From the Commandant

My message this time is one of farewell to the military and civilian employees of the Special Warfare Center and School and greetings to the personnel of the 1st Special Operations Command.

I have been proud to command the men and women of the Center and School for the past three years, and as I leave I look back on a long list of projects which we've accomplished together, projects which will have a lasting impact on special operations and on the effectiveness of the Army as a whole.

We can all be proud of the development and approval of the Special Forces Branch, a true milestone that will ensure professional development through formal schooling and sequential, progressive assignments to Army, joint and combined organizations.

We've made great strides in training improvements as well. The longer Q-Course now gives students more extensive academic training and more time in the field, and the Special Forces Selection and Assessment Program will help us to evaluate candidates' potential before they begin the Q-Course to ensure that only the best candidates begin training.

The development and approval of Functional Area 39 for civil affairs and psychological operations officers will also give them better promotion potential, better career management and the opportunity to serve repetitive tours in an area for which they are highly trained.

New regional studies and language training will prepare civil affairs and psychological operations officers to operate in specific geographical areas, and functional language training for Special Forces will make those soldiers better able to deal with the local population in areas in which they may be operating.

The opening of the Center and School's own NCO Academy will now allow us to train soldiers in Special Forces and PSYOP in basic and advanced leadership techniques key to their particular MOSs.

We've also been included in the creation of the U.S. Special Operations Command, another special operations milestone that promises a long-needed command-and-control structure to oversee special ops training and operations of all the services.

There are a number of other important projects still going on, from combat developments to plans for other new courses. It's an exciting time to be in special operations, and I'm glad that my next assignment is that of commander of the 1st Special Operations Command.

I'm grateful to be able to leave the ongoing projects in the hands of someone as capable as my successor at the Center and School, Brig. Gen. David J. Baratto. He is a fine officer with a wealth of special operations experience in the 1st, 5th, 7th and 10th Special Forces Groups, 1st SOCOM and USSOCOM. I have no doubt he will do an excellent job as commander of the Center and School.

To those of you in 1st SOCOM, I send my highest regard and respect for the variety of missions you are accomplishing throughout the world. It's a demanding job whose challenges change as quickly as the headlines of the daily newspaper. I will be honored to serve with you in meeting those challenges.

Our job will be made easier by the personnel, training and material developments which have come out of the Center and School over the last few years. I know I can also count on the soldiers I'll have working for me — soldiers who've trained at SWCS and soldiers with whom I've worked in the past. I know they will live up to their reputation as special operations soldiers: dedicated, highly skilled, and as their motto says, without equal.

Brigadier General James A. Guest

Commander & Commandant
Brigadier General James A. Guest

Editor
Jerry D. Steelman

Graphic Arts Director
Bruce S. Barfield

Features
3 Beyond the sniper: Special Operations Target Interdict by Capt. John L. Stanley

The special operations sniper must train to unique standards which conventional sniper training cannot meet. One of the developers of the Special Operations Target Interdict Course explains the course and its objectives.

11 New career directions for Special Forces by Capt. Matt Carr, CWO3 Scott Herbert and Sgt. Maj. Jake Carter

Special Forces has come a long way, but what lies ahead? Three experts from the Special Operations Prophecy Office provide the latest information for Special Forces officers, warrant officers and NCOs.

19 Kachin Rangers: fighting with Burma's guerrilla warriors by James S. Fletcher

Early in World War II, the United States sent a group of soldiers to northern Burma to train native soldiers and help them to fight Japanese invaders. One soldier who served with them recalls what that war was like on the ground level.

28 Psychological operations: the oldest weapon of mass destruction by Lt. Col. John C. Reppert

In these days of high-ticket weapons systems, budget cuts and increasing missions, soldiers may need to do more with less. A PSYOP commander offers an option which is low-cost but proven effective since ancient times.

Departments
34 Update
38 Book reviews

The cover: The special operations sniper must be proficient in areas which conventional sniper training does not address. To learn more about how these snipers are being trained, read Capt. John L. Stanley's article, "Beyond the sniper: Special Operations Target Interdict," on pg. 3. (Photo by Phil Howell)
Beyond the sniper: Special Operations Target Interdiction

by Capt. John L. Stanley

The special operations sniper is a Special Forces or Ranger soldier highly skilled in delivering precision rifle fire from concealed positions, at selected targets and in support of special operations missions. This implies much more than the traditional sniper mission of engaging personnel targets beyond the range of standard infantry weapons.

Engaging "selected targets" demands that the sniper be proficient with rifles designed to interdict material targets. He will also perform "in support of special operations missions," requiring him to have an extensive background in sniper operations at all levels of conflict.

In fact, the sniper's skills are best exploited in special operations missions. The intricate nature of these missions — unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense and direct action — require a special operations soldier to be highly trained, adaptable to changing mission requirements and physically and mentally tough. A special operations sniper must be just as proficient with a .50-caliber special-purpose sniper rifle, interdicting a material target, as he is training a group of guerrillas equipped with a foreign or antique sniper weapon. Because of these missions, no greater variety of skills has ever been required of a sniper than of today's special operations sniper. In fact, his art requires more flexibility, initiative and practice to survive now than ever before. New technology in sensors, thermal imagers and other countermeasures employed against the sniper has raised the ante he must pay for success.

In a direct-action role, the special operations sniper will be required to interdict a variety of targets. These will include "high-value" personnel targets, whose loss will have a significant impact on the battlefield, and material targets. Material targets range from items like missiles, aircraft, radars and communications equipment to critical nodes that will shut down entire facilities and systems. The SOF sniper can employ a variety of weapons and ammunition tailored to interdict these specific targets. Naturally, he can also provide his unit with precision, long-range rifle fire in a conventional manner. This makes him a welcome asset, considering the restricted firepower of small Special Forces A-teams and reconnaissance units.

The battery of weapons available to the SOF sniper include a mixture of arms to interdict a wide range of targets. His basic sniper weapon is a 7.62 NATO-caliber rifle. This is currently the M-21 sniper weapons system, a semiautomatic M-14 modified with a scope and "match" tuning. By August 1988, the new M-24 sniper weapon should be fielded to SOF units (see accompanying article). The M-24 is a very accurate bolt-action design also in 7.62 NATO caliber. Other weapons available include large-bore sniper rifles like the Haskins .50-caliber or the .338/.416 magnum (a modified African big-game cartridge). The special operations sniper may also opt for a suppressed sniper weapon for special requirements or a foreign sniper rifle to mimic the indigenous forces' weapon or ammunition.

The SOF sniper also has some latitude when it comes to cartridge caliber and ammunition to increase the effects on target. Most of the sniper's requirements will be fulfilled by the 7.62 NATO cartridge; it is an overall good performer. However, some missions may dictate the sniper use his knowledge to "tailor" his equipment. This may mean selecting special .50-caliber projectiles designed to penetrate armor or cause fires. He may choose a .300 Winchester magnum for 1000-yard accuracy or subsonic ammunition for low-signature requirements. The sniper's careful target analysis will determine just what type weapon or ammunition is best and exactly where he has to put the round to achieve the desired results.

In the UW and FID role, the special operations sniper can perform both as a fighter and a
The dilemma that has faced SOF units in the past has been the lack of any institutional sniper training that fully exploited the attributes of the special operations soldier and provided for SOF missions. SOF units often used conventional sniper schools such as Fort Bragg’s XVIII Special Operations Corps School (now defunct) or the Marine Corps Scout Sniper School at Quantico, Va. Although fine programs, they provided little specific training for special operations snipers. Conventional sniper schools tended to invest a lot of time in teaching basic skills such as land navigation, radio procedures and artillery adjustment, which the SOF soldier has learned in either Special Forces or Ranger qualifications courses.

What special operations needs was institutional sniper training that fully capitalized on the potential that a special operations soldier was already a highly trained asset and that his sniper training should start from that point. The Special Warfare Center and School’s first attempt in 1983 was short-lived, primarily due to the lack of understanding and planning for the role of the SOF sniper. This was the same problem encountered with the other schools — the new school merely addressed sniper training from a conventional framework and centered little in the area of special operations requirements. As a result, the first school’s potential value to SOF was not realized, and it did not exist at the same year. However, the lessons learned did not die. Early in 1985, the SWCS started another sniper program.

The new sniper school was formulated on several new precepts. One, the SOF soldiers have a strong foundation in skills the soldier must possess before he starts on Day One. Eliminating basic skills training allowing the cadre time to delve into missions, weapons and procedures as they apply to special operations in the entire spectrum of operations. The name was the Special Operations Target Interdiction Course, or SOTIC. The title is much more indicative of the special operations sniper’s role and highlights his missions not only as a sniper, but as an expert in aspects of interdicting various targets with a rifle.

Today, the Special Warfare Center and School operates the SOTIC program with little flintheart and with low visibility. The cadre members have put a lot of personal experience and knowledge into the course. Their ideas are not found in Army subject schedules, but they are garnered through experience and observation. These instructors have met some very challenging tasks, developing ideas and techniques where none existed. Little reference material exists on many of the subjects taught in the SOTIC program. Where does one find information on interdiction on corpse searching for wind errors when shooting a .30-caliber rifle at 2,000 meters, or long-range night-vision target interdiction? The cadre needs to use their experience, develop a plan, and go find out for yourself. The results must be valid, since no room for error exists. The information may place lives in jeopardy.

The cadre of the school has been selected based on the basis of sniper experience, SOF background and performance. Another criterion (not so easily measured) is the desire to be a sniper. The SOF instructor must possess a hunger to learn and teach his craft. The “laziness” of the student doesn’t fit in to the SOTIC instructor’s lifestyle. The long hours and complex curriculum are so demanding that without a genuine desire to do this work, he would be quickly overwhelmed.

Limiting the classes to fewer than 24 students guarantees a student-to-instructor ratio of 2:1. Such a ratio has fostered an almost apprentice relationship between the students and the cadre. This relationship is one of tremendous advantage when training snipers, for what is taught is not a craft, but a long list of tasks to meet graduation criteria. To pass, students must have the desire to learn and talent to demonstrate their skills. Most exams are practical application, not theory. Students are continually guided through the course. They are measured on a range on a bang away at targets; each shot is evaluated and critiqued, to the point of no less than 2,000 rounds per student.

The sniper program is a “hands-on” oriented school with only 41 of the 340 hours of instruction in the classroom. The SOTIC philosophy is that most sniper skills must be taught, practiced and evaluated in the field. Students are shown “how to” by the cadre, and then they perform each task until it is perfected. New training concepts and equipment such as precision air rifles, laser range finders and shooting techniques have been blended with the cadre’s teaching techniques (usually first-hand from instructors) so as to glean every possible benefit from available training time. This results in a program that is well-rounded for the sniper; new technology is always backstopped with time-honored techniques. Range determination, for example, is a difficult task without laser range finders, but students learn the traditional methods as well as the new, in case the range finder breaks down.

The students are taught using practical methods available anywhere. They learn that sniper training does not depend on equipment and high-speed ranges. They learn how easy it is to set up simple sustainment drills. A unique approach to training and sustainment is the use of matchgrade air rifles. Air rifles are cost-effective, always available and allow training virtually anywhere and any-time without the complicated requirements of setting up a live-fire range, forecasting ammunition, requesting transportation, and so on. Air rifles merely augment practice; they do not take the place of live.
New sniper weapon system designed to be rugged, dependable and accurate

by Capt. John L. Stanley

The M-24 weapons system is the result of hard work and research by special operations snipers who saw a need for a new weapon. That need was based on long-standing problems encountered with the Army’s old M-21 sniper rifle, a system plagued with problems since its adoption in the mid-1960s. The M-21’s 7.62-caliber service rifle was matched to standard ballistics and equipped with a telescopic sight. With these modications, however, the durable service rifle became a fragile, uncomfortable and unsatisfactory sniper weapon. Since the M-21’s problems included poor ac-
curary, complicated semiautomatic operation, constantly changing zero and poor maintainability.

There have been many efforts since the Vietnam conflict to adapt a new sniper weapon, with no suc-
cess. The reason was twofold. First, a lot of disagreement existed over whether a sniper rifle should be bolt-action or semiautomatic. Second, since the Vietnam conflict had ended, so had the need for this type of weapon. The U.S. Army finally issued an officially sanctioned sniper pro-
gram in peacetime until the advent of the Special Operations Targets Inter-
diction Course).

Early in 1985, instructors in the Special Operations Targets Interdict-
cation Course at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School took a hard look at a better special opera-
tions sniper rifle. SOTIC instruc-
tors knew that sniping is important to SOF, in peacetime or war, and knew every type of weapon they needed to meet their mission requirements. Through their re-
search, instructors established re-
quirements for the new weapon. The result was a statement of need outlining the specific characteristics of the special operations sniper ri-

The Perfect Rifle

The new M-24 sniper weapon system, with scope and “iron-sighted.”

One of the most notable features in the fourth week is the stalking phase. Here students are taught to move undetected to within 150 me-
ters of a target and engage it twice with blank rounds. The students will stalk 800 to 1,000 meters while the area they are moving in is being observed by two instructors located on the objective with 7x50 binocu-

ers. Any target indicator such as movement, shine or color will alert the observer of the sniper’s loca-
tion. The instructor believes he sees a sniper, he will maneuver another instructor, called a walker, via radio to the suspected location. If a sniper is discovered, he is a “go.” Once the snipers get within 150 meters of the observ-

ers, they engage the target with a blank round. The walker will move within 10 meters of the sniper and indicate the sniper’s direction to the instructor/observer. If the sniper is still undetected, he will fire a blank second while the walker is within five meters of his position. If that is not enough, the walker will finally move next to the sniper and touch the sniper’s head. To receive a “go,” the student must remain undetected. Any indicator such as muzzle flash or an impro-

Rapid Fire

M-300 accurate, complicated semiautomatic operation, constantly changing zero and poor maintainability.

Front. Movers are fired out to 600 yards and are presented walking, fast walking or crawl. I am re-
spect to marksmanship, this is the student’s most challenging event. To continue in the course, he must pass this course of fire.

Other subjects are introduced in this week, such as the class on locating the sniper. Here each

sniper receives practical live-fire training on how to determine the range, type and location of assorted weapons firing in their direction. Weapons like rifles, pistols, rifles, machine guns, suppressed weapons and large-bore sniper rifles are fired over a distance of 100-1,000 yards with the students downrange in a defilade position. By listening to the “crack-chump,” or the bullet’s noise, students learn to discern differences essential to target detection. This is a survival skill, as the sniper must know if the fire is directed at him or merely in his firing area. Perhaps the enemy is conducting “recon by fire,” probing likely sniper locations with weapons fire for any reaction that the sniper must be able to quickly detect and neutralize threats before he, in turn, is neutralized. His target may be merely his own unit’s bullet’s sup-
spercack and rifle’s muzzle report are the only target indicators. The final week of the fieldcraft course is the fieldcraft week, with exams in observation and stalking. Both tasks are essential to the sniper’s mission. In the preceding weeks, the snipers have practiced in exer-
cises designed to hone observation and stalking skills to a fine edge. Ultimately, the fieldcraft and fieldcraft skills is what separates him from just another marksman.

to adopt the weapon for all sniper requirements Armywide. The current sniper weapons were submitted, SOTIC instructors traveled to Fort Benning, Ga., to help test them. It is significant that SOF snipers had an active role in the test procedure — the new weapon had to satisfy the users, not technicians in a test lab.

The winner of the sniper-rifle tests was submitted by the Remington Arms Company, and it represents the state of the art in sniper-rifle development. The new weapon is rugged, easily maintained and, most of all, accurate. It uses a simple bolt-action Model 700 re-

ceiver in 7.62 NATO, combat-proven by the Marine Corps in its sniper rifle for more than 20 years. The rifle incorporates a less-steel barrel, synthetic stock and a Leupold & Stevens 10-power Ultra scope. Additional design fea-
tures include a long receiver (for future upgrade to a larger cartridge) and a spare-parts kit with most re-
pairs a sniper would need in the field.

In August 1985, the Army will receive the new M-24 sniper weap-

ons system, with the first weapons going to the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. Instructors in SOTIC have been training snipers with a weapons system very similar to the M-24 to assure that snipers in the SOF community are prepared to use the new weapon.
sive use of night-vision equipment. They will spend many nights in practice working this late. Night training to the sniper is as es-
essential as his marksmanship. More than 90 percent of the 9th Infantry Division's sniper kills in Vietnam were at night, and this is typical of most successful sniper employment. Every application of night-vision equipment - from the SOTIC night optical system, to the PVS-3 night vision system, to the night vision, infrared enhancement and thermal imagery. Students progress with night sights to the point where they are capable of passing the diagnostic shoot administered on Day One using night-vision equipment.

The fifth week encompasses a wide variety of training. All the shooting conducted in the fifth week is at unknown distances. Extensive use of steel or "iron maiden" targets allows the snipers immediate feedback on exact bullet impact points. The students develop a hands-on training in many types of weapons, including foreign, obsolete U.S., and special-purpose sniper weapons systems.

Mixed with the fifth week are classes in training and organizing snipers, including the parent unit's snipers and those trained in UW and FID missions. Shooting is conducted under cadre-induced stress to ensure that snipers will see their limitations as well as their strong points in this area. Instructors also teach advanced application of measures such as high-frequency shooting, and hit targets hidden behind a reverse slope, using the bullet's trajectory to "see" the targets or failures in the course of the students' training. Depending on course hits, the students are given two more days of shooting at unknown distances. Then comes the "must check," the SOTIC field training exercise. Here the students perform test much of the sniper's training in the course. The students are placed in a short isolation (their homework has been the mission planning) and present briefings to the force. In the early morning of the next day, the students infiltrate by teams via static-line parachutes into their operational areas. They must move undetected to their target area and construct a "hide," a place to conceal themselves. For the next 36 hours, they will observe their targets, gather tar-
get intelligence, maintain observation logs and adjust to changes from their mission planning. This is a blank-fire exercise conducted with an active aggressor force and counter-sniper and tracker teams in the area. This phase ends when students engage their targets and exfiltrate.

Within two hours of exfiltration, the students will be given a new mission for a live-fire sniper am-

"No badges or tabs are awarded, for the student's future ca-
pability as a sniper will largely depend on his continued training and desire to improve."
New career directions for Special Forces

Special Forces career management has changed greatly over the last five years. Three experts from the Special Operations Proponency Office present an update on the changes and what lies ahead for Special Forces officers, warrant officers and NCOs.

Special Forces Officer Branch

by Capt. Matt Carr

Since the inception of Special Forces, its officers have been controlled under five separate and distinct management systems.

Initially, officers were given a prefix 3, which was later changed to an additional skill identifier of 5G. In the early 1970s, Special Forces officers were controlled under the foreign-area-officer specialty, with an area of concentration of 48E. Under the Officer Personnel Management System, the Special Forces officer was given a separate specialty code of 18. In 1953, the Officer Personnel Management System II was implemented, and Specialty Code 18 changed to Functional Area 18.

Functional Area 18 held some flaws for the Special Forces community. With FA 18, the officer could not hold another functional area; therefore, the Special Forces community could not produce experts in necessary fields such as personnel, combat developments or public affairs.

Additionally, the officer, by ARs 611–101 and 614–162, had to be branch-qualified in his entry branch before coming to Special Forces. For example, an infantry officer had to command a company prior to entering Special Forces. Although the branch-qualification requirement was frequently waived, it was still a regulation that hampered recruiting of Special Forces officers. The requirement caused Special Forces to acquire officers at approximately their seventh year in service. After the required training, officers were normally within two years of being promoted to major by the time they arrived at their first Special Forces assignment. Special Forces quickly became over-strength in majors and under-strength in captains.

With limited time at the grade of O4, many Special Forces majors then had to make a serious career decision: in which area should they be qualified, their basic branch or their functional area? This dilemma caused Special Forces to lose many qualified officers and keep many others away.

These conditions made a Special Forces officer’s professional development erratic at best. Although some officers were able to meet the professional-development requirements of both their branch and Special Forces, these officers were the exception rather than the rule. The majority of Special Forces officers were not making the necessary steps. The lack of a systematic, progressive, sequential professional-development scheme hurt the warfighting capability of Special Forces. This deficiency was addressed in the Special Operations Forces System Program Review (1986) and the Special Operations Forces Functional Area Assessment (1987), senior forums held to identify and correct problems in special operations.

During the 1980s, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School recommended a Special Forces Branch, but the idea was not accepted. With that decision, the
SPECIAL FORCES OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

SWCS, in conjunction with the Army Training and Doctrine Command and the Military Personnel Command (now the Total Army Personnel Agency), started a concerted effort to research and develop all the options available to correct the professional–development deficiencies of Special Forces.

The initial joint working group was convened by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans, in August 1986. This working group included representatives from the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations and Plans; the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel; the Total Army Personnel Agency; TRADOC; the Soldier Support Center; the Combined Arms Center; SWCS; and the 1st Special Operations Command. The working group’s recommendation for a 12-month, plus or minus Branch, starting at the O3 level, was created.

With this initial position, the SWCS and TAPA developed a decision briefing on the Special Forces Branch. This decision briefing was staffed through the CAC and TRADOC. In mid-September the Special Forces Branch decision briefing was given to the commanding general of CAC, Lt. Gen. Gerald T. Bartlett, who approved the briefing to go forward to the commander of TRADOC. In early October 1986, the SWCS and TAPA briefed the TRADOC commander, Gen. Carl E. Vuono, who approved the concept of the branch briefing to be briefed to commanders of major commands and a few retired general–officer officers, and then to the Chief of Staff of the Army.

With the conceptual approval from the TRADOC commander, the SWCS coordinated and conducted the required briefings in October, November, and December 1986. In late December, the TRADOC commander approved the Special Forces Branch briefing and forwarded it to the Army Chief of Staff. On April 19, 1997, after discussion with the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Secretary of the Army approved the Special Forces Branch as one of the combat-arms branches of the Army. With his decision, Special Forces leadership development was codified with a definite system to access, train and develop officers, warrant officers and noncommissioned officers.

This system will ensure progressive, sequential branch assignments and a systematic method for professional development of Special Forces officers. Additionally, the new branch will ensure Special Forces officers are trained in the necessary skills in order to enhance the Army’s warfighting capability. Special Forces will require officers to enter at their fourth year in service. This will make the Special Forces Branch the only non-accession branch in the Army and will mean that the SWCS and TAPA will have to recruit officers from the other branches. The Special Operations Proponent Office at the SWCS and the Special Forces Branch at TAPA are currently recruiting officers from Army units worldwide.

The Special Forces branch selection criteria come from AR 614-162. They require that an officer:

1. Be a male commissioned officer managed by the Officer Personnel Management Division.
2. Have a Defense Language Aptitude Battery score of 85 or higher, or be able to achieve a language proficiency rating of 2/2 or higher.
4. Be eligible for a top-secret clearance in accordance with AR 604–5.
5. Be airborne–qualified or volunteer for airborne training.

In addition to the above criteria, one other consideration will be the time officer has been in Special Forces as an officer with more than seven years will not be selected, because the time period would not be representative to his first assignment, he would be entering the zone for consideration for major.

By selecting younger officers, Special Forces will get officers who will be able to serve for a longer period of time. In addition to an upper limit on time in service, there is also a lower limit. The minimum requirement will be approximately three years in service and graduation from a basic–branch advanced course. This three-year requirement ensures that the officer has been selected for promotion and conditional professional indefinite. With these limits and the selection criteria, the Special Forces Branch is confident that it will be able to meet its accession goal of 150 officers per year. With that number, Special Forces will be able to fill all its authorizations and professionally and manage its officers. If the branch meets its goal, there will be approximately 737 captains, 399 majors, 272 lieutenant colonels and 110 colonels in the Special Operations Community. Each captain, upon graduation from the Special Forces Detachment Officer Qualification Course, will be assigned to a Special Forces group to serve as an operational detachment commander. Currently, captains should serve as ODA commanders for 18 months in sinuous months; in order to consider Special Forces branch–qualifying major.

Majors should update the Command and General Staff College and strive to serve a Special Forces assignment as a company commander, battalion executive officer, battalion operations officer, or group or level staff officer, all of which are considered under the assumption that most were very senior NCOS who already knew almost everything they needed to know to become good detachment commanders. The selection criteria and job description were based on what the warrant officer program’s developers thought was available in the noncommissioned officer corps and what they perceived to be the role of the warrant officer — and they were right.

During this same period, the Army was conducting the Total Warrant Officer Study. The study determined that the Army should have a warrant officer program for warrant officer programs developed to meet the needs of the modern warrant officer.
“grade-code” all warrant-officer positions. Positions would call for a Warrant Officer (WO1 or CW02), a Senior Warrant Officer (CW03 or CW04) or a Master Warrant Officer (selected CW04 or CW05). The Army shifted its emphasis to younger NCOs who could have longer careers as warrant officers, stressed better training and gave warrant officers more responsibilities. Finally, a formal system of warrant-officer management, the Total Warrant Officer System, TWOS, was developed as a result of the Total Warrant Officer Study. At the same time, SF was in the process of finding out things about itself. What we found was that most sergeants first class and staff sergeants didn’t have two SF MOSs and the Operations and Intelligence Course (the original selection criteria). They couldn’t get more MOSs because of a shortage of training slots and training money, reluctance of the groups to send them back to school and a number of other reasons. It was becoming apparent to the bulk of us involved in promotion that SF NCOs didn’t know everything they needed to know to be special operations technicians, and our new warrant officers were quick to point out their own shortcomings. We also found that our selection criteria and training design, based on what we had thought was in the NCO corps, was unrealistic and inadequate. Finally, it seems that no one had clearly explained the warrant officer’s job to the commissioned officers, the NCOs or even the new warrant officers themselves. On the bright side, we have learned from our mistakes.

Generally, the SF warrant-officer program now meets all the requirements of the TWOS System. The only real difference between the TWOS System and SF is that we will continue to access only E6s and above; less experienced soldiers won’t do. The Special Operations Propoenency Office, with feedback from the field, has conducted a realistic appraisal of SF today, and the warrant-officer selection criteria and training have been adjusted to reflect reality.

The minimum selection criteria now are: possess a secret clearance; have an 85 or better Defense Language Aptitude Battery score or a current language proficiency rating of 1+1+ in a foreign language; have four or more years A-attachment experience; pass an Army Physical Fitness Test with at least 60 points per event and at least 206 points overall, using the 17-21 age-group standards; possess one SF MOS and be a graduate of the 16-week Operations and Intelligence Course or the resident/non-resident O&I Course; be serving in grade E6 or above; be recommended by the chain of command and be physically able to serve on an A-attachment. As an exception to these criteria, 1st SOCOM will give priority seating in O&I to applicants who are otherwise fully qualified but do not yet have O&I training.

SF positions have been grade-coded, and SF warrant will have higher-level positions available with the implementation of the L-series Table of Organization and Equipment in FY 89. A-attachments will have one SF assignment space each; of the six detachments in each company, four will have WO slots and two will have SWO slots. In addition to the detachment spaces there will be an SWO position in each SF company, an SWO assistants operations officer in each SF battalion and both an SWO and an MWO in each SF group headquarters — one in group intelligence and one in group operations.

In the simplest terms, getting approximately six warrant-officer candidates from each SF battalion each year will fill our current needs. We are also making an active effort to identify additional spaces requiring SF warrant-officer space. More spaces mean a need for more volunteers; the need for more volunteers means searching harder for quality men.

The responsibilities of the chain of command cannot be overstated in the selection of quality warrant officers for Special Forces. The single most important factor in deciding who is selected to become a warrant officer is the recommendation of the soldier’s commanders, so the burden of selecting good men rests squarely upon the shoulders of the various commanders in the Special Forces groups.

SF has a unique opportunity: commanders can observe a soldier’s performance, make a determination about his potential and then recommend him to be selected and trained to become a Special Forces warrant officer. The advantages of using this system for a portion of our company-grade officer corps can be seen in the performances of other countries who use similar systems (Israel, Rhodesia and South Africa, to name a few). We must make the most of our special advantage.

Warrant-officer training now consists of six weeks at Fort Rucker, Ala., for the Warrant Officer Candidate Course and 13 weeks at Fort Bragg for the Warrant Officer Technical Certification Course. Today, our new warrants are taught with our new captains in the Special Forces Detachment Officer Qualification Course.

Why put warrant officers in SFDOCQ? Don’t the warrant officers already know that stuff? The answer is yes, most warrant-officer candidates do know some of “that stuff,” but there are other reasons for training them with our captains. First, it establishes a sound working relationship between detachment commanders and their technicians during the training process. Both sides learn something about the roles and thought processes of the other. By working together during the SFDOCQ/WOTCC, the two members of the officer command element begin to function as they would on an ODA. Second, SFDOCQ and WOTCC are not exactly alike. For various special forces soldiers. It also eliminated many of the enlisted personnel management problems which had plagued Special Forces from its beginnings.

Prior to the approval, soldiers from various MOSs volunteered for Special Forces training. If they completed the Special Forces Qualification Course, they were awarded special qualification identifier “S” and assigned to Special Forces units, retaining their original MOSs.

After a tour of duty in Special Forces, these soldiers could be levied for assignment in their original MOS. When that assignment was complete, some would return to Special Forces, but others would remain in their respective branches.

---

**Special Forces Enlisted CMF 18**

**by Sgt. Maj. Jake Carter**

The approval of Career Management Field 18 in June 1983 marked the beginning of more intensive career management for enlisted Special Forces soldiers. It also eliminated many of the enlisted personnel management problems which had plagued Special Forces from its beginnings.

Prior to the approval, soldiers from various MOSs volunteered for Special Forces training. If they completed the Special Forces Qualification Course, they were awarded special qualification identifier “S” and assigned to Special Forces units, retaining their original MOSs.

After a tour of duty in Special Forces, these soldiers could be levied for assignment in their original MOS. When that assignment was complete, some would return to Special Forces, but others would remain in their respective branches.
SPECIAL FORCES
NCO PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

With this one-time utilization of many Special Forces-trained soldiers, training dollars were lost, the experience level in SF units was difficult to maintain and a continuous recruiting and training program was necessary to keep Special Forces units at an acceptable strength level.

Early in 1982, the commander of the Army Institute for Military Assistance, now the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, asked his staff to research the possibility of creating a career management field for Special Forces enlisted soldiers. The result of that study was the proposal for a field which consisted of six MOSs — 18B, weapons NCO; 18C, engineer NCO; 18D, medical NCO; 18E, communications NCO; 18F, operations and intelligence NCO; and 18Z, Special Forces senior sergeant. IMIA also recommended that newly enlisted soldiers be allowed to enter CMF 18. At that time, no enlistment bonus was paid for any SF skill except for MOS 05B, radio operator. The IMIA commander forwarded the proposal to the Department of the Army, where it was approved by then-Chief of Staff Gen. John A. Wickham Jr.

With the approval, reclassification procedures began. Throughout the Army, all 11Bs and 11Cs with SQI "S" were given the chance to reclassify into CMF 18 as 18B weapons NCOs; 12Bs could convert to 18C engineer NCOs; 91Bss to 18D medical NCOs, and 31V/04Bs to 18E communications NCOs. NCOs with an additional skill identifier of "F1" could become 18F operations and intelligence NCOs, and 68s were allowed to convert to 18Z, Special Forces senior sergeant. New soldiers recruited for CMF 18 had to meet the following selection criteria:

1. Be a male soldier.
2. Be a high-school graduate or have a GED.
3. Have a GT score of 110 or higher.
4. Be airborne qualified or volunteer for airborne training.
5. Be able to swim 50 meters unassisted wearing boots and fatigue.
6. Score a minimum of 206 points on the Army Physical Fitness Test with no less than 60 points on any event, scored for age group 17-21.
7. Have at least an interim secret security clearance.
9. Have no bar to reenlistment.

MOS training was upgraded, and subject matter was taken from the instruction of other service schools to ensure that major tasks of related CMFs were included in the training objectives for CMF 18.

New tasks were developed, and CMF 18 training was well on its way. Internal and external training evaluations determined the adequacy of the training and how well the soldiers were functioning within their units.

As CMF 18 was being created, Special Forces was expanding. The 1st Special Forces Group was activated at Fort Lewis, Wash., in the summer of 1984. The activation of the group increased SF enlisted personnel strength from 2,850 to 3,220, its current authorization.

To man the groups with the best-trained soldiers possible, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School is constantly working on ways to improve its training. In June, the SWCS began the pilot class for a new three-week assessment and selection program, Special Forces Orientation Training, which Special Forces candidates will take prior to the SF Qualification Course. SFOT is intended to reduce the attrition rate for Special Forces training, which is currently approximately 50 percent. With SFOT, the Center and School expects to reduce that number significantly, thereby saving both time and money without reducing standards. The new program will allow Special Forces to assess each student's physical, emotional, and mental stamina. SFOT also allows soldiers to make an educated decision about Special Forces and their career plans.

Since October 1987, the qualification course has been 23 weeks long, four weeks longer that before, to allow more training time. Soldiers also receive BCOC and SERE Level-C training while they are attending the O-Course so that they are fully trained and qualified for promotion when they reach their first team assignment.

The BCOC is being taught at the newly created SF NCO Academy at Special Warfare Center and School. The academy is also teaching the SF Advanced NCO Course, so SF NCOs may now get leadership training tailored for their MOSs.

The latest personnel development in the CMF is the proposed upgrade of 18F positions on A-detachments from E6 to E7. That upgrade was required to improve promotion potential and maintain the operations and intelligence capabilities of the detachments. The proposal to upgrade these positions was sent to the Soldier Support Center — National Capital Region, in February of this year. The FY90 authorization documents will reflect the 18F upgrade. Special Forces enlisted soldiers currently enjoy a promotion selection rate that exceeds that of any other MOS — SF NCOs are being promoted roughly two years ahead of their counterparts in other fields. This will continue through 1991 with the activation of the 3rd SF Group at Fort Bragg, and enlisted positions will increase to more than 4,350 authorizations by the end of FY91.

Between now and FY91, CMF 18 will mature. Its operating strength will match its authorizations, bringing it to 100-percent strength for the first time since it was formed in 1983. When that happens, the current promotion rate will drop toward the Army's norm. CMF 18 soldiers will no longer have a two-year promotion advantage, but they will be promoted at the same rate as soldiers in other fields.

Soldiers in CMF 18 currently have one of the best career development patterns in the Army. They possess a vast amount of military knowledge and special skills, and they have their hands on a progression ladder that extends to the top.

Sgt. Maj. Jake Carter is the sergeant major of the Special Operations Proponent Office of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. Prior to his current assignment, he was the operations sergeant major for the 2nd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group. A 1978 graduate of the Sergeants Major Academy, he has served in the Office of the Inspector General for the Military Districts of Washington and with the Reserve Officer Training Corps. From 1963-78, he served in a variety of assignments with the 1st, 5th, and 7th Special Forces Groups.

July 1988
Kachin Rangers:
fighting with Burma’s guerrilla warriors

by James S. Fletcher

In the early days of World War II, the U.S. Office of Strategic Services sent American soldiers to Burma to train Burmese Kachin tribesmen and help them to fight the Japanese. This is the author’s account of his experiences with those forerunners of today’s special operations forces.

The Americans in this story were part of a small group assigned to train and lead native Burmese tribesmen in a shadow war against the Japanese who invaded mainland Asia in the early days of World War II.

The Kachin Rangers were asked to do more than the average soldier, and their daring and skill succeeded where other tactics failed. They became experienced in hit-and-run guerrilla warfare, making raids deep into enemy territory, hitting the enemy where he least expected and keeping him off balance.

In April 1944, the V-Force Kachin Rangers merged with Detachment 101 of the Office of Strategic Services.

By war’s end, the Office of Strategic Services and its band of Kachin raiders had demolished or helped to demolish 57 bridges, captured 15,000 tons of equipment, rescued 425 allied servicemen and killed 5,400 Japanese soldiers.

The unit had its beginnings late in 1942, when Gen. Joseph Stilwell formed the V-Force, a special group of Americans and Englishmen whose assignment was espionage, sabotage and collecting intelligence. The group was looking for local people who knew the jungle and who were willing to fight the Japanese. The Kachins were just what they were looking for; they had very few weapons with which to fight — a few knives, spears, crossbows, arrows and some old flintlock guns — but they were superb jungle fighters.

The Japanese had terrorized the helpless Kachins when they invaded Burma in 1942, and the Kachins hated them with a passion.

An Englishman who had run a tea plantation in India before the war, Lt. Col. J.R. Wilson, was the first commander of the V-Force. The Americans’ most important assignment was to recruit as many Kachins as they could and teach them to use automatic weapons, grenades and explosives.

The Kachins were primitive tribesmen who had conquered the Naga headhunters only a few years before. In the Kachins’ own language, they were Jinghpaw, meaning “men of the hills.” They are customarily called Kachins by most of the people in Burma. They were small but straight and strongly built, and their endurance was unbelievable. They could march through the jungle all day with a heavy pack, much to the amazement of the Americans. The Kachins were friendly people; from the beginning, they liked the Americans and taught them quite a few tricks about the jungle. The Kachins often posed as laborers and coolies and worked for the Japanese until they had all the information they needed. Some were caught and tortured to death, but the majority vanished and returned to the Americans.

As members of the Jinghpaw Rangers, we were taught how to survive in the jungle. We were told never to sleep on the ground and to cut all growth from around the sleeping area. This would guard against snakes and scorpions. The Kachins would build lean-tos and platforms for us to sleep on to keep dry. We were warned never to drink water unless it had been boiled at least 20 minutes, because of cholera and dysentery. If we became lost in the jungle without food and did not know what was safe to eat, we were to watch what the monkeys were eating. The first monkey I saw after I arrived in the jungle, however, was picking fleas off another monkey’s head and eating them.

The rainy season had begun when we arrived in Burma, and it rained daily. We were loaded on a truck and carried as far as the Ledo Road had been built, to an area between Ledo and the Burma border known as Hellgate. That’s where we began walking back into Burma, over the trail toward Tagap-Ga, at that time...
the farthest outpost.

At Tagaq-Ga there was a Chinese infantry company of the 38th Divi-
sion and a hospital run by Dr. Gordon Seagrave, who had worked in
Burma before the war, training nurses and establishing a reputation
for treating every disease known.

When the U.S. declared war on Japan,
he was commissioned a major in the
U.S. Medical Corps.

A few days after we arrived, Lt.
Bill Cummings informed our group
we would be leaving for the village
of Hkllak-Ga the next morning.
The Japanese had terrorized the vil-
lage, killing and wounding the few
remaining natives there. The
Chinese soldiers had recaptured the vil-
lage, but there were sick and
wounded villagers whom needed med-
cal attention. Tun Shein, a member of
the Kachin Rangers who was born in
Burma and had worked with Dr. Seagrave, was taking two of
Seagrave’s Burmese nurses there to
set up a hospital unit.

We began our march for Hkllak-
Ga the next morning, and it had
been raining for days, we waded in
mud up to our knees.

Some of the slopes were too steep
to climb. Leeches were everywhere,
and we were bloody all over from
their bites. The further we went, the
thicker the jungle became.

We finally put three of the Kachins
in front of us to cut the trail out so
that it was passable. I had never seen
so much bamboo; some was
nearly as large as telephone poles.

It was amazing what the Kachins
could make out of bamboo: huts,
drinking cups, hats, water and cook-
ing containers, fuel and food.

Tun Shein suggested we stop early
and fix something to eat. I could not
sit down to rest even for a place to
sleep before it got dark.

We stopped in a village the natives
had abandoned when Burma was
invaded. The Kachins cleaned out
one of the old bamboo barracks, or
huts, and killed around 12 scorpios in
the bugs in bamboo and
out of some wet bamboo, producing
a choking smoke which would drive
away not only the mosquitoes, but
every other living thing. After the
smoke cleared up we dried our wet
clothing and used salt to get the
leaves off our bodies.

The Kachins cooked some rice
and curry with red-hot pepper in it.
Every time I took a bite of the
curry, it was so hot I thought my
tongue had been dissolved. After
eating and giving our mouths first
aid, we listened to the Kachins
and Nagas sing in their native language
and watched them smoke opium in
their bamboo pipes.

Seeing how the natives lived
seemed like a dream. They ate all
kinds of jungle food, roots and ber-
ries, and they cooked stew out of
monkey meat and other wild game.
I did not like the idea of eating
monkey meat at first; it was like eat-
ing your next-door neighbor’s dog

"As we entered the
headhunter village, I
saw something that
brought me to
dead stop. There
were about 25 skulls
hanging outside one
of their bamboo
huts. I was looking
at some of the Naga
headhunters’ tro-
phies."

Kachins and I started out for
the Naga village. It was like all of
the head hunters, it was built on a hill
for protection against surprise
raids from other headhunters. As
we entered the village, one of the
Kachins informed us that it was the
first Americans ever to enter this vil-
lage. The Nagas were more savage
looking than the Kachins; they were
darker and more rugged. The men were
very little clothing, just G-strings
held by vine belts. They were very
muscular tribesmen covered their
arms and bodies. Each had a large
bone in the matted hair on the back
of his neck, for protection in the
event a headhunter from another
village attacked him with his head
and tried to cut off his head. Each
Naga carried a large razor-sharp
knife in a belt around his waist and
around his neck. He also carried a very
long spear.

As we entered the headhunter vil-
lage, I saw something that
brought me to a
dead stop. There
were about 25 skulls
hanging outside one
of their bamboo
huts. I was looking
at some of the Naga
headhunters’ tro-
phies."

or cat. In the months to come,
though, I would eat quite a bit of it,
so I sold many other things I
thought I would never eat.

We finally arrived at the village
of Hkllak-Ga. The Kachin jungle
people then started to inform on the
Japanese which we would radio
back. We were in bad need of
food, but the weather had worsened
and transport planes could not get
in to make an air drop. One of the
Kachin scouts said he knew of a
village about six miles away that
the Japanese had left.

The next morning three other
Americans — Oscar Creel, James
Medlin and George Phueher — 12
and about eight dozen eggs. In re-
turn we gave them sugar, salt and
oil. The headhunters had never
seen or tasted sugar before we
arrived in the jungle, and they called it
"sweet salt." After resting a little
and getting more gas information on the
enemy, we headed back to camp.

The next day our planes finally
got through the fog and dropped us
plenty of food and mail from home.
A week later, Lt. Col. Wilson radi-
ed us to return to Tagaq-Ga.
About two of our Kachin
informers returned in exhausted
condition. The Japanese had am-
bushed and killed most of their
group. Three of the Kachins were
captured and tortured to death.

The Japanese cut their tongues out,
cut the skin off the bottoms of their
feet and marched them through the
jungle before they shot them in the
head. We left the two Kachins at
Hkllak-Ga and headed back for
Tagaq-Ga.

Things were moving fast now; the
rainy season was ending, and more
and more troops were arriving.
Two Americans named Tuggle and
Reese were hidden with a band of
Kachins in a camp near
Shinghlwiyang, watching the move-
ments of Japanese patrols. Another
American named McCulloch and I
were to join them. They were noti-
fied that we were on our way and
were to send two of the
Kachins to the main trail to meet
us.

We left three days later, we passed
within ten feet of the two Kachins
and did not see them until they
called out. We left the main trail
and traveled a back trail to the hid-
ded Japanese. We always had
sharp guards posted; we did not want a
surprise attack from the enemy.

A few days later, McCulloch,
Tuggle, myself and 10 Kachins fol-
lowed a back trail to Shinghlwiyang
to collect information on how many
Japanese there were between
Shinghlwiyang and the main trail.
We arrived at Shinghlwiyang on the
flat land of the Huksang Valley by
the Chindwin River.

There were many refugees
died trying to walk out of
Burma after the Japanese invasion
in 1942. Some died of malaria,
some of typhus, and others of dys-
entery and starvation. Some were
so weak they just lay down and
died. There were hundreds of
skeletons, with clothing still intact,
lining side by side in small bamboo
lean-tos.

Around the first of November
1943, General Stilwell’s Chinese
troops were ready to make their big
push to rescue our men and
reopen the Burma road to China.
The Chinese 38th Division captured
Shinghlwiyang with little opposition,
but the Japanese put up a fight at
Ningam Sakan, and both sides had
heavy casualties.

Our group met Lt. Col. Wilson
in Ningam Sakan where we set up our
camp. The sound of mortar and
machine-gun fire could be heard all
night, and we slept very little.
We had been at Ningam Sakan about
10 days when Lt. Col. Wilson told
McCulloch, Tuggle and me that
we would be leaving with him early
the next morning. We left the
next morning with 29 Kachins to
infiltrate Japanese lines, spy on them and ra-
dio back information. Three days
later, south of Ningam Sakan, we
arrived at our destination and set up
Ningam Sakan, and both sides had
heavy casualties.

Our group met Lt. Col. Wilson
in Ningam Sakan where we set up our
camp. The sound of mortar and
machine-gun fire could be heard all
night, and we slept very little.

We had been at Ningam Sakan about
10 days when Lt. Col. Wilson told
McCulloch, Tuggle and me that
we would be leaving with him early
the next morning. We left the
next morning with 29 Kachins to
infiltrate Japanese lines, spy on them and ra-
dio back information. Three days
later, south of Ningam Sakan, we
arrived at our destination and set up
The Kachins cut some large green bamboo and used a section of it to cook the rice. The Kachins had the rice steaming in a nearby stream and had all the fish we could eat.

After three more days cutting our way through the thick jungle, we came out by the Chindwin River and made our camp. It was there we ran into a herd of wild elephants. One of the Kachins accidentally shot and wounded one of them; the elephants gave a howl and vanished back into the jungle. The two Kachins told us the elephants would come back after dark and stampede our camp. After dark, we heard the big elephants slowly coming back through the jungle toward our camp, and about a 2 a.m., they stampeded, tearing our bamboo huts down and throwing the into the jungle. Luck was with us; no one was killed or injured.

Fifteen days later, with no food to eat except what we found, our clothing torn, dirty and bloody, we cut our way out of the jungle and made our way down the trail where we first met up with a Chinese patrol. We went back through Ningam Sakan and then to a flying boat, where we were checked into Baggart's hospital for treatment of infections from the bites of leeches and blood flies. That is where we spent Christmas Day, 1943.

A short time after we arrived back in Shingbwayang, a company of Chinese arrived and set up camp on the west side of us. Just before dark another company of Chinese arrived and set up camp on the other side of us. Around 9 p.m., the two companies of Chinese got jumpy. Each company of Chinese assumed the other was Japanese; they began shooting at each other with us right in the middle. We made a dive into the trenches outside our bamboo hut. About 10 minutes later the Chinese realized they were fighting with each other and ceased firing. We were afraid to come out of the trenches. When I did return to my sleeping platform, I found nine bullet holes in my mosquito net. Shingbwayang had really changed since I had first arrived. It did not look the same place with all the skeletons crowded in one corner. Early in part of 1944, Merrill's Marauders began arriving in Shingbwayang, and after the many successful operations in the early jungle, it was quite a sight to see so many Americans.

Lt. Col. Wilson told McCullough and me that he had been given a rest leave for the two of us since we had been in the jungle for almost a year. Three days later, McCullough and I flew back on to Calcutta. We left Shingbwayang late in the afternoon and flew over Taung-Ga. The Ledo Road had already been built to that point, and it was quite a sight looking down on the road where we had previously walked miles and miles. The next day, we went to base headquarters, where we were given new clothing and shoes and were paid for the first time in 15 months. We left Ledo on an Indian train for Calcutta; five days later we arrived in Calcutta and reported to the rest camp.

All too quickly, our 10 days were up, and we were on that train headed back to Ledo. Arriving back at area headquarters, I was told that I would be assigned to Col. John B. Bennett with five additional men. Our destination was to be Fort Hertz, near the China border, where the British had an airstrip. We were flown straight to the best-up DC-3 and spent the night with the British. Early the next morning, we left by jeep and rode a day over the high mountain road arriving at a beautiful village which served as a British outpost. There were around 1,000 Gurka soldiers in the area.

The Gurkas were the top fighting men of India, and they, like the Kachins, were very dear to us when it came to fighting. Each Gurka carried a razor-sharp knife, but it was smaller than the knife carried by the Kachins. When I did receive a letter from him — if he pulled his knife from its case, he had to bring blood from someone, even if he had to cut himself.

Orders came for us to move south to a place called Laung-Ga, north of Sumpobrum to ambush Japanese convoys and find the location of a hidden ammunition dump.

Ledo with the fever. I was the only one of the original Americans who had not come down with it.

Two more Americans, James Fagan and Harry Graham, flew in as replacements. Shortly after their arrival, we traveled to the south of Sumpobrum to ambush Japanese convoys and find the location of a hidden Japanese ammunition dump somewhere along the main road by the Irrawaddy River. We were to return to the camp, giving details of the exact location to the Air Force.

Our group moved south along the Irrawaddy River. We had to be cautious of booby traps that had been placed along the barely visible trail. Sharp bamboo stakes had been placed in deep pits, and the pits were then covered with vines and leaves to make them look like part of the trail. When anyone fell into one of these pits, it was a quick death.

We found a good location on a mountain pass where the Japanese could not see us. Our group did not have to wait long before one of the Kachins spotted an old Japanese truck inching along the muddy jungle road about a quarter of a mile away. The Kachins held their fire until the truck was very close, but once they began firing, they fired continuously, shredding the canvas top and shattering the windshield. The two Japanese inside on top of the truck cab were cut in two by bullets and fell off the truck. The truck went out of control, hit the embankment and came to a stop with the driver falling out of the truck dead. By this time, the Kachins had circled the battle and were ready to do anything.

Ten more Japanese were found dead in the back of the truck; they all had beriberi and were being taken back to Myitkyina. The Kachins were going to kill all 10, but we stopped them. The prisoners were searched, their hands were tied, and they were ordered into the jungle. They could hardly walk, but they knew if they stopped the Kachins would kill them.

Two days after we returned to our campsite, we received word that one of our cargo planes had crashed into a nearby mountain, and the next morning we left four Kachins guarding the prisoners and went in search of the wreckage. We reached the wreckage in two days and found the plane scattered over the side of a mountain and five badly burned bodies in the wreckage. It was a gruesome job searching the debris; there was nothing we could do other than bury the men on the spot. We were then ordered to return to the camp, giving details of the exact location to the Air Force.

Our group moved south along the Irrawaddy River. We had to be cautious of booby traps that had been placed along the barely visible trail. Sharp bamboo stakes had been placed in deep pits, and the pits were then covered with vines and leaves to make them look like part of the trail. When anyone fell into one of these pits, it was a quick death.

We found a good location on a mountain pass where the Japanese could not see us. Our group did not have to wait long before one of the Kachins spotted an old Japanese truck inching along the muddy jungle road about a quarter of a mile away. The Kachins held their fire until the truck was very close, but once they began firing, they fired continuously, shredding the canvas top and shattering the windshield. The two Japanese inside on top of the truck cab were cut in two by bullets and fell off the truck. The truck went out of control, hit the embankment and came to a stop with the driver falling out of the truck dead. By this time, the Kachins had circled the battle and were ready to do anything.

Ten more Japanese were found dead in the back of the truck; they all had beriberi and were being taken back to Myitkyina. The Kachins were going to kill all 10, but we stopped them. The prisoners were searched, their hands were tied, and they were ordered into the jungle. They could hardly walk, but they knew if they stopped the Kachins would kill them.

Two days after we returned to our campsite, we received word that one of our cargo planes had crashed into a nearby mountain, and the next morning we left four Kachins guarding the prisoners and went in search of the wreckage. We reached the wreckage in two days and found the plane scattered over the side of a mountain and five badly burned bodies in the wreckage. It was a gruesome job searching the debris; there was nothing we could do other than bury the men on the spot. We were then ordered to return to the camp, giving details of the exact location to the Air Force.

Our group moved south along the Irrawaddy River. We had to be cautious of booby traps that had been placed along the barely visible trail. Sharp bamboo stakes had been placed in deep pits, and the pits were then covered with vines and leaves to make them look like part of the trail. When anyone fell into one of these pits, it was a quick death.

We found a good location on a mountain pass where the Japanese could not see us. Our group did not have to wait long before one of the Kachins spotted an old Japanese truck inching along the muddy jungle road about a quarter of a mile away. The Kachins held their fire until the truck was very close, but once they began firing, they fired continuously, shredding the canvas top and shattering the windshield. The two Japanese inside on top of the truck cab were cut in two by bullets and fell off the truck. The truck went out of control, hit the embankment and came to a stop with the driver falling out of the truck dead. By this time, the Kachins had circled the battle and were ready to do anything.

Ten more Japanese were found dead in the back of the truck; they all had beriberi and were being taken back to Myitkyina. The Kachins were going to kill all 10, but we stopped them. The prisoners were searched, their hands were tied, and they were ordered into the jungle. They could hardly walk, but they knew if they stopped the Kachins would kill them.

Two days after we returned to our campsite, we received word that one of our cargo planes had crashed into a nearby mountain, and the next morning we left four Kachins guarding the prisoners and went in search of the wreckage. We reached the wreckage in two days and found the plane scattered over the side of a mountain and five badly burned bodies in the wreckage. It was a gruesome job searching the debris; there was nothing we could do other than bury the men on the spot. We were then ordered to return to the camp, giving details of the exact location to the Air Force.
Some time later, two other Americans, an Australian named Willard and myself, were operating south of Sumprabum when we received a message telling us to check on a large bridge on the Irrawaddy river north of Myitkyina to see if our group could destroy it. The bridge was on the only road to Myitkyina from Sumprabum, and the Japanese were using it daily to transport supplies to Sumprabum. The bridge was deep in enemy territory and was guarded by enemy troops. As we penetrated the area close to the Japanese, the trail showed fresh enemy footprints. To keep the enemy from seeing us, we slipped off the trail back into the jungle. Two days later we arrived in the vicinity of the bridge. We found out it was well-guarded; in fact, it was suicidal for us to try to destroy it. We radioed the 10th AF headquarters to give them the details and location of the bridge.

The next morning at daybreak we spotted the bombers skimming low across the jungle. The gunners on the planes tried to silence the anti-aircraft gun emplacements around the bridge, but despite their strafing, the enemy anti-aircraft began firing. The planes maintained control and dropped their 500-lb. bombs, then dropped sharply to the river to stay away from the anti-aircraft. We saw the center of the bridge go down, and the bombers headed back to home base.

The British, Gurkhas and Kachins advanced southeast in the direction of Myitkyina, and we traveled with them. A week later, we came upon some Merrill’s Marauders coming down a jungle trail. The Marauders’ maimed and wounded in Burma were on a special field hospital with the Chinese Army, penetrating through one of the worst jungles in the world. The Marauders had spent a long way since I had first seen them in early 1944 at Shinghwiang; they had captured a village after arriving in Burma and had fought battle after battle. They had done an outstanding job, but the jungle was beginning to get the best of them. Many were sick with malaria, typhus and dysentery. They had been promised that after three months in combat they would be relieved, and this was true, but for some reason, that relief never came. General Stilwell had other plans — he was going to capture Myitkyina regardless of how long it took.

Detachment 101, one battalion of Chinese and one of Gurkhas connected, moved out and, after three days they stopped not far from the air strip at Myitkyina. The airstrip was surrounded by fields and very high elephant grass which enabled the men to spread out and crawl quite close to the airfield without being seen by the enemy. When the Americans attacked, the enemy was caught off guard and began to withdraw back into the defenses of Myitkyina. The Chinese, Americans and Kachins captured the airstrip May 17, 1944 with little opposition. The task of capturing this area fell to Stilwell, however, was delegated to the Chinese, and that was one of the worst mistakes the Americans ever made.

Although it was not known at that time, the Chinese leadership was sagging in the worst way. Two Chinese battalions moved forward to capture the city, and unknown to the Chinese, there were some Japanese snipers between their two battalions. The Japanese began shooting the Chinese like ducks on a pond, and when the Chinese returned their fire, the Japanese quickly slipped out of the area. The Chinese battalions lost communication with each other, and when the trouble really began, the two battalions attacked and nearly destroyed one another. When the fighting was over, more than 700 Chinese were killed, many of them from artillery fire. The Chinese ceased fighting, and both battalions were ordered to withdraw. An inexperienced Chinese battalion arrived to Myitkyina, where the Chinese who had just been fighting each other were Japanese, and the new arrivals were not prepared for the battle. At the time this mistake was discovered, it had cost the Chinese hundreds of wounded and dead.

The Japanese General Tanaka in charge of enemy troops realized how vital Myitkyina was and reorganized the Japanese lines. He had determined to hold the area at any cost. The Americans and Chinese had no idea that the Japanese had rushed more troops to Myitkyina from their garrisons below the city; the Japanese now had around 7,000 men in the area instead of 300.

The battle raged for nearly two months. Of the original Marauders who started out in northern Burma, only about 240 remained, and General Stilwell used every man who could fire a rifle. The hospitals were closely inspected, and many of the sick and wounded were brought to Myitkyina to fight. The heat was unbearable, and the enemy snipers kept us pinned down most of the time. Many of the men were beginning to look haggard; they were tired, dirty, wet and sick of the constant odor of dead bodies. Dysentry was getting very bad, and many of the wounded needed to be evacuated.

The Japanese made several counterattacks using knee mortars at point-blank range, but we always managed to throw them back. After the counterattack some of the men from the 290th Combat Engineers went out on patrol. When they returned, they told of finding 40 dead Japanese about 100 feet in front of us, killed by our machine-gun fire. The Japanese had dug tunnels under the railroad tracks, and in some of the tunnels they even had foxholes and bunkers dug out for sleeping. Day after day our planes bombed the enemy, but they continued to fight. They were near starvation and in disgrace, and at times they were slowly being killed off, but they still refused to surrender, and their resistance was fierce. Finally the Japanese began looking for a way to escape. Their only escape would be to head down the Irrawaddy River, and when they began slipping out in small groups and floating down the river on logs covered by freshly cut bushes. The Kachin Rangers farther downstream finally realized what the enemy was doing, and from then on, whenever a log or bush came into view on the river, the Rangers would shoot at it. The Americans were under heavy enemy fire, and casualties were high on both sides.

The conditions on the battlefield were a living hell. Week after week, the rains drenched the air strip; we were forced to stay in flooded foxholes and slit trenches in water up to our chests. Many of the men who had malaria died as a result of continually wearing wet clothing. The enemy we were fighting could not be seen at night. The Japanese would be dug in a few feet from us; we would throw hand grenades at them and they would roll them back.

“‘The heat was unbearable, and the enemy snipers kept us pinned down most of the time. Many of the men were beginning to look haggard; they were tired, dirty, wet and sick of the constant odor of dead bodies.’

The last of May 1944, the 290th Combat Engineer Battalion, after nearly a year of building parts of the Ledo—Burma Road, was abruptly ordered into battle at Myitkyina to help the Marauders. A few days later, the 236th Engineers were sent into battle also. Additional troops were rounded up and flown in from all over India, most of the men having just arrived from the States. They were shown how to fire their rifles on the plane before they landed at Myitkyina. The Americans were not under heavy enemy fire, and casualties were high on both sides.

The conditions on the battlefield were a living hell. Week after week, the rains drenched the air strip; we were forced to stay in
very few of the original Marauders were there to see the capture. In the battle of Myitkyina, only 29 prisoners were captured out of the Japanese 18th Division. General Mizukami, commander of the Japanese 18th Division, committed harakiri the day before the fall of Myitkyina.

Two days after the fall of Myitkyina, I was flown back to a rest camp in Calcutta with some of the Marauders. Two days later, I developed a severe headache. I went to the dispensary for some aspirin, but they took my temperature and found it to be 105 degrees. I was rushed to the 263rd General Hospital, where doctors told me I had contracted scrub typhus. For the next two weeks, I remained little; my fever was very high; my head felt like a large balloon; and my body felt as if it were being pulled apart. After two long weeks, the fever broke, but I weighed only 115 lbs. and was very weak. The doctors told me I was lucky to be alive, and that I still had been in the jungle, I would have never made it.

Four weeks later, I was released from the hospital, and I spent the rest of my leave in Calcutta. After that, I returned to Myitkyina and rejoined my outfit. Two weeks later, I volunteered for a special mission in China with a newly-named Waters. Two more Americans, James Hinton and Bob Crandle, were picked for the mission as well. We went on the books as the first combat unit to enter China from Burma. I spent most of my time on the trail with the Kachins, who did not come along very well with the Chinese, since some of the Kachin villages had been raided by the Chinese in the past.

Ten days after we left Myitkyina, we were crossing a small stream which was very muddy. About 40 feet from where I was, Hinton and me were two Chinese soldiers leading a pack mule across the stream. The pack mule stepped on a land mine, and the mule and the two Chinese were blown to bits. Later that day, we arrived at an open paddy field which looked like it might have been mined, too. Since we had no mine detectors to sweep the field, Maj. Wong, who was in charge of the Chinese, lined up about 100 Chinese, two feet apart, and marched them across the open field. The Chinese were in luck — there were no land mines to be found.

We were running out of supplies and since this field looked like a good place for an airstrip, we radioed our location. The following day was perfect for a drop. In a routine drop, the rice bags were always free-dropped from the plane, and the bags always came down like bullets. On this particular day, everything was going along fine until one of the Chinese soldiers watching the drop ran out on the field with stretched arms and attempted to catch one of the rice bags. Needless to say, he was buried when he caught the rice bag. He never knew what hit him.

A week later, as we entered China, we found the trail rising steeply and the mountains becoming higher in some places. The trail, attempts to lighten their loads, but two days later, we were forced to leave the mules and start up the steep incline on foot. It was rough climbing, and we could only climb for a few minutes before we would have to stop to catch our breath. We finally reached the crest of the mountains and it seemed as if we were on top of the world; the nights were so clear the destruction of the moon could be seen on the snowcapped mountain peaks, and miles below, a large Chinese village could be seen. The villagers informed us that the Japanese were in an old fort high in the Himalayas, and we had to begin climbing the steep mountains once again. Our clothing was not suitable for the cold — we had only half a blanket each and no gloves. As we approached the old fort, the Chinese spread out and crawled as close as they could, but the Japanese spotted them and opened fire. The attack was on.

The Chinese fought all the way up to the rock wall before the enemy realized we were new arrivals. We arrived later, and began to withdraw down the back side of the fort. The Chinese then captured the fort with little opposition.

Although the Kachins and Chinese kept fires going, Waters, Hinton, Crandle and I nearly froze that first night. We were in desperate need of food, blankets and warm clothing. After radioing our location, all we could do was wait and hope that the planes would be there soon. The following day visibility was impossible; we could hear the planes flying overhead, but they did not locate us. The next morning dawned bright and clear, and soon the sky was full of planes. They circled a few times before we knew it, the air was full of white parachutes driftling down to us with food and warm clothing.

We stayed at the old fort about three weeks before moving down through China gathering what information was available to us. A few days after we left, Hinton, the Kachins and I were leading the way down a rugged mountain pass with Maj. Waters, Crandle and the Chinese following. Unknown to us, the Japanese had set up an ambush in a well-camouflaged area on the trail. Suddenly the Kachins pushed Hinton and me into a ditch behind some large rocks and fell on us. I had no idea what was happening until the Japanese began firing at us with a machine gun. The Kachins seemed to have a slick sense that detected the Japanese long before we could. It's still a mystery how the Kachins knew, but they definitely saved us from certain death. The Japanese had us in a tight spot — they held the key to the pass and there was no other way around the mountain. The Kachins outsmarted the Japanese, however, by climbing the side of the steep mountain in order to get above them. After reaching the top, the Kachins carefully and quietly made their way to the ledge directly above the enemy, and then the Japanese busy by firing at them. Whenever the Chinese tried to advance, they were cut down by the enemy, but the Kachins were now in the right position and started firing at the Japanese continuously. The enemy was caught in a cross fire; when the main body of the Japanese realized they did not stand a chance, they began to withdraw down the mountain. We found 15 dead Japanese left behind and seven Chinese who were killed in the ambush; another 10 Chinese were wounded.

The next day we headed south, our destination being a large Kachin village along the China border. We arrived four days later at the village, where all of the villagers came out to welcome us. The headman told us it was a great honor to have us in his village, and we, in turn, were truly honored to receive such a welcome. The chief brought us 15 chickens, four pigs and 12 dozen eggs. He also told us he had ordered a feast for the next day.

The next day we were up bright and early for the celebration. The Kachins had built rows of bamboo tables out in the open. The Kachin food was highly seasoned yet delicious, and we all ate and drank until we could eat no more. It was a bright day — we arrived early morning at the Kachin village and headed for Bhamo, where the Japanese defenders were dug in against the Americans. We arrived in Bhamo a week later, the battle was well under way. A few days later, I contracted malaria and checked into a nearby U.S. field hospital. Twelve days later, I was released from the hospital and returned to headquarters in Bhamo, by which then had been captured.

The Japanese were in fast retreat. The Burma Road had been opened into China; Lashio had been captured and convoys were going into China with supplies. On Feb. 13, 1945, we left Bhamo, headed down the Burma Road to Lashio. When we arrived at Lashio, we found most of the town had been destroyed. We moved into one of the few remaining houses, a two-story wooden frame house previously occupied by Japanese.

I was still in Lashio April 12, 1945 when we received the news of the President Roosevelt's death. The following day the Americans, Chinese and Kachins assembled in an open field to pay their last respects to the late President's remains.

The war ended in Europe May 8, 1945. Everyone's records were checked, and anyone having 85 or more points would be flown back to the States for discharge. I had more than enough points, so on May 10 I left for the States. On May 24 I arrived in New York City. It was a good feeling to be back in the U.S.A.

On June 2, I was given an honorable discharge. I had been in service four years, four months and 12 days. When asked if I would do it all over again, my answer was, "If the conditions were the same, yes."
Psychological operations: the oldest weapon of mass destruction

by Lt. Col. John C. Reppert

“There is no simple formula for winning wars. Defeating enemy forces in battle will not always achieve victory. Other national instruments of power and persuasion will influence or even determine the results of war.”

-- FM 100-5, Operations

In this modern era of vast nuclear arsenals, million-dollar tanks and billion-dollar ships, as well as dreams of space defenses, who would argue that superior weapons and skill in combat would not win wars? The answer to that question is as surprising as it is long, for it includes many prominent practitioners of the “art of war.”

Doubts of the benefits of technology were raised in the long struggle against a well-equipped foe in Vietnam. They have certainly been re-emphasized by the movement of world attention from the threat of a superpower confrontation in Europe to the daily news of the “wars in the shadows,” the unconventional conflicts in Latin America, Africa and other locations where human will seems a more powerful force than weapons.

If we cannot buy victory, or even security, through advanced technology, what then are the “other instruments” which determine our success in war and our deterrence in peace? Among the most ancient and important is psychological operations.

Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese strategist, is called the first proponent of psychological operations for his advocacy of such positions as “All war is based on deception.” The enduring relevance of his teachings is seen in their use by one of the victorious Soviet leaders in World War II, Marshal Shaposhnikov. Shaposhnikov said: “The prerequisite of victory is to make proper preparations in the enemy camp so that the result is decided before the battle begins.” Sun Tzu had said more briefly, “The victorious army attacks a demoralized and defeated enemy.”

The question emerges whether psychological operations can still be a significant factor in determining the outcome of modern-day conflicts. To answer that question, the Soviet perspective on the issue is a good starting point. In their textbook Military Psychology, which is mandatory reading in each officer’s library, the Soviets note:

“In modern war soldiers will be subjected to unprecedented stress. This can lead to restricted mental activity, disruption of coordination, distortion in judgment, reduction in reaction and deterioration of thought. This is especially damaging considering the complexity of modern weapons. . . The imaginary fears created by psychological warfare may be more debilitating than the actual dangers of combat.”

Indeed, though stress-inflicted casualties are but one of the useful effects of PSYOP, they alone have been reported as one of the greatest influences on combat power in recent conflicts. In some cases, they are credited with as many “casualties” as all enemy firepower. This reporting comes from conflicts as disparate as the prolonged struggle in Vietnam and the short-duration high-intensity wars in the Middle East.

If we realize that PSYOP has been important in previous conflicts and that the Soviets consider that it will be important in a future conflict, shouldn’t we ask who controls this weapon? Though PSYOP is nominally assigned to the commanders of supported combat units at echelons from division through theater army, the truth is that its control is often left to the “experts,” the PSYOP personnel themselves. Comments are often heard that commanders “don’t understand the arcane science of psychological operations,” or that they are too tied up with “combat power.” Would these same commanders avoid using nuclear weapons or even conventional ordnance because they did not understand the basic principles of physics upon which they operate, or refuse air support because they did not understand aeronautical engineering?

There is a compelling reason for commanders and staffs at all levels operating across the spectrum of conflict, most particularly for special operations forces, to better understand the potential PSYOP offers and the means of employing it to obtain maximum impact.

Psychological operations specialists with extensive regional knowledge and language proficiency can assist commanders in defining what message a particular act might send or how to send the appropriate message to a selected target audience through words or actions. Without the advice of specialists, actions or messages may have devastating and unintended results, such as advertisements for the Red Cross in Moslem countries which may still associate the image of the


Special Warfare

This HMMWV with loudspeakers is one example of modern equipment being adapted to perform traditional psychological operations missions.


July 1988
cross more with hostile crusaders than with charity.
A second major use of PSYOP is in deterring aggressive action by a potential opponent. Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger defined deterrence as persuading an enemy in terms of his own perceptions that the cost of aggressions will outweigh probable gains. In the days of the Berlin Blockade it was the fierce determination shown by the airlift that convinced the Soviets to back down. At the low-intensity end of the spectrum, the Libyan expectation of an easy defeat of the Chadian irregulars was rapidly dissipated in 1987 by several days of successful Chadian attacks using lightly armed soldiers in pickup trucks.

Despite improvements in intelligence-gathering capabilities, leaders of nations and leaders of combat formations can still misread their actions. On final assessments of the consequences of their actions based on their perceptions of enemy potential and will. The ability to form and modify these perceptions will tell much of our ability to prevent the testing of either our combat potential or our will.

Once conflict has begun, PSYOP requires considerable capability to demoralize the enemy, to encourage surrender, or to confuse and deceive him as to the actual situation and possible courses of action. This brings us back simultaneously to aspects of the ancient wisdom of Sun Tzu and to hard modern reality. In terms of the ancient strategy, it is hard to improve upon Sun Tzu’s advice that defeating the enemy in battle is not the acme of military skill — to subdue the enemy without fighting is the highest skill.

Our period of greatest success in Vietnam has not been reflected in the weekly enemy body counts, but in the success of the surrender campaigns that periodically reduce the enemy’s fighting strength. The number of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong soldiers who turned themselves in to South Vietnamese authorities during the “Chiefs Hoo” surrender campaign, a joint U.S.-South Vietnam PSYOP effort, was reportedly 250,000. Such surrender campaigns not only remove an enemy from the battlefield, but they simultaneously add an ally. The hard reality of the present is that in many theaters we must be prepared to fight outnumbered and win and that new budgetary limitations mandate that we become smarter on doing more with less.

Finally, it is imperative to realize that every actual and potential enemy from the jungles of Southeast Asia to the plains of Europe can and will use psychological operations against our forces. The seventh of the Soviets’ 11 principles of military art calls for the use of extensive propaganda to motivate their own troops and demoralize the enemy. The Soviets, in particular, have created a large and complex structure with this specific mission. This “political officer” structure for the Soviets runs through its own chain of command from the Ministry of Defense to specially trained officers in every company-sized unit in the military. The campaigns, which are centrally controlled, are prepared to attack the U.S. military on every front from race relations to abhorrence of American civilians at home. Few who fought in Vietnam would deny that soldiers were sapped of their will to fight by their perceptions that they were abandoned by those at home and that they were politically denied the opportunity to win.

The Soviet military is assisted in psychological operations by a vast civilian apparatus which constantly works with various agencies and central press and challenges the legitimacy of the presence of U.S. forces overseas from Japan to Europe.

Professional PSYOP soldiers, through their study of communist techniques and experience in guaging the psychological thrust of various messages, can serve as the first echelon in uncovering the deception campaigns of the enemy designed to demoralize our forces. They can also advise the commander of effective means for restoring lost confidence and seizing the initiative in the war for men’s minds.

PSYOP offers a number of unique advantages. One is that it can be employed across the entire spectrum of conflict and, under certain circumstances, even during peace. While many sophisticated and important weapons are excluded from consideration in anything other than combat between the superpowers, the brilliant influence of the smallest propaganda operations can be felt with the personal experience by man.

For terrorists, years have been aware that they can capture not only a handful of prisoners by hijacking an airplane, but that they can capture the entire free-world press as a medium for messages by the same act. While we are all comfortable with the battle for “hearts and minds” at the low level of confusion, let us not forget that many experts of the time argued that the nuclear weapons used in Japan at the end of World War II would have a psychological effect that exceeded even their great physical destruction.

A second advantage is that PSYOP is a low-cost, economy-of-force operation which has special implications in an environment in which we are already and will become conscious of our limitations in rapid deployment. In its traditional deception role, PSYOP has been used repeatedly in economy-of-force operations. Publicly placed on full alert is far less expensive than moving them hundreds or thousands of miles, and it can obtain for U.S. forces the same effect of the tactical or operational level, a deception campaign could make sure the enemy was aware of “liberation” literature for a city or region which, in fact, was not a major focus of an offensive, thus diverting enemy forces to guard that area. On the strategic level, psychological operations were critical in raising the morale of resistance forces on the mainland of Europe prior to D-Day, thus dispersing German forces which otherwise could have been massed against the invasion. PSYOP cost is extremely low in the means necessary to achieve persuasion. Leaflets, presses, megaphones, loudspeakers and even the more advanced video technology necessary to disseminate messages cost only a fraction of any modern weapon system.

The greater price is in the training of highly skilled and officer specialists. These soldiers understand the power and techniques of influence and are focused in their training on a specific geographical region in terms of language skill and cultural knowledge. The skills necessary to conduct psychological campaigns are taught both officer and enlisted students at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg.

... properly used psychological operations can have devastating effects upon an enemy and can simultaneously steel one’s own forces against enemy attempts to undermine their spirit and will to fight.

The mainland of Europe prior to D-Day, thus dispersing German forces which otherwise could have been massed against the invasion. PSYOP cost is extremely low in the means necessary to achieve persuasion. Leaflets, presses, megaphones, loudspeakers and even the more advanced video technology necessary to disseminate messages cost only a fraction of any modern weapon system.

The greater price is in the training of highly skilled and officer specialists. These soldiers understand the power and techniques of influence and are focused in their training on a specific geographical region in terms of language skill and cultural knowledge. The skills necessary to conduct psychological campaigns are taught both officer and enlisted students at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg.

U.S. Army photo

Fixed and mobile printing plants add to the speed and sophistication of products which can be prepared by today’s psychological operations units.

July 1988

Special Warfare

Language schooling and area specialization are currently provided where available following the assignment of soldiers to their regionally oriented battalions. Even this investment in personnel training is a bargain because of the versatility of such specialists in both peace and war.

The third advantage is that psychological operations units are highly mobile, requiring for most missions special training and limited means for message dissemination. A fully operational nuclear force can often be deployed aboard a single aircraft. An entire battalion of equipment and supplies necessary for limited periods of operation throughout the entirety of many countries could be airlifted by three C-141 aircraft.

PSYOP units have readily deployable components which can be tailored to a particular situation and can provide expert advice to a commander already serving in the area. Other components can be prepared to conduct independent supporting operations through any of the dissemination media at their disposal. To increase this mobility, all active Army PSYOP units are now airborne organizations. This enables them to deploy directly with forces of the XVIIIth Airborne Corps or any element of the U.S. Special Operations Command.

The fourth and most important advantage is that properly used psychological operations can have devastating effects upon an enemy and can simultaneously steel one’s own forces against enemy attempts to undermine their spirit and will to fight. A leader of China far more modern than Sun Tzu, Mao Tse- tung, commented from his own experiences that “Weapons are not the decisive factor in war; it is man.” In his extensive treatise, War Through the Ages, Lynn Montross identifies the Crusades as the beginning of formal campaigns of propaganda to consciously mold mass opinion, although it may well predate this struggle. Alexander, Frederick the Great, Stonewall
joint-level headquarters into a position of operational command of all psychological operations assets of each of the services, including the active and reserve–component resources. This will further facilitate joint training and planning for each of the supported theaters. Despite their ancient lineage, American military psychological operations have been significantly transformed by recent innovations. One major area where this is evident is in terms of available technology. In this electronic era, VCR and audio cassettes may well be replacing other means of communication. Surveys even in less-developed nations indicate that they are the preferred means of communication for the most influential elements of society. The 4th PSYOP Group and certain reserve units have significantly upgraded their studio and field facilities for the production of audio and video tapes and live shows. The 4th PSYOP Group has achieved notable success in Central America through cooperation with host nations in the preparation and dissemination of radio and television products designed to illustrate positive aspects of mutual cooperation. American military personnel in the U.S. Southern Command are currently producing and distributing TV programs to accurately portray U.S. assistance programs and joint programs with host governments to encourage better relations with the United States. This has been widely applauded as a powerful support to our humanitarian assistance operations in countries such as Honduras and El Salvador.

Another important area of technological improvement is in print facilities. An entire new generation of fixed-installation and mobile printing plants is being fielded at this time. This adds to the speed and sophistication of products that can be prepared in any environment. A new series of tests is being run to evaluate portable computer systems with desktop-publishing capability to keep pace with the technological revolution. These computers rapidly integrate graphics and written messages and can store them for long-term use and instant retrieval. They can operate in a variety of alphabets used in the native languages of potential target audiences. Further, they can interconnect and transmit final products thousands of miles in seconds, wherever they can be linked with modern communications.

A second area of innovation is in the creation of psychological operations career fields. The recognition, particularly in the larger Army units, that this skill requires both extensive and intensive training has resulted in the creation of an enlisted MOS 96F and officer specialty code 39B for PSYOP specialists. This is designed to provide more thorough training throughout a military career and the opportunity for repetitive assignments using the skills acquired. Though still in its infancy, this new specialty has attracted some highly motivated and extremely talented soldiers anxious to make contributions to PSYOP.

A third major improvement has been in the expansion of joint exercises. In recent years theater commanders-in-chief have noted the potential value of PSYOP and have consciously expanded opportunities for PSYOP play through joint exercises. These joint exercises give psychological operations units from both active and reserve components increased opportunity to learn and operate in their assigned region and to work with specialists from the other services. They can also give units the chance to work alongside host-nation units in a mutual learning experience. This "hands-on" training in theater with allies best measures the abilities of psychological-operations units to perform their assigned missions and to better prepare themselves under the most realistic field conditions.

Current emphasis on the special operations community, of which psychological operations is now an integral part, has again highlighted its critical but often overlooked capacity. A military becoming smaller must become better to fulfill its missions. This means, above all, to become familiar with all available resources, new or old, and how to use them to the maximum advantage. As a powerful weapon in the war of persuasion, PSYOP remains capable of preventing conflict or playing a major role in achieving victory. <<

---

Jackson, George Patton, Ho Chi Minh and Johannes Savimbi have all well understood the value of breaking the will of the enemy and have found it preferable to the cost of achieving the total destruction of the enemy's combat might through direct confrontation.

Are resources currently available in the U.S. military inventory to accomplish these missions? The answer is a qualified "yes." The Air Force and Navy have both devoted resources to creating versatile and sophisticated means of dissemination, primarily through radio and television broadcast platforms. While these are worthy of their own consideration, primary focus here will be on the Army, which contributes the bulk of the forces in this sphere.

The current composition of psychological operations forces consists of four groups, each consisting of subordinate battalions and companies. Three of these groups are reserve–component forces, while one is active–component. Each of the three reserve groups and their subordinate units is regionally oriented and trained culturally and linguistically toward its designated theater. The one active–Army unit, the 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne), is stationed at Fort Bragg as part of the 1st Special Operations Command. It has four battalions, each focused upon a separate theater.

The creation of the U.S. Special Operations Command has for the first time brought an integrated...
Update

Waterborne Infiltration Course scheduled for FY89

A new course being developed by the Special Warfare Center and School’s Special Operations Advanced Skills Department will improve the ability of special operations soldiers to infiltrate and exfiltrate by water.

The six-week Waterborne Infiltration Course will emphasize small-boat, kayak and surface-swimmer operations. Subjects will include planning and operational considerations, nautical charts, tides and currents, use of the magnetic compass, launch and recovery procedures, at-sea rendezvous and navigation techniques.

The course will also include a one-week infiltration and exfiltration practical exercise which will require the students to perform extensive planning and coordination.

The first class of the new course is currently scheduled for January 1989, according to Capt. Patrick Desmond, chief of the Advanced

Special Warfare

Skills Department’s Waterborne Division.

Training will be conducted at the Waterborne Training Site near Key West, Fla., where the SWCS’s other waterborne courses — Combat Diver, Combat Diving Supervi-
sor, and Diver Medical Technician — are taught.

The course has been under develop-
ment since February of 1987, Desmond said. Units have been conducting the training on their own, but the new course will ensure that the training is standard for all soldiers.

The course will train active and reserve components of the Army and other DoD agencies. Applicants must meet the following requirements: be assigned to DoD in duties requiring skill in waterborne operations, have an APFT score or 206 with no less than 60 points in each category (for the 17-25 age group), and have a type-A physical within one year of the course completion date. No security clearance is re-
quired.

Applicants must be able to pass a swim test which consists of swimming 50 meters wearing boots and fatigues and completing a 300-meter surface swim using any stroke.

Interested applicants should submit training requests through their unit training officer. For more in-
formation, soldiers should contact SPC David W. Davis at AV 236-6629/8639.

Some SERE/terrorism classes canceled

Some classes taught by the SERE/ Terrorism Counteraction Depart-
ment have been canceled for FY 88.

Selected classes of the SERE

Level-C Course (high-risk) and Individu-
als’ Terrorism Awareness Course were canceled because of a current instructor shortage, accord-
ing to Maj. Steven Slade, assistant director of the SERE/Terrorism Counteraction Department.

Canceled are SERE Level-C Classes 15-88 (July 3-July 28), 17-88 (July 31-Aug. 24), and 19-88 (Aug. 28-Sept. 22). INTAC Class 5-10 (Sept. 25-30) has also been canceled.

In most cases, no students had been scheduled for the classes, Slade said, but soldiers who were planning to attend or to make applica-
tion for a specific class should check to see if they need to re-
schedule. Classes for FY 89 will run as scheduled, Slade said.

SERE to offer new course on anti-terrorism

A new joint-training anti-terrorism course at the JFK Center and School will teach officers and NCOs how to reduce their unit’s vulner-
ability to terrorism.

Terrorism Counteraction for the Tactical Operations Staff Officer is a one-week course designed for unit intelligence and operations officers and NCOs. The course will teach students to assess and reduce their unit’s vulnerability to terrorism while operating in or on their way to and from areas of high terrorist threat, said Maj. Steven Slade, as-
sistant director of the SERE/Terrorism Counteraction Department.

The course curriculum will in-
clude terrorist operations, threat as-
essment and threat vulnerability. Instruction will consist of classroom work and a 2½-day command-post exercise and workshop.

Students will also benefit from

the experience of the other stu-
dents, said Capt. Tim McEntee, chief of SERE’s Antiterrorism Divi-
sion. “The intel guys know where the threat is, and the operations guys can plan it. It brings the key players in to work together.”

Instructors and guest speakers will be drawn from all the services, McEntee said, since it is a joint-service course.

Attendance is open to all officers and senior NCOs who work in op-
erations or intelligence positions in the Army, Navy, Air Force, Ma-
ines or Coast Guard.

The course has been under develop-
ment by the SWCS and the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., for about a year. Slade said one NCO class ran in December and another is sched-
uled to begin in FY 88. Regular classes are scheduled to begin in FY 90, McEntee said. — Capt. Tim McEntee/AV 236-5606.

PSYOP enlisted now have own BNCOC

PSYOP enlisted soldiers now at-
tend a basic NCO course tailored for their military occupational spe-
cialty.

The course, developed by the Special Warfare Center and School’s Psychological Operations Department, is designed to train qualified enlisted soldiers in MOS 968 in common leadership skills, intelligence-related topics and MOS-specific subjects related to planning, developing and conduct-

ing a PSYOP campaign.

The active-component course, four weeks long, is being taught at the new SWCS BNCOC Academy. The first class ran June 5-July 1. The second class is scheduled for June of 1989. The PSYOP Department plans to run one per year.

The reserve-component BNCOC will be taught in two phases. The first phase will emphasize common leadership training; the second will cover MOS-specific subjects. Both phases will be taught at selected U.S. Army Reserve Forces Schools, such as intelligence collec-
tion and map reading; the second deals with PSYOP techniques and doctrine.

Soldiers may take both phases in residence or, if they at least have a year of service in a PSYOP unit, in the field. Soldiers may take the PSYOP Course offered by the Army Correspond-
ence Course Program in place of Phase I, Garrett said.

Resident courses are taught at the 2nd ITAAS at Fort Bragg; 4th ITAAS at Fort McCoy, Wis.; and 6th ITAAS at Los Alamitos, Calif. Regardless of whether soldiers choose the ACCP option or take both phases in residence, both phases of the reclassification pro-
gram must be completed by Sept. 30, 1989.

Soldiers who wish to apply for the ITAAS reclassification program should see their unit training offi-
cers. For more information, contact Richard M. Ruffin at AV 236-6088/3106.

Senior Warrant Officer Course to be taught at JFSDKWCS

Active and Reserve Special Forces warrant officers now have their own senior officer course at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. The Special Operations Techni-
cian Senior Warrant Officer Training Course, taught by the Special Operations Advanced Skills Depart-
ment, is a four-week course and will run two 12-man classes per year, according to CWO2 Al Childress of the Special Operations Advanced Skills Department. The course graduated its pilot class of 14 stu-
dents in December; the next class is scheduled to begin Sept. 30.

The senior course is designed to prepare its students for leadership, management and staff assignments in Special Forces units and on Army, combined and joint staffs, Childress said.

Training objectives of Army com-
mon and advanced special-opera-
tions subjects. Army-common sub-
jects include communicative arts, leadership and ethics, military his-
tory, employment and tactics of U.S. forces, program management, force integration, logistics and general subjects.

Advanced special operations subjects include low-intensity and counter civil affairs, psychological operations, threat, SERE overview, and duties of battalion intelligence and battalion operations officers.

Prerequisites for the course are that a warrant officer be a CW03 or promotable CW02. Special Forces warrant officers who want information about selection for the senior course should contact CW04 Don Needle, branch manager, at the Total Army Personnel Agency, AV 221-7841.—CW02 AI Childrens/AV 236-2155.

Work continues on new civil affairs TOE

Civil affairs units will soon have new tables of organization and equipment to reflect their foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare and general-purpose missions.

The new TOE will include battalions especially trained and equipped to train Special Forces detachments and foreign personnel how to plan and conduct civic-action and civil assistance programs. The FID and UW battalions will be assigned to the theater army commander to support other special operations units.

General-purpose civil-affairs battalions will continue to support conventional units under the theater army commander by working with civil authorities and military forces to minimize civilian interference with military operations.

The Army Training and Doctrine Command contracted the job of writing the TOE to a civilian contractor, and completed sections were reviewed in March by a board composed of representatives from civil affairs units in the United States and the JFK Special Warfare Center and School. The TOE went to the contractor for final preparation before being submitted to TRADOC in late May.

The new TOE is scheduled to go into effect in FY 91.

Civil Affairs Department to develop new training

The Civil Affairs Department of the Special Warfare Center and School will develop new doctrine and training to support the new civil affairs tables of organization and equipment.

The Civil Affairs Officer Course, taught to active-duty officers, will be redesigned to include FID and UW training, and the department will begin developing new Army Readiness Training and Evaluation Programs, said Lt. Col. Larry Wayne, deputy director of the Civil Affairs Department. ARTEPs will be tailored to the various geographic regions in which the units operate.

FM 41-5 submitted for printing

The final draft of FM 41-5, Joint Manual for Civil Affairs, is complete and has been submitted for printing, according to Lt. Col. Larry Wayne, deputy director of the Civil Affairs Department.

The existing FM 41-5 was written in 1946, and the new manual will provide much-needed guidance on conventional parachutes, and jump injuries or equipment damage can be technical.

The SWCS imposed its own requirement that the new parachute have a maximum forward drive than the MCI-1B. The forward-drive modification will be quickly apparent to observers, Walls said, because the changes in the material gives the modified area the appearance of the letter H.

The parachute was developed by the Aerocenter, a development and Engineering Center in Natick, Mass., using the MCI-1B as a base model for development and improvement, Walls said. Testing of the parachute was done at Fort Bragg by the U.S. Army Airborne and Special Operations Test Board during 1987.

The MCI-1C uses the standard MCI-1B harness, pack tray, employment bag and packing procedures. It is designed to be as reliable and easy to maintain as its predecessor, Walls said.

Work under way to develop desert mobility vehicle system

Special operations soldiers may soon have vehicles specially suited for transportation in desert areas.

Work has been under way since 1984 on a desert mobility vehicle system, according to Maj. David Bergum of the SWCS Directorate of Combat Development. The Army Development and Employment Agency has conducted two appraisals for the system, which which might be included in the system.

During the first evaluation in June of 1984, soldiers in 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group tested the Army's High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle in the desert at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, and Fort Bliss, Texas. The HMMWV met or exceeded the requirements set by SWCS, and its maintenance and reliability records were excellent, Bergum said.

The second appraisal was done in July and August of 1987, again by soldiers of the 1st Bn., 5th SF Gp. This time they evaluated HMMWVs modified for desert operations along with other proposed elements of the system — cargo and weapons carriers, trailers, 250–350cc motorcycles, vehicle ignition systems and inter-vehicle communications equipment, Bergum said.

Based on the results of the second evaluation, Bergum said, ADEA concluded that the DMVS should be fielded as a complete system.

The system includes all elements of the Desert Mobility Vehicle System, according to Maj. Robert Adolph, chief of the Special Operations Proponent Office at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

Based on a request by the SWCS, Adolph said, the Defense Intelligence Agency has now approved soldiers in FA 39 and MOS 969F to study under the program.

Programs may consist of language training and area studies or language training only. Priority is given to languages of the Third World, Adolph said, but other languages may qualify if they are relevant to research. Area studies may include graduate or undergraduate courses.

Ike will encompass 3–for–1 serv- ice obligation and a follow–on ass- ignment using the language or area studied, Adolph said. For more information, sailors should contact Maj. Robert Adolph at AV 239–9002/5559 or S. H. Adolph, JR, ISS, AV 233–3032/2117.
From the Japanese attack on the Philippines (Dec. 8, 1941) until his departure for the U.S. (June 20, 1945), it is one of the many small ironies of war that Ray Hunt came to the Philippines as an aircraft mechanic because of his determination not to serve as an infantryman. Though he began working as a maintenance technician in Capt. Ed Dyess’ 21st Pursuit Squadron on Bataan, it was not long before Hunt found himself serving as an infantryman after all. It was a role which he was to fill for three long years.

Lessons came quickly during those early days. Told by “a real infantryman” that his rifle was his best friend, a bemused Hunt soon learned the wisdom of the man’s words. The savagery of his Japanese opponent was another fact that the young soldier learned painfully, seeing a helpless American pilot machine-gunned in his parachute by Japanese fighter planes and wounded Americans cruelly bound used by Japanese infantrymen as decoys to draw out more targets. When U.S. forces on Bataan surrendered, Hunt was an unwilling participant in the infamous Death March. Though weakened by thirst, hunger and disease, he managed to escape along the route and was nursed back to health by sympathetic Filipinos and an American plantation owner.

The next three years were filled with danger, toil, worry and occasional humor. The Japanese were a ruthless enemy, and Hunt’s growing guerrilla organization had to contend with rival Hukbalahap (communist) groups, bandit gangs, and guerrillas and Filipino collaborators as well. Some of the situations and people he dealt with had large roles to play in the future. For example, the Hukbalahap guerrillas fought on from 1946 until 1953 in an attempt to take over the Philippines, and two of the men Hunt dealt with, Manuel Roxas and Ferdinand Mar- cos, later became president.

Many of the books about the guerrilla war in the Philippines (We Remained, Blackburn’s Headhunters, American Guerrilla in the Philip- pines, etc.) were published relatively soon after the war ended. Hunt waited 40 years to write his book — years he spent in part reflecting on the war and on considerations beyond his own role in the fighting.

The short essay on guerrilla warfare which begins Chapter 6 is worthwhile reading for anyone enamored of the subject. Hunt’s discussion of treachery, ineptness and bloody reprisals should convince anyone that guerrilla warfare is neither a romantic pastime nor an inexpensive form of warfare. His evaluation of the historical role of the United States in its dealings with the Philippines is worthwhile, whether the reader agrees with his conclusions or not. All things considered, Hunt’s book has a depth which makes it far more than just another war story.


James Adams is the defense correspondent for the Sunday Times of London. After a visit to Fort Bragg last August, he prepared an article presenting a less-than-complimen- tary view of the special-operations capabilities exercise he witnessed at Matt Lake. Adams may have been working on Secret Armies at the time of his visit. If so, his general opinion of U.S. special operations doesn’t seem to have changed much in the course of completing the manuscript.

Secret Armies is a somewhat broad-brush examination of the special operations forces of several countries. A great deal of space is given over to Soviet, Chinese, British and French forces, and an appendix provides a brief but useful description of those of other European nations. Because of differences in the po-
bias toward conventional forces — even in the face of Congressional mandates — seriously weakens the West's ability to defend itself. One finds the size and level of readiness of Soviet SOF to be a particular threat to the conventional-minded U.S. military leadership.

Though I agree with many of Adams' conclusions, this cannot be a completely favorable review. Unfortunately, Adams makes several outright errors in fact. For example, he says that Col. Russell Volkman (a WWII Philippine guerrilla leader and a central figure in the founding of U.S. Army Special Forces) was a veteran of the OSS, which he assuredly was not.

Adams also states that Special Forces were not deployed in Korea during the war, which is patently false. In limited numbers and with little success (because of lack of language skills and use as individuals rather than teams), Special Forces soldiers were sent to Korea early in 1953. Adams' statements concerning the origins of the early Special Forces Operation Blue Light also foster confusion regarding that organization. Such mistakes do not detract from the validity of the author's conclusions, but they are disappointing in an otherwise well-witten study.


The latest offering in the Presidio Press Power Series, this book presents a lavishly-illustrated look at U.S. Army Special Forces — where they came from, who they are, what they do and a bit about how they do it. More importantly, the book presents an examination of the essential philosophy of conflict embodied by SF. The intent of the Power Series is to present an up-close and personal view of a specific military community. Books in the series are not meant to be scholarly histories or detailed unit unique picture which goes far in capturing the essence of Special Forces without permeating the myths which burden some similar works.


This book first appeared in 1973 as Center for Military History Publication 90-23, one of a group of books concerning various aspects of America's experience in Vietnam. It is a good basic history of Special Forces' major involvement, though it adds only a few "official" sources and thus leaves itself open to potential criticism from those who maintain a jaundiced view of the mission and purpose of Special Forces.

Kelli gives a good description of Special Forces in the unconventional warfare role — training, advising and assisting in the creation of a fighting force from the indigenous population. He also notes that Special Forces contribution to the development of intelligence through its reconnaissance mission (Projects Delta, Sigma, Omega, etc.). Other aspects of Special Forces involvement are covered as well — psychological operations, strike operations, civic action and the logistics necessary to support them.

All the above reviews were written by Fred Fuller, reference librarian for the Special Warfare Center and School's Marquart Memorial Library.


At 5:30 a.m. on Dec. 16, 1944, the German Army launched a mighty offensive in the Ardennes "Ghost Front" that achieved complete tactical and strategic surprise and nearly split the Allies in what has come to be known as the "Battle of the Bulge." In the end, the Allies turned the tide but suffered 78,000 killed, wounded, captured or missing (including 10,000 soldiers of the U.S. 306th Infantry Division who surrendered within 24 hours of being cut off by the Germans). The surprise attack set off an intelligence scandal equal to that of the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor and the 1983 destruction of the Marine garrison in Beirut.

Altogether numerous books and movies have exhaustively described the conventional aspects of the Battle of the Bulge. Ardenne: The Secret War provides an excellent outline of the causes of the intelligence debacle and competently details the scope and sizes of German special operations in support of the offensive.

Whiting describes the pervasive complacency on the Allied side of the line in the fall and early winter of 1944. Based on the deeply-held belief that Germany's industrial nation incapable of major offensive operations, U.S. tactical and strategic intelligence atrophied.

Included in Whiting's description of the debacle are numerous anecdotes of ineffective value to contemporary intelligence soldiers. Foremost, there was overreliance on technical intelligence obtained by breaking the code on the German encryption system Enigma — the Germans did not use Enigma channels in preparing the offensive. U.S. line commanders from company to division level operated on a "9-5" basis and disregarded tactical intelligence collection against the enemy opposite their positions. At night the Germans conducted aggressive and generally unimpeded patrolling behind American lines, including one patrol that successfully stole an intact Sherman tank. Of equal or greater interest is Whiting's description of the rapid organization and execution of German special operations. He gives coverage to Dr. Karl Recknagel's covert weather teams which operated north of the Arctic Circle to give the Germans advance weather forecasting. The last unit of the German military to surrender to the Allies was one of these teams.

The author also gives substantial attention to Abwehr Colonel Her- man Giskes' artful and efficient campaign of true-blue and false-blue espionage and disinformation. This propaganda campaign included the use of refugees and communist sympathizers who worked in tandem with other elements of German intelligence to completely fool Allied intelligence as to German intentions. Whiting describes the desperate battle behind enemy lines of Baron von der Heydte's scattered paratroop commandos. He also discusses the devastating pseudo-operations of SS Colonel Otto Skorzeny's Panzerbrigade 150 and Strelau Unit, consisting of English-speaking Ger- mans disguised as Americans and used for long- and short-range reconnaisance, sabotage, spying and combat assaults.

Whiting's book is a valuable addition to the libraries of enthusiasts of military intelligence or special operations. It contains valuable lessons by example in tactical and strategic operations security, deception and the use of special operations in support of combined-arms offensives. It also contains interesting tangents such as descriptions of the British effort to blind Hitler and Mussolini with poison gas and to put female sex hormones in Hitler's garden-grown vegetables. Overall, it also provides food for thought as to the role of U.S. or Soviet special operations forces in the AirLand Battle.

Capt. William H. Burgess III Fort Richardson, Alaska

Book reviews from readers are welcome and should address subjects of interest to special operations forces. Reviews should be about 400-500 words long (approximately two double-spaced typewritten pages). Include your full name, rank, daytime phone number (preferably a military number), and your military address. Send review to: Editor, Special Warfare, USAF/FSKWS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.