OFFICIAL DISTRIBUTION TO UNITS: Active Duty and Reserve special operations units can subscribe to Special Warfare at no cost. Just email the following information to SpecialWarfare@socom.mil

- Unit name / section
- Unit address
- Unit phone number
- Quantity required

INDIVIDUALS: Personal subscriptions of Special Warfare may be purchased through the Government Printing office online at:

ON THE COVER
Lithuanian Special Operations Soldiers train in the same dense forest where their predecessors, the “Forest Brothers,” fought against the Soviet occupation.

Photo Courtesy of the Lithuanian Armed Forces

CONTENTS

ARTICLES
06 | SOCEUR Overview
08 | In Depth: SOCEUR Commander
10 | Regional Threat Overview
12 | A Legacy of Resistance
14 | The ROC
17 | Survivability: Medical Support to Resistance
22 | Resistance, Resilience, and Everyday Citizens as an Element of National Power
26 | A History of Resilience
30 | The Whole-of-Society Approach
32 | War After War
36 | Si Vis Pacem, Para Bellum
   (If You Want Peace, Prepare For War)
38 | Leveraging STRATCOM
44 | Propaganda
46 | Latvia: A Country of Tenacity and Resilience
50 | Estonian Defense
53 | Supporting the Homeland: The Role of the Estonian Women’s Voluntary Defense Organization
56 | Countering Malign Influence in Estonia

DEPARTMENTS
FROM THE COMMANDANT 04
FROM THE EDITOR 05
BOOK REVIEW 58
CAREER NOTES 59

SUBSCRIBE
ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: Special Warfare welcomes submissions of scholarly, independent research from members of the armed forces, security policy-makers and shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists and civilians from the U.S. and abroad. Manuscripts should be 2,500 to 3,000 words in length. Include a cover letter. Submit a complete biography with author contact information (i.e., complete mailing address, telephone, fax, e-mail address).


Articles that require security clearance should be cleared by the author’s chain of command prior to submission. A memo of the security clearance should be forwarded with article. If the article talks about a specific theater special operations command, the article will be forwarded to the TSOC for clearance.

PHOTO AND GRAPHIC SUBMISSIONS: Special Warfare welcomes photo submissions featuring Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and/or Special Forces Soldiers. Ensure that all photographs are reviewed and released by the unit public affairs officer prior to submission.

Special Warfare accepts only high-resolution (300 dpi or greater) digital photos; be sure to include a caption and photographer’s credit. Do not send photos within PowerPoint slides or Word documents.

Photos, graphics, tables and charts that accompany articles should be submitted in separate files from the manuscript (no embedded graphics).

SUBMISSION REVIEW AND PUBLICATION: All submissions will be reviewed in a timely manner. Due to the volume of submissions we receive, we cannot reply to every submission. However, we do review and appreciate every submission. If your content meets the goals and requirements, we will be in touch. There is only one editor on staff and while in edit or layout phase of the upcoming magazine, new submissions will not be reviewed until complete.

Please note that submitted content is not guaranteed to be published in Special Warfare. There are several factors that determine what content is ultimately published including time and space availability, the approved editorial outline and theme, as well as relevance to the Special Warfare target audience and mission.

Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all contributions. Special Warfare will attempt to afford authors an opportunity to review the final edited version; requests for changes must be received by the given deadline.

No payment or honorarium is authorized for publication of articles or photographs. Material appearing in Special Warfare is considered to be in the public domain and is not protected by copyright unless it is accompanied by the author’s copyright notice. Published works may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and the authors.

SUBMIT ARTICLES FOR CONSIDERATION TO:
E-mail: SpecialWarfare@socom.mil or via regular mail: USAFKSWCS; Attn: A0JK-PAO;
Editor, Special Warfare
3004 Ardennes St., Stop A
Fort Bragg, NC 28310

FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONTACT THE SPECIAL WARFARE STAFF AT:
Commercial: (910) 432-5703
DSN: 239-5703
E-mail: SpecialWarfare@socom.mil

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly publication of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, N.C. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and should be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare, USAFKSWCS, 3004 Ardennes St., Stop A, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: DSN 239-5703; commercial (910) 432-5703, fax 432-6950 or send e-mail to SpecialWarfare@socom.mil.

Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material. Published works may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and the authors.

Published works are reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and the authors. Official distribution is limited to active and reserve special operations units. Individuals desiring private subscriptions should forward their requests to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Special Warfare is also available on the Internet (https://www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWmag/swmag.htm).
President George W. Bush made a solemn promise to the people of the Baltics 17 years ago. That promise was one of not only support, not only protection, but also of friendship. The speech given in the Old Town Hall Square in Lithuania’s capital Vilnius, marked the date NATO decided to invite Lithuania and six other countries to join the alliance. The historic speech marked an historic event that impacted not only Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia — the countries addressed in this issue — but was also an important date for NATO.

Today, Army Special Operations are living up to that promise as they work side-by-side with their partners in countries like Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. In this issue of Special Warfare, we will continue to explore the idea of resistance and Army Special Operations unique role in supporting our partner forces through unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense.

The relationships ARSOF Soldiers make today in countries throughout Europe are key in the competition phase and cannot be ignored. The long-standing friendship and partnership between the United States and these historic partners are key in countering Russian aggression in the Baltic Region.

“The long night of fear, uncertainty and loneliness is over. You're joining the strong and growing family of NATO. Our alliance has made a solemn pledge of protection, and anyone who would choose Lithuania as an enemy has also made an enemy of the United States of America. In the face of aggression, the brave people of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia will never again stand alone”

— President George W. Bush, Nov. 23, 2002
There are places you go throughout the world where you can physically feel the history, the pain and the triumph of a place or its people. We found one of those places several years ago when we visited Goree Island off the coast of Senegal. There, European traders would sell slaves, put them on boats and send them around the world. The evil of the place was palpable.

I thought never to find another place like that — but I was wrong. During a recent visit by Special Warfare to Lithuania, we visited the Museum of Occupations and Freedom Fights, which is located in the historic heart of Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania. The museum illuminates the 50-year Soviet occupation of Lithuania, which started in World War II and even later, and the students who started the Singing Revolution of the ’90s, today’s citizens are sworn to protect the sovereignty of their countries. The citizens are sworn to defend their nation if an invader comes. Each country has volunteer forces who work in normal occupations day-to-day, but prepare for the day their sovereignty is in jeopardy.

Everyone — the young and the old; men and women — has a role in the defense of their nation and they take it quite seriously. Multiple organizations exist, with each allowing a certain segment of the population to take part in the defense of their homeland.

For those whom have truly lost their freedom, protecting it is the highest priority. You can hear the resolve in their voices when they talk about it, one theme is repeated often in each Baltic country — never again.

Like the Forest Brothers who fought in the woods throughout World War II and even later, and the students who started the Singing Revolution of the ’90s, today’s citizens are sworn to protect the sovereignty of their countries. The citizens are sworn to defend their nation if an invader comes. Each country has volunteer forces who work in normal occupations day-to-day, but prepare for the day their sovereignty is in jeopardy.

For those whom have truly lost their freedom, protecting it is the highest priority. You can hear the resolve in their voices when they talk about it, one theme is repeated often in each Baltic country — never again.

U.S. ARMY PHOTOS
MISSION SOCEUR employs Special Operations Forces across the U.S. European Command area of responsibility to enable deterrence, strengthen European security collective capabilities and interoperability and counter transnational threats to protect U.S. personnel and interests.

VISION SOCEUR will integrate with the USEUCOM components and the Interagency to achieve USEUCOM theater objectives. SOCEUR will preserve its distinct theater operational response capability through a culture of readiness, decentralized mission command, and empowered tactical operators. The priorities for SOF operational employment are to gain and maintain persistent access to areas of potential conflict and violent extremist organizations areas of operations, to enable preparation of the environment tasks in support of USEUCOM OPLANs and CONPLANs, while assuring our European Allies and partners of U.S. commitments to bilateral and NATO obligations.

ABOUT Across Europe, our adversaries are challenging national sovereignty, alliance solidarity and U.S. resolve. Within this contested environment, SOCEUR is uniquely postured to galvanize the interagency with allies and partners to counter malign influence, build cohesion, rapidly respond to emerging threats, and if necessary, defeat aggression.

LINES OF EFFORT
» Respond to Crisis
» Counter Russian Malign Activities
» Prepare for Conflict
» Counter Designated Threat Networks

MAJOR ANNUAL EXERCISES
» Jackal Stone: A bilateral counter terrorism exercise that focuses on crisis response at the tactical and operational level, leveraging interagency and host nation capabilities.

» Trojan Footprint: A SOCEUR-led regional exercise that rotates between the Baltic and Black Sea regions, incorporating multiple NATO Allies and partners. The exercise focuses on mission command at the Special Operations Task Group, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Group and Joint Forces Special Operations Component Commander levels across multiple nations to set conditions for larger combined, joint full-spectrum warfare.

ORGANIC COMPONENTS
» 352d Special Operations Wing
» 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne)
» Naval Special Warfare Unit 2
» SOCEUR Signal Detachment, 112th Signal Battalion (Airborne)
» Joint Special Operations Air Component-Europe

APPORTIONED FORCES:
» 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne)
» 92nd Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne)
» 6th Psychological Operations Battalion (Airborne)
» Special Operations Detachment – Europe, 19th Special Forces Group (Airborne)
SOCEUR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

SOCEUR’s area of responsibility is derived from EUCOM’s area of responsibility, consisting of 51 independent countries that extend from Greenland east through the European continent and all of Russia, and south of the continent to include the Mediterranean Sea, south to the Caucasus Region and Israel.

**BALKANS**
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia

**HIGH NORTH (BALTICS)**
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Sweden

**BLACK SEA**
Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine
**Q & A WITH THE SOCEUR COMMANDER**

**MAJOR GENERAL KIRK W. SMITH, U.S. AIR FORCE**

**Q:** Broadly speaking, what does your Command focus on in Europe?

**A:** As the Theater Special Operations Command for U.S. European Command, we are responsible for the employment of special operations across a 51-country area of responsibility. The focus ranges from ensuring our forces maintain a high state of readiness to respond to a crisis, strengthening relationships with our Allies and partners through training and other activities and bringing unique capabilities to the overall joint force.

SOF does not work in a vacuum in Europe. Instead, it functions as part of a larger operational and strategic framework, not only within EUCOM, but also in coordination with the Department of State, combined with our allies and partners.

The long-standing and mature relationships we developed, both within our government and particularly amongst our allies and partners, are oftentimes our most valuable assets. Most of the countries that deployed with us both in peacekeeping and combat operations around the world are from the European theater. We can build cohesion and galvanize support amongst a wide variety of agencies and partners to accomplish objectives.

Furthermore, competition goes beyond deterrence, which is closely related as a physical manifestation of competition. It’s important to send a clear signal both in our readiness, capabilities and will that we will support our NATO allies and partners. However, it goes much deeper into building, maintaining and maturing relationships. It’s not as much about competing for influence as it is in ensuring we make every effort by investing in relationships and improving our integration with our partners and allies.

**Q:** What role does Resistance and Resilience play in SOCEUR’s overall effort?

**A:** How can we best support our allies in their national defense planning? What unique capabilities and relationships can SOF bring and leverage to that effort? These are the discussions that led to the ROC. Resistance is one option within a range of contingencies to preserve or restore sovereignty in the face of an illegal invasion, incursion or occupation. It’s something you have to plan for in advance. By discussing these ideas now, it contributes to the ability of our Allies to strengthen the overall resilience of their populations.

What’s more, the ROC provides a framework that can lead to discussion beyond the Baltics. We are currently looking at our allies and partners across Europe to respond to their interest in exchanging ideas about resistance and resilience as a framework for defending national sovereignty.

**Q:** Although this issue of Special Warfare focuses on Resistance concepts in the Baltics, the Black Sea region is a major focus area for the command. In terms of Russian malign activity, what kind of things are you observing in this region?

**A:** More so than any other area in Europe, Russia is overtly active with its military in the Black Sea, and illegally occupies portions of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Both our NATO allies and partners are obviously concerned about this, and so we are engaged with our counterparts to ensure it’s clear that we, both as U.S. SOF and EUCOM, are clear about our commitment to our NATO allies and broader stability in the region.

**Q:** SOCEUR recently held its Trojan Footprint exercise for the first time in the Black Sea region. What is U.S. SOF doing in this area?

**A:** Primarily we are training with, and alongside, our allies and partners, strengthening and demonstrating relationships that we’ve built over decades, and providing advice on the refinement of their special operations defense institutions. As with most European countries, most of our allies and partners in the region have very capable tactical SOF units. Where we focus then is on the ability to command and control at echelon, with our partners, in either NATO or multilateral constructs. This year’s Trojan Footprint was a prime example, where we had 10 nations working together, including the Hungarian-led Regional Special Operations Component Command, a regional initiative to form an operational-level SOF command between five nations.

**Q:** What lessons from the past 18 years in the Middle East has SOF taken away and applied in countering Russia/great power competition as outlined in the National Defense Strategy?

**A:** We haven’t been fighting in the U.S. Central Command area by ourselves. Most of our key allies there are the same countries we work with every day, so both in terms of our relationships and our ability to integrate, as well as simply our combat readiness, it’s never been better. With respect to specific lessons from the nature of that conflict, they are very different. However, from a special operations perspective, both state and non-state actors use networks. What we’ve gained in the past two decades is a better understanding of human networks, and the importance of building coalitions and shared understanding.
Q: What are U.S. Special Operations Forces doing in Ukraine?

A: We work closely with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense to advise on the further development of Ukrainian SOF institutions. Most notably, we participate in the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine effort as part of our ongoing efforts to contribute to Ukraine's long-term military reform and to help improve Ukraine's internal defense capabilities and training capacity. This effort is part of our long-running defense cooperation with Ukraine, and is taking place at the invitation of the Ukrainian government.

Our primary effort as part of JMTG-U has been assisting our Ukrainian partners in the refinement of their assessment, selection and qualification of their special operations forces. From an institutional standpoint, we advise the Ukrainian Special Operations Command on a variety of topics ranging from structure to equipment.

When we were first asked in 2015 by Ukrainian SOF to assist with their qualification course, U.S. SOF provided a large portion of the class material. Now after multiple iterations, there’s not only a large number of graduates of this new course, but an experienced cadre of trainers who have taken over full responsibility for the training program. Our Soldiers provide advice and assist them with further refinements from an institutional standpoint.

Q: What is your command doing to counter threat networks? What does that look like in Europe?

A: Unfortunately there’s been several high-profile attacks in Europe in the last few years, so it’s very much something our allies and partners are concerned about. However, it’s very much a policing function instead of military for most of our partners. As U.S. SOF we are not asked to conduct raids or anything like that, most of our partners have extremely competent counter-terrorism skills. For us, it’s about relationships and as SOF we’re positioned to assist our allies and partners best by being able to connect them to resources and in some cases, provide training. For example, we bring embedded intelligence and law enforcement access, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations forces.

Q: What kinds of activities do you see Russia conducting in the Balkans and what is your command doing to counter them?

A: The Balkans are a place where Russia considers certain nations in its sphere of influence going back for more than a century. They are very keen to retain their military influence there, both in terms of their relationships and other efforts to influence the populations through disinformation and other means. For example, Montenegro recently convicted two suspected Russian GRU, the foreign military-intelligence agency of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, agents in absentia in May for their role in an attempted coup against the legitimate, pro-Western government in 2016.

We’ve maintained a consistent presence and assisted partners that we’ve worked with in the region, whether that’s through combined training, exercises, providing subject-matter expertise, etc. Engagement by SOF Civil Affairs, in conjunction with civil society, the inter-agency (DoS, United States Agency for International Development, etc) and/or host-nation government, enables efforts to reinforce legitimate governance and build resilience among at-risk populations. Feedback reinforces the transformative impact U.S. SOF partnerships in these activities can have. The success of those relationships has attracted new partners who have seen that we are invested in promoting security in the region and not merely our own interests.

Q: What kind of presence does U.S. SOF maintain in the Balkan region?

A: We’ve worked hard to develop relationships with our allies and partners in the region, building off deployments to the region in the 1990s. Some of the relationships we maintain and strengthen through habitual training, such as in Kosovo and in Bosnia, include not only Ministry of Defense forces but also select special police units. We’re also very engaged with Civil Affairs units there working with both our partners and the U.S. Embassies.

01

**Bulgarian and Ukrainian Special Operations Forces fast-roped from a U.S. Army MH-60M Blackhawk helicopter assigned to the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) near Yambol, Bulgaria, as part of Exercise Trojan Footprint 19. Trojan Footprint is an annual U.S. Special Operations Command Europe-led exercise that incorporates Allied and partner special operations forces. The 2019 exercise brought together 1400 special operators from ten nations for training over land, sea and air, across Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Black Sea. U.S. Army photo by SPC. Monique O’Neill**
RUSSIAN INDIRECT ACTION

Russia characterizes security as a zero-sum endeavor, threatening its neighbors militarily while compromising their societies, economies and governing bodies through a wide range of malign activities. Russia leverages its significant cultural, historical and economic ties in Europe to facilitate intelligence operations and malign influence activities. This approach is central to the Russian military concept known as indirect action.

Russia supports a broad range of military and non-military covert actions intended to advance its national interests while obfuscating its involvement and identity. These actions include non-standard maritime activity, dual use infrastructure, assassination and sabotage. These activities have spilled into the public sphere more frequently of late, ranging from Russia using privately-owned front companies to purchase land in Finland to establish forward support sites, to Montenegro’s conviction in absentia of two suspected Russian GRU agents for their role in an attempted coup against the elected democratic government, to the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal, a former Russian military officer and double agent for the United Kingdom’s intelligence services, who, along with his daughter was poisoned.

Russia also provides funding and support to a number of surrogates and proxy organizations throughout Europe, providing plausible deniability for its destabilizing activities. The surrogates and proxy organizations range from Russian-led separatists in Ukraine’s Donbas to anti-NATO political groups. It has been thoroughly reported in the media that Russia sponsors numerous tactical training organizations.

REGIONAL THREAT OVERVIEW

Russia continues to illegally occupy Crimea and maintains permanently stationed military forces in the sovereign territories of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, thereby remaining a belligerent revanchist power in Europe. Amidst this backdrop, Russia is reinforcing a sizable, modern military presence along its border with our NATO allies, guaranteeing the country a significant overmatch in aggregate combat, at least at the immediate onset of conflict or in the event that hostilities break out with the west. Though a conventional military attack against NATO members remains unlikely in the near term, Russia continues to exploit its proximity to Europe in conducting malign activities focused on weakening Euro-Atlantic institutions and setting conditions for contingency operations.

While Russian destabilization efforts trouble the east, the European theater also broadly contends with terrorism, violent extremist organizations and various other transnational threats to peace and security. Terrorists, criminals and their organizations continue to use the same illicit networks to profit by moving people, weapons and narcotics. Foreign terrorist fighters, particularly those who fought for ISIS, create a difficult situation for European governments after the collapse of the physical caliphate. Our allies in Israel continue to face pressure from Iran and its proxies as well.
in the Baltic States and Balkans including paintball, airsoft and knife fighting clubs to recruit and exert influence. Russia provides funding and material support to a variety of European political parties, non-governmental and cultural organizations across the political spectrum to sow discontent and reduce popular support for host-nation governance and continued integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.

Russia manipulates the information environment through traditional media and discrete influence operations to influence Europe’s populace, leadership and military forces. This activity, dubbed “information confrontation,” also includes information operations and disinformation targeting U.S. forces in Europe. Russia’s information operation narratives in Europe have been largely focused on exploiting socio-economic fissures and discrediting western institutions such as NATO and the European Union in order to reduce popular support for NATO troop increases and forward-staging of advanced weapons.

For example, Russian-backed media outlets recently published disinformation stories targeting U.S. SOF in Ukraine, falsely claiming the Ukrainian government provided U.S. military members Ukrainian passports to facilitate the infiltration of American “advisors” into Russia.

Finally, Russian activities in cyberspace, including espionage and offensive operations, are focused on manipulating, destroying and gathering critical information from computer networks. A prominent example was the crippling NotPetya attack by Russian hackers against Ukraine in 2017 that crippled not only government and essential Ukrainian services such as hospitals, but also spilled out into global commerce.

**TERRORISM, VIOLENT EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL THREATS**

The risk of terrorism in Europe remains high. Despite a decline in fatalities from a spike in terrorist attacks since 2016, violent extremists present a clear and persistent threat to Europe’s people and its infrastructure. The destruction of ISIS’s physical caliphate in Syria and Iraq has challenged European security services and law-enforcement to track and monitor the return of foreign fighters to their countries of origin, actors using mass migration to infiltrate Europe’s borders to plan and conduct attacks.

The violence caused by ISIS and the Syrian Civil War, long-running conflict and unrest across the Middle East, combined with economic conditions in Africa, have led to waves of migrations to Europe in the past five years that have strained Europe’s ability to accept, process and integrate refugees and migrants. The strain on the social systems of European nations, especially along the Mediterranean Sea, diverts resources that could otherwise go toward military and defense spending. Finding solutions has tested political relationships. EU member states struggle to find a common, “shared” approach to admit and settle migrants.

Iran continues to use the Syrian Civil War to leverage Lebanese Hezbollah to support the Assad Regime and threaten Israel militarily. Iran, which Israel views as its greatest existential threat, continues to transfer advanced conventional arms to Hezbollah and maintains its regional influence in the Levant against Israel through support to radical groups such as Hamas. 

---

JULY - SEPTEMBER 2019 | SPECIAL WARFARE
A LEGACY OF RESISTANCE

BY JANICE BURTON

Over the past several years, Special Operations Command-Europe has focused on the theory and practice of resistance. Throughout their study, they have looked at historical examples of resistance, as well as the ongoing planning and practice of resistance as seen through the Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The Special Warfare team had the opportunity to go forward with U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Baltics to learn more about the modern practice of resistance. We came away with some key points:

- Resistance is not theoretical in the Baltics
- Resistance is ingrained in the DNA of the people in the Baltics
- Resistance is a way of life for the people in these countries

One has to understand the historic ties of the Baltics to not only Germany, but more significantly, Russia. Throughout its history, the Baltic States have been forcefully ruled by Russia and Germany, although there were many periods of freedom for each of the nation-states. At the end of World War I, Latvia and Estonia established their independence. Lithuania would follow suit, but not without a great deal of conflict. Like many countries in Europe, the three states became members of the League of Nations, the precursor to the United Nations. During the 1920s, the League’s main goal was to prevent war and to help settle disputes between member countries. From 1922 to 1934, Estonia and Latvia worked hard to achieve regional security, but it wasn’t
until 1934, when Lithuania joined the alliance that the Baltic Entente was formed. The three Baltic States signed nonaggression pacts with Russia and Germany in the 1930s, in an attempt to remain neutral. Ultimately, all three states fell under the Soviet sphere of influence, and were forced to sign mutual assistance pacts with the Soviet Union. Leading up to World War II, the Russian government stationed Soviet garrisons throughout the region. Following the fall of Paris in 1940, the governments of the three Baltic states were abolished and Russia established Communist control of the Baltics and began the process of Sovietization of the region, with the establishment of People’s Assemblies in each of the countries. In the ensuing years, social organizations were disbanded, property rights were taken away and mass deportations began, which moved more than 100,000 people from the region to Russia. That effort ended in 1941 when Germany attacked the Baltics. Seeing the Germans as liberators, citizens in Latvia and Estonia, tried to reestablish their national governments, but were squashed under the German rule.

While Germany attempted to establish administrative governments throughout the Baltics, including the conscription of people into the Germany military, a resistance bloomed throughout the region, with the establishment of various resistance organizations in each of the Baltic states. As the war continued, the Baltics fell back under Russian control in 1944/1945. The war had a huge human impact on the region with Estonia losing more than 90,000 people; Latvia more than 180,000 and Lithuania more than 250,000.

As the war ended, the region once again fell under Soviet control. The Soviet government reestablished pre-war governments and brought in Soviet officials to take control of the governments in the region — with the goal of eradicating the idea of independence. This ignited another resistance among the people in the Baltics, particularly in Lithuania where the Catholic Church played a large role in the resistance movement. In Estonia and Latvia the Popular Front formed, and in Lithuania the Movement for Reconstruction started.

In August, 1989, the people of the Baltics created a massive demonstration of more than 500,000 people linking the people of Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius to highlight the illegal acquisition of the Baltic States by Russia through the German-Russian pact of 1939. The following year, pro-independence majorities swept the legislatures in all three countries. On March 11, 1991, Lithuania declared its independence. Estonia and Latvia followed within the year.

Moscow denounced the elections, and tried to bring the Baltic states to heel through the use of economic blockades and other moves to reinstate Soviet rule. On Jan. 13, resistance activities led to bloodshed in Vilnius and later in Riga. In Vilnius, the Soviet military occupied the Vilnius television towers, which gave birth to the Singing Revolution in Estonia and the human chain that stopped tanks in Lithuania and protected the legislature. These acts of civil disobedience resulted in the independence of the Baltic States.

RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES LED TO BLOODSHED IN VILNIUS AND LATER IN RIGA. IN VILNIUS, THE SOVIET MILITARY OCCUPIED THE VILNIUS TELEVISION TOWERS, WHICH GAVE BIRTH TO THE SINGING REVOLUTION IN ESTONIA AND THE HUMAN CHAIN THAT STOPPED TANKS IN LITHUANIA AND PROTECTED THE LEGISLATURE. THESE ACTS OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE RESULTED IN THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE BALTIC STATES.
THE ROC


BY COLONEL KEVIN D. STRINGER, Ph.D. AND DR. OTTO C. FIALA, Ph.D., J.D.

BACKGROUND AND CONCEPT

Russia’s 2008 war against Georgia served as a precursor to its future mischief in Europe. This revanchist action coupled with other indicators sparked a renewed interest in unconventional warfare and resistance operations in Europe. In July 2013, SOCEUR established a small project team to develop a resistance knowledge network of institutions, subject matter experts, academics and practitioners. The primary objective was to study UW and resistance via seminars and workshops to create a foundation of intellectual interoperability on the subject. The concept foresaw a series of increasingly advanced sessions that would ultimately emplace resistance operations as an integral component of national defense for allies vulnerable to hostile neighbors, primarily the Baltic States and Poland. The resistance workshop series would also shape plans, exercises and training in this area. A secondary objective was to revive UW and resistance as a core SOF task after many years of atrophy due to direct action-centric problem sets involving the War on Terror. The first Resistance Workshop occurred in Warsaw, Poland in January 2014. While the launch event had good attendance from the Baltics and Poland, and provided initial lessons-learned, wider NATO interest was low. Russia’s subsequent February 2014 annexation of Crimea significantly changed this level of interest and future participation.

RESISTANCE SEMINARS

The forums were explicitly unclassified and multinational to allow a free exchange of ideas, concepts and themes among academics and practitioners. The purpose of the seminars was to create common resistance understanding and terminology, while developing modern ideas on resistance warfare informed by historical examples. The participants also sought to engender whole-of-government awareness which would ultimately bring the interagency participation that would facilitate national defense planning.

The seminar methodology encompassed presentations by academics and specialists to provide the necessary foundational frameworks, followed by small group syndicates focused on specific topics within the UW/resistance domain. The conclusions of the syndicate groups were summarized in after action reports that captured terminology and identified gaps for continued exploration at follow-on seminars. A natural outgrowth of the Resistance Workshops was the need for a usable primer for both policymakers and practitioners. The Resistance Operating Concept emerged to fill this requirement.

ROC DEVELOPMENT

Created in two multinational writing workshops held in April and July 2016, the first version of the ROC, enhanced with supporting doctrinal and professional references, offered a starting point for relevant partner feedback at the March 2017 seminar held in Stuttgart, Germany. The constructive feedback loop regarding the contents and focus of the ROC set the precedent for continued ROC development. Inputs from each subsequent seminar and augmenting table top exercises resulted in a more complete coverage of the topic, supported by further appendices to lend context and understanding.

By 2018, SOCEUR was ready to pursue publication of the ROC. The aim was to make the ROC available to a broader European national security community seeking resistance relevant information. As an integral institutional participant since 2014, the Swedish Defence University was the natural choice for ROC publication. As a second step, Joint Special Operations University agreed to publish a version to ensure distribution of the document to U.S. defense community practitioners and policymakers. JSOU has been an active supporter since the first seminar in 2014, and the unpublished version of the ROC is already the primary document for the JSOU National Resistance Course as well as reference material in other JSOU modules.
Resilience

Defending National Sovereignty

Loss of Sovereignty

Regaining National Sovereignty

Resilience

Preparation

Deterrence

Resistance

The ROC’s primary focus is to guide the development of an organized resistance capability prior to an invasion and the subsequent full or partial occupation of territory with its respective loss of sovereignty. Resistance, as a form of warfare, is part of a layered national defense in-depth. To this end, the ROC first seeks to delineate the concept of national resiliency in a pre-crisis environment. The ROC defines resilience as “the will and ability to withstand external pressure and influences and/or recover from the effects of those pressures or influences.” National resilience is enhanced with the formation of a national resistance capability intended to restore sovereignty. Resilience is thus distinguishable from resistance and is a necessary pre-condition for successful resistance operations. The ROC demonstrates the significance of national resilience by devoting a full chapter, enhanced by case studies in the appendices, to this important cornerstone of national defense.

After establishing a necessary understanding of national resilience, the ROC then lays out its concept of resistance. The ROC defines resistance as; “a nation’s organized, whole-of-society effort, encompassing the full range of activities from nonviolent to violent, led by a legally established government (potentially exiled/displaced or shadow) to reestablish independence and autonomy within its sovereign territory that has been wholly or partially occupied by a foreign power.” This definition is complementary and adjunct to the definition of unconventional warfare found in Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations, which defines it as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.”

This definition purposely begins with the term whole-of-society. Most of the states concerned with developing a resistance capability tend to be smaller states in close proximity to or bordering much larger and more militarily capable potential adversaries. This situation is applicable to several states in Europe as well as other regions of the world. The terms most often used to describe their approach is Total Defense or Comprehensive Defense. This defense concept goes beyond a whole-of-government approach to include civil society organizations in national security. It recognizes that attacks can come not only in the form of traditional conventional military actions, but also include assaults against the country’s economy and society, in asymmetric or hybrid form, designed to weaken national cohesion, and reduce resolve to maintain independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Though the term resistance in the historic context of wars recalls activities such as sabotage and raids, the ROC recognizes that resistance to a foreign occupier can also take the form of non-violent actions. These actions can vary in effectiveness depending on the willingness of the occupier to apply coercive force against the population. Due to the significance of such activity in recent decades, the ROC devotes an appendix to explaining types of non-violent actions and their applicability.

What distinguishes the ROC the most from other related writings concerning unconventional warfare and the sister topic of insurgency is its message that a national resistance capability is pre-planned and led by the government. The concerned government creates an organization prepared to conduct activities on its own territory against a foreign occupier with the intent of removing that occupier and re-establishing the political status quo with its previously elected government. Within this planning should be the development of agreements and even bi-lateral planning with allies and partners for combined exercises that include resistance. Very significantly, World War II historical examples demonstrated that outside assistance from a major power was necessary for resistance success.

The ROC also contains case studies of Cold War era stay-behind networks within several western European nations that were formed in preparation for Soviet invasion. The primary lesson to be learned from this era is the necessity of transparent legal and policy frameworks that render legitimacy to the planning and formation of a stay-behind resistance organization.

Effective resistance against an occupier requires organization. According to U.S. Army and Joint doctrine, the four primary components of a resistance are: underground, auxiliary, guerrilla forces, and a public component (if possible). The ROC describes in detail and through historic examples these components and the required underground networks within the resistance organization, including (but not limited to) logistics, medical, information/messaging, finance, education/training, transportation, recruiting, communication, intelligence/countering intelligence, security and sabotage and subversion. Furthermore, after short historical references to these components and networks in the main body of the document, the appendices add case studies for broader breadth and scope. These case studies are for a dual audience: U.S planners supporting allied or partner resistance planning and the Allied and partner-nation resistance planners themselves, thus giving both groups the same context, terminology, and frames of reference.

Key Considerations

The ROC emphasizes several key considerations that are critical for the successful establishment and conduct of a resistance campaign against a foreign occupier. These considerations are: governmental pre-planning, establishment of appropriate legal and policy frameworks, compliance with international law and maintenance of legitimacy.
Resistance as a form of warfare is best planned by a government prior to a crisis and not left to the sua sponte development of a movement once an occupier takes territory. Uncontrolled and unguided efforts to resist an occupier result in unforeseen political endstates. The re-establishment of the pre-crisis status quo is the goal most likely supported by a majority of the population in free and democratic societies and by the international community. That re-establishment must be the goal of the plan and must be consistently communicated throughout the resistance campaign.

The construction of legal and policy frameworks is necessary to authorize the development of a resistance capability during peacetime with the attendant pre-crisis preparation, oversight and planning. The responsible organization must be authorized and controlled by the government using appropriate legal frameworks to support it. The policy structure provides the rules and guidelines for the direction of the organization. Though much information concerning the organization may be classified, the authority for it to exist must be transparent.

Closely linked to national legal and policy frameworks is the necessity to adhere to the international legal context. Each state operates within customary and codified international law. Conducting a resistance campaign within this framework can translate directly to external policy and material support. Furthermore, if a nation becomes occupied, then a lawfully exiled government can retain national sovereignty and legitimacy under international law. An exiled government can represent the interests of that nation in the international community while contesting the acceptance and legitimacy of the occupier. Compliance with international law can also result in economic, political and military actions by the international community against the occupying state.

This state authorized resistance organization, established within the necessary national frameworks, and mindful of the law of armed conflict, must retain a high degree of domestic and international legitimacy. This legitimacy is relevant during peacetime, crisis and occupation. Retention of this legitimacy can translate into successful strategic communication narratives and messaging that can facilitate the support necessary in peacetime, crisis and under occupation.

SUCCESS OF THE ROC AS A COMMON PLANNING GUIDE

On a restricted distribution basis, the ROC has been used by certain allies to design their approach to resistance operations for national defense. In this role, the ROC fulfills its primary purpose as a common frame of reference between SOCEUR and its allies, both their military and interagency organizations. The ROC has become a shared planning guide, focusing and synchronizing combined and joint resistance efforts. To this end, these activities assure the allies of SOCEUR’s commitment in the event of this worst case scenario while contributing to the overall deterrence effort.

ROC DEFINITIONS

RESILIENCE
The will and ability to withstand external pressure and influences and/or recover from the effects of those pressures or influences.

RESISTANCE
A nation’s organized, whole-of-society effort, encompassing the full range of activities from nonviolent to violent, led by a legally established government (potentially exiled/displaced or shadow) to reestablish independence and autonomy within its sovereign territory that has been wholly or partially occupied by a foreign power.

NOTES
03. Resistance Operating Concept, v5, Appendix D.
Survivability
Medical Support to Resistance

BY SERGEANT FIRST CLASS JAKE HICKMAN, U.S. ARMY; COLONEL JAY BAKER, U.S. ARMY; AND LIEUTENANT COLONEL ELIZABETH ERICKSON, U.S. AIR FORCE

Hope is a primary driver of resistance movements, and the best way to keep hope alive in a resistance movement is to keep people alive. There are many aspects to enhancing survivability of a resistance movement, and medical support is one critical part. Doctrinal military health service support constructs, such as combat support hospitals or forward surgical teams, will be wholly inadequate to support resistance movements in a peer conflict in Europe for the primary reasons that they are overmanned and under trained. This article will discuss a whole-of-society approach to preparing military and civilian medical resources that will build readiness and resiliency of our allies or partners, improve casualty mortality rates and enable both resistance members and allied forces to sustain the fight to regain territorial sovereignty against an illegal occupation.

Medical infrastructure is vastly different in peacetime Europe than in more austere areas frequented by U.S. Special Operations Forces. Medical evacuations begin with calling 112, the European 911 equivalent, ambulances arrive to provide pre-hospital care, sometimes with physicians onboard, the patient is transported to a trauma center, and medical care is generally comparable to U.S. standards. If peer conflict occurs again in Europe, medical infrastructure will be severely degraded and significant obstacles to medical support will immediately arise, especially regarding extremely prolonged evacuation times and scarce resource availability. The U.S. military has not faced as severe a challenge to provide medical support since World War II.

The SOF medical community has been bracing for the regression of medical support in emerging conflicts since at least November 2017 when U.S Army COL (Ret.) Dr. Warner “Rocky” Farr published The Death of the Golden Hour and the Return of the Future Guerrilla Hospital; yet the existential threat facing Eastern Europe poses the worst case scenario for medical support to resistance. The restricted mobility for friendly forces in territory occupied by a peer adversary will severely limit external medical support to U.S. SOF and our allied partners, including the resistance. The isolation of U.S. and allied forces in a denied environment will by necessity convert the delivery of medical care from a linear progression of medical evacuations from point of injury to higher echelons of care outside the combat zone, to a cyclical progression of evacuation, treatment, convalescence and return to duty, all completely within occupied territory.

Norwegian, American and Swiss Special Operation Forces work through the night on simulated casualties in a field clinic during the NATO Special Operations Medic Course in Germany. Medical support capabilities play a critical role in enhancing survivability in a resistance scenario. U.S. ARMY PHOTO BY SPC. PATRIK ORCUTT
A resistance scenario in Europe presents a unique risk to U.S. SOF supporting resistance movements, as organic capabilities will not be able to provide required medical support in this tactical environment. Recent exercises have demonstrated that U.S. SOF surgical teams will be severely restrained and may not be survivable in a denied environment, and conventional medical forces will likewise be absent. U.S. SOF medics are highly capable within their scope of practice, but over-inflation of their ability results in commanders miscalculating risk; a medic’s ability to reduce serious risk is often predicated on access to definitive care.

The Maquis in occupied France and Partisans of Yugoslavia faced similar challenges in World War II but were still able to provide medical support despite great odds. The relevance of these historical precedents might be limited, however, by exponential advances in technology over the last 75 years. Providing medical support to U.S. SOF and resistance forces will be immensely challenging, but there is one great advantage over historical precedence: there is time and space now to enable ourselves and our allies and partners to be prepared to provide medical support to resistance prior to conflict, instead of reacting after a violation of a country’s national sovereignty.

**BACKGROUND**

In early 2018, SOCEUR conducted a multinational SOF exercise focused on irregular warfare and resistance in the Baltic region of Eastern Europe. Key medical lessons learned from the exercise were that medical evacuation in restricted areas during peer conflict is incredibly challenging, and U.S. SOF surgical teams as currently configured and trained will have low, if any, chance of survival in occupied territory. It was evident that planning medical support solely using only a U.S. military doctrinal construct was impractical and ineffective; civilian medical resources were identified as, and will necessarily be, the center of gravity for medical support to resistance.

Resistance doctrine was turned to as a possible solution to the way ahead, but existing doctrine was found to be largely inadequate for the range of potential operational environments in future conflicts against a peer adversary in Eastern Europe. The focus of U.S. resistance doctrine on unconventional warfare and resistance movements assumes that conflicts have already begun or are ongoing. Furthermore, reverse engineering resistance constructs prior to conflict is difficult because it is impossible to forecast who and what will survive the initial invasion. The whole-of-society approach advocated by the Resistance Operating Concept was embraced as a potential solution for addressing critical gaps in providing medical support to resistance.

**WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY APPROACH TO MEDICAL SUPPORT FOR RESISTANCE**

The SOCEUR Surgeon’s Office has developed a whole-of-society approach to enable medical support to resistance (Figure 01) as a tiered approach to improve trauma care from point of injury through surgical intervention, convalescence and return to duty. Additionally, it aims to increase medical interoperability with Allies and partners in preparation for a resistance scenario in Eastern Europe.

**U.S. SOF MEDICINE**

The core of this approach begins with increased readiness for U.S. SOF. If peer conflict in Eastern Europe occurs, U.S. SOF medics will be required to treat casualties on extended timelines with limited supplies. Proficiency in Prolonged Field Care improves the SOF medic’s ability to do this, but is dependent on the medic’s ability to transfer casualties to higher echelons of care for definitive treatment or required convalescence. SOF surgical teams may be part of the solution, but will require manning changes and additional training in order to improve survivability in peer-adversary occupied territory.
Previously, the SOCEUR Surgeon’s office developed and conducted a course in UW medicine for surgical teams. This training was conducted as a proof of concept in Fall 2017, and was subsequently turned over to U.S. Army Special Operations Command with a request to further develop UW training for SOF surgical teams. Currently, the SOCEUR Surgeon’s office is continuing to develop Trojan Footprint as an opportunity for U.S. SOF medical units to practice UW medical tactics and techniques in a major exercise.

The command is developing training opportunities for U.S. SOF medics and surgical teams to work in partner-nation trauma centers in Eastern Europe. This aims to achieve multiple objectives including enhanced interoperability of U.S. medical personnel and potential partners, information sharing regarding medical materiel and techniques and potentially to raise standards of trauma care as best practices are shared between allies and partners. The strong relationships that would be created by this course of action would be mutually beneficial. These types of training opportunities may be expanded beyond U.S. SOF to other U.S. military medical personnel, further increasing interoperability and alliance building.

SOCEUR is also assisting USO-COM to define the Special Operations Forces Baseline Interoperability Standards for medics and surgical teams. These efforts attempt to link SOF medical requirements to National Defense Strategy priorities in order to develop the force for the future, and not simply to fight the last battle. Finally, current U.S. SOF doctrine on medical support to resistance appears to have gaps in Eastern Europe’s potential operational environment, especially with regard to preparing Allies and partners to conduct resistance prior to conflict. Working with USASOC’s medical teams will help develop future iterations of doctrine in order to prepare U.S. SOF for best success in an extremely challenging environment.

PARTNER MILITARY HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT

A key focus area for the SOCEUR Surgeon’s office is supportive relationships with European partners. Effective relationships with partner SOF medical leaders builds shared vision and enables work toward common goals. The majority of partners’ SOF medical personnel are intertwined with their conventional military Health Service Support, similar to U.S. military medicine, and efforts with conventional HSS are required in addition to work with SOF medical leaders. Investments in relationships now with partner nations’ medical capabilities will pay dividends in a peer conflict and resistance scenario, even though partner’s military HSS will likely be diminished. Partner SOF medics, military medical personnel, and home guard units will serve as medical cadre in local resistance movements and save lives through application of their medical skills and knowledge.

Special Operations Forces Institution Building is a primary line of effort that aims to improve interoperability. The near term plan is to promote Tactical Combat Casualty Care (as the base standard for all allied SOF medics and enable partners to conduct internal training without external support. An additional goal of this initiative is to assist North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Headquarters to develop doctrine for NATO and partner SOF medics and SOF surgical teams. This aims to make allied medical enablers similar, with improved interoperability.

The SOCEUR Surgeon’s office is currently working with partners to develop
a medical annex for the ROC to serve as a guide for medical support to resistance in Europe. The emerging medical annex is focused on key components of medical resistance networks, treatment and triage considerations and planning medical stay-behind capabilities.

Major exercises like Trojan Footprint are opportunities to test the viability of potential medical resistance networks and competencies in a controlled setting, while identifying areas for improvement. SOCEUR aims to increase involvement of key European SOF medical enablers in order to further improve combined medical preparedness as an interoperable allied force.

**CIVILIAN MEDICAL CAPABILITIES**

Civilian personnel are anticipated to provide the majority of medical support to resistance, as most military medical capabilities are likely to be exhausted during an invasion. While there is no doubt our Eastern European allies have robust, capable trauma systems, a significant gap in our collective medical preparedness for resistance, however, is understanding the available civilian medical capabilities. Investing time and resources to better understand and cooperatively increase the trauma capabilities of civilian medical institutions will enhance our collective ability to provide medical support in a resistance scenario. Creating a medical common operating picture will identify where gaps exist and inform planning priorities for greater resilience in trauma care now, as well as prepare for medical support to resistance.

First responders are the critical bridge from POI to higher levels of care. Sharing lessons learned from decades of combat with partner civilian first responder systems will improve initial survivability of resistance members and enable better chances of successful evacuation to higher levels of care. U.S. Allies in Eastern Europe are already preparing themselves. In Lithuania, for example, new regulations were recently passed to enhance the scope of paramedics in the event of disaster. The new training for these paramedics closely mirrors TCCC guidelines, which have saved many lives from combat trauma.

In most resistance operations, bystanders will be the first on scene, just as they are in everyday life. Treatment of combat casualties at the POI by first responders improves the likelihood of survival until casualties can be treated by qualified medical personnel. Because it is impossible to predict who will be first on the scene in a resistance scenario, the potential target for training on POI care might be as large as a country’s entire population. There are precedents for whole-of-society programs for POI care in recent years due to terrorist acts against innocent civilians. In 2015, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security launched the STOP the Bleed campaign in order to cultivate a grass roots efforts to train, equip and empower bystanders to help in a bleeding emergency before professional help arrives. In the United Kingdom, London Ambulance provides life-saving first responder training to taxi drivers. Conducting large scale campaigns like these in Eastern Europe would undoubtedly save lives in future resistance scenarios.

Finally, trauma systems and medical facilities are critical for definitive treatment of trauma casualties. Trauma center subject-matter expert exchanges would facilitate sharing of best practices and development of strong relationships. These relationships could be at a medical center or university level. Enduring institutional relationships would enable medical interoperability and could be expected to advance the efficiency and effectiveness of trauma systems bilaterally and multilaterally.

A whole-of-society approach to enhancing trauma system capabilities is beneficial not only for resistance scenarios, but also to increase preparedness for, and improve response to, a host of contingencies. Trauma systems nest within broader emergency response systems, which must be prepared for natural disasters such as earthquakes, fires or floods, man-made disasters such as industrial accidents or chemical releases, disease outbreaks or terrorist attacks. Well-prepared, effective emergency response systems increase national resilience to adverse events and build hope.

**PARTNERING WITH EUCOM**

Observations from recent theater level exercises by the EUCOM Surgeon’s office closely parallel the SOCEUR Surgeon’s office’s lessons learned from focused exercises: modern conflict modeling and casualty estimates reveal that military medical resources may be rapidly depleted, such that civilian medical infrastructure, when present, will be critical for medical support to Allied operational forces in various Eastern European conflict scenarios. The EUCOM Surgeon and staff, along with Service Component Surgeons’ staffs, have begun efforts to address the identified need for a whole-of-society approach to preparing for the potential medical scenarios associated with contingencies in Europe.

EUCOM is working with the Defense Health Agency’s Joint Trauma System to
establish a Combatant Command Trauma System, which aims to set a common baseline across U.S. geographic combatant commands for standards of trauma training and components of trauma systems. This effort ensures that U.S. military HSS capabilities are optimally poised to be ready for response to contingencies, providing the best possible care from POI through surgical care. It also acknowledges the need to better integrate partner nation systems into a theater-wide trauma system. EUCOM has begun to develop a MEDCOP that will provide EUCOM and Component Commanders, Surgeons, and medical planners with increased awareness of military and civilian medical, and specifically trauma resources in Europe. Ideally, this MEDCOP will be developed collaboratively with partner nations, and shared for common operational benefit.

EUCOM’s Global Health Engagement activities with Allied and partner nations over the last several years have focused primarily on military-to-military activities that aim to support partner nations’ achievement of NATO standards for expeditionary medical capabilities. These have included cooperative training on TCCC and other trauma care standards, as noted above. Recognizing the importance of civilian medical capabilities in a variety of operational scenarios, EUCOM is updating its GHE strategy to increase U.S. engagement with partner nation civilian health systems, medical centers and personnel.

This, of course, must be approached with a great deal of coordination: with U.S. Embassy country teams for synchronization with other U.S. government health efforts; with partner-nation military and civilian health leaders; and with multilateral organizations, such as NATO, as appropriate. One approach to enhancing understanding of partner-nation trauma systems and developing institutional relationships is to capitalize on the State Partnership Program. This program, executed via the National Guard Bureau, pairs U.S. states with partner nations. There are 22 such partnerships in the EUCOM area of responsibility. Military-to-military activities, such as training and exercises, often lead to military-to-civilian and civilian-to-civilian interactions with enduring personal and institutional relationships.

CONCLUSION

Medical support to U.S. SOF and partner resistance forces will be extremely challenged in the European theater in a resistance scenario. Specifically, medical evacuation will be severely restricted and U.S. SOF surgical teams, as currently designed, will have low survivability. The SOCEUR Surgeon’s office is targeting a whole-of-society effort to enable medical support to resistance across multiple spheres of influence, including U.S. SOF medical forces, partner-nation military HSS and partner-nation civilian medical institutions. A whole-of-society approach is critical for uniting efforts of U.S. medical equities now in steady state operations, which will improve capabilities and increase options for medical support of U.S., allied and partner forces in the event of peer conflict in Eastern Europe.

EUCOM recognizes the value of this approach and is developing a strategy toward end states of enhanced military and civilian trauma capabilities, and increased interoperability between civilian and military capabilities, both within and between nations. Embarking now on these collective steps will save lives and, should the worst case happen, enable better trauma care at every level, which will help keep hope alive.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Sgt. 1st Class Jake Hickman, U.S. Army, is a SOCEUR Medical Operations Sergeant.
Lt. Col. Elizabeth Erickson, U.S. Air Force is the EUCOM Chief of Global Health Engagement.

Acknowledgments: We extend a special thanks for review and comments to Col. (Ret.) Dr. Warner “Rocky” Farr, Col. (Ret.) Sean Keenan, Maj. Michael Weisman and Maj. Adrien Adams.
THE ROLE OF CITIZENS’ WILL TO RESIST IN THE PATHWAY TO SECURING LITHUANIAN FREEDOM

On Jan. 13, 1991, Vilnius, Lithuania’s TV Tower became a symbol of ordinary Lithuanian peoples’ will to resist tyranny and to sacrifice to secure sovereignty and freedom no matter the cost. Less than a year earlier, on March 11, 1990, Lithuanian leaders officially declared the re-establishment of Lithuanian independence. No one knew the extent to which Soviet leaders would go to prevent collapse of the failed Soviet system: a system centered on the impossible effort to divorce humanity from reality, known as Communism. The odds were against the small Lithuanian nation successfully moving from Soviet subjugation to freedom and self-determination, particularly in the face of the massive might of the Soviet system.

On Jan. 10, 1991, the General Secretary of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, issued a demand to Lithuania’s newly independent parliament, the Seima to demand that Lithuania reestablish the constitution of the USSR. Two days later, Soviet General Vladislav Achalov arrived in Vilnius. Achalov’s mission was to reestablish Soviet control over Lithuania by seizing power from the Seima and its leader, Vytautas Landsbergis. The Communists controlled the weapons, but the Seima and the Lithuanian people controlled the airwaves. On Jan. 12, Soviet troops mobilized to seize key Lithuanian communication and governance infrastructure. At the same time, ordinary Lithuanians determined to defend their independence, mobilized to defend key infrastructure.

Shortly after midnight on Jan. 13, 1991, about 3,000 ordinary Lithuanians established a defensive perimeter around the Vilnius TV tower and studio. Unarmed, these heroic patriots were soon surrounded by Soviet troops, tanks and armored vehicles. As Soviet troops fired live rounds over the heads of the TV tower’s defenders, the voice of Lithuanian Communist Juozas Jermalavičius boomed over Soviet BMP loudspeakers. Jermalavičius declared that the Seima, which he called “the nationalist and separatist government,” had been overthrown. The defenders were undeterred by this final failed attempt at Soviet propaganda. Shortly after, 14 of these defenders were martyred, as Soviet troops crushed them with tanks in the Soviets’ final push to seize the tower.

RESISTANCE, RESILIENCE, AND EVERYDAY CITIZENS AS AN ELEMENT OF NATIONAL POWER

BY NICK B. ISRAEL, SPIRIT OF AMERICA

THE ROLE OF CITIZENS’ WILL TO RESIST IN THE PATHWAY TO SECURING LITHUANIAN FREEDOM

On Jan. 13, 1991, Vilnius, Lithuania’s TV Tower became a symbol of ordinary Lithuanian peoples’ will to resist tyranny and to sacrifice to secure sovereignty and freedom no matter the cost. Less than a year earlier, on March 11, 1990, Lithuanian leaders officially declared the re-establishment of Lithuanian independence. No one knew the extent to which Soviet leaders would go to prevent collapse of the failed Soviet system: a system centered on the impossible effort to divorce humanity from reality, known as Communism. The odds were against the small Lithuanian nation successfully moving from Soviet subjugation to freedom and self-determination, particularly in the face of the massive might of the Soviet system.

On Jan. 10, 1991, the General Secretary of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, issued a demand to Lithuania’s newly independent parliament, the Seima to demand that Lithuania reestablish the constitution of the USSR. Two days later, Soviet General Vladislav Achalov arrived in Vilnius. Achalov’s mission was to reestablish Soviet control over Lithuania by seizing power from the Seima and its leader, Vytautas Landsbergis. The Communists controlled the weapons, but the Seima and the Lithuanian people controlled the airwaves. On Jan. 12, Soviet troops mobilized to seize key Lithuanian communication and governance infrastructure. At the same time, ordinary Lithuanians determined to defend their independence, mobilized to defend key infrastructure.

Shortly after midnight on Jan. 13, 1991, about 3,000 ordinary Lithuanians established a defensive perimeter around the Vilnius TV tower and studio. Unarmed, these heroic patriots were soon surrounded by Soviet troops, tanks and armored vehicles. As Soviet troops fired live rounds over the heads of the TV tower’s defenders, the voice of Lithuanian Communist Juozas Jermalavičius boomed over Soviet BMP loudspeakers. Jermalavičius declared that the Seima, which he called “the nationalist and separatist government,” had been overthrown. The defenders were undeterred by this final failed attempt at Soviet propaganda. Shortly after, 14 of these defenders were martyred, as Soviet troops crushed them with tanks in the Soviets’ final push to seize the tower.
As the sun rose over Vilnius that morning, news of the brutal Soviet assault spread. Inspired, 50,000 more Lithuanians acted. They left their homes to reinforce those defending other important buildings against the attempted Communist coup. The determination of these Lithuanian citizens, and their willingness to sacrifice everything to resist Soviet control, reached the Kremlin and the broader world. Soviet forces began a slow retreat, which eventually led to their complete withdrawal. Through the power of the people, Lithuanian freedom was preserved.

**THE ROLE OF CITIZENS’ WILL TO RESIST IN THE PATHWAY TO SECURING AMERICAN FREEDOM**

Over two hundred years before the Lithuanian peoples’ stand against Soviet tyranny at the Vilnius TV tower, a similar singular act of civil resistance provided a pivotal milestone on America’s path to independence. In 1768, with growing colonial unrest in response to the British Stamp Act and the Townshend Acts, British troops deployed to Boston with a mission to quell dissent and crush colonial resistance, autonomy, and revolution.

On the evening of March 5, 1770, a dispute between a colonial wigmaker and a British Army officer took place outside the Boston Custom House. The argument escalated. Bystanders transformed into a mob of colonial Americans, demonstrating open hostility to the British military guards. As tensions increased, a freed slave, Crispus Attucks, forcefully led a group of Bostonians into direct confrontation with British soldiers. The soldiers, in response, opened fire, striking and killing Attucks.

Immortalized in a lithograph printed and distributed by Paul Revere, Attucks was the first martyr in the American Revolution. Attucks became a symbol of American willingness to sacrifice for the causes of freedom and liberty. The 1770 event, later known as the “Boston Massacre,” is considered one of the most significant turning points in shifting colonial sentiment against King George III and British Parliamentary authority, eventually leading to American independence.

Five years later, on April 18, 1775, Paul Revere and William Dawes undertook their famous midnight ride from Boston to Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts. Their mission was to warn American patriots that British regular troops were on the move, with calls of “The British are coming!” Their warning allowed patriots time to protect weapons stockpiles that would later arm the American population in support of the revolution and resistance to British rule.

By the conclusion of the American Revolution, up to 150,000 of America’s first citizens, answered the call to arms and resisted the tyranny of alien rule. Even more ordinary Americans provided the soldiers with the materiel and support they needed to secure the revolution. These first Americans stood for building a new society based on the ideas that all are created equal, and that all have inalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. These principles, revolutionary in the 18th century, today provide the foundation of the relationship between freedom-loving Americans and like-minded friends and allies in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and elsewhere around the world.

**BALTIC AND AMERICAN CITIZENS, UNITED IN COMMON COMMITMENT TO FREEDOM**

Beyond Lithuania’s January 1991 events, the Baltic states and Poland were home to a multitude of anti-Communist civil resistance events and movements. These include the “Baltic Way” in 1989, Poland’s “Solidarity” and “Orange Alternative” movements, and Estonia’s “Singing Revolution” in the 1980s, as well as a variety of other religious, political, environmental, art, music, literary and other cultural efforts participated in by resilient and committed citizens willing to resist, choosing freedom over Communism. Their work and
RESISTANCE, RESILIENCE, AND EVERYDAY CITIZENS AS AN ELEMENT OF NATIONAL POWER

SOCEUR ISSUE

SPIRIT OF AMERICA – CITIZENS SERVING THE NATION TODAY

Spirit of America is an organization that harnesses the patriotism of everyday citizens reflecting the spirit of Crispus Attucks and the defenders of the Vilnius TV tower. Spirit of America works to advance and defend the American values of freedom and liberty around the world.

Spirit of America is a privately-funded 501(c)(3) nonprofit that assists in response to local needs identified by deployed U.S. troops and diplomats. Spirit of America fills critical gaps where U.S. government resources can’t be applied, supporting the safety and mission success of our personnel overseas.

Born out of a desire to support the United States after the attacks of 9/11, Spirit of America is funded entirely by the generosity of private American donors who care about the safety and mission success of those who represent our nation abroad. The organization’s model represents a unique way for U.S. citizens to directly support our men and women in uniform who carry out missions on the American public’s behalf around the world. Spirit of America has operated in more than 70 countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Central and South America, and Europe, including all of the Baltic States. Spirit of America provides private-sector knowledge and resources through an all-veteran field team.

Recognized in law by Congress as part of the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, Spirit of America operates under a Memorandum of Agreement with the Department of Defense that facilitates our work in close coordination with the military. Spirit of America provides vital tools that aid national efforts in Europe and around the world. Spirit of America’s all-veteran field team, includes men and women from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard, with regional knowledge, language skills, and experience in regular and special operations. The team works in parallel with military, diplomatic, and development partners, enhancing their ability to take advantage of finite windows of opportunity, to bring the resources, speed and flexibility of the American people to support U.S. missions abroad.

In the Baltics, Spirit of America helps address the gaps American personnel identify as they to bolster the civil and military preparedness of our allies. These efforts have included a wide array of projects ranging from providing lifesaving tactical medical gear to frontline law enforcement units in Lithuania’s Suvalkai Gap as part of USSOF’s efforts to improve partner force security posture, to support for projects aimed at bolstering contingency communication capabilities, and to helping Marines enhance Estonian scouting and emergency response organizations. Additionally they have provided funding for essential educational opportunities for key Baltic partner forces, to
supporting American diplomats’ efforts to promote female involvement and regional cooperation across the Baltic states in technology. Spirit of America has also supported numerous military outreach and community relations efforts aimed at socially and economically vulnerable communities, including service projects at orphanages, sporting events with NATO partners and educational and cultural exchanges.

The Spirit of America Advisory Board member, former United States Special Operations Command Commander Admiral Eric Olson, said “Special Operations Forces are often referred to as the ‘tip of the spear’ because they are the leading edge of military engagement. Things at the tip of the spear are dynamic and difficult — and are often dangerous and sensitive. Every situation is different. Our special operators must be courageous fighters, knowledgeable partners and exceptional problem solvers. In situations that require speed and audacity, Spirit of America has proven over and over again that it can and will help our forces answer an emerging need in order to help prevent a crisis. Spirit of America’s agility and ingenuity fit perfectly with the mission requirements and mind set of special operations forces.” This assessment of the dynamic challenges faced by USSOF, and the criticality of flexible approaches to meeting, has proven as true in the Baltics as anywhere in the world today.

CONCLUSION

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and the United States stand shoulder-to-shoulder as allies in the defense of each other’s liberty, freedom and sovereignty. America and the Baltic States are bonded not only by formal treaty, but by our mutual values, historical commonalities, and our citizens’ steadfast commitment to playing active roles in national defense and resilience by supporting those who defend our nations through military service.

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland demonstrate this commitment through deployment of their troops beside our own in the War on Terror. America demonstrates this commitment, alongside other NATO allies, in our participation in Enhanced Forward Presence and Operation Atlantic Resolve, as well as through extensive bilateral and regional military relationships, training events, persistent presence of forces and equipment and cooperation across all levels of command and government.

Spirit of America is proud to be a unique part of the American people’s unshakable commitment to supporting our troops, diplomats and special operations forces as they perform and succeed in their assigned missions beside our Baltic allies. We trust that our support serves as a demonstration to the people of the Baltics that no matter what the future holds, the American people will stand by their side in our common commitment to freedom and liberty.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Nick B. Israel is Spirit of America’s Europe Regional Program Manager. Before joining the Spirit of America team, Nick served in the U.S. Army as an Armor and Psychological Operations Officer and deployed to Europe and the Middle East. Before joining the Army, Nick earned his bachelor’s degree with a focus on Russian and Eastern European studies and political science from the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor.
Mišky tankumynė gyvenimą eina... 1947 m. 12 del.
A HISTORY OF RESILIENCE

BY 1ST LIEUTENANT JONAS MINDAUGAS

Since the coronation of its first King, Mindaugas, in 1253, Lithuania has demonstrated a resilience to foreign influence and occupation that may well be unmatched by any other nation on earth. It has maintained its identity in spite of political, military, cultural, and religious pressures, at times on multiple flanks, since its founding. Even after multiple occupations by different opponents, Lithuania has retained its cultural identity, and today its political and territorial sovereignty are intact. At present, Lithuania's sovereignty is threatened again, and while the tools, tactics and techniques its adversaries employ have changed, Lithuania can still draw on its heritage of resilience and resilience from centuries past to meet the present challenge.

Resistance is a nation’s ability to withstand aggression while sustaining its legitimacy and the national government. Throughout the centuries, Lithuanians have shown a remarkable ability to withstand aggression and oppression, and have been remarkably loyal to the idea of a free and independent Lithuania. For the first several hundred years of its existence, Lithuania was under assault on both its western and eastern borders, by the Teutonic Order and Russia, respectively. In spite of this, Lithuania expanded during this time to become the largest nation in Europe, extending from the Baltic Sea down to the Black Sea in present-day Ukraine.

Until 1795, Lithuania maintained its borders, at which time it fell victim to occupation by the Russian Empire. In 1918, Lithuania enjoyed independence again, as a result of the conclusion of World War I. Tragically, Lithuania fell under the dominion of the Soviet Union in 1939, followed shortly afterwards by Nazi Germany, and then again by the Soviet Union until 1990. Lithuania was the first Soviet Republic to declare independence from the Soviet Union. In spite of repeated and brutal occupations, Lithuania has consistently found the will to reconstitute itself, and today enjoys a vibrant culture and political life.

Lithuania’s most recent occupation by the Soviet Union was the setting for one of the world’s most impressive resistance movements. From 1944 until well into the 1960s, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia resisted Soviet control. Lithuanian Partisans fought the Soviet army at every scale possible, as individuals, squads, platoons and even battalions. These Partisans, the so-called “Forest Brothers”, are heroes in Lithuania today. Monuments and plaques commemorate their heroic struggles, and their sacrifices are celebrated all over Lithuania.

During this conflict, the Lithuanians held the gargantuan Soviet Army at bay through sheer willpower. Lithuanians from all walks of life, both members of the resistance and civilians, committed themselves and their resources to the resistance. Civilians served as lookouts, distractions and sources of information. The successes and longevity of the resistance depended upon the willingness of civilians to support the Partisans. The Partisans recognized this, and endeavored to protect and serve their supporters whenever possible.

Minimizing the effects of the conflict on civilians and maintaining civilians’ faith in the resistance movement and the Lithuanian government were the most important aspects of the Partisans’ interactions with civilians. Protecting civilians from reprisals was just as crucial as attacking high-value targets. Partisans conducted patrols through villages throughout the country simply to make themselves known to the people, and to hear their concerns. Providing a face for the resistance and demonstrating a commit-
ment to protecting and improving civilians’ lives won the Partisans the loyalty of the populace, and this enabled them to fight with a strength beyond their numbers.

Since the events of 2014 in Crimea, Lithuania has reenergized its military preparations for conflict of two sorts. First, Lithuania has increased the size of its conventional forces, improved its armaments, and trained with a fresh urgency. Obviously, stopping an aggressor at the border is preferable to occupation of any duration or character.

The second sort of conflict Lithuania has begun preparing itself to fight is a resistance under foreign occupation. While highly professional and skilled, the Lithuanian Army is small in comparison to some potential aggressors’. As such, the possibility of being occupied is very real in Lithuania. As Lithuania learned from the Forest Brothers, its ability to resist will depend upon the resilience of its civilian populace. In order to conduct the type of engagements that the Partisans found so valuable 70 years ago, Lithuania has begun to reorganize its armed forces. The National Volunteer Defense Forces (KASP), Lithuania’s National Guard, added non-lethal squads to every Light Infantry Company in January of 2019. Each squad will bring specialties to their company, like reconnaissance, intelligence, PSYOP and civil-military cooperation. Of all the specialties in the new squads, Civil Military Support Element specialists are best suited to maintaining resilience crucial to a successful resistance.

In order to make these squads effective and capable of facilitating and capitalizing on civil-military cooperation, Civil Military Support Elements have partnered with the organization that serves as master trainer for the CIMIC Specialists in the non-lethal squads, the 801st Non-Kinetic Operations Company. The 801st contains two platoons of CIMIC specialists (one is composed of functional specialists and the other one is the “unconventional warfare” platoon) and a PSYOP platoon. The 801st sends teams of trainers across Lithuania to train the numerous Non-Kinetic Squads, and has spearheaded the revision of CIMIC doctrine and training.

Until recently, the Lithuanian Army’s experience with CIMIC has been predominantly overseas. Lithuania has deployed CIMIC forces to West Africa, Afghanistan and other NATO missions. Its Mission Essential Task List reflected this experience. The METL focused on refugee camp operations and managing Displaced Persons. CIMIC forces were not prepared to either identify and resolve problems that would diminish civilian support for a resistance, or identify and capitalize on civilian resources and skill sets that could support resistance fighters.

Civil Military Support Element Lithuania and the 801st partnered to rewrite the METL for all Lithuanian CIMIC, one that would focus CIMIC training on meaningful engagements with civilians. The CIMIC METL now focuses on identifying both problems and solutions within the civil environment, with the respective goals of maintaining legitimacy and support within the civil populace and identifying solutions for military problems using civilian support. CIMIC forces will be trained to both protect-and-build resilience during occupation, and actively support resistance during the occupation.

Many of these concepts, like resilience, resistance and civil-military cooperation are abstract at best, and confusing at worst. A frequent problem that the 801st’s Soldiers and CMSE Lithuania encountered was that many Infantry commanders did not understand how a force that had traditionally focused on refugee camp operations and managing displaced persons should contribute to resilience and resistance. Furthermore, while many understood the value of civil-military cooperation during the 1940s and 1950s practiced by the Forest Brothers, translating that into modern operations was challenging. Given the changes in warfighting technology in the last 70 years, a resistance movement is far more likely to succeed in an urban than a rural environment.
To explain how to capture the value of modern engagements with civilians, CMSE Lithuania participated in the Fighting in Built-Up Areas Seminar. At this seminar, CMSE Lithuania explained to all KASP and Regular Army Company Commanders, as well as numerous battalion commanders, how to employ their CIMIC forces in an occupation. The Commander of the 801st Non-Kinetic Operations Company conducted a poll of Company Commanders before the seminar, asking what problems Commanders wanted CIMIC Soldiers to address in an occupation. The results of this poll helped CMSE Lithuania provide concrete recommendations for CIMIC Soldiers that would both repair and maintain the resilience of Lithuanian society and its armed forces, not to mention directly supporting the resistance.

Lithuanian Special Operations Forces have also endeavored to prepare for an occupation, and approached development and maintenance of resilience in a twofold approach. LITHSOF has started Resistance Planning Seminars, which discuss how every different member of the government and civil society can contribute to a successful resistance. CMSE Lithuania partnered with the instructors for this course to provide students with ideas to sustain the resistance movement and maintain the efficacy of a government that has gone underground or into exile.

Additionally, LITHSOF and CMSE LTU partnered to run the pilot version of the Non-Kinetic Operations in Occupied Terrain Course. This course taught LITHSOF students how to maintain the support of the civilian population and degrade support for an occupying power by identifying and exploiting functions of governance. In the future, LITHSOF will teach this course to students from the KASP and the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union, spreading these ideas across Lithuania and building the knowledge base necessary to both preserve and build Lithuanian resilience in a conflict.

Lithuania’s resilience has been proven an unfortunate number of times throughout its history, and hopefully will not be tested again, particularly by an occupation. Now though, Lithuania’s membership in NATO means that resilience and resistance are not battles that must be fought alone. Resilience has a new light at the end of the tunnel, a joint response by NATO partners. Resistance must no longer be fought alone, but must be part of a multinational effort combining both irregular and conventional warfare. Synchronizing national efforts with a NATO response is the new challenge for Lithuania’s Armed Forces, a task Lithuania’s servicemen and women are already committed to and strive for every day.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
1st Lt. Jonas Mindaugas is a Strategic Communication Officer in the Lithuanian Armed Forces.
independence was acquired by the power of the "Singing Revolution," rather than aggression. As Soviets attempted to take over the freedom of Lithuania once again in 1991, unarmed citizens stood in front of tanks and armed soldiers, proving to the whole world that civil defense is effective both in theory and practice.

All historical experiences led to the fact that Lithuania is one of the few countries where civil defense takes an important role in the documents of defense and national security. According to the constitution and legislation, every citizen of Lithuania must defend Lithuanian independence and opposing the aggressor is universal. There are two main elements to the defense preparation of citizens, against an armed attack: the will of the citizens, their willingness to fight for the independence and specific military knowledge and practical skills to defend the country using weapons. The willingness to resist is strengthened through increasing society's immunity to dangers, which is implemented through the education of society, patriotic education, learning history, improving the information literacy and reinforcing the fundamental values. The theoretical and practical knowledge is acquired through voluntary or mandatory military training. The knowledge and skills are also supplied by the Lithuanian Riflemen Association — a public organization that has existed for more than 100 years and is supported by the government, uniting people concerned about the state of the country and its defense.

Strong, motivated, critically thinking and active citizens are the power of the nation and the basis of its defense. How do you ensure society's engagement and its state of mind? By strengthen-
ing the civil attitude. For this single purpose, the whole system of National Defense is putting great efforts toward organizing various events uniting citizens and the military, as well as exhibitions, discussions and fairs. There are also many publications, brochures, books, TV shows and projects that ensure the more effective education of the public, give the needed information and introduce with the topics and concerns of national safety. Exclusive attention is dedicated toward the younger generations — organizing various school visits with lectures, competitions, summer camps, creative workshops, sports events and other activities that help to develop the critical thinking, public spirit, encourage the interest in country’s history and Lithuanian military. It is essential not to exclude the Lithuanians ex pats, all around the world, who nonetheless love and respect their homeland. Their inclusion into the defensive forces in case of danger will provide faster communication with the rest of the world, spreading correct messages and possibly providing the needed support for those fighting.

History proves that we should look at several aspects. One may have a perfectly prepared, large military, made of motivated people, equipped with the latest military equipment, have strong partners and allies; however, without public willingness and determination to defend their country, it might be useless. Every armed soldier should have the support of at least 10 citizens. This means that fighting and more importantly, winning is nearly impossible without public support. Therefore, public determination, and willingness to fight are the most important components. Today, 88 percent of Lithuanian citizens claim it is every citizen’s duty to protect their country. Thus, we aim to give people even more self-confidence by providing more knowledge and practical skills rather than increasing the above statistics or letting them diminish.

From history, we also know that the majority of partisans fighting for Lithuania during the interwar were the members of various organizations. Therefore, even today it’s hard to expect organized collective defense without the involvement of organizations. Participating in an organization, not necessarily at a militarized one, gives self-confidence, skills for team activities, creates a community and unity feeling. The members of organizations know each other, have structures, leaders, common ideas and values that in a case of danger would help to organize and perform civil resistance. As a consequence, we shall strengthen the organizations, support them, involve in state affairs, encourage public involvement and participation. Only the feeling of community and unity, patriotism, historical memories and particular skills make us stronger, more immune and prepared to defend the homeland.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Luka Sinevičienė is a historian and an advisor to the Department of Mobilization and Civil Resistance under the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defense. A social activist, she regularly engages the Lithuanian population, especially young people, to explain the importance of civil defense.
Lithuanian Resistance: The Significance of War after War
BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL LINAS IDZELIS

"...It is enough to consider the partisan struggle. How many men there were in the first days – strong as oaks and brave as lions. Only a few of those have remained amongst us to this day. The faces of the fallen pass, again and again, in front of our eyes. And how numerous they are – a whole world of the dead! Who will understand, who will describe their heroism, whose like the world has not heard of until now? Will the future know how to give what is due to the heroic sacrifice of these people? Part of the nation will understand them, but there will be some who will trample all this into the mud…’

— Lioginės Baliukevičiūtės-Dzūkas (1925-1950)
Commander of Dainava Military District

The Partisan War of War after War from 1944 to 1953 (in some areas the armed resistance lasted until 1965) is one of the most significant events in the history of Lithuania in the twentieth century. It revealed the strong European foundation of the modern Lithuanian state and continued its Western geopolitical trend.

From 1944-1945, Europe and the whole world was ecstatic with the thought that the threat posed by Nazism had finally been overcome, and that the war that carried away millions of lives, destroyed cities and changed the world was finally over... Lithuania, as well as other Baltic states that had lost their independence in 1940, were beginning to feel the peculiar flavor of the ‘Soviet paradise.’

Lithuania began a drive to bring about the restitution of the Lithuanian state. Thousands of men gathered in the forests drawn by the hope that the military stand against the Soviets would not have to be long — only as long as it took to pass the resolution of the Peace Conference, which was supposed to implement the principle of national self-determination. Sadly, Lithuania’s hopes and confidence were dashed, and for 21 years, Lithuania was obliged to wage its war all alone.

By 1945, the forests of Lithuania already contained around 30,000 partisan fighters, commanded by former officers of the Lithuanian Armed Forces, by the members of voluntary pre-war Šauliai (Riflemen) Association, students and school-teachers. Large units of up to 200 men were formed and their battles against the Soviet Army resembled engagements between two regular armies. In the first years of armed resistance (1944-1946) alone an estimated 10,000 partisans were killed, while the overall death toll for the whole period of resistance is estimated at more than 20,000 partisans (and around 2,000 liaison agents and supporters).

At first, armed resistance was to some extent irregular and sporadic, and the structure of the movement, based on military territorial principles, formed very gradually and with immense difficulties. Until 1948, three military regions were formed in the whole territory of Lithuania; each region was made up of military districts, which consisted of brigades with its own operating areas. Brigades further consisted of companies and platoons. Structural subdivisions had their own subordinate headquarters that up until 1948 were commanded by the officers of the former Lithuanian Armed Forces.

The partisans promulgated documents prescribing military regulations through which they sought to maintain military discipline, and also to avoid unauthorized activities and unnecessary bloodshed. The same purpose was served by the introduction of military uniforms and badges as well as other appropriate signs of recognition.

Historians usually divide the 1944-1953 Partisan War into three periods: (1) 1944-1946, (2) 1946-1948 and (3) 1948-1953. The first period points to the beginning of the war. It was around that time that the first resistance organizations fighting against the Soviet occupants began their activity, the most prominent of
them being the Lithuanian Freedom Army (Lietuvos Laisvės Armija, or LLA) founded during the German occupation. The first period was marked by numerous partisan squads that built well-fortified camps in the forests, engaged in large and open fights against NKVD (the Soviet Committee of Internal Affairs, later known as Committee of State Security, KGB) of forces and the regular Red Army, which frequently took over small towns or government institutions (headquarters of volosts and repressive forces).

But the partisan tactics eventually started to change. Due to great differences in the proportion of the forces and ammunition, the Lithuanian partisans suffered great casualties in open fights with the Soviet soldiers, and their large bases, even if well-masked in the forests, were quite easily detected by the occupants. Beginning in 1945, the partisans started acting in small groups and living in hideouts. The structure of partisan units was also about to change. The experience of previous years as well as the surrounding circumstances led them to seek a centralized and higher organization. As a result, military districts — steady, acting compounds with separate headquarters were founded.

This marked the beginning of the second Partisan War, sometimes called the period of military districts. Most historians distinguish the Dainava, Tauras, Vytautas, Vytis, Didžioji kova, Algimantas, Žemaiciai, Kestutis and Prisikėlimas military districts. Upon the formation of these compounds, the partisan movement developed its organized structure, order, customs and traditions, which spawned many gifted leaders. The military districts kept connections among themselves, which lead to the establishment of the united partisan leadership. Since the third period of the Partisan War was largely related to this vitally important goal, it needs to be addressed in more detail.

The first attempts at unification were made in 1946, when the headquarters of the Tauras and Dainava military districts became very active in Southern Lithuania. Their efforts to create a political leadership, separate from the fighters, turned out to be a total failure, as it became apparent that a potential candidate to leadership, a prominent doctor and an influential intellectual from Vilnius, Juozas Markulis, was an agent of the Ministry for the State Security, or MGB, which later became the KGB in the Soviet Union. Around the same time the

PHOTOS (TOP FROM LEFT)
Lithuanian freedom fighters with women wearing national Lithuanian costume; A group of freedom fighters with arms; Freedom fighters take a break and enjoy the forest sun; Freedom fighters conduct weapons training.
LITHUANIAN MILITARY MUSEUM PHOTOS COURTESY OF THE LITHUANIAN ARMED FORCES

MAP (RIGHT)
In 1945 the structure of the partisan units started to change as they began to seek a centralized, higher organization. This resulted in the creation of military districts and marked the beginning of the second Partisan War period, sometimes called the period of military districts.
Lithuanian partisans tried to build closer connections with the Lithuanian organizations in immigration, especially the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania (Vyriausias Lietu vos išlaisvinimo komitetas) and to create the Lithuanian government in exile. These attempts, however, were also doomed, because it was extremely difficult, almost impossible to maintain close ties with the West. Moreover, the Lithuanian partisans’ and VLIK’s views on certain matters radically differed. After these failures, the only real possibility to consolidate all partisans was to establish an institution — made exclusively of armed guerrilla fighters — that would carry out both military and political objectives. Thus, during the third period the partisans strengthened their mutual ties. The military districts gradually combined into separate areas. The attempt to unite all partisans reached its peak in the congress of all Lithuanian partisan commanders, which took place in February 1949. The congress established the Council of Lithuanian Freedom Struggle Movement (Lietuvos laisvės kovos sąjūdis). On Feb. 16, 1949, the congress signed a declaration that envisaged the main guidelines for the future re-established independent state of Lithuania. The Partisan Declaration has been recognized as the legal act of the Republic of Lithuania. It comes as no surprise that the Parliament of Lithuania declared the leader of the Lithuanian partisans, Jonas Žemaitis, as the fourth President of Lithuania.

Unlike previous attempts at unified organization, this supreme command succeeded in securing the allegiance and subordination of all the Lithuanian partisan commanders who participated in the constitutive assembly. The political Declaration of LLKS — a document that is now recognized as an integral part of the Lithuanian legal system, and bridges the historical chasm between the Lithuania of 1990 and the Lithuania of 1918. An aspiration for freedom, independence and democracy is part of that all-important legacy of guiding values bequeathed to the future Lithuania by the generation that lived by the principle, “Give to Fatherland that which you owe…”

Unfortunately, at that time due to unequal power relations and constant fighting, the partisan movement started to decline, though the struggle continued up until the mid-1950s, and the last individual fighters were killed by the Soviets as late as the mid-1960s. Stasys Guiga was the last partisan, who escaped the Soviet repressions and died in 1986.

It must be admitted that the Partisan War was not an ordinary partisan war as the freedom fighters did not receive any resources from abroad or neighboring countries. Resisting against the Soviet occupation Lithuania was left in complete isolation, whereas the partisans, the majority of whom were not professionally trained soldiers, were confronted by the greatest empire that did not observe the customs of warfare and had the largest living force resources — one of the World War II winners — the Soviet Union. The fact that the Lithuanian fighters for freedom were able to resist that empire for more than a decade, the Partisan War can rightly be considered as one of the most unique wars in history.

The Partisan War has to be assessed as part of the Second World War. Formally World War II was over, but not for the state of Lithuania. At the very beginning of the war, Lithuania lost its independence along with other European countries. In 1940 it was occupied by the Soviet Union, and in 1945, at the end of World War II, Lithuania did not gain its freedom, on the contrary, it was retaken by the Soviets for an undefined time. Therefore, the Partisan War for the liberation of Lithuania from the Soviet Union was virtually a continuation of the Second World War.

In light of the above, it follows that the Lithuanian Partisan War is best understood in the context of the resistance history of other European countries during World War II. In view of tactics, world view, motivation and other aspects the Lithuanian partisans have differed only little from French, Polish, Czech, Norwegian, Greek and other fighters. Just the occupants were different, but here too, the Nazi and Soviet totalitarian policy was alike in many ways, and what is more, at the outset of World War II Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union made a mutually beneficial agreement. It is noteworthy to mention that, when collaborating with the Lithuanian partisans, the Western Allies’ agencies of special operations used communication methods applied during World War II with other resistance movements. This kind of communication in Lithuania was not as fully developed and implemented as it was in France or Greece, yet as far as it continued it was based on the experience of World War II.

In addition to what has been said, the Lithuanian Partisan War was distinctive in its well-developed underground government activity, also known to the Polish resistance organizations. The origin of this activity went back to the 19th century when the former Polish-Lithuanian state had been divided by the Russian Empire. The first underground government was established during the Revolt of 1863-1864, when the insurgents formed not only fighting squads, but also an underground government as well as various administrative institutions. The
Lithuanian Partisan War of 1944-1953 was in line with the same historical tradition. The partisans saw themselves as a volunteer army, not only fighting against the occupiers but also striving to maintain and to re-establish the state of Lithuania. The most recent research has revealed the partisans’ elaborate political and administrative system, which included jurisdiction, legislation, tax collection and distribution, suppression of hostile Soviet propaganda and other public functions.

The resistant citizens were thus able to create an intermediate political form. The partisan leadership represented the Lithuanian political nation after it could no longer be represented by the constitutional institutions that had been in power until 1940. The Lithuanian Partisans’ Declaration of February 16, 1949, expressed the assumed responsibility as follows:

1. The Council of the LFSM [Lithuanian Freedom Struggle Movement], guided by the decisions of the UDRM [United Democratic Resistance Movement] Presidium and UDRM Military Council joint meeting of Feb. 10, 1949, shall be the supreme political body of the nation during the occupation period, in charge of the political and military struggle for the liberation of the nation.
2. The headquarters of the LFSM Council and its Presidium shall be located in Lithuania.
3. The State system of Lithuania shall be that of a democratic republic.
4. The sovereign authority of Lithuania shall belong to the nation.
5. The governing of Lithuania shall be exercised by the Seimas elected through free, democratic, general, equal elections by a secret ballot, and by an appointed government.
6. The Provisional National Council shall have legislative power from the end of the occupation to the assembly of a democratic Seimas of Lithuania.
7. The Provisional National Council shall include the representatives of all regions, districts, teams, universities, cultural and religious organizations and movements as well as political parties having national support, under a united leadership, struggling in Lithuania and abroad and in line with the principle of proportional representation.
8. Upon the restoration of Lithuania’s independence, before the Seimas assembles, the Chairman of the LFSM Council Presidium shall perform the duties of the President of the Republic.
9. The Provisional Government of Lithuania shall be formed upon the recommendation of the Chairman of the LFSM Council. The Government shall be held accountable to the Provisional National Council.

The above-cited Declaration text testifies that the Council of Lithuanian Freedom Struggle Movement acted in a similar way as the Council of Lithuania, which had reinstated the independence of Lithuania on the Feb. 16, 1918, i.e. as an intermediate political form.

The Partisan War in Lithuania repeatedly confirmed that Lithuania was a European republic, a state created by and belonging to its citizens. The true content of the nation’s sovereignty and true meaning of the concept of citizens is revealed during the periods of crisis, such as the Partisan War. It becomes evident that the citizens of the true modern republic can resist not only by means of spontaneous revolt but also by creating a new state in the underground. That’s why the history of the Partisan War in Lithuania is also a key to a deeper understanding of what it is to be a modern European state.


ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Lt. Col. Linus Idzelis is the Chief of Information Operations for the Lithuanian Armed Forces Strategic Communication Department.

Lithuanian freedom fighters conduct weapons training. LITHUANIAN MILITARY MUSEUM PHOTO COURTESY OF THE LITHUANIAN ARMED FORCES
"Si vis pacem — para bellum" [lat.] (Eng. “If you want peace, prepare for war”) is one of the most known sayings by the renowned Roman Empire war theorist Vegetius (Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus, 4th century). In the context of the current geo-political environment in Lithuania, it is still relevant to the defense of Lithuania. But what does “para bellum” mean for 3 million people living in the country? Heavy arms, total defense or building resilience? There are various opinions and answers to those questions from Lithuanian and international military experts. However, “management of recourses” might be identified as one of the critical conclusions in many of those opinions. It’s not about classic military logistics or the traditional role of the government when it comes to the defense. It’s about population motivation and capabilities to be a part of the country’s defense. Non-lethal (defined in Lithuanian Armed Forces as activities in information or civil environments like psychological operations, civil-military operations, etc.) operations are opportunities for every civilian to be a part of the nation’s defense. Such operations do not require weapons, explosives or specific military measures and training. Consequently, many civilians can potentially execute them in denied territory with little to no guidance from the military. However, without lethal activities, it is difficult for non-lethal operations to achieve strategic success while the country is occupied by enemy. In turn, lethal operations can be significantly more effective when supported by the integration of non-lethal activities.

In addition to Tier I tasks, Lithuanian Special Operations Forces focus on conducting non-lethal operations in a non-permissive, semi-permissive or simply stated enemy-occupied or controlled terrain. That is the primary task for the LITHSOF Information Activities Group — the unit built, trained and directed to conduct psychological, civil-military and information operations by non-standard means, independently or with and through developed supporters’, which is comprised mainly of a civilian-based network. The majority of the historical lessons are taken from the Lithuanian extensive history of armed and non-armed resistance. Lithuanian Special Operations Forces keep the traditions of the ‘Forest Brothers’ (resistance forces who fought against Soviet occupation for nine years after the end of World War II) and incorporates lessons learned from the non-violent resistance that won Lithuanian Independence in 1990. The Information Activities Group adopted and integrated key lessons learned and tactics, techniques and procedures of resistance...
movements who confronted Russia most recently: Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (from 2014). Below are the five key lessons:

1. **A definite Identity.** Understanding who we are and why we need to save all elements of our identity becomes crucial during resistance. That’s why all national symbols, including historical events, persons, places or infrastructure and social-national elements are “targets of exploitation.” For such exploitation, techniques of psychological operations play a significant role. Elements of identity must be presented at the right place, right time while using the best method to reach the target audience. Graffiti, letters in mailboxes or posters might be seen as “old school;” however, they are effective partisan-type communication methods while under occupation.

2. **Looking for the “drivers.”** There is always a part of a population that has a motivation to take a lead in lethal or non-violent resistance activities. They have to be given the knowledge and skills to resist. A social survey in Lithuania conducted in 2018 revealed that 3.4 percent of Lithuanians will organize resistance activities by themselves in case of occupation. The same survey shows, that 35.5 percent of Lithuanians will join resistance movements and 44.6 percent will support non-violent resistance. Separately, such activities might cause challenges for the occupying forces. However, when planned and coordinated, they can result in a decisive success. Civil-military engagements are the instruments to integrate civilian resources into the overall defense initiative or possible resistance movement. Any logistic, transportation, medical, financial, information gathering and sharing, communication capabilities and functions might be conducted by the supporters’ network, thus making civil affairs a critical element in the resistance.

3. **Proactiveness is better than reactiveness.** When the enemy is proactive through the conduct of lethal or non-lethal activities such as spreading propaganda, the populace tends to be reactive and follow the enemy’s “scenario,” finding themselves in on the defense. However, the question remains “How many wars were won by defense?” Therefore, proactive activities such as non-violent resistance events or information attacks can change the narrative in the information environment forcing the enemy to use his resources to react or counter-act.

4. **Complementary effects build synergy.** All activities create a synergetic effect when they are coordinated and complementary. If there is a lethal or even non-lethal operation against an occupying force, it must be known and understood, while sending a clear message to all target audiences. That’s why lethal forces must integrate non-lethal specialties, like communication, human behavior experts or social engineers into the process of planning, execution and post-operation exploitation. Complementary non-lethal activities shape the information environment and consequently influence perception, attitudes and behavior of different target audiences in support of objectives.

5. **Effects-based thinking.** Each action, either lethal or non-lethal, brings consequences. Effective management of these actions is the challenge for the resistance force. Planners often focus only on the first-order, or direct effect of a planned activity, however, that might cause a negative affect on the people or groups that haven’t been assessed as the target audiences. In the best case scenario, first, second, third and even higher-order effects should favorably impact different people or groups. It’s like playing chess: your success is determined by how many of your opponent’s moves you can predict.

All five lessons are used as principles to increase the effectiveness of the LITHOSOF Information Activities Group and guide operations in non-permissive and semi-permissive environments. Civilian population integration, by training, advising and assisting different government and non-government organizations helps manage resources and significantly reinforce Lithuanian defense capabilities and effectiveness.

---

**PHOTOS COURTESY OF THE LITHUANIAN ARMED FORCES**
Leveraging STRATCOM

The importance of Strategic Communication and how it’s implemented in the Lithuanian Armed Forces.

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL LINAS IDZELIS

As an active member of the transatlantic community, Lithuania is under pressure from organized third-country and non-state actors. Political, social, economic, energy pressures, military power operations, intelligence operations, falsification of historical facts and their tendentious interpretation in the media and social networks are actively used and publicly demonstrated in relation to our country. It is done in order to influence Lithuania’s domestic and foreign policy, European Union and NATO decisions, increase mistrust of transatlantic unity and values, and to support the goals of third, hostile countries border, intelligence and internal policies.

Since Lithuania regained its independence from Soviet Union, four potential future scenarios for our country have been simulated during various crisis management exercises. Examples such as Chechnya, Georgia, Syria and Ukraine have shown us that we live close to a “sleeping volcano, which from time to time erupts and starts throwing hot, flaming stones on its neighboring countries.” Due to this we have to search for new strategies, potential security and deterrence policies in order to know what to do if it will happen again, because no one wants to be the next.

Let’s take a look at the Matrix 1 which provides a snapshot of hypothetical situations by 2025 of different ways the Baltic States might be threatened by Russia. Four axes show possible Russian approaches to use power against the Baltic States. Numbers from 1 to 4 show how likely Russia is to use one or another scenario/tactics and finally letters from A to D constitute how disruptive potential scenarios could be to overpower the Baltic States.

The first scenario (A1) relies on an example of Russian annexation of Crimea and covert, proxy war in Eastern Ukraine. The second scenario (B2) mirrors Russian incursion into Georgia in 2008 after huge scale joint complex exercises. The third scenario (C4) demonstrates possible ‘Russian World’ creation in the Baltic States where it is fought for people hearts and minds. And finally, the fourth scenario (B3) reflects Russia’s aspirations to isolate the Baltic countries desire to become energetically independent. This is done by constantly changing electricity prices and offering much cheaper electricity than our countries could produce domestically, hereby delaying political aspirations for disconnection and synchronization with the West.

SCENARIO 1: (A1) HYBRID WARFARE

The first scenario is really serious and very destructive, thereby might be most dangerous. Taking into consideration that “a special law on accession of foreign countries or even parts or territories of them to the Russian state has been presented by President Putin and passed by the State
Duma. Besides that, the statement in the Russian military doctrine about the possibility of protecting Russian citizens by military means, gives reasonable grounds to acknowledge an increased threat to the security of the neighboring countries. Given the big Russian-speaking minority in Estonia and Latvia, which comprises about 25 percent of the population in both countries, Moscow could, prior to conflict, issue Russian passports to the Russian speaking population as it has done in Georgia. Simultaneously, it could import volunteers and proxies reinforced with members from Russian Special forces. Then to linking-up with local supporters and one morning start seizing governmental buildings and self-proclaim the independence of fictitious states which would gladly join Russia after simulated elections. Baltic States authorities immediately address this issue to the NAC, which after long hours of debate will not declare article V. Therefore, the Baltic States would lose some parts of their territory, which would remain under control of Russia. NATO would split into different smaller alliances or separate case by case made coalitions to counter similar threats.

**SCENARIO 2: (B2) DELIBERATE OR HASTY ATTACK**

The second scenario is based on an imminent Russian military intervention in the Baltic States, and might be treated as most likely. To begin, Russians assemble necessary amount of troops near the Baltic States borders under cover of huge scale joint combined exercises, such as Ladoga or Zapad. Subsequently, Russia quite unexpectedly launches a full scale incursion, employing up to two combined arms corps into the Baltic States. Russia broadcast via media that Russian military build-up is being used to liberate their compatriots and citizens from Latvian and Estonian nationalist’s oppression. In a best-case scenario, subsequently, NATO would immediately start military operations to defend its Baltic members, initially by employing Enhanced Forward Presence battalions, after that reinforcing with very high readiness forces as a part of the NATO NRF then dispatching required amount of follow on forces. As an end state, Russian military incursion is prevented and Baltic States international borders are restored. In worst-case scenario, NATO would provide military assistance too slowly, with the US, UK and some other NATO countries having assembled in Poland, take actions and sends their troops to defend their Baltic allies and to show strong resolve as well as solidarity. As a result, NATO would remain the strongest military alliance, capable of extinguishing fires and reassuring and defending the Baltic States.

**SCENARIO 3: (C4) SHAPING LOCAL POPULATION’S MIND**

The third scenario is related to persuasion of the Baltic States population and it might be very dangerous in the long term perspective. In light of possible “Russian World” creation in the Baltic States, Russia continuously organizes different cultural events such as concerts, conferences, youth camps, air soft team competitions and etc., where they spread ‘alternative truth’ and use deception with Kremlin bias. Besides that, TV, radio, newspapers and internet serve as a primary means to spread Russian propaganda with aim to show that only Russian troops can effectively fight fascist and ISIS while west, especially NATO, is just a paper organization. To counter Russian propaganda in Lithuanian Armed Forces the Strategic Communication department was established a decade ago and has become well known among allies and friends.

**SCENARIO 4: (D3) DENIAL OF ENERGY RESOURCES**

The fourth scenario is less lethal but might be very disruptive as well, and from general perception is most likely. In 2012 gas flow started directly from Russia to Germany through the North Stream pipeline bypassing Baltic States and Poland. At the same time referring to the fact that all three Baltic States are still dependent on Russia for oil, gas and electricity, and taking into consideration
that Russia already in 1990 and 1992 seized oil supplies to Lithuania we easily expect that something similar can be repeated again. The main reason for such action is Moscow’s will to increase its power and influence through the manipulation of energy resources. Furthermore, Russia by doing this, may conduct a test for credibility and solidarity of NATO and EU as well as to check whether some kind of actions will be taken or not. In best-case scenario, the European Union and Baltic States governments would promptly get in touch with Russia and negotiate the case or offers something in exchange. The inflicted damage to the Baltic States would be very marginal and after some tense situation, normal life would be restored. Relationship between Russia and Baltic States is resumed and goes like "business as usual." In a worst-case scenario, Russia would suspend energy resource supplies in winter time and call for social and political unrest. NATO and EU would put themselves aside claiming that the situation has to be solved by Baltic States on the bilateral basis. This situation development would definitely lead Baltic States towards economic and social crises.

LITHUANIAN ARMED FORCES STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION DEPARTMENT AND ITS FUNCTIONS

As Lithuania responded to emerging geopolitical challenges, Strategic Communication became an integral part of national security and defense policy. The Lithuanian Armed Forces Strategic Communication department, or LAF STRATCOM, evaluates the information environment, emerging hybrid threats, strengthens society’s resilience to disinformation and prepares various analytical products.

The LAF STRATCOM process is designed to synchronize and mobilize efforts and resources to accomplish the appointed tasks mentioned before. The Strategic communication process consists of the following steps: Analysis, planning, coordination and implementation.

1. Analysis. Analysts of the department continuously analyze the national and foreign information environment in order to identify the impact of information on internal and external decision-making. They pinpoint vulnerabilities, potential risks, and give recommendations for potential actions and counter measures.

2. Planning and evaluation. Planners evaluate the reliability of data provided by hostile information activities analysis, and identify the most appropriate methods, tools and resources to achieve the needed effects. They develop short-term and long-term implementation plans for strategic communication and assess the effectiveness of actions and measures taken in order to make recommendations for further measures and actions.

3. Implementation and coordination. Recommendations from the analysis and planning stages are reviewed and tasks are implemented according to the short-term and long-term plans of the LAF STRATCOM. Continuous coordination of actions is maintained to ensure continuity of activities and achieve the desired effects or results.

The LAF STRATCOM is divided into four separate units, which are closely interrelated and work in coordination: Assessment of the information environment, Military Public Affairs, Information and Psychological Operations and Citizenship education.

Military Public Affairs Section

The Military Public Affairs section is one of the key executors within the LAF STRATCOM department. The functions of the Military Public Affairs section include public relations via policy guidelines provided by Lithuanian Ministry of Defense, shaping positive public opinion and the planning and execution of public information activities about Lithuanian Armed Forces. In general, there are two types of work performed by different specialists: public affairs and public information. This reflects the two directions that the Military Public Affairs section targets — the society and the media.

Public Affairs. This sub-section works directly with the society and is
Local citizens interact with Lithuanian Armed Forces Soldiers and equipment during a "Military-Society Day" hosted by the LAF STRATCOM Military Public Affairs Section. This event allows citizens to become familiar and comfortable with the military.

LITHUANIAN ARMED FORCES PHOTO BY SRZ. SPEC. LEVA BUDZEIKAITĖ

A member of the Lithuanian Armed Forces educates students on 21st century threats.

PHOTO COURTESY OF THE LITHUANIAN ARMED FORCES

A military officer briefs kids about the role of the Armed Forces at a summer camp.

LITHUANIAN ARMED FORCES PHOTO BY SRZ. SPEC. LEVA BUDZEIKAITĖ

At the end one of the most important goal of Military Public Affairs section and all Strategic Communication department is to gain desired operational effects preplanned by department’s planners as well as to run continuous public projects to gain trust towards Lithuanian Armed Forces from two sources — media and the Lithuanian society, which is being seen as a vital condition for successful armed defense of the State.

responsible for all cooperation requests received from society to the Lithuanian Armed Forces.

The section does not operate with any military resources, though its job is to mediate between the civil organizations and the military units on various projects, such as public events, celebrations, commemorations and others. The Military Public Affairs section maintains several “military-born” events, among them – Armed Forces Day in November, "Military–Society Day," an open door event held in May, and some others. Overall there are about 100 events per year where the LAF STRATCOM department is actively involved.

The civilian organizations that are usually met by the Military Public Affairs section are NGOs, creators, media producers, semi-state organizations (such as Riflemen’s organization) and others.

The spectrum of tools that the Military Public Affairs section operates with is strongly connected with everything that Lithuanian Armed Forces units maintain – such as static displays that could be used at public events, military orchestras, military field kitchens, various specific military performances, planes, helicopters and more.

Public Information. This is a sub-section of specialists who work directly with the inter-state and foreign media.

This job consists of generally four parts – internal campaigns, routine news releases, maintaining media requests and routine “breathing” of several social media outlets.

The greatest part of LAF STRATCOM MPA sections work still remains internal campaigns, projects and work with media. Typically there are from three to six active campaigns/projects. Some of the projects are temporary (e.g. promotion of studies in Military Academy of Lithuania), some of them — long term and continuous (such as “Through the Soldier’s Eyes” — thoughts about the service, provided by “boots on the ground,” or “Off Duty” — texts and photo galleries of soldiers hobbies while not on duty).
Analysis section. LAF STRATCOM departments Analysis section is responsible for Information Environment Assessment (IEA) in order to provide timely and accurate situational awareness to support Higher command’s intents and other national and international institutions on Hostile Strategic Communications. In other words, the unit consists of military and civilian personnel with intelligence, social sciences and information technologies backgrounds, they are taking part in monitoring and analyzing of opinion shaping indications in electronic and physical domains. The core concept of the IEA was developed in 2016 during LAF STRATCOM department participation at scientific project so called ECOPOL, where government, academic and private sector organizations participated in theoretical and practical concept co-creation activities.

At the LAF STRATCOM department the entire IEA process is split into separate activities, but at the same time everyone’s actions are interrelated through a virtual joint analysis fusion environment, where analysts can see each other’s activities. It is a collaborative process, which allows integration with as many various field analysts as necessary. Process integration design is based on chain relationship analysis:

Monitoring of indications in electronic and physical domains >> Indications content deconstruction in to the messages, themes, sectors, audiences and targets >> Final products preparation and dissemination.

The overall process has two activity cycles: monthly and quick response. Monthly cycle is designated for overall opinion shaping indication assessments through the Political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment and time perspective, because military sector is interrelated with other sectors. Monthly product reflects key and new disinformation messages directed against national and NATO military activities.

The Citizenship Education Division

When we speak of the state security we have to keep in mind that all of the states depend on their people and how they see their country. It is important to stress that it is hard to defend a country if all of the citizens do not want it. We are living in unstable and unpredictable times and if we want to have safe, prosperous and resilient society, we have to foster and promote civil, democratic and patriotic ideas. Due to this, one of the main goals of the Citizenship Education Section of the Lithuanian Armed Forces Strategic Communication Department is to ensure long-term prevention and public resilience in the face of hostile information threats.

The Citizenship Education Section of the Lithuanian Armed Forces Strategic Communication Department is one of the four branches which gathers all the information from the other sections and implements it in practice by communicating with different social groups, children, civil institutions and military personnel in order to fight with disinformation, promote and strengthen critical thinking, historical knowledge as well as civil duties and rights. In other words, the main goal of Citizenship Education Section is to preserve and strengthen the interaction between Lithuanian Armed Forces and society in the long term by creating synergy in the field of state defense.

We have to realize that in the context of information warfare, the main target is to lessen the ‘will to resist’. For us, unfriendly states are trying to undermine it, in order to incline our commitment to resist in the event of a potential conflict. The Short-term tactical goal of the information warfare is to demoralize and discredit the armed forces itself, and the other, the strategic level goal, is to either intimidate the society or provoke its disintegration.
An information product created by the LAF STRATCOM cell communicates important survival information to children and young adults in a format that is easy for them to understand.

A book titled “What You Need to Know About Emergency Preparedness and War Time,” provides detailed information to Lithuanian Citizens on readiness and helps to build a resilient, educated society.

A Russian propaganda news story on YouTube pokes fun at LAF STRATCOM information materials in attempt to make the country look paranoid in its preparations against Russian aggression. The LAF STRATCOM cell works on a daily basis to counter propaganda such as this to its citizens and international audiences.

A LAF STRATCOM information booklet titled “What We Need To Know: Guidelines For Proactive Preparation,” provides an illustrated guide to show weapons, equipment and other materials Lithuanian citizens might encounter during an invasion.

Information and psychological operation section

Information operations are coordinated actions designed to influence the opponent’s decision-making process and affect the opponent’s information processes and systems, while protecting our own.

The Information Operations Unit plans and implements various information operations, develops defense strategies and supports other governmental authorities in dealing with information threats as well as drafts annexes to the national defense plan. It develops new and improves old operational-level strategies and contributes closely to the development of strategic-level national security projects. Moreover, it coordinates information operations and gives insights about Lithuanian and regional information environment. It also participates in various military and civil crisis exercises and simulations, where two domains: information and cyber are being united to achieve the synergy and learn from each other. And last but not the least thing is that these specialists coordinate information activities coordination board.

Finally, Strategic Communication must be planned and coordinated in order to do what is necessary to create a Joint Operational Planning Group and draw operational design identifying lines of operations, decisive conditions, operational effects and finally operational actions, which are of paramount importance. Once complete, the center of gravity and operational end state must be discussed and included into operational design. It is worthwhile to mention that all operational effects must be measured, otherwise, it would be very difficult to stay on track and to achieve your goals.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Lt. Col. Linus Idzelis is the Chief of Information Operations for the Lithuanian Armed Forces Strategic Communication Department.
As Latvian families make their way home in the evenings, and settle down to watch the evening news, there is a broad disconnect in what each household hears. In Latvia, where about 30 percent of the population is ethnic Russian, the televisions are by-in-large tuned to the Russian language channels, many of which are produced in Russia. These Russian-produced channels reflect what Andis Kudors, a researcher at the Centre for Eastern European Policy Studies, a Latvian think tank, calls a Russian bias that lacks a pluralistic approach. This is concerning to the Latvian government because three of the six most popular TV channels are Russian owned and send anti-West messages into the country on a daily basis that serves to undermine the integration of those individuals into Latvian society.

Prior to the break up of the Soviet Union, Russian leaders moved large numbers of Russian citizens into the Baltic States. These are the people that make up the block of Russian speakers in Latvia. They are not citizens of Latvia and many still hold Russian passports. In an interview with Special Warfare, Kudors explained how Russia, on a daily basis, seeks to sow discord between the Russian speakers and the Latvian state.

“At the Centre for Eastern European Policy Studies, we are conducting studies about Russian propaganda narratives and disinformation campaigns against the Baltic States as well as the Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova,” explained Kudors. “In 2005, Putin said that the Soviet Union collapse was the biggest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century. That was not just a message, it was not relating historical events. Instead, it was a command as to how people should look at the Soviet past. Since that time, we have seen many of disinformation campaigns with some historical explanation.

One of these historical explanations concerns the illegal occupation of the Baltics in 1940. Kudors noted, “Today, Russian propagandists call it a voluntary decision of the people of the Baltic states to become Soviet citizens and join the Soviet Union,” he explained. “They suggested that in one morning all true Baltic nations like Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia somehow decided maybe it would be better to be part of Stalin’s Soviet Union. It’s not believable, but they are still using this story. This historical propaganda is really an important part of Russian hostile influence in the Baltic states.”

Over time, this idea evolved into the Russian compatriot policy, which is directed toward Russians residing outside of Russia. The policy is designed to influence the politics of the countries where a big percentage of Russians or so-called Russian speakers live and to polarize the native Latvian community from the Russian speaking community in Latvia.

“These messages resonate among groups that feel threatened, for example, in the eastern part of Latvia, unemployment is higher than in Riga, so sometimes, that audience is more swayed toward Russian propaganda,” Kudors explained. “So, in that way they are trying to split...
society, and at the same time, weaken the link between North America and Canada and the United States and the European Union. The second dividing line is to divide European nations within the European Union. Why? Because if Europe is united in foreign policy toward Russia, there is no place for them here. The third dividing line is within each European nation by splitting society between ethnic lines. This is why Russia is supporting populist movements in the European Union. In Latvia, this line is an ethnic line.

Kudors said that currently, there is no real ethnic conflict in Latvia, but there are tensions at times, which are caused by Russian propaganda that is aimed at the state. He said a major message is that Latvia is a failed state, when it is compared to other European Union countries. He added that the channels are aggressively and skillfully weaving propaganda into their stories, which are really disinformation campaigns.

“An event happens, none of the four Russian channels will give you the same interpretation and none of them are factual as to what happened. Over time, this changes the opinion of the people (Russian speakers) of the country and of the world,” he continued. “This altered view of what is going on not only in the country, but in the world affects the electorate. This portion of the electorate will want to soften sanctions toward the Kremlin, which is what the Kremlin is doing — playing the long game in an attempt to make Latvia a Trojan Horse in the EU and NATO. But they will not succeed because their actions have strengthened pro-NATO sentiments in Latvia, not only with Latvians but also with those ethnic Russians who are already well integrated here.”

Kudors concluded, “It’s not black and white. There are so many aspects here. But in general, I am quite optimistic. I am a lecturer at a university, and I see many younger Russians who are living here. They are really Europeans. They like democracy so they do not care what Putin says. They don’t want to live in Russia. They are happy to live here and have said so.”

HOW CEEPS WORKS TO COUNTER PROPAGANDA

**Monthly Analysis:** CEEPS scans the Internet using a media monitoring tool and publishes a monthly analysis of the data. Learn more at: [http://appc.lv/eng/appc-has-launched-a-new-disinformation-monitoring-project/](http://appc.lv/eng/appc-has-launched-a-new-disinformation-monitoring-project/)

**Exposing Disinformation:** CEEPS publishes a regular series of articles that contain some of the most popular messages and topics of the current period about Latvia, and the common methods of disinformation in Russia. Learn more at: [http://appc.lv/eng/ceeps-exposes-the-topics-and-methods-of-russian-disinformation-in-latvia/](http://appc.lv/eng/ceeps-exposes-the-topics-and-methods-of-russian-disinformation-in-latvia/)
Situated on the Baltic Sea between Lithuania and Estonia, Latvia is one of the three Baltic States. It also shares borders with Belarus and Russia. Throughout its history, Latvia has been under the control of Germany, Poland, Sweden and finally, Russia. The Latvian republic emerged following World War I, but it was annexed by the USSR in 1940. Latvia reestablished its independence in 1991 following the breakup of the Soviet Union: although Russian troops did not completely leave the country until 1994.
In 2004, Latvia joined both NATO and the European Union. Living in the Shadow of Russia, Latvia obviously has a strong drive to protect its sovereignty. It is an effort that impacts everyone in the country, which has a Russian population that makes up 25% of its total population of 1.8 million.

When the Special Warfare staff traveled to Latvia in 2019, we had the opportunity to sit down with not only leaders of the military, but also the Latvian Minister of Defence to talk about resistance in Latvia.

Artis Pabriks, the Minister of Defence and Deputy Prime Minister, talked about the role of his office in supporting resistance and resilience in Latvia.

“I think we all learn from our experiences, and if you’re looking to the experience of Latvians or Baltic nations, then I think our biggest problem, probably psychological problem, is the years of 1913 and 1940,” he began. “Why? Because we had relatively well-prepared armies and also a society that was ready to stand for their values...their country — but we did not fight against Soviet invaders. And, I think that created for us this kind of psychological trauma, which we will never forget.”

Minister Pabriks continued, “We are learning from our mistakes. Smart people learn from the mistakes of others. In this case, we have to learn from our own mistake. So the major goal of our government, of our Ministry of Defence, of our Army, is that history never, ever repeats itself.”

He went on to explain that it’s each individual’s personal experiences that compels them to take a stand to not let history repeat itself. For him, it is very personal.

“I will never allow my children to have to live in something that I was born under — the occupation of Soviets. So that means that no matter what, or no matter how a hypothetical enemy crosses our border, we would shoot to kill. That’s very simple,” he said. “I think we should also prepare our society for attacks from different locations, not because we want a bad relationship with another country, but because we need to be prepared.”

He used Russia as an example. “For instance, Russia is a neighboring country. We, as a country, are most interested in having a working relationship with our neighbors. Russia is our neighbor, but they are different from other nations on the European continent.”

“We cannot live in the world of illusions. We must have a realistic point of view, and we understand that we live in asymmetric geopolitics, and that our neighbor is much bigger and much stronger than us,” he explained. “So the question is about the price. And I think the opponent must understand that we are not going to be sold. If we are to be taken over, our neighbor must know that there will be a large price, and we will ensure this process costs them a large price in lives.”

To meet the Army at their borders, the Latvians have several levels of defense. The Latvian Armed Forces (Nacionālie Bruņotie Spēki) are the Armed Forces of the Republic of Latvia. Latvia’s defense concept is based on a mobile, professional rapid response force and reserve segment that can be called upon relatively fast for mobilization should the need arise. The National Armed Forces consists of land forces, naval forces, the Air Force and the National Guard, all of whom are charged with protecting the territory of the state; participating in international military operations; and preventing threats to national security. The National Guard is comprised of people who work in professional positions throughout the week, but who volunteer and train in their private time and on weekends, he explained. The next level is a reserve force, which is made up of young people between the ages of 12 to 18, who also train on weekends.

With the volunteer forces supplementing the professional military
A country of tenacity and resilience

LATVIA

assets, the country is focused on developing a comprehensive defense system, which is tied to mutual cooperation and involvement of all facets of society, including armed forces, non-governmental organizations, individual and families.

Minister Pabriks, continued, explaining that each and every one of the citizens involved in defense must understand what they would do if an incursion happened.

“They need to know how they survive in the event of crisis,” he said. “And, one of the lessons, from 1939 and 1940 is that at that time, people, soldiers, were ready to defend their families and their country. In 2016, we had a law passed by our government that tells us that even if the order doesn’t come, each and every citizen must, or has a right to defend himself or herself against the invader. Soldiers and officers have a duty, according to the plans to do the work they are supposed to do to defend their country, even if the order from the top doesn’t come,” he explained. “So that basically means there will be no standstill if something happens.”

He explained that under their comprehensive defense plan, government leaders and military leaders look at each level of government to ensure that crisis plans are up to date and practical. He said they are asking, what happens in the Ministry of Health if a crisis occurs, how many doctors do they have, etc. They also look at the provision of electricity, transportation and telecommunications to try and shore up all them up prior to a crisis.

Another project that will contribute to the comprehensive defense system is military education in schools. The Prime Minister acknowledged that the idea might not be popular among other European countries, but believes it will work in Latvia.

“We are offering a compulsory semi-military education in all schools starting in 2022, which is one day per month where they can train on how to act in the event a of
civilian crisis or even in a catastrophe,” he explained. “If a student joins the Army, they are better prepared, of if they want to just do it a part-time because of patriotism, they can join the National Guard.”

He continued, noting that he is not willing to take a chance on the defense of the nation, which is why Latvians must prepare themselves as much as possible. In 2014, after the Russian incursion into the Ukraine, the Ministry of Defence created a unit of the National Guard from the employees of the agency.

While there have been no overt actions from Russia to Latvia, Latvians are combating psychological operations, propaganda and cyber attacks on a regular basis. In response, the Baltic countries have come together to create centers of excellence, like the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia and the NATO STRATCOM Center of Excellence in Latvia. In 2014, Latvia suggested that NATO form a Center of Excellence for Strategic Communication and has worked to develop it over the past six years. The Minister of Defence noted that the center has developed a great capacity that will help many countries before elections or during crises. He noted that the center has written papers on ISIS propaganda and is advising other countries.

“We are looking at this from our experience ... from an asymmetric position,” he continued. “We understand that we can’t have a thousand tanks, but we can have a quite good capacity on cyber security and cyber offense. It’s possible that you don’t need to have a big country to make other people feel pain. Our duty is actually to fight against the Russian propaganda, which is daily. There are actually few differences between Russia using propaganda to attack us or you, or the West in general, because a major target is to tell that, look, you are a failed countries.”

Noting the messages that are used in propaganda, he pointed out that some similar themes are used: corrupt democracy, corrupt value system, or corrupt religious system, etc. The goal of the propaganda is simply to make people unwilling to defend their country or to work to abolish the government system. He added that this kind of propaganda could be fought in many ways using small tools.

Referencing Latvian Special Operations soldiers, he noted that he has a great respect for the Latvian soldiers who will be the first and most important defense if there is an incursion.

“Many people ask me as a politician what will happen in Latvia if these green men appear as they did in Ukraine ... We are a small society. We know each other ... so if strangers appear, we know where they come from. If they violate our border and if they come, we will take them out. That’s it. So no chances.”

"MANY PEOPLE ASK ME AS A POLITICIAN WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN LATVIA IF THESE GREEN MEN APPEAR AS THEY DID IN UKRAINE ... WE ARE A SMALL SOCIETY. WE KNOW EACH OTHER ... SO IF STRANGERS APPEAR, WE KNOW WHERE THEY COME FROM. IF THEY VIOLATE OUR BORDER AND IF THEY COME, WE WILL TAKE THEM OUT. THAT’S IT. SO NO CHANCES.”
ESTONIAN DEFENSE

The Obligation of Every Citizen

The Estonian Defence League: Enhancing the readiness of the nation and defending its independence and constitutional order through free will and self-initiative.

BY JANICE BURTON

Maj. Gen. Meelis Kiili is the former Commander of the Estonian Defence League, an organization that is an equivalent to the U.S. Army’s National Guard.

“This is a quite unique organization. It is the citizen soldiers — like the U.S. National Guard — however, there is a major difference. We don’t pay our members. It may sound controversial, but we even ask a small symbolic fee from our members,” he explained. “We don’t have a formal contract with them. It is more like a psychological contract. If I am to describe what we doing, I would say we are protecting our values.”

These values are written in the Estonian Constitution where it is stated that the defense of the country is the obligation of every citizen; not only is it listed as a right, but also an obligation for every citizen to defend the homeland.

Kiili explains, “These are human activities, so emotions are involved. If you compare obligation with the right, then the right is always a much stronger emotion and that’s why we are deliberately cultivating that culture which is focused on our right to defend our country. Ordinary citizens are utilizing their free time to be ready and trained for the defense of the country at any time, in any situation.”

He explained that the Defence League is an organization of mature people who all have their unique skill sets, experiences and their own way of thinking, which makes it a multi-dimensional organization.

“First of all, it is territorial. Literally every municipality has some of the organization’s units. Second, it is a functional because all of the members have a huge knowledge and skill set, which the organization uses, while adding additional skills and leadership training and experiences. Finally, the intangible aspect of the organization is in the psychological dimension, wherein the

seven years until turning over command to the Command of the Estonian Defence League for the State Partnership Program.

Members of the Maryland National Guard train with Estonian Defense League personnel during an exercise in Southern Estonia.

BY MAJ. KURT M. RAUSCHENBERG

U.S. ARMY PHOTO BY JENNIFER G. ANGELO

BY MAJ. KURT M. RAUSCHENBERG

03


U.S. ARMY PHOTO BY JENNIFER G. ANGELO

THESE VALUES ARE WRITTEN IN THE ESTONIAN CONSTITUTION WHERE IT IS SAID THAT THE DEFENSE OF THE COUNTRY IS THE OBLIGATION OF EVERY CITIZEN; NOT ONLY IS IT LISTED A RIGHT, BUT ALSO AN OBLIGATION FOR EVERY CITIZEN TO DEFEND THE HOMELAND.

We have very strong bonds with the municipalities,” he explained. Resilience and resistance are key words in the organization.

“We put also a lot of effort on resilience because if the society is not resilient, it will fail. First of all the resilient society is most likely to be able to deter an enemy’s unfavorable actions. And, if it goes so far that we need to resist or apply resistance technologies, then resilience is the foundation,” he said. “And, it is based on the networks. The Defence League is a network of networks, which is comprised of nodes in each district. Every individual has their own social networks, professional networks and family networks. That is our main strength.”

To keep the local municipalities actively engaged, the league conducts mutual projects with local municipalities. In doing so, they gain information to use if an evacuation is necessary — not only in war time, but also in times of natural disasters.

Like many in the country, Maj. Gen. Kiili believes history will play a major factor in the Estonian people’s will to fight. “I don’t believe that in Estonia there is a single family who has not been touched by the Occupation or World War II for instance, and the suppression of the occupying forces,” he said. “When we restored our independence, there was a sort of debate: Should we become a neutral country like our neighbors Finland and Sweden?” The obvious answer is no, we cannot do that. First of all there are many preconditions to be met for neutrality. The country must be very rich because it must be armed to the teeth. And secondly, all your neighbors must accept the neutrality as well. In 1940, when the Soviets occupied us, we were also a neutral country. So this is the lessons learned from history. It is deeply in our mind set that never again, whatever the cost, we will fight. But another piece is our main effort, which is to be as good and together with our allies, which means we won’t have to fight on Estonian soil.”

The general, who is now assigned to NATO, sees being a good partner as being key in the defense of Estonia, and part of that is interacting with and conducting exercises with NATO partners.

“I’m just coming from the exercise with the British, who were landing their helicopters on the beach. We are receiving them and synchronizing with them. Most of our Defence League exercises have become multinational, which is effective and allows us to learn from our partners and allies,” he said. In the same way, the country is working on its doctrine.

“The Defence League’s main partner is the Estonia Special Forces ... they have a very close link with the U.S. Special Forces,” he said. “So logically, we’re very much connected with the U.S. Special Forces as well. The Americans’ help has been enormous. Just their sheer presence in Estonia is a huge strategic message. The U.S. footprint on our soil is always a good thing.”

Brig. Gen. Riho Ühtegi is the current commander of the Defence League and the former commander of the Estonian Special Operations Forces. During his previous job, Ühtegi worked closely with U.S. Special Forces, not only in training, but also...
deploying forward and working with them in Afghanistan.

“We have only one service, so Special Forces are mainly doing land tasks,” he explained. “But we are also capable of doing airborne and maritime tasks. In my new job I will work with the Defence League. There is a huge difference between Special Forces and the Defence League. We also need the countries who we call on for military assistance to partner with us. We see a lot of military assistance in Estonia, and we say also that we can provide that assistance to other nations.”

Ühtegi is proud that his soldiers deployed four times in support of operations in Afghanistan. They became a force multiplier. In 2010, one Estonian Infantry company held a village and its surrounding area — some 28 kilometers.

“We kept the land which was 28 square kilometers, with about 4,000 people living in this territory. We actually secured it and made peace for these people. And, we did that by being force multipliers by finding the right partners who we can train and use them to increase the capabilities of other people to make more troops,” he explained. “At the time, we had a special police company that was our partner and together, with this police company, we built local police units in villages and secured the area,” he explained.

With the Defence League, Estonia has a very unique force, which is focused on total defense.

“This means it is not just the military’s job to resist or defend the country. It is the duty of all of the nation. Every citizen has a duty to defend the state. This sentence doesn’t mean that everyone has to fight with a weapon, but the defense can be very different,” he explained. “People who are capable and who want to fight with a weapon they can do it, but other people have their own duties or other options.”

Ühtegi said it is also important for the Estonian forces to understand their enemies’ ways of thinking. In particular, he pointed out Russia’s hybrid warfare, which is intended to keep another state in situational warfare for as long as possible and to cause problems with the economy and the minds of the people.

“We have to learn from that and be ready to answer,” he said. “This kind of situation means that we must be clever because we cannot keep our people forever at defense because it would be very difficult for our economy.”

He said that this long game, requires massive support from the Estonian Government and its allies, but more importantly the Estonian people. “Probably the biggest task is how to keep the nation mentally ready for defense and this is what we are calling resilience, which is not so much physical preparation for war but more mental preparation for war.

“We have to understand that the world is changing, and warfare is also changing so we have to be prepared also to fight the information war and the psychological war. The war we’re talking about is hybrid warfare which comes to diplomacy. It’s also about the economy and it’s about the people and their understanding of the homeland or fatherland.”

He explained that homeland is the land where you are living, where your roots are. “It’s why I need to say my life for this country because it is important. It is for people and then peace is possible. This must be part of our national policy as well.”

U.S. and Estonian Special Operations Forces conduct a joint training exercise in Estonia. U.S. ARMY SOCEUR PHOTO

Brig. Gen. Riho Ühtegi, current commander of the Estonian Defence League and former commander of the Estonian Special Operations Forces, speaks with the Special Warfare team in Estonia. Brig. Gen. Ühtegi has worked extensively with U.S. Army Special Forces, including during a deployment to Afghanistan. U.S. ARMY PHOTO BY JENNIFER G. ANGELO
In mid-June, when the sun never sets on Estonia, the people of the country gathered to celebrate 150 years of the Estonian Song and Dance Festival. This festival, which speaks to the heart of the Estonian people, was themed “My Fatherland Is My Love.” That speaks volumes about the people of Estonia and their will to keep their country free. Thirty-one years ago, the people of Estonia gathered at the Tallin Song Festival Grounds to start a revolution, one that led to the downfall of the Soviet control of the Baltics, which has come to be called the “Singing Revolution.”

Central to the success of the Song Festival are the efforts of the Women’s Voluntary Defence Organization. The group, comprised of women of all ages, exists to support the defense of the country utilizing the skills that each woman possesses. Founded in 1927, the organization worked until World War II when the country was occupied by Russia. The organization was shut down for about 50 years, but in 1991, it started working in the public again.

“It’s an organization for women, and it gives them the ability to contribute to national defense in the direct sense,” explained Helen, a leader in the organization. “You can be as a soldier or a platoon leader, but you can also contribute to the comprehensive national defense in some other areas like evacuation, collecting donations for veterans, etc. The different assignments and tasks that you can do within our organization is very wide.”

She explained that the organization started out about 15 years ago, with limited tasks for the women who volunteered. That has changed.

“Like I said, on one hand, women can contribute by being a soldier and digging ditches and such. But on the other hand, we can offer other ways for people to support defense. One of the newest and the biggest assignments we have is forming evacuation units that would evacuate the Estonian people in two...
different ways. For example, in a lot of our families both parents are involved in the organization and they are called out to training. For example, if they don’t have anyone to keep their children, one of our units would be in charge of that and they will take care of the children in those cases. In the case of armed conflict or some other instance like a natural disaster, our unit organizes the mass evacuation for civilian in cooperation with the police and border guards,” she said.

If a civilian crisis or some natural disaster occurs, the evacuation units would be responsible for the evacuation shelters. The organization is working throughout the country to build a network that would oversee this kind of evacuation. The group works hand-in-hand with the Estonian Police and Border Guard to identify appropriate shelters. Once that happens, the members of the group man the shelter and provide food, blankets and medical care if needed.

The ability to tackle such a massive undertaking requires a diverse skill set, and the women in the group have it.

“In the organization, we teach our members the simplest thing that you would need in everyday life
to respond to different crises and also in conflict,” Helen continued. “But we can’t teach the entire world, so we started thinking about a tool we could use that would prepare people to react, so we came up with a mobile app.”

The app, *Ole Valmis!,* which means ‘be prepared,’ broadens the group’s reach into the populace. The app includes information that the members of the group thought every citizen should know in a crisis. Working on a strictly volunteer basis, the members compiled information that covers the gamut from when to take shelter, what to take when you go to take shelter, how to treat injuries, etc.

Since Estonia has a large Russian population, the group created the app with three languages: Estonian, Russian and English.

Helen explained the project was time consuming since all of the work on gathering the information was done by the members of the organization. “Our volunteers took it from an idea to the final product. It took almost a year, but it is available free to all of our citizens,” she said.

Another event the group is actively engaged in is the Song and Dance Festival.

“For years, it’s been our organization’s responsibility to cater food for the participants. We open up the soup kitchen and make the special soup for the festival. Our cooks and the distributors then operate here to feed the participants,” she explained.

During the most recent festival, the women’s organization fed more than 180,000 people. Currently the organization has more than 2,600 members, all of whom volunteer their time and talents. “We don’t exclude anyone, she said. “It doesn’t matter your age, or your physical abilities. The only thing that matters is that you have a will to contribute to the internal defense of our country and from there, we can find a job for them within the organization.” Each member undergoes a set basic training and then they are allowed to choose their specialty based on their skills and abilities.

Some of the different specialties include logistics, catering, medical care, communications, etc.

“We have three pillars contributing to the nation’s defense with soldiers’ skills, working with evacuation and working with our youth. We have two youth organizations in and we work in cooperation with the police and the border guards. The way we train, we will make the local community and the overall Estonian security better because people know how to keep safe and how to act in different events,” she said. “I like to say the real estate where our members live should be much more expensive because we know how to respond to a crisis.”

SW
COUNTERING MALIGN INFLUENCE IN ESTONIA

BY JANICE BURTON

In Estonia, a Civil Affairs Team from the 92nd Civil Affairs Battalion works daily with government agencies, non-government organizations and most importantly, the people of Estonia. One of the CA team’s main goals is to counter the influence of malign actors on the people of the country.

“There are many ways we approach countering malign influence not only in Estonia but throughout the region,” explained the CA Team Leader. “The most powerful way is to engage with vulnerable populations. So the types of things we do are some first aid training and some survival tactical training with our partners like the Estonian Defence League.”

A member of the team explained that they do a lot of training with their partners, including medical training. During a recent trip to an Estonian school, the team taught first aid tasks such as controlling pressure points and applying tourniquets on adults and children. He described most of the training as basic medical skills.

On another school visit, the team traveled with an Estonian Defence League Officer to talk with students and teachers about their shared experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. These interactions allow citizens to become familiar with the military and helps to strengthen friendships with Estonian partners.

The team also built partner force bonds through combined training exercises, most recently at an exercise known as Spring Storm, the largest annual exercise conducted by the Estonian Armed Forces. The exercise brought together more than 9,000 troops from 15 NATO countries and partners, allowing them to test their combined skills in responding to a fictional crisis and build solidarity with Allied partners.

Another area the team is focusing on is logistics to support the populace in the event that people are relocated or evacuated. “We’re finding ways to support that population so that they see their government as competent and legitimate,” explained the Team Leader. “Essentially some of the ways we’re doing that is working with the Estonian Defence League on identifying the best ways we can offer non-lethal support.”

During their time in Estonia, the team has requested humanitarian assistance items such as blankets and generators to hold as crisis pre-positioned stocks. They are also working with the Women’s Voluntary Defence Organization on their evacuation planning for internally displaced persons. One of the team members explained that the Women’s Voluntary Defence Organization will operate in a manner...
like the American Red Cross, running evacuation shelters, and reporting up the chain which people were evacuated and where they went. In conjunction with the Estonian Police and Border Guards, the CA team is advising the government on evacuation planning and crisis management. The team also helped to set up an exercise that integrated Estonian planners with planners from Latvia. Both countries came away with important lessons learned. This is one step in implementing not only a whole-of-government approach to the issue, but also a regional one that will lead to knowledge sharing throughout the Baltics and integration of a number of organizations.

“It is important that they don’t have stove-piped organizations and the whole-of-government approach addresses these issues,” said the Team Leader. “This helps ensure that you don’t have different organizations planning the same thing at the same time. The integration of all of these agencies working toward a common goal will set them up for success.”

With the ongoing planning, the Women’s Voluntary Defence Organization has the capacity to manage and set up more than 100 shelters across the country. Putting it in perspective, the Team Leader noted that internally displace persons would be much like the U.S. saw following Hurricane Florence. The goal is to stay in place if it is possible, but at the same time to have the ability to leave an affected area when necessary.

Another avenue the CA team has traveled is integrating non-governmental organizations into the Estonian civil society groups and organizations.

“What they bring to the table, how we can integrate them, gets us all parts of society trying to enhance the capabilities of the local organization,” explained the Team Leader. “Once we make those connections, we will start looking for opportunities to expand that influence by possibly establishing a foreign humanitarian assistance cell.”

The team believes that with the right organizations in place, it will make it easier for people to resist and fight back in their own way — not necessarily taking up arms — but doing what one would need to do to protect themselves and their family, which is a fundamental value of Estonian culture.
“I knew nothing about being a civilian. The military was the only place I ever felt really comfortable. I’m not comfortable at all now. I probably never will be.” — Barry Sadler in 1983, four years before his death by gunshot.

The song is embedded in the culture and tradition of U.S. Army Special Forces. An unexpected hit in 1966 — indeed, a #1 hit for five weeks and the top single of the year — “The Ballad of the Green Berets” is not only a regular part of SF ceremonies, formal and informal, it has been covered by numerous other artists, is one of the primary marches played by the Texas A&M University marching band, was recorded in Italian, French, German and Swedish versions, spawned “answer” songs and parodies galore (including an appearance in the 1980 comedy, Caddyshack, and is even the official song of The Royal Netherlands Army Korps Commandotroepen, who sing the song in English, substituting “the Netherlands” for “America” in the lyrics.

The song is also what ultimately killed its creator, Special Forces medic Staff Sergeant Barry Sadler, who died at the age of 49 at the Alvin C. York V.A. Medical Center in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, after being shot in the head in the back of a Guatemala City taxicab.

In this remarkably well-researched and elegantly written biography, Marc Leepson — a Vietnam veteran, journalist and freelance writer — sheds light on the hard life, hard times and hard death of Barry M. Sadler. It is the story of a man who courted fame, yet when he found it, couldn’t cope with the costs of fame nor the cost of the loss of fame. In a valuable contribution to the Special Forces historiography, Leepson clears away much of the mythology surrounding Sadler’s life — a mythology Sadler himself tried to create — through rich archival research, a close reading of contemporary news accounts about Sadler and interviews with 71 of Sadler’s surviving family members, friends and associates.

The son of a prostitute, Sadler grew up in Leadville, Colorado. From an early age, he craved a stable place in life and a sense of family. After a series of run-ins with local law enforcement, Sadler dropped out of high school and joined the Air Force. While serving as a radar technician in Japan, Sadler learned to play guitar — a fateful decision, as it happened. Sadler left the Air Force at the end of his four-year enlistment and tried to make it — not for the first time — as a musician. Just four months later, he joined Special Forces.

Sadler found the home he was looking for in Special Forces. After floating between several camps in Vietnam, Sadler was assigned to Detachment A-216 at Camp Hardy in the Central Highlands in March 1965. Between patrols, he continued writing songs and plunking away at the guitar, refining what would become “The Ballad of the Green Berets,” a song he’d begun in 1963. Unfortunately, Sadler’s time as an active service Special Forces medic was cut short in May 1965, when he was wounded by a punji stake while patrolling with Montagnards. It was while he was recuperating at Fort Bragg’s Womack Army Medical Center that “The Ballad of the Green Berets” slowly gained exposure. In the summer of 1965, Sadler and Robin Moore — author of the novel The Green Berets — were paired by their agents and the “Ballad” started its climb up the music charts.

As Leepson shows, the popularity of the “Ballad” marks the transition from the 1960s, as a decade, to the “Sixties” that we know culturally. In the 10 years prior to Sadler’s hit, fewer than 2,000 Americans died in Vietnam. In 1966 alone, three times that many would die of wounds or be killed in action, and as opinion turned against the war, “The Ballad of the Green Berets” quickly became an anachronism. Though he tried to recreate the magic, Sadler was a “one-hit wonder.”

Before the song became anachronistic, it was exploited to the maximum extent possible by Lieutenant General William P. Yarborough, who used Sadler as a living SF recruiting poster. Sadler appeared on television, at parades, at county and state fairs, always singing the “Ballad” and always promoting America’s involvement in Vietnam. Leepson shows that Sadler desperately wanted to return to a team, but from Yarborough’s point of view Sadler’s value as a symbol of Special Forces far outweighed his value as an SF medic. Sadler’s success, in effect, took away the only home he’d ever had and, in 1967, an embittered Sadler left the army. In 1971, he told a friend, “I wish that I’d never, ever written that stupid song.”

Leepson paints a sad picture of the next two decades of Sadler’s life, a slow-motion train wreck of alcoholism, philandering, petty criminality, squandered money, failed business ventures and desperate attempts to cling to musical fame.

A decade after the “Ballad,” Sadler again found success, this time as the author of a series of adventure
**ARMY TALENT ALIGNMENT – BUILDING A 21ST CENTURY PERSONNEL SYSTEM**

**Why Talent Management?**

The Army is evolving from an Industrial Era personnel system to an Information Age system which maximizes the potential of every single person in our Army. This new system, called Talent Management, harnesses the power of every person’s unique knowledge, skills, behaviors and preferences (KSB-Ps). Talent Management modernizes how the Army acquires the right talent from among the American people, develops it through training and education, employs it in the right assignments and uses the right incentives to retain talent for a lifetime of service.

Modernization of Army personnel management is a far-reaching, multi-year endeavor targeting every single demographic within the Army. Though there will be many changes to the personnel system, there are two major initiatives that will affect Soldiers in the immediate future. The first major initiative is the Army Talent Alignment Process, which matches officers to units based on mutual preferences and is currently being used by more than 15,000 officers in the Summer 2020 assignment cycle. The second initiative involves new legal authorities in the FY19 National Defense Authorization Act that allows the Army to retain the right talent for the future.

**Assigning the Right Person, the Right Assignment, the Right Time, Over Time: The Army Talent Alignment Process**

Under the legacy assignment system, centralized career managers distributed officers into unit vacancies. Though this system was effective at placing a reasonably-well qualified person in an assignment, it cannot match a person to an assignment based on a person’s unique talent. Nor does the traditional system take into consideration the preferences of either the unit or the officer.

Talent Management uses the Army Talent Alignment Process to match people to jobs. In ATAP, units still identify vacancies and the Human Resources Command will validate these vacancies based on manning guidance. However, units can now clearly identify their unique talent demands and officers can highlight their relevant talents. Furthermore, officers and units alike have an ability to adjust their preferences through interviews and the exchange of information, making for better-informed decisions. This marketplace is enabled by the Assignment Interactive Module 2.0 (AIM 2) software, and the Army Talent Alignment Algorithm will be used to match officers with units based on their mutual preferences.

The Army Talent Alignment Process provides greater transparency to officers on available assignments while units better understand the pool of talent from which they can build their teams. ATAP provides better visibility of every officer’s talents, improves retention through increased assignment satisfaction, and helps the Army better understand both officers’ and units’ preferences.

**Retaining Talent, Rewarding Performance through NDAA Authorities**

The FY19 NDAA has given the Army several legal authorities designed to allow officers to have greater flexibility in their career paths, incentivize challenging assignments, and reward top performers. The Army has implemented many of these as policies, including Opt-Out, Brevet Promotions, and Merit Promotions.

The Army’s Opt-Out policy allows an officer to opt out of a mandatory promotion board for a period of one year, twice at each grade, in order to participate in a broadening assignment or to complete grad school. Opt-Out resets an officer’s year group, allowing them to participate in the next promotion board without prejudice. Whereas traditional promotion timelines did not offer much time for broadening assignments or grad school given Army Professional Military Education requirements, Key Developmental time, and KD wait queues, Opt-Out gives officers the flexibility to participate in challenging developmental assignments that are also of great importance to the Army.

Brevet Promotions are temporary promotions that authorize the recipient to receive pay and benefits associated with the higher rank. The officer holds the brevet promotion as long as they occupy the brevetable position. Two hundred and twenty positions have been designated brevetable for the 20-02 marketplace, with plans to make up to 770 positions brevetable in the 21-01 marketplace. If an officer of a lower rank is accepted to fill a brevetable position (e.g., a captain applies for and is accepted for a major position coded as brevetable), the officer will undergo a short administrative process in order to receive the brevet promotion. Brevet promotions can serve as a great incentive to encourage officers to apply for challenging assignments.

Finally, the Army has instituted a new policy known as merit-based promotions, which will promote a portion of officers based on the strength of their promotion board files, rather than their date of rank. Following each promotion board, the Army will use an algorithm to determine the top cluster of performers – generally between the top 5 and 25 percent. During each fiscal year, the Army will promote these officers first, then the remaining officers by their date of rank.

**Conclusion**

Recent talent management efforts demonstrate that the Army is doing more than just talking about modernizing its personnel system to acquire, develop, employ, and retain talent. Change may not be comfortable for those who have grown up in the traditional personnel management system. However, implementing talent management practices are essential to ensuring the Army gets the right person in the right assignment at the right time, over time. Doing so will allow the Army to better retain the right talent, increase its readiness and dominate in future land combat.

---

**BALLAD OF THE GREEN BERET continued from page 59**

 novels about Casca Rufio Longinus, a Roman legionnaire condemned to immortality to fight in wars throughout eternity. Though his Casco novels sold well, money was always short, and in the early 1980s Sadler moved to Guatemala where the cost of living was low. Though Sadler wanted people to believe he was involved with the Nicaraguan Contras, Leepson shows he spent most of his time at the Don Quixote bar in Guatemala City or at his own “Rancho Borracho” (Drunkard’s Ranch). But Leepson also shows that Sadler still had the heart of a Special Forces medic, providing treatment to the poor Guatemalans in his neighborhood in the same way he’d provided treatment to Montagnards in Vietnam.

On September 7, 1988, Sadler was shot in the head in a taxi. Barry Sadler was born, lived and died on the fringes of society. His brief moment of fame cost him the only home he’d ever really known — Special Forces. In this sympathetic but objective look at Sadler’s life, Marc Leepson has told not just Barry Sadler’s story, but also the story of so many Americans who, by chance or by choice, never quite make it. Sadler often told people that “The Ballad of the Green Berets” was the worst thing that ever happened to him, and yet the song lives on. Just as his character, Casca, was cursed to immortal- ity, so too was Barry Sadler — cursed by the song that made him and, in making him, unmade him. SW
SNIPER TRAINING - INTERNATIONAL SPECIAL TRAINING CENTRE, JOINT MULTINATIONAL READINESS CENTER, HOHENFELS, GERMANY