**OBJECTIVE-T EFFORT**

Objective T is the latest Army Sustainment Readiness Model. It is imperative that the force understands the new procedures, including the yet to be published regulatory and doctrinal guidance. This article outlines the changes and the critical information required to conduct assessments and inform the reporting process. Additionally, a monthly training newsletter is published on MILSuite that provides in-depth instructions on the use of the various systems and how they work together.

**ARMY SUSTAINMENT READINESS MODEL (SRM)**

The SRM is a form of risk management the Army uses to manage and balance mission with resources. It informs high level decision-making on which units must maintain high readiness and which units can maintain a lower level of readiness. It also informs the Army on which units are prepared for war immediately and which require a specified amount of time and resources to become ready. The Army defines strategic readiness as a process that assesses the ability of the total force, as well as the operating and generating force, to execute its role to meet the demands of the National Military Strategy. The Army is developing the latest readiness model to meet that need. The Sustainment Readiness Model represents a change in methodology from the previously utilized processes of ARFORGEN and SOFORGEN. Those terms are now obsolete but the concept is essentially the same with some name changes. The readiness model that applied to the majority of Army forces was the ARFORGEN (now called SRM). Special Operations forces were never a part of the ARFORGEN pool. In fact, at the bottom of each table of organization and equipment narrative there is a statement that reads ‘this unit is not a part of the Global Force Pool of operational forces...It does not support or participate in the ARFORGEN model.’ That model consisted of Reset, Train/Ready and Available pools. The name has changed, and the pool names have changed but the cycle remains relatively the same for Active Army, Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve. For example, Reset is now Prepare 1, Train/Ready 1, 2 and 3 are now Ready 2, 3 and 4, the available pool is now the Mission module. The USAR still has a five-year cycle, the conventional Army forces are on a three-year cycle and ARSOF is on a 18 months cycle.

The U.S. Special Operations Command has directed (USSOCOM 525-25) that all SOF units/personnel must be on at a minimum 1:2 mission to dwell ratio. To meet that requirement the Special Warfare Readiness Model was created (Figure 01).

Certain activities are supposed to occur in each of the phases in order to sustain the readiness of the capability. The Joint Chiefs of Staff use the information from the models (DRRS-S, JTIMS) to inform them on what units available pool is now the Mission module. The USAR still has a five-year cycle, the conventional Army forces are on a three-year cycle and ARSOF is on a 18 months cycle. The U.S. Special Operations Command has directed (USSOCOM 525-25) that all SOF units/personnel must be on at a minimum 1:2 mission to dwell ratio. To meet that requirement the Special Warfare Readiness Model was created (Figure 01).

![Figure 01](special warfare)

**ARSOF Training/Readiness 1:2 Model (Total Cycle=18 Months) (D2D = 1:2)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prepare ~ 4 Months</th>
<th>Ready ~ 8 Months</th>
<th>Mission 6 Months</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual / Crew Qualification</td>
<td>MET Proficiency</td>
<td>BN Ex / TM FMPs, MET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual / Crew Training, Medical, Met Training, PME, Leave</td>
<td>Live Fire Gates</td>
<td>MRX-EXEVAL, Pre-Deployment Prep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Readiness Focus</td>
<td>On Mission or Sustain</td>
<td>6-Month Deployment Cycle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Army Objective-T Terminology**

- **External Evaluation**
- **On Mission or Sustain**
- **Pre-Deployment Prep**
- **Deployment Risk**
- **Validates**
- **Determine**

**Army Objective-T Methodology**

1:2 Training Readiness Model developed by USASOC Staff and CSC/CSUs during SOFORGEN Workshop. Model began phased use by USASOC & 1st SFC(A) in FY16 with full use by FY18.
are prepared for joint operations. Army Special Operations Forces experience an extremely high mission deployment rate when compared to conventional units. Coupled with the fact that it is inherently a much smaller force with a very high demand for services, ARSOF faces serious challenges to maintain a sustained ready force. The readiness models are progressive in that as one team or unit moves forward in the module to month 2, another team or unit moves into the same module at month 1. That means there are now two teams in that module and so on. There are specific activities that take place during each module of the readiness model. Some of the activities are listed in Figure 01. The Army defined activities are explained in depth in the AR 525-30 (currently under revision). Please note on Figure 01 that the Prepare and Ready modules have a three month overlap. By utilizing the readiness model, units are able to shelter time for training, equipping and educating their personnel. It also provides needed rest time between deployments and exercises. While this new readiness model seeks to better manage the force, all the models in the world will not work if they are not used properly. Unit training management is the key to successful training readiness. Multiple courses are available on the ATRRS for unit training managers. The readiness models work hand-in-hand with the objective-T effort.

**STANDARDIZED MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LIST**

The standardized mission essential task list was established to provide a more accurate assessment of Army capability readiness. Most Army units are required to be on a standardized METL. The majority of conventional forces have been on the DA Standardized METL for more than 10 years so that part of the process is not new to them. What is new is that now the standardized METLs must be developed from theater level down to company level. Non-deployable table of distribution and allowances units do not have standardized METLs. An example of a non-deployable TDA unit is the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. Standardized METLs are developed by the proponents with input from the operational force commanders. This input is usually provided during an annual METL review and development working group. Proponents are responsible for developing METLs for the active and reserve components. Each METL consists of mission essential tasks and the supporting collective tasks. All SCTs must be steps in the MET. METLs are developed using a standard set of rules approved by the HQDA G3/5/7. Those rules are as follows:

- METLs are based on the mission the unit was designed to perform as described in the unit TOE narrative and doctrine.
- All METs must be in a training and evaluation outline (T&EO) format.
- The METs must be approved in the Training Development Capability system and on the Central Army Registry.
- No universal joint tasks may be used. UJTs cannot be used because they do not have a T&EO. The proponent must write a T&EO that will reflect the UJT intent and measures. The Army Universal Task List will not be used for the same reason the UJTL cannot be used. The tasks do not have T&EOS.
- No staff tasks may be on the METL unless that is the primary mission of the unit.
- No warfighting functions will be a MET on the METL.
- The METL must contain a deployment task.
- No more than seven METs on a METL unless an exception is granted. There is no restriction for the minimum number of METs.
- Each MET may have no more than seven supporting collective tasks plus the appropriate mission command task for the echelon. There is no minimum number of SCTs for a MET.
- The selected SCTs must be included as steps in the MET and linked to the MET.

There are special additional requirements for ARSOF METs and those are as follows:

- The METs must be based on a UJT. Except when no UJT is available such as the deployment task.
- The METs and SCTs must be written using joint conditions and joint terminology.
- The METs must also comply with Army TRADOC task technical standards and procedures.

These development requirements clearly demonstrate why it is necessary for the units to coordinate with the proponents for developing their METLs. In all cases the tasks must be analyzed and developed using the appropriate TRADOC systems.

Once the tasks are developed, the proponent will then enter the METL in another TRADOC system called the METL builder in the DTMS-CMS. The Net-Centric Unit Status Report will pull the approved METL from the METL builder and populate the reporting systems. The NETUSR will have several updates before it is fully capable of extracting the approved METLs from the system. Figure 02 demonstrates the relationship of all the systems in play with this process. Throughout the reporting period the unit will enter the training evaluations in the DTMS. The unit will enter the
assessments, data, individual training records for mandatory training and qualifications and this information will be entered into the NetUSR and transferred to the SIPRNET reporting systems. The DRRS-A populates the DRRS-S and the DRRS-S populates the Joint Training Information Management System.

Since all the METs were developed with joint reporting requirements in mind and, are available for access in the unit DTMS and the NETUS, there is no need for the units to develop METs or manually enter information in the systems in the event there is a requirement for an additional task or MET, the unit should contact the proponent for assistance.

All Army units are required to use the DTMS, including ARSOF units. DTMS has a multi-layer security system. Not only must you have a CAC to use it, you must also have an account. Users are only able to access the units the DTMS manager allows. The accounts are all managed by the unit DTMS account manager. Most Brigade level units and above have a DTMS master trainer available to manage the system access and to provide the required training to unit users. Mobile Training Teams are available from TRADOC at no cost to the units. These may be coordinated through the proponent or requested directly from the Army Training Network website.

NEW LOOK TO THE TRAINING AND EVALUATION OUTLINE (T&EO)

The T&EO has a new look with the inclusion of the training evaluation matrix and the identification of leader and critical steps. The measures will look a little different in some tasks as well. In the past, the measures were usually copies of the step changed to past tense. That is no longer the case. The measures will describe the observable and measureable results that the step was written to produce. Steps that are not to be measured will have N/A under the GO/NO-GO/N/A blocks. Only the steps that are critical to the successful completion of the task are measured. An example is located on the Special Warfare website.

WORDS MATTER — KEY DEFINITIONS

There are some key definitions that units need to know. During the Sustainment Readiness/Objective T Working Group that took place at Carlisle Barracks in January this year, the Operating Environment (TRADOC G2 lead) working group was tasked with developing the definitions for static, dynamic, complex, hybrid threat and single threat. They developed the definitions and then staffed them for input to the other working groups. The final products will be published in the new FM 7.0, Train to Win in a Complex World. These terms are important for leaders and trainers to know and understand because they will have an impact on whether or not the unit will be able to achieve a trained or partially trained rating. These definitions are taken into account when the METs and supporting collective tasks are written. The measures and standards complement the conditions requirements and the Training Evaluation Matrix (Figure 03), setting the unit up for success during training.

Static. Aspects of operational variables (PMESII-PT) needed to stimulate mission variables (METT-TC) do not change throughout the unit’s execution of the task.

Dynamic. Operational variables and threat TTPs for assigned counter-tasks change in response to the execution of BLUFOR’s task.

Complex. Requires a minimum of four (terrain, time, military [threat] and social [population]) or more operational variables; brigade and higher units require all eight operational variables (PMESII-PT) to be replicated in varying degrees based on the task being trained.

Single Threat. Regular, irregular, criminal or terrorist forces.

Hybrid Threat. The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects.

These definitions are included in the FM 7.0. Hybrid threat uses the ADRP 1.02 definition. The trainer and the unit leadership will determine what constitutes dynamic and complex based on the unit type and

FIGURE 03

Training Evaluation Matrix. The proponent will adjust the PLAN and PREPARE (highlighted in green) factors for each task. Those tasks that require a live fire will have a special task number ending in "L" specified in the T&EO.
missions. The proponent determines if it should be trained in limited visibility, MOPP, live fire and the type of training environment that should be used. An example of a conditions statement may be found on the Special Warfare website.

**OBJECTIVE-T EFFORT**

Objective-T is the moniker given to a process for objectively evaluating training readiness. This process applies to all Army units from theater- to company-level. Objectively evaluating training is important because, in addition to saving lives, the Army Readiness Guidance and the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.03X clearly states that training is the key to readiness. Using an objective methodology assures senior leaders what units are ready to go to war and what is required to bring other units up to the appropriate readiness standard. Not all units will be resourced to achieve a C2 or C1 level of readiness. This effort requires all Army proponents to completely revise all the collective tasks (approximately 4,700) and write new tasks to meet the mission essential task and the objective T rating requirements. Manpower is a finite resource and this process is time consuming. The decision to postpone the implementation of the objective T reporting was made during the Senior Leader Readiness Forum (June 2016). Once all the regulations (AR 350-1; AR 220-1; and DA Pam 350-1) are revised and published, all units will begin using the new NETUSR reporting processes. The expected date for implementation is the February/March 2017 time frame. The new training metrics are published in the FM 7.0 and the C rating metrics in the AR 220-1.

The metrics in FM 7.0 go hand-in-hand with the training evaluation matrix shown in figure 03. The matrix is developed for each task as the task is developed. In order to use the new T&EOs efficiently it is critical that the unit establishes a training program that addresses SOF, Army and joint training requirements. That includes using the METL, the CATS and the DTMS. All Army units including ARSOF are required to use the Digital Training Management System and the Combined Arms Training Strategy. The Army uses the crawl-walk-run methodology for training units/elements. Units are not expected to achieve above a P- during a crawl training event. Due to the metrics involved, a class will never achieve above a P-. That does not mean it is not a successful training event.

**ASSESSING A MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK**

All Army units are required to participate as trainees in an external evaluation on an annual basis. The EXEVAL is used to determine if the unit is prepared to transition to the next module of the readiness cycle. In the case of ARSOF, this will most likely occur halfway through the Ready module. Actual frequency rates will be published in the AR 350-1 and the DA Pam 350-1. The training event is evaluated by and resourced by the command two levels up. The training event is developed around the commander’s training objectives. The training objectives are identified during the commanders’ dialogue. The observer controllers/trainers are trained (all must be formally trained) and provided by higher headquarters two levels up as part of the resourcing of the exercise. The training evaluators use the T&EO to evaluate the training. The commander and unit leaders will do the overall training assessment in the DTMS. There is no option to degrade or increase the training evaluation using the T&EO. Commanders may request a degradation or increase of the assessment by one level during the commanders’ dialogue based on special considerations. The final assessment is recorded in the DTMS.

The diagram in figure 04 shows how to use the T&EO to calculate the overall rating for a MET.

**CONVERTING T/T- /P/P-/U TO THE JOINT Y/Q/N**

During the Sustainment Readiness/Objective T Working Group the Task Framework and Authoritative Data linkage to Joint Readiness assessments working group (DAMO-ODR and DAMO-TRC lead) developed the methodology for converting the Army MET assessment (T/T-/P/P-/U) to the Joint Y/Q/N. That process is diagramed in Figure 05. There is only a slight difference from the existing methodology. If the MET was assessed at a P or P- and there are sufficient resources to successfully accomplish the MET, the commander may choose to downgrade the rating from a Qualified Yes to a No. The downgrade will require a comment for justification. The new methodology will be published in the AR 220-1 that is currently in revision.

**SHIFT IN MINDSET**

A shift in mindset is required to make this system work. That involves educating our forces on the new processes as well as continuing communication between commanders and leaders. The commanders’ dialogue does not occur once or twice a year anymore. The commanders’ dialogue must be a routine function of command. There should never be a surprise evalu-
tation on a MET to the senior commander or the commander being evaluated. All evaluations must be honest in order to determine where the shortfalls are and what resources are required to achieve the desired level of readiness. The semi-annual and the yearly training briefs should have detailed information on MET assessments to include how the assessment was determined. If a unit must report a P or P-, it is not necessarily considered a failure in leadership. It means that unit is only resourced to achieve that training readiness level or there is a situation that must be addressed whether it be a shortage of personnel (training evaluation matrix), too many broken Soldiers in a unit, a lack of funding or equipment that is not properly functioning. Those factors must be acknowledged in order to be fixed. The way this process benefits the ARSOF unit is by objectively identifying what specific resources (time, funding, equipment, personnel, facilities and training) are lacking so that those deficiencies may be addressed with the higher headquarters from company- or team-level up to theater-level units. The commanders’ dialogue is now one of the most important conversations a commander will have during his or her command.

Just a quick word regarding out-of-service equipment; when you borrow a required piece of equipment from another unit (or team) in order to meet mission requirements, that other unit is now degraded in readiness. It may relieve the immediate pain but what happens when that other unit gets called to deploy and cannot meet mission because they loaned the equipment to your unit? The answer is not to get in that position by reporting equipment shortages and out-of-service pieces as soon as they become non-mission capable. If you have a team that loses three members on a mission, how long does it take to get the replacements up to the standards of the team? It takes several months of working together to build the team trust and instill the team ethics in new members. Meanwhile that team’s readiness is degraded due to the personnel attrition. The degraded team goes into the prepare module. The scenarios presented here are simplistic in nature but they make the point. The ARSOF unit is by objectively identifying what specific resources (time, funding, equipment, personnel, facilities and training) are lacking so that those deficiencies may be addressed with the higher headquarters from company- or team-level up to theater-level units. The commanders’ dialogue is now one of the most important conversations a commander will have during his or her command.

CONCLUSION

In closing, the OBJ T effort does two things for ARSOF. First, it will allow Commanders at all levels to have a more effective and informed conversation about training proficiency, manning and equipment status as well as provide a standardized process to improve readiness reporting. Every unit must be manned, trained and equipped to perform its mission. Readiness reporting is how the Army allocates resources and prepares units to fight. Training is the key to readiness. Inaccurate reporting limits a higher echelon commander’s ability to address readiness shortfalls. It will have strategic costs, financial costs, and most importantly it will cost lives. The new Objective T effort is designed to eliminate or significantly reduce the occurrences of inaccurate reports, providing the Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff a more accurate picture of what units are fully capable now and what it will take, in terms of resources, to make other units fully capable of deploying and winning the fight. This is critical especially now because of the high demand placed on ARSOF. Our ability to maintain a balance between a high deployment tempo and an objective, appropriately standardized training pathway will ensure that we are able to sustain and improve upon the unique capabilities ARSOF provides to our nation.

The MILSuite URL for the monthly training newsletter is: https://www.milsuite.mil/book/community/spaces/usajfswcs. SW

BONUS CONTENT ONLINE http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/archive/2902/TrainingUpdate

Want to know more? See additional diagrams and links for more information on our website.