Spanish-American War, Haiti (1915-1934) and the Dominican Republic (1916-1924). Yet, these experiences did not lead to a permanent U.S. Army capability. Again the question is why. The answer lies in documentation, reflection and action. Those experiences did not generate after action reports that inspired change and promotion of the concept of whether the Army should create a permanent CA capability comprised of dedicated CA professionals.

That does not mean that efforts at documenting the Army's prior efforts in CA/MG were non-existent. After the Spanish-American War, then-Secretary of War, Elihu Root, directed that the Army's efforts during the military occupations of Puerto Rico, Cuba and the Philippines be captured in a report. Undertaken by Charles E. Magoon in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, the mind-numbing 808-page report delved into narrow topics. Examples listed in the table of contents include: "In the matter of the application of the board of harbor works of Ponce, Puerto Rico, to the Government of the United States in securing the payment of a claim asserted by said board of harbor works of Ponce against the Government of Spain for 27,503.06 pesos," and "In the matter of the contract for a market house at Sancti Spiritus, Cuba, and the rights thereunder of Primitivo Gutierrez, a Spanish subject." Although a great resource, it was largely written in legal jargon, and therefore not an easily digestible report that sparked greater interest by a larger audience. In short, it did not lead to change.

Likewise, in 1908, the Army Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, published Military Government. It was a compilation of papers presented by the class of 1908, including future General and Army Chief of Staff, then-First Lieutenant George C. Marshall. However, it again did not lead to change. Being produced by the Department of Law, the majority of the papers concern legal aspects of military government. This is further evidence that the Army viewed CA/MG largely as a legal issue rather than as a basic Army capability.

The true beginning of modern U.S. Army Civil Affairs lies the post-World War I occupation of the German Rhineland by the Third U.S. Army from December 1918 until 11 July 1923. The lessons from that experience caused the Army to develop CA doctrine, professional education and create specialized CA/MG units. Furthermore, World War I was the last major conflict in which the U.S. did not have a CA element prior to the end of hostilities.

In the words of Major Truman Smith, the main author of the final report on the post-World War I occupation...
He went on to write, “As incredulous as it sounds, the Army
Clearly, in what was at the time
government been established.”

a single course in the nature and scope of military
schools devoted to the higher training of officers, has
seemingly not been learned. In none of the service
China, the Philippines and elsewhere, the lesson has
States, Cuba, Porto [now Puerto]
rico, Panama,
occupation, “despite the precedents of military
governments in Mexico, California, the Southern
States, Cuba, Porto [now Puerto] Rico, Panama,
China, the Philippines and elsewhere, the lesson has
seemingly not been learned. In none of the service
nations had placed under its temporary
sovereignty.”

As incredulous as it sounds, the Army
created a Civil Affairs apparatus only after the end
of hostilities, while the Army was on the march to
occupy Germany. The Army had been so focused
on fighting the war that it gave no thought to what
would occur afterward. Only when forced into the
reality that it would become an occupation force did
the Army develop an apparatus to properly handle
the civil administration of Germany.

The Army also neglected to prepare personnel
for the inevitability of occupation. As a 1938 Army
War College study noted, “Personnel trained in civil
administration and possessing knowledge of the
German nation was lacking. Adequate, accurate and
timely information pertaining to the German govern-
mental system, of its functions, limitations or chan-
nels of communications was not available to staffs and
unit commanders.”

Clearly, in what was at the time the U.S. Army’s most severe test of its expedi-
tionary capability, it had failed to learn from its previous experiences at conducting CA/MG. The reason is that the Army had not established a connection to prior ef-
forts, and had not developed a CA/MG capability. The Army’s experience in the post-World War I occupation of Germany changed that trend. Thus, the post-World War I occupation constitutes the origins from which modern CA evolved.

Colonel Irvin L. Hunt, the officer in charge of
Civil Affairs for American Forces in Germany (Third
U.S. Army), did his best to ensure that the U.S.
Army would not have to rediscover, yet again, that it
needed a CA capability in the next war. A visionary,
he oversaw the production of a critical after action
report on his tenure during the occupation. Titled
American Military Government of Occupied Germany
1918-1920, it was largely written and edited by Major
Truman Smith, but was thereafter dubbed, ‘The Hunt
Report.’ The report laid out a succinct and under-
standable account of how the U.S. Army conducted
its CA/MG duties in Germany. Colonel Hunt did not
intend for the report to be filed as a footnote. He

In 1916, Hunt transferred to the Judge Advocate General’s
Department. When the U.S. entered World War I, he was made the
Judge Advocate of the Northeastern Department. However, he soon
became the Judge Advocate of the 80th Division, Fort Lee, Virginia,
and deployed to France in May 1918. Promoted to Lieutenant
Colonel on Aug. 11, 1918, Hunt transferred to the staff of the
Commanding General, II Army Corps. As a staff officer in II Corps, Lt.
Col. Hunt served as a liaison officer with the British Second Army
Headquarters. Later, when II Corps was attached to the British Fourth
Army, Lt. Col. Hunt served during the Second Battle of the Somme.
While serving as the Executive Officer, Operations Division, General
Staff, Lt. Col. Hunt was promoted to Colonel on Nov. 8, 1918.

With the signing of the Armistice on Nov. 11, 1918, Col. Hunt was
posted to the newly-created U.S. Third Army. He drafted plans for
how to conduct military government in the sector of Germany
assigned by the Allied Command to be occupied by the Americans.
Arriving at Coblenz, Germany, Col. Hunt was made the Officer in
Charge of Civil Affairs, American Forces in Germany, serving until
April 1920. It was in this position that Col. Hunt secured his legacy by
overseeing the production of, American Military Government of
Occupied Germany: 1918-1920.

Returning to the U.S. in 1920, Col. Hunt transferred to the
Quartermaster Corps. He served in several high level assignments,
including Executive Officer, Transportation Service, Office of the
Quartermaster General, and under the Assistant Secretary of War as
Chief of the Planning Branch for industrial mobilization in war. In
1924, he graduated from the Army War College. From 1925 to 1929,
Mr. Hunt served as the commandant of the Quartermaster School in
Philadelphia. Then, from 1930 to 1931 he was the Corps Area
Quartermaster, Second Corps Area. He passed away on 21 August
1933, while serving on the Army General Staff in Washington, D.C.,
and is buried at Arlington National Cemetery.

All information comes from the Hunt’s obituary, published in the Sixty-Fifth Annual Report of the Association of Graduates of the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York
LIEUTENANT COLONEL TRUMAN SMITH

Lieutenant Colonel Truman Smith was born at West Point, New York, on Aug. 25, 1893. After graduating from Yale University in 1915, he started graduate work in history at Colombia University. His academic career ended when he accepted a commission in March 1916 as a second lieutenant in the 12th Infantry Regiment, New York National Guard. He then joined the Regular Army on Dec. 6, 1916 and served along the Mexican border. When the U.S. entered World War I, he deployed to France, serving with the Third Division in the Aisne and Argonne-Meuse Campaigns. Due to officer casualties, from Oct. 15-27, 1918, Capt. Smith commanded 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, and led that force in clearing the Bois de Foret. He was recommended for the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions, but that was downgrad ed to a Silver Star Medal.

Smith’s entry into Civil Affairs came immediately after the November 1918 Armistice when he was by name selected by Colonel Irvin L. Hunt, the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, American Forces in Germany, to serve as a Civil Affairs officer in the occupation. He supervised German civil administration of the Rhine Province and in the city of Coblenz. Working in the Office of the Chief of Civil Affairs for the U.S. Third Army, he drafted notices and declarations that went out to the German authorities. However, his greatest contribution was that he was the lead writer (8 of 17 chapters) and chief editor of the report American Government of Occupied Germany: 1918-1920.

In 1920, Smith began a lengthy period working in the diplomatic circuit. He first served as Assistant Military Attaché to the Netherlands and as a Military Observer to Germany. In 1921, he was designated the Assistant Military Attaché to Germany, with concurrent duty as an assistant Military Attaché to Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. In May 1924, he returned to the United States for assignment in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. He then commanded the Service Company, 18th Infantry Regiment, Fort Hamilton, New York, until reporting to the Infantry School for the 1926-27 Advanced Officer’s Course. After completing the Command and General School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, he returned to the Infantry School to serve as an instructor. In 1933, he received a posting to Hawaii, serving as a battalion commander with the 27th Infantry until 1935. Smith then received orders to go to Berlin, Germany, for duty as Military Attaché for air, serving concurrent duty as Military Attaché to Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands. One of his biggest achievements in this period was in convincing famed aviator Charles A. Lindbergh to visit Germany to attend the 1936 Olympic Games. Smith scored an intelligence coup when the Luftwaffe eagerly allowed him and Lindbergh access to aviation factories, military aircraft and technological development.

Returning in 1939, Smith was posted to the Military Intelligence Division in the War Department, Washington, D.C. On Jan. 31, 1942, Lt. Col. Smith was medically retired from the U.S. Army; however, on Feb. 23, 1942, due to his expertise on the German military, he was recalled to active duty in the temporary rank of Colonel to serve on the Army G-2 staff. He was later assigned to the Military Intelligence Service as a German Specialist, and routinely briefed General Marshall. For his service, he received the Distinguished Service Medal. Lt. Col. Smith retired after 30 years of service on April 20, 1946. After retiring, he continued as an expert on the German military and helped establish the Bundeswehr. He died on Oct. 3, 1970 and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

All information comes from the Truman Smith Service Record, the National Personnel Records Center, Saint Louis, MO.
fied it into a permanent capability, there had been previous progress in this area. The first major step occurred during the Civil War, when, in 1863, the Army implemented General Orders No. 100, Instructions for the Government of Armies, of the United States in the Field, otherwise known as the Lieber Code after its author, Francis Lieber. While not doctrine, it was revolutionary in that it provided the U.S. Army with overall guidelines that regulated the just treatment of civilians and property in the occupied South.

After the war, General Orders No. 100 served as the foundation for the development of laws dictating how the U.S. Army operated in occupied territory. As important as the Lieber Code was, it was just another step towards developing formal CA/MG structure, doctrine and training.

The next step was when the War Department published the Rules of Land Warfare (1914), which guided how the Army would conduct itself at war. General Orders 100 clearly influenced the Rules of Land Warfare. The preface states that, “It will be found that everything vital contained in General Order 100 … has been incorporated into this manual.”

However, not until the publication of an updated Rules of Land Warfare in 1934, did the document contain a section on military government and establish the need for a CA/MG capability. The academic efforts since World War I became more concrete as the threat of global war again emerged. Fortunately, the 1934-1935 Army War College Committee...
recommended that the Army create a field manual for CA/MG, and drafted a proposed manual. This was again recommended by the 1938-1939 committee. While never adopted, the proposed manual provided an outline to the Army for CA/MG doctrine. Formal recognition came on July 30, 1940, when the War Department published its first CA/MG doctrinal publication, FM 27-5: Military Government. Its publication, along with its Dec. 22, 1943 revision, guided U.S. Army and Navy CA efforts in World War II and after.

With doctrine came the need for specialized education and training. On Jan. 6, 1942, General George Marshall approved the creation of a school to prepare officers for CA/MG duties. Since many of the tasks paralleled civilian functions, a university was considered the best place for such a school. Being only a few hours away from Washington, D.C., the Army staff saw the University of Virginia as an ideal location. When the university offered to rent facilities cheaply, the Army Provost Marshal, then in charge of CA/MG, agreed. The result was the first formal U.S. Army Civil Affairs training program. The School of Military Government at the University of Virginia began instructing classes in May 1942.

The school instructed officers in staff-level military government functions. However, because the School of Military Government could not meet the growing demand for trained CA personnel, the Army exported the program to other civilian universities throughout the United States. Since they could not meet the growing need, the Army also taught CA courses at Fort Custer, Michigan; the Civil Affairs Staging Area at Fort Ord/Presidio of Monterey, California; and in a number of overseas schools. All of these personnel required a CA/MG staff section to develop policy and guidance.

To manage its CA/military government efforts, the Army created the Military Government Division, established in July 1942 under the Office of the Provost Marshal General. However, it was small in size and lacked influence. That, compounded by the sheer number of CA/MG matters experienced by Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower after the invasion of North Africa on Nov. 8, 1942, prompted the formation of the Civil Affairs Division under the War Department in March 1943. Led by Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, it formulated policy for CA/MG units. These units ranged in size from the European
Civil Affairs Division, with three regiments (7,800 personnel), to nine-man CA Detachments spread throughout combat units. In addition, the Army activated numerous Military Government Groups for service in the Far East.

These elements worked closely near or with combat forces, helping both to address the concerns of civilian populations and stabilizing rear areas so that combat commanders could remain focused on the enemy. After World War II, CA/MG elements proved to be of great utility in helping to stabilize post-war Germany, Austria, Italy, Japan and Korea.

Despite the progress made and a clear need defined, CA/MG units nearly disappeared from the Army with the post-war drawdown. The June 25, 1950 invasion of South Korea by the Communist North, however, reversed this trend. CA elements proved of such utility during the Korean War that the Army finally recognized the requirement for a permanent peacetime capability.25 On Aug. 17, 1955, the U.S. Army Reserve established the Civil Affairs/Military Branch. This was formal recognition, first begun by the post-World War I Report, that CA was a necessary Army function.

As this essay has shown, modern CA evolved from events started in 1918. Although an ad hoc effort at first, post-World War I CA/MG efforts revealed that the Army’s approach was deficient. Their efforts in producing a guiding document in the form of American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920, that drove change. World War I was the last major U.S. conflict in which CA/MG efforts were an afterthought. Prior to the conclusion of World War II, and in every conflict thereafter, the U.S. Army utilized CA/MG doctrine, education and specialized units. Therefore, it is from the Army’s post-World War I occupation of Germany, not efforts beforehand, that the U.S. Army saw the need to adopt a permanent Civil Affairs capability.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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