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ON THE COVER

In 2018, the Civil Affairs Regiment celebrated its 100th anniversary. In celebration of that milestone, we put together an issue that pays homage to the past, but more importantly looks to the future of the Civil Affairs Regiment.

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COMMANDANT

We recently dedicated the first building of the new U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School campus to the memory of General Lucius D. Clay. Gen. Clay, who was known as “the great uncompromiser,” is a key figure in the history or Army Civil Affairs. Clay was known for bringing order out of chaos. His role in stabilizing the port city of Cherbourg after its liberation was crucial in maintaining the flow of men and materiel to Allied armies in Europe. In 1947, he was made Commander in Chief of the U.S. Forces in Europe and Military Governor of the U.S. Zone in Germany. He worked closely with German leaders to address the needs of the devastated civilian population under his care.

Gen. Clay, like our Civil Affairs Soldiers today, knew that stability cannot come without good governance and good governance ensures that the needs of the people are met. All around the world, our Civil Affairs teams are following in Clay’s footsteps. The majority of them work in small teams, and often they are the only U.S. presence in some countries. Working in U.S. Embassies, they are a crucial part of the Ambassador’s team. Civil Affairs teams work within the populace. They understand that meeting the needs of the people is the key to stability.

Over the past 100 years, they have played a pivotal role in establishing stability and helping build governance around the world. While we celebrate their storied past, this issue focuses on the future of Civil Affairs and its importance to the ARSOF and Army enterprise as a whole.

“The armed forces of the United States have been fully engaged in the task of nation building for more than 10 years. History reveals that military forces are required to bring stability and ultimately democracy to a region, a lesson repeatedly recorded and effectively implemented in the past.”

— Rebalancing Civil Affairs by Scot Storey

KURT L. SONNTAG
MAJOR GENERAL, USA
COMMANDING GENERAL

SPECIAL WARFARE | WWW.SOC.MIL/SWCS/SPECIALWARFARE
In the aftermath of World War II, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote, "Gen. Lucius D. Clay is one of the ablest officers the Army has produced, particularly in the keenness of his intellect, his profound understanding of organization and the zeal with which he applies himself to every task. While his work has not brought him actual battle command experience I believe that his work as the American administrator in Germany will come to be recognized, when that work is fully understood, as one of the outstanding contributions to our country." Gen. Omar N. Bradley in turn described him as a "brilliant administrator."

On Jan. 11, Gen. Clay received another honor: the Special Warfare Education Group, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, dedicated its headquarters building in his memory. What follows is a brief biography of this Army icon.

Born April 23, 1897, Marietta, Georgia, Clay graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point, June 1918 and received a commission as a 2nd Lieutenant of Engineers. Promotions were slow between the wars; he did not become a major until April 15, 1940. However, the onset of World War II brought Clay escalating positions of responsibility. In 1941, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and colonel, and in 1942 to brigadier general and major general.

During the war, he primarily served stateside in a number of administrative positions centered on engineering and logistics, and as the director of Material, Army Service Forces. Maj. Gen. Clay deployed overseas in October 1944 to the European Theater of Operations to command the Normandy Base Section. He used his organizational skills to speed up the unloading of supplies though the newly-captured French port of Cherbourg. He then returned stateside to help shift combat units from Europe to the Pacific.

Clay returned to Europe, April 18, 1945, to begin his civil affairs/military government service. Promoted to lieutenant general, he was appointed as deputy Military Governor, Germany, to transition U.S. combat forces to occupation duties. Five months later, Lt. Gen. Clay became the commanding general of the Office of Military Government for Germany. In this position, he oversaw denazification, reconstruction, and governance.

Clay was promoted to four-star general, March 17, 1947, to serve as commanding general, U.S. Army Forces (European Theater) and Military Governor of Germany. During his tenure, Gen. Clay solved his greatest challenge: the Soviet Blockade of Berlin, which was imposed in June 1948. Gen. Clay triggered the Berlin Airlift, which served the city residents during the harsh winter of 1948-1949.

Clay retired May 31, 1949, with more than 30 years of service. Having been awarded three Distinguished Service Medals and the Legion of Merit, he received a ticker tape parade in New York City. After military retirement, he served as ambassador in West Germany from 1961-1962. He passed away April 16, 1978, at the age of 80. He is buried at the West Point cemetery.

Clay left a lasting legacy of administrative competence and true professionalism. — By Dr. Troy Sacquetu, USASOC History Office
2018 marks 100 years since the beginning of a modern Civil Affairs capability in the U.S. Army. What began as a small, ad hoc staff section created in 1918 for the post-World War I occupation of Germany has since grown into an Army Branch. In that span of time, CA created a heritage that deserves to be remembered and celebrated. However, the question is still asked: What was the path that led to the creation of a permanent CA capability?

This essay walks the reader through the impact that the occupation of Germany had on the formation of CA doctrine, staff sections and units leading up to World War II. It also addresses why, even though the U.S. Army conducted CA and CA-like functions in prior conflicts, the modern U.S. Army Civil Affairs Corps does not predate the post-World War I occupation.

The U.S. Army has long conducted roles and tasks similar to Civil Affairs/military government. Examples include Major General Winfield Scott’s occupation of Mexico City (1847 to 1848), post-Civil War Reconstruction in the American South (1865 to 1877), military government in Puerto Rico (1898-1900) and the Philippines (1899 to 1913) after the Spanish-American War, Haiti (1915-1934) and the Dominican Republic (1916-1924). Yet, these experiences did not lead to a permanent U.S. Army capability. Again the question is why. The answer lies in documentation, reflection and action. Those experiences did not generate after action reports that inspired change and promotion of the concept of whether the Army should create a permanent CA capability comprised of dedicated CA professionals.

That does not mean that efforts at documenting the Army’s prior efforts in CA/MG were non-existent. After the Spanish-American War, then-Secretary of War, Elihu Root, directed that the Army’s efforts during the military occupations of Puerto Rico, Cuba and the Philippines be captured in a report. Undertaken by Charles E. Magoon in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, the mind-numbing 808-page report delved into narrow topics. Examples listed in the table of contents include: “In the matter of the application of the board of harbor works of Ponce, Puerto Rico, to the Government of the United States in securing the payment of a claim asserted by said board of harbor works of Ponce against the Government of Spain for 27,503.06 pesos,” and “In the matter of the contract for a market house at Sancti Spiritus, Cuba, and the rights thereunder of Primitivo Gutierrez, a Spanish subject.” Although a great resource, it was largely written in legal jargon, and therefore not an easily digestible report that sparked greater interest by a larger audience. In short, it did not lead to change.

Likewise, in 1908, the Army Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, published Military Government. It was a compilation of papers presented by the class of 1908, including future General and Army Chief of Staff, then-First Lieutenant George C. Marshall. However, it again did not lead to change. Being produced by the Department of Law, the majority of the papers concern legal aspects of military government. This is further evidence that the Army viewed CA/MG largely as a legal issue rather than as a basic Army capability.

The true beginning of modern U.S. Army Civil Affairs lies the post-World War I occupation of the German Rhineland by the Third U.S. Army from December 1918 until 11 July 1923. The lessons from that experience caused the Army to develop CA doctrine, professional education and create specialized CA/MG units. Furthermore, World War I was the last major conflict in which the U.S. did not have a CA element prior to the end of hostilities.

In the words of Major Truman Smith, the main author of the final report on the post-World War I
occupation, “despite the precedents of military governments in Mexico, California, the Southern States, Cuba, Porto Rico, Panama, China, the Philippines and elsewhere, the lesson has seemingly not been learned. In none of the service schools devoted to the higher training of officers, has a single course in the nature and scope of military government been established.”

He went on to write that because of this, “the American Army of occupation lacked both training and organization to guide the destinies of nearly 1,000,000 civilians whom the fortunes of war had placed under its temporary sovereignty.” As incredulous as it sounds, the Army created a Civil Affairs apparatus only after the end of hostilities, while the Army was on the march to occupy Germany. The Army had been so focused on fighting the war that it gave no thought to what would occur afterward. Only when forced into the reality that it would become an occupation force did the Army develop an apparatus to properly handle the civil administration of Germany.

The Army also neglected to prepare personnel for the inevitability of occupation. As a 1938 Army War College study noted, “Personnel trained in civil administration and possessing knowledge of the German nation was lacking. Adequate, accurate and timely information pertaining to the German governmental system, of its functions, limitations or channels of communications was not available to staffs and unit commanders.”

Clearly, in what was at the time the U.S. Army’s most severe test of its expediatory capability, it had failed to learn from its previous experiences at conducting CA/MG. The reason is that the Army had not established a connection to prior efforts, and had not developed a CA/MG capability. The Army’s experience in the post-World War I occupation of Germany changed that trend. Thus, the post-World War I occupation constitutes the origins from which modern CA evolved.

Colonel Irvin L. Hunt, the officer in charge of Civil Affairs for American Forces in Germany (Third U.S. Army), did his best to ensure that the U.S. Army would not have to rediscover, yet again, that it needed a CA capability in the next war. A visionary, he oversaw the production of a critical after action report on his tenure during the occupation. Titled American Military Government of Occupied Germany 1918-1920, it was largely written and edited by Major Truman Smith, but was thereafter dubbed, ‘The Hunt Report.’ The report laid out a succinct and understandable account of how the U.S. Army conducted its CA/MG duties in Germany. Colonel Hunt did not intend for the report to be filed as a footnote. He

**Colonel Irvin L. Hunt**

Born in California on July 11, 1877, Second Lieutenant Irvin L. Hunt, Infantry, graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1899. He served in Puerto Rico and the Philippines with the 5th and 19th Infantry Regiments and commanded a company of Philippine Scouts. From 1903 to 1907, he was an instructor and an assistant professor of law and history at West Point. Then-Captain Hunt served with the 6th Infantry and again in the Philippines. In 1912, Major Hunt served in the War Department as Assistant to the Chief, Bureau of Insular Affairs, traveling to Puerto Rico and Santa Domingo to consult with civilian officials.

In 1916, Hunt transferred to the Judge Advocate General’s Department. When the U.S. entered World War I, he was made the Judge Advocate of the Northeastern Department. However, he soon became the Judge Advocate of the 80th Division, Fort Lee, Virginia, and deployed to France in May 1918. Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel on Aug. 11, 1918, Hunt transferred to the staff of the Commanding General, II Army Corps. As a staff officer in II Corps, Lt. Col. Hunt served as a liaison officer with the British Second Army Headquarters. Later, when II Corps was attached to the British Fourth Army, Lt. Col. Hunt served during the Second Battle of the Somme. While serving as the Executive Officer, Operations Division, General Staff, Lt. Col. Hunt was promoted to Colonel on Nov. 8, 1918.

With the signing of the Armistice on Nov. 11, 1918, Col. Hunt was posted to the newly-created U.S. Third Army. He drafted plans for how to conduct military government in the sector of Germany assigned by the Allied Command to be occupied by the Americans. Arriving at Coblenz, Germany, Col. Hunt was made the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, American Forces in Germany, serving until April 1920. It was in this position that Col. Hunt secured his legacy by overseeing the production of, American Military Government of Occupied Germany: 1918-1920.

Returning to the U.S. in 1920, Col. Hunt transferred to the Quartermaster Corps. He served in several high level assignments, including Executive Officer, Transportation Service, Office of the Quartermaster General, and under the Assistant Secretary of War as Chief of the Planning Branch for industrial mobilization in war. In 1924, he graduated from the Army War College. From 1925 to 1929, he served as the commandant of the Quartermaster School in Philadelphia. Then, from 1930 to 1931 he was the Corps Area Quartermaster, Second Corps Area. He passed away on 21 August 1933, while serving on the Army General Staff in Washington, D.C., and is buried at Arlington National Cemetery.

Lieutenant Colonel Truman Smith was born at West Point, New York, on Aug. 25, 1893. After graduating from Yale University in 1915, he started graduate work in history at Colombia University. His academic career ended when he accepted a commission in March 1916 as a second lieutenant in the 12th Infantry Regiment, New York National Guard. He then joined the Regular Army on Dec. 6, 1916 and served along the Mexican border. When the U.S. entered World War I, he deployed to France, serving with the Third Division in the Aisne and Argonne Meuse Campaigns. Due to officer casualties, from Oct. 15-27, 1918, Capt. Smith commanded 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, and led that force in clearing the Bois de Forêt. He was recommended for the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions, but that was downgraded to a Silver Star Medal.

Smith’s entry into Civil Affairs came immediately after the November 1918 Armistice when he was by name selected by Colonel Irvin L. Hunt, the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, American Forces in Germany, to serve as a Civil Affairs officer in the occupation. He supervised German civil administration of the Rhine Province and in the city of Coblenz. Working in the Office of the Chief of Civil Affairs for the U.S. Third Army, he drafted notices and declarations that went out to the German authorities. However, his greatest contribution was that he was the lead writer (8 of 17 chapters) and chief editor of the report American Government of Occupied Germany: 1918-1920.

In 1920, Smith began a lengthy period working in the diplomatic circuit. He first served as Assistant Military Attaché to the Netherlands and as a Military Observer to Germany. In 1921, he was designated the Assistant Military Attaché to Germany, with concurrent duty as an assistant Military Attaché to Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. In May 1924, he returned to the United States for assignment in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. He then commanded the Service Company, 18th Infantry Regiment, Fort Hamilton, New York, until reporting to the Infantry School for the 1926-27 Advanced Officer’s Course. After completing the Command and General School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, he returned to the Infantry School to serve as an instructor. In 1933, he received a posting to Hawaii, serving as a battalion commander with the 27th Infantry until 1935. Smith then received orders to go to Berlin, Germany, for duty as Military Attaché for air, serving concurrent duty as Military Attaché to Sweden, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands. One of his biggest achievements in this period was in convincing famed aviator Charles A. Lindbergh to visit Germany to attend the 1936 Olympic Games. Smith scored an intelligence coup when the Luftwaffe eagerly allowed him and Lindbergh access to aviation factories, military aircraft and technological development.

Returning in 1939, Smith was posted to the Military Intelligence Division in the War Department, Washington, D.C. On Jan. 31, 1942, Lt. Col. Smith was medically retired from the U.S. Army; however, on Feb. 23, 1942, due to his expertise on the German military, he was recalled to active duty in the temporary rank of Colonel to serve on the Army G-2 staff. He was later assigned to the Military Intelligence Service as a German Specialist, and routinely briefed General Marshall. For his service, he received the Distinguished Service Medal. Lt. Col. Smith retired after 30 years of service on April 20, 1946. After retiring, he continued as an expert on the German military and helped establish the Bundeswehr. He died on Oct. 3, 1970 and is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

All information comes from the Truman Smith Service Record, the National Personnel Records Center, Saint Louis, MO.
fied it into a permanent capability, there had been previous progress in this area.

The first major step occurred during the Civil War, when, in 1863, the Army implemented General Orders No. 100, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, otherwise known as the Lieber Code after its author, Francis Lieber. While not doctrine, it was revolutionary in that it provided the U.S. Army with overall guidelines that regulated the just treatment of civilians and property in the occupied South.

After the war, General Orders No. 100 served as the foundation for the development of laws dictating how the U.S. Army operated in occupied territory. As important as the Lieber Code was, it was just another step towards developing formal CA/MG structure, doctrine and training.

The next step was when the War Department published the Rules of Land Warfare (1914), which guided how the Army would conduct itself at war. General Orders 100 clearly influenced the Rules of Land Warfare. The preface states that, “It will be found that everything vital contained in General Order 100 … has been incorporated into this manual.”

However, not until the publication of an updated Rules of Land Warfare in 1934, did the document contain a section on military government and establish the need for a CA/MG capability.

As such, follow-on committees increasingly recommended the advisability of creating a CA staff section, although they differed on where it should be placed. Courses of action included placing it within the general staff at the War Department; within a general staff element, such as the G-1, at lower levels; forming it as its own general staff element; or as a separate technical staff element under the Chief of Staff. Furthermore, the committees began to create a role for CA/MG in war plans. Although not very well developed, it was a step towards preventing the scenario that had typified the U.S. Army’s ad hoc approach to postwar CA/MG through World War I.

In addition, the committees began to see a requirement for specially trained personnel, instead of simply using whomever was available, or in the case of post-World War I, anyone who spoke German. One member of the 1926-1927 committee forcefully disagreed with the rest of his cohort by urgently recommending the need for a CA staff section and for trained personnel, writing, “There will be a required staff for civil affairs. And that staff will require officers not only of great judgement but of skill and a clear appreciation of the relation of civil affairs to the military.” He continued, “The fact remains that though many of the questions that arise will be such that they necessarily will be considered by the commander, he will require some individual or some group to study them and to prepare a digest of the problem.”

Col. Hunt also continued to advocate for the creation of a peacetime Army office that would prepare for CA in times of war staffed with, “properly qualified officers.” He returned to the War College in 1933 to lecture on military government. From experience, Col. Hunt reasoned that:

“The general staff with troops is created very properly for carrying on operations. It is not designed for carrying on military government nor are officers of the general staff selected for that purpose. Therefore, there is no existing division of the general staff which is prepared by training or experience to supervise the vast and complicated machinery of civil government . . . The supreme commander must have a suitable number of specially selected officers available to assist him in handling problems that arise in civil affairs.”

Both Col. Hunt’s efforts, and those of War College students advocating for a permanent CA capability, were successful, albeit slowly. First the Army had to create doctrine. While it had not codified it into a permanent capability, there had been previous progress in this area.

The first major step occurred during the Civil War, when, in 1863, the Army implemented General Orders No. 100, Instructions for the Government of Armies, of the United States in the Field, otherwise known as the Lieber Code after its author, Francis Lieber. While not doctrine, it was revolutionary in that it provided the U.S. Army with overall guidelines that regulated the just treatment of civilians and property in the occupied South.

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The academic efforts since World War I became more concrete as the threat of global war again emerged. Fortunately, the 1934-1935 Army War College Committee
recommended that the Army create a field manual for CA/MG, and drafted a proposed manual. This was again recommended by the 1938-1939 committee. While never adopted, the proposed manual provided an outline to the Army for CA/MG doctrine. Formal recognition came on July 30, 1940, when the War Department published its first CA/MG doctrinal publication, FM 27-5: Military Government. Its publication, along with its Dec. 22, 1943 revision, guided U.S. Army and Navy CA efforts in World War II and after.

With doctrine came the need for specialized education and training. On Jan. 6, 1942, General George Marshall approved the creation of a school to prepare officers for CA/MG duties. Since many of the tasks paralleled civilian functions, a university was considered the best place for such a school. Being only a few hours away from Washington, D.C., the Army staff saw the University of Virginia as an ideal location. When the university offered to rent facilities cheaply, the Army Provost Marshal, then in charge of CA/MG, agreed. The result was the first formal U.S. Army Civil Affairs training program. The School of Military Government at the University of Virginia began instructing classes in May 1942.

The school instructed officers in staff-level military government functions. However, because the School of Military Government could not meet the growing demand for trained CA personnel, the Army exported the program to other civilian universities throughout the United States. Since they could not meet the growing need, the Army also taught CA courses at Fort Custer, Michigan; the Civil Affairs Staging Area at Fort Ord/Presidio of Monterey, California; and in a number of overseas schools. All of these personnel required a CA/MG staff section to develop policy and guidance.

To manage its CA/military government efforts, the Army created the Military Government Division, established in July 1942 under the Office of the Provost Marshal General. However, it was small in size and lacked influence. That, compounded by the sheer number of CA/MG matters experienced by Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower after the invasion of North Africa on Nov. 8, 1942, prompted the formation of the Civil Affairs Division under the War Department in March 1943. Led by Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring, it formulated policy for CA/MG units. These units ranged in size from the European...
Civil Affairs division, with three regiments (7,800 personnel), to nine-man CA Detachments spread throughout combat units. In addition, the Army activated numerous Military Government Groups for service in the Far East.

These elements worked closely near or with combat forces, helping both to address the concerns of civilian populations and stabilizing rear areas so that combat commanders could remain focused on the enemy. After World War II, CA/MG elements proved to be of great utility in helping to stabilize post-war Germany, Austria, Italy, Japan and Korea.

Despite the progress made and a clear need defined, CA/MG units nearly disappeared from the Army with the post-war drawdown. The June 25, 1950 invasion of South Korea by the Communist North, however, reversed this trend. CA elements proved of such utility during the Korean War that the Army finally recognized the requirement for a permanent peacetime capability. As this essay has shown, modern CA evolved from events started in 1918. Although an ad hoc effort at first, post-World War I CA/MG efforts revealed that the Army's approach was deficient. Their efforts in producing a guiding document in the form of American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920, that drove change. World War I was the last major U.S. conflict in which CA/MG efforts were an afterthought. Prior to the conclusion of World War II, and in every conflict thereafter, the U.S. Army utilized CA/MG doctrine, education and specialized units. Therefore, it is from the Army's post-World War I occupation of Germany, not efforts beforehand, that the U.S. Army saw the need to adopt a permanent Civil Affairs capability.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Troy Sacquety is the U.S. Army Civil Affairs Branch Historian. He earned an MA from the University of Nebraska–Lincoln and his PhD in Military History from Texas A&M University. Prior to joining the USASOC History Staff, he worked several years for the Central Intelligence Agency.

NOTES

01. For the purposes of this article, the terms ‘Civil Affairs’ and ‘Military Government’ can be thought of as the same. Military government was a Civil Affairs activity.


04. H.A. White and E.A. Kregar, Military Government: Papers Prepared by the Class of 1908, Army Staff College (Leavenworth, Kansas: Department of Law, Army Staff College, 1908).


06. Hunt, American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 65.


09. Hunt, American Military Government of Occupied Germany, vi.


11. COL Hunt died in 1933.

12. Other sources also contributed. For example, Henry T. Allen, The Rhineland Occupation (Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs Merrill, 1927) also was a resource, but was not available until the later War College committees.


15. W.W. Hicks, “Staff Administration of Civil Affairs in Occupied Territory,” contained in “Course at the Army War College, 1926-1927, G-1, file 331-3, U.S. Army War College Curriculum File, USAHEC.


23. Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946 (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1975, 6-1. For more on the creation of the school, see Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg...
Based off mission statements of Army and CA doctrine, and what is done in preparation to execute those missions, it is clear there is a gap between what CA is expected to do and what CA is trained to do. CA Soldiers must receive additional education and participate in training exercises that validate their governance expertise, and this training should take place in the CAQC. To complicate matters, there is currently controversy in both the military and across other United States government agencies regarding the need for military involvement in governance. This article explains why the military and specifically CA is best equipped to execute governance missions; why currently governance is not part of the CAQC curriculum and finally, articulates why it is critical for CA to possess this skill. A critical element of this misunderstanding involves a failure to differentiate between governance and government. To set the stage, this article will begin there.

GOVERNANCE VS. GOVERNMENT

So, what is the difference between governance and government? Civil Affairs personnel are expected to execute governance, which is different from bolstering government functions in a country. Arguably, other U.S. Government agency partners are better prepared and equipped to support and bolster government activities. However, CA mission sets, and the training CA units receive, specifically in post-conflict scenarios, makes CA particularly equipped to focus on governance. In this manner, CA units will not be executing, advising or assisting foreign partners on how to execute or conduct pillars of government. CA units will be partnering with foreign partners to advise and assist them in applying principles of good governance when conducting government jobs and functions. For this article, governance and government are distinguished in the following text, and these discernments are derived from the UN’s Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific monograph, “What is Good Governance?” and the UN Development Programme monograph, “A User’s Guide to Measuring Local Governance.”

Governance: “The process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented).”

“Governance is the result of interactions, relationships and networks between the different sectors (government, public sector, private sector and civil society) and
involves decisions, negotiation and different power relations between stakeholders to determine who gets what, when and how. The relationships between government and different sectors of society determine how things are done, and how services are provided. Governance is, therefore, much more than government or “good government” and shapes the way a service or any set of services are planned, managed and regulated within a set of political social and economic systems.”

**Government:** In contrast, the UN’s Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, defines government as: “Government is one of the actors in governance. Other actors involved in governance vary depending on the level of government that is under discussion. In rural areas, for example, other actors may include influential landlords, associations of peasant farmers, cooperatives, non-governmental organizations, research institutions, religious leaders, finance institutions, political parties, the military, etc.”

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**WHY CA IS BEST EQUIPPED TO EXECUTE GOVERNANCE**

The American experience in war has shown that, despite superior combat power and capabilities, often the U.S. cannot win wars through force alone. Despite the U.S.’s ability to successfully execute all phases of a campaign through stabilization in World War II, the U.S. currently continues to struggle in Iraq and Afghanistan due to a lack of planning and preparation for post-conflict state-building. In 2005, the military formally recognized the importance of stabilization when it published DOD Directive 3000.05, Stability Operations, which states that stability is a “core U.S. military mission” and that the U.S. military must be prepared to “conduct stability operations throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations, including in combat and non-combat environments.” Furthermore, Department of Defense Directive 2000.13, Civil Affairs, specifically states that CA forces will support this by providing “support to governance.” Given these directives and the variety of environments in which the USG operates, Army forces, and specifically CA forces, are best suited to execute support to government operations in a variety of scenarios that exceed the capabilities of other agencies. Therefore, it is critical that CA soldiers receive more education and training on how to execute this critical task.

However, despite the above directives, the military, arguably, still struggles when successfully planning post-combat operations. There is pushback from personnel in other U.S. Government agencies and departments regarding the military’s role in stabilization. A common argument is that other organizations such as United States Agency for International Development, Department of State and the UN focus on building partner-nation governance capacity, there is no need for the military to put energy into these efforts. Also, partners from civilian agencies are often concerned that U.S. military support to governance will result in the militarization of foreign civilian institutions, which violates the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, on which all assistance hinges.

Both military personnel and civilians misunderstand who is best suited to execute governance. Nadia Schadlow has coined this the “denial syndrome” where she summarizes “discomfort in a democracy with the idea of the military taking the lead in political activities, American concerns about colonialism, the view that civilians could take the lead in governance operations and traditional views about what constituted war and the military profession” as reasons for these misunderstandings. This “denial syndrome” was evident when the U.S. seized and subsequently occupied Baghdad. The Army allocated too few personnel to restore order within the city, leaving it susceptible to insurgent influence. Since then, the controversy continues over who is responsible for building partner-nation governance capability.

Despite reluctance by both the military and the U.S. civilian agencies for military participation in stabilization operations, lessons learned in past conflicts, such as Operation Just Cause in Panama, Iraq and Afghanistan suggest a gap exists that only the military can fill to provide the necessary resources to conduct governance tasks in support of decisive operations, stabilization, transition to civilian authority in accordance with the joint campaign construct.

The U.S. Army plays a critical role in establishing political order during and post-combat operations. Prior to engaging in war, military plans must be made for the transition from combat to achieving desired political end states, and this analysis should encourage decision makers to critically analyze what the post war objective is, and if it justifies the U.S. going to war in the first place. The Army is the only organization capable of “decisively acquiring, holding and stabilizing territory and operating in sufficient scale for ample duration to provide a foundation for a transition to the reestablishment of political order.” This applies to areas of conflict where lack of security inhibits civilian ability to operate. Within the Army, the DoD Directive, 200.13 highlights the CA Branch as specifically designated to execute these tasks that include “…support stability operations, including activities that establish civil security; provide support to governance; provide essential services; support economic development and infrastructure; and establish civil control for civilian populations in occupied or liberated areas until such control can be returned to civilian or non-U.S. military authority.”

There are some operating environments in which U.S. government civilian agency partners are not capable of executing governance and others where CA forces enhance the ability of our partners to build governance capacity within a partner state. For example, U.S. Government civilian agencies may not be equipped to execute governance in areas of poor security. Because of this, the Army and specifically CA forces are critical in building partner-nation governance capacity during conflict and directly post conflict. During these instances, civilian agencies such as DoS and USAID do not possess the elements required, such as weapons, vehicles and security personnel to operate in highly contested areas where enemy forces are a constant threat. Recent examples of this are apparent in Iraq and Afghanistan. In both theaters, USAID and DoS were restricted to the larger and well-secured head-

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**CA MISSION SETS, AND THE TRAINING CA UNITS RECEIVE, SPECIFICALLY IN POST-CONFLICT SCENARIOS, MAKES CA PARTICULARLY EQUIPPED TO FOCUS ON GOVERNANCE.**
CA forces also fill a critical gap in areas outside of war zones. In these areas, the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Country team take the lead in operations; however, there is still a critical role for CA forces and opportunities exist to amplify the objectives of the USG, including supporting the Combatant Commander’s Theatre Security Cooperation Campaign Plan and both the Integrated Country Strategies of USAID and DoS. In many of these countries, security on the periphery is still poor. In these locations, military elements may be able to augment the Regional Security Officer’s movement teams to operate in these areas of decreased security, and partner with local state leadership in attempts to expand the U.S. Ambassador’s and USG influence beyond where U.S. civilian agencies are able to operate. Additionally, the U.S. Country Team’s presence in some countries is limited, not having the personnel to build the local state’s governance capacity beyond major population centers. In such instances, CA forces are trained and capable of filling this gap, further amplifying the strategic objectives of the U.S. Ambassador.

Additionally, aside from mission requirements and capability, CA forces may be beneficial in governance building based upon logistical concerns. Civilian organizations are not self-sustaining and cannot provide their own security. They also cannot be forcibly deployed at a rapid rate. The U.S. military expects all personnel to deploy within short notice; thus, both the military’s flexibility and ability to react to situations exceed that of its interagency partners. Additionally, the cost of sending civilian government employees to Iraq or Afghanistan for one year is approximately $410,000 - $570,000 per year, which is significantly more expensive than sending military troops. In addition to this extreme cost, there are not enough DoS personnel to fill the need. For example, in 2011 there were approximately 1,000 civilian government employees in Afghanistan, and currently there are many less. Because the USG could not deploy enough civilians to fill the gap, Army reservists were relied on to fill this requirement and bridge the gap. Based off this information, it is clear that CA units hold a critical role in governance across all areas of operation.

WHY GOVERNANCE IS NOT TAUGHT IN THE CIVIL AFFAIRS QUALIFICATION COURSE

Despite the importance of governance in today’s conflicts worldwide and CA’s niche capability to fill this role, CA soldiers do not receive education or training on governance in the CAQC. Since 2017, the 95th CA BDE (A) has identified the importance of governance and has spent time and resources developing methods to educate its soldiers in this area; however, because governance is a foundational element of CA, it should be a part of the CAQC curriculum that is given to all active duty CA soldiers. While it is important that governance be emphasized and skills built upon and reinforced at the unit level, often new graduates of the CAQC immediately enter into a pre-mission training cycle and deploy without first gaining this knowledge. Thus, all CA soldiers need to be able to support governance efforts immediately upon graduation from the CAQC.
There are several factors that have contributed to the road block for introducing governance into the curriculum at the CAQC. One of these factors was that the CA reserve and active components did not clearly articulate and agree upon what the actual task of governance entails. Recent progress has been made in this area, specifically with the signing of the updated FM 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations, and its publication in May 2018. The updated FM 3-57 articulates Military Government Operations as a core competency and “support to governance” as a primary stability task. However, the new FM 3-57 does not include ATP 3-57.40, Military Government Operations, which is still currently under revision. This effort is delayed because it is awaiting information from the Institute for Military Support to Governance, which is the CA reserve component entity responsible for the training and education of CA functional specialists in the 38G program (Military Government Specialist), specifically information regarding the duty description and employment of 38G’s. Progress has been made in this area as well. In December 2017, the U.S. Army Human resources Command published a MILPER message that redefined and expanded the skills and activities associated with Military Government Capability, specifically the 38G program. This MILPER message evaluated the nine original governance specialties and added an additional seven for a total of 18 Skill Identifiers. This new change is reflected in the updated FM 3-57, and further breaks down MGO into transitional military authority, Support to Civil Administration and functional specialty areas, which include security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, governance and participation and economic stabilization and infrastructure.

The updated FM 3-57 further articulates that because MGO is a CA core competency, “CA Soldiers are trained, educated and organized to support or execute the functions of a civil administration during transitional military authority or SCA.” Despite this statement, neither MGO or governance are currently included as part of the curriculum in the CAQC. The second quarter Civil Affairs Proponent Newsletter further addresses this by stating that while the proponent has received inquiries regarding the Professional Military Education for 38Gs, PME is completely separate than 38G qualification. The newsletter articulates that currently, 38Gs are “deemed eligible to branch transfer to the Advanced Operations Course by the 38G panel based upon their civil sector education and expertise.” It does not address means or methods currently underway to train CA Soldiers on how to better and uniformly execute the task of MGO. While in the reserve component, Soldiers may be more eligible to execute governance based off their civilian sector professions, this is not the case in the active CA component. Because of this, it is critical to formally educate and train CA Soldiers on how to execute missions involving MGO and governance to ensure they adequately qualified.

While in the last year, the CA Regiment has made significant progress in taking steps to better articulate and formalize tasks involving MGO and governance, it is important that the branch figure out a way to navigate through the remaining obstacles preventing governance from being incorporated into the CAQC. Since governance support is integral to the CA Regiment as indicated in the recently updated FM 3-57, training to develop governance know how should begin during the CAQC. Without this foundational expertise, the credibility of the CA Regiment at large is at risk — not only in CA special operations units, but when supporting conventional forces as well.

**WHY CA SOLDIERS SHOULD BE GOVERNANCE EXPERTS**

While the CA Branch is the most appropriate element on the battlefield to possess governance expertise, governance will always be a task for which every
military commander and battlespace owner is responsible. While both SOF and conventional units could assume this responsibility, very few conduct any training to prepare for this mission and even fewer make governance a training priority despite more than 17 years of being expected to execute governance and stabilization missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is imperative for the CA Regiment to truly be experts in this critical area of operations. Expertise in governance will make CA units an even greater asset in both tactical and embassy environments because many military commanders have been given missions that involve governance, while, few know how to execute the task adequately.

Currently throughout the Army, the CA Regiment faces an ongoing struggle in better informing both SOF and conventional commanders on what CA does, CA roles and responsibilities and how to utilize CA in the operational environment. While this is not an obstacle for many CA units working autonomously in embassy environments, it is an ongoing struggle for units working alongside or attached to other SOF units or conventional forces. There are many misconceptions that include the assumption that CA units execute projects, manage money, hand out humanitarian assistance and are out to win the “hearts and minds” of the population. These misconceptions result in CA units being underutilized or tasked to execute other responsibilities that are not CA related such as planning redeployment ceremonies or the brigade ball. And why should they not be used to support these tasks? As a community, CA has failed to educate the greater force on our capabilities. To them, CA officers on their staffs are free labor.

One way to change this misconception is to truly become experts in governance; an area that is both highly important in current operations and familiar to all Army commanders throughout the force. While many military commanders do not know how to go about the execution of governance, many are familiar with its importance, especially after lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. While today CA units often include governance in their capabilities briefs, largely because it is noted in our field manuals and doctrine, very few CA Soldiers can articulate why they are more qualified to execute governance enabling tasks than their SOF or conventional counterparts. To date, most CA Soldiers have no specialized training that makes them any more capable to do so. As with all CA training, governance-focused education begins at the CAQC and is built upon through other professional development opportunities at the unit level, which will create a foundation of expertise in an area that is highly relevant and critical, and also in an area that is not studied or trained by most other Army entities. CA, a relatively new branch that was formalized in 2006, is one that many military commanders still do not understand and know how to properly employ. Developing governance expertise will assist in CA units being used to their full potential and also fill a critical capability gap within the U.S. Armed Forces.

There are many ways to train governance, but one approach is a four-step process (figure 01) that guides the user through the execution of a governance mission. Included in such a process is an instructional guide (figure 02) that CA teams can use as they train and deploy that will aid them in advising, assisting and assessing regional and local governance in conflict and post-conflict environments. It identifies building blocks of governance and principles of governance that can be used to assess pillars of government (or government institutions). In this manner, it distinctly differentiates between governance and government activities. This approach could allow CA units to properly assess and promote good governance while enabling for a seamless handoff to host-nation officials and international and U.S. aid organizations to foster long-term good governance.

This is meant to be a baseline and working document that can used as an initial
training tool for CA soldiers on governance. As an initial concept for governance training, the research at the link below compiles the best governance practices and assessment techniques of international and U.S. institutions, but tailors these ideas to the specific contexts of CA units working at the local level. It can be found at https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/56893.

A failure to execute good governance tasks has led to a continued struggle for the U.S. in both in Iraq and Afghanistan. While every military commander is responsible for governance, the current approved CA doctrine emphasizes that CA tactical units are especially equipped to execute the task. Despite this, CA units receive very little education or training on governance. It is time to change that and practice what we preach. To do so, the Civil Affairs Regiment needs to regain control of the curriculum in the CAQC to ensure every CA Soldier has the requisite skills to support governance when called upon to do so.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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NOTES
3. The concepts in this article are derived from a thesis written at the Naval Postgraduate School by MAJ Melanie Collins and MAJ Jennifer Jantzi-Schichter entitled, Civil Affairs Framework for Executing Governance, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/56893. The author also thanks COL Ian Rice for his invaluable assistance and suggestions.
12. Shadow, War in the Art of Governance, x,
13. Ibid., xi,
14. Ibid.,
17. Ibid., 7.
18. Ibid., 7.
19. Ibid., 12.
20. Ibid., 12.
21. Ibid., 12.
22. Ibid., 12.
26. Ibid., 8.
27. Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Operations, FM 3-57, 2-9, 2-11.
28. Ibid., 2-8.
The trend toward global urbanization will have a profound impact on future military operations undertaken by the United States Army. It is estimated that 55 percent of the world’s population currently lives in an urban area and it is estimated that the numbers will increase to 68 percent by 2050. An increase in migration from impoverished rural areas to larger, more economically viable centers throughout the world has given rise to populations in certain cities. Cities that have a population in excess of 10 million are labeled megacities.

Globally, there are currently 37 cities with populations in excess of 10 million. Eight of the top 10 megacities in the world listed by Demographia World Urban Areas are located in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility. The top two urban areas listed, Tokyo-Yokohama, Japan and Jakarta, Indonesia, have populations estimated at 38,050,000 and 32,275,000, respectively. According to estimates by the UN, the number of cities with populations in excess of 10 million will grow to 43.

This trend in urbanization has heavy consequences for military forces operating in dense urban areas. A city that includes skyscrapers, a robust infrastructure, defined transportation corridors, shipping and economic viability can have, within a few miles from the city center, a patchwork of shantytowns, slums and makeshift settlements that are not governed or connected to the main city with water, electricity or funding. This sharp contrast will make it difficult for U.S. forces to operate in these areas. One square kilometer in different parts of the city can have completely different features in terms of poverty and prosperity, health and disease, access to clean water and drawing water from a polluted river.

Civil Affairs Soldiers are trained to engage with indigenous populations and institutions, enhance stability, set conditions to mitigate threats to civil society and assist in establishing local government capability. Conducting Civil Affairs Operations in the cities and rural areas of Iraq, Afghanistan and the Philippines pose challenges as shifts in military, political and social dynamics can create setbacks in planned operations. When not deployed, CA Soldiers continue to hone their skills for operating in and among the populace through unit level training exercises and at any of the three combat training centers.

The outlook for operating in a megacity, whether in a period of war or in the midst of a natural disaster, will prove daunting. Organizations and individuals within the U.S. Army are exploring and studying potential issues and risks from the strategic-to-tactical level to U.S. forces operating in and around megacities. The Chief of Staff of the Army’s Strategic Studies Group (Megacity Concept Team), Training and Doctrine Command’s Mad Scientist Initiative, as well as the Maneuver Center of Excellence, have all looked at the complexities of operating in megacities. There is also a Department of the Army Strategic Broadening Seminar that focuses on dense urban areas and exposes mid-career captains and majors, warrant officers and senior noncommissioned officers to the complexities and critical issues that frame the problems of a megacity.
The SBS is conducted at Fort Hamilton, New York, and seminar attendees are exposed to the urban workshop of New York City to help them process the enormity of the city’s flows, gain perspective on the interconnectedness of its infrastructure and visualize the three-dimensional nature (skyscrapers and urban canyons, subterranean geographies and street-level traffic flows) of a modern metropolitan area.

The world’s megacities may share some similar characteristics but each megacity is a unique living entity with its own characteristics that must be studied and mapped. The approaches and methodologies to study dense urban environments are still in development and up for debate. Regardless of the state of a megacity, the human terrain will be a major consideration and obstacle for Civil Affairs personnel working in the future operating environment.

HUMAN TERRAIN

As previously stated, no two megacities are alike. As a result, it is important to develop an understanding of the human terrain of megacities. Understanding the make-up, demographics and diasporas of a megacity is a much more daunting task for CA formations than what they have encountered in previous conflicts. When operating in an area, units generally develop an in-depth understanding of the political, social and economic strata. In the case of the 2017 Battle of Mosul, the Mosul Study Group stated in its findings that, “Civil Affairs personnel developed a level of understanding of the Mosul populace down to the tribal-leader level. This facilitated information dissemination through informal networks.” This was a key factor to developing an understanding of the human terrain and providing sound advice to the task force commander. Mosul had an estimated population of 1,377,000 in 2014, far below the threshold of a megacity.

Understanding the human terrain in a megacity will pose a much greater challenge. The dimensions and unit boundaries of different formations within a coalition of friendly forces will exacerbate information sharing and knowledge management for understanding the complexities of the disjointed and interconnected alliances between diasporas and city areas. A road or natural barrier may separate two completely different populations or diasporas. An example of this within the United States is in Lower Manhattan where Chinatown and Little Italy meet. Although this example represents a small population in each section, the diversity of the two neighborhoods is astounding. The sights, the smells and the noise
of a large city with its pedestrian population carrying out its daily routine can be overwhelming. More than likely, this issue will be compounded in megacities where languages other than English are dominant.

Understanding the informal power structure of a megacity is crucial. An understanding of local politics and power bases will allow Civil Affairs forces to better cope with the complexities of their area of operations.

Civil Affairs Soldiers must come to understand the influence and control a local leader has with other leaders and the local government. The territory that is controlled in one area may be of economic (ports and harbors) or social (religious sites) significance to the city at large and disrupting a pre-established equilibrium may inadvertently further complicate matters for U.S. forces. Conversely, in areas that are not governed or patrolled by municipal authorities, gangs and organized crime may be the law of the land. Again, it is critical to recognize the power strata within the area of operations in order not to exacerbate an on-going conflict without having an understanding of the environment.

Incorporating geographic information systems into mapping the human terrain will assist CA forces in creating graphical depictions of their areas. The ability to create and update overlays based on demographic data and civil information from open source databases and surveys can greatly improve one’s understanding of the operating environment. Overlays depicting transportation networks, public utilities, communications nodes, demographics, elevation and land usage to name a few, can assist CA Soldiers in analyzing the physical and human terrain. Enterprising CA Soldiers do not need to attend a specialized school to learn the basics of GIS. Online learning venues, such as massive open online courses offer free or low-cost instruction on the basics of GIS. Online programs such as Google Earth can assist in developing a context for understanding the physical and its characteristics. There are videos on YouTube that demonstrate how to create Google Earth fly throughs. These fly throughs are virtual excursions through a specified area. Using Google Maps Street View, a CA team can conduct initial civil reconnaissance with a panoramic view at street level of the crowded, densely packed seaside areas in Jakarta, Indonesia, that are vulnerable to flooding.

CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE

In his book, *Out of the Mountains: The Coming of the Urban Guerrilla*, David Kilcullen explains four trends that will shape the future operating environment and create a situation that is in stark contrast to what we see in the world today. These four elements are: rapid population growth, accelerating urbanization, littoral,
In this type of scenario, we may see near-peer competitors vying for influence in megacities. It is not unreasonable to believe that our CA forces may come face-to-face with “Red CA forces” from our peer of near-peer competitors, transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups — as seen in countries like Sri Lanka. Faux nongovernmental organizations sponsored by competitors may also be seen in the cityscapes attempting to undo and dismantle our operations and efforts. A competitor can use U.S. doctrine against U.S. forces. With a vast majority of our doctrine freely available on the Internet, an enterprising competitor at the tactical level with an understanding of the English language and the help of Google Translate can understand our tactics, techniques and procedures. This is a challenge that we will likely encounter in the future due to the interconnectedness of our world.

Another challenge in megacity operations was described by the 31st Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, General Charles C. Krulak. The concept of the “Three Block War” describes the future urban battlefield where simultaneous operations encompassing full-scale combat operations, humanitarian operations and peacekeeping operations occur within three city blocks. A survey of the densely populated major metropolitan areas across the globe using Google Earth and the explosion of urbanization makes this scenario likely in future operations. Adding to the complexity and confusion of this scenario is the mass, panicked evacuation of the populace interfering with ongoing military operations.

CONCLUSION
This article briefly touched on the human terrain and future challenges of the complexity of operating in a megacity. There are many more topics that require in-depth investigation and study. Some examples are the city as a system, insurgency in a megacity, operations in the subterranean environments of a megacity, the use of drones in contested areas, artificial intelligence applications, social media as a mobilizer in an urban environment, sophisticated surveillance systems and biometric scanners and mass atrocities response operations in a megascale to name a few. Preparing for the future operating environment is part science fiction and part reality. The science fiction part can be covered by reading, discussing and participating in venues such as Small Wars Journal, Special Warfare or the TRADOC Mad Scientist Initiative. The reality of a megacity can be realized by visiting (physically or via Google Earth) and researching those major metropolitan areas that may be the battleground of the future prior to the onset of conflict or a disaster.

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NOTES
ARSOF derived its modern lineage from World War II legacy units. However, PSYOP and CA had roots in the American effort during and after WWI. American soldiers established a legacy to perform propaganda activities, and the Army conducted Military Government in Germany and Russia. These efforts provided the impetus for robust psychological warfare and Civil Affairs capabilities in WWII.

**WORLD WAR I**

April 6, 1917 - November 11, 1918

ARSOF derived its modern lineage from World War II legacy units. However, PSYOP and CA had roots in the American effort during and after WWI. American soldiers established a legacy to perform propaganda activities, and the Army conducted Military Government in Germany and Russia. These efforts provided the impetus for robust psychological warfare and Civil Affairs capabilities in WWII.

**1917**

APR 6 - U.S. declared war on Germany.

JUN 25 - First troops of the American Expeditionary Force arrived in France.

**1918**

NOV 3 - Austria agreed to an armistice.

NOV 12 - Germany agreed to terms for an armistice.

**1919**

JUN 28 - Germans signed peace treaty in Hall of Mirrors at Versailles.

**WORLD WAR II**

7 December 1941 - 2 September 1945

During WWII, many units that influenced U.S. Army Special Operations Forces were formed. These included the First Special Service Forces, the Alamo Scouts, the Philippine Guerrillas, and elements of the Office for Strategic Services of Special Forces, the 63rd Ranger Battalion, Merrill's Marauders, and the MARS Task Force for the Rangers; and Military Government and Psychological Warfare elements, for today's Civil Affairs and Psychological/Operations units. With the exception of a small Military Government capability, all special operations units were disbanded at the end of the war.

**1941**

DEC 7 - Japanese forces attacked Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The U.S. declared war on the Axis and joined the Allied Powers in World War II.

DEC 11 - Germany and Italy declared war on the United States.

**1942**

MAY 8 - School of Military Government at the University of Virginia opened. The first of several to convene in civilian universities during World War II.

SEP 15 - CA SecOfS of Armed Forces Headquarters formally activated in London.

**KOREAN WAR**

June 25, 1950 - July 27, 1953

U.S. involvement in the Korean War led to the rebirth of Army Special Operations Forces. A new Ranger Training Center created Ranger Infantry Companies (Airborne), and later instructed individuals in Ranger skills. The Eighth U.S. Army created a guerrilla organization to command, control, train, and advise North Korean guerrillas fighting alongside UN troops. Civil Affairs units helped alleviate the widespread misery experienced by the Korean people. Tactical and strategic Psychological Warfare Units reappeared. Toward the end of the conflict a new Psychological Warfare Center and School was formed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to train Psywar and Special Forces soldiers. Some of the first Special Forces trained soldiers served in combat in Korea.

**1952**

APR 13 - Office for Occupied Areas was abolished; its functions were transferred to the Office of the Chief of Civil Affairs and Military Government in the Army Staff.

**1955**

AUG 17 - Civil Affairs/Military Government Branch established in the U.S. Army Reserves.

**1956**

JUN 1 - CA Branch Insignia approved. Purple and white were designated as the branch colors.

**1959**

MAY 15 - OCCAMG redesignated the Office of the Chief of Civil Affairs in the Army Staff.
Modern U.S. Army Civil Affairs began in the post World War I occupation of the German Rhineland. This timeline depicts the significant events, units, and campaigns in Civil Affairs history and places them into a wider context of historical events that shaped today’s force.

**OPERATION EAGLE CLAW**
April 24, 1980

An attempt to rescue 52 American hostages in Iran failed dramatically. In the aftermath of the operation, Congress mandated deficiencies in America’s ability to conduct special operations. Legislation established the Joint Special Operations Command. The Goldwater-Nicholas Act and the Rumsfeld Amendment clarified command and service relationships and led to the creation of USSOCOM as a unified joint command with responsibility over all special operations.

**1987**

- APR 16 - USSOCOM was activated at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, to provide unified command and control for all military special operations forces.

**1990**

- NOV 27 - USARSOC inactivated. U.S. Army Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations Command created to command all active and USAR CA and PSYOP units assigned to USASOC.
- DEC 1 - Soldiers from the 352nd CA Command and 354th CA Brigade activated for service as the Kuwaiti Task Force. As part of the Combined Civil Affairs Task Force, the KTF assisted Kuwait with reconstruction. It disbanded in May 1991.

**1993**

- MAR 3 - Secretary of Defense Les Aspin Designated Civil Affairs Forces as Army Special Operations Forces elements.

**GWOT**

**2001**

- NOV 9 - Terrorist Attacks in the U.S. Led to Operations in Afghanistan. Combined with denials from subsequent operations in Iraq, active duty CA experienced dramatic force structure growth that included the activation of two brigades.

**2006**

- OCT 1 - USACAPOC and its subordinate units are transferred from USASOC to U.S. Army Reserve Command.

**2010**

- OCT 16 - Civil Affairs established as a Basic Branch in the Regular Army.

**2016**

- MAR 16 - 95th CA Brigade reactivated at Fort Hood, Texas.
SHAPING AUTHORITY IN THE HUMAN DOMAIN

Transforming Civil Affairs’ Aperture on Governance.

BY MORGAN G. KEAY

The term ‘governance’ recently re-emerged across the Civil Affairs Regiment, appearing on new Mission Essential Task Lists in the SOF component, in updated regiment-wide doctrine and publications and as a reinvigorated topic of concept and capability development. Governance is not new to CA. The regiment’s roots are in Military Government in post-World War I and World War II theatres, and more recently in state-building endeavors, including in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, images of CA forces executing technocratic, essential service projects in support of governments-in-transition is often the first image that comes to mind when one thinks of governance in the military context. This image is problematic.

The perceived value and capabilities of CA forces have been hindered by understanding of governance that remains overly state-centric and service-focused. As discussed below, doctrine, operational concepts, training and education and leadership are preoccupied with government at the expense of governance. This prevents CA forces from gaining necessary capabilities to assess and affect the myriad manifestations of non-state governance that define contests in the human domain.

To more effectively shape outcomes of war, CA must orient more explicitly towards non-state governance and operationalize the idea that social contracts based on values and processes — and less on services — are the basis of authority and conflict in the Human Domain. To the extent CA forces are already executing approaches on these principles, Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) must catch up to practice and ensure personnel consistently and deliberately gain required governance capabilities.

Institutional changes will help broadcast images to CA customers such as Ambassadors and Joint Force Commanders that governance as a CA capability is more than service projects or military government. Transforming how governance is understood and actioned will help make CA a reliable and effective proponent for governance across the U.S. joint force, and throughout the phases of war.
GOVERNANCE IS NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH GOVERNMENT

When understood as simply any ‘system of authority’ in society, governance can be seen everywhere from corporate boards, to ethno-religious organizations, to knitting clubs. Far from background noise, these myriad non-state governance systems shape the outcomes of social conflict more so than governments. Non-state governance systems are more proximate in the lives of people than even the strongest most capable governments. Unsurprisingly, 2018 Pew Research Center data show that an overwhelming majority of Americans place family responsibilities and even their role in the economy as higher priorities than participation in politics or government. Consistent with data from around the world, individual and group behavior is governed more by family and market systems of authority than by formal state institutions. Non-state governance, in other words, influences whether or not one joins an armed group or takes part in a resistance movement, and shapes who populations ultimately view as a legitimate state government.

In addition to proximity, the significance of non-state governance in the Human Domain is also a matter of sheer numbers. With just 207 national governments globally by the highest estimate, each with a finite number of sub-national administrative bodies, governments (i.e. formal state institutions) account for a tiny fraction of governance systems worldwide compared to the infinite number of civic, market, tribal, familial, religious or other social systems of authority. This ratio matters in complex conflicts.

Take for example West Africa’s Lake Chad region, where Boko Haram extremists have driven over two million Nigerians, Chadians, Cameroonians and Nigeriens from their homes. Though often unreported, it is informal governance networks — predominantly ethnic and religious groups at the hyper local level, each with their own authorities, rules, networks and norms — that are taking in the majority of IDPs and refugees. Formal camps run by governments and inter-governmental organizations like the UN have the capacity (and often, will) to accommodate only a fraction of this vulnerable population, and at much higher costs per person. Meanwhile, foreign internal defense missions supported by U.S. CA forces that seek to contain Boko Haram and stem extremist recruitment in part by mitigating humanitarian disaster tend to concentrate on host-nation (read: government) capacity while missing the critical role of non-state authority in shaping this crisis. Whether owed to guidance or lack of permissions from military or civilian leadership, or shortfalls in operating concepts, training or education, the tendency to focus narrowly on government could be helped by expanding upon current doctrine.

Fortunately, doctrinal definitions already recognize that governance extends beyond state institutions. For example, FM 3-07 Stability states that “Governance is the set of activities conducted by a government or community organization to maintain societal order, define and enforce rights and obligations, and fairly allocate goods and services.” Similarly, the recently updated FM 3-57 Civil Affairs Operations describes the political variable as “...the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of governance — formally constituted authorities, as well as informal or covert political powers,” and asserts that “Support to governance is one of five primary Army stability tasks.”

But doctrinal guidance on activities with respect to governance remains a focus of debate. ‘Governing support’ throughout U.S. military publications is described almost exclusively as “provid[ing] transitional military authority,” with TMA defined as “a temporary military government exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority.” The Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations, as another example, compels military forces to “Empower formal and informal governance structures to enable campaign transitions and conflict termination,” but offers little other than TMA as a way to do this.

To transform CA capabilities beyond TMA, the starting point is a new doctrinal definition of governance that more definitively broadens the aperture beyond governments. A candidate for a new definition could be the following:

 Governance is any system of authority premised on a social contract of mutual consent between those with power (the governing) and those who grant power (the governed).

This definition transforms current military notions of governance in at least three ways. First, because this definition is not biased towards state-centric governance, CA forces as the proponent for governance will have a doctrinal basis to assess the limitless manifestations of social authority systems in the Human Domain, then zero in on those that are operationally relevant to engage. Engaging civil society would be a primary and perpetual task in virtually all operating environments.

Second, the word consent differentiates the concept of governance from the concept of control, with the latter reliant on force or coercion as the basis of authority. This is important because in order to consolidate gains from war to durable stability, CA must ultimately set conditions for consensual social order, not coercive rule, in the OE. Yes, governing authorities retain the ability to coerce if order is broken by a few, but coercion is a poor basis to assert authority at scale because the governed, who outnumber the governing, could revolt.

Third, by referring to social contracts, the proposed doctrinal definition of governance offers CA the
Social contracts hinge on mutually agreed terms. These terms outline what each party will give and take (the services and performance) the governed and governing expect of one another, how each party will interact (the processes of exchange between the governed and governing) and establish some basis of mutual interest (the shared values that earn the consent of the governed and shape the rules made by the governing). Summarized, these three distinct categories offer a helpful way to recognize the terms present in any social contract:

1) Services/Performance: The tangible or intangible goods or services provided by the governing to the governed who demonstrate their “eligibility” under the rules of the contract.

2) Processes of Exchange: The mechanisms by which information and ideas are transmitted between the governing and the governed.

3) Shared Values: The norms and interests in common between the governing and the governed that bring the two together for mutual benefit.

Social contracts underpin all governance systems, whether it is governance between parents and children, states and citizens, rebel leaders and supporters or any other authority figure and those who recognize their authority. When the terms offered by a social contract across the three categories described above are attractive, people “opt in,” granting legitimacy to the system of governance that establishes social order.

Despite harsh rules, millions of Afghans have “opted in” to the social contract offered by the Taliban. In exchange for services of protection, dispute resolution and land management, to name a few, many Afghans willingly perform according to the Taliban’s rules on gender, Shari’a, and importantly, by not joining the fight against them. These “rules” are explained, renegotiated, and enforced through shuras, Taliban jurisprudence rulings, and face-to-face interactions between community members and Taliban leaders, reflecting the processes of exchange in Taliban governance. What likely draws communities to turn to the Taliban for these services and processes instead of other authorities is a shared desire of the Taliban and ordinary Afghans not to be occupied or defined by outsiders, along with locals’ perception that the Taliban are incorruptible. These shared values create the trust necessary for processes of exchange to function and determine the services and performances expected of the governed and governing.

As operational concept, social contracts offer an orienting principle for affecting governance in all phases and forms of war. In a FID mission, for example, CA and partners must weaken the social contract of the insurgency, militant or violent extremist organization adversary in order to subvert their authority in the Human Domain, while helping ensure the state-citizen social contract grants the host government sufficient authority to govern social order. In an unconventional warfare mission, CA must help resistance partners undermine the adversary “government or occupying power[s]” social contract and cultivate a sufficiently attractive alternative contract as the basis of national authority. In conventional war, CA must be ready to leverage social contracts present on complex battlefields to gain locally- legitimate influence and reach to help manage populations and resources, minimize civilian interference in combat operations, and thwart adversary control of the Human Domain.

Regardless the form or phase of war, the above demands that CA assess, identify, engage or leverage non-state social contracts not just of partners or adversaries, but of any system of authority that shapes operationally relevant decisions of people in a contested operating environment. Ultimately, it is a patchwork of household, market, tribal, ethnic, civic, religious and other social contracts that determine the terms and rules of social order nec-
essary “to support the transition to legitimate host-nation governance.”

Deeply understanding social contracts, therefore, will enable CA to achieve better operational effects.

TARGET PROCESSES & VALUES, NOT SERVICES

Empirical research on social contracts reveals an important insight CA must embrace: Contrary to current doctrine and operational concepts, services are not the center of gravity for governance.

In 2006, the Sunni Islamist group Hamas unexpectedly won a majority of seats in Palestinian Parliamentary elections by earning votes among populations previously loyal to the rival Fatah Palestinian Authority. This outcome begged the question: How had Hamas, a group deemed a terrorist organization by the U.S. and that many Palestinians had rejected until then as a hardline militant group, earned a mandate to govern? Onlookers observed that during their political campaign, Hamas had administered social service programs ranging from kindergartens to food banks in small, multi-ethnic enclaves in the West Bank and Gaza. It seemed these services acted as a carrot in exchange for votes, but in fact Hamas won over far more of the electorate than had received any services, including support from populations outside the areas Hamas targeted for outreach. Research by the political scientist Szekely revealed that voters were impressed by Hamas’s style of transparent fiscal and logistical management of service administration — even at small scale — and by the group’s willingness to deliver services inclusively across sectoral lines. Effectively, Hamas used services as a tool to demonstrate their bureaucratic skills and principles of sectoral inclusiveness. As Szekely put it, services were simply “political advertising” for the terms of the social contract Hamas was offering Palestinians. Processes of exchange and shared values earned Hamas the authority to govern, not services.

Yes, services matter to people, but service delivery only earns one the right to govern when those services are delivered by actors with whom recipients have legitimate mechanisms to interact and with whom they share a basis of common values. Research consistently shows that values and processes supersede services in terms of importance in almost all governance systems, regardless of form, yet military doctrine still reflects a service-focused view of governance.

Elaborating on the tasks to support stability, FM 3-57 lists “provide support to governance; provide essential services; support economic development and infrastructure; and establish civil control,” as though provision of food, water, jobs and security by U.S. forces translates to social order. It does not. Only authorities who establish hard-won shared values and processes of exchange with those they seek to rule can deliver services in the name of governance. When delivered by international forces who do not seek to govern in the long term and who lack a mutually-agreed social contract with foreign populations, services are little more than bribes. To the regiment’s detriment, CA’s reputation remains too closely associated with service projects, which at best only marginally affect authority in the Human Domain, and at worst undermine prospects for establishing locally-legitimate governance in an operating environment.

Recognizing that values and processes are the foundation of governance is critical to enhance engagement and the targeting process. Hypothetically, CA forces might determine with further analysis that targeting Hamas’ bookkeeping systems could disrupt key processes of exchange, or that publicizing instances when Hamas failed to include non-Sunni beneficiaries in social service programs could...
demonstrate a break from the key value of sectoral inclusion. Both of these actions might subvert Hamas’ authority with Palestinians. Concurrently, CA might identify challengers to Hamas’ authority with whom to partner by zeroing in on those who have locally-legitimate bureaucratic processes and a commitment to sectoral inclusion.

**LEGITIMACY IS NOT ZERO SUM**

Like Hamas, the Taliban continues to compete for and win legitimacy in the eyes of many because they offer attractive terms across all three categories of the social contract. The competition for legitimacy, however, is not a zero-sum equation.

Take for example the millions of Afghans who “opt in” to the Government of Afghanistan’s social contract by seeking resources from the state, voting in elections or holding a national ID card, while at the same time consenting to the Taliban’s rules. In Afghanistan, as in separatist-held territory in Eastern Ukraine, or militant strongholds throughout the Sahel, social contracts between state and non-state armed groups often have overlapping membership because people derive distinct benefits from various governance systems. Apart from consenting to one or both adversaries’ rules, individuals in any given operating environment will likely “opt in” to countless social contracts that determine how they are governed.

**LEVERAGING PATCHWORKS OF GOVERNANCE**

Mapping the multitude of non-state authority systems in an operating environment that influence population behavior in operationally-relevant ways is a capability CA forces must develop because it will enable forces to effectively leverage governance in support of mission objectives. A historical retrospective is helpful here to see how that can be done.

Post-World War II Europe saw the emergence of various armed groups who resisted communist rule and undertook UW against Soviet-backed regimes. Such groups included the ‘Cursed Soldier’ insurgency in Poland, the ‘Forest Brothers’ in the Baltic States and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Outmatched in military capability and unable to establish a social contract attractive to a sufficient base of supporters, nearly all these groups were suppressed by Soviet-backed regimes by the 1960s. Meanwhile, however, a multitude of governance systems in communist Europe were setting the theatre for an end to the Cold War.

By 1980, Poland’s “Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity,” or simply Solidarity, had amassed an estimated nine million supporters, boasting a social contract with a quarter of Poland’s population. The group offered underpaid Polish laborers the service of collective bargaining against state-owned industries through the process of strikes guided by values of workers’ rights and freedoms. In the years that followed, Solidarity’s leader, Lech Walesa, pursued a successful strategy of subverting the communist government’s authority through mass labor walk-outs and public ridicule of Warsaw’s failure to uphold enforceable treaties on labor rights. Under economic and political distress, the government consented to a multi-party election by 1989, in which Solidarity supporters won control of parliament and ushered in the first non-Communist government in the Soviet bloc. This UW victory was achieved not by guerrilla insurgents, nor by Solidarity alone, but thanks to a patchwork of non-state governance systems leveraging authority through distinct social contracts.

The Catholic church — arguably the largest governance system in the world — helped codify a narrative of anti-communist values among Pol-
ish congregants who never withdrew consent to the Church’s rules even as a binary geo-political contest played out. Universities — among the more structured of non-state governance institutions worldwide — continued to provide platforms for students and scholars to engage in processes of exchange ranging from academic debates on competing politics systems, to literal exchanges with foreign institutions that created a global network of resistance supporters. These religious and academic governance systems — sometimes as collaborators, but often independently — shaped Polish human geography in ways Solidarity was able to leverage, and that directly advanced U.S. strategic objectives.

With Russian encroachment a resurgent threat facing U.S. allies in Europe today, CA forces deployed there have an opportunity to learn directly from this historical example and leverage non-state social contracts among such civil society actors in similar ways. At a minimum, CA could help ensure these non-state systems of authority remain strong, thereby creating local resilience that presents dilemmas for Russian aggression. From the illustrative historical example, CA in all theatres can learn that leveraging governance broadly can translate to significant operational gains.

**CA CAPABILITIES TRANSFORMED**

Leveraging and affecting non-state governance to ultimately influence who emerges as the legitimate authority at a national scale demands a transformation of CA capabilities. At a minimum, CA must cultivate at least three specific new capabilities:

1) The ability to assess and depict non-state governance in its multitude of forms in order to identify social systems of authority that are operationally-relevant in any given operating environment.

2) The ability to conduct precision governance targeting with fidelity on the strength and nature of social contracts — category by category — among operationally-relevant adversaries, partners, spoilers and enablers.

3) The ability to execute new tactics, techniques and procedures to subvert the social contract of adversaries and spoilers, leverage social contracts of partners and bolster social contracts of legitimate authorities.

Identifying and mapping operationally-relevant non-state governance in a complex Human Domain requires CA to replace blunt instruments such as ASCOPE-PMSEII that simply inventory features in an OE, with precision tools. Fortunately, social contract-based analytic and planning tools grounded in empirical research already exist in the social science and international development community. Adapting and integrating such tools will enable CA forces to reveal, for example, the precise services, processes of exchange, and shared values that earn ISIS the mandate to govern in each enclave where they operate, or that empower traditional rulers in Nigeria to mobilize grassroots networks of human intelligence collectors or armed vigilantes against VEOs. Identifying relevant governance actors and understanding the basis of their authority is the precursor for better engagement (read: targeting). Among other benefits, precision targeting can help reveal often-overlooked partners to engage in support of operational objectives.

The Far East Broadcasting Company, as one example, is a group of evangelical Koreans that transmits radio programs into North Korea with the goal of “using Christian radio to subvert the Kim regime’s strict ban on religion,” presenting an alternative social contract the FEBC believes will “ultimately pave the way for [unification] of the Korean Peninsula.” With a membership network across North America and Asia, and established communication channels into denied terrain, FEBC or groups like them may have operational value as a partner. Us-
Shaping Authority in the Human Domain

Civil Affairs

Special warfare with a role player during the Sluss-Tiller culmination exercise.

A student in the Civil Affairs Qualification Course interacts

U.S. Army Photo


NOTES


CONCLUSION

The Handbook for Military Support to Governance, Elections and Media states that “The SOF CA BDE is the only member of the Army’s special warfare team that specializes in countering irregular threats through a unique capability to enhance partner or degrade adversary governance, which includes the formal or informal organizations, systems, mechanisms, or institutions that control, influence, or direct a population.” Not just SOF CA, but the entire regiment must transform to enhance partner and degrade adversary governance more effectively and reliably.

Doing so is essential across the phases of conflict because governance is ultimately what is contested in all forms of war.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Morgan G. Keay is Founder/CEO of the social enterprise Motive International, whose mission is to mitigate conflict and instability in fragile global societies, often through partnerships with the Civil Affairs community. Before launching Motive, Morgan was a Policy Officer with the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, serving as Conflict Advisor to AFRICOM HQ, team lead for conflict prevention operations in Nigeria, and a civil-military policy officer. Previously a member of USAID’s Foreign Service, Morgan directed an interagency joint task force in Afghanistan focused on governance aspects of the transition process. Before serving in government, Morgan founded an NGO, The Itgel Foundation, working with nomadic tribes in Mongolia, where she lived for ten years. She holds a master’s degree in international policy from The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, and bachelor’s degrees in environmental biology and religious studies from the University of Colorado at Boulder.

A student in the Civil Affairs Qualification Course interacts with a role player during the Sluss-Tiller culmination exercise.

U.S. Army Photo
A U.S. Army Civil Affairs team leader discusses the importance of governmental collaboration with local leaders and the commander of the 12th Regional Infantry Commando Battalion in Burkina Faso. As populations continue to grow, become denser, more urban and connected, building enduring relationships with stakeholders that lead to desired civil-military effects becomes increasingly more important.

U.S. ARMY PHOTO COURTESY OF THE 91ST CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALION (AIRBORNE)

“*The best way to predict the future is to invent it.*” — Alan Kay

For those in the Profession of Arms fathoming the nature of conflict is critical to preparing for it, as failing to prepare for conflict is preparing to fail in conflict. As such, the Civil Affairs (CA) Regiment must strive to imagine and comprehend the nature of their future operating environments. From such inquiry, they must adapt and match resources to reasonably predicted conditions and scenarios. Above all, the CA force must comfortably embrace ambiguity by building resilient formations and purposefully growing their capability and capacity to navigate unexpected events and environs.

The military’s requirement to conduct CA operations not only remains acute, but its importance steadily rises. That obligation will increase in scope and scale as populations grow, become denser, more urban, and more connected. Complicating these realities will be the likely prevalence of gray zone conflicts requiring enduring development of relationships with civilian stakeholders that lead to desired civil-military effects in support of broad strategic defense objectives. In these conditions, the indigenous populations’ cognitive and emotive capital will remain a crucial prize to be won by competing powers. To win their piece of the gray zone fight, the CA force must recognize that CA operations there are political warfare that must be won by our supported indigenous partners and surrogates, whether state or non-state actors, empowered by their constituent civilian populations.

These coming conflicts will involve competing campaigns to secure contested human will—the will of people whose consent or compliance is required for political actors to achieve governance amongst civil society and determine sovereignty over disputed territory. The thresholds separating state and non-state, regular and irregular, combatant and civilian, are increasingly eroded, adding sensitivity and complexity to future CA operations. Under these conditions the depth and breadth of CA forces’ cross-functionality, integration, and synchronization across Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) and the CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCE OF THE FUTURE

Empowering and Optimizing the Future Force.

BY MR. MIKE DAWDY

A U.S. Army Civil Affairs team leader discusses the importance of governmental collaboration with local leaders and the commander of the 12th Regional Infantry Commando Battalion in Burkina Faso. As populations continue to grow, become denser, more urban and connected, building enduring relationships with stakeholders that lead to desired civil-military effects becomes increasingly more important. U.S. ARMY PHOTO COURTESY OF THE 91ST CIVIL AFFAIRS BATTALION (AIRBORNE)
whole-of-government will be fundamental to employment of the Global SOF Network. To do so, CA forces will harness new technologies and authorities, modernize its force structures, expand expertise through advanced training and education, and find innovative and agile approaches to solving new problems.

THE FUTURE CA OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS WILL BE HEAVILY POPULATED, URBAN, AND HYPER-CONNECTED

Trends in changing security environments indicate a likelihood of a continued disintegration of the Westphalian state system via gray zone conflicts in which state sovereignty is threatened by a variety of causes and catalysts. These threats will take the form of malign state and non-state actors, criminality, resource scarcity, mass migration, disease, localized political instability, and climate catastrophe—all affected by cheaply distributed and accelerating technology. Hyper-connected communities are urbanizing at unprecedented rates and are increasingly able to cross porous borders, mobilized by political, social, and economic anxieties and opportunities. These patterns will place severe strain on nations’ urban centers and social fabrics not organized for the absorption of massive civilian migrations. Exacerbating these civil trends is the likelihood of near-peer adversaries such as Russia, Iran, and China continuing their subversive hybrid warfare strategies. These campaigns destabilize regions by provoking crises along ethnic and religious fault lines below the threshold of overt war, through and with local proxies.

In aggregate, these conditions indicate that minimizing civilian casualties in military operations will be increasingly difficult, while mitigating consequences of those events and of populations displaced by them will be a persistent civil-military challenge. The toll paid by civilians in these short-of-war scenarios will be high and this milieu of chaotic international affairs will require US response strategies that call upon many DoD capabilities, not the least of which will be the unique knowledge, skills, and attributes of CA forces.

Evolving CA forces’ approaches to their core tasks in these environments will be necessary. Firstly, new frameworks are required for the chartered activities of Civil Reconnaissance (CR) and Civil Information Management (CIM). Scarcity of information was once a challenge for developing the Common Operating Picture of an area of operations. Today, and into the future, volume of information from competing sources of disputed reliability is a greater obstacle, making on-the-ground investigation more critical. The existence of dense population centers with increasingly networked infrastructure and governance systems will mean the struggle to reconnoiter, map, and understand the human terrain and civil infrastructure of a host nation or adversary will become more complex and will frustrate decision-making processes.

The foci of CR will likely need to shift into areas of disease surveillance, climatology, urban planning, and political data sampling, among others, in order to be the most relevant.

Mission success will rely upon innovative technologies that utilize such data to enable precise descriptive and predictive analysis at the operator’s fingertips, in real time, that can be fed into decision-
In this sense, future gray zone conflicts are “wars of territorial resources or domination of rival nations. and resources,” monopolize the use of force over internal populations and projects are not employed for altruistic ends in indiscriminate humanitarian ways—they are targeted for military purposes with intended effects that benefit national security and strategic objectives by working through people with political agency over the actions of others.

Political warfare includes activities designed to help proactively shape environments and prevent broader military actions by influencing the decision-making processes of specific actors and organizations toward favorable strategic diplomatic, economic, and military outcomes.

This is often achieved by demonstrating or implying the likelihood of various incentives and consequences, and through persistent presence and engagement. CA operations contribute by gaining and maintaining proximity and access to key actors and organizations, by developing networks of purpose, reciprocity, and trust, by evincing tangible benefits of cooperation, and by shaping the perceptions of populations whose acquiescence or support those political actors require. CA forces are naturally postured to provide the necessary advanced understanding of political and economic forces at work and under stress that can be leveraged by Combatant Commanders for indigenous political effects in line with theater strategy.

In phase zero activities, where the current Civil-Military Engagement (CME) program is employed, CA operations help consolidate or expand the internal power of partner nations by enabling governmental institutions and implementing partners to influence vulnerable and susceptible populations and out-govern malign non-state actors. As many of the current long-term CME programs come to fruition, these and other CA shaping activities will fortify allied populations against adversarial meddling and shape those adversaries’ calculations of earned incentives gained from subverting newly-resilient institutions and communities that CME activities have strengthened.

As phase zero environments transition to gray zone conflicts, CA’s political warfare activities will take a more aggressive posture. This involves targeted, large-scale social and economic development programs that leverage human capital and sway popular support toward either incumbent or resistance political institutions. Such programs will require enhanced synchronization with interdepartmental partners and dedicated resources disbursed in earnest by empowered CA forces. Aggressive tactical political warfare will require civil analysis that illuminates socio-political power structures within a society that can be targeted to empower political actors who align with US strategic ends.
FUTURE CA ORGANIZATIONS WILL BE CROSS-FUNCTIONAL, NETWORKED, AND TECH-ENABLED

CA forces have recently seen more integration with the other ARSOF formations and our interdepartmental stakeholders and this trend will continue. Several significant steps have already been taken that partially foretell future trends in this vein. Notably, the establishment of the 1st SFC(A) consolidated the active duty ARSOF Career Management Fields (CMF) into a more scalable and modular Division-like formation. This increases SOF-CF interdependence and helps to realize the potential of fully optimized and seamless ARSOF capabilities.

 Continuing current practices of collaboration with industry, academia, and the interagency will exponentially enhance interoperability. The instability and complexity anticipated in the future precipitates the need for cross-functionality as a trait and best practice of future ARSOF formations.14

Flexibility in future conflicts will require more ad-hoc, projectized formations designed to rapidly match highly-specific requirements to available personnel, rather than rote adherence to bureaucratic, doctrinal roles and functions.15 This will mean whole-of-ARSOF team formations for specific, atypical mission sets. The future CA force should embrace the possibility of force structures resembling the concept of “Special Operations Groups” (SOG) that more closely mimic a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) than they do the Groups and Brigades structure. An infantry BCT contains infantry battalions, plus a reconnaissance, an artillery, an engineer, and a support battalion. All of these capabilities are under O-6 discretion for training and employment in the battlespace and are scalable down to platoon-sized elements. Imagine a “SOG” that forms and deploys “Special Operations Detachments” that integrate SF, PSYOP and CA, that are precisely-sized and deliberately matrixed with exactly the appropriate CMF & MOS, language, experience, and rank composition for the mission, and that are assembled and commanded at the lowest, most decentralized level necessary.

Beyond fellow ARSOF brethren, CA forces will continue to increase collaboration and coordination with interdepartmental partners. There remains untapped potential for hand-in-glove synchronization with the Department of State’s Bureau of Conflict & Stabilization Operations and USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives, among others. The complexity of gray zone conflicts and political warfare requires broad spectra of expertise applied from across the whole-of-government. CA holds the distinction of being responsible for shaping a “positive climate for the military and for the nation to pursue diplomatic activities” that achieve foreign policy objectives.16

Future cross-functional and projectized ARSOF organizations should seek out new ways to episodically assign interdepartmental federal civilian employees, technical and academic experts, and Reserve Component functional specialists to CA formations in order to synergize whole-of-government approaches to future problems. Inversely, when future problem sets faced by interdepartmental partners in-the-lead require expertise found in ARSOF ranks, CA personnel could be detailed to, for example, the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance on ad-hoc bases. The obstacles to these possible collaborations should not dissuade action to realize them.

Improved mechanisms for these assignments and proofs of concept will be required, but all of these concepts are in line with USSOCOM’s “Integrated Campaign” concept.17

A certainty for future CA formations is their inclusion of rapidly advancing technology. Future CR may be augmented by unmanned aerial systems (UAS) used for discreet targeted civil data accumulation. For example, UAS sensors can measure population density in a city to inform food security or public health programs or enable the delivery of medical supplies to austere locations. Real-time communication with stakeholders from interdepartmental, partner nation, and nongovernmental implementing partners will be achieved through secure commercial mobile technology enabling rapid collaboration, particularly useful in HA/DR scenarios when access to information could mean life or death to targeted communities. 3D printing may enable CA personnel to design civic action projects to manufacture common medical, water filtration, sanitation, or other assistance items or devices in lieu of costly commercial procurement mechanisms, serving to instill real resilience in communities whose political will is required for operational objectives. Social media will increasingly be a source of civil information but also a venue through which CA forces engage, inform, mobilize, and influence civil populations toward US strategic interests. Operating in the cyber domain is not an option—it is a requirement to succeed in CA’s chartered activities.

To capitalize on recent successes in the CA Regiment and to meet demands of future scenarios the force must consolidate its gains and transform. Several proposals are starting points for ways ahead
that may solidify the roles and functions that the Regiment has come to occupy and those that Commanders seeks to expand or resign. Four areas stand out: Force Structure, Training & Education, Doctrine, and Fiscal Authorities.

**FORCE STRUCTURE**

Force structure issues already addressed include the aforementioned ARSOF integration via “SOGs” however that potentiality relies on an abundance of externalities. Two largely internal force structure alterations for proposal are (a) size of a CA Team, and (b) addition of a Warrant Officer to the CMF. As outlined, the demands on future CA forces will increase. The current four-man configuration of a CA Team is antiquated and inadequate for emerging threat environments. A minimum of six personnel should compose the CA Team of the future in order to (a) ensure physical security during independent maneuver in semi-permissive or hostile environments, (b) enable split-team operations and for long-term talent management targeted toward country-specific expertise, and (c) ensure dedicated CR and CIM expertise on every team to professionalize those core activities.

The professionalization of CR and CIM at the team, company, and battalion levels should be accomplished through the creation of a Warrant Officer (WO) in the Regiment. The role of a WO would serve multiple purposes: provide the necessary command and control structure for split-team operations, critical longevity and continuity for teams and companies, and a technical expertise capability in, primarily, CR and CIM. To meet the CR and CIM demands of the future operating environment, specialized training, education, and expertise that is persistent at the team level will be critical to success.

**TRAINING & EDUCATION**

The Regiment’s personnel will require academic and industry certifications via higher education institutions and professional accreditation organizations. The goals of such certification and academic accreditations are three-fold: credibility with interdepartmental and civilian partners, gained expertise in management-level tasks and performance measures of governmental and non-governmental activities, and long-term professional development of the regimental-specific core activities that the current military education systems are ill-equipped to provide.

Sincere credibility with interdepartmental and non-governmental stakeholders will only be achieved through formally acquired skills that CA forces can master in Exercises and apply in Operations. Academic degrees and professional industry certifications demonstrate immediate value that translates across the civil-military divide and have a force-multiplying effect on the quality of CA forces’ best practices. Incorporating multi-tiered, specialized, formal academic accreditation at the CA Qualification Course should be the first priority for reform and where personnel begin their ascent through additional tiers of recertification or continuing education, similar to but distinct from ILE or NCOES, tied to continuing service and assignment.
specificity. This iterative track-based advancement of a soldier’s civilian education will reinforce a culture of learning in the Regiment and produce an operational force that shares equivalent bases of knowledge and comparable academic pedigrees with DoS, USAID, and NGO partners. It is not enough to be internally certified as “SOF” and “CA Operators” and to piecemeal with episodic training exchanges and disparate individual education; the active component of the Regiment must reach further and require its members be recognized as Civil-Military Professionals by non-military stakeholders, much like the Reserve Component (RC) by its fundamental composition of qualified civilians in respective functional areas. Project Management, Emergency Management, Nonprofit Management, Organizational Development, Public Administration, and Data Analytics are all examples of fields from which to begin.

**DOCTRINE**

Civil Affairs doctrine must embrace the future ways and means by which people learn. Modern technology enables the fusion between doctrine, training, knowledge management and operations delivered to the palm of a soldier’s hand. It is not enough to catalog concepts and broad approaches in written form. CA forces must utilize technologies that provide immediate, global access to analysis and planning frameworks and current best practices, layered by updated institutional doctrinal knowledge, accessible by secure mobile device, tethered by cloud infrastructure. These solutions must incorporate the use of multimedia—doctrine must explain concepts through video, audio and even virtual or augmented reality formats and interactive online learning systems that captures and keeps the next generation’s attention. Enterprise-wide wiki-like spaces built for highly-specific topics can enable users in the field to contribute lessons-learned and capture best practices in real time. Should this be fused with CIM databases and predictive analytical systems, CA’s past, current and future operations can be networked and available for extrapolation in the field. This infrastructure could empower doctrine developers to crowdsource enormous data samples of CA Operations to incorporate that col- lation into evolving, dynamic doctrinal products that insure CA doctrine’s relevance to the force.

**FISCAL AUTHORITIES**

CA Operations are most effective when they have enduring, tangible, and visible effects in targeted communities that enable the appropriate stakeholders to take credit with their political base and which manage the attribution of the US government’s role along a spectrum from overt to opaque. In accomplishing this, much debate surrounds the relationship between money & projects to performance & effectiveness. Local control of dedicated, Title X, civic aid and development funds for the rapid financing of civic action, humanitarian assistance, and development programs and
projects will significantly empower CA Teams and their supported Combatant Commands. To completely and effectively fulfill many doctrinally prescribed functions in the future gray and urban conflicts, dedicated “CA Money” would be a critical force multiplier to the full spectrum of SOF Core Activities. Current funding paradigms are inadequate for the coming fight but examples exist that can be easily mimicked to fill the gaps.

These funds could look similar to “127e” Counterterrorism (formerly “1208”) funding lines in allowing the efficient enabling of local implementing partners to produce targeted civil-military effects. Augmenting the current, cumbersome competition and approval processes of existing fiscal rice bowls that CA forces tap into would optimize the capability to execute programs and projects that are persistent and appropriate. Such programs and projects can be better integrated into and synchronized with existing Theater Campaign Plans and complement the effects of the entire suite of SOF Enterprise operations and activities.

CONCLUSION

The CA Regiment is on solid footing for future success. In the twelve years since the creation of the Active Component CA force, we’ve watched the unprecedented growth, evolution, and maturation of the force. There have been significant growing pains and, make no mistake, growing pains will continue. However, when taking stock of, and looking forward to, the CA force much is to be celebrated and applied to future successes. Any stakeholder in the ARSOF enterprise can be confident in several things: the future operating environment will place CA forces in high demand, many of those operations will be in urban, gray zone environments involving a contest for political wills, and the employment of CA will be significantly integrated with a variety of fellow military and other USG partners, all enabled by rapidly evolving technology. For those who have a stake in this future, the time is now to innovate ideas, collaborate with strategic consorts, and advocate for bold thinking on age-old civil vulnerabilities manifesting themselves in new ways.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Mike Dawdy is a Senior Military Operations Analyst and SOF Instructor at the Special Warfare Network Development Course (SWNDC) in 6th Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne). He served fourteen years on active duty in the Infantry and Civil Affairs Regiments, including overseas tours in Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali, and The Republic of Korea, and as an augmentee at two TSOCs. His positions included CA Team Sergeant, CA Planning Team NCOIC and Senior SOF Instructor/Writer.

Mr. Dawdy is a contributor to the “Unconventional Warfare Mission Planning Guide for the SFODA Level” (TC 18-01.1, 2016), the author of “Governance as a Weapon: Advising the Shadow Government in Unconventional Warfare”, and a novel, The Prides of Lions. He has earned a Master of Public Administration (M.P.A.) with a concentration in public policy analysis from Pennsylvania State University and a B.S. in Strategic Studies and Defense Analysis from Norwich University.

NOTES
The active component Civil Affairs (CA) community has witnessed significant changes in capabilities over the past 17 years while actively contributing to counter-terrorism efforts globally (in combat operations and Phase 0 shaping activities). This Active component of the branch has grown from one Battalion (BN) with five geographically-aligned Companies to a Special Operations aligned Brigade (BDE) manned with over 1,300 Soldiers. Today, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) provides Civil Affairs support to the global Special Operations Forces (SOF) network through the training, manning, and equipping of five subordinate, regionally-aligned Battalions in support of Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs). In recognition of the overwhelming impact and desire for Civil Affairs capabilities in the full range of military operations, the Army implemented the growth of the 85th Civil Affairs Brigade to meet the increased number of mission requirements. With five of their own regionally aligned Battalions in support of Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs), the 85th provided support to the Conventional Force. As the Department of Defense and Army reduced capabilities in the mid-late 2010s, the battalions and headquarters of the 85th Civil Affairs Brigade was deactivated completed through early 2018, leaving only the 83rd Civil Affairs Battalion with regionally aligned companies to support the ASCCs.

Despite the obvious benefits of increased CA capacity, there have been challenges to such rapid expansion and then contraction. The most critical of these challenges may be viewed in terms of operational experience, detailed technical knowledge of critical systems (such as those used in mapping and understanding aspects of the Human Domain), and Army and Joint operational planning capacity at the tactical and operational levels (Joint Planning Process, Army Operational Planning Methodology, etc). The routine transition of experienced officers and senior NCOs, although necessary for development, created significant gaps in detailed technical expertise, institutional knowledge, and experienced operational level planners. It is very common for Captains to remain on a Civil Affairs Team (CAT) for a short 24 months before being moved to critical staff positions at higher headquarters and Branch critical requirements. The same is true for the enlisted population, where an increased number of senior NCOs are waiting to complete key developmental positions (e.g. Team Sergeant). In some cases, this has hindered the ability to leave highly

Bridging the Technical Capabilities Gap.

BY COLONEL TOM MATELSKI, CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER 3 CHRIS LUDWICK AND FIRST SERGEANT CHRISTOPHER R. GREZ
competent and capable personnel in place for more than 24 months. The common theme across both enlisted and officer populations is lack of operational planning depth, detailed knowledge of non-lethal targeting mechanisms, and significant experience at the company level, which begs the question: What is the focal point of these desired capabilities within the Company and higher? Continuity is a part of the solution, but the need for a highly trained, capable Soldier, is the main part of the solution.

**THE ARMY’S TECHNICAL EXPERTS: WARRANT OFFICERS**

In the traditional sense, a Warrant Officer provides technical expertise in a specific Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) that he or she has mastered over time through experience, schooling, and mentorship. This highly specialized individual also provides continuity to the command leadership as senior Commissioned and Non Commissioned Officers (NCO) rotate through their various key developmental positions. Across the services, Warrant Officers fill the gap of experience and knowledge, ensuring the continuity of military efforts for their organization. The Civil Affairs Branch has not had the benefit of this capability. Only in the past five years has the Army provided Warrant Officers as a part of the Civil Affairs Battalion’s staff expertise; through Maintenance Technicians, Property Book Officers, and Targeting Officers.

**CA WARRANT OFFICERS: WHY NOW?**

The implementation of a Civil Affairs Warrant Officer career field is not a new idea to the branch. The concept has been studied for potential implementation over the last 10-15 years; however, the viability of a CA Warrant Officer has not been acceptable until now. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) has long benefitted from the experience and expertise of Warrant Officers. In 2014, then-Commander, John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Major General Eric Wendt issued guidance to both the Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Commandants to examine the feasibility of developing a combined Warrant Officer program for the two respective branches. In USASOC Strategy 2035, one of the core competencies that makes ARSOF unique is, “providing joint force commanders with culturally astute professionals who are agile, adaptive, flexible, bold, innovative, and possess a high degree of advanced training.” Only through sustained exposure in garrison and the operational environment can ARSOF Soldiers develop the necessary skills and education to have a nuanced understanding of a region, a country, or a culture’s opportunities and challenges.

Since the transition in 2006 from a Functional Area to an Active component Branch (in addition to the Reserve CA Branch), Civil Affairs Soldiers have professionally developed and matured into a highly sought after, often employed portion of ARSOF capabilities (in addition to Psychological Operations and Special Forces). As the Army discusses potential options to make additional reductions to the Active and Reserve components, the Civil Affairs branch is not exempt. In order to adequately retain and invest in the experience and education of these Soldiers, a Warrant Officer program in Civil Affairs is appropriate.

**THE CIVIL AFFAIRS WARRANT (380A): PROPOSED CONCEPT**

If implemented, a CA Warrant Officer would fill vital roles within the SOF Civil Affairs community with priority of fill going to those positions with the greatest need for longevity. Given the relatively small composition of the active duty CA force, initial implementation should be focused within the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A) and the training/education pipeline. This can be accomplished by eliminating 38A billets that are traditionally not used or that are rarely filled due to a shortage of branch qualified Captains and inserting a Chief Warrant Officer Two (CW2) billet. A Warrant Officer at the Company level would work in the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), becoming the keeper of all institutional and operational knowledge within the Company for a minimum of three years, but no longer than five. During this time he or she should be working diligently towards achieving an undergraduate degree prior to their primary zone of consideration for advancement to Chief Warrant Officer Three (CW3). Advanced educational opportunities which emphasize planning would further professionally develop the newly-appointed Warrant Officer and prepare them for future assignments at various echelons. Ideally, the Warrant Officer would remain at the Company for the majority of their time as a CW2. Figure 01, page 40, is a draft model for potential implementation.

As a Chief Warrant Officer Three (CW3), Civil Affairs Warrant Officers would work in positions focused on planning and analysis at the BN level. The BN staff is another entity within a military organization that typically sees a fairly regular turnover of personnel. Once again, we can see the need in certain sections for increased continuity. Those positions (shown in Figure 01, page 40) cover a wide range of critical staff functions. Top performers from this population will be afforded the opportunity for assignment outside the traditional Civil Affairs organizations. These position include, but are not limited to the Special Forces Group’s 4th BN S9s, Combat Training Center Observer, Controller, Trainer (CTC/OTC), Doctrine Writer, CA Selection and Training Cadre or as Professional Military Education instructors at the Army, Service, and Joint education centers. They would also have the same advanced schooling opportunities that were afforded to them while working in the CMOC. Civil and military education progression in this phase moves toward focusing on the attainment of baccalaureate degree and attendance to Warrant Officer Intermediate Level Education (WOILE), prior to their primary zone of consideration for promotion to Chief Warrant Officer 4 (CW4).

Initial assignment as a Civil Affairs CW4 would place the Warrant Officer inside the BDE headquarters, mirroring the same functions they performed as a member of a Battalion staff but with increased scope and responsibility. What is unique about this grade is that it would be the first time in a CA Warrant Officers career that he or she had the opportunity to apply for and...
attend advanced civil schooling through the National Defense University (NDU), Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), or the National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC). It also serves as the first occasion in which to compete for nominative or Joint assignments such as the Proponent Office as the Civil Affair Proponent Warrant Officer, Human Resources Command as the Career Manager, in the Civil Military Advisory Group (CMAG), potentially selected to serve as a Command Warrant Officer for one of the Civil Affairs battalions. However, CA CW4s are not competitive for selection to serve in one of the aforementioned positions until minimum of three years has been completed in S-3 Training, S-3 Operations, CAPT, CIM, or the Fusion Cell.

The pinnacle of the Civil Affairs Warrant officer program would be selection to Chief Warrant Officer 5. As the senior Civil Affairs Warrant officers in the Branch, these highly experienced and specialized Soldiers, would serve in a variety of critical roles, both inside, and outside of Brigade. These positions include the Command Warrant Officer for the 95th CA BDE (SO) (A), Chief Warrant Officer of the Civil Affairs Branch (CWOB), and potentially as a key member of a Geographic Combatant or Functional Command staff.

MAKING THE CASE: AN INVESTMENT FOR THE FUTURE

Just stating a need for a capability doesn’t necessarily provide an adequate argument for why something is needed. In the case of a CA Warrant Officer program, an example may be more appropriate. The example used in Figure 02 starts from the position of a senior CW4, CW4 Chris Geracz and moves backward to SFC Chris Geracz over the life span of his later military service.

The case of CW4 Chris Geracz goes beyond the immediate benefit to the individual Soldier or a Civil Affairs unit. In the case of Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF), USASOC gains the benefit of a seasoned, qualified planner and deep area knowledge expert relative to his/her Language and Regional Educational Concentration (LREC). This Soldier has multiple operational rotations that are accompanied with the requisite understanding of Army SOF and conventional capabilities to build and develop Special Warfare campaign plans. For US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), the wider SOF portfolio gains a culturally attuned, advanced practitioner that has worked in Joint Operational and Strategic levels capable of understanding the underlying causes of instability and can craft long term SOF campaign Plans to meet Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) and Country Team objectives. For the Nation and for the Soldier’s family, the benefit is a highly trained, agile, flexible, and adaptive leader.

### PROPOSED CA WARRANT OFFICER (380A) DEVELOPMENT MODEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Warrant Officer Time in Service</th>
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<th>Warrant Officer Time in Service</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CW2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>CW3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CW4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>CW5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant Officer Advanced Course (Branch Specific)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Warrant Officer Intermediate Level Education (Branch Inmaterial)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UWODC, Joint Targeting Staff Course, Joint CA Planners Course, Joint CMO Course, CMOS</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>UWODC, Joint CMO Course, SOF MILDEC</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Command Course</td>
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**Developmental Assignments**

- CMOC
  - S3 Training
  - S3 Operations
  - CAPT
  - Fusion Cell
  - CIM

**Broadening Assignments**

- SWCS
  - CTC OC/T
  - Doctrine Writer
- SWCS
- TSOC
- Proponency Warrant Officer
- Career Manager (HRC)
- Doctrine Writer
- CMAG

**Self Development (Civilian Education)**

- Associates Degree (Recommended prior to promotion to CW3)
- Baccalaureate Degree (Recommended prior to promotion to CW4)
- Masters Degree (Recommended prior to promotion to CW5)

National Defense University, Naval Postgraduate School, National Defense Intelligence College

**GETTING FROM HERE TO THERE: IMPLEMENTATION**

The concept of developing and implementing a Civil Affairs Warrant Officer program is not without considerable, but worthwhile challenges. Implementation requires much analysis and consideration. Above all, two major considerations are required: the Army’s Average Grade Distribution Matrix (AGDM), which governs the sustainability of a Ca-
career Field, and the identification of authorizations to be utilized to implement a new Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). Assuming that these two considerations can be met prior to implementation, below are three potential implementation options.

The first option is to study past implementation programs involving the creation of a Warrant Officer specialty from across the Army. In recent history, the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) (CMF 74) conducted implementation of a CBRN Warrant Officer Program (740A) in 2010. In execution, the 740A CBRN Warrant Officer was introduced through a phased approach that allowed the career field to grow into its appropriate AGDM. The process allowed the 740A MOS to be utilized to implement a new Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). Assuming that these two considerations can be met prior to implementation, below are three potential implementation options.

**All calculations are based on a 38B who has been accepted for accession between 14-16 years of total Army service.**
LAYING OUT THE CHALLENGES:
DOTML-PF IMPLICATIONS

As with developing and implementing force structure and career development changes, there are a host of implications across the DOTML-PF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities) domains (shown right). Additional analysis is required prior to implementation of a Civil Affairs Warrant Officer program. The analysis listed below is not to be considered all inclusive.

CONCLUSION

The benefits of establishing a Civil Affairs Warrant Officer program are many and the challenges are many, but the benefits far exceed the challenges. As ARSOF capabilities continue to mature and the Civil Affairs branch plays a key role in conflict mitigation and prevention, the need for a highly experienced and expert Soldier is evident.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Col. Tom Matelski is the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Director, Commander’s Action Group. He joined the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Staff in June 2016 as a member of the future operations planning division (J3S) at Camp HM Smith, Hawaii. Col. Matelski is a U.S. Army Senior Service College Fellow and a former commander of the 97th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne), an Asia-Pacific aligned organization supporting Special Operations. His deployments include operations in Iraq and multiple tours at various levels in Afghanistan.

Chief Warrant Officer 3 Chris Ludwick is currently the Brigade Targeting Officer for 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). At the time this article was created, he was serving as the Battalion Targeting Officer for the 97th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne) where he spent nearly four years supporting the SOF Civil Affairs mission.

1st Sgt. Christopher R. Grez is assigned to Co. D, 97th Civil Affairs Battalion, 95th Civil Affairs Brigade. As a member of a Civil Military Support Element, 1st. Sgt. Grez has deployed twice to Bangladesh. He also had a CMSE rotation in the Philippines in support of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, with a follow-on assignment to the Regional CMSE in Singapore. He also served as a member of a Theater-CMSE in Hawaii.

DOTMLPF ANALYSIS

DOCTRINE – Development and implementation of doctrine relevant to the Civil Affairs (CA) Warrant Officer will take significant time. Until creation and approval is complete, 380As would use a hybrid form of 38A, 131A, and 180A doctrine to guide their training and utilization. Appropriate doctrine will be identified for use from each MOS field and approved by CA Proponent prior to execution of the initial round of Professional Military Education (PME), Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOB).

ORGANIZATION – CA Warrant Officers would be initially utilized and positioned within CA Battalions and Brigade (BDEs). Reassignment of an underutilized billets; with appropriate recoding of MOS requirements and Advanced Skills Identifiers (ASIs), will minimize the need for position growth at the company and battalion levels. Positions at the BDE and higher would be created to allow for continued career progression of the 380A.

TRAINING – Like the doctrine aspect of this analysis, the training portion will take time to create. Prior to the establishment of a formal training pipeline, CA Warrant Officers would attend the necessary schooling upon completion of CA Assessment and Selection from the BN in which they will be assigned. Maximum utilization of already existing opportunities in the 180A and 131A highlighted in the Professional Development Model will reduce the need for creation of new courses. This training progression and prioritization will be monitored at the BDE level and by the CMD Warrant Officer with a bi-weekly or monthly reporting requirements to the CA Proponent.

MATERIAL – There will be new material needed for the development of the 380A Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) but it will be material that is already organic to the Army inventory. Equipment for additional personnel will be utilized form existing positions at the company level therefore there will be zero increase in equipment outside of new technological developments. However, there will be an increased authorizations for weapons, night vision devices, and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Electrical equipment, equal to the increase in personnel seen at the BN level and above.

LEADERSHIP AND EDUCATION – Professional and military development will occur across all ranks of the MOS. The initial training pipeline will culminate in appointment of graduates to Warrant Officer One (WO1). While the grades of WO1 and Chief Warrant Officer Two (CW2) training outside of the pipeline will be focused on planning and analytics at the tactical level of war. Prior to promotion to Chief Warrant Officer Three (CW3), 380As will attend the Warrant Officer Advance Course (WOAC). Additional education opportunities will become available in advanced planning and analytics while in grades of CW3 and Chief Warrant Officer Four (CW4). PME for senior CW#s and CW4s will be in accordance with the pre established Warrant Officer Education System (WOES). This system outlines that CW3s who have successfully completed the WOAC and have a minimum 1 year Time In Grade (TIG) are eligible for attendance to the Warrant Officer Immediate Level Education (WOILE). CW4s who have successfully graduated form WOILE and have a minimum one year TIG will be eligible for attendance to the Warrant Officer Senior Service Education (WOSSE). Additionally it is in these same ranks that the opportunity to compete for advanced civil schooling opportunities in pursuit of a Graduate Degree form the National Defense University (NDU), the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), or the National Defense Intelligence College will present itself. Chief Warrant Officer Five (CW5) personnel selected for assignment as a Command Chief Warrant Officer will attend the Pre-Command Course Prior to assuming duty.

PERSONNEL – Further analysis must be conducted to determine the amount of qualified people on hand for peacetime, wartime, and various contingency operations the 380A will be utilized for.

FACILITIES – Creating the 380A MOS will require no change in real property already being utilized Civil Affairs organizations.
ANNOUNCEMENTS

UPCOMING BOARDS
06 MAR 2019: Reserve Component Major Promotion
17 APR 2019: CW3/4/5 Promotion Selection Board
13 MAY 2019: RA CSM/SGM Nom and RA-USAR (AGR) CSM –SGM QSP
29 MAY 2019: RA-USAR (AGR) SFC/SSG QSP

UPDATED ARMY JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT
Human Resources Command published MILPER 18-404, Updated Army Joint Officer Management, which updates the criteria to award Army skills identifiers associated with Joint Credit, 3A, Joint Duty Assignment Qualified and 3L, Joint Qualified Officer. Both criteria go into effect on 3 APR 19.

Officers with specific questions should contact the Joint Policy Branch for questions pertaining to Joint Officer Management at usarmy.knox.hrc.mbx.opmd-ord-jpb-discre- tionary-points@mail.mil or their Assignment Officer at Human Resources Command.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARMY JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3A - JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT QUALIFIED</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Grade</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPME</td>
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| **3L - JOINT QUALIFIED OFFICER** |
| Grade | Be in the grade of O-4 or above |
| JPME | Successfully completed JPME Phase II |

Successfully complete one of the following requirements:
- Completed a standard Joint Duty Assignment (S-JDA) and awarded full joint tour credit by JCS but have not yet been nominated or approved for Joint Qualification Level III designation.
- Accrued 24 Experience-Joint Duty Assignment (E-JDA) points approved through the JCS, J1 Joint Qualification System (JQS) panel. Officer must complete a minimum of 12 months’ time in position (TIP) as a MAJ or above in a non-JDAL assignment. The TIP must be equal to or greater than 365 days boots on the ground (BOG). A maximum of six discretionary points may be derived from joint training, education and exercises.
- Served in an S-JDA and completed JPME I and accrued E-JDA points with time (months) served in the S-JDA position to achieve the requisite 24 points/months. If currently serving in an S-JDA, this combination cannot be used unless the officer has accumulated at least 22 months in an S-JDA position.

DA TALENT MANAGEMENT
The Army Talent Management Task Force is redefining the officer management system with the help of Army Proponents. There are 10 areas of focus: NDAA changes, data structure, assessments, tools and training, succession, broadening and professional military education, marketplace, permeability, officer career model and warrant officers. The approved FY19 NDAA provides the greatest expansion of authorities to the Army since DOPMA in 1980. The first phase is focusing on pilots that will start in FY19.

- #501 - Repeal of Age Limit: Removes the requirement to complete 20 years of service by age 62. The SECARMY has approved and is pending signature. This compliments #502 Direct Commission.
- #502 - Direct Commission to O6: Authorizes the direct commission up to O6 based on education and experience. The SECARMY approved full implementation for all components and the policy is pending signature.
- #503 - Brevet Promotion: The Army can temporarily promote up to 770 Officers to the next grade that serve in positions the SECARMY deems a critical shortage. Recommended piloting will begin as early as JUN 19.
- #504 - Merit Based Promotion: Officers with a high promotion board score can be promoted first instead of by seniority. Implementation will begin in JUL 19 with the ACC O4 promotion board.
- #505 - Opt-out of a Promotion Board: An Officer in both the active and reserve components can opt-out of a promotion board due to the impact of advanced education, broadening assignments, or assignments of significant value that impact the Officer’s competitiveness for promotion. The SECARMY and CSA will receive an update and provide guidance shortly.
- #506 - 40-Years Time in Service: CPTs to COLs can request to remain on active duty up to 40-years. This authority could be used to focus retention on specific critical skills.
- #507 - Alternative Promotion Authority in Designated Categories: The SA can designate alternate promotion board categories that provides up to 5 considerations for promotion. Time in grade requirements do not apply. Rand is conducting an analysis with the services and will provide feedback to OSD.
- #513 - Reserve Officers Not Considered for Promotion: An Officer in the Individual Ready Reserve would not be required to meet a mandatory promotion board until they have been in the IRR status for more that 2-years. Legal review received, and data is being compiled to discuss with Army in FEB 19.
- #518 - Federal Recognition: The SECARMY can adjust the effective date of promotion in the event of an undue delay in receiving federal recognition. Pending SECARMY to approve/sign in MAY 19.