ON THE COVER

U.S. Special Forces conduct a downed pilot simulation for the Army Warfighting Assessment 17.1 exercise at Ft. Bliss, Texas. The annual exercise allows the force to test not only its skills but also new equipment before it goes out to the operational force.

U.S. Army Photo by Pfc. Alexander Holmes

ARTICLES

08 | CRITICAL THINKING AND SOF DECISION MAKING
12 | SOCIAL ENGINEERING AS A SOCIOCULTURAL TACTIC
18 | BOKO HARAM
21 | NOT READING TEA LEAVES: EDUCATING THE FORCE FOR FUTURE THREATS
23 | EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS
26 | VIRTUAL ACCOMPANY KITS RETURN TO BAGHDAD
30 | COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE GRAY ZONE: THE ADVANTAGE OF SOC-FWDs
34 | BUILDING LEGITIMACY, PROMOTING POLICY AND DEVELOPING NETWORKS

DEPARTMENTS

FROM THE COMMANDANT _____ 04
UPDATE _______________ 05
EDUCATION UPDATE _______ 06
CAREER NOTES _________ 39
HUMAN PERFORMANCE _____ 40
OPINION______________ 42
BOOK REVIEW __________ 43

SUBSCRIBE

OFFICIAL DISTRIBUTION TO UNITS: Active Duty and Reserve special operations units can subscribe to Special Warfare at no cost. Just email the following information to SpecialWarfare@socom.mil

> Unit name / section
> Unit address
> Unit phone number
> Quantity required

INDIVIDUALS: Personal subscriptions of Special Warfare may be purchased through the Government Printing office online at:
ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: Special Warfare welcomes submissions of scholarly, independent research from members of the armed forces, security policy-makers and shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists and civilians from the U.S. and abroad. Manuscripts should be 2,500 to 3,000 words in length. Include a cover letter. Submit a complete biography with author contact information (i.e., complete mailing address, telephone, fax, e-mail address).


Articles that require security clearance should be cleared by the author’s chain of command prior to submission. A memo of the security clearance should be forwarded with article. If the article talks about a specific theater special operations command, the article will be forwarded to the TSOC for clearance.

PHOTO AND GRAPHIC SUBMISSIONS: Special Warfare welcomes photo submissions featuring Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and/or Special Forces Soldiers. Ensure that all photographs are reviewed and released by the unit public affairs officer prior to submission.

Special Warfare accepts only high-resolution (300 dpi or greater) digital photos; be sure to include a caption and photographer’s credit. Do not send photos within PowerPoint slides or Word documents.

Photos, graphics, tables and charts that accompany articles should be submitted in separate files from the manuscript (no embedded graphics).

SUBMISSION REVIEW AND PUBLICATION: All submissions will be reviewed in a timely manner. Due to the volume of submissions we receive, we cannot reply to every submission. However, we do review and appreciate every submission. If your contribution is not selected for publication, we will inform you. If you do not hear from us, that means your article has been accepted and will be published.

Please note that submitted content is not guaranteed to be published in Special Warfare. There are several factors that determine what content is ultimately published including time and space availability, the approved editorial outline and theme, as well as relevance to the Special Warfare target audience and mission.

Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all contributions. Special Warfare will attempt to afford authors an opportunity to review the final edited version; requests for changes must be received by the given deadline.

No payment or honorarium is authorized for publication of articles or photographs. Material appearing in Special Warfare is considered to be in the public domain and is not protected by copyright unless it is accompanied by the author’s copyright notice. Published works may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and the authors.

FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONTACT THE SW STAFF AT:
Commercial: (910) 432-5703
DSN: 239-5703
E-mail: SpecialWarfare@socom.mil

SUBMIT ARTICLES FOR CONSIDERATION TO:
E-mail: SpecialWarfare@socom.mil
or via regular mail:
USAJFKSWCS; Attn: AOJK-PAO;
Editor, Special Warfare
3004 Ardennes St, Stop A
Fort Bragg, NC 28310
Our Army Special Operations Forces are unique. They are tactically proficient, regionally savvy and have the ability to think and act at the strategic level. Some of this, they have learned through their training at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, some of it they have learned by pursuing one of the many higher education programs available to them. Together, they are a force to be reckoned with.

During my first weeks at the Special Operations Center of Excellence, I explained that an Army SOF operator could be buck naked with a butter knife and still succeed. That analogy turned some heads. But it is a true statement. It is not our high-tech weapons that make ARSOF Soldiers so successful. It is their most important weapon — their minds.

In this issue of Special Warfare, you will have the opportunity to read papers written by our Soldiers who are currently pursuing their masters’ degrees, at various institutions of higher education. These Soldiers are adding more tools to their ruck sack. They are taking the next step in their education, which will increase their critical thinking, their ability to reason and to analyze what is going on around them through a broader lens.
Special Operations Command South honored 142 fallen warriors during a ceremony held at Homestead Air Reserve Base, Florida, March 3, unveiling a memorial that preserves the names and legacy of those who died in the line of duty in Latin America and the Caribbean since 1963.

The memorial commemorates U.S. Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force Special Operations Forces members killed during combat operations or while conducting training in U.S. Southern Command’s area of responsibility.

“[These fallen warriors] paid the ultimate sacrifice as they trained for and participated in combat operations during a critical period in our nations history,” said presiding officer and SOCSOUTH Commander Navy Rear Adm. Collin P. Green.

“A period where we sought to assist nations, and their people, pursue our shared western values of democratically elected governments, personal freedom, and human rights,” he said.

A black granite wall proudly displays the engraved names of the fallen along with their rank, service affiliation, unit, date and location of their death. Surrounded by USSOUTHCOM, SOCSOUTH and service emblems, is President Ronald Reagan’s quote: ”We will always remember. We will always be proud. We will always be prepared, so we may always be free.”

Four individual stones near the flag poles pay tribute to SOF warriors killed in action during four major combat operations: Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada, the Salvadoran Civil War, Operation Just Cause in Panama and Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti.

During the ceremony, SOCSOUTH service members representing all four services read each of the 142 names aloud as a bell was rung for each of the fallen.

“These great Americans were every bit like you and me,” said retired Army Brig. Gen. Hector Pagan, guest speaker at the ceremony and SOCSOUTH’s 11th commander. “Heroes as they were, I’m sure they would never acknowledge anything they did as special; but also like you and me, what set them apart was they loved being in special operations, they loved our country and loved the work they did.”

Previously, there was no monument recognizing those who made the ultimate sacrifice, nevertheless the fallen deserve to be remembered and honored, said retired Army Lt. Col. Patrick Lenaghan, SOCSOUTH’s deputy director of operations.

That’s one reason he took it upon himself, working tirelessly with SOF and community volunteers, to properly honor the fallen, an endeavor Lenaghan began in 2014.

“To get here, Pat and his volunteers had to plan like you would an operation, do research, design work, and most important, set up a non-profit and raise the funds for the memorial,” said Pagan, who has known Lenaghan since their time serving together as Green Berets in 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne). More than 30 sponsors raised the funds needed to build the memorial, which was donated to SOCSOUTH’s headquarters.

“We would not be here today if it wasn’t for Pat’s vision, tireless persistence over three years, and leadership,” said Green. “Thanks Pat, and all who contributed in so many ways to make this happen.”

“And to our SOCSOUTH command, use today and the rest of our time here as will I, to know and respect the many chapters of SOCSOUTH’s history and pay tribute to those who have gone before us,” added Green. “Learn how they led and bled before us and built the culture and legacy we enjoy today.”

“We will not forget because as long as we remember they will be with us,” said Pagan.

— Story by Staff Sgt. Osvaldo Equite, Special Operations Command South.
THE GRMO KNOWS: LEVERAGING EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE ARSOF HUMAN PLATFORM

The Special Warfare Education Group (Airborne) believes “The Human is the Platform.” To maintain this platform, education is a force capability rather than simply an opportunity for individual and career advancement. The force must consistently focus on improving the minds of ARSOF Soldiers responsible for negotiating leadership and partnership problem sets.

How are you strengthening the ARSOF Human Platform in your daily efforts? Which fully funded advanced education opportunities can support your efforts in developing understanding and wielding influence across the range of military operations? Additionally, how can you ensure you have solid research support for your research paper or your team’s deployment? SWEG(A)’s Graduate Research Management Office is available to answer all your questions and more. Two programs, the Advanced Education Program and the ARSOF Academic Research Program, both operated by the GRMO, leverage educational opportunities to strengthen the ARSOF community’s Human Platform and enhance force capabilities to address strategic issues and operational challenges.

ADVANCED EDUCATION

The GRMO offers fully funded advanced education opportunities that include two graduate degree programs, certificate programs and fellowships that focus on critical thinking, strategic understanding, and research skills.

The National Defense University’s Joint Special Operations Master of Arts Program at Fort Bragg grants a Master of Arts in Strategic Security Studies. This program is open to eligible SOF officers, warrant officers and noncommissioned officers. It consists of a 10-month curriculum addressing the strategic perspective on the global threat environment; the rise of newly empowered and politicized ideological movements; the relationship between political objectives, strategy, all instruments of national power, and the roles of power and ideology. Through seminars, independent study, research, and the writing of a thesis, students will develop strategies for working with other agencies and with members of the international coalition. The program prepares professionals to develop and implement national and international security strategies for conditions of peace, crisis, and war.

The Naval Postgraduate School provides eligible ARSOF officers an 18-month graduate level education within the Department of Defense Analysis at Monterey, California. The program provides two tracks: the Special Operations and Irregular Warfare curriculum, which provides focused instruction in irregular warfare, and the Information Strategy and Political Warfare track, which addresses the strategic analysis and operational dimension of information as an instrument of statecraft. The courses address counterinsurgency, terrorism, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, information operations, and other “high leverage” operations in U.S. defense and foreign policy, providing a strong background in strategic analysis, decision modeling, organization theory and formal analytical methods. Additionally, the program provides a strong background in strategic analysis, decision modeling, organization theory and formal analytical method. Graduates from the Information Strategy and Warfare program will be able to develop information strategies to support military action by taking advantage of information technology, exploiting the growing worldwide dependence on automated information systems, and capitalizing on the near real-time global dissemination of information to affect an adversary’s decision cycles — all with the goal of achieving information superiority. Successful completion of either track results in a Master of Science in Defense Analysis and fulfills the officer’s Intermediate Level Education requirement.

For more information, visit the GRMO sites, or contact the GRMO at 910-908-1517 for assistance.

ARSOF ACADEMIC RESEARCH

As a researcher, you want your research efforts to matter and deliver meaningful outputs for the force. To this end, the GRMO pioneered ARSOF efforts in operationalizing academic research for the Human Platform. We can support you in synchronizing and magnifying your research efforts with access to Command prioritized research topic lists, leading Command experts working on real world challenges and the research papers of your ARSOF contemporaries and predecessors.

Knowing what and where to research. To access lists of Command prioritized research topics designed to strengthen the Human Platform, check out the “SOF Research Topics and How to Guides” site that features U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Army Special Operations Command priority research topics lists, research guides and writing helps for ARSOF academic researchers.

Acquiring research mentors. As ARSOF Soldiers engage in advanced education opportunities, those Soldiers, their research efforts and the force can benefit from steady dialogue with ARSOF leaders researching and working on related real world problem sets. Through the ARSOF Academic Research Program, the GRMO connects communities of interest to support ARSOF students by providing enhanced operational and strategic depth to students’ completed research outcomes.

Utilizing ARSOF’s rich research heritage. The GRMO has more than 1,200 research papers, theses, dissertations, capstone papers and research projects completed by ARSOF graduate students. ARSOF graduate students’ research papers are accessible through two means. The USASOC Sharepoint hosts the broader collection of ARSOF graduate work with advanced search features, and the USOEO public website provides abstracts and links directing you to the research papers.

For those within the ARSOF community who have completed graduate level research papers, the GRMO could use your completed research papers if we do not have them. For subject-matter experts and leaders, ARSOF students could benefit from your wisdom and expertise. Contact the GRMO at 910-908-4594.

NOTES
DOCTRINE SCRAMBLE
TEST YOUR KNOWLEDGE

Contributed by the GRMO, USAJFKSWCS SWEG (A)

ACROSS
3. Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.
4. Any person who has been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their home or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.
8. The building upon a diplomatic or consular compound which houses the offices of the chief of mission or principal officer.
10. Formal or informal instruction provided to foreign military students, units, and forces on a nonreimbursable (grant) basis by offices or employees of the U.S., contract technicians, and contractors. Instruction may include correspondence courses; technical, educational, or informational publications; and media of all kinds.
12. Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.
14. Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties and exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon.
15. Concept which includes all aspects of protecting personnel, weapons and supplies while simultaneously deceiving the enemy. Tactics include building a good defense; employing frequent movement; using concealment, deception & camouflage; and constructing fighting and protective positions for both individuals and equipment.
18. Method of delivering personnel, equipment, or supplies from airlift aircraft that must fly at altitudes above the threat umbrella.
21. The state’s ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society, including the representative participatory decision-making processes typically guaranteed under inclusive, constitutional authority.
22. In air operations, an operational flight by one aircraft.

DOWN
1. Actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks.
2. The assigned airborne qualified individual who controls paratroops from the time they enter the aircraft until they exit.
5. The anticipation, communication, prediction, identification, prevention, education, risk assessment, and control of communicable diseases, illnesses and exposure to endemic, occupational, and environmental threats. These threats include nonbattle injuries, combat stress responses, weapons of mass destruction, and other threats to the health and readiness of military personnel. Communicable diseases include anthropod-, vector-, food-, waste-, and waterborne diseases.
6. Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which U.S. forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.
7. Global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.
8. An organization normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan & facilitate coordination of activities of the U.S. military with indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander.
9. In biological/chemical warfare, the characteristic of an agent which pertains to the duration of its effectiveness under determined conditions after dispersal.
11. Subordinate unified or other joint command established by a joint force commander to plan, coordinate, conduct, and support joint special operations within the joint force commander’s assigned operational area.
13. A nation/area near or contiguous to a combat area that, by tacit agreement between the warring powers, is exempt from attack and can serve as a refuge for staging, logistic or other activities of the combatant powers.
16. U.S. Government agencies and departments, including the DoD.
17. The DoD activities that contribute to unified action by the US Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions.
19. Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances.
20. Actions performed by isolated personnel designed to ensure their health, mobility, safety & honor in anticipation of or preparation for their return to friendly control.

Answer Key on page 38
CRITICAL THINKING AND SOF DECISION MAKING

Special Operations Soldiers thrive in complexity and anticipate adversary actions, methods and tactics, techniques and procedures through an in-depth understanding of the geopolitical environment. To predict a changing environment requires a high degree of critical thinking and an adaptive approach to problem solving. Gen. Martin E. Dempsey stated in an interview “We assert that strategic leaders must be inquisitive and open-minded. They must be able to think critically and be capable of developing creative solutions to complex problems. They must be historically minded; that is, they must be able to see and articulate issues in historical context.”

Gen. Dempsey also said “with mental agility, successful strategic leaders scan their environments, think critically, and lead and manage change across large, complex organizations.” The military stresses the importance of continuous learning through campaigns of learning and through emphasizing life-long learning concepts.

SOF AND THE INTELLECTUAL STANDARDS

SOF must apply the Intellectual Standards to ensure that our reasoning and decision making takes into account all relevant information and that we communicate effective solutions to complex problems. Application of the intellectual standards (clarity, accuracy, precision, relevance, depth, breadth, logic, significance and fairness) provides a framework that we hang information on or filter to determine relevancy and validity. Speed, autonomy, mission command and trust allow warfighters to process information much quicker and facilitate a rapid decision making process. Operational decisions are made in a compressed decision cycle and operators are pushed to the edge with the rapid pace of an evolving battlefield. This is increasingly evident as we face Gray Zone challenges and competitive interactions among state and non-state actors where on-the-ground decisions impact strategic decisions. The battlefield process of taking information, analyzing it and making decisions is similar to more extensive processes such as the Military Decision Making Process.
TRUST BUT VERIFY

When working with other nations, we need to trust but verify the information that we receive and conduct analysis to determine whether things are or are not as they appear to be. Critical thinking must become second nature and requires practice to hone an analytical mindset so we can see details as they relate to the big picture. Thinking as a way of understanding the environment can be done through strategic, creative, and critical thinking to gain an appreciation for information. Strategic thinking envisions the ideal future, end state or outcome based upon action or lack of action. Creative thinking finds unconventional ways to elevate the tactical and operational options toward an objective. Critical thinking assesses the practical ramifications of information and helps to separate the facts from opinion, bias from truth.

CRITICAL THINKING

According to the Foundation for Critical Thinking, 2007, “we use concepts, ideas and theories to interpret data, facts, and experiences to answer questions, solve problems, and resolve issues.” Each SOF Soldier must be able to break critical thinking down into its parts of the Elements of Thought and the Intellectual Standards when making decisions. We make decisions every day and the more complex the problem, the more we need to break it down into parts that can be researched, analyzed and communicated.

Paul and Elder state that “there are two essential dimensions of thinking that students need to master to learn how to upgrade their thinking. They need to be able to identify the “parts” of their thinking, and they need to be able to assess their use of these elements of thought.” In writing and communication, we seek to break down the information into smaller components and then apply the intellectual standards to assess the information. All reasoning leads somewhere and has implications and consequences, and it is the SOF operator’s responsibility to gather all of the information and validate that information before making decisions.

CRITICAL THINKING SKILLS IN PME

A finding in the RAND study Enhancing Critical Thinking Skills for Army Leaders Using Blended-Learning Methods they concluded that learners require face-to-face interaction to learn complex material. Certain information is best taught in an academic setting where students can learn from each other and ask questions while the information is fresh in their mind. Students are still anchoring or linking the new knowledge to old knowledge and developing understanding. The instructor or facilitator challenges the students to think critically and points students to primary academic sources. The instructor employs the intellectual standards, elements of thought and Bloom’s taxonomy in their questioning to bring students to a higher cognitive understanding. Students in PME are challenged to think more critically and gain valuable experience in applying critical thinking to solve complex problems.

CRITICAL THINKING AND THE IDMP

Why does a Soldier make a decision that will ruin his career? Is his decision reflexive based on emotion, perception, bias or other motivation? The natural reflexive process of decision making must be replaced with a deliberate, reflective process. A reflexive process is necessary that is as rapid as its reflexive counterpart and provides an individual decision-making process or IDMP. To take over any automatic thought processes that may be influenced by emotion, bias or other natural human filters, (every decision we will make) we have to STOP-THINK-ACT. The IDMP provides the decision space necessary to step back from the problem and see it from a critical perspective. The IDMP can be broken down into its parts in the acronym SMELL-L: S - Safe, M - Moral, E - Ethical, L - Legal, L - Logical, and L - Lasting (second and third order effects). If we have a mechanism or warning light to stop and think for a moment, we can instantaneously redirect our cognitive process and engage the prefrontal cortex in making reflective decisions. The operator must think, is this the best decision with the information and time provided? Because no one wants a decision that stinks so apply SMELL-L!

The IDMP and SMELL-L will help the Soldier make the most informed on the spot decision. Reflexive decision making is done in the "heat of the moment" and an objective. Critical thinking assesses the practical ramifications of information and helps to separate the facts from opinion, bias from truth.
while reflective decision making applies a holistic approach to problem solving and decision making to improve the outcome. SMELL-L helps us to STOP and THINK before we ACT and helps the Soldier transition from the reflexive to the reflective frame of mind to engage the prefrontal cortex in raising thinking to a higher level of quality and making a "good decision."

**THE PREFRONTAL CORTEX AND THE IDMP**

According to Funahashi and Andreau, 2013, "The prefrontal cortex is one of the last regions of the brain to reach maturation. This delay may help to explain why some adolescents act the way they do." Funahashi and Andreau, 2013 continue "the so-called “executive functions” of the human prefrontal cortex include: focusing attention, organizing thoughts and problem solving, foreseeing and weighing possible consequences of behavior, considering the future and making predictions, forming strategies and planning, ability to balance short-term rewards with long term goals, shifting/adjusting behavior when situations change, impulse control and delaying gratification, modulation of intense emotions, inhibiting inappropriate behavior and initiating appropriate action, and simultaneously considering multiple streams of information when faced with complex and challenging information."

**CRITICAL THINKING AND LEADERSHIP - START WITH WHY AND KEEP THE END IN MIND**

Think "big picture" and consider the impact of the decision on the tactical and operational plan and any strategic impact. It is critical that leaders communicate the vision of the commander one and two levels higher to help Soldiers remember that their actions either support or negate the commander’s priority efforts. Few set out on a mission or in a decision to fail and to deliberately make the wrong choices. However, by not anchoring our thinking and filtering our actions through a deliberate, reflective process we will not consider all of the necessary information prior to making decisions.

**LEADERSHIP 101**

Getting to know our Soldiers is critical and understanding what motivates them to action and success. Do they possess a high intrinsic or internal drive or are they externally motivated by recognition or other external factors? Knowing these motivations and identifying their potential to impact decision making is reason enough to counsel and spend time with them. When we get to know the values that a person builds their life upon and how they perceive reality, we can identify potential obstacles or damaging beliefs that drive a person more toward the reflexive and not reflective process for decision making.

We will soon realize that each individual is unique with their personality, learning style and behavioral style. Only when the leader takes the time to know their people can we then influence them through providing purpose, direction and motivation. Influence must be done in a way that relates to other’s experiences, values and beliefs and is built upon common ground. Leader intervention is necessary to identify patterns of illogical behavior in our Soldiers and harmful patterns in their decision making and INTERVENE. Engaged leaders who are self-aware will develop other leaders who are self-aware and aware of how they interact with their environment and others. We all take in and process information based on personality, learning style and behavioral style so it is important to know where we are and to know ourselves first. Leaders who understand how to apply the IDMP are leaders who can influence Soldiers to make right decisions when faced with danger or difficult ethical situations.

---

**INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING PROCESS (IDMP)**

The IDMP takes over any automatic thought processes that may be influenced by emotion, bias or other natural human filters and provides the decision space necessary to step back from a problem and see it from a critical perspective using the SMELL-L method.

**DOES IT PASS THE SMELL-L TEST?**

| S | Safe |
| M | Moral |
| E | Ethical |
| L | Legal |
| -L | Lasting (2nd/3rd order effects) |

SMELL-L helps us to STOP and THINK before we ACT and helps the Soldier transition from the reflexive to the reflective frame of mind to raise thinking to a higher level of quality to make a good decision.

**CRITICAL THINKING AND REALISTIC TRAINING**

Getting to know people we can identify motivations, personality and trends of behavior and predict the types of decisions people will make under pressure. That is why STX lanes or simulated training exercises are critical to providing realistic training events that stimulate the senses and emotions. It is important to put our Soldiers in these realistic situations to inoculate them from fear and to help them transition from reflexive thinking to reflective thinking. The engagement of the prefrontal cortex during realistic training helps elevate the level of decision making under stressful conditions.
Realistic training exposes Soldiers to situations where the body creates the stress hormone cortisol as a survival instinct or “fight or flight” release of adrenaline. The amygdala, as small as it is, has a major role in our automatic response mechanisms but sometimes we need to run toward the sound of gunfire and not away. The counter or override to the “fight or flight” instinct is the transition from reflexive to reflective decision making. Many Soldiers have said that the “training just kicked in” and their experiential foundation helps them to survive.

**CRITICAL THINKING AND THE COMMANDER’S VISION**

Leaders must clearly communicate the commander’s intent through purpose, key tasks and end state and empower subordinate leaders to make decentralized decisions with an understanding of how the commander sees the situation or mission. Leaders must begin with why to help Soldiers anchor the commander’s vision to their decision making process. Therefore, a vision that poorly communicated leaves the outcome up to chance or the decision making to the decentralized element and their understanding of the situation and success factors.

SOF conducts mission brief backs, not only to gain approval for a mission but to demonstrate that the element has done analysis and contingency planning of all mission factors that lead to success as articulated by the approving commander. Mission Analysis is the application of critical thinking and helps the planning team to apply the intellectual standards and the elements of thought to the information given to develop courses of action. Specified and implied tasks are extracted from orders through critical thinking, experience, and a shared understanding of the mission. The application of critical thinking and reasoning must be practiced and deliberate and those who do practice “thinking” make better analysts, planners, or strategists than others.

**CONCLUSION**

We base decisions to commit our nation’s blood and treasure to an understanding of the environment and the application of the elements of national policy. We must ensure that we employ critical thinking to cultivate the “right information” to base tactical to strategic decisions. Critical thinking is not a natural process; therefore, we must exercise critical thinking by employing the intellectual standards for every decision until it becomes second nature. Critical thinking requires knowing what questions to ask to get the information that we need to make the best decisions. MDMP provides a process to take information and conduct analysis to gain an understanding of a military situation and with the commander’s vision, we will execute sound courses of action. We require a similar process at the individual level such as the IDMP to rapidly process information and make good decisions at the Soldier level. Stop and SMELL-L the operating environment decision by decision, moment by moment.

**ABOUT THE AUTHOR**

Sgt. Maj. Robert J. Burton is a Special Forces NCO who wrote this paper while attending the Joint Special Operations University Enlisted Academy.
INTRODUCTION

During peace time scenarios, order is maintained through internationally established and accepted laws and regulations. However, that environment has had its volatility revealed to the world through the operating environment we face today and anticipate for tomorrow. The threat today is defined by aggressive state and non-state actions that deliberately fall short of recognized thresholds of traditional war. We must adapt our approach.

This article will provide an alternative approach to the overly militarized and overly constrained techniques in response to today’s Gray Zone challenges. We must think, plan, and approach these challenges differently. This article will discuss the paradigm shift of USASOC following the Army Capstone Concept through ARSOF 2022, the educational challenges facing U.S. Army Special Operations Command today, possible solutions to these problems, as well as introduce a unique weapon system for today’s Gray Zone challenges.

U.S. ARMY FUNCTIONAL CONCEPT OF ENGAGEMENT

Following the Special Operations Forces White Paper, published February 2012, the Army Capstone Concept, published Dec. 19, 2012, identified a capabilities gap with the Army’s past functional construct. The ACC stated that in order to operate more effectively in the Land Domain, while still accounting for the human aspects of war and conflict, the Army required a new Warfighting Function. This new function was to encompass the tasks and systems to allow the Army to assess, shape, deter and influence the decisions and behaviors of security forces, governments and people through lethal and nonlethal means. To meet this requirement, USASOC was tasked by the Commanding General of the Army Capabilities Integration Center through an Integrated Capabilities Development Team Charter to write the concept and conduct a Capabilities Based Assessment on the Seventh Warfighting Function, now titled the U.S. Army Functional Concept of Engagement, to develop solution approaches that mitigate the Army’s gaps in conducting engagement activities.

The content and focus of the FCE changed multiple times from start (SOF focus) to final concept (CF focus) and is still changing. The ongoing tenants of the FCE are gaining an understanding of the human aspects of the operating environment, building relationships, building partner capacity and leveraging enabled partners to contribute to the multinational effort. The FCE supports increasing the Army’s awareness of the Human Domain. The concept prioritizes sufficient knowledge of aligned regions, and provides guidance to better survive within the sensitive human, cultural, and political dynamics of an uncertain operational environment. USASOC’s solutions will be submitted towards Gray Zone challenges, to one centered on the Human Domain and a Bio-Psycho-Social approach to cognitive engagement. Through the SESTC, SOF will collect, analyze, and apply information in order to leverage the human condition and quietly deter emerging security challenges. The SESTC pushes our force to understand and account for root causes rather than symptoms while providing a tactic to increase the specialization of SOF, apart from conventional warfare, in order to raise our country’s efficiency against Gray Zone challenges.
Social Engineering as a Sociocultural Tactic

Investing in human capital and creating the world’s best trained and educated special operations Soldiers is one of the top priorities as outlined in ARSOF 2022. SOF LREC programs must be at the core of this priority and receive full attention. Where the ACC detailed what the Army must accomplish in the future, the Army Operating Concept described how the Army must fight in the future. Through the AOC, Army forces, both conventional and special operations forces, must be regionally aligned in order to properly organize their capabilities and respond to immediate requirements within a complex operational environment. As a result, and as outlined by the AOC, SOF Soldiers will be required to be proficient in language, culture, customs and regional orientation. These are the core functions of SOF LREC programs.

Currently, SFGs offer the Command Language Programs taught by regional representatives. Courses last roughly four months. Such programs provide Soldiers the opportunity to advance their understanding of the cultures of a region and continue to develop or maintain their language proficiency achieved from the Special Forces Qualification Course. Further, live-fire range safety briefs, commands and even Concept of the Operation briefs and story boards are all executed in their assigned language and incorporate aspects of their current country focus culture. Efforts such as these are all a result of the Command Language Program.

To offer such programs is a positive step in the right direction. However, these programs are still very self-initiated, largely affected by command emphasis and personalities and are heavily constrained by training timelines and operational deployments. With other obligations on top of already tight timelines, options such as these are not always practical. As a result, most regional training is done reactively prior to a deployment rather than proactively and developed over time. Here in-lies the largest challenge for SFGs given the operational tempo they have experienced from 2001 to drawdown. With only limited time between operational deployments, often LREC programs are neglected for other capability requirements during an Operational Detachment Alpha’s premission train up. Too often, time just doesn’t allow SFGs to make the transition needed by today’s operational environment to go from a reactive educational environment to one that is properly developed over time and proactively aligned to their region.

With that being said, SFGs have internally developed many systems to maintain continuity of effort and share information gathered in regards to various regions’ orientation, culture, customs, and the progress/efforts made within each. Special Operations Tactical After Action Review and Special Operations Debrief and After Action Review are examples of such systems and are digitally maintained and shared between operational detachments entering and leaving theater. Efforts such as these, similar to LRECs, aid detachments’ ability to prevent, shape and win within their regions and assist in meeting operational requirements such as those outlined by the AOC.

LREC programs, and efforts such as CLPs, are the backbone of engagement within the special warfare form of special operations. As stated in the ACC, AOC and emphasized by ARSOF 2022 priorities, special operations Soldiers must be educated and culturally in synch with their operational environment at a level unparalleled by any other force. Achieving this level of education is paramount in identifying root causes of Gray Zone security challenges. Without it, efforts will continually be directed towards symptoms rather than preventing and shaping conflict.

Global Engagement Cycle

Theory: How to Facilitate Prevent and Shape

When the Army introduced the concept of the Human Dimension, it presented an excellent means to focus efforts inwards to increase the efficiency and strengthen our orga-
we must all first see, understand and mention win amid these parameters), tions, allies or our enemies (not to underlying forces of foreign popula - shape the social, cognitive and moral However, to effectively prevent and形状未来冲突 in an build the Army's capability to pre-mention Functional Concept was to inwards. The focus of the Engage - Dimension focused leaders' efforts manner similar to how the Human special operations forces can better focus on how its conventional and brought the Army's attention to lored to every region that surrounds our nation. This realization is what should be applied outward and tai - led to every region that surrounds our nation. This realization is what drove the creation of the Special Operations White Paper and the ef - fort to incorporate the Engagement Capability into what was then the six Army Functional Concepts.

The implementation of the Engagement Functional Concept brought the Army’s attention to focus on how its conventional and special operations forces can better affect external actors in a non-lethal manner similar to how the Human Dimension focused leaders’ efforts inwards. The focus of the Engagement Functional Concept was to build the Army's capability to prevent and shape future conflict in an undefined operational environment. However, to effectively prevent and shape the social, cognitive and moral underlying forces of foreign populations, allies or our enemies (not to mention win amid these parameters), we must all first see, understand and account for the Human Domain in the same manner.

Figure 01, the Global Engagement Cycle, is a theoretical example of what such a construct may look like and is comparable to the Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze and Disseminate process used in targeting. Currently, Functional Solution Analysis results are being refined prior to being staffed as part of the Engagement Capabilities Based Assessment. Throughout this strategic planning process, the need for, and design of, such a construct will be determined. This representation is only an example of what such an idea may look like. Regardless of the outcome from the CBA, a synchro-nized perspective will be necessary to properly identify and fulfill LREC requirements and bring USASOC to a proactive educational stance. Such models also provide a placeholder to drive initiatives, development of processes, and doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy solution sets.

Figure 02 depicts an example of some possible subordinate actions, considerations and items for DOTMLPF-P solution set development. If implemented, these tasks should also include the same type of subordinate templates to assist in planning, development, execution and feedback similar to the F3EAD targeting cycle. It is a flexible, codified system that continuously adjusts LREC focus priorities to fit the demands of a continuously changing operational environment.

As stated before, ARSOF’s LREC strategy is the absolute prevent, shape and win strategy. However, currently, there is no structure to support information processing to enable command decisions. There are clear concepts for planning and ex-ecuting targeting, but not one that is suited well for the complexity and interdependence aspects of operations (or the Engagement Functional Concept’s capabilities for engagement) with humans to shape and influence. Until such a model is created, SOF will continue to fight a reactive battle of educating its forces in response to Gray Zone challenges within a fluid hyper-sensitive operational environment which calls for more refined and proactive measures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analyze</th>
<th>Identify</th>
<th>Prepare</th>
<th>Affect</th>
<th>Adapt</th>
<th>Disseminate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Global context</td>
<td>• Engagement</td>
<td>• Plans</td>
<td>• Deploy</td>
<td>• Listen</td>
<td>• Consolidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Regional context</td>
<td>• Gaps</td>
<td>• Concepts</td>
<td>• Engage</td>
<td>• Think</td>
<td>• Synthesize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Other perspectives</td>
<td>• Requirements</td>
<td>• Relationships to leverage</td>
<td>• Train</td>
<td>• Learn</td>
<td>• Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Cultural nuances</td>
<td>• Opportunities</td>
<td>• TSOCs to receive</td>
<td>• Observe</td>
<td>• Correlate</td>
<td>• Capture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Negotiations</td>
<td>• Methods</td>
<td>• Country Teams to receive</td>
<td>• Ask</td>
<td>• Adjust</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Game theory win/win options</td>
<td>• Partnerships</td>
<td>• Units to host</td>
<td>• Support</td>
<td>• Understand</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Areas to impact</td>
<td>• Exchanges</td>
<td>• Mutual benefits</td>
<td>• Shape and/or prevent</td>
<td>• Invite</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ramifications, orders of effect</td>
<td>• Exercises</td>
<td>• Education venues</td>
<td>• Deter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NMS and ARSOF needs</td>
<td>• Augmentations</td>
<td>• Measures of effectiveness</td>
<td>• Disrupt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• TSCAPs, Campaign Plans</td>
<td>• Training Requirements</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Influence and/or manipulate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Priorities</td>
<td>• Units to assign</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Build</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Current abilities in LREC</td>
<td>• Mutual benefits</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Rapport</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Training needs (ours/ theirs)</td>
<td>• Education venues</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Partnership capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Threats to deter</td>
<td>• Measures of effectiveness</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Relations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Key units, personnel to engage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Future opportunities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Points of influence to leverage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Knowledge and skills</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
COEM & CM2E, AN ORGANIC ASSET TO PROVIDE AN EXTERNAL SOLUTION

The Irregular Warfare Analysis Division at TRADOC Analysis Center White Sands Missile Range is one of many subordinate divisions headquartered at Fort Eustis, Virginia. TRAC-WSMR’s IW Division specializes in aiding decision makers through providing analysis of single Soldier to Brigade Combat Team operations with a focus on Irregular Warfare.

As guided by the National Defense Strategy, and specified through TC 18-01, “without a clear understanding for the desired effects and end state for a region or conflict, it is impossible to assess whether support...would achieve favorable results.” TRAC-WSMR’s IW Division is able to aid the strategic level by evaluating, modeling, and analyzing the problem as defined by the “customer” and providing feedback and recommendations prior to establishing a definitive plan. TRAC-WSMR’s IW Division can also assist planners in deciding whether to provide U.S. sponsorship to an environment within Irregular Warfare scenarios. Among other capabilities, this team can clarify the feasibility of support by describing the human conditions of the environment (through the Complex Operational Environmental Model, Figure 3). TRAC-WSMR’s IW Division can aid strategic level planners in defining the appropriateness of such support (through the Complex Military Mission Environment model, Figure 4) based on the mission and U.S. Government strategic interests. The COEM is a deterministic simulation of the complex operational environment designed as a stand-alone model to investigate the COE impacts resulting from changes to any combination of PMESII sub-variables. The CM2E is a modeling environment where actors interact with each other in the COE to accomplish their missions over a protracted time period (e.g., 20 years).

Through both the COEM and CM2E, TRAC-WSMR’s IW Division has the ability to depict a region’s geopolitical environment and aid strategic-level planners in determining if favorable terrain exists for an IW campaign. This capability, and the flow of information from higher echelon planners down through the operational and tactical levels, can similarly aid in understanding a specified region’s Human Domain and later be better equipped to correctly operate and engage within any operational environment. These models can help enhance the cognitive abilities of SOF Soldiers and therefore increase Soldier performance in the Human Dimension.

The key point to both models is their ability to indirectly fill a current capabilities gap within SFGs (more specifically their LREC programs) when proactively used and injected into an Operational Design planning process. With the tight training and operational timeliness, elements struggle to sustain regional alignment. As stated before, SFGs’ regional education efforts are almost always doomed to a reactive (rather than proactive) fate. With TRAC-WSMR’s IW Division’s ability to produce a solution like the COEM in a period of 4–6 months (situationally dependent). It seems a tremendous educational burden could be relieved from the SFGs and other entities under USASOC and SOCOM, should such an asset be realized and appropriately utilized.

The COEM has the potential to provide select operational detachments a base level education, or picture of the battlefield prior to deployment. This is a picture that would take SFGs immense time and effort to create and provide internally, especially within an identical timeframe. The CM2E would depict how foreign individuals and groups would likely react and be affected as a result of a proposed mission and provide an invaluable planning perspective. When disseminated to the tactical level, this perspective would empower a detachment to more effectively navigate and interact within a region’s Human Domain.

The SESTC is a tactic to manipulate and influence the behavior of an identified personality. However, the SESTC focuses on the individual (or individuals) and the human terrain within a narrow and limited scope. The key challenge to this theory is educating the SOF Soldier to understand how the individual on the other end of the table is persuaded/affected by the external influences from that region. COEM and CM2E can potentially provide that knowledge prior to an operational deployment to account for those external aspects and allow the SOF Soldier to consider and plan for each dynamic. Potentially, being provided products from both frameworks, the SOF Soldier’s interpretation of the situation would be higher during the ‘understanding’ phase of the proposed cycle due to the COEM, and the Soldier’s ability to determine an intellectual strategy would be facilitated through the CM2E during the ‘judgement’ phase of the cycle. Both models allow USASOC to better cultivate the Human Dimension of its SOF Soldiers while successfully navigating through, and engineering, the Human Domain. Constructs similar to the non-adversary based targeting methodology found within Civil
Military Engagement Development Joint Targeting/Non-Lethal Handbook can help refine this initial understanding and account for shifts within the environment while on the ground.

**SOCIAL ENGINEERING AS A SOCIOCULTURAL TACTIC: COGNITIVE ENGAGEMENT TO WIN THE FIGHT**

Once it is realized how manipulative human interaction is, the boundaries and parameters traditionally influencing decisions become less definite and more a personification of the characteristics, morals and beliefs of those that create or enforce the decisions. This is a relative constant across all populations, regardless of their diversity at skin level. Through understanding the power residing in the Human Domain, SOF has the capacity to further develop their uniquely people-focused capability at a level unparalleled by any other force. When utilized as a sociocultural tactic/ weapon system, Social Engineering, and the discipline of persuasion and influence, provide SOF a means to more effectively operate and engage within the Land Domain by leveraging the human condition.

*Figure 5* depicts the Human Dimension as the SOF Soldier’s, and our Army’s, core function. Around it, represented in blue, is the Human Domain. The Human Domain is the similar potential found internally to our organization through the Human Dimension, but is externally resourced and leveraged through the social, cognitive and moral underlying forces of foreign populations, allies, or our enemies. To structure this model, the graphic is framed similar to the observe, orient, decide and Act loop cycle. The model depicts four phases necessary to effectively navigate throughout the Human Domain and the cycle is repeated until the desired end state is achieved.

Under each phase are specific tactics, techniques and procedures to provide the SOF Soldier tools to reach a desired end state with an individual. Finally, layered in the rear of the cycle, are both the COEM and CM2E models. Depicting how each will supplement this cycle and provide the SOF Soldier perspective for the external influencers within a given operational environment.

Through application, while understanding the multiple internal and external influencers on an individual, a SOF Soldier can take advantage of this knowledge and can act quicker than the individual can execute his/her OODA loop. SE is a weapon system to navigate through the Human Domain (by leveraging USASOC’s unique and experienced Human Dimension) to manipulate, control, or influence foreign people (the affect portion of the Global Engagement Cycle). This is how the SOF Soldier affects human behavior within the Gray Zone.  

Independently, no single component of the SESTC is unique or foreign to today’s SOF Soldiers. However, when each element is executed in series, with this framework as a guide, therein lies a unique sociocultural tactic. It is the deliberate execution of each action, based off a superior understanding of the individual, the internal psychological and social influencers, as well as the external regional and cultural factors, that can make a person with ‘people skills’ a valuable and unique weapon system within the Human Domain.

**ABOUT THE AUTHOR**

Captain Christopher O’Brien is currently assigned to the 20th Special Forces Group (Airborne) serving as an Operational Detachment Alpha Commander.

**NOTES**  
02 Training Circular 18-01, Special Warfare Unconventional Warfare (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, 2010), paras 1-2 and 1-3.  
03 Additional information detailing the execution of the SESTC can be found within the OSD-SMA White Paper Bio-Psycho-Social Applications to Cognitive Engagement, published September 2016.
Where does Boko Haram’s terrorist campaign fall in the context of Gray Zone conflict? The short answer is: it depends which viewpoint you are using to evaluate Boko Haram and their fight against the Nigerian establishment. As Capt. Philip Kapusta stated in his Special Warfare article, “Gray Zone challenges are perspective-dependent” and this statement holds exceptionally true for the Boko Haram conflict in northern Nigeria. From both the Nigerian Government and Boko Haram perspective, the conflict is tantamount to war. However, from a U.S. perspective the conflict lies closer to the Gray Zone area of concern. Evaluating two key characteristics of Gray Zone challenges, aggression and ambiguity, as they pertain to Boko Haram will provide insight and understanding of where they fall in the spectrum.

A BRIEF INTRO TO BOKO HARAM

Boko Haram (“western education is forbidden/sinful”), a northern Nigeria-based terrorist organization, has the goal of establishing Sharia Law throughout Nigeria and overthrowing the current government. Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram’s first leader, established the group in 2002 in the city of Maiduguri. Between 2002 and his death in 2009, Yusuf preached Sharia Law, believing the current version practiced in the North was not strictly enough enforced, and spoke out regularly against the government. Yusuf was arrested several times but always released without any significant punishment until he was finally arrested and killed while in police custody in 2009. The extrajudicial killing of Yusuf, sparked outrage among his followers and resulted in moths of violence between the group and the Nigerian police and military forces. Eventually, Boko Haram went underground until emerging again in 2010 with Abubakar Shekau at the helm. Under Shekau’s leadership, Boko Haram has transformed from a grassroots type movement to protest poor governance into one of the most violent and destructive terrorist organizations in the world.

BOKO HARAM AND AGGRESSION

There is no doubt that Boko Haram is an aggressive and dangerous organization. According to the Global Terrorist Index, Boko Haram was the deadliest terrorist group in the world in 2014, responsible for 6,644 deaths as compared to 6,073 attributed to ISIS. Yet, the idea of Gray Zone conflict is to display some level of aggression while refraining from the escalation to overt war and the potential consequences that accompany declared combat. Not only has Boko Haram steadily increased their aggression and violence, but they have also openly declared war. In November 2014, the group’s leader Abubakar Shekau stated, “There is no ceasefire or dialogue with anyone; instead, it is war.” Boko Haram has kept good on its word, carrying out a brutal campaign of massacres, rapes, kidnappings and child suicide bombings among other attacks. In this regard, Boko Haram clearly sees the conflict as war, is increasing its aggressiveness as required to win and achieve their goal of an independent Islamic state in Northern Nigeria, and is emphatically not a Gray Zone conflict.

However, from a U.S. perspective, Boko Haram poses no direct threat to the U.S. homeland; has taken no direct action against U.S. citizens or facilities in Nigeria or abroad; has not successfully recruited foreign fighters other than those who share an ethnic commonality and are in the immediate surrounding areas of Niger, Chad, and Cameroon; nor does Boko Haram receive significant support from an expatriate community in the U.S. or other western countries. Outside of sporadic rhetorical threats made by Shekau during his propaganda messages and videos, Boko Haram has displayed little intention or capability of significantly harming U.S. interests. Boko Haram’s message and mission also lacks resonance with Nigerian citizens or dual-citizens abroad, effectively mitigating the ability of Boko Haram to gain access to U.S. or western passport holders which could then make an attack on a U.S. facility more easily attainable.
That does not preclude Boko Haram from being a concern for the U.S. Government or counter terrorism community though. Boko Haram threatens the stability of the most populous country and largest economy in Africa. Additionally, Nigeria is the fifth largest exporter of oil to the U.S. and its capital, Abuja, plays host to the headquarters of the Economic Community of West African States. In March 2015, Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS and eight months earlier in August 2014, declared its own Islamic Caliphate in northern Nigeria, just two months after the Islamic Caliphate declaration of al-Baghdadi in Iraq. ISIS' acceptance of Boko Haram's loyalty further establishes ISIS as a global franchise and potentially offers a boost to Boko Haram's stature. However, it is also important to note that despite allegiance to ISIS, Boko Haram does not appear to have benefited significantly financially or through an influx of foreign fighters. In fact, its allegiance to the most recognized terrorist group in the world has done little to increase its global salience among the international jihadist community. Several questions arise from these points such as: Why are individuals around the world inspired by and dedicated to ISIS but not another declared Islamic caliphate of Boko Haram? Is it because ISIS has a greater claim of legitimacy or a broader population of disenchanted Sunni Muslims around the world from which to draw? Yet not all who attempt to support ISIS are Muslim; sometimes they are middle class, caucasian teenagers from Colorado. Is it because of the greater media coverage afforded to ISIS, despite the fact that Boko Haram is a more deadly organization? On the other hand, has ISIS capitalized on the use of social media and invested heavily in its recruitment campaign through online forums and its written publication, Dabiq, while Boko Haram barely releases any messages or videos in anything other than the local Hausa language?

**BOKO HARAM AND AMBIGUITY**

Ambiguity is typically prized and sought after by the instigator of a Gray Zone conflict but Boko Haram leaves little to the imagination when it comes to its campaign of terror. After kidnapping more than 250 schoolgirls from Chibok in northern Nigeria, Boko Haram’s leader released a video not only claiming responsibility but also stating his intention to sell them as slaves and marry off the others. Shekau has not shied away from claiming responsibility for Boko Haram’s attacks and taking a page direct from ISIS, began showing murders and executions of infidels and traitors in video messages. Boko Haram routinely threatens the government, local religious leaders who speak out against the message, the military and all civilians who attempt to resist, and then claim its attacks publicly once carried out. It is clear that Boko Haram has declared their war against the government and non-believers and wants it to be known who they are and what violence should bear their brand name. Despite the fact that a few of their leaders are known to the international CT community and its open claims to its attacks, there is a great deal of ambiguity that surrounds the group itself. Boko Haram’s leadership and operational structure remains largely unknown. It is accepted that Shekau is the overall leader and front man of the organization, but whether or not he power-shares with others or operates through decentralized cells with independent leadership remains a mystery.

There has long been suspicion of collaboration with other terrorist groups in Africa such as al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to explain Boko Haram’s financing and introduction of new tactics, techniques and procedures such as IEDs, but the connections are mostly circumstantial and hard proof has been elusive. Boko Haram certainly draws financing from criminal activities such as bank robbery, kidnapping, extortion and smuggling, but if there is a large source of foreign financial existence, it has yet to be identified. Even Boko Haram’s political goals remain ambiguous. They claim to want to establish an Islamic government run under Sharia Law, but have shown little to no effort to effectively govern the population. Whereas ISIS provides services such as electricity, employment, courts and laws; Boko Haram appears uninterested in establishing the basic fundamentals of governance. Although, early in its existence the group did provide food and shelter to portions of the population, that type of support has waned and brute force is now the driving mechanism for compliance. Aside from carrying out a reign of terror, Boko Haram has provided minimal guidance to the population and essentially has done nothing to increase economic development. Perhaps the most ambiguous aspect of the Boko Haram conflict is the level of support afforded the group by the local population. Determining the exact level of resonance of Boko Haram’s message and mission among the population is difficult. Verifiable information coming from the hardest hit regions of the country is minimal at best. Additionally, Boko Haram has made it clear through messaging that anyone who speak against the group will be targeted, and they have convincingly backed up the threat with violence. This makes it difficult to evaluate the level of support Boko Haram receives, for many may simply fear retaliation and choose complicit silence instead of violent retribution. Despite Nigeria’s president stating in December 2015 that Boko Haram was “technically defeated” and unable to hold terrain and launch conventional attacks due to several military successes against the insurgent group, Boko Haram remains a daily threat. In February of this year, Boko Haram declared their war against the Nigerian government and non-believers and wants it to be known who they are and what violence should bear their brand name.

**ACCORDING TO THE GLOBAL TERRORIST INDEX, BOKO HARAM WAS THE DEADLIEST TERRORIST GROUP IN THE WORLD IN 2014.**
Haram slaughtered more than 65 people in the village of Dalori, burning children alive in their homes. In the year since kidnapping hundreds of girls in Chibok, Boko Haram introduced female suicide bombers, inflicting more than 750 deaths and 1,200 casualties throughout the region and neighboring countries. The government has had tactical, military success but still struggles to ensure the safety of its constituents.

**CONCLUSION**

While aspects of the terror group remain ambiguous and there are more questions than answers about the leadership, construct, alliances, financing, support, etc. one thing remains crystal clear: Boko Haram wages a violent campaign in northern Nigeria that decimates the local population and threatens stability in the region. Does the battle against Boko Haram fall into the Gray Zone? For the U.S., Western Allies and several neighboring countries of Nigeria the group perpetuates grotesque, but largely limited violence, thereby constraining its action to regional effects. However, as Boko Haram has made clear through its actions, and the Nigerian government has reciprocated with an increased military campaign to defeat the terrorist organization, from the viewpoint of the two belligerents, the conflict falls squarely in the black spectrum of all out warfare. In the end, the ambiguous categorization of Boko Haram makes it a Gray Zone challenge to be sure.

**ABOUT THE AUTHOR**

Major Casey Mills, a U.S. Army officer, is a graduate of The National Defense University with a MA in Strategic Security Studies and wrote his thesis on evaluating terrorist threats using Boko Haram as a case study. He has served overseas throughout the AFRICOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM, and PACOM areas of responsibility in addition to multiple assignments in the U.S.

**NOTES**

The future operating environment can be a bit hazy for ARSOF operators working in dynamic situations with violent extremist organizations at play. Looking at the past through a scholarly lens can provide insight to help shape how ARSOF reacts to future threats.

Disposed populations experience at the hand of abusive political, economic and social structures, the inclusion of such agency issues as self-interest and personality play a central role in both explaining the rise of violent extremists organizations and the contexts under which they may arise in the future. In order to understand the complexity of those factors, several categories of analysis have proven beneficial in scholarly research into comparative politics, the context that shapes and often drives the violent non-state groups facing the U.S. today and that will likely exist in the future. International factors certainly shape those environments, but the axiom that “all politics is local” stands true because perspectives get filtered through the local context, even when that context may include larger regional and transnational influences.

The basic premise starts with structural factors that both constrain and incentivize individual behavior, either personally or in a group, and compares them to the agency of those individuals that operate within and sometimes change the structure. Structure applies equally to the state and society, carrying with it attributes of capacity — the actual resources used in the operation of power, as well as the ability and willingness to use them; autonomy — the ability to make and enforce decisions without alternative authorities overriding decisions; and legitimacy — the persistence of active support, all the way down to the absence of overt opposition. The value of this format is that it allows for comparison across cases and can include data collected from multiple academic disciplines ranging from political science, history and economics, to sociology and anthropology. It also includes diverse inputs from practitioners in the field, whether through Department of State country briefs, or more localized Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs missions designed to accumulate and analyze information, as well as shape perceptions on the ground.

The interaction of those dynamics creates the relationship often called the social contract, whereby the state agrees to provide certain benefits in exchange for society’s submission to its decisions and demands. That relationship can be both resilient and vulnerable to change depending on a host of factors, all of which become more complicated with the increase of information available to average citizens, the use of demonizing language by political opponents to influence those populations to their sides, and the role of transnational groups seeking to stir the pot even more. So how can we make sense of this “Gray Zone” of data? Social movement theory does

At a U.S. Army Special Operations Command Futures Forum earlier this year, Lt. Gen. Kenneth Tovo and Maj. Gen. James Linder asked several critical questions about the indicators and warnings for groups like Boko Haram in Niger and the FARC in Colombia. At different times during the briefing, both Commanding Generals identified the role of latent discontent and proximate sparks to ignite what in other places and at other times would lead to political dissent rather than overt violent rebellion. Yet at the same time, they also emphasized the role of greed and outright thuggery in the rise of both groups. While not discounting the genuine anger many disposed populations experience at the hand of abusive political, economic and social structures, the inclusion of such agency issues as self-interest and personality play a central role in both explaining the rise of violent extremists organizations and the contexts under which they may arise in the future.

In order to understand the complexity of those factors, several categories of analysis have proven beneficial in scholarly research into comparative politics, the context that shapes and often drives the violent non-state groups facing the U.S. today and that will likely exist in the future. International factors certainly shape those environments, but the axiom that “all politics is local” stands true because perspectives get filtered through the local context, even when that context may include larger regional and transnational influences.

The basic premise starts with structural factors that both constrain and incentivize individual behavior, either personally or in a group, and compares them to the agency of those individuals that operate within and sometimes change the structure. Structure applies equally to the state and society, carrying with it attributes of capacity — the actual resources used in the operation of power, as well as the ability and willingness to use them; autonomy — the ability to make and enforce decisions without alternative authorities overriding decisions; and legitimacy — the persistence of active support, all the way down to the absence of overt opposition. The value of this format is that it allows for comparison across cases and can include data collected from multiple academic disciplines ranging from political science, history and economics, to sociology and anthropology. It also includes diverse inputs from practitioners in the field, whether through Department of State country briefs, or more localized Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs missions designed to accumulate and analyze information, as well as shape perceptions on the ground.

The interaction of those dynamics creates the relationship often called the social contract, whereby the state agrees to provide certain benefits in exchange for society’s submission to its decisions and demands. That relationship can be both resilient and vulnerable to change depending on a host of factors, all of which become more complicated with the increase of information available to average citizens, the use of demonizing language by political opponents to influence those populations to their sides, and the role of transnational groups seeking to stir the pot even more. So how can we make sense of this “Gray Zone” of data? Social movement theory does
a good job of telling one side of the story, the rise of movements, how they are structured, and what they are capable of accomplishing based on internal dynamics. However, it lacks a contextual grounding in the state-society relationship, or at least emphasizes the social side too much. As a result, a more effective model uses basic comparisons of key concepts between and within states and societies, thus allowing more explanation of information that could otherwise overload and threaten to spin out of analytical control.

Yet, knowing what has happened in the past and what is going on right now is not enough to give indicators and warning for future threats. Trend analysis puts that picture into context by evaluating likelihood and consequence to determine the level of threat posed by various indicators. The USASOC G9 has been working on these aspects to give a reliable picture of future threats, as well as a framework that can adapt to so-called “black swans” or exogenous factors that lie outside of a predictive model. In that sense, using structure and agency allows for both tried and tested methods of analysis, and a systematic approach that can survive first contact with a new variable.

Comparative politics is helpful in that regard, and building competencies in the discipline would serve SOF well, as would greater education in cultural empathy and conflict resolution. These have strong roots in SWCS training methods, and can be integrated into a variety of short-courses to longer-term educational opportunities, like the one at the National Defense University’s Joint Special Operations Master of Arts program at Fort Bragg. The program is part of the College of International Security Affairs, with its blended faculty from both traditional civilian academia and professional military and interagency backgrounds. The faculty represent the college’s mission to educate practical skills in critical thinking and analysis that do more than increase knowledge, rather seeking to expand the options for effective, feasible policy making.

Competencies such as cultural empathy, with its emphasis on learning how to step outside of “self” to see the world from “other’s” perspective, and conflict resolution efforts to move beyond the powerful emotions and interests associated with violence in order to see and show the disputants the available options so easily missed by narrow perspectives in conflict, do not come easily. They do fit into the SOF truths though, by stressing the role of humans over hardware and the need to take time to build a force capable of navigating the complex security environment facing the U.S. currently and what will develop in the future. Continuing to educate SOF in competencies that go beyond the necessary war fighting skill sets, and include the strengths of scholarly analytical tools will ensure SOF can continue to take the fight to the enemy, while also learning beforehand what gives rise to them and working where possible to prevent threats from escalating to the point of violence.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Dr. Spencer B. Meredith III, Ph.D., Fulbright Scholar, Associate Professor, Joint Special Operations Master of Arts, College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University.
INTRODUCTION
The study of history, enabled by professional instruction and civilian education, will increase Army special operations’ regional expertise and enhance intellectual creativity to assist in addressing complex problems, driving the operations process and developing sound strategic options. Army special operations forces work in a complex and uncertain environment. It contains regular, irregular and paramilitary enemies of increasing capability and is characterized by rapid change amidst societal, political, religious and environmental turmoil. Within this environment, Army special operations personnel are charged with developing a deep understanding of local conditions and cultures that enables them to perform a nuanced shaping of the operational environment, that is, to work with friendly indigenous or host-nation elements for conflict avoidance or mitigation and to set conditions for a rapid introduction of other friendly forces. Understanding the history within a particular environment is critical to these nuanced shaping operations and ARSOF can only arrive at this understanding through an intellectual maturity honed by the study of history.

DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK FOR REGIONAL EXPERTISE AND UNDERSTANDING
Three lines of effort guide the development and employment of Army special operations. They include generating a force with a purpose, sustained engagement and executing operations. Regionally focused expertise begins in force generation and is expected to result in a culturally aware force that provides senior leaders with enduring situational understanding. Ultimately, Army special operations personnel are expected to possess area and regional expertise that informs operational design and assists in developing strategic options across the range of military operations.

The Army special operations doctrinal capabilities of special warfare and surgical strike both demand regional expertise and enduring situational awareness to best achieve the desired operational- or strategic-level outcome. Army special operations doctrine recognizes the importance of regionally informed, culturally astute and politically nuanced elements within both of these capabilities. Furthermore, special operations doctrine defines understanding the operational environment as a SOF imperative. Specifically, it states “Special operations forces achieve objectives by understanding the political, military, economic, social...variables within the specific operational environment, and develop plans to act within the realities of those operational environments.” Additionally, ARSOF expect to achieve effects of magnitude disproportionate to their small footprint. The ability to think historically assists in achieving these effects and is necessary for success at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war.

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL HEATH HARROWER

EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

APRIL - JUNE 2017 | SPECIAL WARFARE 23
HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Army special operations personnel that possess an ability to think in a historical context can distill history into lessons that assist in making decisions and planning for the future. Dates, names and locations serve well in Trivial Pursuit, but the ability to think in a historical context goes well beyond a simple compilation of facts. In his book *Balkan Ghosts*, Robert Kaplan provides an example of this ability when describing an elderly gentleman in Yugoslavia whom he characterized as “able to predict the future.” This gentlemen paid no attention to daily headlines because the “present for him was merely a stage of the past moving quickly into the future” and instead he thought in purely historical terms. The ability to distill and understand the past allowed him to predict correctly trends in governance to include economics, leadership and reforms. While this is an extreme example and we should not expect an ability to predict the future, understanding past events and leveraging that understanding as experience certainly lends depth to regional expertise. Additionally, leaders who learn through others’ experience will possess knowledge that may allow them to conceptualize faster than the enemy can adapt, critically important when the consequence of failure and incompetence are so final. Somebody, somewhere, at some point in time experienced the same events Army special operations will face in the future. Man has waged war over thousands of years, providing plenty of experience to leverage outside of one’s own, and through concerted study Army special operations personnel can identify lessons applicable to the situations they will face.

The ability to distill the lessons of history to the degree that Army special operations personnel can “anticipate [these] changes in the operational environment and exploit fleeting opportunities” and use them to assist linking tactical success to strategic success, like any other task, requires proficiency acquired through education and instruction. Through study, one can assess the relation of past actions to a particular set of current circumstances to assess their relevance to the current operating environment. Through practice, one can also ascertain how to apply these differences and similarities to the current operating environment. Historian John Lewis Gaddis compares achieving this proficiency to that of achieving proficiency within sports. Proficiency in sports requires knowledge of the rules and a practice of baseline skills that provides preparation for general circumstances. However, each game contains its own characteristics and room is needed for individual discretion and judgment to address the particular circumstances.

Professor Rufus Fears provides an applicable example in his lecture “The Wisdom of History.” One of the fundamental lessons he presents is the notion that freedom is not a universal value. Some nations based foreign policy and waged war on the belief that all people desire freedom. This belief also resulted in the illusion that America’s unique evolution of freedom is transferable and desired by others. However, a study of history demonstrates that many civilizations chose otherwise. In fact, some civilizations, such as the ancient Egyptians, did not even possess a word for freedom. A deeper study of history demonstrates different types of freedom including individual freedom (examples include religion, thought, and speech), political freedom (such as the right to vote and the right to a fair trial), and national freedom (an entity free of foreign control, to include a nation or tribe). History demonstrates these three types of freedoms rarely co-exist and that national freedom proved a far more powerful motivator than individual or political freedom. The Roman Empire, Hitler’s Germany, North Korea, China and Russia are five examples that demonstrate the motivation for national freedom outstripping the motivation for individual or political freedom.

If using Professor Fears’ lesson as a generalization, an ARSOF element employed in a specific location and working within a particular population can then use discretion and judgment gained through study to apply that historical lesson to the particular circumstances they face. An understanding of the importance various regional entities place on these types of freedom will greatly increase regional expertise. Army special operations can draw similar lessons from religion and spirituality. A deep understanding of ancient systems of faith remains integral to the very cultures that ARSOF operate within every day. The historical aspects of religion motivate millions of people even within cultures normally thought as secularist, such as Russia. Overlay the same understanding of the historical context of other aspects such as science and technology and Army special operations personnel will truly possess the regional understanding needed to solve complex problems and offer sound strategic options.

HISTORICAL THOUGHT AND THE OPERATIONS PROCESS

This understanding also allows commanders to better connect all elements of the environment to drive the operational process through a more comprehensive approach. Critical to understanding is establishing context, that is, the set of circumstances surrounding the event or situation. History serves as the basis for this context and historical thought allows for a better visualization of a desired end state by enabling a broader understanding of the environment. This is especially important when...
dealing with complex and unfamiliar problems that commanders and their staffs cannot readily frame within existing doctrine. The risk presented within these complex problems increases when the solutions are based on an incomplete understanding of the environment. This incomplete understanding may compound the risk to force and mission already resident within ARSOF operations that typically rely on small elements conducting low visibility or clandestine operations in austere locations that are far removed from their higher headquarters and other friendly forces. Historical knowledge is an essential element that enables the operations process and “buys down” risk by providing a more complete understanding, thus enhancing the odds for success through a sound and thorough operations process that reduces the effects normally attributed to such elements as fate, unforeseen circumstances, luck, fog, and friction. Using history as a stand-in for experience, commanders and their staffs can objectively evaluate courses of action in light of their alternatives and thus offer sound solutions based on more than a contemporary (and incomplete) understanding of the operational environment.

**HISTORICAL THOUGHT AND STRATEGY**

The ability to think in a historical context is also critical to strategic success because the clarity and predictability derived from a mastery of doctrine and the operations process does not automatically translate into strategic competence. Success at the tactical and operational level, however brilliant, may not translate into strategic success as evidenced by the German armies of the World Wars, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and the United States in Vietnam. Accordingly, historical knowledge is a critical factor in developing, managing, and adapting sound strategic options.

Strategic thought and theory’s connection with general history makes many of the continuing issues of war relevant within the current operating environment. The context leading to the development of the strategic theory becomes apparent through the study of history and thus we can gauge how applicable it is to the current environment. Though every age contains a unique combination of events and conditions, they do nothing to diminish the relevance of historical strategic theory. Sound strategic theory is not based on contemporary events of the time and, because the present always contains dimensions of the past, it provides enduring relevance. Clausewitz recognized the importance of understanding history as it related to strategy, acknowledging that it stands-in for experience and thus advocated that a study of history served as preparation for the future. Additionally, Clausewitz advocated the study of history to test general theoretical concepts, and as a result he discovered common patterns of behavior in military operations and codified these into axioms and principles for instruction. A study of history allowed him to distill these patterns into universal truths that he felt did not change regardless of culture, political entities involved, and the era in that it occurred. Thucydides, who preceded Clausewitz by more than a thousand years, maintained similar beliefs. Thucydides maintained the lessons of history were eternal because human nature does not change. Factors such as advances in science and technology do not make us immune to the lessons of history because we employ them through the same human nature that existed thousands of years ago; human nature that Thucydides claimed is motivated chiefly by a desire for power.

Studying the history of strategic theory and testing that theory across various historical cases will greatly assist Army special operations personnel with their ability to conduct strategic analysis and offer sound strategic options commensurate with expectations of SOF employment.

**CONCLUSION**

The concerted study of history is essential to understanding the environment and will increase Army special operations’ regional expertise and enhance intellectual creativity to assist in addressing complex problems, driving the operations process, and developing sound strategic options. Admittedly, studying the past is not a surefire method for predicting the future; however, it does greatly prepare us for the future by expanding experience and increasing wisdom, and thus bettering our judgment. History is the only database available to assist in the understanding needed to successfully deal with current and future problems. As Army special operations continue to assess changes to doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel and facilities, continued investment in people and ideas remain essential, more so than investment in platforms. Within this, resources dedicated to enabling historical thought will set the foundation for the enduring situational understanding expected of Army special operations personnel.

**ABOUT THE AUTHOR**

Lt. Col. Heath Harrower holds a BS in Aeronautical Science from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, an MA in Military Operational Art and Science from the Air Command and Staff College, and an MA in Military History from Norwich University.

**NOTES**

THE RETURN TO BAGHDAD

On a muggy August night in Baghdad, a C-130 touched down; the Remote Advise and Assist project team is delivering the newest Virtual Accompany Kit prototypes directly to the front lines of the war against the Islamic State, capping off a year-long effort to get these new equipment suites funded and delivered to the troops on the ground who need them. This is a return to a battlefield they only recently left in 2015 to attend the Naval Postgraduate School. The VAKs they helped develop at NPS are the newest form of two-way communication suites that will allow special operators to connect to their partner forces in ways that were never before possible. Together, these technologies provide a possible solution for a problem that has plagued U.S. forces throughout the battle with the Islamic State in Iraq: how can U.S. forces effectively assist Iraqi partners when they cannot accompany them into the fight? Given the situation in Baghdad and Iraq in August 2016, the time was ripe for this expanded capability.

As the project team arrived in Baghdad, there was a small opportunity to reflect upon the process that brought them there. The group was composed of four members: the authors Maj. Eric Roles, the original developer of the kits, Maj. Christopher Thielenhaus, a NPS student project partner, Mr. Michael Stevens, a representative from the NPS Defense Analysis departments CORE Lab, and Sgt. 1st Class Steven Connor, a representative from Special Operations Command Central and equipment tester. For the authors, a tremendous amount of change had occurred since the last time the two were in Iraq in 2015. The Islamic State has been pushed to Haditha in the West of the country and the Iraqi military has seized Qayarah in the North, which opened the way to Mosul. This is a far cry from the situation in 2014. As the progenitor of the virtual accompany kits in 2014, Maj. Roles was present in Baghdad during the relentless assault of the Islamic State in 2014, when the fall of Baghdad seemed like a distinct possibility. He and his team of special operators devised the virtual accompany kit concept as a way to positively affect the battlefield when the rules were very strict about how much U.S. forces were allowed to assist Iraqi partners. Maj. Thielenhaus was also present during the initial struggles the special operators faced in retaking the cities of Tikrit and Bayji in early 2015. The change in situation for the enemy has led to a golden opportunity for Iraqi partners to fully take advantage of new technology, especially in the form of enhanced communications and partnering ability.
The initial testing indicated that the satellite-on-the-move package functioned well after a few minor tweaks, and even allowed the test team to use personal cell phones to get on the network after specific security and encryption protocols allowed them to join. This initial test acted as a backdrop for further development efforts.

Between the testing in October 2015 and the eventual completion of a new prototype, the NPS faculty was able to spread the word about the VAK capabilities in ways that were simply not possible for the student project leaders to do alone. This entailed a brief to the staff members of the Senate Armed Services Committee as well as a brief to General Raymond Thomas, commander, U.S. Special Operations Command. In addition to these briefs, the project team was also able to get input from General Joseph Votel as he took command of U.S. Central Command in early 2016. NPS further supported the interactions of the project team with important government agencies, such as DARPA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Joint Improvised-threat Defeat Agency and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, bringing each one’s unique insight into the project development process. Among the efforts’ high points was the NPS brief to Congressional representatives and members of the House Armed Services Committee in August 2016. The NPS project team provided a briefing directly from Iraq, which included participation from Australian special operators who were preparing to employ a new VAK in upcoming operations.

In May 2016, the advanced prototype development at the WinTek Arrowmaker Prototype Manufacturing Facility in Tampa, Florida, was complete. Initial testing of the new prototypes immediately followed in June 2016. The purpose of the testing was to achieve the following capabilities:

- U.S. forces capable of providing direction, advice, and assistance while not physically present with partner-nation forces.
- U.S. forces capable of receiving PN still imagery and geographic location supporting ‘positive identification’ requirements
- PN enabled to provide mutual support to other PN elements.
- Able to operate in austere environment lacking reliable power, communications and/or network infrastructure.
- Components compliant with ITARs restrictions.
- Able to be operated by PN forces not accompanied by U.S. forces

Over five days of testing between June 6-10, 2016, the project team and DARPA testers collaborated with representatives from U.S. Army Special Operations Command, Marine Corps Special Operations Command, the Canadian Special Operations Regiment, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Defense Security Service and several other industry partners to tentatively achieve these results in the simulation testing environment in Tampa. The project team now had a total of four kits developed, three which were considered “low visibility” kits and one “high visibility” kit. The difference between the two kits being that the “high visibility” kit included a 4G LTE capability through a Gnomad, which is a satellite on the move system that creates a cellular network capable of supporting speeds of up to 2 megabytes per second through a vehicle-portable telescoping mast.

VAKS ARE THE NEWEST FORM OF TWO-WAY COMMUNICATION SUITES THAT WILL ALLOW SPECIAL OPERATORS TO CONNECT TO THEIR PARTNER FORCES ... PROVIDING THE ABILITY TO TRACK, COMMUNICATE AND TRANSMIT RELEVANT INFORMATION WHILE IN AN AUSTERE ENVIRONMENT.
GNOMAD system vastly extends the range of the kit itself as well as the bandwidth for the potential users, allowing up to 400 users if needed. The “low visibility” kits, in comparison, include a local Wi-Fi network connected to a broad global area network system, which provides about 500 kilobytes per second speed. This kit can support 10 users by design, but works best with about 5 users. With these prototypes built and the tests completed, the next phase would be active deployment of the equipment in support of actual operators in Iraq.

THE NEW VAK PROTOTYPES EXPLAINED

The Virtual Accompany Kits delivered on this trip were a far cry from the improvised kits assembled in late 2014. The original prototype kits developed at Special Operations Command-Central were a collection of Android cell phones paired with a BGAN in an ad hoc functionality to provide real time communications with the Iraqi Special Operations units. Although functional, these kits suffered from a few significant limitations, such as inability to control bandwidth, low transmission speed and limited range. These kits are still in Iraq, but have been seriously degraded after heavy use, lack of sustainment, and multiple rotations of operators. Unlike their predecessors, the new Phase II prototype kits included equipment that had been inherently designed or modified to support integration with each other. The new kits include three basic divisions: software components, “data island” components and end-user devices.

The software components of the kit consist of three government developed Geospatial Information Systems or moving maps software application operating on different platforms. The Android Tactical Assault Kit and the Android Team Awareness Kit, the partner-nation releasable edition operate on Android-based smartphones. Spyglass Touch, which is similar to ATAK, operates on the included laptop pre-installed with MS Windows Operating System.

The “data island” components consist of an integrated suite of components, which includes a Satellite Communications on the Move terminal, Wi-Fi router, and 4G network in the larger kit. The primary use of the Data Island is to provide a data network in an environment that lacks cellular infrastructure. A server is included in both versions, which runs a Tactical Assault Kit server and a Web map service to serve localized map data for the phones.

The End User Devices are smartphones running ATAK-PN and have sensors and apps installed onto them for enhanced communication. Three primary smartphone devices are integrated and included in the kit. A commercial Laser Range Finder is included to help the partner forces point to a specific area that is not easily accessible. The LRF is paired via Bluetooth with the Smartphone and automatically calculates the point on the map for the devices.

Together, these components form the whole of the virtual accompany kit, and operate in tandem to send information to and from the combined joint operation center.

DELIVERING THE VAKS AND STARTING THE TRAINING

Arriving to the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Complex, the project team immediately moved to link-up with the commander of Army Special Forces troop, which are partnered with the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force. The commander told the team that he was fully on board with the new kits and was excited about their use in upcoming operations. He had already identified Special Forces Soldiers who were excited about using the kits to better partner with the Iraqi special operators and had the technical “know-how” to really dive into the kits’ capabilities. At the same time, the project team made contact with the Australian Commando detachment that was present in Baghdad as well. The commander of this detachment was also present in 2015 while the original ad hoc virtual accompany kits were still in use. He was just as excited to get to work with the new phase II prototype kits, and had also identified a small team of Soldiers who would train on the
kits to gain enough understanding to put them to good use as soon as possible. Together, these two units would form the “core” group of operators who would get the initial training on the use of the kits.

The first phase of the training began with simple familiarization and testing of the kits on the ground. Since this was the first time the kits had been operationally deployed, there were bound to be some quirks that the operators would identify as the training and familiarization proceeded. Thankfully, the manufacturers and designers of the kits were always on hand by either phone call or e-mail and were able to solve simple communications problems easily. This phase also included adapting the smartphones to the specifications of the users to make them as easy to use as possible. This entailed showing the operators how to set up pre-mission graphics and planning tools. Once the operators from both the U.S. Special Forces troop and Australian Commando detachment had kits that they were comfortable using, the training and setup proceeded to the next phase.

The next phase focused on the establishment of a local tactical server at the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force–Iraq level. This piece of the setup was key to making sure that on-going operations where the VAKs were being used could be tracked by the actual special operations commanders on the ground, leading to the enhanced higher level support that the team envisioned and the operators preferred. This required working with the CJSOTF-I J6 to make sure that the proper security and failsafe architecture was in place so that the kits could be both as operationally useful as possible while also supporting operational security efforts. At the time of this writing, the J6 staff was devising solutions so that the VAK information could be easily transported onto U.S. Secret Internet Protocol systems for the best use of the information. In addition to this functionality, this next phase also included the incorporation of some auxiliary sensors, including individual Spot trackers and the SHOUT Nano system that was in the issue process to the Iraqi forces (known colloquially as the “Iraqi National Tracking System” or INTS). These efforts led to the prototype kits being as ready for operations as possible, with the users’ operational creativity able to drive the employment.

CONCLUSION

These kits are already having an effect on the battlefield. As operations supporting the seizure of Mosul proceeded, the Virtual Accompany Kits were on the battlefield, connecting Iraqi and U.S. commanders in new ways. Although specific details of the kits’ employment are currently classified, the initial reaction and enthusiasm of the Special Operations Command is evidence enough that this idea is one that truly supports the SOF mission in Iraq, and could potentially be expanded to other global hot spots with similar restrictions. In any case, the Virtual Accompany Kit project team is tremendously honored to have had the chance to support SOF operators directly on the battlefield. The delivery of these kits represents a true cross-organizational effort to support the U.S. and Coalition mission in Iraq. The Virtual Accompany Kits provided a vital common operating picture to commanders throughout the battlefield.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Maj. Christopher Thielenhaus is a Special Forces Officer currently serving as a student at the Naval Postgraduate School. He has served and deployed with 101st Airborne Division, 1st Special Forces Group, and numerous other Special Operations Task Forces.

Maj. Eric Roles is a Special Forces Officer currently serving as a student at the Naval Postgraduate School. He has served and deployed with the 101st Airborne Division, 75th Ranger Regiment, 3rd Special Forces Group, and numerous Special Operations Task Forces.

NOTES

05. Ibid.
06. Ibid., p. 10.
07. This information is based on the following document: Response to Congressional Inquiry, RH 16-138, 19 May 2016. The Senate Armed Services Committee staff requested information from USSOCOM on RAA capabilities and funding solutions in early May, 2016, and received this document as a response, indicating that Shout NANO was SOCOM’s interim tracking solution.
THE CHALLENGE OF SOF C2

“The greatest single challenge facing special operations forces today is outdated command and control structures,” according to ARSOF 2022. Among the primary challenges for special operations forces command and control is the need to operate across all phases of joint operations. This broad spectrum includes Phase 0 Shape and Phase 1 Deter that characteristically do not involve major combat. Joint doctrine describes the shape phase as actions that “dissuade or deter adversaries and assure friends.” The deter phase seeks to “deter an adversary from undesirable actions because of friendly capabilities and the will to use them.” Both of these phases occur below the threshold of conventional combat and involve maneuvering capabilities, relationships and access to gain a superior position before the event of war or to prevent war. Strategists have recently described this time-space below the threshold of violent combat as the Gray Zone that “involves the holistic application of a mosaic of civilian and military tools, short of combat operations, to achieve gradual progress toward political objectives.” Further, SOF theorists have called for SOF to develop the ability to plan special warfare campaigns that are capable of synchronizing SOF efforts in the Gray Zone. Scholars succinctly describe special warfare as “political-military warfare or shaping and influencing environments and populations.” Common to all of these descriptions is a time-space that is long in duration, does not involve large-scale combat and emphasizes influence via engagement that includes, but is not limited to, military efforts.

To meet the C2 challenge, SOF developed several C2 concepts that it employs concurrently today for a broad range of special operations. Chief among these concepts are the special operations joint task force and the special operations command-forward. Of these two, doctrine identifies the SOJTF as the “principal joint SOF organization tasked to meet all special operations requirements in major operations, campaigns or a contingency.” The SOJTF is a relatively larger organization consisting of a “headquarters, SOF units, support forces and service-provided capabilities.” A SOF unit headquarters forms the nucleus of the SOJTF staff. The SOJTF has the capacity to C2 large-scale SOF activities and is manned, trained and equipped to do so.
TSOCs construct and deploy many versions of SOC-FWDs. For the purposes of this paper, SOC-FWDs are a command cell led by a command-selected O-6, joint-qualified officer, subordinate to the TSOC commander, who works from the U.S. Embassy in his or her area of operations. This commander has a small, in-country supporting staff consisting of a senior enlisted advisor and two or three operations officers. A rotating company of Special Forces Soldiers often augments the SOC-FWD as staff serving at a separate location within the area of operations, typically on a partner force installation. These SOC-FWDs rely heavily on the TSOC headquarters staff located in the continental United States for non-operational staff functions.

In assessing these two forms of C2 for joint operations phases 0-1, SOF must consider the nature of special warfare in the Gray Zone. Special warfare emphasizes operations that have the following characteristics: leadership of the interagency and consequent cooperation, small footprints and low visibility, primacy of the partner nation and long duration. Understanding the nature of special warfare in phases 0-1, the SOC-FWDs are the SOF C2 structure most beneficial to the development and employment of special warfare campaigns to shape and deter. The principle virtue of the SOC-FWD is its ability to conduct interagency coordination and cooperation through its small, forward and networked construct.

**INTERAGENCY ADVANTAGES OF THE SOC-FWD**

SOC-FWDs are the most beneficial SOF C2 structure for special warfare campaigns for their intimate interagency coordination capability. Special warfare campaigns demand an interagency approach. A recent report on the special warfare operational art states, “Special warfare efforts benefit from greater joint and interagency support when key partners are involved in the planning process.” More to the point, doctrine describes military involvement in foreign internal defense, a component of special warfare, to be one of the integrated efforts of a whole-of-government approach. “For FID to be successful in meeting a host-nation’s needs, the United States Government must integrate the efforts of multiple government agencies.”

Former SOC-FWD Yemen commander Rob Newsom stated unequivocally, “SOC FWDs must be and are integrated into the U.S. Country Team and a whole-of-government, interagency approach.” This is necessary because the political nature of special warfare campaigns involves the whole-of-government and “are routinely reviewed and discussed by the National Security Staff and often require U.S. Presidential approval.” Moreover, the risk of “policy fratricide” is high if interagency coordination does not balance lines of effort. Scholars have pointed out that SOF has perfected interagency collaboration in regards to direct-approach, counterterrorism operations; however, collaboration in regards to indirect special warfare approaches remains an underdeveloped concept.

SOC-FWDs achieve interagency integration primarily in three ways. First, their approachable size deflates militarization of foreign policy perceptions. Second, their physical location within a U.S. embassy increases planning opportunities. Finally, SOC-FWD commanders are valuable, if honorary, members of the country team with immeasurable worth in the Human Domain.

**SMALL FOOTPRINT**

SOC-FWDs are the best SOF C2 model for interagency collaboration because their small size deflates perceptions of the militarization of foreign policy. Benefits are twofold. First, it facilitates special warfare campaign integration where the Department of Defense is likely not the lead department. Second, it reduces strain on U.S. diplomatic efforts. DoD dwarfs other federal agencies. For example, “at 68,000, the Special Operations forces of the Pentagon are larger than the personnel of the civilian foreign policy agencies.”

This figure operates in the background of interagency collaboration where other government agencies tend to view the DoD as everywhere by virtue of its manning, budget and authorities gained during the Long War. Within a country, a SOJTF numbering several hundred will easily dwarf the staff of the U.S. embassy. Indeed, a SOJTF can be overwhelming to an embassy. A former SOC-FWD commander explained how the ambassador appreciated the SOC-FWD as a way to prevent the “invasion force” from arriving. This anecdote also serves to illustrate how the embassy understood the SOC-FWD as distinctly different and acceptable from other large C2 nodes.

Small footprints are necessary for the low-visibility nature of a special warfare campaign. By definition, special warfare is attempting to influence the political nature of a place or event, not lead the change. Nor does special warfare seek to directly impress U.S. will onto an adversary or a partner. Special warfare is an indirect and persistent approach. It requires the primacy of the host political community. This necessitates a presence that is as small as possible while remaining effective. To accomplish this, former U.S. Special Operations Command commander Admiral William McRaven stated, “proactive, relationship-based approaches grow through effective, enduring partnerships and globally agile, forward-deployed or forward-based SOF.” Essential to this perspective is the concept of SOF in theater, persistently based with the partner nation that enables the establishment of a trust-based relationship. Trust is essential. The SOC-FWD C2 construct meets this description by being located in the country with commanders serving for one year. Unlike large

---

[31] Special Forces team members assigned to SOC Forward-North and West Africa work with Senegalese Commandos during Flintlock 2016. A rotating company of Special Forces Soldiers often augments the SOC-FWD as staff serving at a separate location within the area of operations, typically on a partner-force installation.

U.S. Army Photo by Jennifer G. Angelo
special-operations footprints, the SOC-FWD is able to remain small by placing additional personnel at the CONUS-based TSOC. This allows the SOC-FWD commander and his/her small team to remain on point for the low-visibility work of influencing relationships. For example, a SOC-FWD may require a more robust intelligence staff capability or a staff capable of conducting increased requests for forces. The TSOC is able to provide these functions and prevent growth at the forward location.

In contrast, SOJTFs can be intrusive. SOF researchers have written, “Contrary to both doctrine and perception, SOF have a record of operating with a large footprint.” Deploying a division-size staff to a country sends a strategic signal of U.S., and specifically Department of Defense, leadership. Scholars have observed that this type of expeditionary activity often leads to mission creep because of its “political complexity.” The result in the case of special warfare is the expansion of limited, political aims with larger conventional, military aims. Consider the example of Vietnam from 1963-1964. With the increasing requirements for special operations in Vietnam in terms of both personnel and infrastructure, a direct correlation in the need to improve protection and the other warfighting functions continued to increase requirements of SOF. The result was a SOF culminating point where special warfare was necessarily overtaken by conventional efforts. This led to an end to what some have argued was an effective special warfare-like campaign. In the current environment, SOC-FWDs are a concept that hedge against mission creep.

The small size of the SOC-FWD also does not disrupt diplomatic or other interagency efforts. SOF theorist Brian Petit notes that within a host nation “visible military actions (DoD) improve security but strain diplomacy (DoS).” For example, the arrival in a country of a large SOJTF may signal that the country is weak, or inflame anti-American sentiment in a population that views a large U.S. military presence unfavorably. These then become diplomatic and intelligence problems as the interagency adjusts to the shift in the political environment. In contrast, a small SOC-FWD team can conduct C2 functions with relative discreetness from within the embassy and pose no threat to adjusting diplomatic calculus for the country team.

**PRESENCE**

SOC-FWDs are the best SOF C2 structure for integrating with the interagency because of their forward presence in the relevant U.S. Embassy. For example, Special Operations Command Central SOC-FWDs currently occupy office space in U.S. embassies throughout the Central Command area of responsibility. The embassies are able to accommodate the three to four members of the SOC-FWD team. This presence in the embassy gives the SOC-FWD direct access to the country team and to the ambassador. Subsequently, it allows the country team to see the SOC-FWD commander as a member of the team. Currently, SOC-FWD commanders are not under chief of mission authority and are thus not a statutory member of the country team. Despite this formal inhibition, current commanders have used their authorities derived from the Geographic Combatant Command to the advantage of the country team. For example, a recent SOC-FWD commander explained that his authorities gave the ambassador flexibility in integrating SOF into the country plan because of the SOC-FWD’s access to resources and his ability to engage other regional nations that influenced the security environment in her area. This SOC-FWD commander was invited to country team meetings and diplomats understood him to be the SOF coordinator in the country similar to the way they understood the chief of station as the intelligence chief. A former commander of SOC-FWD Lebanon recounts a similar experience, “Although not formally a country team member under chief-of-mission authority, the SOF O6 SOC-FWD commander is afforded a seat at the invitation of the ambassador at weekly country team meetings and other country team director level venues.” In unconventional warfare scenarios, the SOC-FWD may be located in a U.S. embassy in an adjacent country or with a government agency responsible for overseeing a failed state in which no U.S. political representation exists. Regardless of the physical location, the SOC-FWD commander is located with other U.S. government agencies conducting engagement in a given country. This physical location with the interagency facilitates constant integration with the interagency team. It allows the SOC-FWD commander to leverage direct relationships with interagency principles in his area. Most importantly, it allows the commander to identify opportunities as they materialize thereby accelerating the operational planning and execution cycle. In special warfare, seizing opportunities through understanding the operational environment in real time constitute retaining the initiative.
HUMAN DOMAIN

Finally, SOC-FWDs are the best SOF C2 model for interagency collaboration because they most readily operate in the Human Domain of interagency relationships. The embassy understands the SOC-FWD as referring to a person. This is difficult to quantify yet it remains essential to the effectiveness of the SOC-FWD model against other models. The synchronization and coordination of interagency special warfare lines of effort are “thoroughly human endeavors.”24 Embassy culture is not military. The country team commonly understands military personnel as perpetually preparing for war. SOC-FWDs are politically sensitive commanders who, by virtue of experience and training, understand special warfare as civilian turf where diplomats and intelligence officers have traditionally worked to prevent the deployment of U.S. service members in major war. SOF must select talented, SOF-qualified officers to serve as SOC-FWD commanders. Their qualification gives them the credentials not only to command disparate SOF units, but also provides a baseline of credibility when working with the country team. Understanding the nature of interpersonal relationships and interagency agendas in an embassy goes a long way to framing the right mindset and attitudes that must characterize the SOC-FWD commander.

CONCLUSION

The ability to apply flexible solutions to complex problems is a trademark characteristic of SOF. In considering the C2 challenges for SOF operating in the Gray Zone, the SOC-FWD construct has virtues that align it more readily with the nature of conflict in the deter and shape phases. Primarily, SOC-FWDs offer a small-footprint, persistent presence, in an environment that is dominated by the distinctly human interagency and multinational effort. The SOC-FWD can rapidly identify opportunities and more immediately understand the situation in a given AOR. This provides SOF with the ability to gain and maintain initiative in the Gray Zone where leaders recognize initiative less as seizing key terrain and engaging enemy capabilities and more as developing relationships, accessing positions of advantage and bringing to bear in deterrence well-coordinated interagency resources. SOF should continue to explore how to increase the effectiveness of SOC-FWDs to conduct C2 in the Gray Zone.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Maj. Joshua Lehman is the Executive Officer, 3rd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne). He holds a Master of Arts in Defense and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College.

NOTES

Tales of powerful nations aiding or supporting armed non-state actors, or ANSAs, to further disaffected or revolutionary causes and, more importantly, to support those nations’ national security interests remain prolific in discussions of foreign policy and unconventional warfare. These discussions may lie in the legend and secrecy of Cold War expansion throughout Europe and Asia or play out more recently in the global media within the Middle East, Africa or back into former Soviet republics. Supporting these irregular forces; with weapons, training, cash or other needed capabilities; remains a viable foreign policy option for nations that do not wish to cross a threshold to more traditional military operations but choose, or prefer to operate in a Gray Zone when supporting resistance movements. Not unlike the “peacetime” political warfare of the Cold War, proposed by George Kennan, many of today’s operations supporting opposition groups enjoy — or loathe — domestic and international press and scrutiny.

The methods in which training and support reach groups vary as greatly as the nations and organizations that provide it or the opposition forces that receive it. For the United States, protection of fundamental human rights remains an intricate facet of this kind of foreign policy; not only because it encompasses the moral approach, but also because it is written in national security strategy and international law. Training and encouraging these humanitarian norms ultimately supports the domestic and international legitimization of these opposition movements. Conducting this training, monitoring and evaluating in situations that prohibit trainers or advisors from accompanying the supported forces into a denied area becomes increasingly difficult. These operations then become ones based on the use of proxies. In these situations, a requirement exists for a formal process of training, monitoring and evaluating the ANSAs to include their adherence to human rights norms. This article presents a framework for the integration of human rights into the training, monitoring and evaluating of operations designed to provide support to opposition forces, particularly in situations in which U.S. advisors or trainers may not accompany the supported forces. The framework sets the foundation for moving beyond training and equipping ANSAs and takes the force from a better-dressed and straighter-shooting one to a more professional, effective, legitimate and an accountable force that may one day support a new government’s rule of law. Additionally this framework supports resistance movements by providing additional understanding and synchronization of friendly overt and clandestine networks; conducting or supporting political subversion; providing support to disarm, demobilization and reintegration activities; increasing interagency participation in assisting resistance and political opposition groups and leadership; and most importantly, supporting the coordinated application of all U.S. instruments of national power to enable a resistance movement.

The U.S. often considers the U.S. Special Operations Command, through its subordinate commands, as the primary actor for human rights and international...
humanitarian law training when the U.S. chooses to provide operational support to opposition groups or legitimate foreign militaries. This is due to the inherent connection the foreign forces may have with U.S. Special Operations Forces trainers and operational support mechanisms throughout the spectrum of special warfare. USSOCOM provides the primary forces for foreign training events, to include train and equip programs of foreign forces. SOF develop lasting relationships with the special operations forces, conventional forces, civilian entities and non-governmental organizations indigenous to their assigned regions, as well as maintaining regional expertise in locations where the U.S. has no diplomatic or conventional military presence. This article also provides additional context and discussion points for alleviating the many concerns voiced by prominent members of the domestic and international HR and HL communities on the training of these foreign forces. Proposed below are several areas in which SOF should focus the training of HR/IHL.

Lending credibility and relevance to the Laws of War will make training and compliance in HR, IHL and other norms meaningful to opposition forces. Many ANSAs, with aspirations of independence or autonomy, already understand the importance of adhering to international humanitarian norms. They actively seek the domestic and international legitimacy that accompany this adherence. Acknowledging that there is just as much nobility and honor in showing restraint and compassion to the enemy or to civilians as there is in fighting and possibly dying for a cause lends to this credibility. Furthermore, the sponsor’s accountability, transparency and trust will lend additional credibility and relevance not only to the Laws of War, but also to the individual trainers or advisors responsible for its training and compliance.

The most important aspect of training and mentoring ANSA should center on the identification, development and support of leaders within the ranks. Opposition fighters are more likely to abide by their training and international standards when they see those whom they respect adhering to humanitarian norms. Trainers should work with the leadership separately to reinforce the principles of command responsibility, oversight and accountability. Training methodologies should test the ability of the leadership to prevent abuse and to hold abusers accountable. Scenario based training that is environmentally and culturally similar to the conflict and replicates the complex ethical situations leaders are likely to face brings additional value beyond classroom lecture. Programs should test trainees on their ability to use their training when they encounter or observe misconduct, even amongst their leaders. This represents the beginning of a professional military ethos; starting with training for the respect of the rule of law and human rights.

Training should focus on the types of violence and tensions most likely encountered during operations, the kinds of weapons most likely used and specifically address the human rights abuses alleged to have been committed and most likely recommitted by opposition forces. Additionally, presenting and applying the training in a context culturally and traditionally familiar to the ANSAs will further the receptivity and credibility of the training. When feasible, during the course of training, SOF should integrate local members of civil society, local human rights advocates or NGOs and former fighters into the instruction. The advantages of this integration are: 1) it provides the program with a local and possibly familiar or credible face for the training; 2) it reinforces the legitimacy of the opposition from a local viewpoint; and 3) it begins to make or enhance civilian-military connections locally and perhaps regionally or internationally. Candid and neutral discussions with opposition leadership and fighters, rather than classroom lecture, should occur focusing on the various pressures and situations the opposition force may encounter.

ANSAs must understand the practical reasoning to abide by IHL. The opposition will more likely abide by the training when they understand the strategic benefit of doing so. Strategic leaders and trainers should work with the opposition leadership to develop and reach consensus on public messages that reinforce the importance of abiding by rules or deeds of commitment to protect civilians. Not only as an ethical matter, these messages benefit of the cause, bolster legitimacy and may ensure continued material support by international partners.

Having the leadership disseminate this narrative early and often to all trainees will reinforce its importance. Rape and sexual violence are under-reported and extremely sensitive issues in most cultures and their occurrence usually pre-dates the conflict. Areas in which gender inequality existed prior to hostilities are no more likely to experience sexual violence than areas with roughly equal gender rights. Additionally, ANSA units with female fighters are no less likely to experience sexual violence than all male units; with females participating in or often instigating the violence. Because of highly publicized religious and cultural principles, great caution and deliberate wording will be required to discuss this topic with ANSAs. Introducing such a topic can easily destroy any trust or rapport a trainer has created but not doing so brings significant risk to the legitimacy of the program. Mentoring and advising should include specific emphasis on preventing, reporting, and accounting for sexual violence committed not only by the ANSAs, but also by anyone.

The presence of “children” in fighting formations or support roles adds additional human rights challenges that trainers or advisors must address on a culturally and traditionally sensitive basis, as well as a legal basis. The Convention on the Rights of the Child generally defines a child as any person under the age of 18. However, Article 38 uses the lower age of 15 as the minimum for recruitment or participation in armed conflict. Many ANSAs view the inclusion of younger children in service or support roles to be ideal as it offers family and unit cohesion and additional protection for children. In some cases, if the children are not under the protection and supervision of an armed force they run the real risk of recruitment, kidnapping or killing by extremist elements.

While autocratic regimes remain the greatest abusers of human rights, ANSAs also commit human rights
abuses. Opposition groups have carried out abuses including, but not limited to: murder, torture, arbitrary arrest, attacks on civilian areas and objects, the use and recruitment of child soldiers, the use of forced relocation along sectarian lines, denial of humanitarian assistance, denial of free association and NGO operations, rape and other sexual violence. International human rights documentation groups, such as Amnesty International, provide a primary source for locating and documenting violations. However, these large international groups rely in part on the documentation efforts of local organizations and media. These local groups less frequently report opposition abuses, in part, because documentation groups have to cooperate with these groups in order to operate, they may sympathize with the opposition, they view autocratic regime abuses as greater or they do not have access to contested areas and the frontlines where abuses may be taking place. Very few opposition-aligned human rights groups publicly report on opposition abuses and international organizations encounter difficulty negotiating for access to opposition facilities, which effectively makes third-party monitoring challenging.

In proxy situations, SOF require a formal process for monitoring and evaluating (assessing) the ANSA’s operations, to include adherence to human rights norms. Currently, the primary system of monitoring and evaluating ANSAs consists of direct communication with the forces and a reliance on information collected from all intelligent sources. Such collection methods may present ANSAs in an overly positive or negative light. The framework below discusses the requirement for SOF to develop a tailored monitoring and evaluation system for ANSAs; specifically designed to mitigate the challenges of providing cross-border support, monitoring of behavior and the evaluation of ANSAs in denied areas. SOF needs to monitor how civilians perceive opposition forces inside contested regions and the legal obligation to ensure compliance of the force to IHL, and other human rights norms all within an appropriate cultural and religious context. This includes monitoring how the force allows for humanitarian access to populations affected by the conflict, maintains legitimacy through appropriate interactions with civilian counterparts, and fulfills U.S. expectations for the use of logistics and financial support provided for the conduct of operations. The system fits within the current in-depth assessments SOF uses to allocate the proper balance of operations, activities, and tasks as part of a measured military action to complement, support, and leverage nonmilitary activities as part of the operational framework. Working in coordination with existing information and intelligence activities, this system will augment the information required to produce assessments for military commanders and policy makers. These intelligence requirements and the SOF assessments conducted to fulfill them, answer questions central to the conduct of supporting and directing a resistance movement or other population-centric operations. This system must rely on redundant, multi-tiered checks that provide monitoring and evaluation services at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.

**Tactical-level Monitoring & Evaluating:** The primary purpose of tactical-level M&E measures the effects and objectives of individual opposition trained units. The limited access to locations inside denied areas poses considerable challenges to effective activity monitoring. SOF should simultaneously pursue three lines of monitoring for opposition operations inside a denied area. Each line may utilize geo-tagged photographs and videos, interviews with key leaders, site visits and surveys, focus groups, social media monitoring and information provided by civil-society partners. Tactical-level M&E develops effective monitoring methods by communicating with the opposition force, mapping civil society organizations with access to the denied areas and facilitating direct or indirect communication with organizations and individuals that can provide feedback on the perception of the ANSA force by the local population. The three lines of monitoring include ANSA reporting, third-party monitors and proxy/ad hoc local monitors.

**ANSA Reporting:** This line of monitoring does not differ greatly from the current SOF reporting and assessment methodology of partnered units. SOF should require the submission of reports, photographs and/or videos of ANSA operations. Opposition operations should require the submission of plans and/or orders, signed receipts of donation for in-kind materials, receipts for cash reimbursement, copies or samples of media materials produced, and links to press coverage.

**Third-Party Monitors:** SOF should make the most of third-party monitoring abilities, based at various locations inside the denied area where the ANSAs operate. Third-party monitors provide the program with meaningful oversight of opposition operations and useful information about results. They could provide weekly political and security updates that are used to inform SOF, members of the interagency and other interested parties of opposition actions in a given geographic area. Private companies and nonprofit organizations offer training, monitoring and evaluations services, maintain subject-matter experts and experience in providing IHL and civilian protection-related training to governmental and non-governmental forces. Many of these organizations already provide related training and conceptualized programs on training, monitoring and evaluation. Additionally, these organizations may have — or could easily develop — additional monitoring or reporting infrastructure within an operational area.

**Proxy/Ad Hoc Local Monitors:** SOF should engage with local civil-society organizations to serve as proxy monitors for ANSAs inside denied areas. This may be done directly or through the many organizations that will already report to other agencies within the international community and the U.S. government. Local media can also provide monitoring through its network of reporters in the opposition’s operational areas. This network can verify output data provided to SOF by the ANSA forces, observe deliveries of salary payments or logistics, measure the achievement of opposition programs to support civilians in the operations area and assist with additional data collection efforts. In addition, SOF should use ad hoc
local monitors for individual activities. These monitors, consisting of local or regional organizations or other contacts within the denied area, verify operational effects and gauge the achievement of opposition objectives. Connecting organizations that provide civil or humanitarian services, such as fire response, search and rescue, food/medical aid or media coverage lends credibility and legitimacy to the opposition force when it is seen working in conjunction with or facilitating access and protection for these civil organizations.

The above network of partners will provide SOF with independent assessments of its training methodology and operations to ensure that newly trained ANSAs forces internalize core-learning objectives on HR and IHL within the appropriate cultural and religious context for interacting with domestic civil society and international humanitarian agencies.

Each tactical opposition unit should have an individually tailored M&E plan, which outlines planned effects and expected objectives of its operations. The plans should specify the method(s) data collection will occur and the M&E responsibilities of the ANSAs themselves, third-party monitors and the staff within the responsible SOF headquarters. The SOF staff should prepare after action reports and a narrative report outlining the achievement of planned effects and objectives, best practices, and lessons learned. Particular emphasis placed on the achievement of objectives will allow SOF to test and refine its M&E plan for each unit.

**Operational-Level M&E:** The primary focus of SOF’s operational-level M&E efforts is to measure the achievement of ANSA objectives and sub-objectives, listed in the campaign plan for each opposition unit. SOF should employ or pursue three methods for operational-level M&E: perception surveys, cluster evaluations and final evaluations.

**Perception Surveys:** SOF should establish an operations and intelligence cell to provide in-depth information on civil-military events and public perceptions of ANSAs, opposition civil authorities and the public in ANSA operational areas. Perception data may originate from geo-tagged photographs and videos, interviews with key leaders, site visits and surveys, focus groups, social media monitoring, and information provided by civil-society partners. Survey data may also substitute as a proxy variable to measure the achievement of program objectives and sub-objectives.

**Cluster Evaluations:** Cluster evaluations aggregate M&E data from multiple ANSA units to help measure the effectiveness of the program as a whole, and to manage toward operational or strategic objectives. Evaluations draw on existing documentation, perception survey data, informal surveys and/or focus group discussions, and social media coverage.

**Final Evaluations:** Final evaluations, conducted by an external firm/organization, evaluate efforts at or near the conclusion of the program. The final evaluations will seek to measure the overall impact of the HR, LOAC and IHL training, monitoring and evaluation program and aid in determining the extent to which related termination criteria are met.

**Strategic-Level M&E:** The primary focus of strategic-level M&E should analyze the political context of train and equip programs; carried out primarily through Department of State, USAID or other-governmental agency programs and working in conjunction with Department of Defense programs. Strategy review

The presence of “children” in fighting formations or support roles adds additional human rights challenges that trainers or advisors must address on a culturally and traditionally sensitive basis, as well as a legal basis. The Convention on the Rights of the Child generally defines a child as any person under the age of 18. However, Article 38 uses the lower age of 15 as the minimum for recruitment or participation in armed conflict.

U.S. ARMY PHOTO
sessions, program performance reviews and routine political analysis (focused on history, long-term political rivalries, culture and more) that feed into regional strategies and other documents, constitute the basis of these reviews. These processes contribute to SOF and USG understanding of the overall regional environment and aid in updating strategic decision makers.

Supporting ANSAs in their resistance against an autocratic or suppressive regime will remain on the extreme end of political warfare with roots in the true meaning proposed by George Kennan. While SOF, specifically Special Forces, is the only force organized, trained, educated, equipped and optimized to work through or with an ANSA group these operations will increasingly require the involvement of the USG interagency, the interagency of multinational partners and nongovernmental organizations. Expanding the focus of training programs and developing robust civilian networks for the continuous and thorough assessment of supported forces works to the attainment of military objectives and ultimately supports the national security policy of the United States.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Mag. Justin Frazier is a graduate of Texas Tech University with Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and History. He is the Special Operations Center of Excellence Representative to the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence. Prior to his completion of Intermediate Level Education and Irregular Warfare Scholars Program at the Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Maj. Frazier served as the 5th Special Forces Group (A) Civil Military Advisor and as the Civil Military Advisor and Primary Interagency Liaison for the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Syria.

NOTES
01. There is no universally agreed definition of “armed non-state actor.” For my purposes, I use this term to refer to organized armed entities that are primarily motivated by political goals, operate outside effective state control, and lack legal capacity to become party to relevant international treaties. This includes armed groups, de facto governing authorities, national liberation movements, and non- or partially internationally recognized states. This article uses terms such as opposition, opposition force, opposition group, guerilla, guerilla force, proxy, or proxy force interchangeably with ANSA and has no other definition than the above.
04. “Though the military tends to prefer the expressions ‘Laws of Armed Conflict’ (LOAC) or ‘Laws of War,’ these two expressions are synonymous with ‘IHL.’ In this article, IHL being defined by the International Committee of the Red Cross and generally accepted.” Commentary on the Additional Protocols of June 1977. ICRC, Geneva, 1987, p. XXVI.
15. For the purpose of this article, evaluation and assessment remain synonymous. Monitoring is defined as the systematic collection, analysis, and use of information to follow up on compliance with humanitarian norms; with the processing of information in oral or written reports. This definition derives from Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (PHPCR). Monitoring, Reporting and Fact-Finding Mechanisms: A Mapping and Assessment of Contemporary Efforts, HPCR, Harvard University, November 2010 and Amnesty International and Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, Monitoring and Investigating Human Rights Violations in Africa, A Handbook, Russell Press, Basford, Norris, 2000.
16. The Leahy Law (The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2002, S 3700M “Limitation on Assistance to Security Forces” (2003) and the current DOD Appropriations Act require the department of State and the Department of Defense to vet prospective foreign military units for evidence of past commission of gross human rights violations. The DoS utilizes the International Verification and Security Tracking (INVEST) system, which tracks all units and past individuals who are potential recipients of assistance, including any information that suggests they are ineligible for assistance and any past determinations regarding their eligibility. Because of the ambiguity in the law, questions on the eligibility status of ANSAs remain. In some recent cases, because the proxy forces were not part of a state-sponsored force, the Leahy Law does not apply; yet military commanders, civilian leaders, and congress have required similar or more in-depth screening of ANSAs. For a specific instance see: “U.S. Will Use Psych Evaluations, Stress Tests to Screen Syrian Rebels for Training.” Washington Post. Accessed April 05, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us- military-will-use-psych-avs-stress-tests-to-screen-syrian-rebels-for-training/2014/11/28/3b9b382-7712-11e4-bd1b-03009bd3e984_story.html.
DA PAM 600-3, OFFICER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND CAREER MANAGEMENT

DA G1 is separating DA Pam 600-3 into a core Pam, Chapters 1–7 (Part 1) with branch/functional area chapters posted on MILSUITE. Staffing completed for Part 1 on March 31. It is undergoing review prior to submission to Army Publishing for editing. Once finalized, the previously submitted branch/functional area chapters will be posted on MILSUITE. Key changes to the respective branch chapters are as follows:

CMF 18
> Updated key and developmental billets andSF organizations at the chief warrant officer 3 and 4 grade levels.
> Updated PME course titles.
> Recommend that CW3s should be MEL Q prior to promotion to CW4 andCW4s should be Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course complete prior to promotion to CW5.

CMF 37
> Updated naming conventions for PSYOP and MISO.
> Updated developmental billets at the captain, major and lieutenant colonel grade plates.
> Updated the Psychological Operations-related skill identifiers available to PSYOP officers.

CMF 38
> Adding a section on Military Government, skills, proficiency levels, recruitment and officer management.
Over the past few years, the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School dining facility has been undergoing changes. A recently concluded U.S. Army Special Operations Command study evaluated a nutrition intervention to improve the dietary intake of ARSOF dining facility patrons at SWCS. With the newly released results showing significant success, the program is beginning its launch to other ARSOF dining facilities within USASOC to continue improving the nutrition of special operations forces who dine in their respective ARSOF dining facilities.

The USASOC Human Performance Program, known internally as THOR3: Tactical Human Optimization Rapid Rehabilitation & Reconditioning, is a holistic approach to maintaining ARSOF operators’ readiness capabilities. USASOC HPP provides Soldiers access to a multidisciplinary team consisting of strength and conditioning staff, physical therapists, athletic trainers, mental performance coaches and performance dietitians. The design of the program enables ARSOF operators to maintain mission readiness, decrease injury rates and return to duty time, as well as increase the longevity of their careers.

HPP performance dietitians at SWCS rely heavily on classroom education for nutrition instruction due to the size of the population. To build on education efforts and better equip ARSOF operators and students with optimal fueling options to enhance performance, a study design was created to assess and ultimately validate a novel approach to integrating classroom education with providing updated performance based menu options in the dining facility.

**Accessing Nutrition and Setting Standards**

The U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine was tasked to assess the performance nutrition intervention developed by the SWCS performance dietitians that incorporated classroom education and changes to the SWCS dining facility. These changes included performance-based recipes, modified menu standards and population-specific point-of-service labeling. The intervention was evaluated from multiple aspects including patron satisfaction, diet quality of patrons’ food selections, food service management practices, cost, operational sustainability and feasibility for future expansion to other ARSOF dining facilities. Some menu modifications that fell within the scope of dining facility regulations had already been implemented at the SWCS dining facility prior to the approved release from AR 30-22, which governs what Army dining facilities must serve (example French fries were baked, not fried). Full implementation of the USASOC HPP DFAC intervention began after the baseline data collection received...
approval from the Army G4 (Funding), the Defense Logistics Agency and the Joint Culinary Center of Excellence.

SOF performance-based menu standards and guidelines were developed jointly by the SOF Performance Nutrition Working Group consisting of Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force performance dietitians within the SOF community. The core of the updated standards was founded on the U.S. Olympic Training Center’s menu standards, which had also incorporated the 2010 Dietary Guidelines for Americans. The point-of-service labeling implemented during the study included colored cards with ammunition style icons, which became coined as the ‘THOR3 bullet system’. The more ‘bullets’ a card had (1-3) reflected options with a higher nutrient density. The colors reflected the types of foods: green = carbohydrate, blue = protein, yellow = fats, purple = combination of protein and carbohydrate. This approach to labeling was user-friendly in terms of making performance focused food choices and accepted within the SOF community to reflect both quality and type of foods available.

USARIEM utilized the Healthy Eating Index tool to measure diet quality of participants’ trays as they compared to the 2010 Dietary Guidelines for Americans. This method evaluated multiple domains of foods (fruits, vegetables, beans, refined grains, fatty acids, etc.) and respective nutrient contents on a scale of 100 possible points. The national average HEI score over the past 10 years has ranged from 48-57 points.* The study results showed the SWCS dining facility HEI score increased from 65.6 at baseline to 70.3 at the end of the 12-month study when accounting for the increased sodium needs of the military. This was a 20 point difference compared to the control dining facility (56.3 points) at the end of the study. Overall diner satisfaction improved as well during the study, validating the acceptance of the new menu and labeling system by the community.

The Way Forward
Cost effectiveness of the updated 21 day menu was verified during the study within the allotted SOF basic daily food allowance, as was the feasibility of expanding this intervention to other ARSOF dining facilities. Incorporation of the dining facility food service staff for feedback and evaluation was highly beneficial during the study and will be valuable at other locations as well once the program expands. 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) has been selected as the next implementation site to other locations as well once the program expands. 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) has been selected as the next implementation site to incorporate the 2010 Dietary Guidelines for Americans. The point-of-service labeling implemented during the study included colored cards with ammunition style icons, which became coined as the ‘THOR3 bullet system’. The more ‘bullets’ a card had (1-3) reflected options with a higher nutrient density. The colors reflected the types of foods: green = carbohydrate, blue = protein, yellow = fats, purple = combination of protein and carbohydrate. This approach to labeling was user-friendly in terms of making performance focused food choices and accepted within the SOF community to reflect both quality and type of foods available.

USARIEM utilized the Healthy Eating Index tool to measure diet quality of participants’ trays as they compared to the 2010 Dietary Guidelines for Americans. This method evaluated multiple domains of foods (fruits, vegetables, beans, refined grains, fatty acids, etc.) and respective nutrient contents on a scale of 100 possible points. The national average HEI score over the past 10 years has ranged from 48-57 points.* The study results showed the SWCS dining facility HEI score increased from 65.6 at baseline to 70.3 at the end of the 12-month study when accounting for the increased sodium needs of the military. This was a 20 point difference compared to the control dining facility (56.3 points) at the end of the study. Overall diner satisfaction improved as well during the study, validating the acceptance of the new menu and labeling system by the community.

* Additional details on the HEI-2010 domains can be accessed at http://riskfactor.cancer.gov/tools/hei.

continued from page 31

JOINT CREDIT
An officer may receive joint credit for serving in a Standard-Joint Duty Assignment or requesting Experience-Joint Duty Assignment or the officer may receive credit for a combination of S-JDA and E-JDA. Here, we are focusing on Levels II-IV with regard to joint credit.

The definition of Joint can be summarized by what you do, matters related to the achievement of unified action by integrated military forces in operations conducted across domains, such as land, sea, air space or in the information environment and with whom you do it with, in the context of joint matters, the term “integrated military forces” refers to military forces that are involved in the planning or execution (or both) of operations.

Traditional S-JDA credit is earned following 24 months in a position on the Joint Duty Assignment List; previously it was a 36-month requirement. The Secretary of Defense may waive this requirement to 22 months for officers selected for CSL or attendance to SSC and the officer may be awarded full joint tour credit.

Level II
- Accrual of 18 joint qualification points (a minimum of 12 points from joint experiences other than joint training or joint exercise) or awarded full joint duty credit
- Successful completion of JPME Phase I
- Accrue 36 points for award of ASI “3A”, Joint Duty Assignment Qualified

Level III
- Requester must be O-4 or above
- Awarded full joint-duty credit of 36 joint qualification points or a combination of SJDA and E-JDA time to equal 36 points/months
- Successful completion of JPME II or Advanced Joint Professional Military Education (AJPME) (RC only)
- Have been selected by the Secretary of Defense for designation as a Joint Qualified Officer
- Receive ASI “3L”, Joint Qualified Officer

Level IV
- Accrue 24 joint qualification points or awarded G/FO joint-duty credit from an assignment in a G/FO joint billet

Officers requesting E-JDA (experience based) must self-nominate through the Joint Qualification Systems and submit their request within one year of completing their joint experience. Requests must be submitted via https://www.hrc.army.mil/officer/joint%20policy%20branch.

Points are awarded based on duration of duty, 30.4 days equates to one point. If it is a combat deployment, there is a multiple of 3 for each deployment. If it is a non-combat deployment, there is a multiple of 2. Steady state deployments have a multiple of 1.

Note: DoDI 1300.19, DoD Joint Officer Management (JOM) Program will undergo review later this FY.
The October 2015 issue of Special Warfare magazine carried an article by Capt. Shawn Stangle, wherein he outlined the Special Operations Forces Captain’s Career Course concept and the advantages that he believes it to confer upon Army Special Operations Forces. It is my contention that the new career course model is ultimately detrimental to the Special Forces Regiment. It deprives SF captains of some of the best training the Army has to offer and denies them exposure to a peer group from other branches, services and partner nations that would otherwise nest with USASOC’s ARSOF 2022 vision.

Before 2012, Army captains and first lieutenants who had been selected for entry into the Special Forces Qualification Course attended the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course at Fort Benning, Georgia. Officers selected for entry into the Civil Affairs or Psychological Operations qualification courses attended any available captain’s career course—regardless of branch. MCCC is a 22-week course for Infantry and Armor officers, the first half of which is spent on company operations and troop leading procedures, the second on battalion staff operations and the military decision-making process. The course required a permanent change of station move to Fort Benning.

The new SOFCCC is three months long at Fort Bragg. This has the definite benefit of saving taxpayer money ($7 million per year, according to the article). A shorter career course and no additional PCS had the net effect of getting ARSOF captains to graduate sooner, which means more time for utilization in operational billets. Captains move from their initial assignments directly to Fort Bragg, which saves them and their family the inconvenience of a very short PCS move to Fort Benning. Finally, SOFCCC has ARSOF instructors and a more ARSOF-driven curriculum, which is intended to standardize the captain’s mission planning procedures and doctrinal competencies before starting their ARSOF qualification courses.

One of the ARSOF 2022 priorities is to optimize SOF and conventional force interdependence. Special Forces deploy and fight as Operational Detachment-Alphas, led by captains. With this in mind, I believe there is no single person in our formation more important to imbue with the SOF/CF partnership than our SFODA commanders. Attending MCCC allowed future SF officers, regardless of their previous branch, to mix with Infantry and Armor officers, as well as a small cohort of officers from a cross-section of other branches in the Army, sister services and partner nations. On a personal level, it allowed me to network with other captains who are now company commanders or staff officers in conventional brigade combat teams. As a result, I know a captain in every Army Division, at minimum, and they know a captain in SF. This is a great resource to be able to reach out and talk about upcoming deployments, training center rotations or overseas exercises with the conventional force involved.

Capt. Stangle wrote that SOFCCC provides a “cementing of relationships” between SF, CA and PSYOP officers, which “allows for continued collaboration throughout their careers.” Had I attended SOFCCC, my SF peer group would be the same group of captains for the 18 months of the SFQC after graduating SOFCCC. It is true that I would have met more Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations officers. However, I think SF’s interoperability with our ARSOF brethren is inherently better than that with CF. ARSOF officers collaborate out of necessity, often working within the same company-sized element in CONUS training and overseas. We do not have the same working relationship with the conventional Army. By setting a professional standard in MCCC with our CF peers, we set the precedent that SF is an elite, professional force and negate some of the negative stereotypes that can have an adverse effect on our autonomy and freedom of maneuver. Our ultimate goal is to develop a symbiotic relationship with the rest of the Army and expand our network of SF supporters. Isolating ourselves in a SOF-specific course will not help, in this regard.

From a tactical perspective, MCCC graduates understand how the combined arms fight works and how light, mechanized and Stryker units are employed and their effects integrated in offense, defense and stability operations. This is essential to creating the well-rounded and well-connected SF officer that has to work effectively alongside and sometimes nest his efforts with CF. While SOFCCC instructors can provide more specific insight and training tailored to detachment command in the ARSOF world, they cannot match the MCCC instructors’ experience of commanding conventional companies. Capt. Stangle wrote that SOFCCC provided “an advantage in uniquely preparing assessed students for their branch qualification course.” I contend that the SFQC for officers should require no preparation course. If such a thing is required, it would seem to make more sense to restructure the 18A MOS phase of SFQC, instead of trying to recreate the effects of MCCC.

My recommendation is that SF officers attend MCCC en route to SFQC to continue to get the training for company and battalion-level operations that will enable success. The Special Forces Regiment should put its best foot forward by sending top-performing senior captains and junior majors to serve as instructors at MCCC, which would further CF/SOF interdependence, as well. I do not dispute that the new SOFCCC model saves taxpayer money, that it spares ARSOF captains and their families an additional PCS move, nor that it enables captains to move more quickly through the SFQC. However, the money and time saved with the new SOFCCC pale in comparison to the loss of the opportunity to build relationships with CF officers and the opportunity to understand how they fight.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Capt. Gordon Richmond is a graduate of the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course at Fort Benning and a SFODA Commander in 1st SFG(A).
There will never be less information available than there is when you read this sentence. Experts at IBM estimate that the human race is currently creating new data at a rate of 2.5 quintillion bytes of data every day; a rate that is projected to exponentially increase for the foreseeable future. Simultaneously, budget constraints will increase pressure on senior U.S. Government leaders to allocate scarce resources based on solid, data-driven evidence.

Special operations forces often play a critical role in shaping U.S. Government understanding of local dynamics and conditions in vulnerable communities throughout the world. Through persistent engagement in remote or difficult-to-access areas, tactical-level Special operations forces contribute unique atmospherics that provide policymakers key information necessary for making effective decisions. Being able to communicate and understand this information is important, and will only become increasingly more important.

Therefore, being able to depict and analyze information gathered at the tactical level is increasingly important for special operations leaders seeking to understand the operational environment. In this process, the ability of SOF leaders to display (or visualize) information in a manner that effectively communicates their intent will be crucial.

In his book The Visual Display of Quantitative Information, Dr. Edward R. Tufte provides a thorough overview of the key concepts at play in the field of data visualization. A pioneer in the study of effective communication of information, Dr. Tufte brings a multi-disciplinary approach to bear on the subject, providing actionable, tangible, useful advice to approaching a skill that may at first seem primarily artistic or subjective. Though published in 1983, this book has undeniable relevance for tactical-level SOF personnel seeking to effectively communicate information to senior leaders.

The author breaks down his approach to data visualization into two main parts – “Graphical Practice,” which provides overarching characteristics of effective data visualization, and “Theory of Data Graphics,” which gives specific advice for readers seeking to effectively display particular types of information or certain relationships between sets of data. Most of Dr. Tufte’s suggestions revolve around how to create graphics that “reveal the data.” To effectively communicate their intent, a communicator must ensure that his or her graphic:

1. Shows the data in an accurate manner
2. Induces the viewer to think about the substance of what is being communicated
3. Makes large data sets cohere
4. Serves a clear purpose
5. Provides sufficient context for any data presented

Assertions are supported through historical examples and side-by-side comparisons of graphics drawn from a wide variety of sources. Considering the inherent dryness of the subject matter, Dr. Tufte succeeds in communicating his recommendations in an accessible and engaging manner.

The concepts presented in The Visual Display of Quantitative Information allow tactical-level SOF leaders to gain a baseline understanding of data visualization. Building competency in this area will improve how information of importance is articulated to SOF leadership, U.S. Government policymakers and other interagency partners. Given that the availability of information will continue to increase, the ability to effectively visualize this information will only become increasingly important in the future. SOF leaders would do well to take an interest.