From the Commandant

Special Warfare

Water covers most of the earth’s surface; it’s only logical that waterborne infiltration and exfiltration be an important part of the mission of special operations forces, which are designed to operate anywhere in the world.

Despite that fact, the only standardized SOF waterborne operations training has been for underwater operations (UWO), and while diving is an important capability, it represents a small part of the waterborne mission in small terms of both probability and requirements, yet costly in terms of training time and funding. Scarce UWO delivery vehicles coupled with inherent limitations of the diving equipment, (which severely restrict the time a diver can spend underwater) make diving the least effective of the infiltration/exfiltration methods and the least likely to be used. Diving equipment is highly technical and requires a great deal of support structure and maintenance. The highly perishable skills of the divers themselves take an inordinate amount of training time to maintain, and keeping divers trained to the required standards leaves little time to train them in other necessary skills.

On the other hand, the availability and versatility of surface means offer numerous options which are pragmatic solutions to meeting our requirements. Since we have never had standardized training in surface waterborne operations, units have been forced to develop their own training strategies, with the result that different units were training for different operability and versatility of surface means offer numerous options which are pragmatic solutions to meeting our requirements. Since we have never had standardized training in surface waterborne operations, units have been forced to develop their own training strategies, with the result that different units were training for different tasks with varying standards.

This year the Special Warfare Center and School will begin running the first regular classes of the Waterborne Infiltration Course, a training program designed to prepare special operations forces for their surface waterborne missions. The course will provide students an introduction to navigation, marine hazards, planning procedures, surface swimming, and the use of various surface craft and support vessels. It will also allow them to put all their training to use in a field training exercise.

By providing a standardized training base, the Waterborne Infiltration Course will ensure that soldiers have a common basis on which units can develop their mission-specific training. In providing training for the most likely infiltration and exfiltration methods, the course will improve the readiness of our special operations forces.

Along with training, the Center and School has recently developed a new training circular, TC 31-25, Special Forces Waterborne Operations, which replaces the older FM 31-25. The older manual was based on Navy diving manuals and failed to incorporate surface waterborne operations. The new manual deals with all the forms of waterborne operations — diving, rubber—boat and kayak operations, and surface swimming — and their various applications. With the distribution of this manual to field units, surface waterborne operations have officially become part of our waterborne doctrine.

Our commitment to the waterborne mission does not stop with training and doctrinal publications. The Center and School’s Directorate of Combat Developments is working on various equipment projects to make all types of waterborne operations more effective. To meet the demands of our training strategies, we have plans to improve our waterborne training facility near Key West, Fl., to improve training in our diving courses and to accommodate the new Waterborne Infiltration Course.

Training such as the Waterborne Infiltration Course is the result of a study of our current missions and ones we are likely to encounter in the future. This same kind of study goes into other articles in this issue which analyze current and historical military operations from the Civil War, World War II, the recent Iran—Iraq War and on-going insurgencies to produce lessons for all special operations forces.

By examining our special operations missions we are working to meet the needs for all special operations forces both now and in the future. It is a formidable challenge that requires our constant attention and complete commitment to designing the finest force possible.

Brig. Gen. David J. Baratto
Letters

Special Warfare

CMF history

I have enjoyed the second issue of Special Warfare as fully as I did the first. You have a good product with a good mixture of input on special operations, Civil Affairs and PSYOP, garnished with good historical pieces.

There is one minor cavil I would like to make on the contents of the second issue. Sergeant Major Carter's piece on CMF 18 there are some errors concerning the history of the CMF. It is my suspicion that the author was working from some incomplete files and therefore did not have all the history available to him. (The ARs requiring frequent culling of files may save us from paper inaudition, but they are hard on history.) The effect of the addition of the CMF (and the officers' SC and the WO program) began a full year or more before the 1992 period cited by your author. The march of events was as follows:

April 1981: Maj. Gen. Vaughn had a conversation with Gen. Meyer (then CSA) on the need for some personnel programs to support special operations. MILPERCEN was asked for a proposal.


October 1982-May 1983: DCSPER implementing group with membership from MILPERCEN divisions, SF organizations and a number of Army commands held meetings approximately monthly to work out the details of implementation.

Ergo, the effort to achieve the personnel changes necessary to support Special Forces took a bit longer than it would appear in your article.

A last farp: it was done during Gen. Meyer's tour as CSA, not Gen. Wickham's tenure as chief of staff.

J.H. Crerar

Col. (USA, Retired)

Vienna, Va.

(The enlisted CMF was implemented while Gen. Meyer was Army Chief of Staff, but the Special Forces Branch for officers was implemented during Gen. John A. Wickham's tenure as chief of staff.

The Special Operations Proponency Office has done some further research on the history of the CMF and confirms Col. Crerar's statements, adding that the "other officer" assigned to the SF Branch, was Col. Crerar himself. —Editor)

Lost knowledge

A few years ago, I began re-search for material concerning unconventional warfare and foreign internal-defense base camps. The purpose of this research was to obtain material to develop a detailed class on this subject of 18-series instruction.

In the course of this research, I came to a disheartening discovery. Text and reports such as "lessons learned" and "after-action reports" are nearly impossible to locate. After nearly 200 hours of research, I finally gathered enough material to work with. But it appears to me that nearly everything about Vietnam by those organizations that kept after-action reports of these accounts would present duplication of effort in those areas and make them unnecessary.

Concerning the apparent lack of interest toward Vietnam by some people, I feel that there is a great deal to be learned from Vietnam by studying both sides of the conflict. Speaking of the "other side," communist guerrilla tactics basically have not changed, nor will they.

From small-unit operations to base-camp principles, the biggest changes are generally refinements to counter better intelligence-gathering techniques and weapons pitted against them. Additionally, studies show definite similarities between Central and South American communist guerrillas and Viet Cong concepts.

To find this similarity, one must determine the level of development in the region of interest and then compare this level to a similar one researched by the VC. Once this is done, you need only to look at the phases each went through to achieve that same level, and you will see how similar it is. Knowledge is the key to success.

Therefore, this knowledge must be available to those who need it. The best knowledge is what we learn from our own efforts and what we learn from the experience of others. We should not say that because something is bad or unpleasant we cannot or should not learn from it. We should make every effort to share among ourselves the knowledge gained by first-hand experience. Much of that experience is lost because many warhores of yesterday are now retiring. Without a written account of their experiences, their knowledge will be lost.

SFC Ronald W. Johnson

C.O., 3rd SF Group

Fort Bragg, N.C.

(According to Dr. Stanley Sandler, historian for the JFK Center for Special Warfare; USAJFKSWCS; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.)

Special Warfare welcomes letters from its readers but may have to delete items for length. Please include your full name, rank, phone number (AUTOVON, if possible) and address. Address letters to Editor, Special Warfare; USAJFKSWCS; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

Give medics credit

The article in your first issue by Brig. Gen. Guest dealing with overall Special Forces training concentrated on the many qualifications between all the 18 Career Management Field MOS training and therefore skipped over some important differences in the 18D track.

After Phase I and before the 60–day Phase II (the med lab phase, Phase IIb) are ten weeks of 91A training and 21 weeks of Phase IIA (the old 300 F–1 Course plus hospital training)
Water covers most of the earth. To be ready to accomplish their missions, special operations forces must be skilled in all types of waterborne infiltration.

New Training for an Old Mission

by Capt. Patrick Desmond

An A-detachment embarks from a friendly location aboard a fast-attack nuclear submarine. Eighty nautical miles from the detachment's objective, the submarine surfaces for 15 minutes and the team launches three motorized rubber boats. In these rubber boats, the detachment navigates 80 miles of open ocean to a safe position off its beach landing site. Scout swimmers from the detachment swim to the landing site, recon and secure an assembly area and signal the detachment forward. After landing quietly on the beach, the detachment caches its equipment and supplies and moves out to execute its inland mission.
Although the preceding scenario may seem irregular, it is not. It is typical of what all special operations units should be capable of — infiltration by sea. Since the majority of the earth’s surface (more than five-eighths) is covered with water, nearly all special operations units must be able to infiltrate all types of enemy coastlines in order to execute their missions, including unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance and operations in support of conventional forces. Equally critical, the detachment must be able to exfiltrate by sea and link up with friendly forces.

Waterborne operations, because of their complex and unusual nature, are typically joint-service operations which require an extensive amount of inter-service coordination and a great deal of both operational and logistical support. The unit’s pre-mission training must also be extensive — the open ocean is the least forgiving of all environments.

In October, the Waterborne Division of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School’s Special Operations Advanced Skills Department will begin regular classes in an innovative training program. The Waterborne Infiltration Course is specifically designed to meet the demands of units faced with real-world waterborne missions. The six-week course will cover the spectrum of surface waterborne operations to better prepare soldiers and increase the operational readiness of all special operations units.

Need for the Course

Waterborne missions will, under most circumstances, be accomplished by one of three methods: underwater swimming, surface swimming or employment of small boats.

"...the greatest problem with combat diving as a means of infiltration is the fact that the underwater breathing apparatus will allow divers to infiltrate only a very short distance underwater."

Each is effective, with distinct advantages and disadvantages, and real-world waterborne missions will often demand that they be used in combination.

Of the three methods, underwater operations are the most complex and difficult. They depend upon sophisticated operational and support apparatus that must be flawlessly maintained. Combat divers must also devote a tremendous amount of training time to both individual and collective underwater operations skills to maintain even an elementary proficiency. Indeed, the maintenance of diving skills in the special operations community has long represented an almost insurmountable obstacle, since diving is but one of the many skills in which team members must remain proficient.

At a minimum, combat divers must make monthly proficiency swims and qualify semi-annually in all diving skills. Key personnel such as dive supervisors and dive medical technicians must remain active in diving and attend periodic refresh seminars. But the greatest problem with combat diving as a means of infiltration is the fact that the underwater breathing apparatus will allow divers to infiltrate only a very short distance underwater.

When using traditional open-circuit equipment, a team can swim no more than 2,000 meters sub-surface. Even with the more efficient closed-circuit systems, an infiltrating team is limited under ideal conditions to a maximum of 4,000-5,000 meters of sub-surface swimming. These are extremely limiting factors, and in all likelihood, the majority of waterborne missions will require surface swimming or small-boat operations.

The Waterborne Infiltration Course will focus on long-distance "over-the-horizon" surface infiltrations and exfiltrations, with detailed instruction in operational planning considerations, surface swimming, and rubber-boat and kayak operations. Emphasis will also be placed on the coordination for and the use of all available intermediate delivery systems: aircraft, surface vessels and submarines.

"Over-the-horizon" refers to that distance from the coastline that will provide the infiltrating detachment with the highest degree of safety from detection or observation on its insertion. If an objective beach landing site has no early-warning systems other than sensor observation from the beach, a detachment in a small boat may be safe from observation from as close as two nautical miles offshore. Normally, however, coastal radar systems can be expected to be prominent, in which case the safe distance, the over-the-horizon distance, is dependent upon the height of the radar. The higher the radar, the greater the radar tangent, and the farther away the infiltrating detachment must be inserted to avoid observation. The type and height of the intermediate delivery system will also be a critical factor in determining the safe distance. These safe distances can be extremely far, and a long-range infiltration capability is essential.

Although the course is new, these skills are not; they have been required by special operations units since their inception. Yet even though surface operations represent the most likely means of executing waterborne missions, seldom has any surface operations doctrine been standardized. The training itself has never been institutionalized; units had to bear the entire training burden, with different units employing different approaches and different training techniques. As a result of the lack of institutional guidance, the procurement, standardization and fielding of operational equipment has also suffered. With formal entry-level training being done by the Special Warfare Center and School, units will now be able to direct their efforts toward mission-specific collective training. Along with the establishment of a surface-operations training base, the Special Warfare Center and School will take the lead in the development of Army surface-operations doctrine and the standardization of waterborne equipment for Army special operations forces.

Course design

The Waterborne Infiltration Course will be divided into five weeks of training at the Waterborne Division, Key West, Fla., and one week in a realistic "fly-away" field training exercise somewhere off the east coast of the United States. In designing the course, the SWCS has developed the following

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Soldiers in the Waterborne Infiltration Course will learn to conduct rubber-boat tranits from 10 to 80 nautical miles.

The kayak has a low radar signature and has proven itself an excellent infiltration vehicle. Students will learn to make kayak "paddles" as 30 nautical miles long.

Photo by Al Petersen
WATERBORNE INFILTRATION COURSE

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**Critical tasks for soldiers with waterborne-related missions:**
- Conduct surface-swimmer transits up to 10,000 meters
- Conduct rubber-boat transits of more than 50 nautical miles
- Conduct kayak transits up to 30 nautical miles
- Conduct surface operations in all environmental and climatic conditions
- Integrate terminal delivery methods (surface-swimmer, rubber-boat and kayak) with intermediate delivery systems, including fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, military and commercial surface vessels, and submarines
- Conduct operations during daylight and darkness
- Accurately navigate over extended distances in all conditions
- Conduct at-sea rendezvous with rotary-wing aircraft, surface vessels and submarines during all conditions
- Conduct extensive pre-mission operational planning
- Infiltrate and exfiltrate detachment equipment operational
- Conduct system maintenance as required

**Course structure**

The Waterborne Infiltration Course is broken into three phases. In Phase I, students will learn all aspects of surface operations planning.

"The objective of the first phase...is to have the students become proficient in all aspects of operations planning. This is essential, as the open ocean is a unique environment and totally foreign to the majority of special operations soldiers." When en route to the debarkation point, training will place special emphasis on computing tide and tidal-current data needed to plot the tidal current offset, which is essential to successful open-ocean navigation. Developing the offset involves computing the direction and velocity of the currents (both the ocean currents and the currents near the shore) and applying their effects on the delivery means. Current effect sometimes requires the course to be considerably offset for a detachment to reach its objective on time.

Students will also receive an overview of intermediate delivery systems used to transport detachments to their debarkation points and the planning considerations associated with each system.

Intermediate delivery systems take many forms; perhaps the best is the submarine. Submarines can move virtually undetected in all environmental conditions and may be relied upon for pinpoint accuracy; they can deliver swimmers and boat teams to their debarkation points with absolute secrecy. Submarines also have superior communications systems which are a tremendous asset to the embarked detachment.

Large surface vessels are also outstanding intermediate delivery systems, and both military and commercial ships are considered in mission planning. With submarines, many surface vessels are equipped with superb navigation and communications systems. Both delivery systems allow a detachment to continue to refine its mission planning while en route to the debarkation point.

A variety of high-performance fixed-wing aircraft may also be used to deliver waterborne operators. One of the most effective aircraft delivery methods is the "rubber-duck." In this operation, an inflatable boat is connected to a wooden platform with a cargo parachute attached. The boat engine and all the detachment's equipment are packed in the boat. The boat is dropped at the debarkation point and the detachment parachutes behind it, assembling on the boat.

**Phase I**

The objective of the first phase, which consists of six training days and involves approximately 70 hours, is to have the students become proficient in all aspects of operations planning. This is essential, as the open ocean is a unique environment and totally foreign to the majority of special operations soldiers. Because the nautical chart is the waterborne operator's main planning graphic, students will train extensively in charting courses, using geographic coordinates, plotting dead-reckoned courses and applying time-distance-speed calculations.

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Computing and applying this data will be practiced to proficiency in Phase I.

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The parachutes and platform are jettisoned, the engine is attached and the detachment is rapidly en route to its objective. If the distance from the debarkation point to the landing site is less than 10,000 meters, aircraft may also be used simply to parachute surface swimmers.

Helicopters can also be used as delivery systems. The long-range capability of the UH-60 Blackhawk makes it an excellent option. The CH-46 and CH-47 are capable of performing "soft-duck" operations, in which an inflatable assault boat is simply rolled off the ramp into the ocean with the boat team following behind. For soft-duck operations, the altitude is kept as low as possible, normally around 10 feet. If a boat is not necessary, the swimmers simply jump off the ramp or out the side door into the water. This technique is called helocasting.

All of these intermediate delivery systems, with the exception of fixed-wing aircraft, can also be used to recover exfiltrating detachments. During Phase I, students will become thoroughly familiar with these systems.

In preparation for open-ocean exercises, the magnetic compass and basic and advanced piloting procedures will be heavily emphasized. Finally, students will receive instruction in marine hazards and medical considerations, as well as planning factors dealing with weather forecasting.

The planning skills practiced and mastered in Phase I will form the foundation from which individual skills may be applied in Phase II.

**Phase II**

Phase II is clearly the meat of the Waterborne Infiltration Course. In this phase, which consists of approximately 20 training days, students move from the classroom to the open ocean. Students begin with six training days using the Zodiac F-470 Marine Commando, an inflatable rubber boat specifically designed to support special operations. The Zodiac F-470 is standard throughout the special opera-
tions forces of the United States and many allied services as well. It has several inflatable compartments as well as an inflatable hull, and it comes with wooden-plank and aluminum floors. The Zodiac F-470 can be air-dropped and will carry up to six operators with equipment, although the boat will function more efficiently with four personnel and equipment. The F-470 is designed to be powered by the standard MARS 35-horsepower engine, a silent, waterproof system that is excellent for certain special operations missions. For long open-ocean transits with a heavily laden boat, however, students will use a stronger 55-horsepower engine.

As part of their rubber-boat training, students will chart courses of various distances and make extended-distance transits using assorted navigational techniques, including state-of-the-art electronic navigational aids which help the navigator in determining speed, estimating time of arrival and making course corrections en route. Students will conduct transits both day and night and in all types of tidal—current conditions, with distances varying from 10 to 80 nautical miles.

Following the rubber-boat training, students will learn to use the kayak. The kayak, frequently referred to as a canoe, was highly efficient, students will learn to use the kayak. The kayak is used for each problem, and the terminal methods used in combination. These scenarios will be mission-specific and designed to allow the students to apply all previous instruction. Initial training will be conducted in the Key West area. Students will make day and night open-ocean parachute drops with dry suits and full combat gear, link up in the water and conduct tactical combat swimming to an objective beach landing site. Other exercises will find the students working with Blackhawk helicopters, performing surface-swimmer casting and small boat and kayak insertions.

Who Can Attend?
Prerequisites for the Waterborne Infiltration Course include the following:
- Be a member of an active or reserve Army unit or selected DoD personnel, or assigned or on orders to a SOF unit;
- Pass the Army Physical Fitness Test with a minimum score of 60 points in each event and an overall score of 200 or more (scored on the 17-25 age group in accordance with FM 21-20);
- Pass a 50-meter swim test with boots and fatigue shorts;
- Complete a 300-meter surface swim using any stroke;
- Pass a Type-A medical examination.

The Waterborne Division highly recommends that students be in superior physical condition as they are training soldiers capable of planning and conducting any type of surface-related waterborne mission. Its implementation will increase operational readiness and serve commanders at all levels in the SOF community. The standardization of waterborne training is long overdue. From the Mediterranean in World War II to the more recent events in the Falkland Islands and Grenada, small units have been required to conduct long-distance waterborne operations to accomplish their missions. In the future, waterborne operations will continue to play a significant role in all armed conflicts. The Waterborne Infiltration Course will produce special operations soldiers capable of planning and conducting any type of surface-related waterborne mission. Its implementation will increase operational readiness and serve commanders at all levels in the SOF community.

Cpt. Patrick Desmond served at Key West from 1985–1988 as chief of the Waterborne Division of the Special Operations Advanced Skills Department and was one of the primary developers of the Waterborne Infiltration Course. A former Special Forces NCO commissioned in 1978, he has served with the 46th SF Company in Thailand and on scuba teams in the 5th and 10th SF Groups. He is currently pursuing a master's degree in Latin American studies at the University of New Mexico.

Administrative data
Two pilot courses are scheduled for Jan. 7–Feb. 17 and Feb. 18–March 31. The course is designed for 36 students, and both pilot courses will be attended by a full complement of students from the 1st Special Operations Command. The SWCS anticipates conducting several courses each year, but the number of courses to be conducted in the future will be dependent upon the demand from the SOCOM community.
The Tri-Zone Concept:
Allocation of SOF assets in a counterinsurgency

by Capt. William M. Susong

Today, special operations forces are key to success in the area of low-intensity conflict. But even though the various SOF elements — psychological operations, Rangers, Special Forces and civil affairs — are fully committed to that mission, they are a finite resource which must be used carefully. And while everyone talks "LIC," there are still gaps in doctrine and analysis as we try to get SOF operations and guide us in using them skillfully and efficiently.

Using counterinsurgency operations as a model, for instance, we still do not have standard terms of reference for gauging and discussing the course and progress of an insurgency. The measured commitment of SOF assets cannot occur, however, without a firm grasp of the critical and strategic state of a particular insurgency, and the ability to examine an insurgency from a perspective of resource allocation is critical. The technique which can provide a standard by which to evaluate and control counterinsurgency forces, naturally to include SOF. In addition, having agreed-upon, standard definitions and terms serves the SOF community well in all aspects of operations and planning.

Basically, the concept dissects a conflict geographically according to the degree of impact the insurgency is having on the population. Based on these three insurgent zones of operation which always develop, the intelligence analyst, the planner, the operator and the commander can all discuss an insurgency in the same terms.

The first step in the tri-zone is analysis, and as an intelligence professional, the perspective is the enemy's. While looking through the enemy's eyes may not appeal to us emotionally, it allows the planner and the operator to focus on the insurgents' strong points. Insurgents strive to develop total control over a country through stages or degrees. They begin expansion efforts into a new area, progress to the point of influencing both the political and the military situations, and finally gain control over a specific geographic area.

Three zones

A zone of expansion is characterized by little insurgent military capability and an emphasis on establishing a base of insurgent support from the population. In a zone of influence the situation is militarily balanced between insurgent and government forces. Here insurgent combat units are weakening the security forces while simultanously attempting to penetrate more of the population to their cause. A zone of control is an area in which the insurgents have military and political dominance and pursue their objectives in relative safety. Recognition of each of the three zones is critical to application of military and civilian resources to combat the insurgency.

After hostilities begin, the tri-zone concept monitors the course of a war and in a general sense, gauges the success or failure of the insurgency. The tri-zone concept is a tool designed to define and track the insurgent's geopolitical progression. As with any tool, it is only as effective as the one who uses it. Final analytical decisions remain subjective. The actual mechanics of constructing a tri-zone analysis fall to the intelligence analyst. Using an intelligence process called a zone matrix, the analyst combines observable indicators of insurgent progress with geographic areas to delineate these "zones" of operation.

When designating zones of operation in any country at war with insurgents, two principles apply:

Any insurgent area of influence begins as a zone of expansion. Although the military may develop with such speed as to make the transition seem instantaneous, there is nevertheless an evolution.

As a corollary, when a counterinsurgency is successful, the insurgent zone of operation will dissolve in the reverse direction, i.e., from control to influence to expansion.

As you examine the tri-zone concept, you will notice the insurgency is rural based, not urban. While not ignoring the latter, the majority of successful insurgencies are and have been rural.

Zone of expansion

A closer examination of the zones will clarify the tri-zone concept and illustrate its usefulness. Beginning with a typical zone of expansion, we find a rural base of subsistence agriculture, possibly some export crops, with most of the manpower tied to these activities. Government representation is minimal and marginally responsive at best. Public utilities are scarce and usually a common—use type such as a village well or town phone. In effect, the citizen views the government as unresponsive and sees personal goals and aspirations of a better life as unattainable. The insurgent is aware of these shortcomings, frequently having come from the same area himself. He offers to teach a few children to read, shares his life as an adventurer, and offers an ideological formula to improve the political system. It may be easy to ignore such humble efforts by the insurgents, but these actions have impact and potential. Teaching four children the alphabet may seem insignificant in comparison to government promises of five—room schoolhouses, but in the end the peasant father will feel his allegiance to whoever brings a better life, however slight, to him and his children.

Examining a country in terms of the tri-zone concept will define the geographic boundaries and the physical and socioeconomic circumstances of an expansion zone. This provides a government baseline assessment for use in designing a complete counterinsurgency plan. If the insurgents have surveyed an area and found exploitable weaknesses, the government could beat them to the punch by responding to these weaknesses with projects which yield long-term results. A focus on education, basic health and agrarian reform could be key. Current SOF initiatives such as Special Operations Forces Humanitarian Assistance Teams, called SOFHIAT, are ideally suited to countering the newly—formed insurgent threat in a country.

As can be seen, the majority of a government's counterinsurgency activity in expansion zones is non—military, as well it should be. After the government has proven its responsiveness and commitment to its citizens, the civil—defense program has a chance of taking hold, as the citizen will feel he has something (a well, education for his children, more food) to defend. In theory and in practice, an effective and responsive government will undercut the insurgent's ability to gain support.

Zone of influence

In other parts of this hypothetical country, the war has expanded beyond the initial stages. There military force is required to counter the insurgents' ability to conduct both military and political actions. Over all, these zones of influence are the most hotly contested portions of the country. A portion of the populace actively supports the insurgency. The insurgents have been able to develop base camps and supply caches. The enemy military infrastructure will be relatively complete with regional command, control, communications and intelligence elements and support facilities such as field clinics, explosive construction shops, or small training camps.

Zones of influence are usually based on terrain which supports insurgent military operations short of attempts to take and hold terrain against the government's military forces. Depending on the circumstances of a particular engagement, the insurgents will have the potential to defeat the government force. A delicate balance exists between the opposing forces: Both sides are capable from moment to moment of seizing the initiative and winning a battle. Sometimes the "battle" is a花瓣—sized meeting engagement, other times it is gaining the trust of a village through humanitarian and civic—action projects.

In the zone of influence a nation's overall plan to counter an insurgency is put to the test. It fails or succeeds based on the results of the battle. In the tri—zone concept insurgencies will employ brutal means to prevent the perception of a benevolent government. A purely military resolution is not viable; the population, traumatized by constant combat, sees only more destruction at the end of the battle. The most disciplined and highly—trained soldiers are needed, but they must also be capable of achieving the government's nation—building objectives. Behind the shield of military force, the civic—action plan has to rebuild the peasant's community, as well as his faith in the government.

If the conditions which allowed the insurgents to gain a foothold are not corrected, the military in the world will not shake the grip of the insurgent.

An actual example from an ongoing insurgency clearly illustrates the dynamics involved: A government patrol enters a small fishing village, which is a crudely constructed school. Pauising to speak to the children, the patrol leader is alarmed.
to discover their schoolbooks are to be collected and destroyed. As the patrol departs the area, a small child approaches the officer and sadly states that they (the insurgents) said that the government wanted to keep its people ignorant and suppressed. Horrified at the child's interpretation, the officer quickly returns with new books and pencils. Newly aware of the real battlefield (the child's allegiance) the military patrol acts to reinforce the values of the nation while still pursuing the insurgent combatants.

Zone of control

Meeting engagements, ambushes, attacks and occupation of strategic facilities are common in the final zone to be discussed, that of control. Conventional small-scale military operations are the main activities of the insurgents within these geographic areas they control. The strategic command-and-control nodes, as well as extensive supply and medical facilities, function with only sporadic intervention by government operations. Propaganda is rare, as the population has already been co-opted. Insurgent offensive operations are used primarily to intimidate the local security forces and constrain the government’s area of operation.

With their safe havens and concentrations of materials and manpower, control zones contain the most lucrative military targets of the three zones. The key to defeating the military leadership of the insurgency depends on aggressive, sustained military operations in control zones. Humanitarian and civic-assistance operations will have to follow military success. “Taking the war to the enemy” while respecting the human rights of the innocent is the only way to break the insurgent’s stronghold in these areas.

Using decentralized operations and trained combat units, the military must bear the brunt of the war in the control zones. Over time, as the tide turns in favor of the government, the role of the security forces diminishes, and they are replaced by civil-defense units which have developed under the protective wing of the military. A vigorous civic-military program supported by all components of the government provides tangible proof of the government’s legitimacy. In turn, the citizenry is committed to defend his community and is receptive to the idea of civil-defense units.

Without dwelling on the actual analysis process for identifying the individual zones, it is important to recognize that a substantial step has been made by dividing a country into its functional parts (tri-zones) from a counterinsurgency perspective. The tri-zone concept allows operators, planners and decision makers to view the insurgency from a single perspective.

From the commander’s point of view, this conceptual process presents clear geopolitical divisions, allowing him to apply SOF assets according to the strengths and weaknesses of each of the zones of operation. This way, the skills of the SOF disciplines can be used to their advantage. Through the use of the tri-zone, both U.S. and host nations can focus extremely finite resources prudently.

In the zones of control the conventional military has the dominant role by attacking the enemy’s strategic nodes by sustaining large unit operations. In zones of influence the situation demands a balanced commitment of both military and civic-action resources, in which neither discipline can compensate for the other. These joint civil-military operations, which integrate strategic and tactical psychological operations, are the means by which to shift the confidence and support of the people from the insurgent to the government.

And finally, a counterinsurgency lead in the study of insurgency belongs to the civilian organizations within the government. U.S. Army civic-action units are tailor-made to help organizations develop their nation-building skills. Civic action can address legitimate grievances from the citizenry and develop alliances between the people and politicians which in turn will insulate the population from the allure of insurgent propaganda. Again, psychological operations overlay all actions to maximize their impact.

The zone—matrix concept gives visual examples of how SOF resources might be apportioned under the tri-zone concept. Rangers could be employed as mobile training teams for advanced combat skills for a country’s experienced ground forces. Subjects such as long-range reconnaissance, fixed-site security and advanced patrolling would be appropriate. Rangers could also be employed as a last resort (at the discretion of the national command authority) if the conventional military has developed a stable insurgent zone or zones and is threatened with a military defeat. Operationally, Rangers would be used in the areas of contact to provide the host nation’s tactical military capability. As stated earlier, an aggressive, sustained ground battle must be waged in the zone of control.

Psychological operations are the vehicle for re-establishing the bond between the military and the people. At the tactical level, PSYOP mobile teams could teach patrolling soldiers how to reinforce one-going humanitarian and civic actions in the zones of expansion and influence. Consistent, credible information is needed to overcome a strong negative image of the host nation’s military. Analysis of insurgents propaganda provides the government an insight into the thinking processes of the enemy and his evaluation of exploitable government weaknesses. In the capital, transition of general—staff personnel in PSYOP principles would help in the creation of an all—encompassing campaign plan. Such a plan coordinates PSYOP at all levels and is flexible enough to capitalize on short—notice PSYOP opportunities.

As with the Rangers, PSYOP forces are used to augment host—nation capabilities only as a last resort. By design, Special Forces are well—suited to LIC. Yet they cannot be all things to all situations. As trainers of basic soldier skills within the zones of influence and in supporting civil—defense plans through the control zones, Special Forces are the right tool for the job. So, within the zones of control, the SF teams can offer host—nation forces training in specialized skills.

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Contrary to popular belief, the Iran-Iraq war did not begin in 1980; modern Iran and Iraq have fought in the shadows 35 years for political and economic hegemony in the Persian Gulf.

**Phase I (1950–1975)**

From 1959, the Iranian Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi supported the pesh megar Iranian Kurdish separatists, led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani, with money, weapons, supplies, training intelligence and, possibly, occasional battlefield advisors. Allegedly, Israeli soldiers of Iraqi Jewish extraction also trained and advised Kurdish guerrillas in Iran. The Iraqis aided anti-monarchists, led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani, with money, weapons, supplies, training intelligence and, possibly, occasional battlefield advisors. Allegedly, Israeli soldiers of Iraqi Jewish extraction also trained and advised Kurdish guerrillas in Iran.

Phase I ended with the signing of the 1975 Algiers Agreement, when the Iraqis were militarily and politically much stronger than Iraq. This accord defined the Iran-Iraq land border, divided the strategic Shatt al-Arab, and ended the meddling of each in the affairs of the other. The Kurdish resistance in Iraq quickly collapsed, and Barzani ultimately died in exile in Washington, D.C. The war then entered a five-year dormant phase.

**Phase II (1975–1980)**

Despite the signing of the accords, each nation retained the potential for unconventional warfare in the other's territory. Meanwhile, the internal opposition in each country consolidated its relative positions: The Iranians polarized into pro-regime monarchists, opposition social-democrats, and the Tudeh Party communists. The Iraqis were politically dominated by Saddam Hussein and his Baathist and Shii clerical allies.

After the 1979 Iranian revolution, Khomeini incited and armed fundamentalist separatists in Iraq, who joined the opposition. The Iraqis gave up the use of conventional warfare, transforming the war into a battlefield of guerrilla warfare. The Iranians retaliated by mobilizing their vast air force to bomb Iraqi targets.


The Iraqis spearheaded their initial invasion of Iran with special operations forces from their two ground-force and one naval special operations brigades then extant. A few disaffected former members of these Special Forces Brigade were also integrated with these forces. The overall effect of these SO brigades appears to have been negligible, due largely to the speed of the Iraqi armed advance.

The use of unconventional warfare was revitalized as conventional fighting broke out in 1980. The Iraqis resumed covertly supplying the Iraqi Kurds led by Masoud Barzani (son of Mustafa Barzani) of the Kurdish Democratic Party and Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Shii fundamentalists Islamic revolutionary cells were energized in Iraq and throughout the Middle East. They recruited Iraqi Army deserters, disaffected prisoners of war, Iraqi military personnel sympathetic to Iran, thousands of Iraqis of Iranian descent who had been summarily expelled from Iraq in the wake of the Iranian revolution. The Kurds received more arms, the Peoples Mujahedeen began terror bombings and assassinations in Baghdad. Disaffected Iraqis slipped into the country to commit sabotage and engage in political action, and Islamic revolutionary fronts also began political and military action throughout the Middle East, Europe, Asia and North America.

Within the Iraqi Army, the number of ground-force SO brigades increased to seven or eight by late 1987. Each division was given a complement of one or two "commando" or "special forces" battalions. Special-forces battalions had also allegedly been added to the 16 special-forces brigades of the Republican Guards and to the more elite Presidential Guard Armored Brigade by the time Iraq went on the offensive in early 1988. The separate SO brigades were used effectively during Phase III for tactical-operative reconnaissance, deep raiding and prisoner snatching. The divisional commando battalions were seemingly used as mobile "fire brigades" for rear-area combat operations. During the 1988 Iraqi counteroffensives, the Republican Guards used assigned special-forces battalions for nighttime demontaged reconnaissance and raiding in front of and on the flanks of the main attacks.

**Winter 1989**

Iraqi UW

*At the outset of Phase III, the Iraqis also reasserted contacts with "progressive" resistance and Arab separatist forces inside Iran and activated sabotage and terrorist organizations against the mullahs.*

Iran-U.S. relations had since deteriorated, and the Iranian officials began to view the U.S. role in the war as a threat to their survival. The Ayatollah Khomeini had been able to turn public opinion against the Shah in 1978-1979 by denouncing the Shah as a U.S. puppet, and the Shah's refusal to kill Khomeini, or to deport him from Iran. The events of 1978-1979 shattered the Shah's efforts to reform and to the more elite Presidential Guard Armored Brigade by the time Iraq went on the offensive in early 1988. The separate SO brigades were used effectively during Phase III for tactical-operative reconnaissance, deep raiding and prisoner snatching. The divisional commando battalions were seemingly used as mobile "fire brigades" for rear-area combat operations. During the 1988 Iraqi counteroffensives, the Republican Guards used assigned special-forces battalions for nighttime demontaged reconnaissance and raiding in front of and on the flanks of the main attacks.

**Iraqi UW**
and the Middle East. In June 1986, Prime Minister Jacques Chirac closed the Mujahedeen headquarters in France and expelled the Mujahedeen leadership in a secret deal involving resumed arms sales to Iran in exchange for the release of Frenchmen held hostage by Houthi- luh terrorists in Lebanon. By the time of its expulsion from France and relocation to Iraq, the Mujahedeen had evolved into an essentially anti-Western, socialist, "Islamic-reformist" Iranian insurgent group dominated by Western-educated and Western-trained leaders and beholden to Iraq for sponsorship in its attacks on the Khomeini government.

Initially, the Iraqi-supported Mujahedeen conducted terrorist bombings and assassinations of "unpopular" Iranian officials. Many operations attributed by the Iranian government to the Mujahedeen in this period, however, were actually instances of violence among various factions of the mujahideens. Soon after setting up operations in Iraq, the Mujahedeen began psychological operations and guerrilla-style cross-border sabotage, ambush and prize snatch raids into Iranian rear areas from five Iraqi bases along the north-central war front. Under Iraqi tutelage, the Mujahedeen expanded its manpower with Iranian refugees, deserters and POWs, and in 1987 it developed a 5,000-10,000-member conventional fighting wing called the National Liberation Army. By late 1987, the Mujahedeen was conducting a variety of rear-area special operations and conventional motorized rifle brigade-sized raids alongside the regular Iraqi Army. It was claiming substantial victories over Iranian regular and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (Pasadaran) forces as far as 100 miles into Iranian territory. 

Iranian UW

The secretive 11-member Supreme Defense Council in Tehran has used three different means to conduct UW against Iraq and its other enemies. First, it has relied on regular Army SOF, believed to consist mainly of reconnaissance/assault forces similar to Western long-range reconnaissance patrol units and which include the 55th Airborne Brigade, possibly remnants of the older Imperial Special Forces Brigade (who were mostly street thugs used to trash anti-regime demonstrators in the heyday of the Shah), and separate SO brigades. The Iranians may have a total of dedicated SOF structure of one separate airborne infantry division as many as four SO brigades organized within the 33rd Special Forces Division. One Western source states that three brigades of Iranian "airborne commandos" became operational in 1986 and describes these brigades as Syrian-trained, supported by one squadron of helicopters per battalion, each, and used for reconnaissance and quick raids against communications lines, tank concentrations, artillery bases and command posts. Army SOF are believed to be employed strictly for tactical raiding, conventional ground reconnaissance, and the seizure of key terrain in support of larger conventional formations.

The second, larger and more specialized means comprises Pasadaran elements within a possible brigade structure. These forces are mainly dedicated to operational-strategic UW. In late 1984 or early 1985, the Iranians set about organizing a joint brigade for the prosecution of strategic land, sea and air UW in enemy rear areas. The effort was allegedly conducted under the auspices of Ayatollah Seyed Mohammed Khatami and his Ministry of National Guidance, which is responsible for the export of the Iranian revolution.

The brigade was to be built around Iranian units then operating in Lebanon and was to be composed of approximately 1,300 to 2,000 operational personnel, not including commanders and staff, drawn from all branches of the Iranian armed forces. Command and control was likely to be exercised through the Pasadaran. Among the primary requirements, each operator had to be no more than 35 years old, combat trained in the war with Iraq, a high-school graduate, politically reliable, and "totally committed to martyrdom." This force was to be trained by "ground-force experts in partisan warfare," drawn from the various services. Intelligence support to this force was to be provided by intelligence officers detached from the various services, with likely field agent support provided by the Foreign Ministry. At formation, the brigade’s target priorities were to be: first, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain; second, Jordan; and third, France and other countries "opposed to the Islamic Republic." Although there is no direct, open-source evidence that this brigade was formed as planned, circumstances suggest that the intended capability was attained.

The third, and most insidious means the Iranians have employed is sponsorship of indigenous fundamentalist Islamic revolutionary groups in every country having a significant Muslim population. This tactic is overseen by an umbrella organization, the "Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution," headed by Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri. Various Islamic fronts and councils for the liberation of Muslims as far away as the Philippines have set up their headquarters under the aegis of Montazeri in a Tehran building known as "Taleghani Center." The Supreme Council, with an annual budget estimated to be as high as $1 billion, gives ideological support, assists with planning, fund- ing, logistics and training, and effectively institutionalizes and internationalizes Iranian subversion. Significantly, Iran seldom directly involves its own nationals in foreign operations, and instead uses legions of followers of its revolutionary creed drawn from the countries it is attacking. By the end of Phase III, the Iranians may have "turned over" to the fundamentalist side as many as 26,000 of their approximately 50,000 Iraqi POWs, some of whom have already been dispatched with Pasadaran forces to Lebanon. A number of these defected POWs may ultimately form the nucleus of a new, clandestine "fifth column" in Iraq and the Gulf states or the basis for an overt "Arab Islamic Legion" in the service of Iran.

Tactical operations

At the tactical level of war, the Iranians have used their SO-capable forces for long-range rear-area reconnaissance and the seizure of key terrain, particularly on the 250-mile flat, dry Central Front from Mandali, Iraq to Bostan, Iran. Their clearly defined operational goals were to seize and hold the Baghdad–Basra road, then occupy and hold the Az Zubayr oil-gathering center to cut Iraq in two. During the 1983–86 fight across the marshlands east of Basra, the regular forces and conventionally-organized formations of Pasadaran built causeways across the marshlands to ease the large-scale movement of troops, equipment and supplies as the front moved west. Ahead and on the flanks of these efforts were smaller, waterborne raider units used to scout, and even seize, small islands and oil rigs that the causeways needed either to connect to or bypass. These raiders, mostly Pasadaran, employed small outboard motorboats (powered in many cases by Japanese motors) carrying about a half-dozen lightly armed soldiers on nighttime (and sometimes daylight) forays through the reeds and floating minefields to scout the enemy rear, launch hit-and-run raids and waterborne ambushes, and assault lightly-held positions. Thus the SO-oriented Pasadaran navy was born.

On the 320–mile, mountainous Northern Front from Oshnaviyeh, Iran to Khanqin, Iraq, the Iran-
launched a three-pronged attack near the Kirkuk oil-gathering center, kill, wounding at least 500 Iraqi troops, and taking 200 prisoners, more, though the Iraqis denied the attack took place.18 By early 1985, Kurdish separatists controlled more than 4,000 square miles of Iraqi territory, while main-force Iranian units had advanced 20 miles down the western bank of the Tigris, and along the front from the frontier toward Rowanduz Gorge, were menacing Sulaimaniya, and were about 6 miles from Kirkuk and about 10 from the Darbandikhan Dam.19 The reach of Iranian UW, however, extended to these cities and beyond.

On the Central Front20 the Iranians employed several units of Iranian UW as part of this area's anti-aircraft defenses, and secure the southern approaches to Basra and Baghdad. Fighting on this front was also used to "blood" Islamic commando volunteers from Lebanon and other countries. The Iranians were also indirectly aided by several hundred anti-Iranian Iraqi Army deserters living in area marshlands.

On the Persian Gulf Front from the Faw Peninsula to the Strait of Hormuz, the Iranians conducted maritime reconnaissance, sabotage, seizure and demolition missions using special units of the Pasadaran navy.21

"On the Persian Gulf Front...the Iranians conducted maritime reconnaissance, sabotage, seizure and demolition missions using special units of the Pasadaran navy."
get nations.42

Strategic Iranian UW

The Iranian leadership views the war with Iraq as part of a much wider conflict: Iran's strategic goals are to eradicate Western (non-Islamic) influence in the region and to supplant the governments of the area with pro–Iranian fundamental- Islamic regimes. Toward these goals, they have organized, fi- nanced, trained, equipped and directed a vast underground among Shiites and other clientele, in- cluding "students" throughout the Middle East and beyond. This program of subversion was re- organized and given new impetus as a great jihad (struggle) against "anti-Islamic" forces in the region in the wake of a 1982 watershed seminar in Tehran attended by the leading Islamic revolutionaries from the Middle East, Europe and North America. The underground is well- financed and closely managed by the Iranians at Taleghani Center. Hizbulah, which often used the nom de guerre "Islamic Jihad," is a loose coalition of radical Shiites which the Iranians created in Lebanon in 1982 after the Israeli inva- si0n. It represents the Iranians’ most prominent success and re-

receives an estimated $6.5 million per month in direct aid from the Irani- ans,46 out of an amount estimated as high as $30 million per month spent by the Iranians to promote their influence in Lebanon.47 Hizbulah, an Iranian proxy but not completely controlled by Iran, is most notorious for its destruction, from 1983 to 1984, of two U.S. Embassy buildings, the U.S. Marine Corps compound (with a loss of 241 U.S. servicemen) and the French military headquarters in Beirut. Hizbulah also masterminded the 1985 hijacking of Trans World Airlines flight 847 and now holds approximately one dozen Western hostages in Beirut48 and in the vicinity of the several-hundred-strong Pasdaran garrison at Baalbek in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley.49

In March 1988, after the Saudis broke diplomatic relations with Iran over Iranian attempts to intimidate Gulf Arab states, Hizbulah undertook a series of sabotage and terrorist at- tacks against Saudi petrochemical facilities and other targets.51 Hizbul- lah is also believed deeply involved in the lucrative production and transportation of heroin to Europe, "legitimized" by a Shi'ite fatwa (re- ligious decree) that permits opium and heroin production as long as the product is sold to "infidels."52

Cells organized on the Arabian Peninsula ("Hizbuluh of the Ar- bia Peninsula," as some of its fac- tions sometimes call themselves) commit sabotage, engage in psycholo- gical (terror) operations including assassinations and bombings, and collect intelligence. Work slowdowns and vandalism at oil ports, committed by sabotage visits from Western ships, have often been traced to the Shiite underground.

In 1981, an Iranian-inspired coup attempt was uncovered in Bahrain.53 In November 1986, Bah- raiin authorities uncovered a plot to sabotage critical facilities related to that island’s 250,000 barrels-per- day capacity oil refinery by a three-man underground cell directly linked to Tehran.54 In 1985, an unsuccess- ful attempt on the life of the Kuwaiti ruler was also linked to the Iranians.55 A rash of Iran-in- spired sabotage of Kuwaiti oil fa- cilities has occurred since 1983,56 the latest involving a propane stor- age tank in May 1987.57 The June mining of the Kuwaiti port of Al- Ahmadi by Pasdaran naval com- mandos may have received some support from the Shiite underground. In August 1987, the waters off the United Arab Emirates were also mined by Pasdaran, possibly supported by the Shiite underground.

In 1979, Shites in Saudi Arabia took part in a violent upsurge that was quelled only after the introduc- tion of French military advisors.59 During the 1982 haj pilgrimage, Saudi officials arrested several Ira- nians caught trying to smuggle weapons and explosives into the kingdom.50 In 1986, Saudi security forces recovered explosives in the suitcases of 95 Iranian pilgrims.51 An Aug. 15, 1987 explosion and fire at the ARAMCO Ras al-Jaima gas liquefaction plant is suspected by some to have been the result of Iranian-directed sabotage, although the official Saudi version is that it was an accident.60

The most elaborate Iranian SO in Saudi Arabia was the attempted sei-zure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca during the 1987 Hajj: Iran sent more than 135,000 pilgrims to Mecca in August 1987, led by Mahdi Karroubi, who is described as a close friend of Ayatollah Klomeini. A special unit of the Pasdaran, possibly organized by the suspected joint UW brigade and including several wounded veterans of the Iran–Iraq War, were trained beforehand to "peacefully" seize the Grand Mosque in the name of the Shiite faith and to declare Klomeini the spiritual leader of all Islam. Because of faulty coordina- tion, the attempt was launched before 48 hours ahead of schedule, went out of control and became violent. The Iranians attacked secu- rity personnel and monastery with knives, triggering the tragic killing of at least 402 persons and injuring 649 others in a 90-minute period. Although they did not capture the Grand Mosque, the Iranians reaped a short-term psychological coup among their followers by the "mar- tyrdom" of 275 Iranian pilgrims,61 though the long-term effects of this operation may have included a dimunition of support for the re- gime within Iran.

Rear battle

As a result of relatively un- secured borders, a lack of opera- tional depth, and Iranian eave- loveries, the Iraqis faced a formidable rear-battle task. By 1986, the Kurds in the north were revolt- ing. Al Dawaa had cells in major Iraqi cities, the Pasdaran were conduct- ing hit-and-run raids up and down the 730-mile front line with Iraq, and there was a budding guerilla movement in the marshes south of Basra. A measure of success also attributable to Iranian UW opera- tions in 1986–88 was that Iraqi President Hussein was seldom seen in public and was very rarely known to associate with persons outside a coterie of close friends. In October 1987, Western press reports told of shoot-outs at politi- cal gatherings in provincial towns as near as 40 miles from Baghdad. Bomb blasts in the center of Bagh- dad were reported with some regu- larity. Iraqi pilots were restricted to base at night after several were killed by Iranian agents.64 As part of its response to the rear-area threat, Iraq executives an estimated 10,000 Iraqi Shiite clerics, scholars and other religious leaders for their support of Iranian subversion in Iraq.65 Harsh as this may seem, however, this effort is remarkably restrained in comparison to the Ira- nian execution of 30,000 regime oppo- nents in the same period, in- cluding about 5,000 professional of- ficers in the regular Iranian Army66 and assassinations committed in neutral countries as far away as London and the suburbs of Wash- ington, D.C.

The overall Iraqi response to the rear-area threat was a combination of the carrot and the stick, al- though the latter was used more than the former. The Iraqis’ response to the Iraqi secret police and their network of informers left little in the country unseen or unheard. A political commissar system checked the loyalties of major Iraqi military formations. "Special forces" battal- ions and Popular Army units con- ducted counterintelligence and security operations in the Iraqi tacti- cal-operational rear. Troitars, spies and revolutionaries were quickly tried and either executed, jailed or exiled. Forced reincor- ditions of the Kurdish population diluted the effectiveness of the Kurdish resis- tance. Senior government officials limited their public appearances and accessibility.

The internal PSYP campaign waged by the Iranians glorified the current regime, magnified the politi- cal, cultural and ethnic differences between Iran and Iraq, and stimu- lated the religious element of the struggle. Klomeini and his follow- ers, in contrast, were portrayed as madmen, Persian tyrants bent on enslaving the Arab world,66 and throwbacks to a darker political and cultural past. The Iranians were fur- ther characterized as warmongers who would invade Iraq in 1980 had not the Iraqi Army pre-emptively invaded Iran.

Iranian rear battle during Phase III was markedly less difficult than that experienced by the Iraqis. The murderous course of the Iranian revolution had resulted in the death, imprisonment or exile of virtually anyone or any organization capable of actively opposing the mullahs. The current, worldwide Iranian exile community is estimated at more than 1 million, as opposed to the far more skeptical political reasons, the Iraqis never attempted to unify and exploit the strategic resistance potential of these Iranian refugees. Instead, the Iraqis struck up with the relatively unpopular Mujahedeen. The Irani- ans were also protected by the relative op- erational-strategic depth and the relative inaccessibility of their major political centers.

The greatest actual threat to the current Iranian regime never was the Iraqi Army, but the in-fighting among the mullahs. The greatest perceived threat within Iranian ruling circles, however, is the regular Ira- nian Army. Despite being ravaged by purges and thousands of execut- tant executions, the Army is still viewed by the mullahs as a reservoir of pro-monarchist, anti-fundamen- talist strength. Soon after the con- solidation of the revolution, the Pasdaran was raised from a disor- ganized irregular militia into a mas- sive, full-blown professional military
been completely replaced by the of conventional fighting with Iraq in of the Army. But for the outbreak of the Pasadaran are allowed to bring their Pasadaran. In the wake of the 1988 individual weapons home from the leave the rear.

been pronounced. This may be due to their preference in using their strike targets that might otherwise have to be attacked by UW forces.

The nature and duration of Phase IV of the war, which began with the Aug. 20, 1988 UN-sponsored cease-fire, is difficult to predict while negotiations between Iran and Iraq continue and troop movements are minimal. The negotiations will focus on legal rights, strategic vulnerabilities, and national honor. The specific issues addressed in negotiations will be (1) withdrawal of troops to their respective sides of an internationally-recognized border, (2) control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, (3) control of 77 square miles on the central Iran-Iraq border in the vicinity of Naft-e-Shirin, (4) recreation of POWs, (5) noninterference in each other's domestic affairs, (6) freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, and (7) war reparations.

The Iraqis will insist that the Al-Quds Agreement, which they signed under duress, is null and void. They will demand that the disputed territory on the Central Front (a traditional invasion route to Baghdad) be ceded to Iraq and that the boundary along the southern Shatt al-Arab be set along the eastern (Iranian) shore to protect Iraqi control of its sole waterway to the Gulf. They will agree to repatriate all Iranian POWs (insisting that all Iraqis held POW by Iran be returned, whether these POWs are willing or not) and to noninterference in Iranian domestic affairs (abandoning the Mujahedeen and the Iranian Kurds). The Iraqis will also drag their feet on the issue of war reparations until an amount can be settled on among the other Gulf states eager to buy off Iraq. The Iraqis will, however, steadfastly refuse to be formally identified as the "aggressor" in this conflict. If agreement can be reached on these issues over the next few months, the "peace" will hold until a permanent treaty can be signed. Each nation can then be expected to focus on its own internal political and economic reconstruction, and development for a period of years: Japan's Institute of Middle Eastern Economics estimated that between 1981 and 1985, damage to the petroleum infrastructure, produced oil revenue losses of $23 billion in Iran and $65.5 billion in Iraq. The Institute also estimated that, as of January 1988, wartime military expenses totaled $24.3 billion.

The Iranians and Iraqis have emerged from...the war with a large corps of UW personnel...Should negotiations stall...these UW forces could be used to keep their enemies off balance...

Lessons

To date, the war between Iran and Iraq has provided several basic object lessons in UW:

1. Victory or defeat in war is measured not in terms of territory gained or lost, but in terms of destruction of the opponent's armed forces, its economic viability to wage war, and its will to fight.

2. Conventional and unconventional modes of war are not mutually exclusive, but they are not necessarily complementary. Much of the UW during the conventional phase of the fighting was un-recognized, did not support the main, conventional effort and de-registered from the main battle stream, for example, continued to wage UW on enemies all over the world with combat potential that would have been better invested in economy-of-force operations against key Iraqi political-military-economic targets.

3. Among elite military formations, a force in which religious purity and political allegiance to the regime are given a higher priority than merely military leadership is no match against an other- wise equal force in which religion and politics are secondary to military competence. The Iranians sacrificed military competence for ideological and religious purity when they purged their regular armed forces and when they set up their "elite" Pasadaran formations, which, because of their greater political reliability, were used on more rear-area, UW operations than their regular military counterparts.

4. UW forces are expensive and essentially non-renewable resources. A nation can, by definition, produce only a limited number of "elite" soldiers with the requisite physical and mental abilities for UW. When lost, such personnel are extremely difficult to replace in the short term without a lowering of standards and degradation in performance. In a long conventional phase of war, UW forces are thus more vulnerable to attrition than general-purpose forces are. Over-reliance on UW forces can quickly lead to their exhaustion, as may have happened among the Shiites underground in some Gulf states whose governments have happened among the better Pasadaran units.

5. UW operations in a conventional phase of war are often operationally useful to divert enemy forces and resources from the main battle area: UW operations that are not closely tied to attainable strategic, operational or tactical goals are ineffective. UW was not decisive in Phase III and was often counterproductive. Pasadaran raids on Gulf shipping and mining operations brought the U.S. Navy into the Gulf, which ultimately led to the neutralization of Iranian sea power. The Kurdish re-volt in Iraq failed, causing thousands of refugees to flee to camps in Turkey and Iran that provide in-ducement for a new generation of terrorist-insurgents. The operations of Al Dawa in Iraq and the Mujahedeen in Iran were not tied to the objectives they purport to command, and often appeared to be action for action's sake.

6. State-sponsored terrorism runs at cross-purposes with, and often negates, strategic PSYOP. Long-standing Iranian complicity in terrorism, from the 1979 seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the 444-day ordeal of Americans held hostage there to the criminal hijacking of Kuwaiti Airlines Flight 622, has negated the national Iranian PSYOP theme that it is the victim of international injustices. The world community has shielded a terrorist group from the Iraqi soldiers who, from late 1983 on, have been cruelly gagged to death in the hordes by Iraqi violations of the Ge-neva Protocol of 1925. It was not until large numbers of civilians became casualties in 1984 that significa- nt adverse world public opinion was expressed against Iraqi ac- tions. Similarly, Iran was singularly unable to gain world sympathy.
for the tragic shooting down of Iran Air Flight 655 because world per-ception was that the Iranians were capable of using a commercial air-liner full of civilians in a barbaric terrorist suicide attack in the Gulf. That Iran has come to grips with this lesson is suggested by its pres-ure on Hizbullah in late 1988 to release Western hostages held in Lebanon.

7. UW operations with strong psychological overtones, such as terrorism and guerrilla attacks, can be neutralized in totalitarian societies by state security repres-sion before an incident and media suppression afterward. Disregard of human rights, the lack of civil liberties, and total government control of the media in Iran and Iraq denied mass audiences to sensa-tional attacks and attempts to pro-vide alternate sources to govern-ment-supplied information.

8. Simple and reliable logistics and secure lines of communica-tions are essential to effective guerrilla warfare. The efficiency and effectiveness of GW decreases in direct proportion to increasing logistical complexity and unreliabil-ity. The Kurdish revolt in Iraq in-creased in tempo once Iranian ground forces and Kurdish guerrillas linked up, when supplies could be passed directly and regularly from Iran to the Kurds. Once the Iraqi counterattack split the Kurds and the Iranians, and severed cross-bor-der lines of communication, Kur-dish combat strength declined as the Kurds were forced to go to more circumspect and less reliable LOCs through third countries. Simi-larly, the deployment of UN troops between Iranian and Iraqi lines to en-force the Aug. 20 cease-fire suc-cessfully cut off the Mujahedeen operating in Iran from their logistics base in Iraq. As a result, Mujahedeen operations in the bor-der region have been stifled—supplied information.

9. Otherwise well-trained UW operators using low technology cannot defeat the professional ap-plication of appropriate high technology. Threats to Gulf ship-ping from Iranian speedboats and mine layers were neutralized by the Iraqis and their Gulf allies, and the U.S. Navy, through the use of high-technology ground, air, space and maritime sensors and weaponry that denied the Iraqis cover of darkness and the correspondent element of surprise.

10. Tactical—operational UW forces employed on proper terrain can effectively locate enemy for-mations, collect battlefield intelli-gence behind enemy lines, divert and disperse enemy strength, and improve the correlation of forces for attacking or defending conventional forces. However, when detected or fixed, light UW forces must be extracted, reinforced or supported by heavier forces or by air to survive. Iranian and Iraqi UW forces effectively infiltrated through enemy lines but they were generally ineffective when operating in terrain trafficable by tanks and armored vehicles. Whenever such forces were located by the enemy and were unable to be extracted by, link up with, or be directly supported by heavier friendly forces within a few hours, they were extremely vulnerable to attack by enemy artillery, armor, medical supply, and rear guard. They were especially vulnerable to chemical weapons. For example, Pasdaran and Kurdish guerrilla units were effectively used to infiltrate behind and seize critical heights on the Northern Front, but the Iraqis could not hold these positions in the face of sustained Iraqi coun-terattacks.

Conclusion

Iran has overplayed its UW card. The multiaxial overestimation of potential Iranian incompetence in the Gulf War and the moderate intelligence reports misjudged the potential of Iraqi counterinsur-gency efforts. Generally lower levels of professional military expertise and a relative scarcity of heavy ar-maments and high technology have also caused the Iranians to favor the use of light, irregular forces on missions that could be better served by other means.

Iran has deployed UW in the conflict. The Iraqis did not effec-tively predict Iranian UW forces, or measures of latent insurrectionary resistence to the Iranian regime into popular GW. Eth-nic Arab nationalism in Kuwait was not considered by Iraqis, who failed to capitalize the immense potential of the Iranian refugees. Mujahedeen ter-rorism did not garner popular sup-port. The NLA was created too late in Phase III to transform internal Iranian opposition to the multiaxial into a wave of movement. The rela-tively conservative approach of Islamic military leaders has also limited the employment of UW forces against the Iranian tactical-operational rear.

Attempts to split the populations from their respective governments along religious and ethnic lines could not overcome nationalist sen-timents. Iraq had an estimated 300,000 fighters operating in Iran for eight years with a 70 percent Shiite army led by a Kurdish chief of staff. Iranian Ar-bals apparently fought alongside the Iraqis for several years.

SimilarIranian attempts to galva-nize fundamentalist terrorism—supplied information. in the region, the Gulf and overthrow “anti-Islamic” governments throughout the Middle East were similarly matched by the targeted gov-ernments. With the exception of the Syrian—protected enclave of the Bekaa Valley and the Hizbullah-controlled areas in Lebanon, the Iranians and their al-lies succeeded nowhere in trans-forming latent insurgent resistance into a rebellion.

The underlying compulsion of the struggle between the Persians and the Arabs has not changed in more than two dozen wars over 500 years. In neither countries outside the re-gion are now third parties to the conflict. Although the sides may be exhausted at the moment, they are likely to continue struggling, albeit in unconventional ways and at lower intensities than in the past eight years.

Notes:

See Scott MacLeod, "Iron the Crisis of the Kurds," Time, 19 Sep-tember 1987, p. 32.
Also known as Mujahedeen-Khalq.
The overall Lebanese Revolutionary Guard Corps was Modern Kafirush until late the summer, early—summer 1988. The port was vacant as of the

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Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, State Sponsored Terrorism, June 1985.
Wright, Sacred Race, pp. 32—36.
Wright, Sacred Race, p. 38.
Segal. Iraq—Iran War, p. 947.
A Common-Sense Approach to Psychological Operations


When President Reagan sent American air and naval forces into Libya on April 15, 1986, the bombs dropped by our aircraft carried a message to Col. Muammar Khadafy more articulate than mere words.

The U.S. raid was a psychological operation aimed at influencing the thought processes of the Libyan leader. The message apparently got through — following the raid, Khadafy’s support for the international terrorist community noticeably dropped, or at least went further underground.

This is the kind of war which is little understood, a psychological war where the military is just one weapon in an arsenal of possibilities limited only by one’s imagination and training. For our elected leadership, the psychology of our adversaries is an overwhelming importance. It should be no less so for our nation’s military. Wars are ultimately won, or lost, in minds and hearts. It should be no less so for psychological operations.

PSYOP, the authors argue, is common sense with a military application. In the battle for the mind, the arsenal is limited only by the imagination.

PSYOP, or psychological operations, is commonly defined as the use of psychological means to influence the behavior and attitudes of the enemy. This is the kind of war which is limited only by one’s imagination and training.

One of our more colorful presidents, Teddy Roosevelt, the former “Roughrider,” defined the word “terrorism” when he advised us to “speak softly and carry a big stick.”

Special Warfare

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The German Luftwaffe went so far as to attack wind-driven noise makers to the JU-87 (Stuka) dive bombers so that their enemies could hear, and be terrified by, the screams of diving warplanes.

For various reasons, there are many in our modern Army who think of PSYOP as an esoteric field characterized by leaflets, posters and loudspeakers; a game played by overeducated, underemployed, unnecessary soldiers. The feeling is pervasive among many of our warfighters that PSYOP is not essential to win battles or wars. This misperception will not stand the light of reason.

In fact, we develop a better warfighting concept if we adjust our perspective and make the conduct of PSYOP doctrinally more important than battles. A solid case can be made that the use of military force is only a technique of PSYOP and that the only purpose of armed forces, of warriors, is to influence an enemy — to convince him of the futility of his actions or to break his will to fight. Wars can be prevented by PSYOP alone, without applying military force, and we call these actions deterrence.

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Roosevelt sent America’s Great White Fleet around the world to demonstrate our ability to enforce our policy decisions by military means. More recently, a quarantine of Cuba convinced the Soviet Union of our intent to enforce the Monroe Doctrine — with military force if necessary.

Even the bombing raid on Libya had a PSYOP effect on the rest of the Middle East by demonstrating our resolve to act. In each of these cases, our military activities prevented armed conflicts. Unfortunately, many in the military see these events as incomplete military actions (since no battle ensued) rather than as completed PSYOP actions. Again, there is a lack of understanding about the real purpose of a fighting force.

Many of history’s finest military thinkers have had a better grasp of the value of PSYOP than we have today. Sun Tzu, a Chinese general who lived 2,500 years ago, said, “All warfare is based on deception,” and “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”

Clausewitz asserted that “Psychological forces exert a decisive influence on the elements involved in war.” Mao Tse-Tung put forth the concept that “...weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive one; it is man and not materials that counts.”

In the United States’ most recent conflict, the Vietnam War, General Vo Nguyen Giap of the North Vietnamese Army said, “In preparing for armed insurrection, propaganda is the most essential tool to be performed. During the insurrection, propaganda is even more important than fighting.”

Still, there is little evidence that we have taken these lessons to heart.

Throughout history, the psychological impact of battles has usually been an accidental result of events rather than a planned effect. Interestingly, many of the most significant military events, those most often cited by our military historians as classic examples of military success, are significant primarily from a psychological perspective. It was their psychological impact that made them significant. When 300 Spartans fought the great Persian army at the pass of Thermopylae, it was the psychological impact of their battle that was memorable, not their warrior prowess.

The effects of Hannibal’s elephants, Caesar’s legions marching in unison and the charge of mounted knights in the Middle Ages were all psychological in nature. Germany’s “blitzkrieg,” or lightning war, of World War II was designed to shock the enemy as much psychologically as tactically. The German Luftwaffe went so far as to attach wind-driven noise makers to the JU-87 (Stuka) dive bombers so that their enemies could hear, and be terrified by, the screams of diving warplanes. When an American commander, cut off and surrounded at Bastogne, was asked to surrender, he replied, “Nuts!” — that’s PSYOP.

Psychological operations are not mysterious. In fact, PSYOP is more common sense than many might believe. In 1985, still reeling from the devastating blow at Pearl Harbor, the United States launched an extremely risky psychological operation, the Doolittle raid on Tokyo.

The success of that raid, though of little significance to the warfighting abilities of the Japanese, had a devastating effect on the Japanese people. The Japanese had been told by their government that Japan was invulnerable to attack. Therefore, the psychological effects of this one small raid were greatly magnified.

Not surprisingly, the Japanese military was forced to divert much-needed air-defense assets to protect the Japanese homeland. In addition, our people in the United States got a much-needed boost to their morale — that’s PSYOP.

In 1944, the Allies implemented a major deception plan. A phony invasion force was constructed around the dynamic persona of Gen. George Patton. The apparent aim of this contrived force was to attack the German defenses across the English Channel at the Pas de Calais. The operation was designed to influence Adolf Hitler, who personally approved force dispositions along the English Channel. This “deception” caused Hitler to divert German forces and resulted in the Allies being able to launch a successful invasion at Normandy — that’s PSYOP.

In 1968, the North Vietnamese Army and its allies, the Viet Cong, launched a bold countrywide attack. This operation, which proved to be a tactical defeat, was a strategic victory which announced the beginning of the end of the planned conflict.

The North Vietnamese had already found that they could not defeat the technologically and tactically superior American and South Vietnamese forces on the battlefields of Vietnam. They knew they had to conduct psychological operations in
“The well-designed, artfully executed Japanese attack on the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor failed to accomplish a major portion of its operational strategy because of inadequate PSYOP planning... The unplanned psychological effect of the "sneak attack" mobilized the American population as nothing else could have.”

the living rooms of the American people to be successful. Tet ’68 was the turning point of the war — that’s PSYOP. While we have listed several examples of successful operations which demonstrate the need to make PSYOP an integral part of every military planning process, there are also examples of failures, examples where PSYOP messages caused the originator more harm than good because of inadequate PSYOP planning.

plan was to present a declaration of war to the United States shortly before the attack on the fleet and thereby deliver a devastating blow to the Pacific Fleet and the American psyche. Because of an elevated security requirement accompanying the declaration of war, the message was handled by inexperienced personnel. Their lack of decrypting speed caused the declaration of war to be delivered after the Pearl Harbor attack. The unplanned psychological effect of the "sneak attack" mobilized the American population as nothing else could have.

On a different front, Adolf Hitler’s grand plan to destroy Great Britain’s will to fight by bombing the cities failed because he was unable to account for the brilliant countermaneuvers of the British prime minister, Sir Winston Churchill. Churchill, an astute observer of human nature and the consummate politician, rallied the population to withstand his self-proclaimed "Battle of Britain," turning a potentially devastating blow to England into a defeat for Germany. Notwithstanding the courage of English and allied fliers, the "Battle of Britain" is remembered today more as a psychological than a military success.

In reality, PSYOP is nothing more than common-sense human relations given a military application — common sense by design. We all use PSYOP, and we use it all the time. A handshake and a smile, a pat on the back or a thumbs-up are all examples of common-sense PSYOP. In every case, the act is designed to have a specific psychological effect on the person or persons who receive it. Certainly, we should apply at least as much thought to the lifestyle and death world of warfare as we did to the handshake.

If PSYOP is not only common sense, and so much a part of everyday life, why do we need to train anyone in its use? The easiest answer is that not all of us are equally endowed with common sense, but that isn’t the best answer. What we teach in PSYOP training are the tools and techniques necessary to conduct military PSYOP.

Low-intensity conflict is as much psychological, political, and economic as it is military. The focus in LIC is, and will likely remain, in the "hearts and minds" of the target audience. PSYOP must be effective in this environment, it must take into account the language and culture of the target audience. Although PSYOP is mostly common sense, the "how" of PSYOP can be very complex. The expected effects of military PSYOP must be weighed against the effect on third parties, such as local civilians and world opinion, as well as on our own personnel. To accomplish this, our Army trains PSYOP soldiers in the languages and cultures of peoples in areas where American troops may have to operate. In addition, new technologies in print, audio, and visual media demand more specialists in order to harness the best available means to accomplish tactical, operational or strategic psychological goals. These means — radio, television, leaflets and other techniques — get the desired message to the target audience. The goal is to influence an audience to act, or not act, in ways which will support the commander’s intent, and without risking American lives.

PSYOP is not only near-term, practical applications. PSYOP is the use of PSYOP-trained officers on staffs at every level to ensure that all commanders have the ability to consider the ramifications of their military actions. Burning down the hut is not always the best way to convince an enemy that we are the good guys.

Today only Special Forces units routinely consider the implications of their actions. At the lowest level, the Special Forces A-detachment conducts a psychological assessment as a normal part of its target analysis. The acronym CARVER describes this process; the detachment assesses the criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect and recognizability of any target before making the decision to attack it. Most significant here is the assessment of effect, which means the effect the operation will likely have on the local populace — will they become more or less pro-U.S.? If the effect is not positive, the target will not be attacked. Only when the criticality of the target outweighs any negative impact will this rule be broken. Never is an operation conducted without such an assessment. If Special Forces ODA’s evaluate their operations so routinely, shouldn’t their higher-level elements, with large planning staffs, be as thorough?

It should be clear that PSYOP is not confined behind "green doors," to pipe-smoking academics. The conduct of PSYOP is a warfighting skill which must be planned and practiced in order to be effective. Commanders at all levels, from national to squad or detachment, must train their subordinates and themselves to think in terms of psychological effect. Once an adversary thinks he is beaten, he is beaten. How to convince your enemy that he is beaten is PSYOP.

The key to PSYOP is that it is common sense with a military application. Any opportunity to change the thought processes of a target audience should never be passed up — that’s PSYOP.  

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Mosby: The Model Partisan

by James J. Worsham and Maj. R.B. Anderson

During the Civil War, a man called the Gray Ghost ruled a three-county area known as "Mosby's Confederacy" just outside of his enemy's capital. Col. John Mosby and his 300 partisan rangers tied down five Union divisions. They wrecked railroads, captured wagon trains, raided headquarters, and disrupted communications and plans. They played Robin Hood to the local populace by protecting them from marauding Union soldiers. They provided the people of the three—county area known as "Mosby's Confederacy" just outside of Richmond a sense that, unlike regulars, they were able to enjoy the spoils of war under the Confederacy's partisan Ranger Act of 1862. The Act permitted partisan ranger units to operate behind the lines in enemy-occupied territory, supplementing regular army forces and taking their pick of captured Union equipment and supplies. Mosby's rangers were the best-equipped, best-clothed, and best-mounted cavalry unit in either nation. Indeed, because of their finery, Mosby's private soldiers were often mistaken for officers.

Before the war's end, the Confederacy had either denounced, disbanded, or turned against the majority of the regular army all rangers except those under Mosby's command. According to both Gen. Robert E. Lee and Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart, Mosby's ranger unit was the only one that ever accomplished its intended mission. Mosby's operations serve as a model of the three functions of partisan warfare: weakening the enemy's front line, weakening the enemy's infrastructure and winning the support of the people. Why did Mosby succeed and the rest fail? The answer lies in his men, his methods and his leadership.

John Singleton Mosby

He did not look much like a legend. Standing only 5 feet 8 inches tall, he weighed just 135 pounds. He was thin and wiry, with his shoulders slightly stooped. His hair was a sandy brown and he had a fair complexion. He wore high, black cavalry boots that came up past his knees; his two huge Colt army revolvers looked ill-proportioned to his small size. To the casual observer, he would appear to be just another Virginia lawyer or legislator who, more out of patriotism than preparedness, had donned the uniform of a Confederate officer. Only his eyes, which flashed restlessly when he talked, tempted to betray the real man.

Mosby grew up near Charlotte-va. His boyhood hero was General Francis Marion, the famed "Swamp Fox" of South Carolina. As a ranger leader, Mosby was able to rival the legendary exploits of this Revolutionary War partisan. As a youth, Mosby noticed his size become a reason for being submissive to anyone. Once he was confronted by a bully who had a reputation for violence. Mosby was expecting trouble and was prepared to compensate for any size difference. When his opponent made a threatening move toward him, Mosby drew a pistol and shot him. The bully lived, but Mosby was sentenced to jail. Undaunted, he was soon reading law books and using the solitude of his cell to begin his legal education. Freed short of his six months' sentence because he feared that confinement would endanger his "frail health," Mosby continued to pursue his legal training. Within five years, he was admitted to the bar and set up his legal practice in Bristol, Va.

Mosby may have later surprised the people of Bristol was not that he had fighting ability or even physical toughness, but that he was fighting for the Confederacy. Although his father was a slave owner, Mosby made no secret that he adamantly opposed slavery. He had even told friends that if war came, he would fight for the Union. Yet, like Lee, he could not raise his sword against Virginia. When she was invaded, he enlisted as a private in a militia cavalry company.

As the war progressed, Mosby distinguished himself and became a scout for General Stuart in the spring of 1862. Stuart was further impressed by the young soldier and attempted to get him a commission as captain of a company of sharpshooters — yet the promotion for this command never materialized. In January of 1863, General Stuart gave Mosby the chance to work with a small independent command. With the blessing of some friends in Fairfax County (which borders the District of Columbia), Stuart made the gesture of leaving Mosby and a detachment of nine men behind for a few days to protect the locals from Union foragers, deserters and outlaws.

From such a small beginning, Mosby soon proved the value of his staying for more than a "few days." Reinforced by other Confederates who were home on leave or convalescing from wounds, Mosby, with his "Conglomerates" as he called them, rapidly made a name for himself. By carefully selecting his men and by setting the example, he proved himself to be an effective partisan and finally received his commission as a lieutenant. Before the war was over, Mosby was a colonel, and he and the 43rd Virginia Rattler Battalion had made history.

It is ironic that Mosby was busy forming his command at a time other rangers were being disbanded. The Confederates experienced great problems with their partisans. Two of the complaints are classic and are leveled at Special Forces today: First, that unconventional warriors enjoy latitude and privilege, they cause dissatisfaction in the regular ranks. The foremost charge against the partisan rangers, however, was the lack of discipline, order, and organization. General Lee wrote..."...the system gives license to many deserters and marauders, who assume to belong to authorized companies and commit depredation to friends and foes alike...With the single exception mentioned (Mosby), I hope the order will be issued at once disbANDING the companies and battalions serving in this department."

These same problems can still be seen today in countless Third World brushfire wars. Most revolutions, even "genteel" revolutions, attract a number of rogues who use their charter to achieve their own ends, thereby bringing discredit to their cause.

In his day, Mosby alone succeeded because he knew that special license and special privilege require special men and special discipline. Mosby had a way of enforcing his rules and was always ready to hear complaints of violations from either officers, soldiers, or civilians. Those found guilty were immediately punished and transferred back to the regulars.

Another reason for his success was his personal example. John Munson, one of his rangers, observed, "No man in the command was nearer to the thick of that fight than Mosby himself. There was no room to lead a charge, and the chief got right in the middle. I saw him weaving in and out of the fighting mass like a ferret, fighting hand-to-hand with every man who would stand before him. His fine mare was shot early in the action, and he sat her firmly through the entire fight, though she was on three legs only."

Yet there was a price to be paid for his enthusiasm for combat. Mosby was wounded five times during the war, three times seriously. Sometimes he always seemed, within a few weeks, to be back in the saddle.

Mosby's rangers

Like most military organizations, Mosby's rangers were made up of men with varied backgrounds. Rich widows' sons rode with poor mountain farmers. There were also the likes of bankers, lawyers and gentleman adventurers. The most
important recruits to Mosby were the northern—Virginia natives who knew the area. The most notable characteristic about the command was its youth. Many of the rangers were teen—age soldiers. Mosby once commented that to these youths he owed part of his success; because they didn’t bear the burdens of wives and children, they didn’t worry with the consequences of their daring. Reflections, skill and endurance were other traits of youth that, under the control of a skillful leader, made these boys—soldiers most effective rangers.

In contrast to the many boys in the rangers, there were also some combat veterans. In fact, several former officers, after becoming bored with the regulars, were serving under Mosby as privates. Others had been officers in foreign armies, such as a Captain Hoskins, who had earned a British medal for bravery in the Crimean War. Also with Mosby was Baron Robert von Masse, a Prussian officer who was later to serve as General of the German Ninth Cavalry.

Mosby didn’t consider a man for membership unless he wanted to be in the rangers badly enough to come see him personally. He had seen the disastrous results of other partisan units which had become filled with deserters who had left the drudgery of the regular army for the adventure and spoils of the rangers. Mosby had no need of soldiers on duty; and they were to be on time at the rendezvous; rules of self—discipline: the men had to practice being miserable.

Equipment

The standard ranger uniform included two .44—caliber Colt army revolvers. Some even carried an extra pair of these revolvers in saddle holsters. A few also carried cap—guns. Mosby’s rangers practiced often and were all good shots. In combat it was unheard of for a ranger to fire six shots and empty five saddles. Mosby’s philosophy was never to stand and receive an attack, but to be always on the offensive. His reputation was so consistent that, to save face, Union soldiers often accused him of unfair tactics.

Tactics and techniques

Considering the great odds against them, it is surprising that the rangers did not lose more men than they did. Mosby’s successes were so consistent, that to save face, Union soldiers often accused him of unfair tactics. The most persistent claim was that Mosby’s men fought in Union uniforms. Mosby, however, was insistent that his men wear the full Confederate uniform, complete with insignia of rank.

The real reason for Mosby’s success was his tactics and techniques of fighting. First of all, war was not a game to Mosby — it was a matter of survival. With such serious stakes in the balance, a man could lose not only the “game” but also his life. As he considered athletic competition General Gordon’s artificial rules a waste of time, Mosby also felt that some traditions in warfare were unnecessarily dangerous. At that time, the standard cavalry weapon was the sabre, but repeating firepower in medieval combat than to 19th—century warfare. He urged his men to carry at least two revolvers.

The resting was what happened in those few critical seconds when the enemy had either to react or fail to react and be defeated. In these crucial times of cavalry versus cavalry, Mosby’s men had an advantage. Mosby’s usual order for his men was “Get through them!” Upon the signal, sometimes from the silver whistle Mosby carried on a cord around his neck, all ranger attacks were fast, furious and quicky over. The theory was that the less time spent in contact, the less damage and expenditure of ammunition. In addition, night and bad weather would have had an advantage. Mosby’s philosophy was never to stand and receive an attack, but to be always on the offensive. His reputation was so consistent that, to save face, Union soldiers often accused him of unfair tactics.

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Mosby’s men were trained in hardship. He didn’t want the “sunshine patriots” for the men. Captured corn was food for the horses most of the horses were unsaddled and eating, 200 Union soldiers of the Vermont cavalry were upon them, almost before any warning could be given. Had not a stone wall separated them from the enemy, Mosby’s men wouldn’t have had enough time to react. But a short period of time, before the Union cavalry began to pour through the gate in the wall, some of Mosby’s men were in the saddle. Mosby, with a smoking revolver in each hand, was still afoot but shooting and yelling for his men to charge. One ranger stopped and gave Mosby his horse, and soon the Union soldiers found to their horror that the Confederate were indeed charging them, and many of the Northern soldiers had a stone wall at their backs. Before the Union soldiers were close enough to use their sabres, Mosby’s men were emptying saddles with their revolvers, and the attack became a panic—stricken rout. Mosby’s philosophy was never to stand and receive an attack, but to be always on the offensive. His reputation was so consistent that, to save face, Union soldiers often accused him of unfair tactics.

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six-month report Mosby made to Lee in 1864. With a loss of little more than 20 men, Mosby killed, wounded or captured 1,200 soldiers and captured 1,600 horses and mules, 230 beef cattle and 85 wagons and ambulances. Lee’s major criticism, however, was that Mosby was attacking wagon trains instead of railroad trains that carried more military supplies. Afterward the railroads were damaged at considerable cost to the public and to the army. One such raid resulted in the capture of a $170,000 Union payroll. According to the Partisan Ranger Act, Mosby’s men were entitled to keep the money. Except for horses needed for combat, Mosby never took any of the spoil, and he encouraged his officers to do likewise. The money was divided among the men.

Civilian support

No matter how skilled the rangers were, if the civilians of the area had been hostile, the rangers would have soon been starved into submission or betrayed to the enemy. Mosby’s first act was an effort to win public confidence. Instead of raiding a nearby Union camp, he attacked a robber band. Within the next few months, the rangers became not only a military unit but a peacekeeping force. Mosby employed his legal background, and his martial law extended to anyone who acted as protectors and providers. Mosby did indeed win popular support. The people of “Mosby’s Confederacy” in turn aided the rangers. Today’s guerrilla-warfare textbooks call this support network an auxiliary. Its importance cannot be overemphasized.

Local sympathizers provided the rangers with refuge and intelligence. On several occasions, at great personal danger, civilians traveled long distances to warn Mosby of an impending attack. Even the Quakers, who were opposed to war, gave Mosby’s men shelter and helped them elude capture. One great ally — especially considering the Northern mind — was the many Negroes who gave the Union false information and otherwise helped the rangers escape.

Conclusion

The rangers were neither cold-blooded killers nor impersonal fighting machines. They experienced fear, hunger, illness, anxiety, enemy fire, and fatigue. What kept them going was discipline, success, a certain amount of patriotism and Mosby’s leadership. He led by example: his operations were well planned, and his physical courage was legendary. He also had the moral courage to enforce high standards upon his men and himself. Unconventional soldiers require self-discipline. Storm-trooping automatons are useless in guerrilla warfare. Mosby wanted men who could think and fight on their own. He provides a sterling example to today’s unconventional warrior.

“...The military value of a partisan’s work is not the number of men killed or captured, but the number he keeps watching. Every soldier withdrawn from the front to guard the rear of an army is so much taken from its fighting strength.” — Mosby
The U.S. Total Army Personnel Agency has been renamed the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command. The change became effective Dec. 8, said Lt. Col. Ralph Hinrichs Jr., chief of the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, and soldiers may hear the new command variously referred to as US-TAPC, TAPC or PERSCOM.

Year Group 83 officers will soon receive information packets on how to indicate their preferences for functional-area designation. Officers can help themselves by making sure their civilian and military education and their grade-point averages are reported accurately in their Official Military Personnel Files. For technically oriented functional areas requiring graduate-level training, the grade-point average is used by the Army to determine whether officers will be funded to attend civilian schooling or even allowed to enter the functional area. When officers receive the packet, they should make a choice and answer the mail, said Lt. Col. Ralph Hinrichs Jr., chief of the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office. Up to four choices are available; all Year Group 82 officers got one of their four choices in 1988, Hinrichs said, but only 44 percent answered the mail. For further information contact Lt. Col. Ralph Hinrichs Jr., Special Operations Proponency Office, AV 239-5559.

Senior raters urged to adopt more credible rating profile

While DA selection boards report that the OER system is still healthy and is providing the information they need for their decisions, a special DA review of all profiles shows that there are still too many senior raters who have developed noncredible profiles. Noncredible profiles are those which, for any grade, have more than 50 percent of the ratings in the top box, or in which the top box is unmistakably the most frequently used. Such raters diminish the value of their input; they lose their credibility and penalize their best officers. TAPC encourages senior raters to take a close look at their profile and, if warranted, adopt a more credible senior rating philosophy.

The SF Branch would like to hear from officers who:
• Would like to be associate professors of military science beginning in the fall of 1989. There is no requirement to have 48 months on station.
• Belong to year groups 81-79 and are interested in advanced civil schooling for the fall of 1989.
• Speak a foreign language and do not have it on their records. Officers should update their Defense Language Proficiency Test and send it to the Branch.
• Should have a skill 4Y, 4W or 4X on their ORBs but do not.

Four officers from Functional Area 39 are currently attending fully funded advanced civil schooling. Officers interested in attending school beginning in September 1989 should contact Capt. Gary Harter, FA 39 assignments officer, at AV 221-3155.

Information for Special Forces Technicians

• As of Nov. 1, 1988, the title Special Operations Technician has been changed to Special Forces Technician.
• Those warrant officers planning to affiliate with the 1st Special Forces Regiment need to be aware that regimental affiliation cannot be done by warrant officers. That may change in the future, but right now it is not possible.
• Now is the time to get records up-to-date at TAPC, including DA photos, officer record briefs and microfiche.
• The Voluntary Indefinite Board will meet in January. Warrant officers in their fifth year of service (or sixth year if they came in as CWO2) will be considered. Conditional Voluntary Indefinite no longer exists.
• The next CWO3 promotion board meets in April. The zone of consideration will probably be only six months again (the CWO2 bubble is still up). The Regular Army integration board takes place at the same time. Consideration will be automatic for CWO2s being considered for CWO3, but CWO2s below the zone or out of the zone may apply for RA separately and be considered at the same time.
• The criterion for attending the Senior Warrant Officer Training Course (formerly called the Advanced Course) is that you be a promotable CWO2. SWOT is not required until you are being considered for promotion to CWO4. Given that we fully expect more than 30,000 CWO2s to be selected for promotion by the next board, we expect to conduct the Special Forces Senior Warrant Officer Training Course in July.
• The last CWO3 promotion board selected two 180As in the primary zone and three from below the zone. While the below-zone selection rate might appear low, those three soldiers were three of the 17 selected from the entire Army — almost 20 percent of the below-zone selectees were 180As.

For further information contact CWO4 John McGuire, warrant officer assignments manager, at AV 221-7841.

FA 39 graduate studies program out for bids

The FA 39 Graduate Studies Program was submitted for bid Dec. 12 to universities offering master’s degrees. The program will enroll up to 60 officers per year in a course of study taught on Fort Bragg, N.C., and oriented toward civil affairs or psychological operations. As planned, the program will be made up of three parts. A graduate core for both CA and PSYOP officers will include cross-cultural communications, cultural anthropology, U.S. foreign policy, and quantitative and research methodology. The CA track will cover international economics, public administration and comparative politics. The PSYOP track will include courses in social psychology, marketing and mass communication. The proposed program may be modified based on feedback from the bidding universities. The SWCS anticipates the contract being let in June 1989 and the first course being taught in October 1989.


SF officers should act as recruiters

The Special Forces Branch at TAPC reminds all SF officers that SF is the only nonaccession, volunteer branch in the Army. This represents a significant challenge, and the Branch encourages every officer to play the part of recruiter. Failure to represent the branch well reflects on the entire branch.
SWCS fields new waterborne training circular

The SWCS has recently fielded a new waterborne operations manual which includes all forms of waterborne operations.

TC 31—21 replaces the older FM 31—25, Waterborne Operations, produced in 1981. The older manual was based on Navy training manuals and concentrated on diving operations, according to MSgt. Fred Bremer, NCOIC of the Waterborne Division of the Special Operations Advanced Skills Department at Key West, Fla.

The new manual was produced by the Waterborne Division in conjunction with the Directorate of Training and Doctrine. It contains information on the various forms of waterborne infiltration: diving, rubber boats, kayaks, and surfacing. It also deals with various supporting systems such as aircraft, helicopters, surface vessels and submarines. It explains mission planning procedures; navigation; environmental factors; mission planning procedures; navigation; environmental factors, and concentrated on diving operations, according to MSgt. Fred Bremer, NCOIC of the Waterborne Division of the Special Operations Advanced Skills Department at Key West, Fla.

The circular is currently being published through normal publication channels. For further information on the circular or its distribution, contact the SWCS Program and Doctrine Management Office at AV 239—7328/9400.

Key West construction may run over budget

A construction project to upgrade the Special Warfare Center and School’s waterborne training facil-
both the high-altitude low-opening and high-altitude high-opening operations.

The RAPS is a high glide parachute system with tandem rear—mounted ram—air main and reserve canopies. The canopies are seven—cell, double surface, air—inflated wings of 375 square feet. The main canopy is deployed by a pilot—chute—as a deployment bag, initiated by a three—ring canopy—release system. The canopy is attached to the harness by a pilot—chute—assisted deployment bag, initiated either by the manual ripcord or the FF—2 Automatic Opening Device.

Canopies have a slider with grommets in each corner. The slider retains the canopy in a reeved condition during deployment and allows for a controlled opening with reduced opening force. The main canopy is attached to the harness by a three—ring canopy—release system that can be activated by a single point in the event of a malfunction.

When fielded, the RAPS will be available through normal supply channels for air equipment. Army parachute riggers will be trained to pack and maintain these parachutes. Training on the RAPS will be conducted at the JFKSWCS.

For more information contact Maj. Mark Russell at AV 239—7007.

Officers given one chance to volunteer for SF branch

Military officers considering volunteering for Special Forces must think carefully, since they will get only one chance. Each year the branch directs its officers to volunteer for SF branch accession by the board. Those who are selected for this opportunity will be assigned to the branch and be considered by an annual selection board which meets at the end of the course to allow students to test themselves, said Maj. Georgia Bemis, chief of operations in the Psychological Operations Department.

In addition to explaining the techniques necessary to perform current PSYOP missions, Bemis said the department will look at the old and new techniques and procedures required in current PSYOP missions. The previous FM 33—5 was superseded by the 1979 version of FM 33—1, which combined the two manuals into one but was not as thorough. The new manual will provide more detailed instructions on techniques and procedures required for current PSYOP missions. The PSYOP Department also plans to begin revision of FM 33—1 later this year.

SWCS develops automated SOF command—post exercise

The Special Warfare Center and School recently developed the first automated command—post exercise for special operations forces. The eight—week SOSOC is designed for the course, the CPX is a TDY course designed to ensure training on three levels, used for training on three levels, according to Capt. Mike Asimos, CPX manager in the Special Operations Staff Officer Course, which completed its first regular class Dec. 9. The eight—week SOSOC is designed for officers in Special Forces, civil affairs and psychological operations who are assigned to SOF units or staff positions. The command—post exercise is run at the end of the course to allow students to apply their skills in a simulated theater crisis.

Using a new computer program designed for the course, the CPX uses a crisis—action—decision process to simulate the staff planning phase of an operation up to the deployment of SOF units in a theater. It then jumps ahead 45 days, when units are deployed and SOF forces are in training host—nation soldier operations.

During the CPX, students work under the eye of controllers from various SOF units, including USOCOM, CENTCOM, the Joint Task Force, and the Civil Affairs Command.

The CPX is a corps— and division—level staff exercise to identify staffs' weaknesses and strengths to the respective commanders.

BCTP, headquartered at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., plans to involve civil—affairs units in future warfighting exercises, said Lt. Col. Larry Wayne, deputy director of the Civil Affairs Department.

The department also plans to participate in several major exercises within the next year, including Yama Sakura in Japan, Cobra Gold in Southeast Asia, LOGEX in western Europe and Ulchi Focus Lens in Korea.

Department involvement in these exercises will help to place emphasis on the role of civil affairs in support of the commander, provide civil—affairs guidance and assistance to the exercised unit and assist in the validation of civil—affairs doctrine, Wayne said.

The Civil Affairs Department is working to increase civil—affairs participation in major military exercises and training programs.

The department has been successful in the integration of civil affairs units into the Battle Command Training Program, a corps— and division—level staff exercise to identify staffs' weaknesses and strengths to the respective commanders. BCTP, headquartered at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., plans to involve civil—affairs units in future warfighting exercises, said Lt. Col. Larry Wayne, deputy director of the Civil Affairs Department.

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Special Warfare


There are dozens if not hundreds of thrilling personal narratives written by veterans of the secret war against Germany and Japan during World War II. Classics like Stanley Moss’s Ill Met by Moonlight or Peter Churchill’s Their Own Choice, Duel of Wits and The Spirit in the Cage) have been widely read in the decades since their publication. Many people may not be aware, however, of the number of female agents who were successfully employed in the secret services during World War II — only a small percentage of them actually served in an operational capacity, but those who did faced the same challenges and hazards as anyone else, and some of them paid the ultimate price. Little has been written about them — only Margaret L. Rossetter’s Women in the Resistance comes to mind — and it is fortunate that Aline Romanones has chosen to tell her story in such an outstanding fashion.

After discussing her desire to be of some service in a casual conversation at a party, the 21-year-old model was puzzled by the events which followed, events which led to her recruitment by the OSS. After hearing that questions had been asked about her and her family at their bank, she received an unusual set of telephone instructions leading to a meeting at a nearby hotel. Following an equally mysterious meeting at a hotel in Washington, D.C., her training began at a remote OSS training camp. Romanones received training in such esoteric skills as housebreaking, picking pockets, demolitions, and marksmanship, and more prosaic lessons in sharpening memory skills and secret communications.

Following her training, Romanones was assigned to the American Oil Mission in Madrid, which served as cover for her actual work in the Secret Intelligence Branch of OSS. Her initial assignment involved countering the intelligence operation in protecting Operation Anvil, the planned allied attempt to open an inside front in the south of France. She learned just how serious her work would be when she saw an agent killed in the back in Lisbon while traveling to Madrid. Even with all her training, the female operative had certain difficulties. Maintaining her cover was not easy while maneuvering through the dizzying social circles she was expected to occupy in wartime Madrid. Several times she risked discovery and almost certain death in carrying out her mission. When her organization’s security was breached, she found herself followed by strange cars and stalked by an unknown assassin. Romanones was so successful in accomplishing her assignment that she was kept in Europe as an undercover operative even after the end of the war. She abandoned her career as an intelligence operative to return to Spain and marry the man she had met while on her original assignment in Madrid.

Aline Romanones tells a fascinating story, one which reads better than a great deal of fiction. Her book will serve as a valuable addition to the literature of the secret war in Europe.


Good things come in small packages, and this little book carries weight which belies its small size. The author’s service during a 34-year career in the State Department allowed him first-hand experience in the kind of conflict he describes here. Rice was working in China in 1937 when the Japanese invaded. By 1943 he had discovered that reports of Chinese Communist successes against both the invading Japanese and the stay-behind Nationalist Chinese forces were not exaggerated. He remained in China through the Nationalist-Communist civil war, transferring to the Philippines in 1949. There he witnessed the upsurge of the Hukbalahap rebellion, conducted by communist insurgents who had originally organized to fight the Japanese invaders of the Philippines during World War II. He remained in other positions oriented to the Asia-Pacific region well into the period of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. His experiences during this time prompted him to examine what he calls “wars of the third kind,” guerrilla wars, as opposed to conventional or nuclear wars.

Rice provides a detailed analysis of how guerrilla warfare comes about, explaining its conclusions through the use of historical examples. His conclusions are few in number, yet well taken. He holds that guerrilla warfare are often of a rural and popular nature, arise from fundamental problems and thoughts suppressed, often recur with renewed virulence. They may be carried out with the use of little centralized leadership or logistical structure. The ultimate aim of guerrilla forces is protracted warfare leading to favorable intervention by an outside party, erosion of the opposition’s will to fight or a complete reversal of the balance of forces between the two sides. The author identifies the fundamental differences between resistance movements and insurgencies and discusses various strategies of counterinsurgency which have been applied through the years. He concludes with an illuminating chapter on the perils of “small wars” for major powers.

The book is well documented by footnotes and includes a useful index. It packs an extraordinary amount of historical information and analysis into a small package. Though not a complete survey by any means, it is one of the best primers available on insurgency/counterinsurgency theory. It serves wide readership, especially among conventional officers and the policy makers whose decisions are responsible for the way America prosecutes small wars.

Both the above reviews were written by Fred Fuller, reference librarian for the Special Warfare Center and School’s Marquet Memorial Library.


Col. Roger Trinquier’s colorful career in the French Colonial Infantry started in the small highland post of Chi Ma, near Lang Son, on the Sino-Vietnamese border, in 1934. He later served at Peking and Shanghai, where as a career Army officer, he remained loyal to Pétain throughout the Second World War. Anxious to redeem his loyalty in post-war France, he volunteered for combat duty in Indochina and commanded a company in the first French parachute unit sent to Indochina, the Ponchartrain Commando. After combat in South Vietnam, he was repatriated to France to perform the first Colonial Parachute Battalion and returned to South Vietnam to command the 2nd Colonial Parachute Commando as a captain. Still later, he returned to North Vietnam to command the Groupement des Commandos Mixtes Aeroprtos regional command, and he finished the war as commander of the 2nd Colonial Parachute Regiment. This was a guerrilla-warfare and covert-action branch with missions and an organization similar to MACV-SOG.

Repartitioned to France, he quickly volunteered for the Algerian War. His first command was the Airborne Base — North Africa, a combination paratroop school and mobile logistical support base for tactical airborne operations. He moved up to become the 10th Airborne Division’s operations officer and played a crucial role in the Battle of Algiers.

Having earned the nickname “Torturer Trinquier” in the leftist press, he was picked to command the 1st Colonial Parachute Regiment. Here, he was instrumental in the May 13, 1958 coup that brought de Gaulle to power, despite the fact he had little use for de Gaulle or de Gaullists.

While in command of the 3rd Colonial Parachute Regiment, he captivated on film experience with guerrillas to recruit and train a fifth company of paratroops (each regiment was authorized four line
companies) composed of former Algerian guerrillas captured by the unit on operations. Suspicion of his involvement in the aborted 1961 "General Putsh" led to his forced retirement and subsequent service as a mercenary in the Congo.

Le Temps Perdu is Trinquier's best book. Although he is at times pedantic, for he does have some axes to grind, the sheer variety and magnitude of his canvases hold a valuable and interesting look inside the French colonial army and paratroops at this crucial time in their military history.

Particularly interesting is Trinquier's description of the employment of his unit on pacification and counterguerrilla operations in the Lai Thieu sector. Facing a high command which demanded more and more airborne strike operations, Trinquier noted: "How a unit arrives upon the battlefield is an important shortcoming, Trinquier's account of the consolidation PSYOP campaign in North Korea in 1946-47.

Aleksandr Gromov was a political officer. He started his military career as a simple soldier and retired as a lieutenant general and prominent figure in the Main Political Administration of the Kievan Military District.

Gromov spent most of his early career in the Soviet Far East. In 1939 when Japanese and Soviet forces clashed along the shores of Lake Khalkin Gol', Gromov was a regimental political officer in nearby Kharbarovsk. With the outbreak of the Second World War, Gromov stayed in the Far East although numerous reports went back to the west to fight the Germans.

The life of a political officer during this period was not easy. The supply and mail systems had broken down and the Soviet Army was losing on the battlefield. Against this background, Gromov's unit was being targeted by a Japanese psychological operations campaign: "In those difficult days for our country, what could be more important? What counts is what comes to the front, what is the capital for our homeland - Moscow - Japanese propaganda in the Far East tried to sow panic among the local population. They spread rumors of the fact that the days of Soviet power were numbered; that the army was about to be defeated."

Indicative of the impact of Japanese PSYOP is the relief Gromov expressed the boundless joy which with all Far Easterners met the news...

These passages are suggestive of the collateral effect of a psychological operations campaign. That is, in order to affect soldiers, a PSYOP campaign does not have to target soldiers directly. Indeed a PSYOP campaign may more profitably target the Soviet civilian population. A civilian population already affected by a PSYOP message will in turn convey the message to the soldiers of their local garrison.

As a political officer, Gromov was responsible for psychological operations directed against newly "conquered" populations. Gromov took the problems of pacification seriously. As the Soviet army advanced into Manchuria in 1945 in pursuit of the Japanese, the Soviets distributed announcements in Chinese. These announcements stressed that the Soviets desired to normalize life, i.e., not to interfere in the domestic affairs of the people, to respect local administration or in religious affairs. The Soviets, of course, sought to work closely with local "progressive" forces, but the main burden of pacification seems to have been upon the Soviet military.

The war's end found the 25th Army and Gromov in Korea. In order to reach the populace, the Soviets published a daily newspaper in Korean.

"In the pages of the newspaper, the psychological-transformation of North Korea was discussed in an easy, popular form. The work of people's committees, the Communist Party, and even the formation of trade unions, political organizations, and other parties and social organizations was noted. The newspaper published articles about patriots who fought against the Japanese oppression in the underground, about partisan bands, and about people who actively participated in the rebirth of a new Korea."

As a senior political officer, Gromov traveled around Korea checking on the progress of the consolidation PSYOP campaign: "Every day commanders and political workers appeared before various social groups of Koreans; they explained the beneficial goals of the liberation mission of the Red Army and the international situation. They talked about the prospects of a new Korea."

Unfortunately, the material covered in the book is somewhat biased and reflects the occasionally alarmist nature of material coming from South Korean sources. The misapplying of classification acronyms associated with some of the declassified U.S. sources (e.g., NORFORN instead of NDFORN) detracts from the aesthetic appeal, and for some readers will hurt the book's credibility. The lack of evidence of close collaboration with Japanese and Korean researchers limits the depth of coverage and leaves out some of the psychological considerations that such collaborators could have lent to the study. Still, this book is a must for anyone interested in North Korean military or political matters. It would perhaps pay to have it included in the pre-brief for U.S. military personnel deploying to Korea.
Special Warfare

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