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— CIVIL AFFAIRS — TRANSFORMATION TRAINING

A focus on governance.

BY MAJOR JENNIFER JANTZI-SCHICHTER

Across the Army, Civil Affairs soldiers are recognized as governance experts. CA soldiers consistently deploy worldwide to advise civil authorities on how to execute stable and sustainable governance at all levels. Governance proficiency is emphasized throughout CA doctrine and CA mission statements as a foundation of the CA Branch. Department of the Army, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management* (Pamphlet 600-3) and Department of the Army, *Civil Military Operations* (FM 3-57), both state the mission of CA is “to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society and conduct responsibilities normally performed by civil governments across the range of military operations by engaging and influencing the civil populace and authorities through the planning and conducting of Civil Affairs Operations.”^{01, 02} However, despite the emphasis on governance proficiency, CA Soldiers receive very little formal training on advising local authorities on governance. It is not covered in the Civil Affairs Qualification Course, and there are few other opportunities for further professional development. In addition, when deployed, CA Soldiers are expected to take lessons learned from previous teams, conduct on-the-job training and receive rudimentary mentorship from leadership.

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Soldiers interact with indigenous role players during Operation Sluss-Tiller, the culmination exercise for the Civil Affairs Qualification Course. The exercise is the final test of all the Civil Affairs skills learned during the course. U.S. ARMY PHOTO

Based off mission statements of Army and CA doctrine, and what is done in preparation to execute those missions, it is clear there is a gap between what CA is expected to do and what CA is trained to do. CA Soldiers must receive additional education and participate in training exercises that validate their governance expertise, and this training should take place in the CAQC. To complicate matters, there is currently controversy in both the military and across other United States government agencies regarding the need for military involvement in governance. This article explains why the military and specifically CA is best equipped to execute governance missions; why currently governance is not part of the CAQC curriculum and finally, articulates why it is critical for CA to possess this skill. A critical element of this misunderstanding involves a failure to differentiate between governance and government. To set the stage, this article will begin there.⁰³

GOVERNANCE VS. GOVERNMENT

So, what is the difference between governance and government? Civil Affairs personnel are expected to execute governance, which is different from bolstering government functions in a country. Arguably, other U.S. Government agency partners are better prepared and equipped to support and bolster government activities. However, CA mission sets, and the training CA units receive, specifically in post-conflict scenarios, makes CA particularly equipped to focus on governance.

In this manner, CA units will not be executing, advising or assisting foreign partners on how to execute or conduct pillars of government. CA units will be partnering with foreign partners to advise and assist them in applying principles of good governance when conducting government jobs and functions. For this article, governance and government are distinguished in the following text, and these discernments are derived from the UN's Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific monograph, “*What is Good Governance?*” and the UN Development Programme monograph, “*A User's Guide to Measuring Local Governance.*”

Governance: “The process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented).”⁰⁴

“Governance is the result of interactions, relationships and networks between the different sectors (government, public sector, private sector and civil society) and

*involves decisions, negotiation and different power relations between stakeholders to determine who gets what, when and how. The relationships between government and different sectors of society determine how things are done, and how services are provided. Governance is, therefore, much more than government or “good government” and shapes the way a service or any set of services are planned, managed and regulated within a set of political social and economic systems.”*⁰⁵

Government: In contrast, the UN’s Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, defines government as:

*“Government is one of the actors in governance. Other actors involved in governance vary depending on the level of government that is under discussion. In rural areas, for example, other actors may include influential landlords, associations of peasant farmers, cooperatives, non-governmental organizations, research institutes, religious leaders, finance institutions, political parties, the military, etc.”*⁰⁶

WHY CA IS BEST EQUIPPED TO EXECUTE GOVERNANCE

The American experience in war has shown that, despite superior combat power and capabilities, often the U.S. cannot win wars through force alone. Despite the U.S.’s ability to successfully execute all phases of a campaign through stabilization in World War II, the U.S. currently continues to struggle in Iraq and Afghanistan due to a lack of planning and preparation for post-conflict state-building. In 2005, the military formally recognized the importance of stabilization when it published DOD Directive 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, which states that stability is a “core U.S. military mission” and that the U.S. military must be prepared to “conduct stability operations activities throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations, including in combat and non-combat environments.”⁰⁷ Furthermore, Department of Defense Directive 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*, specifically states that CA forces will support this by providing “support to governance.”⁰⁸ Given these directives and the variety of environments in which the USG operates, Army forces, and specifically CA forces, are best suited to execute support to governance operations in a variety of scenarios that exceed the capabilities of other agencies. Therefore, it is critical that CA soldiers receive more education and training on how to execute this critical task.

However, despite the above directives, the military, arguably, still struggles when

successfully planning post-combat operations. There is pushback from personnel in other U.S. Government agencies and departments regarding the military’s role in stabilization. A common argument is that other organizations such as United States Agency for International Development, Department of State and the UN focus on building partner-nation governance capacity, there is no need for the military to put energy into these efforts.⁰⁹ Also, partners from civilian agencies are often concerned that U.S. military support to governance will result in the militarization of foreign civilian institutions, which violates the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, on which all assistance hinges.¹⁰

Both military personnel and civilians misunderstand who is best suited to execute governance. Nadia Schadlow has coined this the “denial syndrome” where she summarizes “discomfort in a democracy with the idea of the military taking the lead in political activities, American concerns about colonialism, the view that civilians could take the lead in governance operations and traditional views about what constituted war and the military profession” as reasons for these misunderstandings.¹¹ This “denial syndrome” was evident when the U.S. seized and subsequently occupied Baghdad. The Army allocated too few personnel to restore order within the city, leaving it susceptible to insurgent influence.¹² Since then, the controversy continues over who is responsible for building partner-nation governance capability.

Despite reluctance by both the military and the U.S. civilian agencies for military participation in stabilization operations, lessons learned in past conflicts, such as Operation Just Cause in Panama, Iraq and Afghanistan suggest a gap exists that only the military can fill to provide the necessary resources to conduct governance tasks in support of decisive operations, stabilization, transition to civilian authority in accordance with the joint campaign construct.^{13,14}

The U.S. Army plays a critical role in establishing political order during and post-combat operations.¹⁵ Prior to engaging in war, military plans must be made for the transition from combat to achieving desired political end states, and this analysis should encourage decision makers to critically analyze what the post war objective is, and if it justifies the U.S. going to war in the first place.¹⁶ The Army is the only organization capable of “decisively acquiring, holding and stabilizing territory and operating in sufficient scale for ample duration to provide a foundation for a transition to the reestablishment of political order.”¹⁷ This applies to areas of conflict where lack of security inhibits civilian ability to operate. Within the Army, the DoD Directive, 200.13 highlights the CA Branch as specifically designated to execute these tasks that include “...support stability operations, including activities that establish civil security; provide support to governance; provide essential services; support economic development and infrastructure; and establish civil control for civilian populations in occupied or liberated areas until such control can be returned to civilian or non-U.S. military authority.”¹⁸

There are some operating environments in which U.S. government civilian agency partners are not capable of executing governance and others where CA forces enhance the ability of our partners to build governance capacity within a partner state.

For example, U.S. Government civilian agencies may not be equipped to execute governance in areas of poor security. Because of this, the Army and specifically CA forces are critical in building partner-nation governance capacity during conflict and directly post conflict. During these instances, civilian agencies such as DoS and USAID do not possess the elements required, such as weapons, vehicles and security personnel to operate in highly contested areas where enemy forces are a constant threat. Recent examples of this are apparent in Iraq and Afghanistan. In both theaters, USAID and DoS were restricted to the larger and well-secured head-

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quarter hubs namely Baghdad's International Zone also known as "the Green Zone" and "Victory Base Complex." In Afghanistan, the same holds true with mega-bases such as Bagram Air Field and Camp Egger's in Kabul proper. In both campaigns, smaller yet well-fortified Forward Operating Bases also housed just a handful of civilian agency personnel. These civilian experts did not have the internal apparatus to travel out and meet with key individuals, yet such meetings are critical when building partner nation capacity. Army troops, however, were spread across the operating environment, some embedded in local communities, giving them the ability to engage with local populations at the lowest level. The nature of the conflict in both campaigns required that U.S. forces work alongside local actors to assist them in improving their indigenous security. Because of this, governance building must begin during times of conflict and continue through the initial stabilization efforts and during the long-term reconstruction and eventual transition to civilian authority. When security is sufficient for civilian agencies to engage the population, then it may be appropriate for the Army to transition from the governance advising role. Until that point, though, it is critical that CA forces are present and capable of advising and assisting local government entities.



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CA forces also fill a critical gap in areas outside of war zones. In these areas, the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Country team take the lead in operations; however, there is still a critical role for CA forces and opportunities exist to amplify the objectives of the USG, including supporting the Combatant Commander's Theatre Security Cooperation Campaign Plan and both the Integrated Country Strategies of USAID and DoS. In many of these countries, security on the periphery is still poor. In these locations, military elements may be able to augment the Regional Security Officer's movement teams to operate in these areas of decreased security, and partner with local state leadership in attempts to expand the U.S. Ambassador's and USG influence beyond where U.S. civilian agencies are able to operate. Additionally, the U.S. Country Team's presence in some countries is limited, not having the personnel to build the local state's governance capacity beyond major population centers. In such instances, CA forces are trained and capable of filling this gap, further amplifying the strategic objectives of the U.S. Ambassador.

Additionally, aside from mission requirements and capability, CA forces may be beneficial in governance building based upon logistical concerns. Civilian organizations are not self-sustaining and cannot provide their own security. They also cannot be forcibly deployed at a rapid rate.¹⁹ The U.S. military expects all personnel to deploy within short notice; thus, both the military's flexibility and ability to react to situations exceed that of its interagency partners.²⁰ Additionally, the cost of sending civilian government employees to Iraq or Afghanistan for one year is approximately \$410,000 - \$570,000 per year, which is significantly more expensive



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than sending military troops.²¹ In addition to this extreme cost, there are not enough DoS personnel to fill the need. For example, in 2011 there were approximately 1,000 civilian government employees in Afghanistan, and currently there are many less. Because the USG could not deploy enough civilians to fill the gap,²² Army reservists were relied on to fill this requirement and bridge the gap. Based off this information, it is clear that CA units hold a critical role in governance across all areas of operation.

WHY GOVERNANCE IS NOT TAUGHT IN THE CIVIL AFFAIRS QUALIFICATION COURSE

Despite the importance of governance in today's conflicts worldwide and CA's niche capability to fill this role, CA soldiers do not receive education or training on governance in the CAQC. Since 2017, the 95th CA BDE (A) has identified the importance of governance and has spent time and resources developing methods to educate its soldiers in this area; however, because governance is a foundational element of CA, it should be a part of the CAQC curriculum that is given to all active duty CA soldiers. While it is important that governance be emphasized and skills built upon and reinforced at the unit level, often new graduates of the CAQC immediately enter into a pre-mission training cycle and deploy without first gaining this knowledge. Thus, all CA soldiers need to be able to support governance efforts immediately upon graduation from the CAQC.



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Civil Affairs Soldiers meet with Romanian civil authorities in Romania.

U.S. ARMY PHOTO BY CAPT. JEKU ARCE

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Civil Affairs team members meet with Afghan villagers. Civilian agencies are not equipped to execute governance in areas of poor security. Civil Affairs teams are capable of operating in any security environment and have access and placement to local communities giving them the ability to engage with local populations at the lowest level. COURTESY PHOTO BY CAPT. SHAWN R. JOKINEN



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There are several factors that have contributed to the road block for introducing governance into the curriculum at the CAQC. One of these factors was that the CA reserve and active components did not clearly articulate and agree upon what the actual task of governance entails. Recent progress has been made in this area, specifically with the signing of the updated FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, and its publication in May 2018. The updated FM 3-57 articulates Military Government Operations as a core competency and “support to governance” as a primary stability task.²³ However, the new FM 3-57 does not include ATP 3-57.40, Military Government Operations, which is still currently under revision. This effort is delayed because it is awaiting information from the Institute for Military Support to Governance, which is the CA reserve component entity responsible for the training and education of CA functional specialists in the 38G program (Military Government Specialist), specifically information regarding the duty description and employment of 38G’s.²⁴ Progress has been made in this area as well. In December 2017, the U.S. Army Human resources Command published a MILPER message that redefined and expanded the skills and activities associated with Military Government Capability, specifically the 38G program.²⁵ This MILPER message evaluated the nine original governance specialties and added an additional seven for a total of 18 Skill Identifiers.²⁶ This new change is reflected in the updated FM 3-57, and further

breaks down MGO into transitional military authority, Support to Civil Administration and functional specialty areas, which include security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, governance and participation and economic stabilization and infrastructure.²⁷

The updated FM 3-57 further articulates that because MGO is a CA core competency, “CA Soldiers are trained, educated and organized to support or execute the functions of a civil administration during transitional military authority or SCA.”²⁸ Despite this statement, neither MGO or governance are currently included as part of the curriculum in the CAQC. The second quarter Civil Affairs Proponent Newsletter further addresses this by stating that while the proponent has received inquiries regarding the Professional Military Education for 38Gs, PME is completely separate than 38G qualification. The newsletter articulates that currently, 38Gs are “deemed eligible to branch transfer to the Advanced Operations Course by the 38G panel based upon their civil sector education and expertise.”²⁹ It does not address means or methods currently underway to train CA Soldiers on how to better and uniformly execute the task of MGO. While in the reserve component, Soldiers may be more eligible to execute governance based off their civilian sector professions, this is not the case in the active CA component. Because of this, it is critical to formally educate and train CA Soldiers on how to execute missions involving MGO and governance to ensure they adequately qualified.

While in the last year, the CA Regiment has made significant progress in taking steps to better articulate and formalize tasks involving MGO and governance, it is important that the branch figure out a way to navigate through the remaining obstacles preventing governance from being incorporated into the CAQC. Since governance support is integral to the CA Regiment as indicated in the recently updated FM 3-57, training to develop governance know how should begin during the CAQC. Without this foundational expertise, the credibility of the CA Regiment at large is at risk — not only in CA special operations units, but when supporting conventional forces as well.

WHY CA SOLDIERS SHOULD BE GOVERNANCE EXPERTS

While the CA Branch is the most appropriate element on the battlefield to possess governance expertise, governance will always be a task for which every




FIGURE 01

military commander and battlespace owner is responsible. While both SOF and conventional units could assume this responsibility, very few conduct any training to prepare for this mission and even fewer make governance a training priority despite more than 17 years of being expected to execute governance and stabilization missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is imperative for the CA Regiment to truly be experts in this critical area of operations. Expertise in governance will make CA units an even greater asset in both tactical and embassy environments because many military commanders have been given missions that involve governance, while, few know how to execute the task adequately.

Currently throughout the Army, the CA Regiment faces an ongoing struggle in better informing both SOF and conventional commanders on what CA does, CA roles and responsibilities and how to utilize CA in the operational environment. While this is not an obstacle for many CA units working autonomously in embassy environments, it is an ongoing struggle for units working alongside or attached to other SOF units or conventional forces. There are many misconceptions that include the assumption that CA units execute projects, manage money, hand out humanitarian assistance and are out to win the “hearts and minds” of the population. These misconceptions result in CA units being underutilized or tasked to execute other responsibilities that are not CA related such as planning redeployment ceremonies or the brigade ball. And why should they not be used to support these tasks? As a community, CA has failed to educate the greater force on our capabilities. To them, CA officers on their staffs are free labor.

One way to change this misconception is to truly become experts in governance; an area that is both highly important in current operations and familiar to all Army commanders throughout the force. While many military commanders do not know how to go about the execution of governance, many are familiar with its importance, especially after lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. While today CA units often include governance in their capabilities briefs, largely because it is noted in our field manuals and doctrine, very few CA Soldiers can articulate why they are more qualified to execute governance enabling tasks than their SOF or conventional counterparts. To date, most CA Soldiers have no specialized training that makes them any more capable to do so. As with all CA training, governance-focused education begins at the CAQC and is built upon through other professional development opportunities at the unit level, which will create a foundation of

expertise in an area that is highly relevant and critical, and also in an area that is not studied or trained by most other Army entities. CA, a relatively new branch that was formalized in 2006, is one that many military commanders still do not understand and know how to properly employ. Developing governance expertise will assist in CA units being used to their full potential and also fill a critical capability gap within the U.S. Armed Forces.

There are many ways to train governance, but one approach is a four-step process (figure 01) that guides the user through the execution of a governance mission. Included in such a process is an instructional guide (figure 02) that CA teams can use as they train and deploy that will aid them in advising, assisting and assessing regional and local governance in conflict and post-conflict environments. It identifies building blocks of governance and principles of governance that can be used to assess pillars of government (or government institutions). In this manner, it distinctly differentiates between governance and government activities. This approach could allow CA units to properly assess and promote good governance while enabling for a seamless handoff to host-nation officials and international and U.S. aid organizations to foster long-term good governance.

This is meant to be a baseline and working document that can be used as an initial

UNDERSTANDING GOOD GOVERNANCE




FIGURE 02

Figure 01
This diagram depicts a four-step governance execution process that guides the user through a governance mission. In step two, the user will conduct a governance assessment that uses principles of governance and building blocks of governance to assess pillars of government (figure 02), which will assist when developing an implementation plan.

Figure 02
This diagram helps the user understand the difference between principles of good governance, building blocks of government and pillars of government, and how they relate to one another.

training tool for CA soldiers on governance. As an initial concept for governance training, the research at the link below compiles the best governance practices and assessment techniques of international and U.S. institutions, but tailors these ideas to the specific contexts of CA units working at the local level. It can be found at <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/56893>.

A failure to execute good governance tasks has led to a continued struggle for the U.S. in both in Iraq and Afghanistan. While every military commander is responsible for governance, the current approved CA doctrine emphasizes that CA tactical units

are especially equipped to execute the task. Despite this, CA units receive very little education or training on governance. It is time to change that and practice what we preach. To do so, the Civil Affairs Regiment needs to regain control of the curriculum in the CAQC to ensure every CA Soldier has the requisite skills to support governance when called upon to do so. **SW**

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