

FALMLÉN

Special Warfare

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My message this time is one of farewell to the military and civilian employees of the Special Warfare Center and School and greetings to the personnel of the 1st Special Operations Command.

I have been proud to command the men and women of the Center and School for the past three years, and as I leave I look back on a long list of projects which we've accomplished together, projects which will have a lasting impact on special operations and on the effectiveness of the Army as a whole.

We can all be proud of the development and approval of the Special Forces Branch, a true milestone that will ensure professional development through formal schooling and sequential, progressive assignments to Army, joint and combined organizations.

We've made great strides in training improvements as well. The longer Q-Course now gives students more extensive academic training and more time in the field, and the Special Forces Selection and Assessment Program will help us to evaluate candidates' potential before they begin the Q-Course to ensure that only the best candidates begin training.

The development and approval of Functional Area 39 for civil affairs and psychological operations officers will also give them better promotion potential, better career management and the opportunity to serve repetitive tours in an area for which they are highly trained.

New regional studies and language training will prepare civil affairs and psychological operations officers to operate in specific geographical areas, and functional language training for Special Forces will make those soldiers better able to deal with the local population in areas in which they may be operating.

The opening of the Center and School's own NCO Academy will now allow us to train soldiers

in Special Forces and PSYOP in basic and advanced leadership techniques keyed to their particular MOSs.

We've also been included in the creation of the U.S. Special Operations Command, another special operations milestone that promises a long-needed command-and-control structure to oversee special ops training and operations of all the services.

There are a number of other important projects still going on, from combat developments to plans for other new courses. It's an exciting time to be in special operations, and I'm glad that my next assignment is that of commander of the 1st Special Operations Command.

I'm grateful to be able to leave the ongoing projects in the hands of someone as capable as my successor at the Center and School, Brig. Gen. David J. Baratto. He is a fine officer with a wealth of special operations experience in the 1st, 5th, 7th and 10th Special Forces Groups, 1st SOCOM and USSOCOM. I have no doubt he will do an excellent job as commander of the Center and School.

To those of you in 1st SOCOM, I send my highest regard and respect for the variety of missions you are accomplishing throughout the world. It's a demanding job whose challenges change as quickly as the headlines of the daily newspaper. I will be honored to serve with you in meeting those challenges.


Our job will be made easier by the personnel, training and materiel developments which have come out of the Center and School over the last few years. I know I can also count on the soldiers I'll have working for me -- soldiers who've trained at SWCS and soldiers with whom I've worked in the past. I know they will live up to their reputation as special operations soldiers: dedicated, highly skilled, and as their motto says, without equal.


Brigadier General James A. Guest

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The cover: The special operations sniper must be proficient in areas which conventional sniper training does not address. To learn more about how these snipers are being trained, read Capt. John L. Stanley's article, "Beyond the sniper: Special Operations Target Interdiction," on pg. 3. (Photo by Phil Howell)



Photo by Phil Howell

Beyond the sniper: Special Operations Target Interdiction

by Capt. John L. Stanley

The special operations sniper is a Special Forces or Ranger soldier highly skilled in delivering precision rifle fire from concealed positions, at selected targets and in support of special operations missions. This implies much more than the traditional sniper mission of engaging personnel targets beyond the range of standard infantry weapons.

Engaging "selected targets" demands that the sniper be proficient with rifles designed to interdict material targets. He will also perform "in support of special operations missions," requiring him to have an extensive background in sniper operations at all levels of conflict.

In fact, the sniper's skills are best exploited in special operations missions. The intricate nature of those missions -- unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense and direct action -- require a special operations soldier to be highly trained, adaptable to changing mission requirements and physically and mentally tough. A special operations sniper must be just as proficient with a .50-caliber special-purpose sniper rifle, interdicting a material target, as he is training a group of guerrillas equipped with a foreign or antique sniper weapon. Because of these missions, no greater variety of skills has ever been required of a

Left: A special operations sniper-observer team takes aim from its well-concealed position.

sniper than of today's special operations sniper. In fact, his art requires more flexibility, initiative and practice to survive now than ever before. New technology in sensors, thermal imagers and other countermeasures employed against the sniper has raised the ante he must pay for success.

In a direct-action role, the special operations sniper will be required to interdict a variety of targets. These will include "high-value" personnel targets, whose loss will have a significant impact on the battlefield, and material targets. Material targets range from items like missiles, aircraft, radars and communications equipment to critical nodes that will shut down entire facilities and systems. The SOF sniper can employ a variety of weapons and ammunition tailored to interdict these specific targets. Naturally, he can also provide his unit with precision, long-range rifle fire in a conventional manner. This makes him a welcome asset, considering the restricted firepower of small Special Forces A-teams and reconnaissance units.

The battery of weapons available to the SOF sniper include a mixture of arms to interdict a wide range of targets. His basic sniper weapon is a 7.62 NATO-caliber rifle. This is currently the M-21 sniper weapons system, a semiautomatic M-14 modified with a scope and "match" tuning. By August 1988, the new

M-24 sniper weapon should be fielded to SOF units (see accompanying article). The M-24 is a very accurate bolt-action design also in 7.62 NATO caliber. Other weapons available include large-bore sniper rifles like the Haskins .50-caliber or the .338/.416 magnum (a modified African big-game cartridge). The special operations sniper may also opt for a suppressed sniper weapon for special requirements or a foreign sniper rifle to mimic the indigenous forces' weapon or ammunition.

The SOF sniper also has some latitude when it comes to cartridge caliber and ammunition to increase the effects on target. Most of the sniper's requirements will be fulfilled by the 7.62 NATO cartridge; it is an overall good performer. However, some missions may dictate the sniper use his knowledge to "tailor" his equipment. This may mean selecting special .50-caliber projectiles designed to penetrate armor or cause fires. He may choose a .300 Winchester magnum for 1000-yard accuracy or subsonic ammunition for low-signature requirements. The sniper's careful target analysis will determine just what type weapon or ammunition is best and exactly where he has to put the round to achieve the desired results.

In the UW and FID role, the special operations sniper can perform both as a fighter and a



Photo by Phil Howell

SSgt. John C. Thompson (left) and SFC Michael T. McClister, SOTIC instructors, work together as a team to sight the target.

trainer. He can train other soldiers in both conventional and unconventional sniper warfare and thus multiply his impact many times over. He may be challenged with such requirements as teaching a sniper course to a guerrilla force in a heavily oppressed area choked with population-control measures. Using marksmanship drills and air rifles (due to their very low signature and high accuracy) he can teach many of the essential marksmanship skills in a building basement right under the noses of an enemy force.

In addition, his ancillary skills in camouflage, stalking, surveillance and deception are very useful in all special operations missions. The sniper's skills and application of optical devices, surveillance and silent movement techniques make him an outstanding reconnaissance asset. On occasion, the sniper may prove to be more valuable for the intelligence he reports than for the targets he interdicts.

Training a sniper to meet these challenges requires a program of very select skills and tasks. Even more, it requires a student of exceptional talent and experience to grasp the special operations sniper's missions and maintain them after return to his unit.

The dilemma that has faced SOF units in the past has been the lack of any institutional sniper training that fully exploited the attributes of the special operations soldier and provided for SOF missions. SOF units often used conventional sniper schools such as Fort Bragg's XVIII Airborne Corps Sniper School (now defunct) or the Marine Corps Scout Sniper School at Quantico, Va. Although fine programs, they provided little specific training for special operations snipers. Conventional sniper schools tended to invest a lot of time in teaching basic skills such as land navigation, radio procedures and artillery adjustment, which the SOF soldier has learned in either Special Forces or Ranger qualification courses.

What special operations needed was institutional sniper training that fully capitalized on the principle that a special operations soldier was already a highly trained asset and that his sniper training should start from that point. The Special Warfare Center and School's first attempt in 1983 was short-lived, primarily due to the lack of understanding and planning for the role of the SOF sniper. This was the same problem encountered with the other schools -- the new school

merely addressed sniping from a conventional framework and offered little in the area of special operations requirements. As a result, the first school's potential value to SOF was not realized, and it died that same year. However, the lessons learned did not die. Early in 1985, the SWCS started another sniper program.

The new sniper school was formulated on several new precepts. One, that SOF soldiers have a strong foundation in skills the soldier must possess before he starts on Day One. Eliminating basic skills training allowed much more time to delve into missions, weapons and procedures as they apply to special operations in the entire spectrum of conflict. The course was named the Special Operations Target Interdiction Course, or SOTIC. The title is much more indicative of the special operations sniper's role and highlights his missions not only as a sniper, but as an expert in all aspects of interdicting various targets with a rifle.

Today, the Special Warfare Center and School operates the SOTIC program with little flimflam and with low visibility. The cadre members have put a lot of personal experience and knowledge into the course. Their ideas are not found in Army subject schedules, but they are garnered through experience and dedication. These instructors have met some very challenging tasks, developing ideas and techniques where none existed. Little reference material exists on many of the subjects taught in the SOTIC program. Where does one find information on reading and correcting for wind errors when shooting a .50-caliber rifle at 2,000 meters, or long-range night-vision target interdiction? The answer is to use your experience, develop a plan, and go find out for yourself. The results must be valid, since no room for error exists when the information may place lives in jeopardy.

The cadre of the school has been selected on the basis of sniper experience, SOF background and per-

formance. Another criterion (not so easily measured) is the desire to be a sniper. The prospective instructor must possess a hunger to learn and teach his craft. The "just-another-job" attitude does not fit in to the SOTIC instructor's lifestyle. The long hours and complex curriculum are so demanding that without a personal desire to do this work, he would be quickly overwhelmed.

Limiting the classes to fewer than 24 students gives the class a student-to-instructor ratio of 2:1. Such a ratio has fostered an almost apprentice relationship between the students and the cadre. This relationship is one of tremendous advantage when training snipers, for what is taught here is more a craft than a long list of tasks to meet graduation criteria. To pass, students must have the desire to learn and talent to demonstrate their skills. Most exams are practical application, not theory. Students are continually guided through the course. They are not turned loose, on a range to bang away at targets; each shot is evaluated and critiqued, to the order of more than 2,000 rounds per student.

The sniper program is a "hands-on" oriented school with only 41 of the 340 hours of instruction in the classroom. The SOTIC philosophy is that most sniper skills must be taught, practiced and evaluated in the field. Students are shown "how to" by the cadre, and then they perform each task until it is perfected. New training concepts and equipment such as precision air rifles, laser range finders and shooting techniques have been blended with lessons learned in Vietnam (usually first-hand from instructors) so as to glean every possible benefit from available sniper training time. This results in a program that is well-rounded for the sniper; new technology is always backstopped with combat-proven sniper techniques. Range determination, for example, is a difficult task without laser range finders, but students learn the traditional methods as well

as the new, in case the range finder breaks down.

The students are taught using practical methods available anywhere. They learn that sniper training does not depend solely upon equipment and high-speed ranges. They learn how easy it is to set up simple sustainment drills. A unique approach to training and sustainment is the use of match-grade air rifles. Air rifles are cost-effective, always available and allow training virtually anywhere and anytime without the complicated requirements of setting up a live-fire range, forecasting ammunition, requesting transportation, and so on. Air rifles merely augment practice; they do not take the place of live-

"The 'just-another-job' attitude does not fit into the SOTIC instructor's lifestyle . . . without a personal desire to do this work, he would be quickly overwhelmed."

fire training. Air rifles allow snipers a chance to shoot every day and sustain perishable skills such as trigger control.

A typical course is intense, and the days are long. The program lasts six weeks, with many weekends involved in training. The students will spend a lot of time on the training ranges in live-fire exercises. Each week is incremental, adding another rung to the ladder of the sniper's craft.

The first week of the SOTIC program centers around strict training in advanced marksmanship skills. On Day One, the students must pass a diagnostic course of fire administered by the cadre. The course of fire is shot with an M-21 sniper rifle without the telescope sight, or "iron sighted." It consists of shooting groups at 25 meters and

shooting for score on ranges out to 600 yards. The diagnostic shoot assures that students will be able to start training at an advanced level in marksmanship. Students who fail the diagnostic evaluation are sent back to their units with a good evaluation on areas which need improvement before they try the course again.

Initially, all training is conducted with iron sights. This reinforces the student's concentration on basic techniques by not letting the optical sights do the work. It also teaches confidence as the students learn to hit man-sized targets out to 600 yards with little effort. Since iron sights are also the sniper's backup sighting system, he must be able to function effectively with them. This is especially true for the special operations sniper, who cannot turn in his weapon for maintenance when the scope fails in enemy territory.

The first week is the instructor's most challenging period; he is required to transform subtle student errors into corrected techniques. This is also the most important week to the students, as the foundation built here will support every other skill learned in the course. If not taught to perfection, essential marksmanship skills will quickly erode during the more stressful shooting exercises such as moving targets in Week Three. SOTIC instructors have found that shooting in the offhand (standing) position tends to reinforce skills necessary for hitting moving targets at long range. The objective of the training is not to master the position, but to master the skills related to it -- both positions require essentially the same precise trigger control and concentration. SOTIC's student retention rate for the movers exam soared after implementation of the offhand position in training.

Week Two adds optical sights into the sniper's training. Much time is devoted to grouping exercises -- instructors look for consistency and quality of the students' shot groups. Longer ranges are used to give students experience in

compensating for environmental factors. Students get to experience the problems encountered at ranges out to 1,000 yards. Students are also broken into pairs at this time and will work together as a sniper-observer team for the remainder of the course, both students being trained equally as a sniper and observer. This relationship of sniper-observer teams has been proven time and again as the key to successful sniper employment in combat. In training, students seem to be much more honest with a teammate and have a desire not to let their buddy down. The result is a greater desire to help the team excel; some students have done outstanding coaching to help buddies who might otherwise have failed to meet the course standards.

The first two weeks are also used to introduce the student to basic

sniper fieldcraft skills such as camouflage, observation, range estimation, sniper mission planning and maintenance. These are called basic sniper skills; however, the maintenance blocks of instruction include very detailed training in maintaining and field-repairing weapons like the M-21 and the new M-24 sniper weapons systems.

In the third week of training, all the rules change. No more easy targets. Things start moving -- literally. The students are introduced to fleeting targets or "snaps and movers." Snap targets consist of a portion of a silhouette target, such as the head, exposed for only a brief interval. A typical exposure is a head target at 200 yards for two seconds. Snaps are fired out to 400 yards. Movers consist of a 12-inch-wide lateral silhouette of a man moving across the sniper's

front. Movers are fired out to 600 yards and are presented walking, fast walking and running. In respect to marksmanship, this is the student's most challenging event. To continue in the course, he must pass this course of fire.

Other subjects are introduced in this week, such as the class on locating the enemy. Here each sniper receives practical live-fire training on how to determine the range, type and location of assorted weapons firing in his direction. Weapons like pistols, rifles, medium machine guns, suppressed weapons and large-bore sniper rifles are fired over a distance of 100-1,000 yards with the students downrange in a defilade position. By listening to the "crack-thump," or the bullets' sonic crack and muzzle report, students learn to discern differences essential to target detection. This is

New sniper weapon system designed to be rugged, dependable and accurate

by Capt. John L. Stanley

The M-24 weapons system is the result of hard work and research by special operations snipers who saw a need for a new weapon.

That need was based on long-standing problems encountered with the Army's old M-21 sniper rifle, a system plagued with problems since its adaptation in the mid-1960s. The M-21 was a standard M-14 service rifle modified to match standards and equipped with a telescopic sight. With these modifications, however, the durable service rifle became a fragile and troublesome sniper weapon. Some of the M-21's problems included poor accuracy, complicated semiautomatic operation, constantly changing zero and poor maintainability.

There have been many efforts since the Vietnam conflict to adapt a new sniper weapon, with no success. The reason was twofold. First, a lot of disagreement existed over whether a sniper rifle should be bolt-action or semiautomatic. Second, since the Vietnam conflict had ended, so had the need for snipers (the U.S. Army never had an officially sanctioned sniper program in peacetime until the advent of the Special Operations Target Interdiction Course).

Early in 1985, instructors in the Special Operations Target Interdiction Course at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School took a hard look at a better special operations sniper rifle. SOTIC instruc-

tors knew that sniping is important to SOF, in peacetime or war, and knew exactly what type of weapon they needed to meet their mission requirements. Through their research, instructors established requirements for the new weapon. The result was a statement of need outlining the specific characteristics of the special operations sniper rifle.

The sniper rifle they wanted would satisfy the requirements of about 80 percent of the special operations sniper missions; the other 20 percent would be better accomplished with special weapons rather than trying to adapt one rifle to do them all.

Throughout development, experts from the Center and School assisted the Army in the sniper weapons procurement process. Instructors from SOTIC and members of the Directorate of Combat Developments took the new weapon from drawing board through field testing to ensure that special operations needs were being met. During that process, the Army apparently liked the Center and School's ideas on the new sniper weapon and decided

a survival skill, as the sniper must know if the fire is directed at him or merely in his general area. Perhaps the enemy is conducting "recon by fire," probing likely sniper locations with weapons fire for any reactions. Also, the sniper must be able to quickly detect and neutralize threats before he, in turn, is neutralized. His target may be another sniper whose bullet's supersonic crack and rifle's muzzle report are the only target indicators.

The fourth week of the course is the fieldcraft week, with exams in observation and stalking. Both tasks are essential to the sniper's mission. In the preceding weeks, the snipers have practiced in exercises designed to hone observation and stalking skills to a fine edge. Ultimately, the sniper's mastery of fieldcraft skills is what separates him from just another marksman.

to adopt the weapon for all sniper requirements Armywide.

Once candidate sniper weapons were submitted, SOTIC instructors traveled to Fort Benning, Ga., to help test them. It is significant that SOF snipers had an active role in the test procedure -- the new weapon had to satisfy the users, not technicians in a test lab.

The winner of the sniper-rifle tests was submitted by the Remington Arms Company, and it represents the state of the art in sniper-rifle development. The new weapon is rugged, easily maintained and, most of all, accurate. It uses a simple bolt-action Model 700 receiver in 7.62 NATO, combat-proven by the Marine Corps in its sniper rifle for more than 20 years. The weapon incorporates a stainless-steel barrel, synthetic stock and a Leupold & Stevens 10-power Ultra scope. Additional design features include a long receiver (for future upgrade to a larger cartridge) and a spare-parts kit with most repair parts a sniper would need in the field.

In August 1988, the Army will receive the new M-24 sniper weap-


One of the most notable events in the fourth week is the stalking phase. Here students are taught to move undetected to within 150 meters of a target and engage it twice with blank rounds. The students will stalk 800 to 1,000 meters while the area they are moving in is being observed by two instructors located on the objective with 7x50 binoculars. Any target indicator such as movement, shine or color will alert the observer of the sniper's location. If the instructor/observer believes he sees a sniper, he will maneuver another instructor, called a walker, via radio to the suspected location. If a sniper is discovered, he is a no-go. Once the snipers get within 150 meters of the observers, they engage the target with a blank round. Later, the walker will move within 10 meters of the sniper and indicate the sniper's direction

to the instructor/observer. If the sniper is still undetected, he will fire a second blank while the walker is within five meters of his position. If that is not enough, the walker will finally move next to the sniper and touch the sniper's head. To receive a "go," the student must remain undetected. Any indicator such as muzzle flash or an improperly placed piece of camouflage garnish can alert the observer to the sniper's location and lead to subsequent discovery. One point often overlooked about stalking is the tremendous physical strain it requires. Dragging one's body 800-1,000 meters in less than four hours is no easy task. Add the extra weight of a camouflage suit, sniper rifle, optical devices, water and a Fort Bragg summer, and you have the makings of a very challenging exercise.

The snipers are also taught exten-

ons system, with the first weapons going to the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. Instructors in SOTIC have been training snipers

with a weapons system very similar to the M-24 to assure that snipers in the SOF community are prepared to use the new weapon.



U.S. Army photo
The new M-24 sniper weapons system, with scope and "iron-sighted."

sive use of night-vision equipment. They will spend many nights in practice with night-vision sights. Night training to the sniper is as essential as his marksmanship. More than 90 percent of the 9th Infantry Division's sniper kills in Vietnam were at night, and this is typical of most successful sniper employment. Every application of limited-visibility operations is practiced in the SOTIC curriculum. This includes the use of day sights at night, direct illumination, indirect illumination with night vision, infrared enhancement and thermal imagery. Students progress with night sights to the point where they are capable of passing the diagnostic shoot administered on Day One using night-vision equipment.

The fifth week encompasses a wide variety of training. All the shooting conducted in the fifth week is at unknown distances. Extensive use of steel or "iron-maiden" targets allows the snipers immediate feedback on exact bullet impact points. The students receive hands-on training in many types of weapons, including foreign, obsolete U.S., and special-purpose sniper weapons systems.

Mixed with the fifth week are classes in training and organizing snipers, including the parent unit's snipers and those trained in UW and FID missions. Shooting is conducted under cadre-induced stress to ensure that snipers will see their limitations as well as their strong points in this area. Instructors also teach advanced application of fire, such as high-angle shooting and hitting targets hidden behind a reverse slope, using the bullet's trajectory to "see" the target. Training in tracking and countertracking, including dog evasion, help teach the sniper to evade as well as hunt his target.

In course-week six, the students are given two more days of shooting at unknown distances. Then comes the "gut check," the SOTIC field training exercise. This FTX will test much of the sniper's training in the course. The students are placed in a short isolation (their

homework has been the mission planning) and present briefbacks to the cadre. In the early hours of the next morning, the students infiltrate by teams via static-line parachute into their operational areas. They must move undetected to their target area and construct a "hide," a place to conceal themselves. For the next 36 hours, they will observe their targets, gather target intelligence, maintain observation logs and adjust to changes from their mission planning. This is a blank-fire exercise conducted with an active aggressor force and counter-sniper and tracker teams in the area. This phase ends when students engage their targets and exfiltrate.

Within two hours of exfiltration, the students will be given a new mission for a live-fire sniper am-

"No badges or tabs are awarded, for the student's future capability as a sniper will largely depend on his continued training and desire to improve."

bush. After quick mission planning, the students make an airborne infiltration in the vicinity of a live-fire range. Each sniper team will stalk to a firing position and take one shot per student at a target. Depending on course points accumulated, a hit or miss may mean the difference between success or failure in the course. To some students with marginal points, earning a graduation certificate may depend on one shot on the last day of the course. Fortunately, students in this situation are rare. This last phase verifies the snipers' capabilities after an extended stress and ensures that such things as weapons zero and maintenance are in high repair after an extended field exercise and airborne infiltra-

tion.

Five hours after completion of the FTX -- time to shower, clean equipment and clear the school -- the students graduate. No badges or tabs are awarded, for the student's future capability as a sniper will largely depend on his continued training and desire to improve. His talent can erode significantly in a few months without sustainment training. This is another reason instructors retain many old-school training techniques. Students can take these ideas back to their units and with limited resources sustain their craft.

Such a dynamic training program has been possible by capitalizing on the special operations soldier's already proven skills as a Special Forces soldier or Ranger. The prerequisites for attendance further define the student's caliber. In addition to being either SF or Ranger qualified and serving in such a unit, students attending SOTIC must pass a psychological battery, have a GT score of 110 or higher, have no record of disciplinary action, be qualified expert with an M-16, have 20/20 vision (correctable), have a secret clearance, have no record of drug or alcohol abuse, pass the Army Physical Fitness Test and be currently on jump status.

Even with high prerequisites, not all students are up to the task. Attrition rates vary with each class, but roughly 13 percent attrition has been the average over the last three years. Many student failures are attributable to the fact that some students simply don't have the talent or inclination for this type of work. They're good soldiers, sometimes accomplished marksmen, but some students never adapt to the sniper's role. The hard part is convincing leaders that failure from such a course, aside from problems with attitude, motivation, etc., is not a black mark against the soldier. The standards are set to produce an asset who has demonstrated the capability to accomplish a select mission; lives may depend on the sniper's performance, and

no flaws can be tolerated.

Besides its quality students, the SOTIC approach to sniper training is unique in many ways. Unlike competitive shooters who know little of the sniper's craft, the SOTIC instructors are snipers. Although they may compete in shooting sports off-duty, sniping is their work. They will go to any limits to train better snipers. The results have been many innovative training techniques in sniping that have produced a better student on graduation day. The course's greatest attribute is plain hard work, tempered with experience. Instructors can often be found in voluntary off-duty training sessions with students, correcting marksmanship errors discovered during that day's training. Using match-grade air rifles set up on a reduced-scale range in the classroom, the instructors can iron out many student problems in a controlled environment.

Another unique attribute to the course has been its evolution over the years. Constant updating keeps information current and worthwhile. In March 1988 the SOTIC cadre introduced the "night stalker" program, consisting of stealth movement against elaborate sensor arrays, radar and night-vision equipment. This program already has the earmarks of breaking new ground in the art of countermeasures on tomorrow's high-tech battlefield. The sniper's concealed movements have taken an unnerving twist with the advent of new technology. Sensors, radar, thermal imagers and the like have complicated the game even more.

The worth of all this training is simple. One can measure the SOTIC graduate in terms of face value, in that he can deliver effective fire at moving personnel targets out to 600 meters, stationary personnel targets out to 1,000 meters and material out to the effective range of the weapon or ammunition he is using. The real value of the special operations sniper, however, must be measured in more abstract terms. The SOF-qualified sniper



Photo by Phil Howell

Properly concealed, special operations snipers make poor photo subjects. The sniper team in this photo is in the upper-right corner -- the two dark bumps to the right of the tree.

can only serve to improve a unit's capability; even without his talents as a marksman, his high degree of skill as a trainer in such areas as silent movement and surveillance are invaluable to the missions related to SOF. He is skilled enough to maintain his own or his unit's sniper training, and he can train others in a FID or UW role. His flexibility in a direct-action role is tremendous, allowing him to tailor his equipment and techniques to the mission. His ability to collect information is unparalleled. The special operations sniper is not the answer to all SOF missions, but often his only limitation is the imagination to employ his skills effectively.

The special operations sniper's mission has evolved to support the needs of the special operations community. To support the requirements of that mission, the SOTIC program provides as many as five 24-man classes a year, with allocations reserved for Special Forces and Ranger units, active and reserve. In addition, the school serves as a storehouse of information on sniper operations. The school is truly an all-source operation, maintaining experience and data on everything from sniper-

weapons repair (they do all their own custom gunsmithing) to training programs on specialized interdiction techniques.

To be effective in the face of today's conflict requires the special operations sniper to train to a unique set of needs -- needs that have been recognized and are being undertaken by the Special Operations Target Interdiction Course right now. Such training is a challenge to the special operations community and is paramount to the sniper's success. ✕

Capt. John L. Stanley is currently deputy director of the Special Operations Advanced Skills Department at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. Prior to his current assignment, he was chief of the Advanced Skills Department's Target Interdiction Division for three years and helped to develop the Special Operations Target Interdiction Course. He served as an infantry company commander from 1983-85 and as the officer in charge of the XVIII Airborne Corps Advanced Marksmanship Training Unit and Sniper School from 1980-81.



U.S. Army photo

New career directions for Special Forces

Special Forces career management has changed greatly over the last five years. Three experts from the Special Operations Proponency Office present an update on the changes and what lies ahead for Special Forces officers, warrant officers and NCOs.

Special Forces Officer Branch

by Capt. Matt Carr

Since the inception of Special Forces, its officers have been controlled under five separate and distinct management systems.

Initially, officers were given a prefix 3, which was later changed to an additional skill identifier of 5G. In the early 1970s, Special Forces officers were controlled under the foreign-area-officer specialty, with an area of concentration of 48E. Under the Officer Personnel Management System, the Special Forces officer was given a separate specialty code of 18. In 1983, the Officer Personnel Management System II was implemented, and Specialty Code 18 changed to Functional Area 18.

Functional Area 18 held some flaws for the Special Forces community. With FA 18, the officer could not hold another functional area; therefore, the Special Forces com-

munity could not produce experts in necessary fields such as personnel, combat developments or public affairs.

Additionally, the officer, by ARs 611-101 and 614-162, had to be branch-qualified in his entry branch before coming to Special Forces. For example, an infantry officer had to command a company prior to entering Special Forces. Although the branch-qualification requirement was frequently waived, it was still a regulation that hampered recruiting of Special Forces officers. The requirement caused Special Forces to acquire officers at approximately their seventh year in service. After the required training, officers were normally within two years of being promoted to major by the time they arrived at their first Special Forces assignment. Special Forces quickly became over-strength in majors and under-strength in captains.


With limited time at the grade of O4, many Special Forces majors then had to make a serious career decision: in which area should they be qualified, their basic branch or

their functional area? This dilemma caused Special Forces to lose many qualified officers and kept many others away.

These conditions made a Special Forces officer's professional development erratic at best. Although some officers were able to meet the professional-development requirements of both their branch and Special Forces, these officers were the exception rather than the rule. The majority of Special Forces officers were not making the necessary steps. The lack of a systematic, progressive, sequential professional-development scheme hurt the war-fighting capability of Special Forces. This deficiency was addressed in the Special Operations Forces System Program Review (1986) and the Special Operations Forces Functional Area Assessment (1987), senior forums held to identify and correct problems in special operations.

During the SOF SPR, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School recommended a Special Forces Branch, but the idea was not accepted. With that decision, the

SPECIAL FORCES OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT



SWCS, in conjunction with the Army Training and Doctrine Command and the Military Personnel Center (now the Total Army Personnel Agency), started a concerted effort to research and develop all the options available to correct the professional-development deficiencies of Special Forces.

The initial joint working group was convened by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans, in August 1986. This working group included representatives from the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans; the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel; the Total Army Personnel Agency; TRADOC; the Soldier Support Center; the Combined Arms Center; SWCS; and the 1st Special Operations Command. The working group's recommendation was that a Special Forces Branch, starting at the O3 level, be created.

With this initial position, the

SWCS and TAPA developed a decision briefing on the Special Forces Branch. This decision briefing was staffed through the CAC and TRADOC. In mid-September the Special Forces Branch decision briefing was given to the commanding general of CAC, Lt. Gen. Gerald T. Bartlett, who approved the briefing to go forward to the commander of TRADOC. In early October 1986, the SWCS and TAPA briefed the TRADOC commander, Gen. Carl E. Vuono, who approved the concept of the branch to be briefed to commanders of major commands and a few retired general-officer experts, and then to the Chief of Staff of the Army.

With the conceptual approval from the TRADOC commander, the SWCS coordinated and conducted the required briefings in October, November and December 1986. In late December, the TRADOC commander approved the Special Forces Branch briefing and forwarded it to

the Army Chief of Staff.

On April 9, 1987, after discussion with the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Secretary of the Army approved the Special Forces Branch as one of the combat-arms branches of the Army. With his decision, Special Forces leadership development was codified with a definite system to access, train and develop officers, warrant officers and noncommissioned officers.

This system will ensure progressive, sequential branch assignments and a systematic method for professional development of Special Forces officers. Additionally, the new branch will ensure Special Forces officers are trained in the necessary skills in order to enhance the Army's warfighting capability.

Special Forces will require officers to enter at their fourth year in service. This will make the Special Forces Branch the only non-accession branch in the Army and will mean that the SWCS and TAPA will

have to recruit officers from the other branches. The Special Operations Proponency Office at the SWCS and the Special Forces Branch at TAPA are currently recruiting officers from Army units worldwide.

The Special Forces branch selection criteria come from AR 614-162. They require that an officer:

1. Be a male commissioned officer managed by the Officer Personnel Management Division.
2. Have a Defense Language Aptitude Battery score of 85 or higher, or be able to achieve a language proficiency rating of 2/2 or higher.
3. Meet the physical standards in AR 40-501.
4. Be eligible for a top-secret clearance in accordance with AR 604-5.
5. Be airborne-qualified or volunteer for airborne training.

In addition to the above criteria, one other consideration will be the time an officer has in service. An officer with more than seven years will not be selected, because by the time he would be trained and sent to his first assignment, he would be entering the zone for consideration for major.

By selecting younger officers, Special Forces will get officers who will be able to serve for a longer period of time. In addition to an upper

limit on time in service, there is also a lower limit. The minimum requirement will be approximately three years in service and graduation from a basic-branch advanced course. This three-year requirement ensures that the officer has been selected for promotion and conditional voluntary indefinite. With these limits and the selection criteria, the Special Forces Branch is confident that it will be able to meet its accession goal of 130 officers per year.

With that number, Special Forces will be able to fill all its authorizations and professionally develop and manage its officers. If the branch meets its goal, there will be approximately 737 captains, 399 majors, 272 lieutenant colonels and 110 colonels in the SF officer inventory.

Each captain, upon graduation from the Special Forces Detachment Officer Qualification Course, will be assigned to a Special Forces group to serve as an operational detachment commander. Currently, captains should serve as ODA commanders for 18 months, plus or minus six months, in order to be considered Special Forces branch-qualified for promotion to major.

Majors should complete the Command and General Staff College and strive to serve a Special Forces assignment as a company commander, battalion executive officer, battalion operations officer or group-level staff officer, all of which are consid-

ered time with troops. Lieutenant colonels should strive to command Special Forces battalions, and colonels should strive for command of a Special Forces group, even though these are not the only routes to O5 and O6. For more information on Special Forces professional development, see DA PAM 600-3 in the Officer Ranks Personnel Update Number 12.

As with anything new, the branch has its nay sayers, but the Special Forces Branch was created to improve the future, not to correct the past. The branch's success will be evaluated and judged by the officers who enter its ranks now and in years to come. These officers, as they progress through the ranks, will be the future for Special Forces and the Army. The systematic, progressive, sequential leadership development provided by the branch will ensure that these officers are ready for the challenges that face them.



Capt. Matt Carr is currently assigned to the 1st Battalion, 1st SF Group. Prior to his current assignment, he served for three years at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, first as operations officer for the SOF Systems Program Review and later as the Branch 18 Manager in the Special Operations Proponency Office.

Special Operations Warrant Officer

by CWO2 Scott Herbert

In the four years since the first special operations technicians were appointed, there have been many changes in the Army warrant-officer corps. Most of these changes have affected the Special Forces warrant officer program during its most critical developmental period, and the result has been confusion, turmoil and rumor. Today, those

of us working in Special Operations Proponency believe we have identified most of the problems, and we're on our way toward fixing them.

A little history first. The developers of the Special Forces warrant-officer program worked under the concept that warrant officers would be assigned to positions regardless of rank. The developers intended that as long as a warrant officer could physically handle it, he could stay on an A-detachment forever. Special Forces began selecting and training warrant-officer candidates

under the assumption that most were very senior NCOs who already knew almost everything they needed to know to become good detachment technicians. The selection criteria and job description were based on what the warrant officer program's developers thought was available in the NCO force and what they perceived to be the role of the warrant officer -- and they were all wrong.

During this same period, the Army was conducting the Total Warrant Officer Study. The study determined that the Army should

"grade-code" all warrant-officer positions. Positions would call for a Warrant Officer (WO1 or CWO2), a Senior Warrant Officer (CWO3 or CWO4) or a Master Warrant Officer (selected CWO4 or CWO5). The Army shifted its emphasis toward younger NCOs who could have longer careers as warrant officers, stressed better training and gave warrant officers more responsibilities. Finally, a formal system of warrant-officer management, the Total Warrant Officer System, TWOS, was developed as a result of the Total Warrant Officer Study.

At the same time, SF was in the process of finding out things about itself. What we found was that most sergeants first class and staff sergeants didn't have two SF MOSs and the Operations and Intelligence Course (the original selection criteria). They couldn't get more MOSs because of a shortage of training slots and training money, reluctance of the groups to send them back to

school and a number of other reasons. It was becoming apparent to those of us involved in proponency that SF NCOs didn't know everything they needed to know to be special operations technicians, and our new warrant officers were quick to point out their own shortcomings. We also found that our selection criteria and training design, based on what we had thought was in the NCO corps, was unrealistic and inadequate. Finally, it seems that no one had clearly explained the warrant officer's job to the commissioned officers, the NCOs or even the new warrant officers themselves.

On the bright side, we have learned from our mistakes.

Generally, the SF warrant-officer program now meets all the requirements of the TWO System. The only real difference between the TWO System and SF is that we will continue to access only E6s and above; less experienced soldiers won't do. The Special Operations

Proponency Office, with feedback from the field, has conducted a realistic appraisal of SF today, and the warrant-officer selection criteria and training have been adjusted to reflect reality.

The minimum selection criteria now are: possess a secret clearance; have an 85 or better Defense Language Aptitude Battery score or a current language proficiency rating of 1+/1+ in a foreign language; have four or more years A-detachment experience; pass an Army Physical Fitness Test with at least 60 points per event and at least 206 points overall, using the 17-21 age-group standards; possess one SF MOS and be a graduate of the 16-week Operations and Intelligence Course or the resident/non-resident O&I Course; be serving in grade E6 or above; be recommended by the chain of command and be physically able to serve on an A-detachment. As an exception to these criteria, 1st SOCOM will

give priority seating in O&I to applicants who are otherwise fully qualified but do not yet have O&I training.

SF positions have been grade-coded, and SF warrants will have higher-level positions available with the implementation of the L-series Table of Organization and Equipment in FY 89. A-detachments will have one warrant-officer space each; of the six detachments in each company, four will have WO slots and two will have SWO slots. In addition to the detachment spaces there will be an SWO position in each SF company, an SWO assistant operations officer in each SF battalion and both an SWO and an MWO in each SF group headquarters -- one in group intelligence and one in group operations.

In the simplest terms, getting approximately six warrant-officer candidates from each SF battalion each year will fill our current needs. We are also making an active effort to identify additional spaces requiring SF warrant officers. Unfortunately, more spaces mean a need for more volunteers; the need for more volunteers means searching harder for quality men.

The responsibilities of the chain of command cannot be overstated in the selection of quality warrant officers for Special Forces. The single most important factor in deciding who is selected to become a warrant officer is the recommendation of the soldier's commanders, so the burden of selecting good men rests squarely upon the shoulders of the various commanders in the Special Forces groups.

SF has a unique opportunity: commanders can observe a soldier's performance, make a determination about his potential and then recommend him to be selected and trained to become a Special Forces warrant officer. The advantages of using this system for a portion of our company-grade officer corps can best be seen in the performances of other countries who use similar systems (Israel, Rhodesia and South Africa, to name a few). We must make the most of our special advantage.

Warrant-officer training now consists of six weeks at Fort Rucker, Ala., for the Warrant Officer Candidate Course and 13 weeks at Fort Bragg for the Warrant Officer Technical Certification Course. Today, our new warrants are taught with our new captains in the Special Forces Detachment Officer Qualification Course.

Why put warrant officers in SFDOQC? Don't the warrant officers already know that stuff? The answer is yes, most warrant-officer candidates do know some of "that stuff," but there are other reasons for training them with our captains.

First, it establishes a sound working relationship between detachment commanders and their technicians during the training process. Both sides learn something about the roles and thought processes of the other. By working together during the SFDOQC/WOTCC, the two members of the officer command element begin to function as they would on an ODA.

Second, SFDOQC and WOTCC are not exactly alike. For various

portions of the current training, the captains and WOCs are separated so that they may receive training specifically designed for each. In fact, over the course of the next several years, these two courses will become less and less alike as we develop more specific training materials. As an example, for our warrants, we plan to teach an overview of mechanized, armor and artillery tactics to broaden the general tactical knowledge of all the detachment technicians.


As a result of the changes we have made, there is an upward trend in accessions, in training and in quality within the warrant-officer program. The future is bright. As SF grows and more and younger soldiers enter the groups, we will also require more experienced and specialized leaders for the force. The Special Forces warrant officers can be those men.

Is the warrant-officer program alive and well?

The answer is a resounding "Yes!" ✕

CWO2 Scott S. Herbert is the Warrant Officer Manager for the Special Operations Proponency Office at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. He was appointed in 1984 as a special operations technician. Mr. Herbert has served with the 1st, 5th, 6th and 10th SF groups and the U.S. Army Parachute Team. His last assignment was as an A-detachment commander in the 1st SF Group.

SPECIAL FORCES WARRANT OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT



Special Forces Enlisted CMF 18

by Sgt. Maj. Jake Carter

The approval of Career Management Field 18 in June 1983 marked the beginning of more intensive career management for enlisted Spe-


cial Forces soldiers. It also eliminated many of the enlisted personnel management problems which had plagued Special Forces from its beginnings.

Prior to the approval, soldiers from various MOSs volunteered for Special Forces training. If they completed the Special Forces Qualification Course, they were awarded

special qualification identifier "S" and assigned to Special Forces units, retaining their original MOSs.

After a tour of duty in Special Forces, these soldiers could be levied for assignment in their original MOS. When that assignment was complete, some would return to Special Forces, but others would remain in their respective branches.

SPECIAL FORCES NCO PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT



With this one-time utilization of many Special Forces-trained soldiers, training dollars were lost, the experience level in SF units was difficult to maintain and a continuous recruiting and training program was necessary to keep Special Forces units at an acceptable strength level.

Early in 1982, the commander of the Army Institute for Military Assistance, now the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, asked his staff to research the possibility of creating a career management field for Special Forces enlisted soldiers. The result of that study was a proposal for a field which consisted of six MOSs -- 18B, weapons NCO; 18C, engineer NCO; 18D, medical NCO; 18E, communications NCO; 18F, operations and intelligence NCO; and 18Z, Special Forces senior sergeant.

IMA also recommended that newly enlisted soldiers be allowed to enter CMF 18. At that time, no

enlistment bonus was paid for any SF skill except for MOS 05B, radio operator. The IMA commander forwarded the proposal to the Department of the Army, where it was approved by then-Chief of Staff Gen. John A. Wickham Jr.

With the approval, reclassification procedures began. Throughout the Army, all 11Bs and 11Cs with SQI "S" were given the chance to reclassify into CMF 18 as 18B weapons NCOs; 12Bs could convert to 18C engineer NCOs, 91Bs to 18D medical NCOs, and 31V/05Bs to 18E communications NCOs. NCOs with an additional skill identifier of "F1" could become 18F operations and intelligence NCOs, and E8s and E9s were allowed to convert to 18Z, Special Forces senior sergeant. New soldiers recruited for CMF 18 had to meet the following selection criteria:

1. Be a male soldier.
2. Be a high-school graduate or have a GED.

3. Have a GT score of 110 or higher.
4. Be airborne qualified or volunteer for airborne training.
5. Be able to swim 50 meters unassisted wearing boots and fatigues.
6. Score a minimum of 206 points on the Army Physical Fitness Test with no less than 60 points on any event, scored for age group 17-21.
7. Have at least an interim secret security clearance.
8. Meet medical fitness standards outlined in AR 40-501.
9. Have no bar to reenlistment.

MOS training was upgraded, and subject matter was taken from the instruction of other service schools to ensure that major tasks of related CMFs were included in the training objectives for CMF 18. New tasks were developed, and CMF 18 training was well on its way. Internal and external training evaluations determined the ade-

quacy of the training and how well the soldiers were functioning within their units.

As CMF 18 was being created, Special Forces was expanding. The 1st Special Forces Group was activated at Fort Lewis, Wash., in the summer of 1984. The activation of the group increased SF enlisted personnel strength from 2,850 to 3,220, its current authorization.

To man the groups with the best-trained soldiers possible, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School is constantly working on ways to improve its training. In June, the SWCS began the pilot class for a new three-week assessment and selection program, Special Forces Orientation Training, which Special Forces candidates will take prior to the SF Qualification Course. SFOT is intended to reduce the attrition rate for Special Forces training, which is currently approximately 50 percent. With SFOT, the Center and School expects to reduce that number significantly, thereby saving both time and money without reducing standards. The new program will allow Special Forces to assess each student's physical, emotional, and mental stamina. SFOT also allows soldiers to make an educated decision about Special Forces and their career plans.

Since October 1987, the qualification course has been 23 weeks long, four weeks longer than before, to allow more training time. Sol-

diers also receive BNCOC and SERE Level-C training while they are attending the Q-Course so that they are fully trained and qualified for promotion when they reach their first team assignment.

The BNCOC is being taught at the newly created SF NCO Academy at the Special Warfare Center and School. The academy is also teaching the SF Advanced NCO Course, so SF NCOs may now get leadership training tailored for their MOSs.

The latest personnel development in the CMF is the proposed upgrade of 18F positions on A-detachments from E6 to E7. That upgrade was required to improve promotion potential and maintain the operations and intelligence capabilities of the detachments. The proposal to upgrade these positions was sent to the Soldier Support Center -- National Capital Region, in February of this year. The FY90 authorization documents will reflect the 18F upgrade.

Special Forces enlisted soldiers currently enjoy a promotion selection rate that exceeds that of any other MOS -- SF NCOs are being promoted roughly two years ahead of their counterparts in other fields. This will continue through 1991 with the activation of the 3rd SF Group at Fort Bragg, and enlisted positions will increase to more than 4,350 authorizations by the end of FY91.

Between now and FY91, CMF 18 will mature. Its operating strength will match its authorizations, bringing it to 100-percent strength for the first time since it was formed in 1983. When that happens, the current promotion rate will drop toward the Army's norm. CMF 18 soldiers will no longer have a two-year promotion advantage, but they will be promoted at the same rate as soldiers in other fields.

Soldiers in CMF 18 currently have one of the best career development patterns in the Army. They possess a vast amount of military knowledge and special skills, and they have their hands on a progression ladder that extends to the top. ✕

Sgt. Maj. Jake Carter is the sergeant major of the Special Operations Proponency Office of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. Prior to his current assignment, he was the operations sergeant major for the 2nd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group. A 1978 graduate of the Sergeants Major Academy, he has served in the Office of the Inspector General for the Military District of Washington and with the Reserve Officer Training Corps. From 1963-78, he served in a variety of assignments with the 1st, 5th and 7th Special Forces Groups.



Photo by Frank Cancellare, courtesy James Fletcher

Kachin Rangers: fighting with Burma's guerrilla warriors

by James S. Fletcher

In the early days of World War II, the U.S. Office of Strategic Services sent American soldiers to Burma to train Burmese Kachin tribesmen and help them to fight the Japanese. This is the author's account of his experiences with those forerunners of today's special operations forces.

The Americans in this story were part of a small group assigned to train and lead native Burmese tribesmen in a shadow war against the Japanese who invaded mainland Asia in the early days of World War II.

The Kachin Rangers were asked to do more than the average soldier, and their daring and skill succeeded where other tactics failed. They became experienced in hit-and-run guerrilla warfare, making raids deep into enemy territory, hitting the enemy where he least expected and keeping him off balance.

In April 1944, the V-Force Kachin Rangers merged with Detachment 101 of the Office of Strategic Services.

By war's end, the Office of Strategic Services and its band of Kachin raiders had demolished or helped to demolish 57 bridges, captured 15,000 tons of equipment, rescued 425 allied servicemen and killed 5,400 Japanese soldiers.

The unit had its beginnings late in

James S. Fletcher (front left) leads a group of Kachin Rangers down Burma's Chindwin River in 1943.

1942, when Gen. Joseph Stilwell formed the V-Force, a special group of Americans and Englishmen whose assignment was espionage, sabotage and collecting intelligence. The group was looking for local people who knew the jungle and who were willing to fight the Japanese. The Kachins were just what they were looking for; they had very few weapons with which to fight -- a few knives, spears, crossbows, arrows and some old flintlock guns -- but they were superb jungle fighters. The Japanese had terrorized the helpless Kachins when they invaded Burma in 1942, and the Kachins hated them with a passion.

An Englishman who had run a tea plantation in India before the war, Lt. Col. J.R. Wilson, was the first commander of the V-Force. The Americans' most important assignment was to recruit as many Kachins as they could and teach them to use automatic weapons, grenades and explosives.

The Kachins were primitive tribesmen who had conquered the Naga headhunters only a few years before. In the Kachins' own language, they were Jingpaws, meaning "men of the hills." They are customarily called Kachins by most of the people in Burma. They were small but straight and strongly built, and their endurance was unbelievable. They could march through the jungle all day with a heavy pack, much to the amazement of the Americans. The

Kachins were friendly people; from the beginning, they liked the Americans and taught them quite a few tricks about the jungle. The Kachins often posed as laborers and coolies and worked for the Japanese until they had all the information they needed. Some were caught and tortured to death, but the majority vanished and returned to the Americans.

As members of the Jingpaw Rangers, we were taught how to survive in the jungle. We were told never to sleep on the ground and to cut all growth from around the sleeping area. This would guard against snakes and scorpions. The Kachins would build lean-tos and platforms for us to sleep on to keep dry. We were warned never to drink water unless it had been boiled at least 20 minutes, because of cholera and dysentery. If we became lost in the jungle without food and did not know what was safe to eat, we were to watch what the monkeys were eating. The first monkey I saw after I arrived in the jungle, however, was picking fleas off another monkey's head and eating them.

The rainy season had begun when we arrived in Burma, and it rained daily. We were loaded on a truck and carried as far as the Ledo Road had been built, to an area between Ledo and the Burma border known as Hellgate. That's where we began walking back into Burma, over the trail toward Tagap-Ga, at that time

the farthest outpost.

At Tagap-Ga there was a Chinese infantry company from the 38th Division and a hospital run by Dr. Gordon Seagrave, who had worked in Burma before the war, training nurses and establishing a reputation for treating every disease known. When the U.S. declared war on Japan, he was commissioned a major in the U.S. Medical Corps.

A few days after we arrived, Lt. Bill Cummings informed our group we would be leaving for the village of Hklak-Ga the next morning. The Japanese had terrorized the village, killing and wounding the few remaining natives there. The Chinese soldiers had recaptured the village, but there were sick and wounded villagers who needed medical attention. Tun Shein, a member of the Kachin Rangers who was born in Burma and had worked with Dr. Seagrave, was taking two of Seagrave's Burmese nurses there to set up a hospital unit.

We began our journey for Hklak-Ga the next morning, and since it had been raining for days, we waded in mud up to our knees. Some of the slopes were too steep to climb. Leeches were everywhere, and we were bloody all over from their bites. The further we went, the thicker the jungle became. We finally put three of the Kachins in front of us to cut the trail out so that it was passable. I had never seen so much bamboo; some was nearly as large as telephone poles. It was amazing what the Kachins could make out of bamboo: huts, drinking cups, hats, water and cooking containers, fuel and food.

Tun Shein suggested we stop early and fix something to eat and find a place to sleep before it got dark. We stopped in a village the natives had abandoned when Burma was invaded. The Kachins cleaned out one of the old bamboo bashas, or huts, and killed around 12 scorpions in the cleanup. They built a fire out of some wet bamboo, producing a choking smoke which would drive away not only the mosquitoes, but every other living thing. After the

smoke cleared up we dried our wet clothing and used salt to get the leeches off our bodies.

The Kachins cooked some rice and curry with red-hot pepper in it. Every time I took a bite of the curry, it was so hot I thought my tongue had been dissolved. After eating and giving our mouths first aid, we listened to the Kachins and Nagas sing in their native language and watched them smoke opium in their bamboo pipes.

Seeing how the natives lived seemed like a dream. They ate all kinds of jungle food, roots and berries, and they cooked stew out of monkey meat and other wild game. I did not like the idea of eating monkey meat at first; it was like eating your next-door neighbor's dog

“As we entered the headhunter village, I saw something that brought me to a dead stop. There were about 25 skulls hanging outside one of their bamboo huts. I was looking at some of the Naga headhunters' trophies.”

or cat. In the months to come, though, I would eat quite a bit of it, as well as many other things I thought I would never eat.

We finally arrived at the village of Hklak-Ga. The Kachin jungle grapevine could get information on the Japanese which we would radio back. We were in bad need of food, but the weather had worsened and transport planes could not get in to make an air drop. One of the Kachin scouts said he knew of a Naga village about six miles away that the Japanese had left.

The next morning three other Americans -- Oscar Creel, James Medlin and George Phieler -- 12

Kachins and I started out for the Naga village. It was like all of the headhunter villages, built on a hill-top for protection against surprise raids from other headhunters. As we entered the village, one of the Kachins informed us we were the first Americans ever to enter this village. The Nagas were more savage looking than the Kachins; they were darker and shorter. The men wore very little clothing, just G-strings held by vine belts. They were very muscular and tattoos covered their arms and bodies. Each had a large bone in the matted hair on the back of his neck, for protection in the event a headhunter from another village attacked him from the rear and tried to cut off his head. Each Naga carried a large razor-sharp knife in a bamboo case around his neck. He also carried a very long spear.

As we entered the headhunter village, I saw something that brought me to a dead stop. There were about 25 skulls hanging outside one of their bamboo huts. I was looking at some of the Naga headhunters' trophies. My first thought was that I did not want mine to be their next trophy. I took a firm grip on my carbine, trying to show no fear. About that time, one of the Kachins said there was no need to worry; everything was all right. By that time the Nagas were all around us. The entire village had turned out in one mass to get a better look at their first Americans. The Kachins could speak their language and told the Nagas we had come for food.

We were escorted to the largest basha in the village where the headman of the Nagas sat smoking his opium. He was a wrinkled old man who looked like a mummy. His eyes were wild and glassy looking as he welcomed us into his basha. He gave us some rice beer which looked and smelled terrible, but I pretended to drink mine. We could feel eyes peering through the cracks in the wall as the Kachins told him why we had come.


The Nagas brought us 10 chickens

and about eight dozen eggs. In return we gave them sugar, salt and opium. The headhunters had never seen or tasted sugar before we arrived in the jungle, and they called it “sweet salt.” After resting a little and getting more information on the enemy, we headed back to camp.

The next day our planes finally got through the fog and dropped us plenty of food and mail from home. A week later, Lt. Col. Wilson radioed us to return to Tagap-Ga. About that time two of our Kachin informers returned in exhausted condition. The Japanese had ambushed and killed most of their group. Three of the Kachins were captured and tortured to death. The Japanese cut their tongues out, cut the skin off the bottoms of their feet and marched them through the jungle before they shot them in the head. We left the two Kachins at Hklak-Ga and headed back for Tagap.

Things were moving fast now; the rainy season was ending, and more and more troops were arriving. Two Americans named Tuggle and Reese were hidden with a band of Kachins in a camp near Shingbwiayang, watching the movements of Japanese patrols. Another American named McCullough and I were to join them. They were notified that we were on our way and were told to send two of the Kachins to the main trail to meet us. Three days later, we passed within ten feet of the two Kachins and did not see them until they called out. We left the main trail and traveled a back trail to the hidden campsite. We always had guards posted; we did not want a surprise attack from the enemy.

A few days later, McCullough, Tuggle, myself and 10 Kachins followed a back trail to Shingbwiayang to collect information on how many Japanese there were between Shingbwiayang and Ningam Sakan. Shingbwiayang lay in the flat land of the Hukwang Valley by the Chindwin River. It was there many refugees died trying to walk out of



Burma after the Japanese invasion in 1942. Some died of malaria, some of typhus, and others of dysentery and starvation. Some were so weak they just lay down and died. There were hundreds of skeletons, with clothing still intact, lying side by side in small bamboo lean-tos.

Around the first of November 1943, General Stilwell's Chinese troops were ready to make their big push to retake northern Burma and reopen the Burma road to China. The Chinese 38th Division captured Shingbwiayang with little opposition, but the Japanese put up a fight at

Ningam Sakan, and both sides had heavy casualties.

Our group met Lt. Col. Wilson in Ningam Sakan where we set up our camp. The sound of mortar and machine-gun fire could be heard all night, and we slept very little. We had been at Ningam Sakan about 10 days when Lt. Col. Wilson told McCullough, Tuggle and me that we would be leaving with him early the next morning. We left the next morning with 20 Kachins to infiltrate Japanese lines, spy on them and radio back information. Three days later, south of Ningam Sakan, we arrived at our destination and set up




Photo courtesy James Fletcher

James S. Fletcher confers with a group of Kachins inside their bamboo hut in northern Burma.

our camp about a half mile from a Kachin village. The natives in the village were very friendly and gave us important information about Japanese troops in the area.

The day before Thanksgiving, one of our Kachins killed a barking deer, and the Kachins roasted it to have for our Thanksgiving meal. The next morning, without warning, the Japanese came in a back trail to make a surprise raid on our camp. One of the Kachin sentries saw the enemy coming and gave the alarm. We grabbed our guns, ammunition and hand grenades. One of the Kachins grabbed our radio but forgot the hand generator, and without this the radio was useless. We also lost some of our cryptograph codes in the confusion. Two of the Kachins managed to get our two Bren guns in the retreat, but everything else was left behind, including our roasted deer meat.

We were outnumbered 3-1 by the Japanese, but we were able to outrun them down a jungle trail to the Chindwin River. We lost no time in crossing the river and set up an ambush. When the Japanese reached the river, we opened up on them with everything we had.

For the next two days we had no food to eat as we fought a running battle with Japanese bullets buzzing past our ears. We had left the jun-

gle and were crossing an open paddy field with the Japanese right on our tails when suddenly two P-40s came out of the sun so that we would be unable to see them. We waved our hands and pointed in the direction of the Japanese. We tried to tell them we were Americans, but the way we were dressed in mixed uniforms, we could have been in any man's army. The American pilots must have gotten our message; as we rushed into the jungle, we heard the planes strafing the Japanese.

The jungle was so thick the Kachins had to hack and push their way through the undergrowth. We had neither seen nor heard any more of the Japanese since our planes had strafed them. By now we were dead tired, wet and hungry, and we had not eaten in two days. I was soaking wet and blood was streaming down my arms and legs from the bites of leeches. The Kachins had thrown together some lean-tos out of bamboo and banana leaves, and we lay down in our bloody, soaked clothing on a platform up out of the mud and water and listened to the creatures of the jungle and the pouring rain.

Two days later, we arrived at an abandoned village and found some old rice that had been left behind. We had nothing to cook in, but the

Kachins cut some large green bamboo and used a section of it to cook the rice. We threw a hand grenade in a nearby stream and had all the fish we could eat.

After three more days cutting our way through the thick jungle, we came out by the Chindwin River and made our camp. It was there we ran into a herd of wild elephants. One of the Kachins accidentally shot and wounded one of them; the elephants gave a howl and vanished back into the jungle. The Kachins told us the elephants would come back after dark and stampede our camp. After dark, we heard the big elephants slowly coming back through the jungle toward our camp, and about 2 a.m., they stampeded, tearing our bamboo lean-tos to shreds and vanishing into the jungle. Luck was with us; no one was killed or injured.

Fifteen days later, with no food to eat except what we found, with our clothing torn, dirty and blood-stained, we cut our way out of the jungle into a main trail where we met up with a Chinese patrol. We went back through Ningam Sakan and on to Shingbwiayang, where we checked into Seagrave's hospital for treatment of infection from the bites of leeches and blood flies. That is where we spent Christmas Day, 1943.

A short time after we arrived back in Shingbwiayang, a company of Chinese arrived and set up camp on the west side of us. Just before dark another company of Chinese arrived and set up camp on the other side of us. Around 9 p.m., the two companies of Chinese got jumpy. Each company of Chinese assumed the other was Japanese; they began shooting at each other with us right in the middle. We made a dive into the trenches outside our bamboo hut. About 10 minutes later the Chinese realized they were fighting with each other and ceased firing. We were afraid to come out of the trenches, and when I did return to my sleeping platform, I found nine bullet holes in my mosquito net.

Shingbwiayang had really changed

since I had first arrived. It did not look like the same place with all the skeletons cleaned up. In the early part of 1944, Merrill's Marauders began arriving in Shingbwiayang, and after the many long months in the jungle, it was quite a sight to see so many Americans.

Lt. Col. Wilson told McCullough and me that he had requested a rest leave for the two of us since we had been in the jungle for almost a year. Three days later, McCullough and I flew back to Ledo and then on to Calcutta. We left Shingbwiayang late in the afternoon and flew over Tagap-Ga. The Ledo Road had already been built to that point, and it was quite a sight looking down on the road where we had previously walked over muddy trails. The next day, we went to base headquarters, where we were given new clothing and shoes and were paid for the first time in 15 months. We left Ledo on an Indian train for Calcutta; five days later we arrived in Calcutta and reported to the rest camp.

All too quickly, our 10 days were up, and we were on that train headed back to Ledo. Arriving back at area headquarters, I was told that I would be assigned to Col. John B. Bennett with five additional men. Our destination was to be Fort Hertz, near the China border, where the British had an airstrip. We were flown there in an old beat-up DC-3 and spent the night with the British. Early the next morning, we left by jeep and rode all day over muddy roads, finally arriving at a beautiful village which served as a British outpost. There were around 1,000 Gurka soldiers and Kachins there.

The Gurkas were the top fighting men of India, and they, like the Kachins, were very deadly when it came to fighting. Each Gurka carried a razor-sharp knife, but it was smaller than the knife carried by the Kachins. The Gurka had a custom -- if he pulled his knife from its case, he had to bring blood from someone, even if he had to cut himself.

Orders came for our group to move south to a place called Laung-Ga, north of Sumprabum. It was one of the most depressing and isolated places I had ever seen. Several of the Gurkas, Kachins and British soldiers came down with some type of fever and died in less than three days. It was later found to be scrub typhus, and it was carried by the fleas that were on the rats in the village. Col. Bennett was the first American to come down with it. Capt. Collings radioed base headquarters for a plane to fly Col. Bennett to a hospital in Ledo, but the nearest airstrip on which a small plane could land was about 35 miles away. Col. Bennett died two days later in Ledo. Later on, three more Americans had to be flown back to

“ . . . we traveled to the south of Sumprabum to ambush Japanese convoys and find the location of a hidden ammunition dump . . . ”

Ledo with the fever. I was the only one of the original Americans who had not come down with it.

Two more Americans, James Fagan and Harry Grafton, were flown in as replacements. Shortly after their arrival, we traveled to the south of Sumprabum to ambush Japanese convoys and find the location of a hidden Japanese ammunition dump somewhere along the main road by the Irrawaddy River. We were to radio a message back giving details of the exact location to the Air Force.

Our group moved south along the Irrawaddy River. We had to be cautious of booby traps that had been placed along the barely visible trail. Sharp bamboo stakes were placed in deep pits, and the pits were then covered with vines and leaves to make them look like part of the trail. When anyone fell into one of

these pits, it was a quick death.

We found a good location on a mountainside to watch for the Japanese. Our group did not have to wait long before one of the Kachins spotted an old Japanese truck inching along the muddy jungle road about a quarter of a mile away. The Kachins held their fire until the truck got very close, but once they began firing, they fired continuously, shredding the canvas top and shattering the windshield. The two Japanese guards on top of the cab were cut in two by bullets and fell off the truck. The truck went out of control, hit the embankment and came to a stop with the driver falling out of the truck dead. By this time, the Kachins had circled the battered truck and were ready for anything. Ten more Japanese were found facedown in the back of the truck; they all had beriberi and were being taken back to Myitkyina. The Kachins were going to kill all 10, but we stopped them. The prisoners were searched, their hands were tied, and they were ordered into the jungle. They could hardly walk, but they knew if they stopped the Kachins would kill them.

Two days after we returned to our campsite, we received word that one of our cargo planes had crashed into a nearby mountain, and the next morning we left four Kachins guarding the prisoners and went in search of the missing plane. Our group reached the wreckage in two days and found the plane scattered over the side of a mountain and five badly burned bodies in the wreckage. It was a gruesome job searching the debris; there was nothing we could do other than bury the men on the side of the mountain where they had died.

We returned to our campsite to find something we had not expected -- the Kachins had shot all of the Japanese prisoners. We asked them why they did it, and their answer was that the prisoners had tried to escape. We knew that was impossible since they could hardly walk. The Kachins just did not believe in taking prisoners in the first place.



Photo courtesy James Fletcher

James S. Fletcher (front) and four British soldiers cross a native-built bridge of vines and bamboo next to a bridge formerly used by the Japanese to move supplies between Myitkyina and Sumprabum. Fletcher's unit called in bombers to destroy the bridge.

A few days later, three of our Kachin informers came in with information about a Japanese camp hidden in the jungle and well-camouflaged from the air. One of the bamboo bashas was well guarded, and the Kachins had learned that this was the basha in which the Japanese had been storing their ammunition. We radioed this information to base headquarters

and received a message in return telling us to have the Kachins slip back into that area at night and place panels in the paddy field pointing in the direction of the hidden camp. The next morning at daybreak, our planes bombed the day targets, and the following day, our group blew up two bridges that were being used by the Japanese in that vicinity.

Some time later, two other Americans, an Australian named Willard and myself were operating south of Sumprabum when we received a message telling us to check on a large bridge on the Irrawaddy river north of Myitkyina to see if our group could destroy it. The bridge was on the only road to Myitkyina from Sumprabum, and the Japanese were using it daily to transport supplies to Sumprabum. The bridge was deep in enemy territory and swarming with enemy troops. As we penetrated the area close to the Japanese, the trail showed fresh enemy footprints. To keep the enemy from seeing us, we slipped off the trail back into the jungle. Two days later we arrived in the vicinity of the bridge. We found out it was well-guarded; in fact, it was suicidal for us to try to destroy it. We radioed the 10th AF headquarters to give them the details and location of the bridge.

The next morning at daybreak we spotted the bombers skimming low across the jungle. The gunners on the planes tried to silence the anti-aircraft gun emplacements around the bridge, but despite their strafing, the enemy anti-aircraft began firing. The planes maintained control and dropped their 500-lb. bombs, then dropped sharply to the river to stay away from the anti-aircraft. We saw the center of the bridge go down, and the bombers headed back to home base.

The British, Gurkas and Kachins advanced southward in the direction of Myitkyina, and we traveled with them. A week later, we came upon some of Merrill's Marauders coming down a jungle trail. The Marauders' main mission in Burma was to spearhead with the Chinese Army, penetrating through one of the worst jungles in the world. The Marauders had come a long way since I had first seen them in early 1944 at Shingbwiayang; they had captured village after village since arriving in Burma and had fought battle after battle. They had done an outstanding job, but the jungle was beginning to get the best of them. Many were

sick with malaria, typhus and dysentery. They had been promised that after three months in combat they would be relieved and sent home, but for some reason, that relief never came. General Stilwell had other plans -- he was going to capture Myitkyina regardless of how long it took.

Detachment 101, one battalion of Chinese and the Marauders continued walking, and after three days they stopped not far from the airstrip at Myitkyina. The airstrip was surrounded by paddy fields and very high elephant grass which enabled the men to spread out and crawl quite close to the airfield without being seen by the enemy. When the Americans attacked, the enemy was caught off guard and began to withdraw back into the city of Myitkyina. The Americans, Chinese and Kachins captured the airstrip May 17, 1944 with little opposition. The task of capturing the city of Myitkyina, however, was delegated to the Chinese, and that was one of the worst mistakes the Americans ever made.

Although it was not known at that time, the Chinese leadership was sagging in the worst way. Two Chinese battalions moved forward to capture the city, and unknown to the Chinese, there were some Japanese snipers between their two battalions. The Japanese began shooting the Chinese like ducks on a pond, and when the Chinese returned their fire, the Japanese quietly slipped out of the area. The Chinese battalions lost communication with each other, and that was when the trouble really began. The two battalions attacked and nearly destroyed one another. When the fatal mistake was realized, the Chinese ceased fighting, and both battalions were ordered to withdraw. An inexperienced Chinese battalion arriving in Myitkyina assumed the Chinese who had just been fighting each other were Japanese, and the new battalion opened fire. By the time this mistake was discovered, it had cost the Chinese hundreds of wounded and dead.

The Japanese General Tanaka in charge of enemy troops realized how vital Myitkyina was and reorganized the Japanese lines. He had determined to hold the area at any cost. The Americans and Chinese had no idea that the Japanese had rushed more troops to Myitkyina from their garrisons below the city; the Japanese now had around 7,000 men in the area instead of 300.

The battle raged for nearly two months. Of the original Marauders who started out in northern Burma, only about 240 remained, and General Stilwell used every man who could fire a rifle. The hospitals were closely inspected, and many of the sick and wounded were brought to Myitkyina to fight. During the

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last of May 1944, the 209th Combat Engineer Battalion, after nearly a year of building parts of the Ledo-Burma Road, was abruptly ordered into battle at Myitkyina to help the Marauders. A few days later, the 236th Engineers were sent into battle also. Additional troops were rounded up and flown in from all over India, most of the men having just arrived from the States. They were shown how to fire their rifles on the plane before they landed at Myitkyina. The Americans were under heavy enemy fire, and casualties were high on both sides.

The conditions on the battlefield were a living hell. Week after week, the rains drenched the airstrip; we were forced to stay in

flooded foxholes and slit trenches in water up to our chests. Many of the men who had malaria died as a result of continually wearing wet clothing. The enemy we were fighting could not be seen at night. The Japanese would be dug in a few feet from us; we would throw hand grenades at them and they would roll them back.

The heat was unbearable, and the enemy snipers kept us pinned down most of the time. Many of the men were beginning to look haggard; they were tired, dirty, wet and sick of the constant odor of dead bodies. Dysentery was getting very bad, and many of the wounded needed to be evacuated.

The Japanese made several counterattacks using knee mortars at point-blank range, but we always managed to throw them back. After the counterattack some of the men from the 209th Combat Engineers went out on patrol. When they returned, they told of finding 40 dead Japanese about 100 feet in front of us, killed by our machine-gun fire.

The Japanese had dug tunnels under the railroad tracks, and in some of the tunnels they even had foxholes and bunkers dug out for sleeping. Day after day our planes bombed the enemy, but they continued to fight. They were near starvation and in disgrace, and they were slowly being killed off, but they still refused to surrender, and their resistance was fierce. Finally the Japanese began looking for a way to escape. Their only escape would have to be down the Irrawaddy River at night, so they began slipping out in small groups and floating down the river on logs covered by freshly cut bushes. The Kachin Rangers farther downriver finally realized what the enemy was doing, and from then on, whenever a log or bush came into view on the river, the Rangers would shoot the enemy off the log. A Japanese colonel, Maruyama, led the remaining Japanese troops out of Myitkyina toward Bhamo. General Stilwell was quite pleased when Myitkyina was finally captured on Aug. 3, 1944, although

very few of the original Marauders were there to see the capture.

In the battle of Myitkyina, only 29 prisoners were captured out of the Japanese 18th Division. General Mizukami, commander of the Japanese 18th Division, committed harakiri the day before the fall of Myitkyina.

Two days after the fall of Myitkyina, I was flown back to a rest camp in Calcutta with some of the Marauders. Two days later, I developed a severe headache. I went to the dispensary for some aspirin, but they took my temperature and found it to be 105 degrees. I was rushed to the 263rd General Hospital, where doctors told me I had contracted scrub typhus. For the next two weeks, I remember little; my fever was very high; my head felt like a large balloon; and my body felt as if it were being pulled apart. After two long weeks, the fever broke. I weighed only 115 lbs. and was very weak. The doctors told me I was lucky to be alive, and had I still been in the jungle, I never would have survived.

Four weeks later, I was released from the hospital, and I spent the rest of my leave in Calcutta. After that, I returned to Myitkyina and rejoined my outfit. Two weeks later, I volunteered for a special mission in China with a major named Waters. Two more Americans, James Hinton and Bob Crandle, were picked for the mission as well. We went on the books as being the first combat unit to enter China from Burma. I spent most of my time on the trail with the Kachins, who did not get along very well with the Chinese, since some of the Kachin villages had been raided by the Chinese in the past. Ten days after we left Myitkyina, we were crossing a small stream which was very muddy. About 40 feet in front of Hinton and me were two Chinese soldiers leading a pack mule across the stream. The pack mule stepped on a land mine, and the mule and the two Chinese were blown to bits.

Later that day, we arrived at an

open paddy field which looked like it might have been mined, too. Since we had no mine detectors to check the field, Maj. Wong, who was in charge of the Chinese, lined up about 100 Chinese, two feet apart, and marched them across the open field. The Chinese were in luck -- there were no land mines to be found.

We were running out of supplies, and since this field looked like a good place for an airdrop, we radioed our location. The following day was perfect for a drop. In a routine drop, the rice bags were always free-dropped from the plane, and the bags always came down like bullets. On this particular day, everything was going along fine until one of the Chinese soldiers watching the drop ran out on the field with outstretched arms and attempted to catch one of the rice bags. Needless to say, he was buried when he caught the rice bag. He never knew what hit him.

A week later, as we entered China, we found the trail rising steeply and the mountains becoming higher in some places. The trail,

“Since we had no mine detectors to check the field, Maj. Wong, who was in charge of the Chinese, lined up about 100 Chinese, two feet apart, and marched them across the open field.”

leading across the seemingly endless mountains, was just wide enough for a man and mule. We moved slowly, peering ahead, and looked across the valleys of the Himalayas, some of which were snow-capped the year round. We found the mountains to be worse than we had expected, and it was getting harder for the mules to climb. We made

attempts to lighten their loads, but two days later, we were forced to leave the mules and start up the steep incline on foot. It was rough climbing, and we could only climb for a few minutes before we would have to stop to catch our breath.

We finally reached the crest of the mountains and it seemed as if we were on top of the world; the nights were so clear the reflection of the moon could be seen on the snowcapped mountain peaks, and miles below, a large Chinese village could be seen. The villagers informed us that the Japanese were in an old fort high in the Himalayas, and we had to begin climbing the steep mountains once again. Our clothing was not suitable for the cold -- we had only half a blanket each and no jackets. As we approached the old fort, the Chinese spread out and crawled as close as they could, but the Japanese spotted them and opened fire. The attack was on. The Chinese fought all the way up to the rock wall before the enemy realized they were outnumbered and began to withdraw down the back side of the fort. The Chinese then captured the fort with little opposition.

Although the Kachins and Chinese kept fires going, Waters, Hinton, Crandle and I nearly froze that first night. We were in desperate need of food, blankets and warm clothing. After radioing our location, all we could do was wait and hope that the planes would be there soon. The following day visibility was impossible; we could hear the planes flying overhead, but they could not locate us. The next morning dawned bright and clear, and soon the sky was full of planes. They circled us two or three times, and before we knew it, the air was full of white parachutes drifting down to us with food and warm clothing.

We stayed at the old fort about three weeks before moving down through China gathering what information we could on the Japanese. A few days after we left, Hinton, the Kachins and I were leading the way down a rugged mountain pass



Photo courtesy James Fletcher

James S. Fletcher (far right) and other Kachin Rangers take defensive positions in a trench near Shingbwiang, Burma, in November 1943.

with Maj. Waters, Crandle and the Chinese following. Unknown to us, the Japanese had set up an ambush in a well-camouflaged area on the trail. Suddenly the Kachins pushed Hinton and me into a ditch behind some large rocks and fell on us. I had no idea what was happening until the Japanese began firing at us with a machine gun. The Kachins seemed to have a sixth sense that detected the Japanese long before we could. It's still a mystery how the Kachins knew, but they definitely saved us from certain death. The Japanese had us in a tight spot -- they held the key to the pass and there was no other way around the mountain. The Kachins outsmarted the Japanese, however, by climbing the back side of the steep mountain in order to get above them. After reaching the top, the Kachins carefully and quietly made their way to the ledge directly above the enemy while the Chinese kept the Japanese busy by firing at them. Whenever the Chinese tried to advance, they were cut down by the enemy, but the Kachins were now in the right position and started firing at the Japanese continuously. The enemy was caught in a cross fire; when the main body of the Japanese realized they did not stand a chance, they began to withdraw down the mountain. We found 15

dead Japanese left behind and seven Chinese who were killed in the ambush; another 10 Chinese were wounded.

The next day we headed south, our destination being a large Kachin village along the China border eight miles south. We arrived four days later at the village, where all of the villagers came out to welcome us. The headman told us it was a great honor to have us in his village, and we, in turn, were quite honored to receive such a welcome. The chief brought us 15 chickens, four pigs and 12 dozen eggs. He also told us he had ordered a feast for the next day.

The next day we were up bright and early for the celebration. The Kachins had built rows of bamboo tables out in the open. The Kachin food was highly seasoned yet delicious, and we all ate and drank until we could eat no more.

The next morning we left the Kachin village and headed for Bhamo, where the Japanese defenders were dug in against the Americans and Chinese. When we arrived in Bhamo a week later, the battle was well under way. A few days later, I contracted malaria and checked into a nearby field hospital. Twelve days later, I was released from the hospital and returned to headquarters in Bhamo, which by

then had been captured.

The Japanese were in fast retreat. The Burma Road had been opened into China; Lashio had been captured and convoys were going into China with supplies. On Feb. 13, 1945, we left Bhamo, headed down the Burma Road to Lashio. When we arrived at Lashio, we found most of the city had been destroyed. We moved into one of the few remaining houses, a two-story wooden frame house previously occupied by Japanese officers.

I was still in Lashio April 12, 1945 when we received the news of President Roosevelt's death. The following day the Americans, Chinese and Kachins assembled in an open field to pay their last respects to the late President.

The war ended in Europe May 8, 1945. Everyone's records were checked, and anyone having 85 or more points would be flown back to the States for discharge. I had more than enough points, so on May 10, I left for the States. On May 24, we arrived in New York City. It was a good feeling to be back in the U.S.A.

On June 2, I was given an honorable discharge. I had been in service four years, four months and 12 days. When asked if I would do it all over again, my answer was, "If the conditions were the same, yes."

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James S. Fletcher served in the Army from January 1941 until June 1945, 2½ years of which he spent in the China-Burma-India Theater as a member of the Jingpaw Rangers. Following his honorable discharge he worked for Southern Bell until his retirement in 1983. He is a life member of several veterans organizations, including Detachment 101 OSS Kachin Rangers, Merrill's Marauders, British Burma Star Association and the China-Burma-India Veterans Association. He is also a member of the OSS Association, the 121st Infantry Association and the Atlanta Basha CBI Veterans Association, which he organized in October 1977. He lives in Austell, Ga.

Psychological operations: the oldest weapon of mass destruction

by Lt. Col. John C. Reppert

"There is no simple formula for winning wars. Defeating enemy forces in battle will not always achieve victory. Other national instruments of power and persuasion will influence or even determine the results of war."

— FM 100-5, Operations

In this modern era of vast nuclear arsenals, million-dollar tanks and billion-dollar ships, as well as dreams of space defenses, who would argue that superior weapons and skill in combat would not win wars? The answer to that question is as surprising as it is long, for it includes many prominent practitioners of the "art of war."

Doubts of the benefits of technology were raised in the long struggle against a less well-equipped foe in Vietnam. They have certainly been re-emphasized by the movement of world attention from the threat of a superpower confrontation in Europe to the daily news of the "wars in the shadows," the unconventional conflicts in Latin America, Africa and other locations where human will seems a more powerful force than weapons.

If we cannot buy victory, or even security, through advanced technology, what then are the "other instruments" which determine our success in war and our deterrence

in peace? Among the most ancient and important is psychological operations.

Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese strategist, is called the first proponent of psychological operations for his advocacy of such positions as "All war is based on deception." The enduring relevance of his teachings is seen in their use by one of the victorious Soviet leaders in World War II, Marshal Shaposhnikov. Shaposhnikov said: "The prerequisite of victory is to make proper preparations in the enemy camp so that the result is decided before the battle begins." Sun Tzu had said more briefly, "The victorious army attacks a demoralized and defeated enemy."

The question emerges whether psychological operations can still be a significant factor in determining the outcome of modern-day conflict. To answer that question, the Soviet perspective on the issue is a good starting point. In their textbook *Military Psychology*, which is

mandatory reading in each officer's library, the Soviets note:

"In modern war soldiers will be subjected to unprecedented stress. This can lead to restricted mental activity, disruption of coordination, distortion in judgment, reduction in reaction and deterioration of thought. This is especially damaging considering the complexity of modern weapons. . . The imaginary fears created by psychological warfare may be more debilitating than the actual dangers of combat."¹

Indeed, though stress-inflicted casualties are but one of the useful effects of PSYOP, they alone have been reported as one of the greatest influences on combat power in recent conflicts. In some cases, they are credited with as many "casual-

¹ V.V. Shelyag, A.D. Glotchkina, and K.K. Platonov, eds., *Military Psychology* (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1972. Translated under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force, 1976), p. 396.



U.S. Army photo

This HMMWV with loudspeakers is one example of modern equipment being adapted to perform traditional psychological operations missions.

ties" as all enemy firepower. This reporting comes from conflicts as disparate as the prolonged struggle in Vietnam and the short-duration high-intensity wars in the Middle East.

If we realize that PSYOP has been important in previous conflicts and that the Soviets consider that it will be important in a future conflict, shouldn't we ask who controls this weapon? Though PSYOP is nominally assigned to the commanders of supported combat units at echelons from division through theater army, the truth is that its control is often left to the "experts," the PSYOP personnel themselves. Comments are often heard that commanders "don't understand the arcane science of psychological operations," or that they are too tied up with "combat power." Would these same commanders avoid using nuclear weapons or even conventional ordnance because they did not understand the

basic principles of physics upon which they operate, or refuse air support because they did not understand aeronautical engineering?

There is a compelling reason for commanders and staffs at all levels operating across the spectrum of conflict, most particularly for special operations forces, to better understand the potential PSYOP offers and the means of employing it to obtain maximum impact.

Psychological operations specialists can offer unique and useful advice to commanders. That advice can be especially important in an era in which many people describe their actions as "sending a message" to some current or potential opponent or ally. Under the ever-present view of the mass media, this has become equally as true for military commanders as for politicians. The Secretary of Defense has said that the currently proposed defense budget would send a message to the Warsaw Pact and our

allies.² Various senior officials in the Department of Defense have debated what message the INF treaty would send to both the Soviets and our allies in NATO. Even our presence in the Persian Gulf is justified as sending a message to Iran.

Psychological operations specialists with extensive regional knowledge and language proficiency can assist commanders in defining what message a particular act might send or how to send the appropriate message to a selected target audience through words or actions. Without the advice of specialists, actions or messages may have devastating and unintended results, such as advertisements for the Red Cross in Moslem countries which may still associate the image of the

² Caspar Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1988* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 16.

cross more with hostile crusaders than with charity.

A second major use of PSYOP is in deterring aggressive action by a potential opponent. Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger defined deterrence as persuading an enemy in terms of his own perceptions that the cost of aggressions will outweigh probable gains. In the days of the Berlin Blockade it was the fierce determination shown by the airlift that convinced the Soviets of Western resolve to maintain the free status of the city. In the Cuban Missile Crisis it was President Kennedy's statement of American intent, rather than any change in objective capabilities of the two sides, that forced the Soviets to back down. At the low-intensity end of the spectrum, the Libyan expectation of an easy defeat of the Chadian irregulars was rapidly dissipated in 1987 by several days of successful Chadian attacks using lightly armed soldiers in pickup trucks.

Despite improvements in intelligence-gathering capabilities, leaders of nations and leaders of combat formations still make their final assessments of the consequences of their actions based on their percep-

"...defeating the enemy in battle is not the acme of military skill -- to subdue the enemy without fighting is the highest skill."

--Sun Tzu

tions of enemy potential and will. The ability to form and modify these perceptions will tell much of our ability to prevent the testing of either our combat potential or our will.

Once conflict has begun, PSYOP retains a considerable capability to demoralize the enemy, to encourage surrender, or to confuse and deceive him as to the actual situation and possible courses of action. This brings us back simultaneously to aspects of the ancient wisdom of Sun Tzu and to hard modern reality. In terms of the ancient strategy, it is hard to improve upon Sun Tzu's advice that defeating the enemy in battle is not the acme of military skill -- to subdue the enemy without fighting is the

highest skill.

Our period of greatest success in Vietnam may not have been reflected in the weekly enemy body counts, but in the success of the surrender campaigns that periodically reduced the enemy's fighting strength. The number of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong soldiers who turned themselves in to South Vietnamese authorities during the "Chieu Hoi" surrender campaign, a joint U.S.-South Vietnam PSYOP effort, was approximately 250,000.³ Such surrender campaigns not only remove an enemy from the battlefield, but they simultaneously add an ally. The hard reality of the present is that in many theaters we must be prepared to fight outnumbered and win and that new budgetary limitations mandate that we become smarter on doing more with less.

Finally, it is imperative to realize that every actual and potential enemy from the jungles of Southeast Asia to the plains of Europe can and will use psychological operations against our forces. The seventh of the Soviets' 11 principles of military art calls for the use of extensive propaganda to motivate their own troops and demoralize the enemy. The Soviets, in particular, have created a large and complex structure with this specific mission. This "political officer" structure for the Soviets runs through its own chain of command from the Ministry of Defense to specially trained officers in every company-sized unit in the military. The campaigns, which are centrally controlled, are prepared to attack the U.S. military on every front from race relations to abandonment of the struggle by civilians at home. Few who fought in Vietnam would deny that soldiers were sapped of their will to fight by their perceptions that they were abandoned by those at home and that they were politically denied the opportunity to win.

³ U.S. Army Field Circular 33-1, *Psychological Operations*, June 1985, pp. 2-28.

The Soviet military is assisted in peacetime by a vast civilian apparatus which controls Soviet news agencies and central press and challenges the legitimacy of the presence of U.S. forces overseas from Japan to Europe.

Professional PSYOP soldiers, through their study of communist techniques and experience in gauging the psychological thrust of various messages, can serve as the first echelon in uncovering the deception campaigns of the enemy designed to demoralize our forces. They can also advise the commander of effective means for restoring lost confidence and seizing the initiative in the war for men's minds.

PSYOP offers a number of unique advantages. The first is that it can be employed across the entire spectrum of conflict and, under certain circumstances, even during peace. While many sophisticated and important weapons are excluded from consideration in anything other than a major battle between the superpowers, the battle to influence men's minds goes on from the smallest guerrilla operations to the highest level of conflict experienced by man.

For years, terrorists have been aware that they can capture not only a handful of prisoners by hijacking an airplane, but that they can capture the entire free-world press as a medium for their messages by the same act. While we are all comfortable with the battle for "hearts and minds" at the low level of conflict, we tend to forget that many experts of the time argued that the nuclear weapons used in Japan at the end of World War II had a psychological impact that exceeded even their great physical destruction.

A second advantage is that PSYOP is a low-cost, economy-of-force operation which has special implications in an environment in which we are financially constrained and are conscious of our limitations in rapid deployment. In its traditional deception role, PSYOP has been used repeatedly in economy-

of-force operations. Publicly announcing that forces have been placed on full alert is far less expensive than moving them hundreds or thousands of miles, and it can often have the same effect. On the tactical or operational level, a deception campaign could make sure the enemy was aware of "liberation" literature for a city or region which, in fact, was not a major focus of an offensive, thus diverting enemy forces to guard the area. On the strategic level, psychological operations were critical in raising the morale of resistance forces on

"... properly used psychological operations can have devastating effects upon an enemy and can simultaneously steel one's own forces against enemy attempts to undermine their spirit and will to fight."


the mainland of Europe prior to D-Day, thus dispersing German forces which otherwise could have been massed against the invasion. PSYOP cost is extremely low in the means necessary to achieve persuasion. Leaflets, presses, radios, loudspeakers and even the more advanced video technology necessary to disseminate messages cost only a fraction of any modern weapon system.

The greater price is in the training for highly skilled enlisted and officer specialists. These soldiers understand the power and techniques of influence and are focused in their training on a specific geographical region in terms of language skill and cultural knowledge. The basic skills necessary to conduct psychological campaigns are taught both officer and enlisted students at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg.

Language schooling and area specialization are currently provided where available following the assignment of soldiers to their regionally oriented battalions. Even this investment in personnel training is a bargain because of the versatility of such specialists in both peace and war.


The third advantage is that psychological operations units are highly mobile, requiring for most missions only selected analysts and limited means for message dissemination. A fully operational nucleus force can often be deployed aboard a single aircraft. An entire battalion with equipment and supplies necessary for limited periods of operation throughout the entirety of many Third-World countries can be airlifted by three C-141 aircraft. PSYOP units have readily deployable components which can be tailored to a particular situation and can provide expert advice to a commander already serving in the area. Other components can be prepared to conduct independent supporting operations through any of the dissemination media at their disposal. To improve this mobility, all active-Army PSYOP units are now airborne organizations. This enables them to deploy directly with forces of the XVIIIth Airborne Corps or any element of the U.S. Special Operations Command.

The fourth and most important advantage is that properly used psychological operations can have devastating effects upon an enemy and can simultaneously steel one's own forces against enemy attempts to undermine their spirit and will to fight. A leader of China far more modern than Sun Tzu, Mao Tse-tung, commented from his own experiences that "Weapons are not the decisive factor in war; it is man." In his extensive treatise, *War Through the Ages*, Lynn Montross identifies the Crusades as the beginning of formal campaigns of propaganda to consciously mold mass opinion, although it may well predate this struggle. Alexander, Frederick the Great, Stonewall



U.S. Army photo

Fixed and mobile printing plants add to the speed and sophistication of products which can be prepared by today's psychological operations units.



U.S. Army photo

The 4th PSYOP Group and certain reserve units have upgraded their studio and field facilities for the production of videotapes and live shows.

Jackson, George Patton, Ho Chi Minh and Johannes Savimbi have all well understood the value of breaking the will of the enemy and have found it preferable to the cost of achieving the total destruction of the enemy's combat might through direct confrontation.

Are resources currently available in the U.S. military inventory to accomplish these missions? The answer is a qualified "yes." The Air Force and Navy have both devoted resources to creating versatile and sophisticated means of dissemination, primarily through radio and television broadcast platforms. While these are worthy of their own consideration, primary focus here will be on the Army, which contributes the bulk of the forces in this sphere.

The current composition of psychological operations forces consists of four groups, each consisting of subordinate battalions and companies. Three of these groups are reserve-component forces, while one is active-component. Each of the three reserve groups and their subordinate units is regionally oriented

and trained culturally and linguistically toward its designated theater. The one active-Army unit, the 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne), is stationed at Fort Bragg as part of the 1st Special Operations Command. It has four battalions, each focused upon a separate theater.

The creation of the U.S. Special Operations Command has for the first time brought an integrated

"Despite their ancient lineage, American military psychological operations have been significantly transformed by recent innovations. In this electronic era, VCR and audio cassettes may well be replacing other means of communication."

joint-level headquarters into a position of operational command of all psychological operations assets of each of the services, including the active and reserve-component resources. This will further facilitate joint training and planning for each of the supported theaters.

Despite their ancient lineage, American military psychological operations have been significantly transformed by recent innovations. One major area where this is evident is in terms of available technology. In this electronic era, VCR and audio cassettes may well be replacing other means of communication. Surveys even in less-developed nations indicate that they are the preferred means of communication for the most influential elements of society. The 4th PSYOP Group and certain reserve units have significantly upgraded their studio and field facilities for the production of audio and video tapes and live shows. The 4th PSYOP Group has achieved notable success in Central America through cooperation with host nations in the preparation and dissemination of radio and television products designed to illustrate positive aspects of mutual cooperation. American military personnel in the U.S. Southern Command are currently producing and distributing TV programs to accurately portray U.S. assistance programs and joint programs with host governments to encourage better relations with the United States. This has been widely applauded as a powerful support to our humanitarian assistance operations in countries such as Honduras and El Salvador.

Another important area of technological improvement is in print facilities. An entire new generation of fixed-installation and mobile printing plants is being fielded at this time. This adds to the speed and the sophistication of products that can be prepared in any environment. A new series of tests is being run to evaluate portable computers with desktop-publishing capability to keep pace with the tech-

nological revolution. These computers rapidly integrate graphics and written messages and can store them for long-term use and instant retrieval. They can operate in a variety of alphabets used in the native languages of potential target audiences. Further, they can interconnect and transmit final products thousands of miles in seconds, wherever they can be linked with modern communications.

A second area of innovation is in the creation of psychological operations career fields. The recognition, particularly in the larger Army units, that this skill requires both extensive and intensive training has resulted in the creation of an enlisted MOS 96F and officer specialty code 39B for PSYOP specialists. This is designed to provide more thorough training throughout a military career and the opportunity for repetitive assignments using the skills acquired. Though still in its infancy, this new specialty has attracted some highly motivated and extremely talented soldiers anxious to make contributions to PSYOP.

A third major improvement has been in the expansion of joint exer-

cises. In recent years theater commanders-in-chief have noted the potential value of PSYOP and have consciously expanded opportunities for PSYOP play through joint exercises. These joint exercises give psychological operations units from both active and reserve components increased opportunity to learn and operate in their assigned region and to work with specialists from the other services. They can also give units the chance to work alongside host-nation units in a mutual learning experience. This "hands-on" training in theater with allies best measures the abilities of psychological-operations units to perform their assigned missions and to better prepare themselves under the most realistic field conditions.

Current emphasis on the special operations community, of which psychological operations is now an integral part, has again highlighted its critical but often overlooked capability. A military becoming smaller must become better to fulfill its missions. This means, above all, to become familiar with all available resources, new or old, and how to use them to the maximum advan-

tage. As a powerful weapon in the war of persuasion, PSYOP remains capable of preventing conflict or playing a major role in achieving victory. ✕

Lt. Col. John C. Reppert is currently commander of the 6th Psychological Operations Battalion at Fort Bragg. His previous assignments include service as a Soviet foreign area officer with assignments in Moscow, Germany and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C. He has also served overseas tours in Korea and Vietnam. Lt. Col. Reppert is a graduate of the Army War College, the Navy War College and the Armed Forces Staff College. His civilian education includes bachelor's and master's degrees in journalism from Kansas State University, a master's degree in Soviet area studies from the University of Kansas, and a doctor's degree in international relations from George Washington University. In August he will begin attending Harvard University under the Army Fellowship Program.

Update

Special Warfare

Waterborne Infiltration Course scheduled for FY89

A new course being developed by the Special Warfare Center and School's Special Operations Advanced Skills Department will improve the ability of special operations soldiers to infiltrate and exfiltrate by water.

The six-week Waterborne Infiltration Course will emphasize small-boat, kayak and surface-swimmer operations. Subjects will include planning and operational considerations, nautical charts, tides and currents, use of the magnetic compass, launch and recovery procedures, at-sea rendezvous and navigation techniques.

The course will also include a one-week infiltration and exfiltration practical exercise which will require the students to perform extensive planning and coordination.

The first class of the new course is currently scheduled for January 1989, according to Capt. Patrick Desmond, chief of the Advanced

Skills Department's Waterborne Division.

Training will be conducted at the Waterborne Training Site near Key West, Fla., where the SWCS's other waterborne courses -- Combat Diver, Combat Diving Supervisor, and Diver Medical Technician -- are taught.

The course has been under development since February of 1987, Desmond said. Units have been conducting the training on their own, but the new course will ensure that the training is standard for all soldiers.

The course will train active and reserve components of the Army and other DoD agencies. Applicants must meet the following requirements: be assigned to DoD in duties requiring skill in waterborne operations, have an APFT score of 206 with no less than 60 points in each category (for the 17-25 age group), and have a type-A physical within one year of the course completion date. No security clearance is required.

Applicants must be able to pass a swim test which consists of swimming 50 meters wearing boots and fatigues and completing a 300-meter surface swim using any stroke.

Interested applicants should submit training requests through their unit training officer. For more information, soldiers should contact SFC Cecil Davis at AV 236-6629/8639.

Some SERE/terrorism classes canceled

Some classes taught by the SERE/Terrorism Counteraction Department have been canceled for FY 88.

Selected classes of the SERE

Level-C Course (high-risk) and Individual Terrorism Awareness Course were canceled because of a current instructor shortage, according to Maj. Steven Slade, assistant director of the SERE/Terrorism Counteraction Department.

Canceled are SERE Level-C Classes 15-88 (July 3-July 28), 17-88 (July 31-Aug. 24), and 19-88 (Aug. 28-Sept. 22). INTAC Class 5-10 (Sept. 25-30) has also been canceled.

In most cases, no students had been scheduled for the classes, Slade said, but soldiers who were planning to attend or to make application for a specific class should check to see if they need to re-schedule. Classes for FY 89 will run as scheduled, Slade said.

SERE to offer new course on anti-terrorism

A new joint-training anti-terrorism course at the JFK Center and School will teach officers and NCOs how to reduce their unit's vulnerability to terrorism.

Terrorism Counteraction for the Tactical Operations Staff Officer is a one-week course designed for unit intelligence and operations officers and NCOs. The course will teach students to assess and reduce their unit's vulnerability to terrorism while operating in or on their way to and from areas of high terrorist threat, said Maj. Steven Slade, assistant director of the SERE/Terrorism Counteraction Department.

The course curriculum will include terrorist operations, threat assessment and threat vulnerability. Instruction will consist of classroom work and a 2½-day command-post exercise and workshop.

Students will also benefit from

the experience of the other students, said Capt. Tim McEntee, chief of SERE's Antiterrorism Division. "The intel guys know where the threat is, and the operations guys can plan. It brings the key players in to work together."

Instructors and guest speakers will be drawn from all the services, McEntee said, since it is a joint-service course.

Attendance is open to all officers and senior NCOs who work in operations or intelligence positions in the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines or Coast Guard.

The course has been under development by the SWCS and the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., for about a year, Slade said. One pilot class ran in December and another is scheduled to begin in FY 88. Regular classes are scheduled to begin in FY 90, McEntee said. -- Capt. Tim McEntee/AV 236-5606.

PSYOP enlisted now have own BNCOC

PSYOP enlisted soldiers now attend a basic NCO course tailored for their military occupational specialty.

The course, developed by the Special Warfare Center and School's Psychological Operations Department, is designed to train qualified enlisted soldiers in MOS 96F in common leadership skills, intelligence-related topics and MOS-specific subjects related to planning, developing and conducting a PSYOP campaign.

The active-component course, four weeks long, is being taught at the new SWCS NCO Academy. The first class ran June 5-July 1. The second class is scheduled for June of 1989. The PSYOP Department plans to run one course per year.

The reserve-component BNCOC will be taught in two phases. The first phase will emphasize common leadership training; the second will cover MOS-specific subjects. Both phases will be taught at selected U.S. Army Reserve Forces Schools,



Photo by Kirk Wyckoff

but exact training locations have not yet been determined. Phase I, 47 hours, will be conducted as inactive duty for training; Phase II, 88 hours, will be conducted as active duty for training. Phase I is scheduled to begin in October; Phase II will begin in the summer of 1989.

Soldiers must be E-5 or above and qualified at skill level two in order to attend the course. Requests for class attendance should be submitted to soldiers' unit training officers. For more information on the course, contact Richard M. Ruffin at AV 236-6088/3106.

PSYOP reclassification program extended

The reclassification program to allow experienced Army Reserve psychological operations soldiers to reclassify into MOS 96F has been extended through the end of FY89.

The program, developed by the PSYOP Department and taught through the Intelligence Training Army Area Schools, was scheduled to end in September. The extension was necessary because many soldiers still need to reclassify, according to Lt. Col. Jimmie L. Garrett, director of the PSYOP Department.

The ITAAS program is four weeks long, divided into two two-week phases. The first phase covers subjects such as intelligence collec-

tion and map reading; the second deals with PSYOP techniques and doctrine.

Soldiers may take both phases in residence or, if they at least have a year of service in a PSYOP unit, they may take the PSYOP Course offered by the Army Correspondence Course Program in place of Phase I, Garrett said.

Resident courses are taught at the 2nd ITAAS at Fort Bragg; 4th ITAAS at Fort McCoy, Wisc.; and 6th ITAAS at Los Alamitos, Calif. Regardless of whether soldiers choose the ACCP option or take both phases in residence, both phases of the reclassification program must be complete by Sept. 30, 1989.

Soldiers who wish to apply for the ITAAS reclassification program should see their unit training officers. For more information, contact Richard M. Ruffin at AV 236-6088/3106.

Senior Warrant Officer Course to be taught at JFKSWCS

Active and Reserve Special Forces warrant officers now have their own senior course at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

The Special Operations Technician Senior Warrant Officer Training Course, taught by the Special Operations Advanced Skills Department, is nine weeks long and will run two 12-man classes per year, according to CWO2 Al Childress of the Special Operations Advanced Skills Department. The course graduated its pilot class of 14 students in December; the next class is scheduled to begin Sept. 30.

The senior course is designed to prepare its students for leadership, management and staff assignments in Special Forces units and on Army, combined and joint staffs, Childress said.

Training consists of Army common and advanced special-operations subjects. Army-common subjects include communicative arts, leadership and ethics, military his-



U.S. Army photo

tory, employment and tactics of U.S. forces, program management, force integration, logistics and general subjects.

Advanced special operations subjects include low-intensity conflict, civil affairs, psychological operations, threat, SERE overview, and duties of battalion intelligence and battalion operations officers.

Prerequisites for the course are that a warrant officer be a CWO3 or promotable CWO2. Special Forces warrant officers who want information about selection for the senior course should contact CWO4 Don Needeles, branch manager, at the Total Army Personnel Agency, AV 221-7841.--CWO2 Al Childress/AV 236-2135.

Work continues on new civil affairs TOE

Civil affairs units will soon have new tables of organization and equipment to reflect their foreign-internal-defense, unconventional-warfare and general-purpose missions.

The new TOE will include battalions especially trained and modified to train Special Forces detachments and foreign personnel how to plan and conduct civic-action and civil-assistance programs. The FID and UW battalions will be assigned to the theater army commander to support other special operations units.

General-purpose civil-affairs battalions will continue to support conventional units under the theater army commander by working with civil authorities and military forces to minimize civilian interference with military operations.

The Army Training and Doctrine Command contracted the job of writing the TOE to a civilian contractor, and completed sections were reviewed in March by a board composed of representatives from civil affairs units, major commands and the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. The TOE went to the contractor for final preparation before being submitted to TRADOC



Photo by Phil Howell

in late May.

The new TOE is scheduled to go into effect in FY 91.

Civil Affairs Department to develop new training

The Civil Affairs Department of the Special Warfare Center and School will develop new doctrine and training to support the new civil affairs tables of organization and equipment.

The Civil Affairs Officer Course, taught to active-duty officers, will be redesigned to include FID and UW training, and the department will begin developing new Army Readiness Training and Evaluation Programs, said Lt. Col. Larry Wayne, deputy director of the Civil Affairs Department. ARTEPs will be tailored to the various geographic regions in which the units operate.

FM 41-5 submitted for printing

The final draft of FM 41-5, Joint Manual for Civil Affairs, is complete and has been submitted for printing, according to Lt. Col. Larry Wayne, deputy director of the Civil Affairs Department.

The existing FM 41-5 was written in 1966, and the new manual will provide much-needed guidance on

joint civil-affairs operations, Wayne said.

The new manual has been almost completely rewritten, Wayne said. It includes the new TOE changes and is based on four specific civil affairs missions: general-purpose support for conventional forces, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare and civil administration. The sections on FID and UW have been strengthened, based on the upcoming TOE, and emphasize tactical and strategic missions. Other changes include explanations of US-SOCOM responsibilities and a strengthening of joint concepts.

The new manual is scheduled for printing during the first quarter of FY89.

SOF units to get new parachute

Soldiers in special operations units will soon be receiving a new parachute designed to give them softer landings.

The MC1-1C personnel parachute, a modification of the MC1-1B, uses a new no-porosity nylon material in its canopy to give it a rate of descent of 14.6 feet per second, much slower than the current standard of 21 feet per second, said Thomas M. Wallis, air project officer in the Special Warfare Center and School's Directorate of Combat Developments.

Another significant change is the removal of more than 59 square feet of material from the back of the canopy to improve the parachute's forward drive. The new parachute has a forward drive of 8-10 knots, Wallis said.

Work on the new system began in 1986 after 1st SOCOM asked DCD for a no-porosity maneuverable parachute for special operations soldiers. Due to the difficulty of resupply, special operations soldiers often carry all the equipment and supplies they need for their missions. The average SOF soldier may jump with a rucksack weighing 120-130 lbs., Wallis said. The extra weight means harder landings with

conventional parachutes, and jump injuries or equipment damage can be critical to the mission.

The SWCS imposed its own requirement that the new parachute have a greater forward drive than the MC1-1B. The forward-drive modification will be quickly apparent to observers, Wallis said, because the removal of the material gives the modified area the appearance of the letter H.

The parachute was developed by the Army Natick Research, Development and Engineering Center in Natick, Mass., using the MC1-1B as a base model for development and improvement, Wallis said. Testing of the parachute was done at Fort Bragg by the U.S. Army Airborne and Special Operations Test Board during 1987.

The MC1-1C uses the standard MC1-1B harness, pack tray, deployment bag and packing procedures. It is designed to be as reliable and easy to maintain as its predecessor, Wallis said.

Work under way to develop desert mobility vehicle system

Special operations soldiers may soon have vehicles specially suited for transportation in desert areas.

Work has been under way since 1984 on a desert mobility vehicle system, according to Maj. David Bergum of the SWCS Directorate of Combat Developments. The Army Development and Employment Agency has conducted two appraisals for the SWCS of equipment which might be included in the system.

During the first evaluation in June of 1986, members of the 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group tested the Army's High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle in the desert at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, and Fort Bliss, Texas. The HMMWV met or exceeded the evaluation requirements set by SWCS, and its maintenance and reliability records were excellent, Bergum said.

The second appraisal was done in



Photos by Ken McGraw

July and August of 1987, again by soldiers of the 1st Bn., 5th SF Gp. This time they evaluated HMMWVs modified for desert operations along with other proposed elements of the system -- cargo and weapons carriers, trailers, 250-350cc motorcycles, vehicle navigation systems and inter-vehicle communications equipment, Bergum said.

Based on the results of the second evaluation, Bergum said, ADEA concluded that the DMVS should be fielded as a complete system. ADEA also recommended that all desert-mobility vehicle systems include the weapons carrier, that motorcycles for the system should be designed for off-road use, that navigation systems be combinations of satellite and non-satellite devices and that intercom equipment have a free-hand voice capability.

Necessary modifications to the HMMWV would include removal of one of the two rear passenger seats to add a storage rack for extra water cans; replacing standard seats with bucket seats; adding an additional odometer, speedometer and compass to the front right "navigation" position; and adding tie-down straps for cargo.

The SWCS will decide later this year whether to use the HMMWV or to begin development of a new

system, Bergum said.

In the meantime, 1st SOCOM has proposed a change to its table of organization and equipment which would provide an additional 52 HMMWVs to the 5th SF Group for use with the 12 the group has already. The SWCS is working to procure 40 trailers and 40 motorcycles to be used with the 52 HMMWVs, Bergum said. If successful, these actions could mean 5th Group soldiers could get the HMMWVs and trailers in FY 90.

For further information contact Maj. David Bergum at AV 239-6527.

Soldiers in FA 39, 96F eligible for funded studies

Soldiers in FA 39 and MOS 96F may now qualify for funded language training and area studies.

The Defense Advanced Language and Area Studies Program will fund training in foreign language, area studies or intelligence-related skills, said Maj. Robert Adolph, deputy chief of the Special Operations Proponency Office at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

Based on a request by the SWCS, Adolph said, the Defense Intelligence Agency has now approved soldiers in FA 39 and MOS 96F to study under the program.

Programs may consist of language training and area studies or language training only. Priority is given to languages of the Third World, Adolph said, but other languages may qualify if they are related to research. Area studies may include graduate or undergraduate courses.


Soldiers will incur a 3-for-1 service obligation and a follow-on assignment using the language or area studied, Adolph said.

For more information, soldiers should contact Maj. Robert Adolph at AV 239-9002/5559 or S. H. Franke at DAMI-ISS, AV 223-3032/3217.



Book Reviews

Special Warfare



Camp X. By David Stafford. New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1986. ISBN 0-396-09096-6. 327 pages. \$18.95.

Stafford's new book makes an important contribution to the history of U.S., Canadian and British intelligence. It is as well done as his first book, *Britain and European Resistance, 1940-1945*, and it is a natural follow-up so far as the subject is concerned. Currently Stafford serves as an adjunct professor of history at the University of Toronto.

This book is the first study to appear in print concerning Special Training School No. 103, or Camp X, as it came to be called. Planned and established during the latter half of 1941, Camp X was built in Canada, since the U.S. was then a neutral nation. It was the first training facility for secret agents to be established on the

North American continent, and it was intended to train Canadian, American and British agents in the secret arts of clandestine warfare.

During the course of its operations about 500 carefully selected students learned various deadly skills at the hands of the most capable instructors available. Others worked at the camp's radio facility, known as Hydra, receiving and transmitting some of the most sensitive intelligence to cross the Atlantic in the course of the war.

Stafford's book traces the history of the school from its inception at the capable hands of William Stephenson, a Canadian who headed British Security Coordination in North America. Stephenson had worked closely with William Donovan (then serving as Coordinator of Information, a post which preceded his job as head of the Office of Strategic Services) in arranging a tour of the British Special Operations Executive school in England.


Donovan wished to have a similar school on the North American continent, and Stephenson and SOE were only too happy to oblige. The camp was constructed in Ontario, and the training staff arrived from England just in time to hear the news reports from Pearl Harbor heralding America's entry into the war.

In preparing his manuscript, the author drew heavily on newly released materials from SOE archives in London, OSS files in Washington and the Military Archives in Ottawa, as well as diaries, letters and personal interviews. Though some sources remained closed to him because of security restrictions, Stafford has succeeded in tying together

numerous threads leading to many of the shadow war's more interesting stories. The author also debunks several long-cherished myths which have grown up around the camp and some of the people involved with it. Well-researched and carefully documented, this history reads as easily as a good novel.

Behind Japanese Lines: An American Guerrilla in the Philippines. By Ray C. Hunt and Bernard Norling. Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1986. ISBN 0-8131-1604-X. 258 pages. \$20.

Historian Bernard Norling and former guerrilla Ray Hunt have collaborated to produce an exceptionally valuable contribution to the literature of the guerrilla war in the Philippines. Written in the first person, the book details Hunt's experiences on the island of Luzon



Special Warfare

from the Japanese attack on the Philippines (Dec. 8, 1941) until his departure for the U.S. (June 20, 1945).

It is one of the many small ironies of war that Ray Hunt came to the Philippines as an aircraft mechanic because of his determination not to serve as an infantryman. Though he began working as a maintenance technician in Capt. Ed Dyess' 21st Pursuit Squadron on Bataan, it was not long before Hunt found himself serving as an infantryman after all. It was a role which he was to fill for three long years.

Lessons came quickly during those early days. Told by a "real infantryman" that his rifle was his best friend, a bemused Hunt soon learned the wisdom of the man's words. The savagery of his Japanese opponents was another fact the young soldier learned painfully, seeing a helpless American pilot machine-gunned in his parachute by Japanese fighter planes and wounded Americans on the ground used by Japanese infantrymen as decoys to draw out more targets. When U.S. forces on Bataan surrendered, Hunt was an unwilling participant in the infamous Death March. Though weakened by thirst, hunger and disease, he managed to escape along the route and was nursed back to health by sympathetic Filipinos and an American plantation owner.

The next three years were filled with danger, toil, worry and occasional humor. The Japanese were a ruthless enemy, and Hunt's growing guerrilla organization had to contend with rival Hukbalahap (communist) groups, bandits posing as guerrillas and Filipino collaborators as well. Some of the situations and people he dealt with had large roles to play in the future. For example, the Hukbalahap guerrillas fought on from 1946 until 1953 in an attempt to take over the country, and two of the men Hunt dealt with, Manuel Roxas and Ferdinand Marcos, later became president.

Many of the books about the

guerrilla war in the Philippines (*We Remained, Blackburn's Headhunters, American Guerrilla in the Philippines*, etc.) were published relatively soon after the war ended. Hunt waited 40 years to write his book -- years he spent in part reflecting on the war and on considerations beyond his own role in the fighting.


The short essay on guerrilla warfare which begins Chapter 6 is worthwhile reading for anyone enamored of the subject. Hunt's discussion of treachery, ineptness and bloody reprisals should convince anyone that guerrilla warfare is neither a romantic pastime nor an inexpensive form of warfare. His evaluation of the historical role of the United States in its dealings with the Philippines is worthwhile, whether the reader agrees with his conclusions or not. All things considered, Hunt's book has a depth which makes it far more than just another war story.

Secret Armies: Inside American, Soviet and European Special Forces. By James Adams. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1988. ISBN 0-87113-223-0. 440 pages. \$19.95.

James Adams is the defense correspondent for the *Sunday Times* of London. After a visit to Fort Bragg last August, he prepared an article presenting a less-than-complimentary view of the special-operations capabilities exercise he witnessed at Mott Lake. Adams may have been working on *Secret Armies* at the time of his visit. If so, his general opinion of U.S. special operations doesn't seem to have changed much in the course of completing the manuscript.

Secret Armies is a somewhat broad-brush examination of the special operations forces of several countries. A great deal of space is given over to American, Soviet and British forces, and an appendix provides a brief but useful description of those of other European nations.

Because of differences in the po-



litical and military systems of the countries involved and to the different missions and organizational structures of their special operations forces, any attempt to compare those forces with one another would be useful only as an intellectual exercise. What is useful -- and what Adams largely provides -- is an examination of various governments' perceptions of the uses and purposes of special operations forces, their command and control, resource allocation and likelihood of use.

Adams also provides a useful analysis of the differing perceptions of "war" and "peace" between East and West, and the influence of these perceptions on the development of SOF capabilities.

His conclusions may be upsetting to many in the U.S. defense community, even in the light of much-touted recent changes in U.S. SOF structure. He charges that U.S. SOF still lack clear doctrine, much-needed equipment and adequate training. He claims that the Pentagon is still obsessed with fighting a massive conventional war on the plains of Europe and that it strenuously resists attempts to substantially improve special operations forces.

Adams asserts that given the U.S. role as leader of the free world, this

bias toward conventional forces — even in the face of Congressional mandates — seriously weakens the West's ability to defend itself. He finds the size and level of readiness of Soviet SOF to be a particular threat to conventionally minded U.S. military leadership.


Though I agree with many of Adams' conclusions, this cannot be a completely favorable review. Unfortunately, Adams makes several outright errors in fact. For example, he says that Col. Russell Volckmann (a WWII Philippine guerrilla leader and a central figure in the founding of U.S. Army Special Forces) was a veteran of the OSS, which he assuredly was not.

Adams also states that Special Forces were not deployed in Korea during the conflict there. Though in limited numbers and with little success (because of lack of language skills and use as individuals rather than teams), Special Forces soldiers were sent to Korea early in 1953.

Adams' statements concerning the origin and brief existence of Operation Blue Light also foster confusion regarding that organization. Such mistakes do not detract from the validity of the author's conclusions, but they are disappointing in an otherwise well-written study.

Green Berets: Unconventional Warriors. By Hans Halberstadt. Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1988. ISBN 0-89141-280-8. 144 pages. \$12.95.

The latest offering in the Presidio Press Power Series, this book presents a lavishly-illustrated look at U.S. Army Special Forces — where they came from, who they are, what they do and a bit about how they do it. More importantly, the book presents an examination of the essential philosophy of conflict embodied by SF. The intent of the Power Series is to present an up-close and personal view of a specific military community. Books in the series are not meant to be scholarly histories or detailed unit



SOPs packaged for public consumption.

One of the overriding concerns the author faced in preparing this book was consideration for the security of the organization he described. That he was able to win the cooperation and support of significant segments of the SF community says much for his tact and professionalism. Halberstadt's stated intent was to produce a contemporary portrait which sheds more light than heat on his subject. He has succeeded admirably.

The book is organized into a series of chapters covering SF missions in general, isolation, foreign internal defense and strike missions, the Q-Course, a brief history of unconventional warfare and an SF commander's thoughts on the nature of Special Forces. Color and black-and-white photographs are numerous — there are few two-page spreads without at least one photo. Since this review was prepared from a galley without the actual photographs included, I can't comment on them. In other Power Series titles which Halberstadt has prepared, however, the photography has been uniformly excellent, with captions which add much to the text.


It has been a long time since any author — especially one from "outside" — received a great deal of official or unofficial cooperation in preparing a book on SF. Halberstadt's latest work provides a

unique picture which goes far in capturing the essence of Special Forces without perpetuating many of the myths which burden some similar works.

Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971. By Col. Francis J. Kelly. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985. Order Number SN 008-020-00448-1. 227 pages. \$6.50.

This book first appeared in 1973 as Center for Military History Publication 90-23, one of a group of books concerning various aspects of America's experience in Vietnam. It is a good basic history of Special Forces' major involvement, though it adheres closely to "official" sources and thus leaves itself open to potential criticism from those who maintain a jaundiced view of the mission and purpose of Special Forces.

Kelly gives a good description of Special Forces in the unconventional warfare role — training, advising and assisting in the creation of a fighting force from the indigenous population. He also notes the Special Forces contribution to the development of intelligence through



its reconnaissance mission (Projects Delta, Sigma, Omega, etc.). Other aspects of Special Forces involvement are covered as well — psychological operations, strike operations, civic action and the logistics necessary to support them.

All the above reviews were written by Fred Fuller, reference librarian for the Special Warfare Center and School's Marquat Memorial Library.

Ardennes: The Secret War. By Charles Whiting. New York: Stein and Day, 1985. ISBN 0-8128-3032-6. 220 pages. \$16.95.


At 5:30 a.m. on Dec. 16, 1944, the German Army launched a mighty offensive in the Ardennes "Ghost Front" that achieved complete tactical and strategic surprise and nearly split the Allies in what has come to be known as the "Battle of the Bulge." In the end, the Allies turned the tide but suffered 78,000 killed, wounded, captured or missing (including 10,000 soldiers of the U.S. 106th Infantry Division who surrendered within 24 hours of being cut off by the Germans). The surprise attack set off an intelligence scandal equal to that of the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor and the 1983 destruction of the Marine garrison in Beirut.

Although numerous books and movies have exhaustively described the conventional aspects of the Battle of the Bulge, *Ardennes: The Secret War* provides an excellent outline of the causes of the intelligence debacle and competently details the scope and effect of German special operations in support of the offensive.

Whiting describes the pervasive complacency on the Allied side of the line in the fall and early winter of 1944. Based on the deeply-held belief that Germany was a defeated nation incapable of major offensive operations, U.S. tactical and strategic intelligence atrophied.

Included in Whiting's description

of the debacle are numerous anecdotes of instructive value to contemporary intelligence soldiers. Foremost, there was overreliance on technical intelligence obtained by breaking the code on the German encryption system Enigma — the Germans did not use Enigma channels in preparing the offensive. U.S. line commanders from company to division level operated on a "9-5" basis and disregarded tactical intelligence collection against the



enemy opposite their positions. At night the Germans conducted aggressive and generally unhindered patrolling behind American lines, including one patrol that successfully stole an intact Sherman tank.

Of equal or greater interest is Whiting's description of the rapid organization and execution of German special operations. He gives coverage to Dr. Karl Recknagel's covert weather teams which operated north of the Arctic Circle to give the Germans advance weather forecasting. The last unit of the German military to surrender to the Allies was one of these teams, which finally surrendered nearly four months after Germany capitulated.

The author also gives substantial attention to Abwehr Colonel Her-

man Giskes' artful and efficient campaign of true-flag and false-flag espionage and disinformation. That campaign included the use of refugees and communist sympathizers who worked in tandem with other elements of German intelligence to completely fool Allied intelligence as to German intentions. Whiting describes the desperate battle behind enemy lines of Baron von der Heydte's scattered paratroop commandos. He also discusses the devastating pseudo-operations of SS Colonel Otto Skorzeny's Panzerbrigade 150 and Stielau Unit, consisting of English-speaking Germans disguised as Americans and used for long- and short-range reconnaissance, sabotage, spreading confusion and combat assaults.

Whiting's book is a valuable addition to the libraries of enthusiasts of military intelligence or special operations. It contains valuable lessons by example in tactical and strategic operations security, deception and the use of special operations in support of combined-arms offensives. It also contains interesting tangents such as descriptions of the OSS schemes to blind Hitler and Mussolini with poison gas and to put female sex hormones in Hitler's garden-grown vegetables. Overall, it also provides food for thought as to the role of U.S. or Soviet special operations forces in the AirLand Battle.

Capt. William H. Burgess III
Fort Richardson, Alaska



Book reviews from readers are welcome and should address subjects of interest to special operations forces. Reviews should be about 400-500 words long (approximately two double-spaced typewritten pages). Include your full name, rank, daytime phone number (preferably AUTOVON) and your mailing address. Send review to: Editor, Special Warfare, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

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