cycle that psyoperators must enter and put to use. David Hoffman wrote, "The United States and its allies found the lines were open — a rare chance for a telephone modem, and then broadcast and printed worldwide within hours. In the subsequent crackdown, the Chinese Communist Party resumed jamming of VOA and began monitoring fax machines to predict movements of materials from being sent in from overseas. Preventing the transmission of broadcast communications is increasingly difficult, however, as economic reform proceeds to "fax out borders," opening the way for mass-media broadcasts to be transmitted from Beijing via telephone modem, and then broadcast worldwide,25 unfurling an enormous Russian tricolor before an indomitable Yeltsin—passed into history.26

The flow of communications is accelerated by this openness of the mass media gain access to previous centuries of giant Soviet statuary icons. Within four days, the coup plotters were passed into history.

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Army Psywarriors: A History of U.S. Army Psychological Operations

by Stanley Sandler

Soon after World War I, the Kaiser’s Army Chief of Staff, Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg, grumbled: “In the shower of pamphlets which was scattered by enemy airmen our adversaries said and wrote that they did not think so badly of us; that we must only be reassured and that they would see to that. What a blessing peace would be after all the fighting. There was, therefore, no point in continuing the struggle.”

The old field marshal’s outburst can serve as a quite adequate description of the contents of U.S. and British military psychological warfare directed against the Germans in World War I. As German Army discipline wavered or broke, these leaflets became responsible for defections on a large scale. Not surprisingly, Adolph Hitler termed Allied military paywar “psychologically efficient.”

Beginnings

U.S. Army psychological operations can be dated back at least to the beginnings of the War for Independence. Even before the Declaration of Independence, patriot forces used leaflets against British troops in Boston just before the Battle of Bunker (Breed’s) Hill. These leaflets were published locally in “Prospect Hill” (the American side): “Freedom, ease ... and a good farm,” with that on British-held Bunker Hill: “scourvy, poverty, want.”

The leaflets show a sophisticated knowledge of what can move troops. The Americans were well aware of the fact that in Great Britain the term “land-owning classes” was synonymous with “ruling” or “wealthy” classes. They also knew it was obvious to British troops that anyone who received a “free” passierschien would be permitted to remain in Germany purged of Nazism and militarism. The most effective were the two leaflets that played upon the Germans’ innate respect for order and discipline. One was simply entitled Befel (orders). The “orders,” signed by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, were to surrender as soon as possible. The other was the passierschien, or safe-conduct pass, justly famous as one of the most successful paywar leaflets of all time. It was even more imposing a piece of work than the Befel leaflet, resembling, with its fishnet borders, multilingual text, Allied coats of arms, and Eisenhower’s signature, an imperial proclamation.

Interviews of German POWs indicated that many of the Reich’s soldiers carried the passierschien hidden on their persons against the day when they might have to surrender.

World War II

World War II witnessed the development of sophisticated electronic psychological operations for the first time, and the production of leaflets on a magnitude many times that of World War I. Despite its first World War legacy and the undoubted successes of the Nazi propaganda machine, the U.S. only reluctantly entered the field of psychological operations in the Second World War. It took the personal intervention of Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy to establish, in June 1941, the Army’s Psychologic Branch, as it was then called (later changed to Psychologic Warfare Branch, G-2).

First U.S. units

In the autumn of 1942, the Army developed its first draft training manual for psychological operations, Combat Propaganda Company. But in December 1942, it dissolved the Psychological Warfare Branch and turned over its responsibilities to the civilian Office of Strategic Services. In December 1943, the first Army psychological-warfare units, the 1st and 2nd Radio Service Sections, were activated. Together they formed the 1st Combat Propaganda Company.

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European theater

In the field, the U.S. Army psychological operations relied primarily on the leaflet, that “footsoldier of psychological operations.” In the European theater alone, billions of leaflets were showered on Germany’s soldiers, and when those soldiers were in retreat or war weary, these leaflets proved quite successful. At the Italian front, on the other hand, where the war seemed to pose nothing but a weary battering of one German defense line after another almost to VE Day, U.S. and Allied paywar probably achieved little.

But in France and Germany, particularly the latter, skillful and sophisticated U.S. paywar took its toll of the Wehrmacht. U.S. leaflets pounded home the message that America combined its well-known humanitarianism with strict adherence to the Geneva Conventions, emphasized the “happy POW” theme and assured Germans that there would indeed be a place in the concert of nations for a post-war Germany purified of Nazism and militarism.

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American psychological-warfare that early victorious stage of the war was not at all like those predicted.

Korean War

As early as June 29, 1950, four days after North Korean invasion forces struck across the 38th Parallel, the so-called “City” leaflet did the most to convince Japanese civilians of the futility of continuing the war. It simply named a Japanese city, with a date and time, against the background of a flight of B-29s unloading their bombs. And, on schedule, the fearsome Superfortresses dropped their loads against weak opposition.

U.S. Army Far East Command’s small Special Projects Branch of the Headquarters G-2 (Intelligence) Division had begun radio broadcasting and leaflet drops over the Republic of Korea (South Korea). But it was not until the fall of that year of desperate battle that the leaflet was still the major medium. This was America's first “ideological warfare” in such a conflict, psychological warfare would be of supreme concern. In theory, at least, each side was fighting to establish the supremacy of its driving ideology, although in one case the U.S./UN side was the more efficient of the antagonists. And yet by the end, that side could be said to have strategically and tactically “won” the psychological Korean war.

The most impressive psychological weapon of the U.S. Army in Korea, or at least the one that has left the best evidence, was the leaflet. Probably at no time before or since has the Army fielded such effective printed propaganda. One reason was the many lessons learned from World War II’s giant effort, only a few years previous. The other was the calling up of Army reservists who brought their advertising skills from Madison Avenue.

Korean War Army leaflets used the time-tested themes of the “happy POW,” “good soldier—bad leader,” “surrender and you will be well treated,” “we can crush you,” and nostalgia for home, family and women. In addition, Army psychological warriors cleverly worked on latent Chinese anti-Russian feeling, harping on the brutal Soviet “liberators” of Manchuria in 1945, and proclaiming that Stalin will fight to the last Korean.

U.S. leaflets also adopted some unique themes. In one leaflet they solicited aid from the Chinese. The U.S. volunteer army was about out of tobacco; the UN Command couldn't help there, but it could provide at the cigarette paper — and a surrender message. Another leaflet simply displayed the flag of the Chinese People’s Republic on one side and a few words of respect on the reverse. A similar leaflet displayed a portrait of the honored

20th-century Chinese liberator, Sun Yat Sen, followed by a discreet message of peace. The leaflet of the most effective leaflets showed a map of the powerful China of two centuries past, contrasted with a contemporary map indicating (in red) the vast territories lost to Russia by the notorious “unequal treaties.” But judging from surveys immediately taken in UN POW camps documented the effectiveness of these leaflets in the field, as well as of loudspeaker broadcasts. But the most striking psychological-warfare victory for the UN was the refusal of no less than 33,000 enemy POWs to return to their homelands. In contrast, a mere 21 U.S. military personnel refused repatriation.

After the Korean armistice in July 1953, U.S. Army psywar assets were once again drastically reduced, and yet they became the nucleus from which Special Forces emerged in 1962 from the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. In 1967, the term “psychological warfare” was replaced by “psychological operations,” in recognition that such operations did not require a state of war and that they could also be directed toward civilians.

Vietnam War

Less than a decade later, Vietnam demonstrated the need for psychological operations against another ideological enemy. The 4th Psychological Operations Group became the principal unit coordinating Army tactical psychological operations. However, all U.S. PSYOP fell under the control of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, JUSPAO, headed by the chief of the United States Information Service—Vietnam. Unfortunately, there was no U.S. Army PSYOP commander, and JUSPAO was unrepresented at the Senior Command level. Consequently, allied PSYOP suffered from a lack of coordination and duplication of effort. U.S. psychological operations were conducted by no less than 10 organizations: JUSPAO, the U.S. Embassy Mission PSYOP Committee, Military Assistance Command-Vietnam, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, U.S. Army Vietnam, 4th and 7th PSYOP Groups, force commanders and senior advisors, U.S. Naval Forces-Vietnam, and the 7th U.S. Army Force. This was in addition to PSYOP of the Republic of Vietnam and that of America’s allies. Not surprisingly, PSYOP of Vietnam was sometimes termed “a many-splintered thing.”

For all this variation, the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong became targets of what would prove to be the largest and most sophisticated psychological operation to date. In 1969 alone, for example, no less than 10.5 billion leaflets were distributed by JUSPAO.

In 1967 psychological operations became the responsibility of the Army’s PSYOP Division of the International and Civil Affairs Directorate of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations. And since that year, instruction in psychological operations has been furnished by the Army’s John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. In the field, the 4th PSOG ham-

A selection of U.S. PSYOP leaflets produced during the Vietnam War. Themes included self-criticism of VC cadre and VC losses to Allied firepower.
Let us now consider the themes of Allied propaganda. As a result of the appeals of their family amounted to 80 percent, and the number of village guerrillas, hamlet guerrillas and cadres and civilians were 70 percent. Special Forces were particularly successful in their psychological operations directed toward the Montagnards of the Central Highlands. BF PSYOP was more a matter of deeds than of words. Special Forces lived among the mountain tribespeople, and in addition to giving military training and leadership, dug wells, ran medical clinics and improved agriculture. A bond of trust was forged between the Montagnard Civilian Irregular Defense Groups and Special Forces that has remained even to this day.

Vietnamese and U.S. Special Forces also organized combined CIDG Civil Affairs/PSYOP teams that went into the countryside holding face-to-face meetings with the tribes, conducting sick calls, distributing school supplies and health kits, organize athletic contests, and generally attempting to demonstrate their concern for a previously neglected people. Gen. William Westmoreland credited the work of Special Forces as more than 200,000 lower-level defectors over the years. Many of them were organized into the Kit Carson Scouts, where they made excellent unconventional-warfare troops, using their knowledge of the land, language and culture of their people.

North Vietnam

JUSPAO also conducted extensive strategic PSYOP against North Vietnam. Again, billions of leaflets were drawn up, emphasizing such themes as the legitimacy and strength of the Saigon government, the good life in the South, and the historic enmity between China and Vietnam. In addition, Allied aircraft scattered toys and novelty items over the countryside. A “Voice of Freedom” radio station promoted the allied cause and thoughtfully programmed its prime time from 10 p.m.-1 a.m., after workers and peasants had completed their labors and obligatory evening indoctrination lectures.

Nonetheless, the JUSPAO campaign against North Vietnam probably achieved only minimal success. It was hard to argue against the air-raid sirens, which seemed to occur frequently in various armed forces... Some have killed our cadres and soldiers, destroyed weapons and stolen secret documents before surrendering to the enemy.”

“Certainly the enemy seemed to believe in the effectiveness of allied PSYOP. A secret report from a district unit commander to his district committee frankly admitted, ‘Defection occurs frequently in various armed forces... Some have killed our cadres and soldiers, destroyed weapons and stolen secret documents before surrendering to the enemy.’”

Field operations also proved particularly effective in bringing in enemy troops and keeping civilians out of harm’s way. The work of PSYOP personnel was immunusurably aided by the fact that most Grenadians spoke English. The population also strongly resented the government which had toppled former Prime Minister Mau-rice Bishop and scores of his supporters just before the U.S. landings.

Just Cause

During Operation Just Cause in December 1989, Army PSYOP troops jumped into Panama with most initial combat forces. Using Spanish-speaking troops and taped Spanish-language messages, they broadcast appeals to Panamanian forces. The taped messages soon had to be discarded, however, since they lacked Panamanian accents and idiomatic expressions.

Ethnic Panamanian U.S. soldiers filled the gap; alone in the midst of a threatening riot as a particularly brutal Noriega-regime officer was apprehended, a resourceful Panamanian-American trooper of the 4th PG snatched a Panamanian salsa music tape into his loudspeaker and soon had the rioters in his sights. The prisoner in safe custody. Loudspeaker operations proved particularly effective in bringing in enemy troops and keeping civilians out of harm’s way. The work of PSYOP personnel was immunusurably aided by the fact that most Grenadians spoke English. The population also strongly resented the government which had toppled former Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and scores of his supporters just before the U.S. landings.

Desert Storm

A little more than a year later, Army PSYOP soldiers found themselves in harm’s way again in a combat environment, this time in Southwest Asia’s Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm and Provide Comfort. In these operations, unlike Just Cause, entire reserve-componentsy PSYOP units were called up in addition to the 4th PG. A sample of U.S. broadcast and leaflet tactical psychological operations against Iraqi troops reveals an emphasis upon nostalgia and home-sickness; Arab brotherhood; the coalition’s great unity; the fate awaiting Iraqi troops who did not become “line-crossers;” and how to safely become a line-crosser. Most of these themes had been used by U.S. psywarriors since at least World War I. Leaflet designers further showed insight into the enemy’s mentality when they pictured Iraqi line-crossers and their Arab Coalition brothers sitting down to a feast in which bananas were prominent; Iraqis were fond of bananas, which the UN embargo had made unobtainable.

PSYOP troops were unusually successful in the field; on at least two occasions, Iraqi troops surrendered to PSYOP troops armed only with sidears and their loudspeakers. Desert Storm may well have been the first time U.S. PSYOP troops participated in target selection, suggesting targets that would yield the greatest psychological dividends and calling for the avoidance of religious, cultural or historical structures.
Readings in PSYOP

Although there is no single history of U.S. Army psychological operations, the following studies are the most useful:


**Sybeaux:** *Psychological Warfare Against Germany, D-Day to VE Day*, New York: George W. Stewart, 1949.


**U.S. Army Publications:**

- P&W Section, 12th Army Group, “Report of Operations” (Final After-Action Report), XIV, typescript, no date (c. 1940).—Stanley Sandler

**Paul Newman or Bart Simpson.** Surviving Iraqi leaflets from that war show, among other themes, a U.S. jet fighter taking off past a row of coffins, and a weeping Statue of Liberty. Most were rather crudely drawn and reproduced.1

In summary, U.S. Army psychological operations have a grand and successful tradition stretching from Bunker Hill to Kuwait, applying, with varying success, Sun Tzu’s famous dictum: “To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence. Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.”

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Note: 1Material on U.S. psychological operations in Desert Shield/Storm drawn from oral interviews with 4th PSYOP Group personnel, after-action reports and leaflets in SWOS archives.
PSYOP in Support of Low-Intensity Conflict

by Maj. Joe E. Kilgore

The emphasis in recent years on low-intensity conflict has resulted in wholesale revision in our thinking. This is based on the belief that wars will fight a future war. One ancient option, now being brought up-to-date, is psychological operations. This is to say that these operations and their techniques have been practiced throughout history in conjunction with both conventional and unconventional warfare. What is new is the fact that PSYOP units have been trained to employ PSYOP in unconventional warfare. PSYOP is also used to bolster morale of resistance fighters in support of military operations, both conventional and unconventional. This is especially true in the Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC) arena.

U.S. PSYOP Capabilities

Modern U.S. PSYOP programs are complex operations, with objectives set by the National Command Authority. The Department of Defense has a PSYOP mission, and all military services are required to establish a PSYOP capability. Besides PSYOP units themselves, Army Special Forces are uniquely qualified for this type of warfare. SF personnel are extensively trained to employ PSYOP in unconventional-warfare and foreign-intelligence defense programs — two activities of enormous political interest to the United States.

In the past, U.S. Navy, Marine

Air Force and Coast Guard units have rarely trained in PSYOP or worked with PSYOP units. This training deficiency is being partially corrected by the Joint PSYOP Staff Planners Course at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. In this course, mid-level officers from all services and key civilian agencies learn to include PSYOP in their missions and contingency planning.

To support an insurgency, or work in a counterinsurgency role, the commander must understand the principles and techniques of PSYOP. It is an inherent part of foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare, and the commander must be prepared not only to employ PSYOP, but also to counter PFS' measures used by the enemy. Just as clearly demonstrates PSYOP's utility, it also demonstrates the definite possibility that the lack of psychological planning can lose the war — especially when the conflict is not an all-out war. It is necessary to look back only a few years for an example: Even though the village-level tactical PSYOP programs of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese were largely unsuccessful during the Vietnam War, the United States did not fare well against their strategic PSYOP programs, and we paid for it with a loss of public and international support.

The primary responsibility for military PSYOP has been assigned to the Army, which has units to support the theater unified command, the CINC, in peace-time, limited-war and general-war scenarios. The one active-duty PSYOP group, the 4th, based at Fort Bragg, provides peace-time and limited-war capabilities, including those necessary in LIC. Its 9th Battalion has the primary mission of tactical support, while its 1st, 6th and 8th Battalions provide support to the CINC across the operational spectrum.

Currently, the three PSYOP groups in the Army Reserve, the 2nd, 5th and 7th, provide additional support as required. (See "Total PSYOP Integration," on p. 10 for proposed changes to the RC PSYOP organization.) PSYOP units have the responsibility to plan and conduct PSYOP in support of military operations, informing or teaching other units about PSYOP and its implications, and planning or conducting PSYOP in support of U.S. national objectives abroad. So significant is PSYOP, and its potential impact, that all PSYOP programs are approved and controlled at the national level. (In time of war, control passes to the theater CINC.)

PSYOP Support in LIC

Critical to understanding the value of PSYOP is an appreciation for the multiplicity of support roles it can play. PSYOP units may be tasked to support SF or other SOF units in unconventional warfare. Even though the SF operational detachment may be the implementing element, PSYOP personnel provide invaluable assistance in the ultimate accomplishment of an unconventional-warfare mission.

One of the most important PSYOP roles is providing psychological-warfare support to host countries in foreign-intelligence-defence missions. This mission can be executed by means of mobile training teams, technical-assistance teams — both small trainer teams organized to plan and conduct PSYOP programs under the U.S. Security Assistance Act — or a forward operational detachment working in general support to a country team or in conjunction with combat units.

Unconventional Warfare

When supporting SF UW operations, PSYOP elements are used to assist the operational detachments in their unconventional-warfare operational area, or UWOA. The operational detachment must be able to advise the area commander on psychological warfare, plan campaigns in his particular area and be able to train selected members of the resistance in psychological techniques. Basically, PSYOP units use two approaches to plan operations in the UWOA. The first is passive: the mere presence of SF units has an adverse effect on enemy morale and the inevitable success of resistance fighters. PSYOP is also used to bolster the image of the resistance fighter and SF advisor.

In a more active role, PSYOP personnel may use publicity to inform the populace of successful military operations by the resistance and promote civic-action programs, such as the provision of medical assistance to the sick and wounded,or the populace of impending attacks and urge the people to assist the resistance movement. PSYOP personnel can also plan the psychological-campaign for operational detachments to implement in their areas of operation. PSYOP elements provide guidance to the team prior to deployment and during the mission through the SF operational base, which controls and supports deployed SF teams.

PSYOP units may use several methods to get their message across. Mass media, such as television, radio and leaflets, are particularly effective, but whispering agents and word of mouth also get the message to those in the target audience. Propagandists strive to win support in all areas surrounding the UWOA. They target common beliefs, prejudices and fears to alter attitudes and to lower enemy morale. Through the media, they encourage the rest of the world to support the resistance cause.

Throughout the implementation of the plan, PSYOP elements follow certain guidelines. They must identify the target audience, determine the message, establish credibility and select the appropriate method of communication. Although people cannot be persuaded to think or behave in a certain manner unless they are at least willing to adopt new views, PSYOP assists in persuading people to view their world in a way that best benefits the resistance movement.

PSYOP elements begin their planning with the operational detachment receiving a mission. Normally, the initial effort is to prepare the SF personnel to target a specific task area for the introduction of SF units among them. PSYOP elements make contacts among exiled inhabitants of the country, sympathizers...
inside the country and resistance forces. They prepare and update background policies that will be planed on the rules of engagement, which are extremely important to UW, where laws are not clearly defined. By ensuring that the resistance supports in accordance with the law of land warfare, PSYOP can support U.S. political and economic goals and encourage legitimacy of the resistance movement.

Once the resistance force is fully operational, PSYOP elements will concentrate on exploiting friendly-force successes and publicizing enemy reprisals against innocents. They will assure the populace of success and strengthen the support structure. Press releases targeting an orderly transition back into civilian life and support of the new government must be released.

One of the missions for PSYOP groups is demobilization from unconventional warfare. PSYOP units must design and train to support unconventional guerrilla warfare and conventional or special operations, including counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and fighting internal and external conflicts, regardless of the intensity scale. However, the demobilization phase of resistance fighting is almost always accompanied by irregular forces must be molded into regular units of the host nation’s armed forces or disbanded. SF advisors may be of assistance in training the irregulars to be soldiers or in disarming them and aiding in their transition into civilian life.

Unfortunately, throughout this entire process the potential for Murphy’s Law to work is high. Trained unconventional forces can very quickly destabilize a government that is not prepared for, or even engaged in, conflict. These forces must be made to believe that the government understands their needs and that they have made a substantial contribution to the overall success of the war effort. PSYOP units can assist in this process by publicizing the success of the guerrilla forces in the overall campaign plans during the conflict, while protecting their identities.

This type of action increases the self-esteem of the fighters and protects their families from retribution. Follow-up activity will be essential after the transition to overt warfare continues this process. Publicity of the government’s projected reforms and inclusion of guerrilla fighters in post-war settlements and benefits preclude follow-on problems. In other words, active PSYOP programs should be developed to support the guerrilla movement from the early phases of conventional warfare through assimilation back into the mainstream upon conflict termination. After the war, it may take years to evaluate the PSYOP program.

Active PSYOP programs should be developed to support the guerrilla movement from the early phases of conventional warfare through assimilation back into the mainstream upon conflict termination. After the war, it may take years to evaluate the PSYOP program.

In a FID environment, PSYOP may support either conventional forces, SOF or other government agencies. The basis for most conventional FID programs is the infantry-brigade task force. Augmentation to the brigade and battalion staffs must come from the PSYOP group and CA units, which, unfortunately, are not organic below division level in peacetime. To be effective, PSYOP support of conventional units requires that individual soldiers be indoctrinated into the PSYOP programs prior to employment. This applies to host-nation forces as well as U.S. advisors or assistance units. Anyone who comes in contact with the populace must understand the consequences of personal actions on the national policy.

PSYOP programs require careful planning and diligent implementation. PSYOP programs must support and influence the government’s operational command and control, engineering projects and humanitarian projects (well construction, agriculture assistance, etc.) which must of necessity support the government and the viability of national life of a country. Its goal is internal independence and freedom from conditions fostering insurgency. PSYOP in support of this type of mission is based on positive actions taken by the government to gain popular support.

Specifically, the use of PSYOP in FID operations consists of propaganda and civic-action programs. Effective combinations of the two influence the attitudes and behavior of the populace and weaken the enemy, ensuring the integrated military, economic, political, social and ideological actions. FID programs focus on successful tactical operations, playing on insurgent successes, appealing to the people through objectives demonstrably more beneficial to them than those of the insurgents and convincing the people of the government’s intent to implement proposed changes. These themes must seek to remove credibility for the rebel causes through government-inspired changes. They should be planned to support all operations, not just tactical ones. These operations play an important role in gaining the support of the populace and denying that support to the insurgents.

The propaganda aspect of FID is designed to help shape public opinion, mold and influencing the audience. Each propaganda theme is targeted to a specific group. For example, this could range from a movement in a manner that will cause dissatisfaction and disaffection among his units. Desired results might include surrender or cessation of guerrilla activities.

Alternatively, propaganda themes may target directly the enemy infrastructure to disrupt enemy political indoctrination or cause their forces to surrender. Civilian populations should be convinced that they are better served by supporting the government and ceasing to support the enemy. This will necessarily include counteracting enemy propaganda. It is also necessary to prepare government and assistance units for the tasks they must perform. Unit preparation includes country indoctrination for U.S. troops, cultural training for any troops working with the populace, and training in the psychological themes and programs in the area. Host-nation forces could also be targeted for the training of soldiers to treat civilians with more respect to influencing the minister of finance to adopt a better fiscal policy for the country.

The second prong of FID, civic-action, is an important part of the overall PSYOP campaign. Those programs are used to provide tangible evidence of government intentions. Good relationships must be established with the civilian popu-

lution to defeat an insurgency. Favorable actions undertaken by the host-nation military will assist in gaining the respect and support of the people. Such actions include: medical operations, construction of schools and roads, hospital, helping the control, engineering projects and humanitarian projects (well construction, agriculture assistance, etc.) which must of necessity support the government and the viability of the population. The greatest successes are achieved when follow-on projects are increasingly beneficial and self-help is stressed. The population should get involved in helping itself, and the host government’s interest should be emphasized.

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Training
U.S. conventional forces, regard-

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plish the FID mission in the short term, and poor execution invariably results in a psychological and operational disadvantage that the host nation may spend years trying to overcome.

U.S. Army Special Forces are the only units (other than PSYOP and CA units) that routinely train for planning and implementing PSYOP and PSYOP assets. Planning and conducting PSYOP as a civil-military operation is included in the mission-planning and training of SF groups, planner-ads, and operational detachments. These tasks are evaluated on an annual basis during the units’ Army Training and Evaluation Program exercises. These exercises are usually evaluated by U.S. Army Special Operations Command, which is the Army headquarters for SF, CA, and PSYOP units—units that routinely train and exercise together.

These units are practiced at integrating PSYOP and civil-military operations into FID through mobile-training-team deployments, joint and combined exercises and operations in Central America, South America, Africa and Asia. PSYOP area studies and country briefings are part of the standard operating procedure for SF and Rangers, and most deployments of company-size or larger include PSYOP and CA augmentation.

Potential missions

Although legal restrictions prohibit applications of PSYOP in the United States, the potential in LIC for missions outside the U.S. is bounded only by the imagination. Geographically oriented PSYOP units are organized to support unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, security-assistance programs, contingency operations and conventional warfare. The ability to organize these elements to fit different requirements, from task force to detachment size, allows a flexible response.”

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only 12 men, but these 12 have the capability to train and equip a battalion of approximately 1,500 guerrilla fighters, advise a host nation’s armed forces, provide training to friendly and independent military units or nation-building, and carry out combat operations. The A-detachment possesses skills in each staff functional area as well as a knowledge of the host country. The intimate working relationship established by Special Forces enables them to deploy with minimum notice to an unfamiliar area on a short notice and to have units deploy to an unfamiliar area on short notice with minimum notice. The ability to organize these elements to fit different requirements, from task force to detachment size, allows a flexible response. The commander who is preparing to deploy to an unfamiliar area on short notice will find a basic PSYOP campaign invaluable. Other PSYOP assessments tailored to his needs will include a psychological operations campaign plan in support of the national objectives underlying his deployment. Depending on the direction of the National Command Authority, propaganda can be developed, printed, distributed, broadcast on radio or television, or provided to the host government, military units or other U.S. agencies.

Army Special Forces are uniquely able to employ PSYOP. The organization and training of A-detachments enables them to deploy with host nation. By understanding the way of life, they gain invaluable insight into people’s prospective. SF personnel can better use the entire spectrum of psychological warfare to counter guerrilla propaganda, attack the insurgent strategy, support friendly government programs, and influence the populace to support the U.S.-backed government or government in exile.

Integration of CA assets further increases the efficiency of SOF in LIC. Competitive programs enhance the image of the U.S. and the host nation. With an integrated program in support of the PSYOP plan, the effect of individual programs is significantly increased. CA civil-government elements can provide assistance to the government to help curtail abuses and void the resistance’s strategic plans. Public utilities specialists can assist in providing basic governmental services to areas that may never have benefited from them. These elements can also provide a presence long after combat forces have departed. Examples of this teamwork were found in Grenada, where SF and CA units remained behind to help rebuild the entire infrastructure, and the Virgin Islands after Hurricane Hugo, where Special Operations Forces and conventional military policeman units restored order and provided disaster relief. These types of assistance can span the entire low-intensity spectrum, from civil unrest to civil war. Foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare have already been discussed; other collateral missions are based on the capabilities of special-operations forces and include missions such as drug interdiction. The unique capabilities of SF to conduct special reconnaissance can be applied to intelligence-gathering and surveillance of airfields and manufacturing and growing areas. PSYOP can assist by exploiting the intelligence collected by these elements, countering terrorist acts by drug traffickers, supporting host-government in propaganda and educating the populace in agricultural alternatives. PSYOP elements can provide similar support to other agencies, such as the Drug Enforcement Agency or Customs Service.

PSYOP techniques used during the campaign in Panama may be helpful in understanding what PSYOP units can do to assist the tactical forces of all services. Early in the operations, soldiers from the 4th PSYOP Group at Fort Bragg, N.C., began to transmit prepared messages over the frequencies used by the Panamanian government television stations. These messages were attempts to persuade forces loyal to Manuel Noriega to lay down their arms and surrender. The 4th PSYOP broadcast additional messages to the Panamanian people, providing instructions and information from the new government.

PSYOP forces used another technique at the Vatican Embassy to cover communications and possibly harass Noriega: They set up loud-speakers outside the building and directed loud music at the compound. After several days, the personnel inside requested the practice be discontinued. Although the operation was considered by some critics to have been a mistake, interviews in the news media indicate that the technique was a factor in Noriega’s eventual surrender. Additionally, rumors of bloodthirsty mobs demanding Noriega be turned over to them were passed to Papal emissaries who may have viewed the U.S. criminal process as the preferable alternative. The success of these actions assisted in accomplishing the missions assigned U.S. forces deployed to Panama.

Conclusion

PSYOP is an integral part of low-intensity conflict. While it can have a strong effect on the target audience, it is not performed in isolation. PSYOP is a support element; when used as a force multiplier for other SOF, it provides an option short of war. If combat forces are committed, PSYOP can support defensive or offensive operations of conventional and unconventional forces. Flexible in scope, PSYOP can be tailored to the situation and the commander’s needs.

While PSYOP is routinely planned and exercised by SOF units, in the past it has been poorly understood by conventional forces. Additional training is the key to understanding PSYOP’s capabilities and limitations, and training programs currently underway at the Stewart and CGSC promise to increase PSYOP’s effectiveness through a greater awareness.

From Sun Tau to Desert Storm, PSYOP has proven as a means to save lives and bring an end to hostilities. It offers a powerful weapon for the brush fires we face in the 90s, but only if commanders at all levels understand its concepts and units train for its employment.

Maj. Joe E. Kilgore is currently executive officer of the 1st SF Group, Fort Lewis, Wash. His previous assignments include service as a rifle platoon leader in the 101st Airborne Division, service as a detachment commander, company executive officer and headquarters-company commander in the 7th SF Group, company commander and battalion executive officer in the 1st SF Group and service as plans and operations officer with the U.S. Army Western Command Special Operations. Major Kilgore is a graduate of the Naval War College Command and Staff Course. He holds a bachelor’s degree from the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, a master’s degree in systems management from the University of Southern California at Los Angeles, a master’s in international relations from Salve Regina College in Newport, R.I., and a master’s in national security and decision making from the Naval War College.

Special Warfare

October 1992
PSYOP-unique Equipment: Special ‘Weapons’ of Communication

by Capt. Chris Bailey

The U.S. PSYOP community requires a number of special equipment systems in order to accomplish its mission of PSYOP dissemination. These systems are the tools used to communicate messages to designated target audiences, and according to their intended use, they can be grouped into the categories of strategic, operational and tactical assets.

Strategic

Strategic assets include radio and television broadcast, high-volume print and advanced automated database systems. The strategic broadcast assets include the AN/TRT-22, a 50-kilowatt, Vietnam-vintage AM radio system used to support PSYOP efforts in Kuwait and well into Iraq. The AN/TSQ-171 television system was fielded in September 1990 and subsequently deployed to Saudi Arabia in support of Desert Storm. Tactical

Tactical

Tactical systems provide the necessary tools to train PSYOP audio-visual specialists. Strategic assets were the heavy print center, a fixed facility at Fort Bragg. It provides high-quality, high-volume capabilities for print products such as PSYOP studies, newspapers and leaflets. It also supports contingency production requirements prior to the deployment of an operational print system.

The PSYOP Automated Data System is a mainframe computer located at Fort Bragg with remote-terminal access throughout the Department of Defense. It is used to store and access important PSYOP studies and operational data. This system is used by numerous U.S. government agencies for regional and area analysis, background studies and collection of demographic information on nations throughout the world.

Operational

Operational systems within the PSYOP inventory include commercial radio and television broadcast transmitters and deployable print assets. Two special broadcast systems, the Psychological Operations Airborne Mobile Dissemination System, or PAMDIS, and the TATM-10 are unique to active-duty Army PSYOP. Both are transportable and designed for short-range transmissions. The TATM-10, a 10-kilowatt, AM commercial broadcast transmitter, was developed to satisfy shortfalls identified during Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada. It was used effectively during Just Cause in 1989, boosting the highest audience in Panama at that time, and was again deployed during Desert Storm, targeting Iraqi front-line units. Enemy-prisoner-of-war interrogation reports indicated that the system’s broadcasts were responsible for mass desertions, low morale and enemy surrenders. PAMDIS was also developed as a result of Urgent Fury. It is an air-deployable television and radio broadcast system designed to operate from an air platform or ground station in support of contingency operations. It was deployed during Desert Storm for use with the TATM-10.

Operational print assets include the Light Print, Medium Print and Modular Print Systems. The Light Print is the most deployable of the three and is used as a stand-alone asset for low-volume, high-quality PSYOP printing in remote areas. The Medium Print is the oldest of the systems and was originally intended for high-quality, medium-volume production and print output. It is being phased out of the Army inventory and replaced by the Modular Print System, which can be deployed in phases. The Modular Print System includes a lightweight printing plant module which can be deployed early in any operation. As the level of conflict and PSYOP requirement increases, the press-section module and finishing-section modules can be deployed to increase the volume and the number of products. All three print systems were used during Desert Storm, printing 29 million leaflets which were dropped on Iraqi forces throughout the operation. The Modular Print System was also used in Kuwait to print handbills, newspapers and posters in support of consolidation operations during the defense and restoration phase of Desert Storm.

Tactical

Three unique assets represent tactical PSYOP equipment — loudspeakers, the Mobile Audio-visual Van and the leaflet artillery round. Loudspeakers received recognition for their contributions during Just Cause and again, to a greater degree, during Desert Storm. Since their modern combat application by U.S. forces in World War I, loudspeakers have been used in several configurations. The current PSYOP inventory includes man-portable, vehicle-mounted and aircraft-mounted systems. They are used for pre-recorded or live-sound broadcasts during crowd-control, surrender-appeal or deception operations. The newest man-portable system, the AN/PFI-1, was fielded in October 1990 and proved highly effective during tactical combat and consolidation operations in Desert Storm. The Mobile Audio-visual Van, AN/MSQ-85B, was conditionally fielded to support PSYOP during Desert Storm. It replaces the 105mm leaflet artillery round and was used in limited quantities, by VII Corps, just prior to the ground campaign.

Future equipment

Several PSYOP equipment projects are pending development and delivery to the field. These include: • Family of Loudspeakers — to replace PSYOP’s older, less efficient media distribution. It was used by PSYOP specialists to broadcast entertainment and information in enemy-prisoner-of-war camps in Saudi Arabia. Its equipment can capture and produce audio and audio-visual products for editing and can use pre-approved, pre-recorded products for further dissemination with screens and projectors. It can also be used to support PSYOP teams during peace-time engagements by providing them a means to collect, produce and distribute military information to friendly target audiences in denied areas.

The experimental 155mm leaflet artillery round, XM951, was conditionally fielded to support PSYOP during Desert Storm. It replaces the 105mm leaflet artillery round and was used in limited quantities, by VII Corps, just prior to the ground campaign.

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systems.  • Electronic Filmless Camera System — to provide PSYOP and other SOF with a tool to capture and transmit, via radio or telephone, still-photo images for near-real-time intelligence gathering and product development.  • Family of Translators — to provide PSYOP and other SOF with the means to communicate verbally and create written materials in designated target languages.  • Unmanned Aerial Vehicle — to provide a remote-controlled platform for carrying the electronic filmless camera, loudspeakers or leaflets and improve capabilities for collecting and distributing PSYOP materials.  • Leaflet Balloon System — to provide an organic, passive means of distributing leaflets.  • Special Operations Media System — to provide a deployable, high-quality media production and distribution system to replace the AN/TRT-22, PAMDIS, TAMT-10 and the AN/TSQ-171 systems.

The PSYOP community has served its country and the combined armed forces since the founding of this nation, and with the advent of the information age, PSYOP has become even more critical. With the skills of its specialists, its modern PSYOP-unique equipment and the prospect of even more modern and effective systems to come, PSYOP will continue to provide essential support as a combat multiplier.

Capt. Chris Bailey is currently attending the Ordnance Officer Advanced Course at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md. His previous assignments include serving as the commander of the Maintenance Company, 528th Special Operations Support Battalion, and as the PSYOP equipment support officer for the 4th PSYOP Group. During Desert Shield/Storm, he served as a PSYOP operations officer in the Special Operations Support Office — PSYOP of the ARCENT G-3. Capt. Bailey is a graduate of the Ordnance Officer Basic Course, the PSYOP Officer Course, the Joint PSYOP Course at Hurlburt Field, Fla., and the Joint PSYOP Staff Planners Course at Fort Bragg. He holds a BA in mechanical engineering from Idaho State University.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, many threats to world peace have disappeared. “Warsaw Pact” has become a term of the past, and one-half million Americans have fought and won a war to defeat a dictator in the Persian Gulf. Yet, despite this, threats remain, and the largest looms north of Korea’s 38th parallel.

Currently there are more than 40,000 members of the U.S. military services assigned to the Republic of Korea, located in the southern part of the Korean peninsula. The peninsula remains an environment of turbulence and uncertainty. There is perhaps no place in the world where tension is higher or the risk of war greater, and as long as Kim II-sung is in charge of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, it is unlikely that it will renounce its goal of forcible unification of the two nations.

Ever since the national division in 1948, the DPRK has pursued the conquest of the ROK by means of force. It has made numerous attempts to overthrow the ROK government through internal violence, seeking to achieve unification on communist terms. It was through an outright attempt to communize all Korea by force of arms that the DPRK provoked the Korean conflict in 1950. Nevertheless, the DPRK, even after the armistice, did not discard its stated aim of unifying the Korean peninsula under communism. It is our supreme task of struggle for the Korean People’s Army to expel American aggressive forces from the southern half, to liberate our compatriots and achieve the reunification of Korea.

The 1950 invasion is not the only reminder of the aggressive nature of the DPRK. Armistice violations abound, and intentional armed provocations and accidental incidents have been common occurrences during Korea’s 41 years of conflict. Despite recent talks between North and South Korea, no agreement has been reached, and the possibility of war remains great. Provocative DPRK pronouncements cannot be discounted as mere rhetoric, since the Korean People’s Army, the KPA, is approximately 930,000 strong, making it the fifth largest in the world.

One of the least-understood aspects of the DPRK’s military organization is its use of the Special Purpose Forces. The SPF represents one of the world’s largest bodies of highly trained soldiers. Its operations are not limited to the Korean peninsula, but have taken on an international aspect. As such, the SPF is of considerable concern to U.S. and ROK military planners protecting the Republic of Korea.

**Background**

Doctrine for the KPA is a mixture of Maoist and Soviet ideas on war. Both the Maoist principles of protracted guerrilla struggle and Soviet-style heavily armored formations can be found. Within this doctrine there is an unorthodox mixture of...
As a result, the forces. This strategy calls first for the "strategy of three revolutionary faces the world's largest offensive war. They would be employed on the forward edge of the battle area to isolate U.S. and ROK units deployed there. They would seek out and interdict U.S. and ROK forces and attempt to secure tactically important terrain objectives. SPF would also be deployed to the rear to create confusion and panic. Synchronization of shock action and UW operations is a key element of the KPA doctrine. KPA UW forces would work to create confusion and ground infiltration. The KPA would also attempt to have UW forces in place in the Republic of Korea before initiating a conflict. KPA regular units close to the DMZ are in a high state of readiness: 65 percent of the ground force is within 50 miles of the border and in position for attack. These forces are capable of launching a major offensive with little warning.

Special Purpose Forces

The army of the DPRK has two functions: the coordination of land combat forces and the operations of the SPF. The term "Special Purpose Forces" was coined by the U.S. during the early 1980s to provide a single name for that group of KPA combat-related units which are highly trained and uniquely structured. All SPF units possess ranger/commando and special-forces-type capabilities, clearly meeting these definitions. SPF units receive instruction and training which are variable; emphasis is placed upon the use of initiative and political activities behind the enemy lines. Training includes such things as martial arts, demolitions, suicide-type terrorist attacks against buildings and military equipment, swimming, mountain climbing, map reading and rigorous physical activity. The majority of all SPF units have completed missions in peace and war. In the event of UW operations, DPRK SPF would be infiltrated into the ROK by air, sea and ground. Their ground-infiltration capability is best evidenced by the lengthy tunnels that have been dug under the DMZ.15

- Destruction of important man-made military or civilian facilities.
- Sabotage of communications, logistics systems and military installations.
- Interdiction of reinforcements by attacking lines of communication.
- Seizure or destruction of U.S. or ROK nuclear, chemical, and conventional-weapons facilities.
- Seizure or destruction of KPA ground forces and facilities.

In addition to these missions, SPF units are trained and equipped to conduct theater- and global-level missions.

Organization

The KPA is the "armed might of the Korean Workers' Party."16 Effective control resides with the top KWP leadership through the Military Commission of the KWP's Central Committee. Command of the KPA is exercised by Kim Il-sung, chairman of the KWP. Gener-al policy, direction and strategic planning are determined at this level and routed through the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces, or MPAF, to operational headquarters. Command and control flows from the General Staff Department, through its various bureaus and command headquarters, to the operational units.17

The MPAF has three principal divisions: the General Staff, which exercises operational control over the armed forces; the General Political Bureau, which directs all political activity and indoctrination within the armed forces; and the General Rear Services Bureau, which is charged with logistical and support services.18

Within the armed forces there are separate army, navy, air force, artillery, armor and missile commands. The Eighth Special Purpose Corps provides all special-purpose units with administrative and technical support and exercises peace-time operational control over all airborne light-infantry brigades, amphibious light-infantry brigades and those reconnaissance and light-infantry brigades which are not located within the forward corps areas. During peacetime, the brigades are subordinate to the area headquarters in which they are stationed. During wartime, full control over the brigades passes to the Eighth Special Purpose Corps.19

There are times when elements of any SPF units may be temporarily detached and subordinated to another headquarters for special missions.10 Additional administrative and technical support for all special-purpose units is provided in varying degrees by the National Intelligence Committee, Cabinet Intelligence Committee, KWP-Lia-
son Department, General Staff Department's Reconnaissance Bureau, General Staff Bureau, and the Political Security Department.

### Size and composition

The SPF has undergone significant changes in size and composition during the last decade. Readings at the unclassified level which depict size and composition differ drastically. The differences are probably attributable to the different methods used in calculating SPF assets.

The units which comprise the SPF total more than 100,000 troops and represent 15 percent of the total KPA strength. This analysis organizes the SPF into 27 light brigades, including airborne, reconnaissance, light-infantry and amphibious-type brigades, 35 division-level light-infantry battalions and five combined-arms brigades. All SPF units are deployed throughout the DPRK and organized into four general groups:

- **Combined-arms brigades**, directly subordinate to the General Staff Department and deployed within VII Corps.
- **Divisional light-infantry battalions**, organic to each of the KPA's 35 infantry/mechanized-infantry divisions.
- **SPF brigades** directly subordinate to VIII Special Purpose Corps.
- **SPF brigades subordinate to I, II and V-Forward Corps**.

The elite of the SPF consists of four reconnaissance brigades that have been specially trained to carry out covert and overt land, sea and air operations. For covert operations, the SPF unit most frequently employed is the reconnaissance brigade's direct-action unit. Its mission objectives are kidnapping, hijacking, assassination, intelligence and special operations beyond the Korean peninsula. The SPF is one of the few countries of the world that supports terrorism, hijackings, assassinations and kidnappings that have all been attributed to these SPF direct-action units.

### Exporting terror

The use of terrorism by a state entails few risks and constitutes a strong-arm, low-budget foreign policy. The history of the DPRK's use of terrorism is long and bloody and actually predates the June 24, 1950, attack on the ROK. There are a number of examples of the DPRK's use of terrorism, which has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of ROK civilian and military personnel, as well as a number of American servicemen stationed on the peninsula:

- **October 1983, Rangoon, Burma**: The DPRK attempted to murder ROK President Chun Doo Hwan, using a power bomb exploded during a wreath-laying ceremony at a national shrine for Burmese war martyrs. The bomb killed the ROK president and his wife and injured 16 other ROK citizens. The attackers were identified as a major and two captains in the KPA's SPF, assigned to a special terrorist unit. The unit is affiliated with the Reconnaissance Bureau of the North Korean Ministry of People's Armed Forces.
- **1986**: An estimated 31 SPF personnel infiltrated the ROK and assaulted the Blue House, the presidential palace in Central Seoul. All but one commando was killed by ROK defenders.
- **November 1987**: The government of the Republic of Korea concluded that communist North Korean agents had planted the bomb that exploded aboard a Korean Airlines plane, killing 115 passengers and crew.
- **October 1985, Rangoon, Burma**: The DPRK attempted to murder ROK President Chun Doo Hwan during his state visit to Rangoon. A powerful bomb exploded during a wreath-laying ceremony at a national shrine for Burmese war victims, killing four visiting ROK officials (the deputy prime minister, the foreign minister and the ministers of commerce and energy) and 17 other ROK citizens.

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The DPRK's terrorist allies have included Italy's Red Brigades, West Germany's Baader-Meinhof Gang (notorious for slaughtering the Japanese Red Army and the Palestine Liberation Organization). A recent European intelligence report indicates that although relatively inactive for more than a decade, the Japanese Red Army has reported recent action in international terrorism and claims that some Red Army terrorists have been trained at camps in North Korea.

Within this context of worldwide operations, it is important to note that the DPRK is one of the most militarized, despotic and terrorist regimes in the world today, and it has proclaimed that the highest priority of its foreign policies is to teach tactics of terrorism and guerrilla warfare. An indication of the extent of these activities is that an estimated 7,000 SPF personnel have been dispatched to some 47 countries. An additional 5,000 terrorist recruits, from 25 countries, have received training at camps within the DPRK.
North Korean SPF
Included in Schools Wargaming

The buildup of special-operations forces in North Korea is now being included in wargaming at U.S. senior service schools.

In 1989, the schools, which include the National Defense University, the Army War College, the Air War College, the Naval War College and the Marine Corps War College, inaugurated an exercise called the Joint Land, Aerospace and Sea Simulation, or J-LASS. J-LASS is a two-sided, computer-assisted operational planning exercise played at the field army, task force and tactical air force level. An elective for students, it also includes members of the schools’ faculties. The exercise is played at the Air Force Wargaming Center at Maxwell AFB, Ala.

The scenario for this year’s J-LASS, held from April 2-9, 1992, depicted a conflict in the northern Pacific-northeast Asia region involving forces from the U.S., the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Republic of Korea and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, according to Lee McKinney, an analyst in the Threat Branch of the SWCS Intelligence and Security Office. The simulation included both friendly (blue) and enemy (red) special-operations forces, and made use of the latest information on tactics, doctrine and order of battle for blue and red forces.

McKinney was part of a team of SOF subject-matter experts/controllers sent from the SWCS to integrate special-operations activities into the exercise. “This year SOF was looked at more closely, and all the students and faculty were keenly aware of the impact blue and red SOF had in the campaign effort,” he said. “The U.S. is carefully monitoring the tremendous SOF buildup in the DPRK. Based on what I’ve seen at J-LASS ’92, the senior service colleges are also watching it closely and preparing our services to meet the evolving threat.”

U.S. and ROK should adapt doctrine to incorporate operations dealing with the SPF threat. Fifth, there is need to increase civil awareness and preparedness to the SPF threat. Sixth, both U.S. and ROK forces need to strengthen alliance cohesion, enhance interoperability, improve combat effectiveness and demonstrate joint and combined capabilities which increase deterrence.

The DPRK has a reputation of being a wild card, and despite its recent rhetoric, it will remain one. Policy alternatives for the U.S. are limited because friendly forces are deployed in close proximity.

North Korean SPF
included in Schools’ Wargaming

For use in curricular. 10

Notes
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
27. “Added Awareness and Preparedness to the SPF Threat.”
29. Bermudez, pp. 4-5.
32. “ added awareness and preparedness to the SPF threat.”
33. Special Warfare

North Korean SPF

Most effective weapon against the SPF threat is knowledge. As Sun Tzu wrote: “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.”

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North Korean SPF

Incurable U.S. deterrence to DPRK terrorism against ROK and other U.S. allies must be an integral component of the U.S. Asian policy. Deterring DPRK activities has proved extremely difficult. The United States does not maintain direct contact with the DPRK, and since the DPRK has historically played its two major allies, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, against each other, both tend to acquiesce to DPRK violence, rather than risk damaging their relationships with the Kim II-sung regime.

Based on the situation, several options, both unilateral and bilateral, are postulated for the United States:

• Continued military presence, as currently configured.

• Use of U.S. influence upon the Japanese government to ensure that all forms of economic aid to the DPRK are cut off. (The DPRK government and the People’s Republic of China, for instance, are currently highly dependent on Japan for economic aid in the form of loans and business investments.)

• Continued efforts to isolate the DPRK within the world community by urging other nations to take similar measures.

• Encouragement of China to use its influence in curtailing DPRK activities as a component of future U.S./PRC relations.

• Use of all means available to the U.S. government to encourage economic and diplomatic sanctions to press the DPRK to cease its sponsorship of violence.

• Urging the United Nations’ International Civil Aviation Organization to act against DPRK terrorism.

• Vigorous condemnation of all DPRK terrorist acts.

• Pressing DPRK communist allies to condemn DPRK aggression and dissuade Kim II-sung from using such tactics in the future.

Conclusions

U.S. and ROK military planners cannot presently dispose of the threat, but they can lessen its impact. First, there is a need to know as much as possible about the KPA and its SPF. Second is the need to increase vigilance and intelligence—a first-rate strategy must have accurate information about the enemy. Third, active measures must be accelerated by increasing aerial and coastal surveillance, and counterintelligence operations in ROK and elsewhere. Fourth, passive measures must be reinforced to make military installations and buildings less vulnerable, and the
Special Forces Command and Control: Running an Operational Base

by Retired Maj. Ed Sayre

Whether they are in unilateral, combined or joint operations, Special Forces often require unique measures to accomplish their missions, especially in the areas of command, control, communications and intelligence. Command elements of each subordinate headquarters and deployed operational detachment, for example, are often separated by extensive distances. In order to effectively command and control these elements, the Special Forces group organizes a series of operational basess, from the group level (Special Forces operational base, SFOB), to the battalion level (advanced operational base, FOB), to the company level (forward operational base, FOB), to the platoon level (operational base, SFOB), to the patrol level (forward operating base, FOB). All SFOBs have the special forces command, control, communications and intelligence, a mission concept, or SFOB, to plan, direct and control their missions and objectives. In order to effectively plan and control their missions, the SFOB must plan, direct and control their own mission concept, or SFOB.

Mission planning

SF operations encompass a wide range of missions and can last from several days to several weeks or longer. Missions require detailed planning through all levels of command, with decentralized execution at the SF-detachment level. A typical SF-detachment mission is dependent upon air or maritime infiltration and exfiltration, timely intelligence, communications, and accurate reporting and directing throughout the duration of the mission. By identifying activities which must be accomplished before, during and after the mission, the SF team must plan, direct and support the SF detachment and manage the mission to completion. In joint operations, the early deployment of Special Forces is dependent upon strategic objectives, the total force and the depth of the battlefield. As the level of involve-ment increases and a joint task force is required to accomplish the objective, a number of factors greatly affect the ability of the special-operations command to accomplish its Special Forces missions. A few of these factors are:

- Prioritization of missions.
- Increased mission load.
- Reconciliation of missions to resolve any conflict in interest, such as targeting.
- Coordination of joint assets.
- Resources available — personnel, equipment, and aviation assets, both rotary and fixed-wing.
- Communications require-ments — within the JTF, communications requirements can easily quadruple for Special Forces missions after deployment of the JTF on D-Day.
- Synchronization of the battlefield.
- Contingency plans.

Operational planners must deal with these factors and be able to maintain an objective focus in order to command and control their forces. How well the operational base manages these demands can pro-dispose the mission to success or failure.

SF command, control and commu-nications is a complex problem which needs to be managed and closely directed from isolation until return of the team to the FOB. All command problems can be effectively broken down into smaller elements, phases or intermediate objectives. Deficiencies can be identified early-on in the planning process, and staff planners can focus on these potential mission-stoppers. Standing operating procedures support the process by detailing the setup and internal workings of each FOB center, inter-detachment planning, and the use of journals, message logs and operational folders.

Time management

Within the SF planning process there are established windows for specific events to take place, planning, and the use of journals, message logs and operational folders. The time-sensitive and deliberate plan-n ing process presented in FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Oper-a tions, depicts a mission planning pro cess which links the requirement to support a mission. The process starts with a mission tasking, or MKTASK, from the SFOB, which in turn is analyzed by the FOB for mission planning and the appropriate mission concept or SFOB.

The SFOB also coordinates and approves mission-support requests. The mission-planning process integrates many critical factors, including intelligence products and U.S. Air Force fixed-wing, rotary-wing and special-operations aviation rotary-wing air support. The Air Force requires 72 hours for mission planning, and 96 hours notice prior to time-on-target.

A standard mission-planning sce-nario would have the following gates in order to allow enough time for the SF detachment, FOB, SFOB and mission-support assets to fully coordinate the mission:

- 120 hours: FOB receives MKTASK from SFOB.
- 96 hours: SF detachment gets FOB mission brief.
- 72 hours: Mission support requests arrive at USAF.
- 48 hours: Mission-support request arrives at SOA.
- 24 hours: SF detachment briefs to SFOB commander.
- Time-on-target: SF detachment arrival in the operational area.

This planning time sequence can be compressed; however, it requires close coordination and advance planning in a future-oper-ations cell at the FOB. Specific guidelines for the MKTASK/MICON process are outlined in the ICOS Pub 3 series.

FOB center directors and opera-tional planners must provide clear and concise orders, be well-versed in parallel planning, experienced in SF mission-perticular techniques, and provide complete and comprehensive mission-planning folders. In short, the SF detachment in iso-lation is not a training aid for inex-perienced FOB staffers.

Coordination

Missions for SF detachments can be reduced to six phases which form the standard SF-detachment mission profile:

- Isolation planning
- Infiltration
- Operations and execution
- Exfiltration
- Debriefing
- Any phase of the mission requires timely coordination through all FOB centers so that the FOB can pass critical information to subordinate operational bases and the command-and-control headquarters, the SOCC.

Missions with as many as six committed SF detachments represent a significant problem in command, control, communications and intelligence. If, for an FOB which is responsible for the isolation, launch, support and recovery of each one. By assigning operations schedules depicting each phase of the missions, the FOB can direct and coordinate critical activities for each detachment.

The OPSKEDs, when organized into a matrix format, allow the FOB to quickly identify, collate, reconcile and synchronize all SF-detachment missions currently in any one phase of the mission profile.

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The use of code names for Special Forces operations simplifies complex missions and improves control of deployed SF detachments. Code names provide brevity and clarity of message encryption/decryption, voice communications and opera-tional graphics displays. By using a letter-indicator method in concert with SAWSERSUP, both the operational detachment and base benefit in overall command and control and communications security. The assignment of code names should meet the following guidelines:

- Each five-letter name.
- Do not use more than two instances of the same letter in the code name. (Some planners prefer that no letters are repeated.)
OPSKEs

Operations Schedules at a Glance

- Identify critical mission activities and provide mission planners with a means of managing and coordinating missions.
- Matrix format allows immediate visual monitoring of missions.
- OPSKEs are based on the six phases of a standard SF detachment mission.
- They provide a format consistent with, and in support of, SAVERSUP.
- Code names are employed and must meet established guidelines. The JSOA depicted has been assigned the code name Blade and is sub-divided into smaller OA's, each with code names.
- Critical activities are identified for each OPSKED and are necessary for the successful completion of that phase of the mission.
- OPSKED #3 illustrates the critical activities that have been identified for the execution phase.

The following alphabetical letter indicator code name samples are used in the OPSKED examples and JSOA scenario map. Note that they begin with the same first letter as that of the OA code name.

SFODA-543 Designated activity SFODA-155
EDDIE Operational Area SATIN
EAGLE SF detachment SHARK
ELIPE Primary Infl Site SAMMY
ELBOW Alternate Infl Site SMITH
ERASE Target SHUT
EJECT Primary Exfil Site SQUPY
ELDER Alternate Exfil Site SHOUT

The execution OPSKED employs a progressive color coding system and a priority numbering system.

In this example, Team Hamer has been assigned a yellow mission status due to loss of contact with RS team #1. As a result, SOCC and FOB initiate a recovery plan.

The exfiltration OPSKED tracks all exfiltrations within the JSOA and eliminates any potential for conflict.

Here, Team Shark is instructed to link up with the missing personnel from Team Hamer in their designated area of recovery. They are to then move to their own exfiltration beach-landing site.
• Each name must either be a word or approximate a word in the English language. This includes any "re" a non-English language.
• Do not use any code words in SAVERSUP or ones already in use by SF detachments.
• Do not use numbers, cardinal directions, or phases of the alphabet.

Example: north, south, east, west.

• Avoid code names in the same mission that only differ by one letter, such as "alpha" and "bravo".

In contrast, conventional forces assign code names to simplify areas of operation, objectives, and phase lines. For example, all AOs are named after states (California, Ohio, etc.) and phases of the month (February, October, etc.).

A higher headquarters, normally the SFOB, assigns the FOB a joint special-operations area in which to conduct operations. The FOB divides this JSOA into smaller operational areas for its SF detachments. Once an FOB is committed to an operational area, the FOB operations center provides it with a series of code names. For example, the SFOB provides the FOB with JSOA BLADE to conduct its assigned missions. The FOB subdivides JSOA BLADE into two operational areas, OA EDDIE and OA SATIN. Subsequent SF-detachment code names report the first letter of the OA under which they are located.

The SFOB, however, frequently do not use five-letter code names because of the interface at joint-planning headquarters and operations associated with the JTF. In those instances, the SOC issues a message to ensure reconciliation and reduction of confusion. This can be critical when missions are being executed on a theater-wide basis.

Once the FOB has met its requirements for code names, the FOB OPCEN should designate 15-20 spares for re-use and detachment as individual code words. Not all SF-detachment code words need to be assigned by alphabetical-letter indicator. Some operational code words may be standardized by the FOB — for example, "dragon" for a "re" agent. "Code words" are used to denote special functions or collections of functions. For example, the following code words mean: "green" — mission accomplishment on course; "yellow" — mission accomplishment out of touch; "brown" — mission accomplishment lost.

**I**nfiltration

The infiltration OPSKED reorganizes all the missions through the assignment of resources, planned flight routes, times and locations.

**E**xecution

All missions in execution need to be reconciled and constantly tracked by both the FOB and the SOCCE. To maintain a focus on mission status, the mission status and commander's intent.

**F**lux

The exfiltration OPSKED reorganizes all the missions and allocates resources according to the mission priority established by the FOB commander. In the illustration, Team Shark has received a fragmentary order from the FOB to conduct a follow-up mission with the team members from Team Hammer in their designated recovery point and then move to their exfiltration beach and landing site. This form of self-recovery saves the FOB from flying an aircraft to a location without any resources. It is critical that the personnel involved be there. The SOCCE is responsible for the exfiltration of the yellow color code to Team Hammer, as shown in the illustration.

**D**ebriefing

After successful exfiltration of the SF detachment, the FOB conducts a detailed debriefing according to its SOP. It quickly passes critical items of information to both higher and lower headquarters, with more detailed information included in the FOB's detailed intelligence summary. Each SF detachment reports information related to its primary intelligence requirements/information requirements, which will be disseminated for further collection planning. All information is collected at the FOB and placed into intelligence channels for evaluation. Any successful exfiltration is a valuable asset for the FOB planning staff and contributes both to SF detachment currently in mission planning and to all future SF-detachment missions.

**S**pecial Warfare

October 1992

Author's note: The OPSKED process with the SF CIV model can be significantly improved using the Special Forces communications-electronics operations instruction which will be included in the new SAVERSUP V. scheduled for release in fall 1992.

Retired Maj. Edward C. Swyer has more than 16 years in Special Forces assignments in the 10th, 5th, and 1st SF Groups and instructor duty with the Special Forces Combat Diver Course in Key West, Fla. His assignments have included service as both an NCO and officer on five SF A-detachments, as a battalion S-5, a battalion S-3, and as an SF company commander. His last assignment was with the Joint Readiness Training Center, Special Operations Division, as an SF B-detachment observer/controller. Recently retired, he now lives in Fayetteville, N.C. The author wishes to express his debt to Maj. Gen. Peterson and Ray Boucheuser and SFCs Mark Hoffman and Randy White for their assistance with this article, with special thanks to Dick Scibelli, whose coaching and efforts are reflected throughout.
Communal Strife: The Insurgency of the Future

by Norvell B. DeAtkine

Much of the U.S. Army interest in internal defense and counterinsurgency is focused on the Southeast Asian and Latin American insurgencies of the 1960s and 70s. This type, usually termed revolutionary, is vastly different from insurgencies, however, only one type of insurgency. In the book, *Insurgency in the Modern World,* 1 Bard O’Neill has identified six types: secessionist, revolutionary, restorational, reactionary, conservative and reformist.

It is on revolutionary warfare, however, that we have concentrated much of our study of the political-military aspect of counterinsurgency. Based on the experiences of past wars — the French in Indo-China and Algeria, various Latin American insurgencies and other conflicts around the globe, researchers have constructed numerous models on the premise that instability is rooted in problems of income distribution, the absence of political participation and a host of other social inequities. If only the existing government could reform itself, execute programs for the welfare of the disfranchised, the theory goes — all would be well. The legitimacy of the government would be established, and the favorable environment that the insurgents require to survive would disappear.

Although few of the social inequities that spawned revolutionary insurgencies have been eradicated, throughout much of the world, insurgencies are increasingly becoming ethnically, religiously or linguistically based. Most of these communal conflicts would fall into O’Neill’s “secessionist” category; other observers have termed them “traditional” warfare.

In essence, communal insurgencies are wars between peoples, e.g., Kurds vs. Arabs, Jews vs. Arabs, Eritreans vs. Ethiopians, Christian and/or Black Africans vs. Arab Muslims in Sudan, Baluchis and not Pakistanis or Iranians. Communal wars are usually based upon some ethnic, linguistic or racial cleavage in society, but they can also be based upon very tenuous self-identification, often founded on prejudices rather than reality. The primary point is simply that people create their own identity which by definition entails exclusivity and often a perceived fragmentation of multicultural societies.

In examining the insurgencies in the Middle East, for example, only one can be singled out as somewhat revolutionary: the 1970-75 Dhofari revolt in Oman. It is difficult, however, to assign this as a strict revolutionary status. It was a revolt by a group of tribesmen who considered themselves ethnically and linguistically different from their neighbors, and their efforts to expand the revolt beyond the Dhofari territory in central Oman failed. The Dhofari revolt, like many others, disguised its communal basis by application of a strong dose of Marxist rhetoric.

Throughout the Middle East, insurgent groups, such as the Kurds and Sudanese and Palestinian insurgents, make liberal use of revolutionary rhetoric, but with the exception of some fringe Palestinian organizations, they are fighting ethnic or religious wars with nationalistic overtones. For example, Israelis often point out that the standard of living for Israeli Arabs is higher than that of Arabs in neighboring countries, and that Palestinians of the West Bank are probably better off economically than most of their Arab brothers in Egypt or Syria.

But these are meaningless assertions — Palestinians are not looking for civil reforms or greater participation in the Israeli power structure. Even if offered Israeli citizenship, and the same degree of rights as their Arab compatriots in Israel, few would take them. Nor does the fact that West Bank Arabs probably have more freedom of speech than their brethren in Syria, Iraq or the Gulf states make any difference. Separation of religion and state, conversion into Islam is the objective of the Palestinian movement.

In many Third World nations, ethnic or cultural diversity is a time bomb requiring only the slightest of triggers to set it off. We are very much aware of the “ugly American” syndrome, yet we are seemingly surprised when other societies exhibit blatant ethnocentrism well beyond that of the most obtuse American tourist. A few examples will suffice: Muammar Khadafy, in an interview with an Iranian correspondent, was reported as saying: “The mistake (Libyans) is due to the presence of Arab Christians. An Arab must not be a Christian. The basic call of Communal strife is growing throughout the world, with global political developments acting as a catalyst. Within the Third World, there are current trends which are on a collision course and which in the coming years will cause repetitive ethnic conflicts, i.e., the erosion of great-power control and influence, and the growth of religious fundamentalism.”

Islam is that Arabs must be Muslims, Arabs must fight against each other until they adopt Islam.8 Nor is this “special peoples” concept confined to the Arabs. One of the more radical but influential Judaic fundamentalists, the late Meir Kahane, wrote: “The Arabs of Israel represent a descent of the Divine Name. ... Their removal, therefore, is much more than a political matter. It is a religious matter, a religious obligation, (a fulfillment of the) commandment to do away with the desecration of the Name. ... Let us remove the Arabs from Israel’s midst as to bring redemption.”9 (Kahane’s “Israel” includes Judas and Samaria, or we as know it, the West Bank.)

In a more civil ethnocentric fashion, Menachem Friedman capsulized the traditional Jewish conception as being, “That Jewish historicity is essentially unique. The Jewish people, God’s elect, is perpetually subject to Divine Providence.”10

The Iranians are no less ethnocentric, as evidenced in this statement by the former Shah of Iran: “Iran was an early home of the Aryans from whom most Americans and Europeans are descended, and we are racially quite separate from the Semitic stock of the Arabs.”7 The Khadafy government which succeeded the Shah was much less tolerant of non-Muslim minorities, particularly the Bahai sect, which has been virtually eradicated in Iran.12

Although these examples concentrate on the Middle East, communal strife is growing throughout the world, with global political developments acting as a catalyst. Within the Third World, there are currents which are on a collision course and which in the coming years will cause repetitive ethnic conflicts, i.e., the erosion of great-power control or influence,13 and the growth of religious fundamentalism as a political ideology in a Third World with growing ethnic separatist tendencies and assertions. There is also a perceived diminished usefulness of secular humanism and/or political ideologies as a vehicle for human aspirations.14 The common thread in all of this appears to be an increasing intolerance toward ethnic, cultural or linguistic minorities within these Third World (or in the case of the Balkans, Second World) nations.

In the classic FID situation, we provide the assistance, encourage conflict and malignancy needed by the host country to provide the required security and development for its people. Groups such as the...
Turks. Even in a period of great what degree their struggle is sup whom the insurgents fight and to
problems of communal struggle, there
50 Special Warfare October 1992
nor country they are in.16
close Kurdish coordination. Many
opportunities, the Kurds align
trol, the more significant minorities
involvement in their own cultural
and political violence results.
awareness and aggravate commu
minorities fare?
the insurgents, how would other
become an independent state under
violence begins, the longer it lasts,
that once widespread communal
ly stronger Nuer or Dinka tribes.
putes, we must begin to articulate
could be lumped together with
operating successfully in a revolu
tionary scenario will be even more
essential, will be lacking.
the SOF community need to
assist an ally engaged in a commu
real or imagined
will we understand the issues
understanding the historical evolu
written by Ferdinand Schevill, orig
20
Richard Hass, "The Superpowers and Regional conflicts in the
Cold-War Era," Address given before the SOREF Symposium, 29
ington Institute: The Middle East in An Era of Changing Superpower
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— Munir H. Nasser, "Iraq: Ethnic Minorities and their Impact on
Politics," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 6,
no. 3, (Spring 1985), pp. 5-29.

or Kurdistan communities within the
Kurdish areas are an example,18
there are numerous areas of
Turkish and Kurdish communities under the
Kurdish war is not a war of the
future, the U.S. will very likely be
faced with situations in which
trusted allies will be wracked by internal
dishonesty, and its consequences could
be devastating for all parties involved.
Ultimately, the conflict will admit only
a protracted guerrilla war against a
mere group of regime supporters seeking
Human rights organizations report
during the 38th Air Defense Brigade in
Syria, the many minorities in
and Eastern European countries
Most of all, we as Americans
have a right to self-determination? Is it immoral or un-American that
we be involved in defeating an indepen
dent movement? These questions will
need to be dealt with squarely,
or the efficacy of our military action will
be essential, will be lacking.
If we can
Kurdish identity. However, in every case an integrat
politicized-military strategy is imperative:
• Fifth, the area expertise so nec
essary for special-forces operations to
operate successfully in a revolu
tionary scenario will be even more
critical in a communal insurgency. The
depth and detail of knowledge required
will be much greater. For instance, nothing could be more
dangerous than to launch a civic-
political-military strategy that seems to
be militarily necessary will be much
greater. For instance, nothing could be more
dangerous than to launch a civic-
political-military strategy that seems to
be militarily

Second, we need to understand
the society and culture of the tradi
tional insurgent and the attach
ment of the land to him. For ex
ample, it has often been advanced by
the Israelis that the Palestinians already have a home,
called Jordan. This completely misses the
point that the Palestinians want their home on land
to which they have a powerful attachment.
Third, we need to appreciate and
understand the attitudes of other
peoples within the rebelling com
munal region. Should the area
become an independent state under
the insurgents, how would other
minorities fare? All too often the
answer is, "badly." The Assyrian
spirit of the people. The unsettling fact which seems to be
emerging from long communal struggles is that the
rebels are not amenable to political settlement unless they are con
vinced that they are fighting for their mili
tary resistance. This seems to
appear only after one-sided, crush
ning military defeats. The more inhum
anized, the more significant minorities
tual differences. As the government
pursues its goal of achieving control,
the more significant minorities often become increasingly resentful,
and political violence results.
Before we can deal with the prob
lem of communal violence, there
are five aspects of it we need to
comprehend:
• First, we need to understand for
whom the insurgents fight and to
what degree their struggle is sup
ported by their people. The assump
sion that a rebel minority in a tradi
tional insurgency is united in its
demands is seldom correct.
The history of the Kurdish move
ment attests to how the Israelis
have fought each other as viciously
as they have the Iraqis, Iranians or
Turks. Even in a period of great
opposition, they allowed themselves to compete among tribal
chieftains and effectively block any close
Kurdish coordination. Many
side with the government of what
ever country they are in.18
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Notes:
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— For example, Douglas Black and George K. Tananbaum, "Four
trends in the study of counterinsurgency," in The Analysis of Coun
— J. B. Kelly, Arabs, The Gulf and the West: A Critical View of the
— In fact, the imposition of Marxist ideology on an ethnic rebellion
will only serve the purpose of the insurgents. See Roy L.
Cleveland, "Revolution in Dheber Boulanate of Oman," Middle East
— The Kurds, long associated with Marxist philosophy and
the USSR, nevertheless remain first and foremost a tribal group with
a strong feeling of ethnic distinctiveness from the Iranian, Arab and
Turkish nations in which they live. See C. L. Emmons, Kurds, Turks,
Arabs and the Persian Shah (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1947).
— Based on data in the World Fact Book 1989 (Washington, D.C.:
cia, 1989), p. 21. Eton's standard of living is far lower than that of
other countries in the Middle East, Germany, Japan, or the
United States. See J. E. D. Oates, "The Middle East and
the United States," in The Impact of American Economic
Assistance on the Middle East, ed. Isaiah Bertram, (New York:
— The idea that the Palestinians are "settlers" unless they are con
ced to use overwhelming force to crush
the conflict will admit only one
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Functional Area 39:
Guidelines for Training and Professional Development

by Maj. Jose M. Martinez

The Army is revising its career guidance for officers in Functional Area 39, and it is important that officers currently in or considering entry into FA 39 understand the latest guidelines which will affect their designation, training and professional development.

DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Utilization, is being revised to contain the latest information on FA 39, created by the Army in 1988 to offer progressive and sequential assignments to active-duty officers in Civil Affairs.

The Army is also in the process of revising FA 39 training or an FA 39 assignment will be required to complete airborne training to remain in the functional area. Those who have received no previous FA 39 training or assignments may be officers. From YG 85 and later will be required to take airborne training. If a group year is overstrength in FA 39 officers. Airborne qualification may be used as a discriminator in dropping personnel from the functional area.

Academic courses — The Regional Studies Course is a week-long seminar in which the officer studies all five geographic regions of the world, with a concentration in one: Latin America, Asia/Pacific, Africa, Europe or the Middle East. This course, along with a language and graduate degree, provides the broad base of knowledge common to both FA 39 areas of concentration. Officers who graduated from the long Foreign Area Officer Course prior to July 1986 are considered regional-studies-qualified.

In the six-week Civil Affairs and PSYOP Officer Courses, students study subjects peculiar to Civil Affairs or PSYOP. As a minimum, officers from a year-group prior to 1985 must either have completed one of these courses to be designated 39B (PSYOP) or 39C (Civil Affairs), or they must have a strong FA 39 assignment pattern to justify award of either area of concentration based upon experience without actual course attendance. Officers from YG 85 and later must complete all training (less advanced degree) to have a designated area of concentration. Designation is based on the needs of the Army and individual preference. Some officers may become qualified in both areas. Language training — Initial language training lasts from 6-12 months. Depending on the language, many officers will take language training at Fort Bragg; others will be sent to the Defense Language Institute, El Cajon, Calif. The goal for a DLPT score in initial language training varies with language category because of the difficulty involved. For Category I and II languages, the goal is 1+1+1 (listen, read and speak); for Category III and IV, the goal is 1+1+1.

Throughout their careers, officers should strive to improve their language ability to the FA 39 level; officers who fail to maintain foreign-language skills may be dropped from the functional area.

As an additional incentive, foreign-language proficiency pay is now authorized for all PSYOP and CA personnel, regardless of whether or not they occupy a duty position requiring language. The authorization is in MILPER mas.

"Officers will not be accepted for training until they are branch-qualified, less the Combined Arms and Services Staff School. Officers must also have a score of 85 or better on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery (or demonstrate language proficiency by scoring at least 1/3 on the DLPT) and complete airborne training before they can begin FA 39 training. To be fully trained, FA 39 officers must attend the PSYOP or CA Officer Course (depending on area of concentration) and the Regional Studies Course; they must also have a foreign-language ability demonstrated by a score of 1/3 or higher (reading/listening, rated in increments from 1-3) on the Defense Language Proficiency Test. Officers who wish to apply for early designation should send their request with a copy of their graduate transcript and/or DLPT score to the FA 39 assignments officer at the Total Army Personnel Command.

Training requirements

Officers will not be accepted for training until they are branch-qualified, less the Combined Arms and Services Staff School, CAS. Officers must also have a score of 85 or
ing early. FA 39 officers will normally be considered for nomina-
tive assignments as captains because of the length of their train-
ing and the need to work as cap-
tains in their functional area. After training, a senior captain will usu-
ally be assigned to a PSYOP or CA unit, or to another position where a
field-grade FA 39 officer is available to serve as adviser and counselor.

Majors or promotable captains may attend the Command and Gen-
eral Staff College or its equivalent. Following an initial tour in a
PSYOP or CA position, officers not selected for a resident course must
complete training by correspondence to bring them to Military Educa-
tion Level 4.

Officers should seek qualifying assignments in their basic branch
as junior majors. Following a
branch tour, FA 39 officers will nor-
mal return to fill CA or PSYOP positions as senior majors. There
are command, battalion S-3, battalion
executive officer, and high-level
staff positions available to FA 39
majors in both areas of concentra-
tion. An officer who does not have an advanced degree should com-
plete one as a major.

Lieutenant colonels who hold FA 39 may be selected to command in
either their basic branch or FA 39. Other positions are available on
division staffs as majors, FA 39-quali-
fied in the functional area, Reserve
branch.

FA 39 colonels have a role to play at the highest levels of the military.
There is one PSYOP group com-
mmand; other FA 39 positions are
typically found on corps or higher
command; officers should meet
more than the minimum require-
ments and serve in a qualifying
position in a PSYOP unit just as the
active-component FA 39s.

For further information concern-
ing FA 39, contact either:

Special Operations Prophecy Office; JFR Special Warfare Center and
School; Fort Bragg, NC 28307;
phone DSN 239-6406/2415, com-
mercial (919) 432-6406/2415; or the
PERSCOM FA 39 assignments offi-
cers at: Commander, USPERSCOM;
Attn: TAPC-OPB-A; 200 Stovall
Street; Alexandria, VA 22332-0411;
phone DSN 221-3115, commercial
(703) 525-3115. ◄

Reserve-component soldiers holding Civil Affairs skill-qualification identifier
"D" may now reclassify to the new RC MOS 38A (Civil Affairs), according to
MSgt. Phillip Snyder, 37F Proponent Manager in the SWCS Special Opera-
tions Prophecy Office. Besides holding the SQI, RC soldiers must also
have been assigned to a CA unit for at least one year, have attended at least
one session of annual training and have the approval of their unit comman-
der. The Army CA and PSYOP Command began handling mass reclas-
sification by command in June, but soldiers may also request reclassification indi-
vidually. To apply, soldiers should submit a DA Form 4187 through their
unit list for reclassification. SWCS plans to have exportable 38A
Reserve-component soldiers
now airborne-dependent for active-duty soldiers

Effective Mar. 19, 1992, active-duty MOS 37F (PSYOP) became airborne-
dependent, meaning soldiers must now be airborne-qualified to hold the
MOs. The change has no effect on reserve-component 37F soldiers, and its
effect on junior active-component PSYOP soldiers will be small, according to
MSgt. Phillip Snyder, 37F Proponent Manager in the SWCS Special Opera-
tions Prophecy Office. Most PSYOP soldiers in grades through
staff sergeant are already airborne-qualified, since SWCS, supported by
the Army Recruiting Command, has for several years accepted only air-
borne AC soldiers for 37F training. The greatest impact will be on
senior class and master sergeants, Snyder said: They came to 37F
many years ago, and only a few have attended airborne training.
Non-air-
borne 37F have a two-year window in which to attend airborne training,
but they will still be competitive for promotion in the meantime. If they
choose not to attend, they will have two options: soldiers with more than
20 years’ service may have to retire at their next ETS date; those with less
than 20 years may be reclassified into a shortage MOS. “Non-airborne
soldiers holding MOS 37F need to start thinking about their careers,” Snyder
said. “If they elect to stay (in the MOS), then airborne school is definitely
in their future.” The change should improve 37F promotions as non-air-
borne senior NCOs leave the Army or reclassify. Promotion is already
showing some improvement: At the last promotion boards, six PSYOP
NCOs were selected for E-8 and nine were selected for E-7. This easing of
promotions should continue to filter down through the ranks, Snyder said.

Maj. Jose M. Martinez is current-
ly the FA 39 manager in the Special Operations Prophecy Office, JFR Spec-
ial Warfare Center, Special Operations Center and School. Commissioned in Field Artillery in 1978, he has served in artillery
assignments with the 3/21st FA Battalion, 5th Infantry Division; 15th Field Artillery Battalion of the 2nd Infantry Division; and in the
Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Okla. Maj. Martinez has served as
an instructor in the PSYOP Depart-
ment of the JFKSWCS and with the
1st PSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOP
Group, at Fort Bragg. He is a gradu-
ate of the Field Artillery Advanced
Course, the PSYOP Officer Course
and the United Kingdom Staff Psy-
chological Operations Course.

Reserve-component CA soldiers to reclassify into MOS 38A

October 1992
Officer Career Notes

The JFK Special Warfare Center and School is rewriting chapters on the Special Forces Branch (18), Civil Affairs Branch (38) and the Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs Functional Area (32) in DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Utilization. This is a stand-alone document designed to be used by individual officers, commanders, career managers, assignment officers and DA selection boards, according to the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office. It specifies standards by grade for schooling and operational assignments which officers must meet to ensure that they have acquired the necessary skills, knowledge and attitudes to be proficient at that grade and to be fully qualified for promotion and retention in their branch or functional area. Publication is scheduled for late 1992.

The SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office recently lost two of its officers to PCS moves. Maj. Jean-Luc Nash, formerly the SOPO Special Forces branch manager, left June 16 to begin training as the defense attache designate to Chad. Maj. Rick Matthews, the Special Forces officer recruiter, left May 1 for an assignment with the 7th Special Operations Support Command in Germany. Capt. Scott Peters has replaced Matthews as the SF officer recruiter.

Despite the downsizing of the Army, Special Forces Branch continues to grow. Because of increased authorizations caused by new positions at the Joint Readiness Training Center, the activation of the 3rd SF Group and other personnel initiatives, the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel has approved an increase in the Special Forces Branch Accession Model to 130 officers per year group, according to the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office. Previously, the accession model goal was 90-100 officers per year group. On the 1991 promotion list for major, released Feb. 11, 1992, Special Forces Branch had a primary-zone selection rate of 70.6 percent, higher than any other branch.

The following personnel have been selected for FY 93 colonel-level command in special-operations units: Jeffrey B. Jones (11/39), Ronald M. Calvert (18/54), Kenneth W. Getty Jr. (18/54) and Frank J. Toney Jr. (18/54).

The SWCS Proponency Office reminds officers that the Combined Arms and Services Staff School is mandatory military training for officers in year groups 1979 and beyond. This applies to officers managed by the Officer Personnel Management Division of PERSCOM and officers from selected special branches. Without completing CAS3, these officers cannot be approved for attendance at the Command and General Staff College. Officers remain eligible for CAS3 attendance until the beginning of their 10th year of service. This is the last year for officers in year group 1984 to attend CAS3 without a waiver; those already beyond their 10th year (year groups 79-83) should request schooling as an exception to policy through their local personnel office. Waivers will be processed to PERSCOM for approval and must include an explanation of why the officer was unable to attend during the past five years of service.

On Dec. 5, 1991, the President signed the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal years 92 and 93. The Warrant Officer Management Act was part of that bill and became effective Feb. 1, 1992. WOMA amends Titles 10 and 37 of the U.S. Code with statutory changes necessary to implement the following provisions:

- Creation of a new rank of CWO 5 for warrant officers, pay grade of W-5, with a five-percent cap for active components for each of the services. W-5 pay is established at 12 percent above that of W-4. Allowances are increased while special and incentive pays remain the same as the W-4 rate.
- Instead of the previous promotion system using AUS and RA boards, WOMA creates a single active-duty promotion system with flexible zones. Though there will no longer be below-zone consideration for promotion to CWO 5, there will be BZ zones for consideration for promotion to CWO 4 and CWO 5. There are also provisions for officers twice non-selected for promotion, and those not selected for voluntary-indefinite status to remain on active duty until the first day of the seventh month following board approval. This compares with the previous policy, whereas officers non-selected for VI or those twice passed over for promotion had 90 days following board approval to leave the service.
- WOMA provides Army active-duty warrant officers the opportunity to remain on active duty for 24 years of warrant-officer service. CWO 5s may remain on active duty for 30 years of warrant-officer service or until age 62.
- WOMA, as passed, does not apply to the U.S. Coast Guard.

WOMA affects pay, promotion for warrants

CAS3 requirement for CGSC approval

By having the required number of years of service and meeting the CAS3 requirements, officers are eligible for attendance at the Command and General Staff College. This includes the Combined Arms and Services Staff School.
**Foreign SOF**

**Special Warfare**

New Colombian special police units to combat kidnapping and extortion

After 937 kidnappings by the summer of 1991 in Santa Fe de Bogota, Colombian President Gaviria's government announced the creation of a new hostage-rescue force, the Unidad Antisecuestro y Extorsión (UNASE), or Anti-Extortion and Kidnapping Unit, for exclusive use in Colombia's capital city. According to the Aug. 30, 1991, issue of the Bogota newspaper El Espectador, UNASE is composed of 35 personnel: a colonel-commander, four other officers, 15 NCOs and 15 special agents, all volunteers. The unit is said to be capable of responding to any type of hostage-rescue situation in urban or rural environments. Training for the unit was conducted by members of the Police Center for Special Operations; eight members of the group also received specialized hostage-rescue training in Madrid from the Spanish Civil Guard. UNASE has the latest weapons and equipment in the Colombian police-force inventory, including 9mm Beretta pistols; AR-15, G-3 and Galil rifles; voice-secure communications equipment; various types of transport vehicles; and special equipment like fast-rope for rappelling. Following an Aug. 29, 1991, capabilities demonstration in which the unit staged a hostage-rescue operation, General Fabio Campo Silva, commander of the Metropolitan Police, announced the creation of two similar units in the northern Colombian cities of Bucaramanga and Barranquilla. On Oct. 7, 1991, in its first real mission, UNASE rescued a Colombian businessman taken hostage by a local gang, killing two of the hostage-takers.

In June 1983, then-chief of Mexico's Capital Police, Col. Ramon Mota Sanchez, proposed the creation of a special police unit to combat organized crime and criminal violence. Once established, however, the unit evolved into an organization charged with high-risk missions requiring the special training, equipment and skills associated with urban counter-guerrilla actions and antiterrorism. The unit, designated "Force F," is known more familiarly as the "Zorros." Collected by a colonel directly subordinate to the Secretariat General for Protection and Highway Administration of the Federal District, it is based north of Mexico City, close to the Secretary's headquarters. The force's approximately 350 men are armed with weapons including M-16A1s, CAR-15s, 12-gauge shotguns, 30-06 rifles, HK-33 machine guns, 9mm pistols, hand grenades and tear-gas guns. Zorros wear military battle dress, body armor and military load-bearing equipment, all in black. Helicopters and special vehicles provide transport. Personnel-selection criteria focus on physical condition, weapons-handling capabilities and the capacity to learn basic and specialized skills. The unit's internal structure is along military lines; it is organized into urban-commando squads, antiterrorist squads, emergency-ordination-disposal squads and snipers. Usually they carry out 5-6 actions a day, including those dealing with deactivating explosives, rescuing hostages, capturing terrorists and violent criminals, and raiding houses and buildings. They are said to operate with a degree of autonomy and authority not possessed by other security elements. A few specific Force F actions have come to light: In 1986, for example, during the World Soccer Championship in Mexico, the Zorros were in charge of supervising and protecting all sport installations, press centers, hotels, embassies and the Mexico City Airport. They also helped dismantle a bomb placed close to the U.S. embassy in April 1986. In July 1988, they rescued 20 hostages being held in a commercial enterprise, and the officer in charge, Armando Duarte Badillo, was promoted to commander of the group within months for "heroic" actions. (He was killed in December 1988 during an assault on the Tepei jail.) In September 1988, the Zorros were involved in a controversial action: They assaulted their own judicial building and freed two fellow Zorros being held legally on charges of aggression and bribery. While the assault was publicly condemned, no further judicial action is known to have been taken. Since then, however, the unit has received less publicity. Force F most recently surfaced in the press in late March 1992, when it deactivated a bomb in Mexico City.

Failed Soviet coup highlights KGB spetsnaz roles

Voluminous reporting in the wake of the August 1991 coup debacle in the former USSR has revealed information about two KGB special-operations units and their roles in behalf of the "coup plotters." According to senior Russian Republic spokesmen and a number of KGB special-operations personnel interviewed, KGB spetsnaz forces were assigned to storm the Russian Parliament building early on Aug. 21 and seize key leadership personnel, including Boris Yeltsin. Units assigned this mission included the Alpha (Alfa) counterterrorist group subordinate to the KGB's Seventh Main Directorate (Surveillance), and commanded by Hero of the Soviet Union, General Major Viktor Karpukhin. The other heretofore unknown group was under the KGB's First Chief Directorate (Foreign Operations) and intended principally for operations abroad. It was commanded by an officer identified only as Col. Boris B. According to a combination of sources, Alpha has been involved in many counterterrorist and internal-security missions since its formation in 1974 and was heavily active in special-operations tasks in Afghanistan. Among its more recent missions was the seizing of a multi-story criminal detention facility held by armed prisoners who had taken hostages. The FCD group was formed in August 1981 with external reconnaissance, sabotage, training and security missions, and it seems to have been particularly active in internal-security actions. Commanders of both units said they could have accomplished their mission, but only at the cost of many defenders' lives. The assault was to have been commanded by Karpukhin, who controlled not only KGB assault groups, but elements of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) Dzerzhinsky Motorized Rifle Division, the "Moscow Special Army Task Force," and elements from an MVD Militia Detachment of Special Designation (OMON) that in combination totaled some 15,000 personnel. The OMON and other MVD elements were to clear a path through the crowd around the building with gas and water, with the assault groups following by ground and helicopter. Events surrounding the decision not to execute this plan have several variations. Clearly the decision was made higher up, but some sources indicate some participants on the scene, and some Alpha subgroup commanders and personnel refused to take part in the action. Karpukhin's role is less clear, but he evidently supported the idea of preventing unnecessary slaughter. He was later relieved from command, and the Alpha and FCD groups reorganized directly to Soviet President Gorbachev, and secondarily to Russian President Yeltsin. The ultimate status and disposition of these units is uncertain.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Maj. Arnaldo Claudio of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.
Army Special Forces Command

Army Southern European Task Force Jr., formerly commander of Spe
mand of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School July 24 from
Baratto, chief of special programs and director of special projects at Fort Bragg.

Some SOF units at Fort Bragg have recently received new commanders.


The 1st Special Forces Regiment appoints officers

The 1st Special Forces Regiment appointed officers at the Special Forces Ball, held in Fayetteville, N.C., April 10.

The 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Regiment provides...
Under the operational control of the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, the Atlantic, the 6th works closely with XVIII Corps and its 1st Corps Support Command.

Total cost of the building project is estimated at $26 million. In addition to the three-story headquarters, the project includes a single-story headquarters-and-headquarters company facility and the widening of Yadin Road into five lanes. The project is scheduled for completion in 1994.

CMH publishes historical maps

The Army Center for Military History has recently published "Operation Just Cause" and "Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm," 24-by-30-inch commemorative color maps which depict the Army's role in the two operations.

New equipment will improve PSYOP production

Equipment currently being developed at the Special Warfare Center and School will take advantage of the latest communication technologies to improve the production of PSYOP products.

The Special Operations Media System is configured as two separate units, radio- and television-based, capable of producing and broadcasting PSYOP products. SOMS will be two separate systems, A and B. Both will be vehicle-mounted for greater mobility and ease of transportation. "These are modular-designed systems. Both systems are designed to fit on a C-130 to give us a drive-on, drive-off rapid-deployment capability," said Maj. LaRoy Slaughter, PSYOP branch chief in the SWCS Director of Combat Developments.

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Mobile Audio Visual System.

Vietnam-vintage 50-kilowatt AM radio transmitter which requires seven C-130s to deploy, requires a fixed facility and is limited to commercial AM frequencies. SOMS also replaces the current PSYOP Airmobile Dissemination System, a television- and radio-broadcast system, which does not have organic transportation. SOMS is scheduled for fielding during the fourth quarter of FY 94. SOMS A is scheduled for fielding in FY 97.

The Transportable AM Transmitter - 50 kw, TATM-50, is a 50-kw medium-wave transmitter which will be used to extend the range of the current TRT-22 AM radio system. It will be compatible with existing TRT-22 power, antenna and studio facilities. The TATM-50 can be mounted on either a 2 L-1-72 truck. It will be fielded as an interim measure until the SOMS is available. Slaughter said, and afterward will continue to be used in situations which do not require rapid deployment. It is scheduled for fielding during the second quarter of FY 93.

The Mobile Special Visual System AN/MSQ-85B, will be used to provide audio-visual programs in remote areas and to local civilians and enemy prisoners of war. It can receive television, FM, or AM and short-wave signals for editing, storage and local presentation. It has video and audio tape recorders and film-processing capabilities, and its output devices include loudspeakers and large-screen still-picture and projection TV. The MSQ-85 can be contained in a shelter carrier and mounted on a 1/4-ton truck. Power will come from the system's towed 5-kw diesel generator. Limited fielding began in late 1990 but was temporarily suspended. Fielding is scheduled to resume in late 1992.

Military Group-El Salvador commended for service

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has awarded the Joint Meritorious Unit Award to personnel assigned to the U.S. Military Group-El Salvador between January 1, 1990 and June 15, 1992.

The award is contained in Joint Staff Permanent Order J-ISO-0168-92, dated June 5, 1992. It applies to military personnel who were permanently assigned to joint billets and members of the armed forces who were temporarily assigned and participated in the unit's achievements for 30 days or more, according to Peter McGuire of the Joint Staff Personnel Services Division.
The book reviews in this section are of various topics, including military history, propaganda, and psychological warfare.

**The Comandante Speaks: Memoirs of an El Salvadoran Guerrilla Leader**


This book will surprise even jaded experts on El Salvador, Latin America's internal struggle which lasts so many years without resolution, we tend to regard as professional soldiers should welcome. The book's interview style leaves much to be desired. Prisk has done a laudable job of trying to make the text flow, but the result is still very broken-up. This is the major shortcoming, but the book should not be discounted for this reason. Also, the author uses only endnotes. Since the vast majority of the notes are explanatory in nature, footnotes would have been much better.

Overall, the book well worth the time. It allows the reader to see the development of a revolutionary movement from its infancy. The best part is that this is not a theoretical discourse, but a personal testimony of what the developers did, how they did it and what motivated them along the way. Politics aside, the account is one of dedication, sacrifice and continual internal evaluation on the part of the rebels. We must realize and account for such traits in our opponents, or we will underestimate their tenacity and quite possibly be defeated.

The Comandante's bottom-line analysis of the Salvadoran insurgency is not complimentary, but he avoids the "ex-smoker" syndrome. In other words, he never says, "all those guys doing exactly what I used to do are wrong/stupid/delinquent." However, by looking at what he does say, one sees a potentially successful revolution gone bad. Between poor organization, internecine fighting, political differences and an overreliance on Cuban support, Cuban advice, and the hope of the Cuban model of revolution, they failed.

The critical lesson for the Salvadoran rebels, and the U.S. as a counterinsurgency adviser, is exactly the same: An overreliance on military means, and military solutions as a response of political mobilization, will eventually fail. We must realize that the battle is waged first and foremost in the minds of the people. To lose there means defeat.

If you are in the military, PSYOP, or SF, you need to read this book. If you are not, you should also read it. The Comandante's book is a mass of pertinent information that is of value to the student, as much as to the practitioner himself. The Comandante has shown the way for more serious students of propaganda, and site visits, he fails to share his experience either in the narrative or in the bibliography. The notes are sparse, no more than eight per chapter, and the works cited consist essentially of the more general secondary works.

Lawrence Soley also practices a bit of deception in Radio Warfare, although he says that the mention of the CIA on the cover might sell a few more copies. Be that as it may, Soley presents a works of extensive scholarship that is of value to the student of psychological operations. A professor of journalism and mass communication at the University of Minnesota, Soley has taken advantage of the recent declassification of World War II documents that are now accessible in the National Archives and the British Public Record Office. He has also consulted the papers of a number of British and American officials, as well as many personal letters and diaries that are now available. The book is thorough in earlier works. Although Soley has a good knowledge of the CIA, and the British Secret Service, he fails to share his experience either in the narrative or in the bibliography. The notes are sparse, no more than eight per chapter, and the works cited consist essentially of the more general secondary works.

Lawrence Soley's Psychological Warfare, Breuer has some bites of deception in Radio Warfare, albeit in the subtitle, OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda. The CIA is hardly mentioned in this book except for the last five pages. Perhaps the author or the publisher thought that the mention of the CIA on the cover might sell a few more copies. Be that as it may, Soley presents a works of extensive scholarship that is of value to the student of psychological operations. A professor of journalism and mass communication at the University of Minnesota, Soley has taken advantage of the recent declassification of World War II documents that are now accessible in the National Archives and the British Public Record Office. He has also consulted the papers of a number of British and American officials, as well as many personal letters and diaries that are now available. The book is thorough in earlier works. Although Soley has a good knowledge of the CIA, and the British Secret Service, he fails to share his experience either in the narrative or in the bibliography. The notes are sparse, no more than eight per chapter, and the works cited consist essentially of the more general secondary works.


Breuer's book, The Secret War with Germany, lends credence to Gustave Lancon's observation that "scholars are often tainted by the ideology that they study." As a student of deception, Breuer has somehow become a practitioner himself, for his eye-catching title offers much and promises very little. An amateur historian who has published other works on World War II, the author entices the reader further with intriguing chapter titles such as "A Ghost Army Arises," "Radar Duel of Wits" and "Trojan Horse of Saint-Nazaire," which dis-appoint the reader for their lack of substance on deception, espionage and dirty tricks, the announced topics of the book.

The Secret War contains 28 such short chapters, vignettes the author apparently chose because he found them interesting. Most readers will probably not share his enthusiasm. The stories are not well-told and may not even serve well as entertainment or bedtime reading. Even the most casual reader might like to know the context and significance of an episode other than that it was one of many stories that took place during World War II.

Because the book lacks analysis, the more serious student of psychological operations will find little of value in The Secret War. Although the author claims to have "collected a mass of pertinent information," all of which is from books, qualified authors, documents, periodicals, interviews and site visits, he fails to share his experience either in the narrative or in the bibliography. The notes are sparse, no more than eight per chapter, and the works cited consist essentially of the more general secondary works.

Lawrence Soley also practices a bit of deception in Radio Warfare, although he says that the mention of the CIA on the cover might sell a few more copies. Be that as it may, Soley presents a works of extensive scholarship that is of value to the student of psychological operations. A professor of journalism and mass communication at the University of Minnesota, Soley has taken advantage of the recent declassification of World War II documents that are now accessible in the National Archives and the British Public Record Office. He has also consulted the papers of a number of British and American officials, as well as many personal letters and diaries that are now available. The book is thorough in earlier works. Although Soley has a good knowledge of the CIA, and the British Secret Service, he fails to share his experience either in the narrative or in the bibliography. The notes are sparse, no more than eight per chapter, and the works cited consist essentially of the more general secondary works.

The book treats this material in three chapters: Chapter 3 deals with the North African and Italian campaigns; Chapter 4, Europe 1944-5; and Chapter 5, Asia 1942-5. The chapter on broadcasting in Asia is especially informative, as it involves a subject discussed less thoroughly in earlier works.

Despite its value to the study of propaganda, Radio Warfare is not the definitive study of U.S. broadcasting during World War II. The author has shown the way for more work to be done, but he might well have written more here himself. Instead of concentrating on U.S. broadcasting, he chose to fill approximately one-third of the book with chapters that could almost be called filler. The first chapter randomly surveys subversive radio broadcasting, the second makes a feeble effort to show that U.S. broadcasting imitated the British, while the last chapter, instead of presenting a conclusion, describes Soviet broadcasting and briefly, the birth of the CIA.

Furthermore, Radio Warfare would have been more valuable if it had a more solid analytical structure. At times it appears as if the author were trying to attract a wider, more popular readership with...
a less demanding narrative style. Perhaps that explains why he often eschews technical terminology. Nevertheless, Radio Warfare is a valuable contribution to the study of psychological warfare. It contains useful information on U.S. military public support for the war in Vietnam, and that Congress timo-

ously avoided either declaring war and cutting off its funding. Summers credits President Bush with developing public support for military action in the Gulf by clearly and forcefully, if belatedly, articulating the importance of U.S. action. The author goes on to mark Congress' eleventh hour and authorize the use of force against Iraq as the end of Congress' "Viet-


America's Small Wars is the best book out so far on American involvement in low-intensity con-

America's Small Wars is the best book out so far on American involvement in low-intensity conflict. Commissioned as a study by the Library of Congress for the House of Representatives, then reprinted by Pergamon-Braiesy's for sale to the public, the text is far from the ordinary committee report. Author John M. Collins, a renowned military researcher, has done an excellent job of sorting out concepts, definitions and history. His two-page case studies of 60 low-intensity conflicts are succinct and well-

The book poses a second problem for special operators, even if they can demonstrate success in peace-

time engagement. Summers has the ear of the conventional Army — his first volume has become mandatory reading in some service schools, his weekly column is widely read, and, as the present volume's cover
reminds us, he was "seen on NBC news as a Gulf War Expert." Sumners' does first hand, and, in particular, his summary dis- mission of counterinsurgency strategy, will no doubt continue to influ- ence military planners and doctrine developers for years — and perhaps exacerbate the unfortunate rift between conventional and special- operations forces.

Maj. John Martin
USA/JSFックス
Fort Bragg, N.C.


James Dunngan and Austin Bay have produced one of the first many books on Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield. It is written by the outest, readers should understand that this effort is neither academic nor schol- arly. Nothing is footnoted or refer- enced, and serious researchers will no doubt shy away from it. Even with that limitation, it is an enjoy- able analysis of the setup of the conflict and the resulting research to bring this book to press so quickly. Frankly, despite its warts, From Shied to Storm is enjoyable read- ing. More volumes on the Gulf War will follow, and much of that work will be highly footnoted and labori- ously academic, but for clarity and ease of reading, Dunngan and Bay will be hard to beat.

Maj. Robert B. Adolph Jr.
4th FSOP Group
Fort Bragg, N.C.


Do not be misled by the appearance of this book. Cover and format to the contrary, this is not another "coffee table" volume. The author is a combat veteran of Vietnam, with extensive archives of photos and documents of his own to draw upon. Shelby Stanton has long since established his credentials as a mil- itary historian, particularly of the Vietnam-U.S. conflict, with his authoritative studies Vietnam Order of Battle, Green Berets at War, and The Rise and Fall of an American Army. Special Forces at War begins with World War II's Office of Strategic Services, and concludes with the fall of the Republic of Vietnam. Stanton deals with the Laos Bright Star operations, the early SF years in South Vietnam, the U.S. military buildup, and the SF Civilian Irregu- lar Defense Groups. He also includes a fairly detailed narrative and analysis of the Military Assis- tance Command-Vietnam Studies and Observation Group, which, while not a Special Forces organiza- tion, included a number of SF troopers in its covert offensive missions. The book includes superb maps of corps tactical zones, South Viet- nam's ethnic groups and Special Forces in Laos, as well as the terrai- nal and topography of the provi- sions of South Vietnam of prime interest to special-operations forces. It is rounded off with a selection of Special Forces' psychological-operations leaflets for Cambodian, Thai, Laotian and lowland-Vietnamese civil society, as well as for the Mon- tagnards. This is a work that should be read by veteran members of the SOF community as well as by any- one who wants to learn about a Vietnam success story — the "other war."

Stanley Sandler
Command Historian
USA/JSFックス
Fort Bragg, N.C.


After many years, many of the wartime secrets of the OSS and the British SOE are now coming to light, revealed by declassification and the publication of veterans' memoirs. In 1986, the Virginia Historical Society received the papers, medals and orders of Col. David Bruce, for- merly the head of the OSS-Europe branch. This portion of his estate was placed on exhibit, and Steven Lankford managed to obtain Bruce's private wartime diaries. Bruce was chosen by Col. "Wild Bill" Donovan to run much of the infant OSS operation in Europe. The British were very much interested in the shaping, direction and leader- ship of the new agency, and Bruce's job required endless liaison work and travel. The diaries, lacking the sort of vanity that often character- izes diaries or autobiographies, are of interest to those who wish to know what it meant to be a strategic planner and liaison at a time when the OSS was just starting. The diaries are a wealth of information and observations. They run, with some exception, from May 1942 until December 1944. While he does not see much combat, Bruce observes much more. His account of the invasion of Normandy is first-rate, one of the better eyewitness accounts from a strategist's point of view. His account of the invasion of Sicily is also very good, with a de- scription of the introduction of Civil Affairs into the U.S. Army and an interesting comment on the finding of the battle plans of the Germans. Another excellent account is of the formation and control of agent net- works and problems of recruiting and placement. Bruce also makes some interesting strategic observa- tions on the Germans and their will to resist the invading allies. The book is good for those who are interested in the personalities who began the OSS and the pace of the times. Readers looking for a great number of lessons learned will be disappointed, but those interested in Sicily and D-Day, as well as Civil Affairs, will find many items of interest. Lankford has done acommendable job in bringing this right- fully distinguished, yet obscure, histori- cal figure to light.

1st Lt. Jeffrey Unacoper
16th SF Group
Springfield, Va.