SPECIAL WARFARE

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92ND CIVIL AFFAIRS IN THE BALKANS
OPERATION ATLANTIC RESOLVE IN DEPTH

BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE
ARSOF IN EUROPE

THE OFFICIAL PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF U.S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
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On the Cover

The space between war and peace — the Gray Zone — is graphically illustrated by the graffiti underneath the Ibar River Bridge in Mitrovica, Kosovo, a city that is physically segregated by the ethnic divide in the region.

U.S. Army Photo

See the full story starting on page 26.
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In December 2015, President Barak Obama articulated the diverse nature of the threats the United States is facing and the need to look at the ways in which we approach them. One of the tools he refers to is U.S. Army Special Operations Soldiers. The unique skill sets our Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Soldiers possess — unmatched tactical skills, advanced education and cultural knowledge — are what make them successful in operating in the Human Domain and in the Gray Zone — the space between war and peace.

In this issue of Special Warfare, we take an in depth look at how our ARSOF Soldiers assigned to Special Operations Command Europe are bringing their unique talents to bear while working with not only our NATO partners but also in support of other partners in the region. Our European partners are on the frontline and are facing very real threats from destabilization caused by Russian aggression, the surge in violent extremism, as well the flow of foreign fighters and refugees fleeing the war in Syria.

With our NATO partners, ARSOF is working under the banner of Operation Atlantic Resolve, training with our partners to ensure the common defense of our nations, which is at the heart and soul of NATO agreements. It is imperative that the U.S. maintains a persistent forward presence in Europe as a means of mutual defense, but also to deter hostile acts from potential adversaries. Soldiers assigned to the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) play a key role in Atlantic Resolve, and in this issue you will read not only about their efforts but also those of their PSYOP partners.

In the Balkans, small teams of Civil Affairs Soldiers from the 92nd Civil Affairs Battalion are doing an outstanding job of building relationships with partner nation military and police. The Civil Military Support Element are also working closely with local governments, medical facilities and schools. These small teams, often the only U.S. presence in these areas, are having a dramatic impact in countries like Bosnia and Kosovo. They are key players in our embassies and have earned the respect of the Ambassadors and their country teams.

As the security challenges throughout Europe and the world continue to change, ARSOF will continue to build its relationships with our partner forces around the world to ensure the security of our nation.

“So the biggest challenge we have right now is disorder. Failed states. Asymmetric threats from terrorist organizations. And what I’ve been trying to do is to make sure that over the course of the last six years and hopefully the next two, we just have more tools in our toolkit to deal with the actual problems that we have now and that we can project into the future, rather than just constantly relying on the same tools that we used when we were dealing with Germany and Japan in World War II.”

— President Barak Obama
“The Vox Conversation”
Foreign Policy
December 2015
DAESH AND THE GRAY ZONE: More Black and White than They Appear?

The previous issue of *Special Warfare* addressed the concept of the Gray Zone, that evolving space where state and non-state threats develop and proliferate. In order to begin grappling with the concept as it applies to terrorism, the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School partnered with the National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs, in particular the Fort Bragg-based Joint Special Operations Master of Arts program, on a research symposium entitled *Daesh Beyond the Levant*. The event included scholars and practitioners from the U.S. and international partner nations. Panelists identified several categories of issues that need to be addressed in the fight against Daesh, and as it more generally represents the potential outcome for other Gray Zone conflicts.

Yet one of the critical questions regarding Daesh went unanswered by the panelists, that is, whether or not the group represents something new and unfamiliar to U.S. policy, or if it fits into a larger paradigm of revolutionary movements. To start the process of answering that question, JSOMA students were tasked with looking at the group from the lens of statehood, in part because three of the primary titles for Daesh give it the name “Islamic State,” but more importantly because it seeks to become a state in the eyes of wider audiences and those people Daesh currently dominates. Some of the framework used by the students included discussions of pseudo (false), quasi (partial) and proto (developing) states. Other aspects included discussing what Daesh represents more broadly as an anti-status quo violent extremist organization. This term allowed the students to identify the goals of Daesh as more than barbarism, and instead situate it in the larger pantheon of violent groups bent on changing fundamental aspects of the current international system.

As such, Daesh is not simply an aberration when it comes to non-state actors bent on death and destruction. The group represents something much larger and with a longer history, specifically as an anti-liberal (as in Western Enlightenment, not the American political left or free market economic theories) entity that wants to be a state in the modern sense, but with a regime based on rules that differ fundamentally from European and American democracy. In that regard, Daesh sits among many other dictators and military juntas. Yet there is a difference, for while Vladimir Putin certainly possesses autocratic power over the Russian political system, and Myanmar’s former military elites ran a tightly controlled country, both maintain the trappings of democracy, and in the latter’s case, the actual substance when elections overturned the military leadership. Therefore, Daesh is and is not like other non-democratic entities because of its push for modern statehood but with its own set of rules defining the political game, rules that violate so much of what makes Western democracy good and beneficial.

This complexity runs counter to another aspect of Daesh raised at the symposium, specifically, that the group is unique and simple to understand because it is “evil.” Yes, it is evil in many ways, but the group is neither unique in its goals nor does calling it evil add to our understanding of the group or how to defeat it. Many things are evil but fundamentally defy simple solutions. Debt bondage that keeps generations in slavery is evil. The rape of children is evil. Yet calling them such does not get us any closer to arriving at a solution. That is why taking on Daesh requires effective policy analysis, not soapbox rhetoric designed to give decision makers the false impression that bombing them will lead to victory, any more than negotiating with them will produce peace. Daesh is complex and the problems that gave rise to it are equally so. So must the solution be as well.

Any solution for the Daesh problem should first look back on comparable revolutionary groups, whether radical in terms of advancing a wholly new vision of the future that requires violence to achieve it, as with the Bolsheviks and Lenin’s reign of terror; or reactionary by calling society back to a golden age morality, as in the Iranian revolution, also through violent means. Both types of movements have the same goal though, to capture the title of State, for continued on page 06
DAESH AND THE GRAY ZONE

continued from page 05

with it comes the imprimatur of legitimacy, in terms of conferring the right to monopolize the use of legitimate coercive force, and in reference to the global community of states thus opening international relations and all the benefits of trade, membership in the UN and protections under the law. For example, the Soviet Union and Iran followed contrary paths as they emerged in the international system, with different ideologies guiding their regimes’ political rules, but both also played by a host of fundamental interstate rules governing things from air traffic controls to diplomatic privilege. The point is not to cast either as upstanding members of the international community, rather to say that the U.S. has dealt with revolutionary movements that gained statehood before, and Daesh wants the same basic thing — to be recognized as legitimate. For certain, its methods are abhorrent, but current discussions of those methods and the goals they seek to achieve have gone astray.

More importantly, Daesh’s primary audience is not the West, any more than Lenin or Khomeini’s were. Daesh is primarily focused on the ummah, that wide reaching, culturally diverse, yet religiously centered Muslim world that draws its inspiration from parts of the Middle East. This raises the last problem unaddressed at the symposium, one that needs far more attention and analysis. One member of a partner Muslim nation spoke out and claimed that to defeat Daesh, “We need a superior narrative.” This garnered support with confirming nods in the audience, as well as later references by members of the panels. However, the statement misses the point by itself: There is no inherently superior narrative that all will agree upon because Islamic political history has been by nature contested, with groups forming and fighting for dominance on the battlefield, and in the world of ideas for the audiences who believe them. Hence, to call for a monolithic message is to require something that would unite across religious sects, cultural nuances and political realities. To be sure, there are better narratives than Daesh’s, many with rich historical legacies and current support, but they are also contextual depending on which group advocates for them, and how they play into the geopolitics of the region. One such narrative is that Daesh is hypocritical, claiming to support the ummah, but in reality harming those who willingly support it. Testimonies by former insiders, backed by a spectrum of ulema (scholars) across many variations of Sunni and Shia Islam may be enough to give legitimacy to a counter narrative. However, much depends on where they come from — Western, Middle Eastern or other Muslim nations. In some ways being Western would benefit the cause more because they can present a less politicized view than those within contested regions of the Middle East. The obvious down side would be their “Westernization” in the eyes of those who hold Europe and the U.S. responsible, even while loathing Daesh. As a result, scholars from outside both may be preferable, perhaps drawing on traditions from Indonesia or Malaysia. In either case, the topic requires much more analysis than simply assuming such a universally acceptable message will be achievable, let alone work against Daesh.

Therefore, what is needed is not a superior narrative per se, but a superior strategy, one that has been tried and tested in Islamic political history, and political history the world over — win on the battlefield and in the word of wars because conquest confirms the message. This was as true for Western democracy and capitalism in World War II and the Cold War, as for the Aztecs during their rise in Mesoamerica, medieval Japanese shogunates and Islamic empires throughout history.

To do this, ongoing discussions would do well to address two questions raised in the symposium, but which did not get the airtime of other more easily digested comments. First, what should define U.S. partnerships in the fight against Daesh, for going it alone is neither domestically nor internationally politically tenable? Should adherence to core U.S. values matter more than resource sharing, regional influence or long-term geostrategic interests? Second, how do we separate policy debates about strategy and the politics of implementation from the political process, in that good strategies may not be politically feasible for elected officials? Researching and answering both questions are part of larger debates in academic and government circles, and the Daesh Beyond the Levant Symposium was never intended to be a one-size-fits-all answer-generating session. As a first step then, it succeeded in many ways, but with some important caveats that also apply to every policy debate facing the U.S., especially those dealing with security matters: we must guard against the dangers of politicizing the debate and pigeonholing definitions of complex problems and viable solutions into any particular party agenda. Scholars and practitioners must remain objective, or strive for objectivity constantly, in order to offer decision makers the best possible counsel on addressing the complex Gray Zone. Whether they listen or not, it is our duty to present strong arguments analyzing the difficult challenges we face. Thankfully, we have faced many of these problems before, and while containment created its share of negative second- and third-order effects, at least its success in the Cold War tells us that the U.S. policy analysis community has what it takes to develop effective strategies to win against Daesh in the Gray Zone and beyond. — Dr. Spencer B. Meredith III, Ph.D., Fulbright Scholar, Associate Professor, Joint Special Operations Master of Arts, College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University. SW
MISSION
SOCEUR is a subordinate unified command of U.S. European Command exercising operational control of theater Army, Navy and Air Force Special Operation Forces. SOCEUR is responsible to the Commander, USEUCOM/SACEUR for SOF readiness, targeting, exercises, plans, joint and combined training, NATO/partnership activities and execution of counterterrorism, peacetime and contingency operations.
The U.S. Special Operations Command Europe covers a vast area, which is very geographically and culturally diverse. How do you meet the diverse needs within your area of operations?

SOCEUR and its components have a large pool of talented and dedicated personnel from all services of our military. We are also fortunate to be augmented by regionally aligned forces that are essential in helping the command to meet each mission requirement. Each of our service members is trained to adjust, adapt and accomplish the mission. They bring a unique skillset and focus to each and every mission they undertake. Our team trains and learns about each country and culture in which they work to minimize any confusion or miscommunication. They work to form bonds not only of professional respect, but of friendship. A great example of the quality of service members and their contributions is the recent awarding of the Estonian Defense Force Meritorious Service Cross to a Civil-Military Cooperation team sergeant from the 92nd Civil Affairs Battalion. This was the team sergeant’s third trip to Estonia and his personal relationships were instrumental to the success of his team's recent mission and furthering EUCOM’s efforts in the region. Only 554 of these medals have been awarded since Estonia’s independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.

What are the key missions of SOCEUR? How have they changed over the past year and, how do you see them changing?

SOCEUR’s key missions are to employ mission-ready special operations forces, and to strengthen and improve our interoperability with ally and partner special operations forces. We also contribute to deterrence, counter transnational threats and advance U.S. strategic interests. In the past year, we have also assumed the mission of the Special Operations Component Command for the NATO Response Force. We have also focused solely on the European theater, where in the past, we were split between Europe and Afghanistan, assisting partners as they prepared and deployed in support of the ISAF mission. I don’t know if any of us would have predicted the current security environment that we face in Europe. If you would have asked that question only two years ago I suspect the answer would have been much different. So I’ll refrain from predicting any mission changes in the near future. But there are some things that are enduring challenges — we want to make sure that we maintain readiness, we want to maintain interoperability, and we want to continue to modernize special operations forces and keep them special. If adversaries in either state or non-state actors would like to challenge the current security environment, we want to make sure that special operations forces are unique, fully operational and strong, and can provide options for national decision makers to use them effectively to ensure security.

Atlantic Resolve is a key mission in your area of operations. Describe the mission of Atlantic Resolve, what countries it affects and what is the hoped for outcome?

Atlantic Resolve is a demonstration of the U.S. government’s commitment to collective security by strengthening the NATO alliance through military exercises and training events. This mission affects NATO countries located in Eastern Europe. The intended outcome is to deter aggression directed against our allies along NATO’s Eastern flank. This outcome will be achieved by increasing allied interoperability, assist in growing the capacity of resilient security mechanisms and synchronizing NATO SOF planning for a holistic response to crises.

In addition to the counter-Russian aggression mission, SOCEUR is also dealing with the migrant/refugee flow into Europe? What is SOCEUR’s plan for conducting the counterterror mission in the face of this flow?

The migrant/refugee flow is definitely a concern for all of Europe and NATO and is something that SOCEUR is monitoring. SOCEUR’s key contribution to counterterrorism efforts in Europe is done through partnership development, which we accomplish with advisers and trainers working with partnered forces at their request in order to develop tactics, techniques and procedures at the tactical level. At the staff level, training...
and sharing occurs through subject-matter expert exchanges and through combining staffs during bilateral and multilateral exercises. All of these different venues, whether on a range or in a command post, provide all the participants with an opportunity to share experiences and learn from one another and to build bonds that are vitally important.

**With the recent terror attacks in Europe, has the SOCEUR mission/stance changed in regards to the counterterror mission?**

These recent attacks have added emphasis to this important mission, but countering terrorism has been an enduring command priority that our team pursues with vigor and dedication. SOCEUR works with many partner counterterrorism forces, and we support many of the U.S. Country Teams in Europe with their efforts to counter the conditions that cause the spread of violent extremism.

**SOCEUR also provides forward support to other AOs like Africa. How does that support look and what is it comprised of?**

SOCEUR is in a perfect position to help our fellow theater special operations commands in Africa and the Middle East when called upon. We have provided assistance in the form of personnel and platforms on countless occasions in the past, and we stand ready to assist in the future when needed. I believe that the most significant support to operations in Africa and the Middle East comes from our partner and allied SOF here in Europe. Over the past decade the capabilities and capacity of European SOF have grown exponentially. Some countries didn’t have SOF capabilities in their military, and now they export special-operations capabilities in support of bilateral and multinational missions overseas. SOCEUR’s partnership-development program played a significant role in the development of those capabilities that really turned out to be crucial to the success of the Combined Special Operations Task Force–10 (CSOTF-10) mission in Afghanistan, which 1st Battalion 10th Special Forces Group lead for eight years (2005-2014). European SOF continues to enhance the overall capacity of European SOF have grown exponentially. Some countries didn’t have SOF capabilities in their military, and now they export special-operations capabilities in support of bilateral and multinational missions overseas. SOCEUR’s partnership-development program played a significant role in the development of those capabilities that really turned out to be crucial to the success of the Combined Special Operations Task Force–10 (CSOTF-10) mission in Afghanistan, which 1st Battalion 10th Special Forces Group lead for eight years (2005-2014). European SOF continues to enhance the overall mission no matter where they deploy, and they decrease the burden on the U.S. SOF enterprise.

**What is the current status of the relationship between America and its NATO partners and how can it be strengthened?**

Our relationship with our NATO Allies is outstanding. Every day we work with countries like Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Italy, Norway and others in joint operations and training to build and enrich our working partnerships. Many service members within my command have formed personal and professional relationships that ensure our continued success. We will continue to work with, train with and succeed with our partners. Many of the most capable SOF partners in the world come from Europe. We often say that “nothing in Europe is done without a partner.” Europe is a mature and developed theater; our NATO allies are highly capable, have significant capacity, and are experienced in operating in complex environments. SOCEUR has persistent daily interaction with our European partners that further develops strong relationshipships, which we have for decades. In the recent exercise Trident Juncture 2015, with SOCEUR serving as the NATO Response Force Special Operations Component Command, we brought together more than 1,300 special operators from 17 nations to a single Combined Joint Task Force, forward deployed, conducting fused intelligence-based operations. The result was an exceptional display of how formidable NATO SOF is, particularly when we fight together.

**SOCEUR has a very joint force that appears to work together very well. How has this relationship been built and how do you continue to strengthen it?**

The professionalism of our force is amazing. Each component recognizes the synergy that comes from working together, as we are stronger than the sum of our parts. They serve proudly in their component, but also know they best represent it by professionally working with their joint counterparts. Joint interoperability at SOCEUR has been built over time by investing in our people, our units and through the conduct of high quality exercises.

**SOCEUR’s forces are by-in-large working in the advisory role. How does this affect the readiness of the force and its ability to react to crisis operations?**

SOCEUR’s forces work often as advisers and trainers, but to ensure they can do so, they rigorously train in each of their key areas. They train not just to maintain proficiency, but to build excellence. Working in an advisory role along our southern, northern, and eastern flank our forces are positioned in highly responsive and effective locations. If a crisis occurs, whether humanitarian or military in nature, our forces are prepared to render assistance to our Allies and Partners. Today, this is most evident in the East. We have near permanent presence along our Eastern Flank. This has a dual benefit to our readiness: 1) it assists our allies in building their capability to resist any offensive actions against them, and 2) it provides our forces first-hand knowledge of the terrain and conditions they will likely be fighting in, as well as the partners they will be fighting alongside. For crises that occur outside of our current locations we are still able to deploy forces to answer the call. We maintain dedicated crisis response forces at all times.

**EVERY DAY WE WORK WITH COUNTRIES LIKE POLAND, LATVIA, LITHUANIA, ITALY, NORWAY AND OTHERS IN JOINT OPERATIONS AND TRAINING**

**Maj. Gen. Lengyel talks with a SOCEUR Soldier.**

U.S. AIR FORCE PHOTO

**Portuguese Marines Board MV-22 Osprey during Trident Juncture 2015.**

PHOTO BY U.S. MARINE CORPS FORCES EUROPE
U.S. Army Civil Affairs teams have been making an impact in Europe since World War II, when Civil Affairs Soldiers were called on to “occupy, to govern and to help rehabilitate complex, war-torn countries and economies.” Today’s Civil Affairs Soldiers in Europe are following in the footsteps of their predecessors as they work to build capacity in partner-nation forces, conduct programs to strengthen the relationship between governments and the people they govern and strengthen the economy in European countries that are straddling the line between war and peace.

The Soldiers of the 92nd Civil Affairs Battalion, 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) operate in support of the European Command in support of combatant commanders and U.S. Ambassadors. Currently, the battalion supports Special Operations Command-Europe through the efforts of the Theater Civil Military Support Element, the Theater Civil Military Operations Cell and the Civil Affairs Planning Team. The Civil Affairs elements in Europe are assigned to either the Special Operations Command Forward-Eastern Europe, which is manned by the 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), and whose focus is on Atlantic Resolve or Special Operations Command-Southern Europe, which is commanded by Naval Special Warfare Unit 2, and focused on countering violent extremist organizations.

The battalion’s work is largely focused on stopping the flow of foreign fighters and conducting counterterrorism; and Atlantic Resolve with a mission to counter Russian aggression. The 92nd Civil Affairs Battalion is spread across the continent conducting operations in support of named training events and in individual countries, where the civil military support elements support the U.S. Country Team. The CMSEs, which rotate out on a six-month basis, provide a persistent presence in many countries and may often be the only U.S. military presence in the country.

While the CMSEs operate forward, the Civil Affairs Planning Team works at the SOCEUR Headquarters integrating the CMSEs work with the TSOC’s priorities. The CAPT is the conduit to the TSOC and as such, is the back bone to support what the teams are doing. The CAPT is also responsible for creating the CA plan for the TSOC. It is updated on a routine basis, so that when emergent things happen, the TSOC can react with up-to-date information.

The actions of the country CMSE are coordinated through the Theater Military Support Element, which is housed at Patch Barracks in Stuttgart, Germany. In 2013, the first Civil Military Support Element began operating in Kosovo, quickly followed by teams in Bosnia and Georgia. The teams have become almost

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Civil Affairs team members meet with government and non-governmental officials at the Georgian Ministry of Defence. Civil Affairs create a small footprint in European countries, but make a large impact by operating in support of the host-nation.
U.S. ARMY PHOTO
permanent fixtures in these countries because of their ability to build and maintain relationships with their partners. Each of these countries is facing problems with the flow of foreign fighters, a bleak economic outlook and efforts by radicals to disrupt the government.

In Bosnia, the team focuses on programs that will build capacity within a number of government departments including the military and the school system. The programs build confidence of the people in their government and its ability to provide for the people’s needs and their safety. In Kosovo, much of the CA team’s focus is on a unique program called America With Kosovo. The program provides access for young people to function with their government instead of resorting to violence, which prevents them from becoming radicalized. The team also focuses on women’s issues working closely with women’s shelters. Georgia is unique in that it is, like America, a melting pot of cultures. The CA teams focus on building relationships within the many different communities, all of which have different problems facing them. For some, it is the threat of Russian aggression and weapons of mass destruction, for others it is the flow of foreign fighters, while still other parts of the country are struggling with extremists. The main focus on the team is on the Georgian military and its wounded warrior population, as well as on the displaced people who are living in Internally Displaced Persons’ camps.

In Europe, most of the U.S. military presence is during named exercises. That is not the case with the Civil Affairs teams. The teams stay in country 24/7, 365 days a year, operating with their partners whenever they are available. The persistent presence of the CMSEs in partner nations allows SOCEUR to better understand the ground truth in the countries where the teams operate. The small footprint of the teams is not intrusive. There is not a large foreign force within the country, but rather small teams that offer assistance, which is well received. As is the case, with most special-operations endeavors, the Civil Affairs teams put the host-nation forward, while they operate in support.

The teams bring a different perspective to the problems in Europe. Not every problem can be solved with training. Often the answer is one that provides political or economic impacts, which is what CA does best — support to civil administration. This unique mission set requires the team to be attuned to political sensitivities. The members of the team must be politically savvy, which allows them to accomplish more. They must forge relationships that extend the reach of the government to the ungoverned spaces — the areas that fall through the cracks.

**NOTES**

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a Balkan state slightly smaller than West Virginia. Like West Virginia, the country has many undeveloped rural areas and a high unemployment rate. Driving out of Sarajevo, the capital city into the mountains, the countryside is dotted with small farming communities, beautiful mountain overlooks and a winding river that serves as a vacation spot for many in the city. In 1984, the Winter Olympics were held in and around Sarajevo. The Olympic Village and its venues are now in ruin.
To understand Bosnia and Herzegovina, one must first understand its history and the long-term ethnic rivalries that exist within the region. In a small alley in the middle of downtown Sarajevo, the shot that kicked off the first World War was fired. Franz Ferdinand, the archduke of Austria-Hungary and his wife, were assassinated by Gavrilo Princip, a Serbian nationalist who was a member of the Black Hand — a military group seeking Serbian dominance — as they drove through the city. Today, a museum, a street marker and the bridge that Princip jumped off after shooting the Archduke are quiet reminders of the long-term struggle for ethnic dominance in the region that remains today.

Following World War II, the Balkan states of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Montenegro became part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In 1980, when the Yugoslavian President, Josip Broz Tito died, the nationalism, which sparked World War I, reared its ugly head and threatened to tear the country apart. With the rise of Slobodan Milosevic as a powerful leader in the country, the long-held peace between the Serbians in Bosnia and Croatia and Croatians, Bosniaks and Albanians began to crumble. In 1991, Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia declared their independence, sparking a war with the Serb-dominated Yugoslavian Army backing Serbian separatists against the Croatian forces. The region was split along ethnic lines with the country’s 4 million people divided: 44 percent Bosniaks, 31 percent Serbs and 17 percent Croatians. On March 3, 1991, a referendum was held to form a new government. The ethnic Serbs boycotted the referendum, which sparked the worst ethnic cleansing since World War II.

The Bosnian Serb forces backed by Milosevic began a bombardment of Sarajevo, as well as other Bosniak towns forcing out Bosniak civilians. In the beautiful mountains overlooking the city of Sarajevo, snipers took watch over the city, pinning residents down, shooting them at will. Nina, a young woman who now works in the Bosnian government, was just 14 when the snipers began firing on the city. Her family was trapped. They went days without food or water. Going out of their home meant risking death. The people, much like the beautiful buildings in the historic city, which are still riddled with bullet holes, are marked by the war. But for those in Nina’s generation, there is a growing consensus that hate based on ethnicity will only hinder their country and their people.

The internal war continued unabated through the mid-1990s, with the rest of the world watching and refusing to act. From 1991 to 1995, it is estimated that some 100,000 people were killed. In March 1994, the Bosniaks and Croats signed a treaty creating the Bosniak Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On Nov. 21, 1995, all of the parties came to the table...
in Dayton, Ohio, and signed The Dayton Peace Accords that "retained Bosnia and Herzegovina's international boundaries and created a multi-ethnic and democratic government charged with conducting foreign, diplomatic and fiscal policy. Also recognized was a second tier of government composed of two entities roughly equal in size: the Bosniak-Bosnian Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb-led Republika Srpska. The Federation and RS governments are responsible for overseeing most government functions. Additionally, the Dayton Accords established the Office of the High Representative to oversee the implementation of the civilian aspects of the agreement. The Peace Implementation Council at its conference in Bonn in 1997 also gave the High Representative the authority to impose legislation and remove officials, the so-called "Bonn Powers." An original NATO-led international peacekeeping force of 60,000 troops assembled in 1995, and was succeeded over time by a smaller, NATO-led Stabilization Force. In 2004, European Union peacekeeping troops replaced SFOR. Currently EUFOR deploys around 600 troops in theater in a security assistance and training capacity."

The Bosniak/Croat Federation holds about 51 percent of the land, while the Republika Srpska has the remaining 49 percent. Population wise, the country has 48.4 percent Bosniaks, 32.7 percent Serbs, 14.6 percent Croats, with the estimated population of 3,867,055 people as of July 1995. With a nod to its population, the country has three official languages, Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian. Its population is 40 percent Muslim — the majority of whom are Bosniaks, 31 percent Orthodox and 15 percent Roman Catholic.

The current government is a federal democratic republic and Sarajevo remains its capital. The government of Bosnia and Herzegovina is complex. There is a three-member presidency, with a president coming from the three main ethnic groups — Bosniaks, Croats and Serbians. The presidents are elected by a simple majority every four years. A president can serve two terms, and after waiting a four-year period can be re-elected. Every eight months, a member of the Presidency become the Chairman of the Presidency and serves as the Chief of State for those eight months. It then rotates to the next President in line. The cabinet also rotates, with the Council of Ministers being nominated by the council chairman and approved the state-level House of Representatives.

The legislative branch is a parliamentary assembly known as the Skupstina and consists of the House Peoples (Dom Naroda), which is comprised of 15 seats, which again are divided down ethnic lines, with each...
The state-level House of Representatives is known as the Predstavnicki Dom and consists of 42 seats, with the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina holding 28 seats and the Republika of Srpska holding 14.

The military of Bosnia and Herzegovina is growing and becoming more professional. Known collectively as the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is divided into the Army of BIH, the Air Force and Air Defense and the Tactical Support Brigade. It is an all-volunteer military.

Some of the major problems facing the country today are its lagging economy and “brain drain,” which is defined as the departure of educated or professional people from one country, economic sector or field for another usually for better pay or living conditions. The country has an unemployment rate of more than 40 percent, with nearly 51 percent of the working population holding low-paying, service industry jobs. The top economic priorities for the country are integration in the European Union, strengthening the fiscal system, reforming public administration, membership in the World Trade Organization and building a dynamic, competitive private sector, as government spending is roughly 40 percent of the gross domestic product.

Transnational problems impacting the country included internally displaced people who were caught up in the war. The flow of Islamic fighters through the country and illicit drug trade, with the country being a major transit point for heroin headed to Western Europe. It is also plagued by corruption within the complex government.

You have only to walk down the streets of Sarajevo to understand the impact the members of the Civil Military Support Element, 92nd Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne), 95th Civil Affairs Brigade is making in Bosnia.

As members of the team enter stores or restaurants (accompanied by the staff of Special Warfare, they are immediately recognized. The owners and staff members quickly move toward them, hands outstretched to welcome them. The conversations between the members of the team and their Bosnian hosts flow easily. There is laughter and there is a legitimate exchange of information. Developing that relationship is at the heart of what the CMSE does when it is deployed forward in support of the U.S. Embassy Country Team.

While in country, the team is assigned under Chief of Mission authorities. The team’s authority to operate in country comes from the Chief of Mission. In Bosnia, the Ambassador is very supportive of the CMSE’s work.

The members of the team have made a concerted effort to not only make themselves an integral part of the country team, but also an integral part of the community. At the embassy, members of the country team speak highly of the team and the impact they have had. They are quick to work with the team to develop new projects and plans and to follow-up on previous projects. The Ambassador understands and supports the mission of the team, as do other members of the country team.

The team’s footprint is small, but the impact is huge. Because the team works and lives in Sarajevo, they are more attuned to the political and cultural sensitivities of the area. This allows them to accomplish more. They do more analysis, which allows them to tie what the teams are doing on the ground with the vision of the country team. The CMSEs are a low-threat element. They do not step on anyone’s toes and work well with the interagency. The goal of the team is to nest their efforts with those of the country team overall and with their interagency partners.

Currently the team is focused on a few programs that build capacity within the Bosnian security forces, while also building the confidence of the populace in the security forces. For many years, the Bosnian security forces were segregated with Bosnians serving in one unit, Croats serving in another and Serbs serving in yet another. In order to build a national identity, it is important that the people in the various communities see that there is one force and it is comprised of people of various ethnicities who can work together to build a national identity. Today, units that were formerly segregated are integrated. If the commander is a Bosniak, then the command sergeant major is Croat or a Serb. The men who serve under them are also integrated and have developed a healthy respect for each other as teammates and as neighbors. The team pointed out one police commander who has 60 officers all from different backgrounds as the ideals. They noted that the commander made it a priority to ensure his force
reflected the population it serves. “Those are the commands we want to work with because they set the standard,” said the CMSE team leader.

To continue building this partnership and the trust of the community, the CMSE had to be careful to ensure that at the outset of training it was offered to all, not just one ethnically segregated unit. They also ensured that training was held on neutral ground, and that classes were integrated from the get go.

Three unique programs, complemented with donations of supplies to schools, are the backbone of their training programs: Tactical Trauma Management, the Students to First Responders and First Aid for Teachers.

To get the programs under way, the members of the CMSE held a coordination meeting with school directors and the chief of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina Civil-Military Cooperation Battalion to discuss the proposed programs and to donate needed supplies to the schools. The supply donation was presented on Oct. 7, which highlighted the cooperation between the U.S. Embassy, the schools and the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The supplies were funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development at the request of the previous CMSE team. The project had a dual impact. First and foremost, it improved the education standards in the affected schools; second, it supported economic develop-
ment and third, it made it harder for outside influencers to co-op the people of the village because they no longer felt disenfranchised.

Following the donation of supplies a series of events were held that further built the relationship between the populace, the government and its agents.

Sept. 21-30, 2015, the CMSE, along with the medic team and the 92nd Civil Affairs Battalion Medic Team held a Tactical Trauma Management course at the Sarajevo Special Support Unit. The goal was to increase the capacity and interoperability between the Special Support Unit, the Sarajevo canton, the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the State Investigation Protection Agency. Working in conjunction with the International Investigative Training Assistance Program, the team brought together 20 members of the SSU, 20 members of the Armed Forces, five members of the SIPA and two members from the Special Police Unit. The SIPA and SPU members served as assistant instructors and assisted the medical team. The training put life-saving skills and techniques into the hands of the police force that will enable them to save lives in the case of a traumatic event. Further, the event built operational relationships, which will, over time, increase cooperation, communication and professionalism in all members of the force without regard to their ethnic background.

On Oct. 12, 2015, the CMSE conducted a First Aid for Teachers program at Osnovna Skola Maglaj Middle School. While the course itself taught primary first aid skills to teachers and armed them with the necessary supplies they would need in such an emergency, it also helped build the relationships between the people of the community and the Bosnian forces. By bringing the training to the community, the CMSE ensured that all teachers were trained to standard and would be able to respond in the case of an emergency. It also demonstrated to the parents that the welfare of their children is important to community leaders.

Following the First Aid for Teachers event, a Student to First Responder event was held. Representatives from each of the essential services — EMS, fire departments, police departments, etc. — came together to set up static displays for the children and spent the afternoon getting to know the children at the school and giving the children a chance to see them as more than just a uniform. Children had the opportunity to man the fire hose. They explored the fire trucks and joked with the local police officers. The event helped humanize the authorities as the men and women in uniform spent time getting to know the students.

It was also a great opportunity for the community to get to know the CMSE team. Children huddled around the Americans. They took selfies together, told jokes and even exchanged Instagram and Facebook information. As the parents watched from a short distance away, the children quizzed their American visitors about everything from their families to their favorite sport. The interaction between the students and their parents and the Bosnian and American forces has a long-term effect of showing the stability of the Bosnian government and its ability to meet the needs of its people.
INTRODUCTION

While disaster response is primarily a lifesaving and catastrophe mitigation effort, it creates an immediate and substantial vulnerability within an environment that can be exploited more rapidly and economically versus a stable stead-state environment. Disaster response is defined as an “aggregate of decisions and measures taken to (1) contain or mitigate the effects of a disastrous event to prevent any further loss of life and/or property, (2) restore order in its immediate aftermath, and (3) re-establish normality through reconstruction and rehabilitation shortly thereafter. The first and immediate response is called emergency response.” A key word that is not included in the above definition is one that is perhaps the most important, influence. The ability for an actor, either state or non-state, to influence the will of a population is largely based on that actor being able to have an effect on that population’s source of strength or center(s) of gravity. During a disaster, the population’s COG, is far more defined, simplified, and thus easily identified and influenced. Because of this, a fourth desired effect of disaster response actions should be added (4) to gain access into and exert influence over a vulnerable population with the intent to legitimize or de-legitimize an identified power broker and/or government.” It is the influence of disaster response that makes it, although inconsistent, an essential part of combating terrorism and countering violent extremism. This was well highlighted when charitable, social-welfare organizations with ties to radical groups (e.g. Jamaat-udDawa) received popular support due to humanitarian assistance it provided to earthquake victims in Pakistan’s Azad Jammu and Kashmir regions.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: A COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is the most complicated and dynamic environment I have worked in since joining the military in 2004; the political system is arguably the most complex in the world. While the Dayton Accords (the peace agreement that ended the war) were instrumental in ending an incredibly brutal conflict, it also serves as the founding document for the current political system. The situation that has developed from the accords is incredibly complicated, thus there are three factors that are essential to provide needed context for this paper.

First, the national government is designed to give each of the three opposing ethnicities, Serb (Orthodox Christian), Croat (Catholic), and Bosniak (Muslim), a voice and position within the government. This led to the foundation of a tri-partite presidency and the requirement for each of the three ethnicities to have representation in each of the national-level offices.
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Chief of Operations and Chief of Resources. Each of the positions must be filled by a general officer of a different ethnicity. The position of Chairman will then rotate between the ethnicities. In truth, the basis of the entire government can be oversimplified to ethnic equality. That is, equality between the three primary ethnicities that took part in the Bosnian War not all ethnicities that currently live in BiH. This not only creates deep ethnic ties within all levels of government it also immediately marginalizes any groups without ethnic affiliation or ties to an ethnic political party.

Second, under a state or “national” government, BiH was divided into two entities, similar to U.S. States, and one district. The Federation of BiH (FBIH), whose population is mostly composed of both Bosniak’s and ethnic Croats and the Republika Srpska (RS), primarily composed of ethnic Serbs and the Brcko District, the construct of which is similar to Washington, D.C., but without the benefits of being a national capital comprise the entities. Both the federation and republic are similar in physical size and population while the Brcko District is less than one percent of the size and population of BiH. To further exacerbate the ethnic divide in the country, the geographic political boundaries are based on the territory held by the two major combatants (Croat/Bosniak and Serb) at the end of the war.

Third, differences in each entity’s government structures have led to drastic differences in the responsiveness and effectiveness of the entity governments. The majority of resources (funding, equipment and trained personnel) exist at the entity level. While the national government may at times contribute additional funding, all programs are instituted at the individual entity government level. In addition, the entity must request support and declare a state of emergency to receive support from national-level assets. The lack of a cantonal (similar to U.S. county) government structure in the RS has created a more top-down and centrally controlled government structure. The structure has managed to remove a very cumbersome bureaucratic layer that has allowed the RS to be more effective in meeting the immediate needs of its population, particularly during a disaster. This disparity between the entity’s ability to support their populations feeds directly into a rhetoric of militarization and distancing of Bosnia and Herzegovina state actors, primarily in RS, used to destabilize and de-legitimize the national government.

**CMSE: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

While serving as a Special Operations Civil Affairs team leader, I have conducted village stability operations in Afghanistan and most recently led the Civil Military Support Element to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Civil Military Support Element Bosnia and Herzegovina (CMSE BiH) is a National Strategic Decision Directive-38 office working under Chief of Mission authority and reporting to both the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché and the Special Operations Command Europe Commander. Under the COM CMSE, BiH worked to enhance the reputation and utility of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the eyes of the Bosnian people. As the only truly integrated, reconciled and functional national institution, the AFBiH has an essential role in countering both the state and non-state actors’ efforts to degrade, distract and capitalize on the ineffective Bosnian political system. CMSE BiH worked to support this desired effect through three lines of effort:

- **LOE 1:** Build and employ AFBiH Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Forces to support applying AFBiH/Ministry of Defense resources to address vulnerabilities created by a gap in BiH Government (Entity and National) essential services.
- **LOE 2:** Improve capacity within CIMIC enablers (AFBiH engineers, AFBiH medics, EOD) and develop the medical capacity of BiH First Responders to build internal resources and human capital that will increase the ability of the BiH Government to respond to its citizens’ needs in the event of an emergency.
- **LOE 3:** Increase the disaster response capability of the AFBiH and increase AFBiH/Civil Protection Forces (emergency management/response) interdependence to maximize the use of available resources and demonstrate the utility of the AFBiH.

As CMSE BiH worked the three LOEs, we focused on identifying critical vulnerabilities within Bosnia’s civil systems, both governmental and non-governmental. As vulnerabilities were identified and mapped, CMSE BiH
worked with U.S. Government and international partners to develop relationships and programs that would inject CMSE BiH support into those identified civil systems. This placement allowed us to assess the civil vulnerabilities and determine whether to mitigate or exploit the vulnerability in support of desired end states. Working within the host nation civil systems also allowed CMSE BiH to identify any actors, nodes and networks that are already exploiting the identified vulnerabilities. Having the right access and influence in specific targeted systems is essential to identifying and countering our adversaries in a steady state environment. This placement is particularly essential when targeting the violent extremist lifecycle of recruitment, radicalization, mobilization and action.

Supporting the COM’s Integrated Country Strategy, the Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché’s priorities, and the theater special operations command commander’s intent we developed and worked three major focus programs: AFBiH CIMIC, Tactical Trauma Management; subject-matter expert exchange with the Bosnian Special Police Units; and partnered with the UN’s Developmental Program Disaster Risk Reduction project that provided the necessary placement and access to build the relationships and influence required for us to accomplish our mission. The reputation and influence we developed through these programs were essential in our ability to shape the human terrain during the disastrous flooding that started on May 15, 2014.

RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN BALKAN FLOODING

Starting on May 15 and continuing through May 25, 2014, heavy rains caused devastating flooding and more than 2,000 landslides in the Balkan region. Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia were hardest hit as the River Sava and its tributaries reached their highest levels in over 150 years; Bosnia and Serbia were hardest hit with more than 2.6 million people affected between the two countries. Prior to the floods, my team was located in Banja Luka, the RS capital city conducting the second iteration of TTM. When the flooding started, my team along with Banja Luka’s entire population was isolated by the surging waters of the Vrbas River. As my team coordinated with RS Civil Protection Forces and the AFBiH in RS, we fed information to the COM in Sarajevo and the TSOC commander in Germany to determine what U.S. resources could be brought in to support an immediate response. As NATO and EUFOR Althea forces stationed in Sarajevo supported the AFBiH in the immediate lifesaving effort in Bosnia, The Russian Emergency Situations Ministry (EMERCOM) deployed a small high risk rescue force to assist in the response effort in Serbia. Ever ready to seize upon an opportunity to gain influence, the Russians make up for inferior military capability and hardware, by utilizing EMERCOM to gain influence where offensive military operations cannot, thus getting ahead and out maneuvering the U.S. and its allies. Even though EMERCOM only landed a small rescue contingent of 70 personnel, the effect this action had within the Balkan region was immediately noticed, cost effective and unconventional. That action also proved to be an effective tool for the pro-Russian, RS President Milorad Dodik to visit Moscow and
request assistance from Russian President Vladimir Putin. The rapid response from Russia in Serbia and the move by the RS president in favor of Russia caused many Bosnian Serbs within the affected regions to look toward Russia for assistance.

As the immediate lifesaving phase of the response came to a close, the incredible efforts of the AFBiH rescuers were nearly overshadowed by a small Russian contingent in a neighboring country. Even with an influx of $750,000 of needed equipment donated by the U.S. European Command, more than 800 rescue flights by the AFBiH, EUFOR and NATO, I believe this statement from “The Voice of Russia” sums up a sentiment that was planted effectively among Bosnian Serbs.

“The Russian Federation has been the first country to respond during the dire time of need of the Serbian people with many Serbians dismayed by the almost complete lack of response from the European Union and other countries. EMERCOM continues to deploy equipment and personnel as the magnitude of the devastation begins to grow clearer.”

Russia deployed significantly fewer resources and successfully capitalized on an opportunity to counter U.S./NATO influence; Russia also succeeded in exploiting the regional impact of a natural disaster. As disaster response is different in scope and effectiveness based on the responding countries, the disaster itself may not be confined to a single country’s borders. This variable enables a disaster response, in an equally affected country, to be used as a tool to de-legitimize and potentially destabilize the government of the targeted country. This was the effect that Russia’s response in Serbia had on the struggling Bosnian Government in a time of crisis.

**POLITICS, RESPONSE, ISOLATION AND INFLUENCE**

As the flood waters receded and the phases of response transitioned from lifesaving and restoring order to reestablishing normality, my team shifted our focus to countering the destabilizing effect of the ongoing Russian response by keeping the lone bright spot in the BiH government response, the AFBiH, actively engaged. The AFBiH were touted, by nearly all Bosnian media, as heroes during the initial rescue efforts; following those rescues they had continued to work tirelessly. Taking on the daunting challenge of cleaning up the massive damage left by both flood waters and more than 2000 landslides while also supporting thousands of displaced persons who had been moved to AFBiH barracks and surrounding areas. As the U.S., EU, UN, NATO and numerous non-governmental organizations mobilized to “Build Back Better,” politics and scarce resources began to reign in the momentum that the AFBiH had gained for the BiH Government’s response. Working to maintain some government of BiH momentum in midst of a stalling response, CMSE BiH partnered with AFBiH CIMIC forces and Spirit of America in a small school refurbishment in a centrally located Bosnian village. It was during this project that my team was informed of numerous isolated mountain communities that had received no aid or support from the BiH government or international response since the flooding began.

Central BiH has numerous mountain villages and cities whose isolation and historical ties to the Mujahedeen, who fought on behalf of the Bosniaks during the Bosnian War, have made them a target of current Islamic Extremist recruitment efforts. Based on the increasingly aggressive RS rhetoric for separation...
A WEAKNESS IN THEIR RESPONSE EFFORT COULD INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EXTREMIST RECRUITMENT EFFORTS

In my experience U.S. disaster response is based on the question, “Is there a need to apply U.S. resources to the response?” These resources can vary from fiscal to military, but the question comes to need. It is essential that as leaders look at the need to apply resources they look beyond the immediate disaster response. It is absolutely essential to look at how we can use disaster response to reach isolated and vulnerable populations; these populations are current or potential recruitment bases, these areas are the potential safe havens for our adversaries, and the small teams focused on using a disaster response to advance U.S. counterterrorism and counter-violent extremists efforts are the ones that will ensure positive U.S. influence abroad.

25,000 people. In addition the effectiveness of the project allowed us to work with UNDP and USAID to expand the project into both disaster preparedness utilizing UNDP funds and reach seven additional isolated communities funded by USAID. In total $40,000 were spent on the program, reaching more than 80,000 people, increasing CMSE influence with multiple international partners, and expanding CMSE BiH operations into 13 specific communities across Bosnia and Herzegovina in less than 30 days.

The situation, both politically and on the ground, that was created by a natural disaster allowed for CMSE to expand its influence exponentially in a short time and for a low cost.

CONCLUSION

Notes

KOSOVO
The bridge that spans the Ibar River in Northern Kosovo is symbolic of the ethnic division that has marked the region since the days of the Roman Empire. The bridge serves as a divide between the country’s majority Albanian population and the Serbian population. As you approach the bridge, you can easily spot the NATO forces who stand guard on either side. The bridge divides the city of Mitrovica in half.
On one side is the Albanian community. On the other side is the Serbian community. Interaction between the two is limited at best and only came about in 2013, when an agreement was signed between Kosovo and Serbia that stopped short of recognizing Kosovo’s independence, but brought Serbs in northern Kosovo back under the overall authority of Kosovo’s institutions. The agreement offered limited autonomy for the Serbs through an association of northern Serb municipalities, doing little to heal the divide in the country, instead perpetuating the ethnic divide that is at the root of its problems. Until 2013, a large barricade that was manned by the Serbs blocked the Ibar Bridge. With the 2013 agreement, it was thought that freedom of movement would occur. Instead, the bridge remains impassable by cars. Huge concrete planters and benches block the bridge. They were placed there by the Serbs who called the creation a “peace park.” It is a reminder of the divide — the them vs. us mentality that has shaped the region since the 7th century when Serbs first migrated into what is now known as Kosovo.

Centuries later, Turks and Albanians migrated to the area in the wake of the Ottoman take over. As the 19th century drew to a close, Albanians replaced Serbs as the majority ethnic group in the country; the Serbian defeat of the Ottoman’s in the First Balkan War in 1912, gave control back to Serbia. As was the case with many small Baltic countries, Kosovo became part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia following the end of World War II. With the fall of Yugoslavia, the Serbian domination of the majority of the populace remained problematic ultimately resulting in unrest, which lead calls for Kosovar independence in the late ’80s. The Serbs, who created a new constitution in 1989, quickly squashed the movement and revoked the independence of Kosovo. In 1991, Kosovo’s Albanian leaders lit the spark that set the country on fire when they held a referendum and again declared Kosovar independence.

What followed, as was the case in neighboring Bosnia, was almost a decade of undeclared war, with the Albanians starting an insurgency against the Serbs. The Serbian response was quick and bloody. Albanian officials were removed from their posts. Albanian schools were closed. Albanian teachers and professors were removed from their jobs. Reports of ethnic killings, beatings and rapes were widespread. A large number of Albanians fled the country to refugee camps in Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania. More than 800,000 Albanians fled with little more than the clothes on their backs, as world leaders tried to broker peace.

In March 1999, a three-month NATO mission forced the Serbs to remove their military and
police forces from Kosovo.

Following on the heels of the NATO mission, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244, which placed Kosovo under a transitional administration, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, which remained in place until 2005, when the UN began a process to determine the status of the country.

For two years, the Serbs, based out of Belgrade, negotiated with the transitional government in Pristina, which is now the capital of Kosovo without any real resolve. On Feb. 17, 2013, the Kosovo Assembly declared independence again and has been recognized as the legitimate government by more than 100 countries. In April 2013, the two countries began to normalize relations through talks facilitated by the European Union. The Government of Kosovo has since joined the UN, the EU and NATO.

Today, the country’s makeup remains largely Albanian, with 92.9 percent of the population claiming Albanian ethnicity, 1.6 percent Bosniaks and 1.5 percent Serbian. Those numbers are skewed when it comes to the Serbian population because at the time of the last census the northern portion of Kosovo was excluded. It is largely Serbian and Serbs and members of the Roma (gypsy) community in the South boycotted the census.

The country is 95.6 percent Muslim and is highly influenced by neighboring Muslim countries including Turkey, which has gifted the country a number of large mosques in recent years, including one that overlooks the Ibar River Bridge. Orthodox and Roman Catholics make up 3.7 percent of the population.

Unemployment is a major problem, more than half of the working age people in the country are unemployed.
Kosovo’s current government has an elected president who serves as the Chief of State. The head of the government is the Prime Minister. The country’s assembly elects the president and the cabinet. The president is elected by a two-thirds-majority vote by the assembly for a five-year term. If a nominee does not receive a two-thirds majority in the casting of two ballots, a simple majority in the third round of voting elects him. The Assembly, known as Kuvendi i Kosoves or Skupstina Kosovo, has 120 seats, with 100 members directly elected and 20 seats reserved for ethnic minorities, with 10 of those seats reserved specifically for Serbs. The members of the assembly serve for four-year terms.

Kosovo’s economy, while showing progress is still struggling. It is highly dependent on international aid and input into the economy by the diaspora, which accounts for about 15 percent of the GDP. The high unemployment rate, particularly among young people is also causing a brain drain, with young people immigrating in order to gain their education and remaining in foreign countries to begin their careers. The majority of the country’s population lives in rural areas.

An aging electrical grid keeps Kosovo from gaining more business investment; however, in 2012 Kosovo privatized its electricity supply and sought funding through the World Bank and the United States to construct a new power plant and rehabilitate the older ones. Also in 2012, Kosovo joined the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and in 2014 signed agreements with the European Union that are focused on trade liberalization. In August 2015, as part of its EU-facilitated normalization process with Serbia, Kosovo signed agreements on telecommunications and energy distribution; however, there are still disagreements over who owns economic assets within Kosovo.

Kosovo does not have a military force. The Kosovo Security Force, established in 2009, is responsible for search-and-rescue, firefighting, demining and hazardous material response. NATO-led Kosovo Force peacekeepers under the UN Interim Administration Mission remain in the country stabilizing relationships between the Albanians and Serbs. Their presence is seen not only in Pristina, but also in the South of the country and in Mitrovica, where the Iber River Bridge remains blocked — a symbol of Kosovo’s struggle.
On a crisp Sunday morning in October, the Civil Military Support Element, 92nd Civil Affairs Battalion, 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, assigned to Pristina, Kosovo, along with the staff of Special Warfare, traveled from the capital to the Macedonian border and then back to the divided town of Mitrovica. Along the way, the team pointed out important landmarks and projects that had been completed through the combined efforts of the team, the U.S. Embassy staff and their Kosovar partners.

Heading south, the team followed the highway, passing horse-drawn wagons filled with hay and produce stands. A road sign comes into view, and the team leader pointed it out. The area is not really any different than others that lie along the route. But over the past several years, it has gained notoriety. It has become known as a hub for young men who are making their way to Syria to join Daesh. The radicalization of young men is one of the many problems plaguing Kosovo and one that the team must consider in their efforts to support the young republic.

Passing through the countryside, there are few if any factories. Somewhat out of place in the barren countryside, the landscape is dotted by stores displaying intricate chandeliers. This becomes even more ironic when you look at the houses. They seem unfinished. The windows are open. There are no panes or shutters. Other than farms, there does not appear to be centers for employment, which is another problem facing the country, as well as the brain drain that occurs when young people flee a country in order to build a life.

On the other side of the country is Mitrovica, which appears more prosperous than other cities. There are more signs of commerce and influence. Driving into the main business area, a giant mosque, a gift from Turkey, dominates the landscape. If you continue heading north, a blocked bridge manned by armed troops from Italy, part of a NATO peacekeeping mission in the country, divides the city in half. On one side is the Albanian population that makes up the majority of Kosovo’s population. On the other side is the Serbian sector. The divided city is one of the last visible signs of the war that tore the country apart in the 1990s. But the memories of people on both sides of the bridge are
long. Each can talk of the horror that occurred during the war. It is those memories that fuel continued ethnic tensions between the Albanian and Serbian communities within the country.

These are some of issues that consume the time and energy of the Civil Military Support Element, 92nd Civil Affairs Battalion, 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, operating out of the U.S. Embassy in Pristina. The team has developed a number of programs to address various aspects of these problems, all with the goal of building the capacity of Kosovo forces and the support of the populace for the government by showcasing the government’s ability to provide for its people.

In southeastern Kosovo, where radicalization of the youth population is of serious concern, the CMSE has conducted a number of programs; two of which were directed specifically at the women of the region; three of which were medical; and one designed to assess and make recommendations to the operations of the country’s armed forces.

The Women for Women Project is a women’s empowerment and economic development program in the southeastern region that directly counters the ability of violent extremists recruiters to target the villages. Working with Spirit of America (see story on page 45), a non-profit organization designed to provide resources to American Soldiers to help them fulfill their mission, the CMSE arranged for the purchase of equipment to support agricul-
tecture training efforts in the villages of Remnik, Lubishte and Begrace. The project gives the team better access and greater influence within the rural areas that are the most susceptible to extremists recruiters.

Another event sponsored through the Women for Women Project was a women’s health seminar in Dubrave. Working in conjunction with Women for Women International, two U.S. military officers assigned to the 345th Combat Support Hospital at Camp Bondsteel, taught classes on prevention and treatment of hepatitis, which is a major health problem in the country, and the prevention of back injuries. Held in what has been identified as one of the major regions for extremists recruiting, the program strengthened the resolve of women in the community to stand against the recruitment efforts in their villages by demonstrating American support to the female populace, as well as an American presence in this extremely rural region.

Other programs aimed at breaking the connection of the extremists recruiters to the rural population revolve around building a belief by the people that the Government of Kosovo can not only meet their needs, but also protect them. To that end, the team helped facilitate donations of medical supplies to remote hospitals and clinics.

In September 2015, the CMSE coordinated a five-day assessment of the Kosovo Police Special Intervention Unit, which is the backbone of the Kosovo counterterrorism efforts and the unit that is responsible for the majority of the high-risk violent extremist and organized crime arrests by Naval Special Warfare forces in the country. During the training event, the NSW unit assessed the SIU officers’ proficiency in communication, hand and arm signals, reacting to contact and breaking contact in open and wooded terrain. The success of the program served as the foundation for continuing training between the NSW forces, the CMSE and the SIU.

On Oct. 20, 2015, the CMSE team met with the Rahovec Municipal Director of Health and the Director of the Main Family Medical Center to coordinate a CPR training event. The event, which would utilize members of the U.S. Embassy team, as well as the CMSE, was directed toward 12 members of the clinic staff. The training gave the team and the Embassy the ability to increase their situational awareness in the region and build relationships with the medical personnel. It also increased the capacity of the hospital staff to provide care and demonstrated the commitment of local agencies to care for the populace. Programs of this nature increase the confidence of the populace in their government, making them less vulnerable to violent extremist recruitment.
On Oct. 26, 2015, the CMSE worked with KSF CIMIC Department and the 354th Combat Support Hospital to provide medical supplies to the Klina Main Family Medical Center. The event helped not only enhance the capacity of the clinic but also the ability of the KSF CIMIC to conduct civil-military operations. While conducting the engagement, the team also had the ability and time to talk with local townspeople about their concerns and needs. The 354th CSH provided the supplies and the CIMIC transported them and saw to their distribution. The donation also demonstrated the ability of the Kosovo Security Forces to support the local population.

In an effort to lessen the ethnic divide in the country, the CMSE conducted school assessments in disputed areas where the schools are funded by the Government of Serbia rather than the Government of Kosovo. The Government of Kosovo will not allow Serbian language in government-funded school systems. The CMSE met with ethnic Gorani educators to identify sources of disputes between the minority community and the Government of Kosovo. In 1998, the Gorani population was estimated at 50,000. Today, there are fewer than 11,000 Gorani inside the borders of Kosovo. Many of the Gorani fled during the war, while others left after the war citing the unstable situation and economic issues. Currently there are 19 Gorani inhabited villages in Kosovo. Chief among the concerns was the lack of funding due to the language constraint, but also the condition of the school facilities, which are run down and overcrowded.

The CMSE also held two religious tolerance seminars with the assistance of the 92nd Battalion Unit Ministry Team and a behavioral health officer. The purpose of the seminars was to highlight the important role religion and education play in the prevention of extremist ideologies and violence. During the seminar, the students interacted and discussed issues in an open forum with the U.S. staff officers. The students examined the causes and effects of extremism juxtaposed to the moral and tangible benefits of tolerance. The seminar opened doors in the Islamic community and opened lines of communication between people of different faiths.

Working in concert with various partners, the CMSE built relationships and understanding with the Government of Kosovo and the populace. With each engagement, the rapport between the American forces and their Kosovar partners increased, as did their capacity to meet the needs of the people. SW
GEORGIA
Lying in the shadow of the Caucus Mountains, a group of small homes immediately draws attention. Surrounding the homes, there are no signs of commerce or schools. The people who live there view strangers suspiciously. The community they reside in is not home. They have no history there. It is the place they wound up after fighting between Russian and Georgian troops forced them to flee with little more than the clothes on their backs. With the Russian border not far away, there remains a constant threat of more violence.
It is not an unusual occurrence for sentries to return to their post on the Georgia side of the border to find the border has “crept” overnight — sometimes by inches, sometimes by feet. As a result of the problems in Ossetia and Abkhazia, there are a large number of internally displaced persons. It is estimated that more than 300,000 people live in IDP camps.

The Republic of Georgia is strategically located east of the Black Sea and controls much of the Caucasus Mountains and the routes through them. A former member of the Soviet Union, the country gained its independence in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed. From 1991 to 2003, a rather ineffectual and corrupt government was in place. An effort to manipulate the elections of 2003, lead to widespread protests that ultimately ousted then-President Eduard Shevarnadze. The movement became known as the Rose Revolution and the new country was solidified in 2004, when Mikheil Saakashvili came into power with the backing of his party, the United National Movement. Since that time the country has seen great progress, but efforts have been slowed by Russian aggression.

In 2011, the Georgian Dream Coalition, headed by billionaire philanthropist Bidzina Ivanishvili brought the two Georgian opposition parties together, winning a majority of the seats in the October 2012 parliamentary elections and took control of the government from the United National Movement. Ivanishvili was named prime minister and Giorgi Margvelashvili was named president. On Nov. 20, 2013, Georgia’s legislature confirmed Irakli Garibashvili as the new president. The new government has made integration with the West a priority. The country’s top foreign policy goals are joining the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Under the new constitution, the President is elected by absolute majority popular vote in two rounds if needed for a 5-year term. The President may seek re-election. The prime minister is nominated by the parliament and appointed by the president. The parliament, or Sakartvelos Parlamenti, is comprised of 150 seats, with 77 members directly elected in a single nationwide constituency by proportional representation vote and 73 directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote. Members of parliament serve for four years.

The Georgian Armed Forces fall under the Ministry of Defense and are comprised of land forces and air defense forces. Naval forces fall under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Citizens between the age of 18 to 34 must serve 18 months of compulsory military service.

The country’s population is by-in-large Georgian, with 83.8 percent of the people claiming Georgian as their ethnic group. Other ethnic groups are Azeri, 6.5 percent; Armenian 5.7 percent and Russian 1.5 percent.
percent. The official language of the country is Georgian, with 71 percent of the people speaking Georgian. The official religion of the country is Orthodox Christian (83.9 percent), with Muslim, Armenian-Gregorian and Catholic making up the remainder of religions.

More than 50 percent of the people live in urban areas, with rural farms and villages dotting the countryside.

As was the case with most countries that claimed independence at the fall of the Soviet Union, Georgia’s economy has struggled and for a time was hampered by corruption, which was a hallmark of the Soviet regime. The country was largely dependent on Russia to meet its energy needs. In an effort to distance itself even further from Russia, the country is now capable of supplying its own energy and gas supply through renovations of hydropower plants and by importing gas from Azerbaijan instead of from Russia. Utilizing its strategic position between Europe and Asia, Georgia is seeking to become a hub for gas, oil and other goods through a number of projects like the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the South Caucasus gas pipeline and the Kars-Akhalkalaki Railroad. The south Caucasus gas pipeline alone will bring $2 billion in foreign investment to the country. In 2014, Georgia published its 2020 Economic Development Strategy, which is driven by a $6 billion private equity fund set up by former Prime Minister Ivanishvili, that will invest in tourism, agriculture, logistics, energy, infrastructure and manufacturing. 

01 The largest IDP camp sits isolated in the Georgian countryside with Russia looming behind the mountains in the distance. U.S. Army Photo

02 The Holy Trinity Cathedral, known as the Sameba, is the main cathedral of the Georgian Orthodox Church in Tbilisi. U.S. Army Photo by SFC JESSIE BELFORD

03 CMSE team members take part in a Wounded Warrior Working Group with key stakeholders at the Georgian Ministry of Defence conference room. U.S. Army Photo
Perched on the divide between Europe and Asia, the Republic of Georgia is a melting pot of people and cultures. Georgia has known centuries of conflict with clashes between the ancient world powers to modern day clashes with Russia. At one time, Alexander the Great even ruled over the country. With such an eclectic influence of cultures, the country has a unique blend of architecture, literature, music and religion. The lush countryside is dotted with crumbling castles, monasteries and fortifications standing testament to its long history.

Today, Georgia continues to strive against those who would take its freedom. The most recent assault was in 2008 when Russian troops moved into the contested areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Those living near the Russian border are reminded daily of the threat that looms on the border. Many were displaced from their homes, while others wake to find the Russian border has crept even closer to their lands. And, for those who were forced from their homes new, very real threats face them every day.

Georgia is also facing several threats from within: threats from Russia, threats from extremists and from foreign fighters. Other internal problems such as unemployment, an aging infrastructure and a distressed economy further exacerbate the problems faced by not only the people, but by the government to whom the people are looking to make things better. Nowhere is that more evident than in the Internally Displaced Persons camps located throughout the countryside. An IDP is an internally displaced person who is forced to flee his home, but who, unlike refugees, remain within the country’s border.

In an effort to showcase the ability of the government to take care of the populace, the CMSE has been working closely with Georgian residents living in Internally Displaced Persons camps. The IDP camps resulted from the 2008 conflict with Russia. The people who were displaced because of the conflict now live in small camps that are dispersed in the region. Since gaining independence, Georgia has continually faced threats from separatist movements in the regions of Adjaria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In the Abkhazia regiona alone, more than 200,000 people were forced to flee their homes due to unrest in the region. When fighting broke out in South Ossetia between the Government of Georgia and Russia, an additional 160,000 people were forced to abandon their homes. The fighting destroyed many homes, schools and infrastructure, and brought the number of IDPs in excess of 300,000.

The majority of the IDP settlements are located in rural areas, far away from commerce and potential employment. The camps are comprised of rows of small houses. Dark smoke curls out of the chimneys of each of the homes. They are heated by coal. The settlements themselves are fenced for the protection of the people. The roads leading into and through the camp are unpaved. During the rainy season, the roads become unpassable, a little more than mud bogs. Livestock belonging to the residents roam freely down the roads — cows and horses amble past a group of people who are visiting the camp. Chickens scratch
the dirt, clucking at the visitors as they pass by. Each family is allocated a small patch of land for farming. Floods often wipe away their efforts.

It is on these communities that the Civil Military Support Element of the 92nd Civil Affairs Battalion, 95th Civil Affairs Brigade focuses. The goals of the CMSE are complex. First, their presence and connections to the settlements allow them to understand the sentiments of the residents and what factors change the way they look at the government. Second, through gained understanding and communication, the team is able to help meet some of the more pressing needs within the settlement and bring them to the attention of the government. By building these relationships, the team can help counter violent extremists who may play on the problems of the residents in the camp to stir up discontent or recruit residents to support their cause. The presence of the CMSE along with government officials, establishes a persistent presence of the United States Government’s engagement with the people and the Republic of Georgia, while building support for the Republic.

At the end of October 2015, the CMSE traveled several hours away from the capital, to visit two large IDP settlements populated by people displaced by the Russian incursion in South Ossetia. The two settlements Akhalsopeli and Mokhisi are not far from the Russian border, a line that the CMSE cannot go near. Each of the IDP settlements has its own kindergarten program that runs in the community. Those programs were the focus of the visit.

The camps are located about two hours away from Tbilisi, where the CMSE spends the majority of their time. Traveling to the camp is via fairly modern roadways. It’s when you leave the highway that you begin to realize how different the settlements are from the storybook streets of the capital. It had rained quite a bit before the visit. It was cold. The roads were muddy. Along with the CMSE on this visit is a representative of Spirit of America. The nonprofit organization steps in to help fund projects that the military cannot fund.

Driving into the first camp, residents step out of their homes and peer at the convoy as it passes by. A stray horse ambles down the road, and chickens peck at the ground alongside the road. The convoy stops at what appears to be the center of the settlement. Two community buildings sit in the center of the settlement. One hosts the daycare/school; the other is a community center for use by all of the settlement’s residents.

If the older residents appear to be defeated, the children seem filled with hope. Each day the children gather in the school. They sing songs, read books and learn. On this particular day, they were dressed in their best. Parents who were made aware of the visit (mostly mothers) lined up behind the students. The students had prepared for the visit of the American team, and they performed for them. They sang and recited poems. With the hearty approval of the team, the children became more excited. Then the CMSE gave the children a gift. On this particular day, the CMSE brought boxes of toys and books. Additionally, they brought a new heater to replace the wood burning stove that heats the building, which will provide cleaner air for the children. Like kids at Christmas, the children rushed to the toys. The CMSE demonstrated how to use some of the toys. Some of the children fanned through the books. The parents and teachers who watched smiled. The donation benefitted the kindergarten by providing educational products to enhance the educational opportunities for the children. In total, three settlements benefitted from the efforts of the team and Spirit of America.
The CMSE also developed close relationships with local schools located in predominantly ethnic minority area of Georgia. In the Samtskhe-Javakheti Region, the CMSE worked with Public School Number One, which is often referred to as the Armenian School. The school is home to several vulnerable populations, which are more likely to be influenced by outside actors. All of the classes are conducted in Armenian.

There are 400 students in the school, which is open to students grades 1-12. The school is 70 percent male. The school’s gymnasium had fallen into disrepair. During the long winter months, the students had no place to play or practice for sports activities. The CMSE met with local contractors to get price estimates to repair the floor, paint and repair the walls of the gym and replace the basketball backboards. The work was completed using local contractors and met the principal’s desire to have a safe place for children to practice. It met the U.S. Ambassador to Georgia’s goal of countering violent extremism and recruitment in Georgia, while establishing a persistent engagement by the U.S. in the region and show cased the ability of the government to meet the needs of the people. Numerous projects of this kind were conducted in schools throughout affected areas in Georgia.

With its troubled history as a backdrop and the current problems facing the country, it would seem implausible that the Armed Forces of the Republic of Georgia would focus on anything other than national defense. The exact opposite is true. Since 2010, the country has deployed more than 12,000 troops in support of International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan; second only to the United States. Beyond Afghanistan, the country has answered the call sending soldiers where they are needed in support of international security.

In Afghanistan, Georgian soldiers serve without caveats, meaning they can be assigned any mission, including direct combat. From 2010 to 2014, they carried out combat missions in Helmand Province alongside U.S. Marines. During that time, 31 Georgians paid the ultimate price and an additional 282 soldiers have been wounded. The United States Government is helping Georgia care for the wounded warriors through U.S. Security Assistance programs to strengthen their military medical facilities into institutions able to adequately treat and care for its wounded military personnel. Leading the charge is the Civil Military Support Element, which has routine engagements with the Georgian Ministry of
Health and the Defence Ministry, and in particular the wounded warriors' program working group, to discuss not only the care for wounded warriors, but also the facilities in which the soldiers will be treated. The goal is for Georgia to become the regional experts in amputee care.

Members of the CMSE have developed a close-working relationship not only with the government that addresses these issues, but also with the veterans themselves. They have been working closely with both parties to choose the location for the new veterans rehabilitation center, which will be located just outside of Tbilisi, the Georgian seat of government. The CMSE frequently meets with both parties to work out compromises between what the veterans want and what the Georgian Government can actually provide. Since 1998, Georgia has received more than $220 million in Foreign Military Financing, with funds from that pool being specifically used to provide equipment, training and advisory support to strengthen Georgia's ability to care for its wounded warriors. The government showed its commitment to the veterans by establishing a new agency devoted to caring for Georgia's veterans.

Throughout their assignment in Georgia, the CMSE participated in a number of events that focused on the wounded soldiers. In June 2015, the CMSE represented the U.S. Embassy at the grand opening of the Parasports Development Center, which is designed to further the rehabilitation assets available to wounded Georgian warriors. The facility, which will work with disabled people throughout the country, signed a formal agreement between Parasports and the Ministry of Defence that will allow wounded warriors to utilize the facility and its coaches to increase their level of mobility and activity.

In July 2015, another agreement was signed between the Chichua Medical Center Mzera in Tbilisi and the Ministry of Defence Medical Department and the Georgian Wounded Warrior Program that will allow wounded warriors with eye problem and disease to receive world-class care at the medical center at no expense to the soldier. The initiative shows that the Georgian Ministry of Defence Medical Department is utilizing all possible approaches to improve the care for their wounded warriors by reaching out to private organizations.

In July, the CMSE, along with the Georgian Inter-Disciplinary Amputee Rehabilitation Team and the Georgian Wounded Warriors, held a 10-day rehabilitation course at the Tserovani Rehabilitation Center for wounded warriors who live outside of Tbilisi. The wounded warriors had varying degrees of disability from a variety of conflicts. While at the camp, they played basketball, soccer and table tennis. One of the main objectives of the event was to gauge participation and mobility of the wounded warriors, while developing a spirit of community among the rehabilitation community.

In August 2015, the same team welcomed seven Ukrainian wounded warriors for treatment. The Ukrainian soldiers will receive occupational therapy, physical therapy and behavioral health rehabilitation treatment at the Tserovani Rehab Clinic. The seven soldiers underwent therapy for injuries that they received during the Ukraine conflict. This was a major step forward for Georgia in terms of setting the regional standard for wounded warrior care.

In October 2015, another 15 Ukraine soldiers came to Georgia. This time the soldiers spent two weeks at Tserovani Rehabilitation Center undergoing physiological rehabilitation care for wounds received during the ongoing Ukrainian conflict. The Ukraine Government does not have the facilities or programs to offer the same level of behavioral health rehabilitation to their Soldiers who have been fighting in the ongoing conflict. Programs like this showcase Georgia's ability to support its allies effectively and serve as a major step in becoming the regional wounded warrior care center.

In October, the CMSE hosted a meeting between the Ministry of Defence medical Department, the Wounded Warrior Support Department, the Sports Department and the interdisciplinary rehabilitation group, to discuss current wounded warrior care, issues and initiatives.

Taking a lead in these programs, initiatives, the CMSE is able to bring the pertinent players to the table to further the goals of the Ministry of Defence and to ensure that the wounded warriors are provided top-notch medical care. Further, the relationships Georgia is building in the region through these programs show the people that it is capable of meeting their needs.

The organization’s advisory board, a veritable who’s who in the Department of Defense, boasts members like Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Charles Cleveland, Gen. (Ret.) Jack Keane, Dr. David Kilcullen, Adm. (Ret.) Eric Olsen and Gen. (Ret.) James Mattis, who said he buys into the idea of Spirit of America because it opens “a whole new vista for direct support when U.S. Government money is not the answer.”

Founded by Jim Hake — a technology entrepreneur, who started one of the first Internet media companies — following the attacks of 9/11, Spirit of America provides private assistance in direct response to needs identified by American military and civilian personnel. Support comes in a variety of ways. For some, support is given through project funding. Working with a unit, Spirit of America can develop and fund solutions for U.S. civil-military teams, which include employment and job training, education, livestock health and small business assistance and village stability.

Help can also come in the form of know-how. Working with GLG Research, Spirit of America offers U.S. civil military teams access to more than 300,000 private-sector subject-matter experts. Of course, sometimes needs are more pressing and that’s when Spirit of America steps in and provides a variety of material goods from blankets and clothing to computers and school supplies. They also have access to wheelchairs and water purification, as well as sewing machines and playground equipment. The list really has no bounds, and when the need is made known, Spirit of America staffers find a way to make it happen, which includes delivering the supplies to the team.

In Georgia, a Civil Affairs team assigned to the 97th Civil Affairs Battalion recently put Spirit of America to work to support displaced children in a contested area of the country. In 2008, armed conflict broke out in Georgia when the Russian Army started peacekeeping operations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. During the five-day conflict, 170 servicemen, 14 policemen and 228 civilians from Georgia were killed and 1,747 wounded. Sixty-seven Russian servicemen were killed, 283 were wounded and 365 South Ossetian servicemen and civilians (combined) were killed, according to an official EU fact-finding report about the conflict. Georgian citizens fleeing from the ongoing tensions have found home in an Internally Displaced Persons Camp.

In the camp, a large number of families live in small homes. Each camp has its own school and community center. The schools are not well funded and are heated by wood heaters. In an effort to improve the living conditions and the efforts of the school, the CA team partnered with Spirit of America to provide books and toys to the children as well as a more efficient means of heating the center, where the children spend their days and nap.

Traveling with the CA team was Isaac Egan, a former Soldier who now works with Spirit of America and the staff of Special Warfare. Spirit of America’s goal isn’t just to help the military, it also puts former Soldiers to work. Egan’s job is to facilitate the organization’s work with the military. He gets to know the teams, he sees what they are doing and what they need. And then, as in this case, he helps them meet a need and in doing so, builds rapport with the Georgian people.

Members of the CA team speak easily with Egan. He understands them. He understands their limitations and he helps them build on their previous successes.

During the day-long trip, the team visited two internally displaced persons camps and brought smiles not only to the children, who lined up to play with the toys and flip through the books, but also their teachers who work so hard to ensure the children have a safe place to learn. The team members are quick to point out that they couldn’t do what they were doing without the assistance of Spirit America. For Spirit of America, the goal is making U.S. troops and diplomats safer and more successful in their missions by helping local people who are not reached by large-scale aid programs.
GEORGIA IN DEVELOPMENT
NATO, RUSSIAN AND DAESH INFLUENCE IN GEORGIA

BY ROMAN TEREFF OFF

The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or the U.S. government.

Georgia faces many challenges as a developing post-Soviet country with aspirations for NATO membership and integration into the European Union. As the government continues to strengthen its cooperation with its partners in the United States and Europe, Georgia’s northern neighbor, Russia, continues to obstruct development efforts and puts pressure on NATO and its allies to keep the relatively small country in limbo.

Another issue also looms large for the transitioning state and could be an even bigger setback to stability than Russian interference. Daesh has turned its attention to Georgia’s Muslim communities, and reports of Daesh recruitment and influence in these regions have begun to emerge. How Georgia addresses each of these challenges will determine whether the state moves toward growth and stability, or finds itself in a grave struggle to free itself from harmful outside influence — whether from Russia or extremists groups. This articles examines these challenges and what possible futures Georgia may experience.

RUSSIA, NATO AND GEORGIA IN THE MIDDLE

In a recent visit to the United States, Georgian Minister of Defense, Tinatin Khidasheli noted that Georgia is a strong ally to the West and has demonstrated its military and diplomatic capabilities. Minister Khidasheli stated that Georgia deserves NATO integration and NATO needs Georgia as a member. Georgians are pursuing the path to NATO integration and anticipating an upcoming decision on the issue from NATO at the 2016 Summit in Warsaw.

A Georgia-NATO partnership has the potential to stabilize the security environment in the Caucasus region. Despite what Russia may think, Georgia’s possible NATO membership offers an opportunity to strengthen the security of Russia’s southern border and help stabilize the North Caucasus.

Dr. Mamuka Tsereteli, a senior Research Fellow with the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, argues that Russia has not learned its lesson from the 1990s when it supported the separatist war in Abkhazia against the Georgian central government, which helped...
destabilize and radicalize the region. According to Tsereteli, Chechen fighters who fought against the Georgian government soon turned their arms against Russia. The same pattern can be observed in the North Caucasus Region after Russia’s aggression against Georgia in 2008 with the stationing of Russian troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Georgia’s NATO membership would also provide collective defense, which would be efficient and cost effective. According to the article, “Economic Benefits of NATO Integration” by Nina Chitaya, collective defense through NATO could advance Georgia’s economic development through the reduction of its defense spending and establishing an attractive business atmosphere, increasing the flow of foreign investments.

**THE RUSSIAN IMPEDIMENT TO STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT**

Presently, Georgia’s main challenge to stability is Russian aggression and Russian influence over Georgia’s breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Georgia is facing the process of demarcation, also known as “borderization,” which has resulted in the manipulation of Russian-occupied territory lines called Administrative Boundary Lines. “Borderization” has created nearly 23,000 internally displaced persons in proximity of the South Ossetia ABL. Nongovernmental organizations are primarily helping to support this population working on issues of poverty and social inclusivity since the government response to the issue is largely tied up in legislative efforts. With an estimated 270,000 IDPs in Georgia since the ‘90s, it’s evident that Russia’s efforts to dominate its neighbor have a large human impact.

Unfortunately, humanitarian assistance and basic development programs are becoming part of a geopolitical chess match. While IDP communities continuously work with nongovernmental organizations to build a more a stable environment, Russia continues to move its troops and the Administrative Boundary Line further into Georgian territory largely in protest to the Georgia-NATO relationship.

There are tough decisions ahead for Georgia if it wants to continue to attract investors, foreign assistance and tourists. According to Khidasheli, “the Russian sphere of influence is dangerous for the region” and “Russia does not care about democratic participation in anything” as seen by the events in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. With Russian check points being marked half a kilometer from Georgia’s main east-west highway and a mile of the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline now falling within Russian control, the negative effects on Georgia’s development as a transit country for commercial goods, oil products and military cargo may undermine the economic viability of investors and potential donors.

Additionally, there are growing concerns in Georgia about the risks of civil society organizations working in proximity of the Administrative Boundary Lines. Most recently, Russians have advanced the Administrative Boundary Line approximately two kilometers deeper into Georgian territory, cutting off villages’ and farmers’ access to their lands and fields. With reports of arrests and abductions common around the ABLs, some donors are becoming skeptical of providing assistance.

How can civil society organizations build capacity in communities that wake up to barbed wire fences splitting them in half? Efforts to establish cross-community dialogue and peace negotiations between split communities are ongoing, but the uncertainty of the shifting borders constantly raises Georgia’s fear of apprehension and arrest.

This is Russia’s strategy to undermine Georgian efforts to advance regional stability through provocative action that creates uncertainty among NATO members concerning Georgian integration. While Georgia maintains its position that it won’t be provoked into action and looks for support from its Western partners, Georgian borders continue to shift and, at times, shrink.

**AN INTERNAL THREAT: ISOLATED COMMUNITIES**

While Georgia focuses on NATO and Russia, the threat of Daesh to Georgia’s vulnerable communities, specifically in the Pankisi Valley Region, Kvemo-Kartli and Adjara, is expanding.

Specifically, the Pankisi Valley Region has a history of jihadist activity and remains geographically isolated from the rest of the country, making it difficult for the Georgian government to control and influence. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Russia’s wars against Chechen separatists led to the establishment of Pankisi as a sanctuary for thousands of refugees.

Chechen, Arab and allegedly al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters used the area to launch insurgent strikes into Russian territory. In 2002 and 2004, Georgian security forces largely cleared the area of militants and criminal networks; however, the inflow of foreign fighters over the years left a lasting impact on the area and a Wahhabi influence over a traditionally Kist population.

Russian security services have accused Georgia of working in tandem with jihadist organizations for years, suggesting Georgia does so to secure additional defenses against future Russian altercations. Yet the notion that Georgia could be harboring terrorists — regardless of the veracity of this claim — could give Russia another reason to invade.

With reports of Daesh recruitment of youth and even women in the Pankisi Valley region and other Muslim communities, Georgia should seize the
opportunity to establish closer links with these isolated communities and pursue social integration and cross-ethnic inclusivity within these vulnerable populations.

"DISAPPEARING" YOUTH

While men and women may be recruited through a hub of passing foreign fighters, excited to join the fight and make some money in Iraq and Syria, youth are often enticed through a virtual world of social media where former residents of the valley now fighting in Iraq and Syria, are regarded as role models and heroes.

Outside analysts may argue that the main problem is unemployment and marginalization, but locals have voiced that the number one problem is the extremely powerful ideological propaganda coming from Daesh.

Aside from small trade and meager land cultivation, there are few promising life choices available in the valley. However, poverty alone is not enough to cause radicalization.

The prospect of a mercenary lifestyle is not hard for these young men to envision. For example, many young Pankisi men know the story of Tarkhan Batirashvili — a well-known Georgian jihadist who rose to be one of the leading commanders in Daesh. His rumored wealth and reputation have not helped to dissuade them from this path.

Daesh has established a massive, solid media network for online recruitment to capture the minds of those vulnerable to radicalization. Currently, there are a number of former Pankisi residents communicating online straight from the battlefields of Iraq and Syria. This has created a sense of admiration and pride among the youth, who view their former neighbors and friends fighting in Syria and Iraq as opportunists who were able to escape the dull life of the valley for a second chance at adventure, wealth and fame.

In his article in The Intercept entitled “The Mujahedeen’s Valley,” Marcin Mamon explains that residents of the valley have repeatedly told police that their villages have become recruiting grounds for young people enticed to join the jihad in Syria. A representative of the Chechen diaspora in the valley said explicitly that if the Georgian state does not stop recruitment, “the valley’s youth will disappear,” according to Mamon’s article.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE

Regional experts generally conclude that there is little opportunity for men, women and youth in the valley, except to tend to their farms and livestock, go to school and attend the local mosque.

Yet, the region is actually better off than some other under-developed parts of Georgia such as Imereti or Gueria. The residents are not subject to systematic exclusion or discrimination; however the valley’s remote location has prevented many valley residents from engaging in economic activities or benefiting from Georgia’s period of economic growth.

While some experts argue that implementing education, employment and youth-oriented programs may help the region to stem radicalization, others like Onnik James Krikorian, a British journalist and counterterrorism consultant, believes countering
violent extremism initiatives in collaboration with civil society and local communities can reduce radicalization occurrences.

Targeted CVE measures can be designed to minimize radicalization through engagement with local communities and nongovernmental actors in countering extremist narratives. In Pankisi, CVE programs would be best suited to empower youth and families, as well as local religious, cultural and educational leaders.

Georgia’s Minister of Defense, Tinatin Khidasheli, has acknowledged the emerging problem in the Pankisi region and noted that the region needs attention. While addressing questions at the U.S. Institute for Peace on Aug. 19, Khidasheli explained that the region needs to be more integrated into Georgian society and young people from the region need to feel a sense of national pride and belonging.

Better employment, economic opportunities and improved social welfare benefits can advance this aim, but peaceful religious education to young people will be essential in order to counter the narratives of violent extremist organizations like Daesh. On top of this, civil society organizations will have to become more involved in addressing the causes of radicalization and countering the recruitment campaigns of violent extremist organizations.

GEORGIA’S FUTURE AND WAY FORWARD

“Stability is possible in Georgia without Russian rule and without taking orders from Moscow,” explained Defense Minister Khidasheli. If Georgia is successful in joining NATO then others may follow and challenge Russia.

Ultimately the decision about Georgian membership in NATO in Warsaw in 2016 will either move Georgia forward or backward. Many Georgians will look at the decision as reassurance of their voting decisions, political strength and whether the risk to pursue Western ideals and NATO was worth the torment from Russian. This decision will also put NATO credibility on the line — either delivering its promise to Georgia or, if not, potentially allowing Russia to internally manipulate an organization of which they are not even a member.

However, with the right outreach and approach to countering violent extremism, these areas, and the vulnerable youth living there, can still be reached and brought back from the edge.

Georgia will need to collaborate with international partners, nongovernmental organizations and local communities to share in best practices and create new opportunities to counter radicalization by building media and leadership capacity in these vulnerable communities to dispatch counter narratives to extremism and reduce the appeal of joining extremist groups.

Georgia has an opportunity and real potential to counter the Daesh threat. If the Georgian budget and political will can handle it, than the issue can be addressed through a targeted approach that will focus on vulnerable communities in Pankisi, Kvemo-Kartli and Adjara through a combination of development work and countering violent extremism initiatives.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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10TH SFG(A) AND EUROPE IN 2016: Old Wine in New Bottles?

“The 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) is back in Europe.”

Is this statement true or misleading? Paradoxically, it is both. This article separates the truth from the myths about the 10th Special Forces Group in Europe in 2016 and clarifies our future efforts.

BY COLONEL BRIAN PETIT

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

On July 10, 2015, the nominee for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford, declared in his Senate Armed Services committee confirmation hearing that “Russia is the greatest threat to our national security.” In the era of the perpetual counterterror fight, Gen. Dunford’s statement sounded like an anachronistic Cold War sound bite. In truth, his plain language declaration signaled a new geopolitical reality: the global interests of the U.S. and its allies are challenged by an expeditionary-spirited, irredentist Russia.

The most obvious symbols of Russia’s expansionism are three recent Russian campaigns: the March 2014 annexation of Crimea; the hybrid war in Eastern Ukraine, initiated in summer 2015 and ongoing; and Russia’s September 2015 military intervention in Syria in support of the Bashir Al-Assad regime.

To respond to and counter-pressure Russian expansionist tendencies, the United States and its allies responded with diplomatic, political, military and economic measures to counter, contain or deter Russian strategic aspirations. This is a global effort that expands beyond the confines of Europe and involves partners other than the 28-members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Within the European theater of operations, the main military component of the deterrence effort is Operation Atlantic Resolve; this is a “demonstration of continued U.S. commitment to the collective security of NATO and to ensure peace and stability in the region, in light of Russia’s illegal actions in the Ukraine.”

The special operations component of OAR is led by the Stuttgart, Germany-based Special Operations Command – Europe. The U.S. Army Special Operations Forces components of SOCEUR bring special warfare capabilities to this new geostrategic challenge. Europe-focused ARSOF include the 4th Military Information Support Group (Airborne), the 92nd Civil Affairs battalion and the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne).
10th Special Forces Group, recognized by the distinctive Trojan horse insignia, has been European-oriented since its activation on June 19, 1952. Headquartered at Fort Carson, Colorado, the 10th Special Forces Group has maintained a forward presence in Europe since 1953, when then-Col. Aaron Bank deployed the 10th SFG(A) elements forward to Bavaria, West Germany. In 1989, the 1st Battalion, 10th SFG(A) relocated from Bad Tolz, Bavaria, to Stuttgart, where 1st Battalion, 10th SFG(A) has remained as the group’s forward-based battalion.

In 2015, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command directed a regional realignment of Special Forces Groups. The realignment was in response to U.S. security policy vis-à-vis Russian aggression combined with a reduced commitment to Central Asian counterinsurgency and stability operations. The realignment directed the 3rd Special Forces Group to return to Africa, relieving in place the 10th Special Forces Group elements operating under Special Operations Command – Africa. This geographic shift enabled the 10th Special Forces Group to devote greater attention and assets on the European theater. This regional shift is currently underway. In practical terms, what does this mean? What is truth and what is fiction?

MYTH #1: “10TH SFG(A) IS GOING BACK TO EUROPE.”

THE TRUTH: The 10th SFG(A) never left Europe. Since 10th Group’s initial stationing in Bad Tolz, Germany in 1953, the 10th SFG (A) has maintained a forward-presence in Europe. Even during the heart of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and enduring commitments to Africa, 10th SFG(A) remained consistently engaged in Europe with Europeans. Over the past two decades, partner engagements have expanded from 10th Group’s traditional west and northern European partners to building SOF partnerships with East European partners, most notably, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania.

On a macro-historical scale, the evolution of 10th SFG(A) engagement in Europe reflects the dynamic history of European security since “Victory in Europe” day, declared May 8, 1945. The (simplified) mission chronology in the sidebar on the right represents the arc of 10th SFG(A) engagement in Europe over the past 65 years.
Following the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., the 10th SFG’s main effort immediately shifted to expeditionary campaigns outside of the European theater. The 10th SFG(A) campaigned with SOF, joint and multinational forces in the Iraq, Afghanistan and African theaters. These other-than-European theater commitments did reduce 10th Group’s capacity aligned against European security issues.

Given this history, a more accurate statement is that the 10th SFG(A) is now weighting its effort toward Europe. In practical terms, the 10th SFG(A) is focusing its intellectual and military power to support SOCEUR and European partner nations more consistently and — where merited — with more capacity. The most obvious indicators of this shift are an invigorated intelligence focus, adjusted language requirements, increased engagements events, expanded partnership opportunities, improved deployment pre-study and preparation, improved SOF-Conventional Force integration, and increased high-tactical and operational-level command emphasis.

**MYTH #2:** “IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN CREATED LOST TIME FOR 10TH GROUP AND EUROPE.”

**THE TRUTH:** This is a myth. In fact, the opposite is true. The last decade of desert wars — principally, Afghanistan — galvanized European SOF partners around growing, sustaining and fighting their joint SOF formations. In Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force numbered more than 52 nations at its peak. The SOF component of ISAF, named ISAF SOF, consisted of more than 20 contributing nations: a strategic coalition by any measure.

The Afghanistan theater of war served as an expeditionary proving ground for many European SOF units, whose primary missions were typically domestic-defense focused. NATO SOF served as the coordinating headquarters that validated the pre-deployment training infrastructure, command and control, medical evacuation, and fire support infrastructure to enable European SOF nations to aggressively deploy and employ their SOF in high-risk environments. The 10th SFG(A) partnered with multiple European nations, from pre-mission through full combat tours, providing advisory and enabling support (communications, intelligence) as European SOF took the lead role in training, advising and assisting Afghan Security Forces. The decade of partnership with 10th SFG(A) and its European partners – in the unforgiving trial of combat – accelerated relationships and capability far “beyond the joint combined exchange training.”

Within Europe proper, SOF institutions matured apace with the expanding tactical SOF capabilities. The NATO SOF coordination cell was conceptualized to provide a common European-based joint SOF headquarters. Over the last decade, the NSCC grew from a “business start-up” in Stuttgart, Germany to its current state: a strategic, three-star joint SOF command called NATO SOF Headquarters, located in Mons, Belgium.

It is said that the strongest steel is forged in the hottest fire. Many European SOF partners — now partnered with 10th SFG(A) in the European theater — revised their modern identities and developed their capabilities in combat operations in Afghanistan. These same SOF partners now work with their 10th SFG(A) counterparts as part of their national defense strategies. These high-trust partnerships and close personal relationships are paramount as NATO SOF jointly plan, prepare, and posture in the shadow of a revanchist Russia.
The 3rd BN, 10th SFG(A) colors are unfurled in Kabul, Afghanistan, in 2013 as they assume command of Combined Special Operations Task Force-10, a multinational task force with SOF advisers from Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and the United States.

American and Estonian SOF wait for paratroopers to exit an American C-130 and conduct a water infiltration in Estonia as a part of Exercise Spring Storm 2014, an annual training event that has evolved into the largest field training exercise in the Baltic states.

**MYTH #3: “10TH GROUP IS RELEARNING UW.”**

**THE TRUTH:** Everyone is learning and adapting to modern warfare. The 19th century war theorist Carl von Clausewitz posited that the *nature of war* does not change but the *character of warfare* does. Whether it is high intensity conventional battles or surreptitious unconventional warfare, the modern era of conflict demands a perpetual review and validation of even the most durable principles of warfare. Toward that end, 10th SFG(A) is both student and teacher: adapting, learning and leading the application of special warfare and its doctrinal subset — UW — in the contemporary European environment.

Organizationally, 10th Group maintains a strong historical and intellectual tradition oriented on unconventional warfare. Even in the heart of the counterinsurgency era (2002-2014), the 10th SFG(A) retained a strong affinity for the study and practice of unconventional warfare. Experientially, the 10th SFG(A) led the joint-force unconventional warfare campaign in Northern Iraq in 2003, executing a doctrinal application of a discrete entry, surrogate warfare operation as part of a major theater campaign. Academically, 10th SFG(A) and Operation Iraqi Freedom veteran Lt. Col. (Ret.) Marc Grdovic synthesized the big ideas and best practices of the Afghanistan and Iraq unconventional warfare campaigns into a series of articles, publications and doctrinal references. Strategically, the USASOC Commander (2012-2015) and former 10th SFG(A) Commander, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Charles T. Cleveland, led a renewed call for intellectual clarity on the tactical application and policy implications of UW. Most recently, the 4th Battalion, 10th SFG(A) co-sponsored, with the Naval Post Graduate School, an Advanced UW Academics course that ranged from understanding policy implications to exploring emerging cyber techniques. Within Europe proper, ARSOF are sponsoring or participating with European partners in seminars, conferences and wargames that aim to craft successful UW strategies suitable to local conditions.

10th SFG(A) is also revising its own understanding of UW application where the U.S. is not the primary UW agent. The Europeans rightly view themselves as the principal actors in the self-defense of their own countries. It is within this cultural and legal context that today’s 10th SFG(A) A-detachments are applying special warfare and UW principles. Europe presents delicate tactical and political environments where UW doctrinal solutions require studied judgment and wholesale understanding of sovereignty to ascertain their value and risk. While these unconventional warfare missions have clear echoes of history, the modern European security environment remains knotty to even the most clear-thinking unconventional warfare practitioners.
MYTH #4: 10TH GROUP’S RETURNING TO ITS COLD WAR MISSION.

THE TRUTH: Despite the historic precedent of countering Russian aggression in Europe, the differences between 2016 and the Cold War era may be more telling than the similarities. Five key differences give pause before subscribing to the simplified Cold War II analogy:

- Russia. The threat is Russia — a singular, if massive, country — and not the conglomerate of states once known as the The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that existed from 1922 to 1991.
- Ground Forces. Europe no longer maintains massive standing armies, tactically arrayed on conspicuous invasion corridors, such as the notorious Fulda Gap. Even today’s agile U.S. Army Europe presence is a fraction of our peak Cold War posture represented by multiple Corps and Divisions.
- Cyber. The cyber domain means new modes of attack and new vulnerabilities to protect.
- SOF partners. The growth of partner-nation SOF over the past 20 years gives USSOF new partnership options and long standing, trusted relationships to leverage.
- The U.S. Joint Force. In the past 25 years, the U.S. joint force concept has appreciably matured, in both peace and wartime. SOCEUR, with its integrated SOF capabilities, represents that joint SOF capability within the European Command joint force team. Despite a smaller force structure in Europe, today’s joint force tendencies are a stark improvement over the questionably synchronized, service-centric era of the Cold War.

The actual missions conducted — direct action, counterterror, unconventional warfare — will continue to shift as the character of warfare inevitably shifts.
CONCLUSION

This is no myth: In 2016, the 10th Group priority of effort is in Europe with Europeans.

For nearly 65 years, 10th Special Forces Group has conducted operations and activities that reflect the evolution of collective security and the shifting threats in Europe. 10th Group veterans take justifiable pride in their contribu-

tion to the post-World War II, Marshall plan-stimulated rise of a prosperous, continental Europe based on democratic principles, free markets, open media, and the respect of human rights. This historical arc includes the past two decades of engagement and partnerships with nations that fell behind the Iron Curtain. These nations face the real potential of Russian aggression on their borders and seek U.S. assurance, assistance and support to maintain their sovereignty and prosperity. At once, this is both a novel challenge and familiar terrain for the men and women of the original Special Forces Group.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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MYTH #5: “EUROPEAN SOF IS UW FOCUSED.”

THE TRUTH: Some European SOF are UW focused, but not all. Taken together, Europe faces multiple crises: the monetary (euro) crisis; the influx of refugees from North Africa, the Levant, the Middle East and Central Asia; domestic terrorist threats; and ethnic strife within internal citizenry; energy dependency; and an expansionist Russia capable of effective hybrid warfare. Each NATO SOF nation, by virtue of its geography, policy, threat and defense capability, configures and missions its national SOF in concert with its defense priorities. For some, the top priority is al-Qaeda or Daesh threats emanating from North Africa and the Levant. Others focus on precision counterterror operations at home or near-abroad. For a select few, their national SOF are chartered to conduct unconventional warfare as a component of their national defense strategies.

For those European countries that employ UW warfare as an element of their deter and defense plans, there is great relevance in the World War II and Cold War era UW and resistance case studies. Elements of PSYWAR, auxiliary-building, citizen resistance networks, sabotage and subversion are modern descendants of their Cold War-era antecedents. While the past is not prologue, nearly all ARSOF engagements in continental Europe are informed and influenced by shared historical and regional knowledge of European resistance histories, both successful and failed.

Thus, 10th Group’s renewed focus on applying unconventional warfare is not a uniformly practiced position among European SOF partners. Despite this truth, the real value of partnerships lies in the trust forged over the past two decades, many of them in a combat theater. High trust partnerships underpinned by rehearsed interoperability remains the foundation of our coalition strength with European security forces. This truth remains the foundational idea of 10th SFG(A) engagement in Europe. The actual missions conducted – direct action, counterterror, unconventional warfare – will continue to shift as the character of warfare inevitably shifts.

NOTES
01. Hybrid warfare, a non-doctrinal term, is defined here as the blending of conventional escalatory dominance with elements of non-declared insurgent-like activities such as sabotage, surrogate warfare, and misinformation. 02. United States Army Europe website, www.eur.army.mil (accessed on January 31, 2016). 03. Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Beret (Presidio Press, Novato, CA 1986), 171. 04. U.S. Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations, 16 July 2014, defines UW as “operations and activities that are conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations, Joint Publication 3-05, Washington, D.C., July 16, 2014, p. xi). 05. JCET stands for Joint Combine Exchange Training. These events are normally six to eight weeks in length and usually take place inside the host country. Outside of combat, JCETs are generally the main venue where U.S. and partner SOF work together. 06. Carl von Clausewitz. Vom Kriege, 1832. Translated, edited and published as On War by Peter Paret and Michael Howard (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 07. U.S. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-05, Special Operations (31 August 2012), defines special warfare as the “execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment.” 08. Grödovic, Mark. A Leader’s Handbook to Unconventional Warfare, Publication 09-1, Ft. Bragg, N.C.: U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, November 2009. 09. To be clear, this means that the U.S. is assisting partner nations who could enable, organize, sponsor or support irregular or citizen-brigades in the conduct of UW. 10. Poor joint interoperability and shoddy inter-service cooperation triggered the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation that mandated joint force requirements. One year later in 1987, the Nunn-Cohen act wrote into U.S. law the creation of standing special operations forces.
Russia’s resurgence in recent years caught some by surprise, but many of those who followed Vladimir Putin’s rise to power merely shrugged their shoulders and asked, what else should we expect from a former KGB power player? Still those familiar with Russian history add that the return of Great Power status to Russia is neither unexpected, nor terribly worrying because despite having made headlines, the country still faces rampant corruption, a struggling economy and the potential for Kremlin “palace coups” if Putin does not keep his supporters satisfied.

Countering those who either downplay the surprise or the severity of threats posed by a resurgent Russia, are those who know that no matter the weaknesses inherent to Russia, and there are many, the country still controls vast power resources, not least of which is diplomatic leverage over several key “problem” countries for the U.S. The rise of Russian initiatives at critical stages of the Iranian nuclear debate, and Putin’s entrance into the battle against Daesh, while pressuring to keep in power the dictator who started the Syrian civil war, complicates an already messy strategic situation. More broadly, Russia’s long-term energy partnership with China, as that nation flexes its new found strength and threatens U.S. allies in the region, makes U.S. bilateral relations even more difficult. Then of course there is the use of hybrid warfare in the former Soviet sphere to reclaim lost parts of the motherland and reassert primacy over neighboring countries, all of which points to an interna-

tional environment more complicated than the Global War on Terrorism “good old days” when the U.S. only had to worry about troubling non-state actors. Now, with the return of Great Power politics, the future looks even more complicated than it did a decade ago because those same non-state threats are still around as well.

In the face of these threats, deterring Russian aggression should be an imperative to policy makers, yet the problems go beyond increased security challenges from potential Russian invasions of NATO member states. Instead, Putin threatens an inherent, fundamental vulnerability in Western civilization itself. He does it with a war of words, and as of late, it is a war in which Putin has had clear advantages.

The words coming out of the Kremlin to control the perceptions of its actions, both at home and among vulnerable populations, carry great weight because they are the same words used by the West to justify its own actions over the last two decades. Talk of separatists and autonomous regions as a way to guarantee their human rights ring true in the ears of Bosnians, Kosovars, and South Sudanese since all now have independent countries thanks in large part to the United States. More importantly though, the same message also rings true with the great masses of discontented around the world as they buy into Western idealism that democracy will indeed make life better — the Arab Spring followed several populist revolutions in other regions, building on both their methods of change and their aspirations for lasting influence over their futures.

However, the same discontent that led to successful regime changes is also easily manipulated, even pro-

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**BY DR. SPENCER MEREDITH III, Ph.D AND A SPECIAL FORCES OFFICER**

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voked into existence by external actors who fan the flames of economic privation and social injustice. Sounding similar to the justifications for U.S. unconventional warfare, support to resistance is a concept that is an effective tool of statecraft no matter the end goal or even who goes along the path to get there. This is what makes the threat from Russia so existential, so basic to the West itself, because rather than riding in as a noble benefactor whose goals are at least benign in relation to U.S. interests, or better still, clearly beneficial for their focus on rights and protections for citizens, Russia’s narrative casts the United States in particular as the harbinger of death. In it, either the watchful U.S. looks on with self-interested neglect or even worse, with genuine disdain for the suffering caused by its mucking about in other countries, breaking systems and leaving a decade of terrorism-fueled insanity in once stable regimes. To counter the obvious Western response that dictators do bad things, often worse things, Putin acknowledges the harm done by autocrats, but only if they do not have the support of the people — thus justifying his own rule and sending a warning to his allies to get their people in line.

A careful observer would ask how any of this differs from the messaging by the United States when it violates the sovereignty of other countries, albeit with UN support and allies aiding in multilateral justifications. The difference is clearly there, but regrettably it is not obvious, nor clearly understood because it is both a product of the Western world, and a process deeply ingrained in democratic societies. The product is restrained government, and the process is an informed, active citizenry to ensure it. Those two things define Western Liberalism, the bedrock idea behind the Declaration of Independence, Constitution and endless debates that both plague the U.S. system and make it a thing of beauty in a world of all-too-common tyranny in the name of the people, tyranny that really only serves the ruling inner circle. As a result, the message that Russia brings may sound similar, but it is ultimately a fun house mirror image — somewhat discernable at a distance, but up close, distorted and ultimately deceiving.

How then can the United States counter this greater war of words? In many ways the same as done in the Cold War, at least in terms of NATO. The focus has been and will continue to be ensuring that alliance members perceive themselves as capable and the union as unbreakable. To that end, Atlantic Resolve has taken on an enduring, broad spectrum support role in terms of communicating U.S. intentions, NATO unity, and support for those nations most vulnerable to Russian messaging, namely the Baltics with their large Russian diaspora populations. Those areas within Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania carry great risk for their governments and societies, ranging from overt separatist threats and Russian hybrid warfare to capitalize on them, down to the more subtle yet perhaps more important identity questions of what it means to be a part of Narva, as a part of Estonia, while speaking Russian, and feeling marginalized.

This raises some important questions about Atlantic Resolve, questions that go beyond its bolstering effect on the alliance and the Baltics in particular, as well as beyond the resulting deterrence NATO assumes the Kremlin will see. The real question deals with the follow-on effects on those same vulnerable populations, both in the Baltics and beyond by implication. Does Atlantic Resolve show that NATO, and the U.S. in

RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN ESTONIA

The Narva River is a natural border between Estonia and Russia. On the left is Estonia’s Hermann Castle in the town of Narva, facing off with Russia’s Ivan gorod Fortress on the right.
particular, are simply entrenching the status quo that marginalized people want so much to change? Does Atlantic Resolve prove to them that their anger is justified and worse, that they are powerless to do anything about it? If so, the chances of Russian operationalization of those vulnerable, marginalized and now even angrier populations increases.

So what is to be done? How can the U.S. reduce the broader risks of necessarily reassuring allies and communicating clear intent to protect the alliance borders? An interesting and instructive exercise was conducted in mid-2015 by the Joint Special Operations Master of Arts program as part of the National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs. The exercise included faculty, students, members of the SOF community at large, diplomatic input from current U.S. ambassadors, as well as partner nation military and political officials. The intent was to showcase several strategies within a complex and evolving scenario centered on one of the most difficult and potentially dangerous areas of Russian influence — the Estonian region of Narva.

**GALLANT SENTRY**

Operation Gallant Sentry began with the status quo, that Russian diaspora communities have Estonian citizenship but with increased pressure to join their ethnic country of origin under Russia’s Compatriot Policy. This policy grants Russian citizenship to those who consider themselves ethnic Russians, or more broadly, hold to the values and ideals of Mother Russia. Putin has used this policy to justify application of UN Responsibility to Protect provisions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia prior to the conflict with Georgia in 2008, and more recently in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. The Compatriot Policy offers a blanket justification within Russia’s narrative for indirect intervention as well, whether through funding opposition groups working to change the political system or through targeted media broadcasting into those regions that speak Russian and consider that identity more important than their national citizenship.

The exercise began by placing participants into teams as part of the Russian political and security apparatus, as well as both Estonian government and Narvan community leadership roles. NATO and UN roles brought in a broader international perspective to the local problems. Structured in successive rounds designed to articulate and establish interests, goals, and methods of achieving them within each group, the exercise proceeded through regular negotiation phases, while allowing for spontaneous “backroom” meetings. As a result, participants engaged in the complex two-level game of politics: internal group debates conditioned and were conditioned by external interactions with other groups.

Several key trends developed out of the phases. First, several escalatory measures by Russia, followed by Estonian responses ramped up the inevitable hardening of positions, thereby making negotiations less and less likely to restore either the status quo calm, or promote long-term solutions. These impromptu events designed by the exercise control group were meant to highlight the complexity of negotiations when both parties have diverse interests and pressures within their sides, not just between themselves and their adversaries. Second, the most successful interactions were between the Estonians and the Narvan representatives. While Russian officials at first appealed to the Narvans’ perception of marginalization, the Estonians were...
initially hostile to any negotiations outside established political processes. That is, they refused to engage in “special” dialogue to hear Narvan grievances. These competing push/pull pressures on the Narvans initially kept their representatives in check and under Moscow’s thumb. However, when elements of the Estonian political system began back channel dialogue with other members of the Narvan leadership, thereby threatening the spokesperson’s position of diplomatic and governing primacy, this incentivized a willingness to concede by the Narvan group as a whole. Critical at this time were the assurances and good faith signals of benign intent by the Estonians, no easy task given their own reticence to treat the Russian Estonians as anything other than Estonians at best, foreign interlopers at worst.

In response to these positive overtures within the Estonian context, Russian pressure increased with a typical media “smear campaign” to discredit the Narvan leadership, as well as more direct threats against personhood and property. In the end, the Estonians agreed to greater internal autonomy over local taxation and government support for Russian language media from Estonian television stations, as well as further talks to help improve the business climate and economic opportunities within Narva. These included greater transportation mechanisms for workers living in Narva but employed further afield in the capital, and grants to support startup businesses. The Narvans agreed to participate in national elections, and the local leadership issued several press statements supporting the Estonian parliamentary system as representative and a means to address their community’s concerns. In the end, the Estonians viewed the Narvans as less hostile, the Narvans embraced their place in Estonia, and the Russians moved on to other areas to test both NATO’s resolve in countering hybrid warfare, and the strength of democratic governments along its borders.

By no means were the relatively positive outcomes assured or to be expected in the exercise. Several key moments tested the intentions of even those “dovish” participants seeking reconciliation, not least of which were Russian violations of Estonian territorial waters, and Estonian security personnel getting into fights with Narvan protestors. Yet at those moments, key players arose within the Estonian delegation, and more importantly the Narvans themselves. By seeing their interests in primarily economic terms, rather than nationalistic or even ethnic ones, Narvan representatives opened the door to receive the strength of Estonia and NATO countries in general – economic prosperity compared to Russian promises of support that often did not materialize. In addition, the wanton devastation of Eastern Ukraine served as an essential break on Russian efforts to operationalize Narva. Thus, when offered a realistic choice between living like Donetsk or Tallinn, the Narvans choose to be part of Estonia given its realistic potential to improve their lives rather than hold on to past Soviet glories and present Russian grievances. The Estonian representatives also offered the key mechanism for achieving that brighter future – space within the political process to address grievances, while also maintaining specific boundaries on the kinds of actions possible with the political system. The Estonians welcomed greater debate from the Narvans, and the Narvans committed publically to play by the democratic rules of the game. In the end, democracy proved its worth by giving voice to those who perceived they had none, while preserving the system in which they and all Estonians can express their interests and resolve their differences peacefully.

WHAT IT ALL MEANS...

The long game of U.S. strategy is about changing perceptions of the United States and its goals, but more broadly, what democracy and liberal ideals can do for a society. Gallant Sentry showed the value of including disparate groups in the process of defining who they are in relation to the greater community, while also preserving what the larger community holds as its core values.
Key to that outcome was the process itself: inclusive dialogue within parameters set by the state. That is, Narva was not permitted to exit Estonia nor become wholly autonomous within it. The Russian diaspora needed to remain a part of the country in both political and practical terms – voting in national elections and maintaining free movement of goods and people within, and between it and the greater country.

Choosing to begin that process was by no means easy for the Estonian government or the Narvan enclave, and that is the great risk of democracy – to set off on a path that includes many participants, not all of whom agree on the destination or even the best route to get there. Gallant Sentry showed that setting boundaries for discussions with the Narvan population and its chosen leadership, even with heavy Russian influence operations, undercut the Kremlin’s main argument that their compatriot citizens were being mistreated. Inclusion within the parameters of state territorial continuity, and participation within the larger Estonian political system, incentivized Narvan moderation in part by exposing the fundamental and inevitable divisions within the community. Some wanted to be part of Russia, some part of Estonia, but most simply wanted a better life in general, and the parameters for discussion about those goals worked to give a sense of inclusion to those who saw themselves as politically and economically marginalized. It also allayed understandable concerns within the Estonian government that they were letting the foxes into the henhouse.

As a result, the exercise showed that the power of Russia’s war of words can be defused and defeated by holding fast to the core of what makes Western civilization so special — granting a seat at the table, but doing so does not mean the newcomers get to change the table or the rules of etiquette while sitting there. Setting and maintaining boundaries for the public to participate in the process of governance means that discussions have limits in both what can be discussed, but equally important, the manner in which it gets discussed and ultimately decided. Those limits can indeed change, but not by the whims of only one set of voices. Inclusion thus incentivizes coalition building within the political sphere, while also constraining the ways conflicts get resolved strictly through non-violent means.

Gallant Sentry showcased the power of the U.S. message in both regards. It communicated the boundaries of U.S. support in the region, what the U.S. and NATO will not allow to happen, but also that the public space for debate within those boundaries is broad enough to include those who feel on the outs. The process is also genuine enough to show that their concerns, along with those of the majority Estonians around them, can in fact find resolution by working together. In the end, that is the best strategy for defeating Russian aggression and removing the potential operationalization of vulnerable people, as they themselves chose no longer to be Putin’s pawns.

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**NOTES**
01. The Narvans were encouraged to have their own local elections, which the central government would validate if they were deemed free and fair by international observers. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has done that before in Estonia, and because Russia is a member, OSCE monitoring gives the Kremlin a chance to show its “protection of compatriot interests”; it also mutes the impact of Russian criticisms of the process if Russia chooses not to participate.
Following Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 and the subsequent activities in Eastern Ukraine, North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries are re-assessing their regional security priorities and adjusting to a new geopolitical environment in which Russia is assuming a more aggressive role. The United States has implemented a variety of diplomatic, economic and military initiatives in response to 2014, one of which has been Operation Atlantic Resolve. OAR “is a demonstration of continued U.S. commitment to the collective security of NATO and to enduring peace and stability in the region, in light of Russia’s illegal actions in Ukraine.”

Although the lion’s share of the U.S. military contribution to OAR comes from conventional Army components, United States Special Operations Forces are achieving great effects through a persistent presence strategy with their fellow NATO SOF partners.

USSOF and their NATO SOF partners have forged relationships over the last decade through a variety of episodic engagements such as joint combined exchange training events and combined deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. Appropriately, these engagements were tailored to the development of direct-action skills and increased battlefield interoperability. However, the emergence of a rising regional hegemon, such as the Russian Federation, presents a more enduring potential threat and demands a different strategy for NATO SOF partnerships. In early 2015, Special Operations Command Europe and 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) adopted a strategy of persistent presence engagement that maintains five deployed Special Forces Operational Detachment — Alphas throughout Eastern Europe, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. These persistent presence ODAs form the backbone of the strategy and are complemented by equally important contributions from Navy Special Warfare Unit Two, Military Information Support Operations teams, Civil Affairs teams and Special Operations Liaison Officers. The persistent presence SOF model is ideal for OAR because it clearly communicates U.S. commitment at a strategic level, while generating opportunities to maximize effects and operational momentum, and establishing and cultivating lasting personal and professional relationships.

Because of the limited quantity of U.S. SOF, their involvement in a crisis or operation clearly communicates that the U.S. has made the problem a national priority. The Lithuanian military, for example, was accustomed to episodic engagements with U.S. SOF for durations usually between 30 and 60 days. A Special Forces ODA deployed to Lithuania in February 2015 and announced its intent to remain for six months before being relieved by a sister ODA from 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), further extending the engagement by another six months. This paradigm shift in U.S. engagement with Lithuanian SOF reinforced the U.S. commitment to Lithuanian national security concerns and reshaped Lithuanian perceptions of U.S. resolve at the highest levels of political leadership. The President of Lithuania, Dalia Grybauskaitė, reinforced this perception shift with her visit to a combined public display of U.S. SOF and Lithuanian SOF equipment during the 2015 Solidarity Day celebration. Immediately after arriving at the celebration, her first action was to meet with the ODA and personally thank them for their support and, more importantly, what their persistent presence in her country represented. She clearly linked the enduring commitment of U.S. SOF in Lithuania to renewed U.S. resolve in support of its NATO allies in the face of an increasingly provocative Russian Federation. The example of the ODA’s engagement with the Lithuanian president
exemplifies how the persistent employment of U.S. SOF can be used to communicate strategic messages to partners and threats alike. The obligation of U.S. SOF assets resonates with clarity and should continue to reinforce diplomacy, demonstrate resolve and delineate defense priorities. Furthermore, the persistent presence strategy allows for the identification and exploitation of opportunities that would likely be missed with more sporadic and episodic engagements. An ODA’s experiences in Latvia represent the value of such opportunities. The five-month deployment duration exposed the ODA to two iterations of the Latvian Special Operations Unit quarterly exercises. Through participation in these exercises, the ODA recognized the influence the SOU harnessed in all facets of Latvian society, to include Ministry of Interior organizations such as the Latvian Border Guard Aviation Unit and the Latvian Security Police. By observing how the SOU integrated with other Latvian organizations, the ODA was able to recognize opportunity for the SOU to synergize such organizations through national level exercises. For example, on June 8, 2015, Latvia executed a nation-wide massive casualty exercise that include participants from nine organizations spread across the Latvia Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Health and the U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense. The day-long exercise included more than 150 personnel and stressed the emergency room capability of the Eastern Riga Clinical University Center at Galiezers with a broad spectrum of combat related casualties. Persistent presence enabled the ODA to work
through the SOU to coordinate otherwise disparate organizations and validate Latvia’s capability to respond to MASCAL crisis events with decisiveness. The exercise resulted in increased cohesion between the participants and reinforced confidence in the Latvian government’s capacity to respond promptly and effectively. Fundamentally, the opportunity to assist with the planning, coordination, and exercise control of the MASCAL exercise was identified and exploited because of the persistent-presence engagement strategy. Fortunately, Latvia was not the only country where opportunities emerged as a result of persistent presence.

In Romania, ODA 0125 was able to assist with the vision, planning, synchronization, and execution of the first Romanian Special Operations Forces Exercise (ROUSOFEX). Romanian SOF, while partnered with ODA 0125, successfully integrated SOF participants from Turkey, Moldova, Georgia, Poland, and Greece into the exercise, demonstrating to NATO and the international community that Romania was capable of leading and executing multinational SOF operations in support of NATO objectives. The ODA remained an unwavering partner to Romanian SOF leadership over a period of five and a half months as the ROUSOFEX grew from discussions of visions and goals into successful execution. The opportunity to be involved from genesis to completion of the ROUSOFEX was only possible because of the continuous engagement and personal commitment enabled by the persistent engagement strategy.

Similarly, in Poland, members of the Jednostka Wojskowa Komandosów and an ODA planned, organized and executed exercise Bear Trap, Poland’s first special warfare exercise designed to address hybrid warfare. This initial iteration was conducted at the tactical level, with the participating elements being of the ODA or special operations task unit level. However, the duration of the persistent presence engagement allowed for the development of a robust scenario that maximized realism for the participants. Specifically, the length of the engagement allowed the ODA and JWK to refine the vision for the event, design the scenario, conduct combined pre-exercise training and finally execute the exercise itself. The JWK and ODA capitalized on the proud Polish national identity to incorporate local citizens and civil leadership into the exercise to increase relevance and pragmatism. The persistent-presence strategy enabled a familiarity with the JWK and the environment that revealed tremendous opportunities. For example, a member of the JWK had strong connections to the town nominated to be the primary exercise venue. This JWK member worked with the ODA’s native Polish speaker to communicate the shared vision of the exercise to the town mayor, police chief, fire chief, forest rangers, and local government officials from the surrounding area. The opportunity to conduct these engagements face-to-face proved to be critical in maximizing the training value of exercise Bear Trap. The interaction with the local population during the development and execution of the exercise provided the ODA members with an unparalleled cultural immersion experience that would be unattainable during a brief episodic engagement.

Perhaps the most important benefit of the persistent presence strategy is the relationship network that was developed by the detachments as they lived and worked with their OAR partners for up to six months at a time. This relationship network provides the framework that facilitates interoperability and positive momentum toward mutual goals. For example, in Estonia, the persistent presence strategy enabled ODA 0121 to assist the Estonian Special Operations Forces with the execution of a qualification course in its entirety, a
task that requires several months of commitment. The ODA members were able to remain involved with the students and instructors on an individual basis from the first day of training to graduation day. This extended period of interaction established a relationship between U.S. SOF and the next generation of ESTSOF soldiers who will act as the foundation for NATO engagements in years to come. Furthermore, professional ties emerged between the ODA members and seasoned ESTSOF instructors as they shared best practices, learned one another’s culture and developed mutual respect. The relationships with the ESTSOF instructors proved to be catalytic in nature as the ODA interacted with other ESTSOF units. The ESTSOF instructor cadre vouched for the ODA’s credibility and military competency, greatly expediting rapport development with other ESTSOF entities. Ultimately, the relationships developed between ODA 0121 and the ESTSOF proved to be personally rewarding, professionally illuminating and efficient for increasing NATO interoperability.

Acknowledging that ODAs cannot be permanently deployed, a rotation was established to enable detachments to refit and rest before re-deploying to their respective OAR countries. However, while these ODAs are at home station, OAR relationship development continued in a variety of ways, such as inviting OAR partners to participate in traditionally U.S.-exclusive collective training events. For example, in the fall of 2015, Company B, 1st Bn., 10th SFG(A) extended invitations to OAR and NATO partners to participate in its Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat (SFAUC) course at Panzer Kaserne, Germany. Participants from Latvia, Lithuania, Greece, Belgium and Italy integrated into combined training teams and transformed the SFAUC into a multinational event that not only assured ODA readiness, but directly improved NATO interoperability and deepened established relationships.

Naturally, the benefits of the persistent-presence strategy come with associated challenges that require deliberate planning to circumvent. First, the persistent presence of ODAs requires a predictable and sustainable rotation schedule that balances a tolerable operational tempo against the contact time required to maintain a relationship. This challenge is best mitigated by clearly identifying which detachments will be rotated into each country and then adhering strictly to the established rotation schedule. Over time, consistent deployments will imbue detachments with the culture, language and geographic familiarity needed to support enduring relationships. Second, the persistent presence strategy requires that the U.S. remain sensitive to our partners’ capacity for engagement. Each SOF organization within each OAR country has a unique mission set, disposition and operational tempo. We must be mindful of our partner’s needs, limitations, and goals so that we can scale the size of each rotation accordingly and ensure the right enablers augment the assigned SOF element.

In spite of these challenges, the persistent presence strategy remains the optimal method of engagement for U.S. SOF in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve because it communicates U.S. commitment, generates opportunities, and invests in relationships. The potential threats posed by resurging regional powers, such as the Russian Federation, are enduring and should be balanced with equally enduring deterrent options and demonstrations of commitment to our allies. U.S. SOF have a unique role to play in providing our nation with flexible deterrent options and represent a strong commitment of U.S. military support.

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solution for a Special Forces battalion in a deployed environment. This is especially the case in SOC-FWD EE. As our companies and operational detachments operate in support of the Operation Atlantic Resolve area of responsibility the geographical displacement is across hundreds of miles and across multiple countries. Additionally, as sovereign nations, these countries each require its own diplomatic clearance, customs control, hazardous material declarations, regulations and restrictions by which we must abide. This provides a unique challenge for logistical support. To add to the complexity, as a forward stationed Special Forces Battalion, 1st Bn., 10 SFG (A) does not have the ready access to the next higher echelon support from the Group Support Battalion locally available to assist.

Army doctrine states that Army Special Operations Forces must rely upon theater infrastructure for all sustainment above organic capabilities; as a result conventional forces integration is critical for 1/10 SFG (A). The battalion works closely with the ARSOF Liaison Element from the 528th Sustainment Brigade (Airborne). The ALE has been the vehicle for SOC-FWD EE to tie into CF logistics since they work directly with the Theater Sustainment Command and can provide direct linkage and points of contact to conventional forces sustainers and our gateway to access conventional forces sustainment resources. The problem set SOC-FWD EE faces in the European theater is that while we actively engage with partner forces, the CF forces that we would normally integrate with to provide a logistics tale are still establishing their own foothold. Because of this fact, the large logistical nodes that were part of the sustainment landscape in Iraq and Afghanistan simply do not exist. As the CF forces develop and improve their logistics footprint in the theater, this capacity is taxed by the arrival of more conventional forces, straining resources, and creating a capabilities gap. One recurring challenge faced by SOC-FWD EE faces in the European theater is that while we actively engage with partner forces, the CF forces that we would normally integrate with to provide a logistics tale are still establishing their own foothold. Because of this fact, the large logistical nodes that were part of the sustainment landscape in Iraq and Afghanistan simply do not exist. As the CF forces develop and improve their logistics footprint in the theater, this capacity is taxed by the arrival of more conventional forces, straining resources, and creating a capabilities gap. 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capabilities to line-haul equipment across Europe, so the FSC outsourced the mission to the 6966th Transportation Company through the 21st TSC. As the conventional Army is moving its large equipment into Europe, they too are utilizing the 6966th. Eventually this demand exceeded the capacity available in the 6966th increasing the strain on its organic capabilities and creating clear demand signal for support augmentation. In order to augment this support requirement the FSC has to provide support to the 6966th augmenting the element that it contracted with to alleviate its movement burden. To mitigate this recurring issue, the FCS is working to license drivers with European commercial driver’s licenses, therefore enabling leasing tractor trailers and creating the capacity to self-sustain for equipment movement missions.

SOC-FWD EE has implemented a practice of deploying logistics capabilities rather than personnel and equipment, imported coordinating capabilities and empowered the lowest levels to conduct operational level logistics. Historically the GSB and FSC would tie into CF logistical nodes and then distributing to teams spread across Eastern Europe. In the current operating environment, the battalion S4, the ALE and the FSC coordinate with conventional forces operating in the area, creating the capability for ODAs to tap into their supply network as well as any existing Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) supply routes, and prepositioned stocks. The benefit of operating in developed nations is that the battalion can empower ODAs with operational funds to procure their own food, water and services on the local economy. This enables operations in a near non-existent logistical footprint compared to dependency upon a massive sustainment brigade footprint to provide the same materials and services.

The current MTOE and manning of the battalion’s logistics cell is designed to support the entire battalion in an austere environment. SOC-FWD EE is deploying small teams to first-world countries, and as such has taken on additional roles for procurement of non-standard supplies and materials. The battalion S4 is in direct coordination with the 409th Contracting Support Brigade in order to establish Indefinite
the question, SOC-FWD EE has mitigated this impact by creating the capability for ODAs to purchase their own fuel from host-nation sources using Fleet Fuel Cards. There is no organic capability in the FSC to accommodate the frequent and no-notice movements across Europe. To mitigate this demand, the SOC-FWD EE relies upon the FSCs Movement Control section to take on the additional role of Customs Certification Officials. These NCOs now have the ability to certify customs documents to enable teams to rapidly deploy to and redeploy from locations without external support throughout Europe, creating a capability, traditionally maintained at the Theater Sustainment Command level, at the operational level.

While the distance between SOC-FWD EE and its higher logistics headquarters could be an operational hindrance, this geographical separation has actually enabled the FSC to innovate and deploy on-the-fly critical logistics capabilities. Rather than relying upon the higher sustainment element, mechanics and technicians have sought after and qualified for many manufacturer-level certifications to repair SOF specific equipment, achieved CCO certifications as logistical planners, trained to become certified Contracting Officer Representatives working at the company level, and empowered junior NCOs to routinely make direct coordination with theater level sustainment elements. SOC-FWD EE’s logistics program is still in its figurative infant stages and perpetually adapting in order to maintain the flexibility required to provide the appropriate support for the broad spectrum of operations conducted under the umbrella of OAR.

Conducting special operations in immature theaters within developed, sovereign nations has forced logisticians to rethink sustainment. The methods of OEF and OIF are now largely impractical and unfeasible. Sustainment for special operations in the European theater now focuses on procurement at the lowest level. As such, sustainment is faster, more cost effective and operationally sensitive resulting in a near non-existent logistical footprint, ideal for special operations forces. Rather than being focused on conducting convoys and providing sustainment, company and battalion level logisticians are enabling operators to sustain themselves, and taking on increased coordination, distribution and synchronization roles that are normally be executed at much higher echelons of sustainment.

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In September 2014, 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was tasked to support Operation Atlantic Resolve. The goal was to reinforce United States support and commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies in the Baltics and Trans-Danube regional areas. In Romania, Special Operations Command Europe faced three immediate challenges: transitioning from Operation Enduring Freedom, working a more expansive portfolio in a Chief of Mission-led environment and maintaining the exceptionally strong relationship with Romania’s Special Operations Forces. While both Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State serve within the same country team, they operate in separate departmental efforts. The Special Operations Forces Liaison Element is the position best-suited to achieve the synergy required for the challenge of fusing special operations forces vision with interagency strategy thereby reinforcing “the network”, formerly known as the Global SOF Network initiative.

A SOFLE is a task-organized rotational SOF element deployed within a specific nation or embedded within CF to conduct liaison activities. The SOFLE can coordinate, assess, and recommend training, equipping, and engaging opportunities with HN forces or provide connectivity and synchronization of expeditionary forces.

A steadfast NATO SOF ally, Romania requested a SOF liaison for their SOF-focused objectives. Within the U.S. Embassy, the Department of Defense maintains a Defense Attaché and the Office of Defense Coordination. These offices are responsible for representatives in the development and operation of security assistance to the Romanian Ministry of National Defense, and more specifically to ROUSOF. On occasion, qualified Special Forces officers are placed in one of these positions, and are sufficient at incorporating the importance of SOF and its integration with interagency and conventional forces; however, the SOFLE is a more permanent solution. The SOFLE operates in a logical line of effort coordinating and aligning multiple agency goals with those of the SOC commanders. One of the initial challenges of the SOFLE is with their acceptance into the current joint international intergovernmental multinational environment. Interagency and inter-governmental partners are frequently reluctant to assimilate new faces. However, the dynamic nature of SOF liaisons allow this position to take root and build into the eventual ‘hub’ for all SOF interaction and engagement within the country of operations.

“United States Special Operations Command describes its vision for the GSN as a globally networked force of SOF, interagency partners, and allies able to respond rapidly and persistently to regional contingencies and threats to stability.”

The operational experience of SOF operators balances the commitment associated with the SOFLE position and espouses that there is a significant impact on the efficiency of resource management, an extension of continuity of effort and a posture for time sensitive responsiveness. The SOFLE is embedded within the U.S. Embassy, and is directed to operate as an extension of the Commander of Special Operations Command Forward Eastern Europe and the Commander of Theater Special Operations Command.
THE EFFICACY OF EFFICIENT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

An extension to continuity and effort, the SOFLE is placed in a position that takes into account the broader political, economic, informational and military effects when faced with operations, training engagements, and logistic support. Capitalizing on the ability to envelop the legal and political constraints, while applying them to each interaction, enables units to gain successes on behalf of SOFLE efforts. Continuing to develop the environment to ensure the success of the SOCFWD commanders’ long-term objectives and immediate or short-term needs is the SOFLE goal.

In concept, the SOFLE simultaneously maintains access to the full spectrum of operations within the interagency established mission. This access is for the purpose of interdicting obstacles before they have a chance to interrupt the functional process of SOF operations and synergized intergovernmental engagements. To aid in these functions, the SOFLE may be afforded the latitude to make time-sensitive decisions based on the commanders’ guidance and objectives, to report any current issues to the SOCs. Properly selected Special Forces liaisons are experts in this task.

A second and more important purpose of a SOF Liaison element would be cultural competence. While many SOFLEs do not speak the host-nation language, they have served together (NATO) or in a common purpose (counterterrorism) within expeditionary combat environments (Operation Enduring Freedom) performing similar roles against a common enemy (violent extremist organizations). The complex and prolific nature of international terrorism generates the need for countries to interact and become interdependent of allies and partners across the globe.

“The activities of building partnership capacity included significant use of 1206, 1207, and Title 22 peacekeeping operations funding mechanisms. These train and equip packages were coupled with persistent presence elements such as the SOFLE.”04

The Commander SOCFWD-EE cannot be everywhere at once. His staff works with the liaison as his extension of mission command in that country, in this case, Romania. The SOFLE’s role is to track and synchronize that commander’s efforts as efficiently as possible balanced with the Defense Attaché Office’s requirements. Those requirements must meet the country teams’ projected strategic message reflected in Mission Strategic Resource Plan. Normally, the SOF commander can use Civil Affairs and Military Information Support Operations to execute these tasks, but in smaller nations, this may have a saturating effect. In these cases, a SOF liaison enabling the country team singularly while identifying partners is a critical on-ramp to increased capability generating host-nation capacity.

This example is a SOF characteristic, and a process very representative of SOF forces around the world daily. USSOCOM routinely maintains thousands of SOF service members in almost every country and SOF operations are involved in regional engagements, with significant effect upon the international community. As a result, strategic communication is by-product of SOF activities in each country, 24/7/365.

PERFORMANCE, PROCEDURE AND PERIL

Primarily, the SOC is striving to strengthen relationships and increase the capacity of SOF interoperability within OAR’s multiple NATO SOF and paramilitary forces. The SOFLE is positioned to ensure this task is adhered to for both the country team and

The Palace of the Parliament in Bucharest is the seat of the Parliament in Romania and is the second largest administrative building in the world after the Pentagon.

Romania is located in Southeast Europe and at 92,043 square miles it’s slightly smaller Oregon. Bucharest, the capital, is the 6th largest city in the EU.

Romanian SOF soldiers practice tactical medical care while under fire during Operation Junction Strike 15 in Romania. U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Daniel A. Carter
the SOF commander, while enforcing parameters set by the Initial Terms of Reference during all operations. When the Romanian SOF desire Partnership Development Program joint training and bilateral operations, the SOFLE is able to advise the Romanian Special Operations Component Command element of PDP purpose, funding, shortcomings and advantages. This key knowledge reinforces the ability of the deployed ODA to continue to advise and assist while the Romanian SOF execute the training programs, with minimal difficulty.

When done expertly, the SOFLE has accomplished one or more of three key outputs; worked himself out of a job, made the country team more dependent on his position (with an insatiable appetite to match) or provided complete synchronization to generate sufficient mass on the appropriate objective with complete unity of effort. In any case, the SOF liaison has provided a much needed function in the country team’s performance of our nation’s service.

A result of being able to blend into the operational environment, become a valued member of the U.S. Embassy Bucharest Country Team, provide SOF Commanders access to real-time situational awareness remains invaluable to commanders, staffs and peripheral forces. This increases the country team’s operational focus and the ROUSOF’s development of effective and increased USSOF interaction. As time endures, the SOFLE gains increased access further assisting Operational Detachments and other SOF elements, with the ability to more precisely gauge the effects of their operations and engagements. In the future, as the SOC needs insight on support the Romanian SOF requires, the SOFLE can provide the required insight needed. An anecdotal example of this is the delivery of casualty assistance efforts at the behest of the SOC FWD or other SOF commanders.

### CONCLUSIVE RESULTS

The SOFLE interacts with high-level allied nation officials and U.S. Embassy staff through constant facilitation of multiple USSOF leadership engagements. As an interlocutor, the SOFLE frequently creates conditions in support of Key Leader Engagements, and maintains a continual process of coordinating and interacting with all the relevant parties to ensure a smooth transition among the different organizations and groups. When available, the SOC commanders desire to retain the option to exploit time sensitive opportunities without interrupting the forward progress of the intergovernmental political objectives. The command’s effort is demonstrative of a conscious willingness to integrate with and support the ‘whole of government’ approach, interconnecting their objectives with the political and interagency goals. As has been described, the SOFLE is in the unique position within assistance to the Foreign Service. The selected liaison requires maturity and sound judgment and has the work ethic common to the best professional of staff officers. The SOFLE is capable of setting the conditions and managing this synergy because the position is uniquely equipped with the SOCFWD-EEs vision, the TSOCs goals and the Theater Security Cooperation Support Plan.

### ABOUT THE AUTHOR

CW2 Rodney Douglas is assigned to the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne).
FM 3-53, defines the United States Army’s Military Information Support Operations, or PSYOP forces, as the Department of Defense’s primary capability specifically organized, manned, trained, and equipped to achieve psychological effects in foreign target audiences in order to ultimately influence their behavior. PSYOP forces provide a low-visibility means for influencing hostile regimes, preventing insurgencies, and limiting conflicts that could potentially destabilize our allies and partners. This is an especially important capability in the 21st Century as global conflicts are smaller now than ever before and both state and non-state actors use unconventional, irregular warfare as their preferred method for creating conflict.

The importance of influence is nothing new in military operations. In Joshua 6:1-27 of the Bible, Joshua lulls adversaries in Jericho into complacency through seven days of marching Israelite forces around the walls, accompanied by blasts of rams’ horns. Joshua used influence techniques to set conditions for the success of the Israelite assault and seizure of the city. In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the famed Hussar Cavalrymen affixed feathered poles to their armor, simulating wings, inspiring their often numerically superior enemies, to panic, and retreat in fear during their initial horse-mounted charge into battle.

Today, influence activities are front and center in political and military leaders’ minds. On September 4 2014, at the annual NATO Summit, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Gen. Philip Breedlove, characterized the initial Russian incursion into Ukraine territory as “the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in the history of information warfare.” The events in Ukraine shattered over a decade of relative peace in Europe, and reemphasized the importance of Psychological Operations to the U.S. and partner forces.

Acting in support of Special Operations Command Forward-Eastern Europe (SOCFWD-EE), Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR), and a host of interagency and military formations, the U.S. Army Psychological Operations Regiment, specifically the 6th Military Information Support Battalion (6th MISB), form the main effort in influence and information activities designed to prevent or end conflict and to counteract threats facing the U.S. and our allies in the European Command (EUCOM) area of operations (AOR). Acting in support of EUCOM, SOCEUR, SOCFWD-EE, Special Operations Command-Southern Europe, and the U.S. Department of State, PSYOP Soldiers are involved in every aspect of regional special operations forces (SOF) initiatives.
The 6th MISB, part of 4th Military Information Support Operations Group (4th MISG), is the primary force provider of PSYOP Soldiers to support special operations, conventional, and partner forces throughout the EUCOM AOR. 6th MISB Soldiers serve as influence advisors to supported commanders by assessing, shaping, disrupting, and ultimately influencing behaviors of foreign related to situations and issues through precision messaging. PSYOP Soldiers are also working on planning, coordinating, and executing training engagements with partner and allied nations focused on improving the existing capabilities of these countries and their emerging information operations programs. PSYOP Soldiers further demonstrate their versatility by providing military information support for interagency and intergovernmental efforts as well as civil authority information support activities aimed at reducing the negative effects of natural disasters and other humanitarian crises. PSYOP Soldiers are integrated across the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

6th MISB is composed of a diverse group of regionally aligned NCOs and officers who have a career focus on the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment, history, and current events of a specific region of Europe. 6th MISB Soldiers are recruited from a variety of military occupational specialties and must pass the intense, demanding John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School before they must test and demonstrate proficiency in a regionally aligned foreign language. Many 6th MISB are native speakers and possess fluency one or more European languages, which makes them critical assets in the countries they are assigned to serve.

The Soldiers of Fort Bragg’s 3rd Military Information Support Battalion (3rd MISB), are the audio-visual specialists who execute the media production and dissemination tasks that are critical to the success of the PSYOP mission. 3rd MISB Soldiers use their organic printing capabilities, radio and television broadcast facilities, and audio-visual production and communication capabilities to support special operations forces around the world. These Soldiers employ the latest media technology to include equipment, software, and media editing and production techniques to augment the efforts of their supported units. The expertise and creative ability of 3rd MISB Soldiers enable supported PSYOP units to effectively engage audiences across a wide variety of information platforms and deliver forward deployed commanders unprecedented access to specific audiences. 3rd MISB Soldiers also serve as a valuable tool in documenting operational events and providing material for use in strategic communication and public affairs initiatives.

The heart of Psychological Operations is the Seven-Step PSYOP Process detailed in FM 3-05.301. This process provides a structured framework for PSYOP Soldiers to accurately and effectively determine the right audience, the right message, and the right medium to achieve a desired behavior change in support of overall mission objectives. The seven-step PSYOP process also isolates impact and effectiveness measures that are observable, quantifiable, and specific in order to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of PSYOP efforts. This data, known as measures of effectiveness, is then used to refine PSYOP activities to adjust to ever-changing conditions, ensure influence activities are conducted using the most effective means, and that resources are efficiently apportioned to achieve a supported commander’s desired end state.

In a February 2013 edition of the Russian military publication, Russian Defense, then newly appointed Russian Federation Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov revealed a new doctrine for Russian warfare. Gerasimov’s doctrine stresses that the broad use of political, informational, humani-
tarian and other non-military measures can outweigh traditional military power. Gerasimov also stresses that effective mobilization should be initiated long before any declaration of war.

Shortly after its debut, Gerasimov’s doctrine was put into practice during the 2014 Russian invasion and annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region. Russian sources effectively flooded the information environment with messages crafted to ease follow on combat operations and political actions. The Gerasimov doctrine was further demonstrated in Russia’s intense media blitz accompanying insertion of ground and air forces into Syria in support of the regime of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria.

SOF’s primary tool in this new “information battlefield” are the Soldiers, NCOs and officers of the 6th MISB. PSYOP Soldiers are deployed throughout the EUCOM AOR in a variety of assignments. PSYOP Soldiers are working in the EUCOM AOR as staff planners helping to plan, coordinate, and execute training with allies and partners. PSYOP Soldiers are also on the ground conducting military to military training engagements with allies and partners aimed at countering the threat of violent extremist organizations and other forms of foreign aggression.

Invigorated adversary focus on influence activities is mirrored in regional partner nations’ continued commitment to ensuring the capabilities and strengths of their own PSYOP forces. Accordingly, the SOCFWD-EE Commander and 6th MISB established Regional Military Information Support Teams (RMT), whose persistent forward presence will promote close engagement, ensure interoperability and build on existing relationships developed through past cooperation and partner attendance in the PSYOP Qualification course. The RMT consists of regional and tactical PSYOP specialists and all necessary audio/visual capability, allowing them to engage in a full spectrum of PSYOP-related collaboration with both special operations and conventional partner forces.

PSYOP support to EUCOM, SOCEUR, SOCFWD-EE and SOCFWD-SE, the Army’s PSYOP Regiment and 6th MISB (A) provides a discreet yet robust, cost-effective, highly adaptable, and diverse tool ideally suited to the contemporary operating environment. The influence professionals continue to live the PSYOP Regiment motto, “Persuade, Change, Influence,” in their daily work across not only the EUCOM AOR, but also the world.

Though 21st century PSYOP Soldiers have replaced Joshua’s Rams’ horns with portable loudspeaker systems and the Hussar’s winged armor with expertly crafted electronic messaging to accompany and magnify the effects of kinetic operations, the principles and commitment to influence in the military domain remain the same. Providing capabilities such as target audience analysis, influence techniques, propaganda analysis, and social media exploitation, PSYOP forces remain uniquely postured to support SOF commanders’ campaign goals.

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CPT Nicholas B. Israel and CPT Albert J. Finocchiaro serve in Co. B, 6th MISB (A). Capt. Israel is currently serving as the commander of the newly established RMT-Baltic. Capt. Finocchiaro is serving as the commander of RMT-Europe, providing coordination of all PSYOP activities in the SOCEUR AOR.
INTRODUCTION

In September 2015, General Votel, Commander of United States Special Operations Command discussed the term “The Gray Zone” with leaders of NATO Special Operations, defining what it means to operate in the Gray Zone. USSOCOM recognized that “a slew of state and non-state actors are now aggressively opposing the international order, but in ways that fall short of recognized thresholds of traditional war.” This space, just short of traditional war but not peacetime, is described as the Gray Zone. SOCOM simultaneously published a white paper expounding on operating in the gray zone by focusing on the Human Domain to understand the different challenges of the Gray Zone.02

The Human Domain, as outlined in the new SOCOM white paper Operating in the Human Domain Concept, is comprised of five elements that influence human behavior. SOCOM asserts that to achieve success in the Human Domain, and thus in the Gray Zone, special operations forces must understand and be competent in social, cultural, physical, information and psychological elements.03 Furthermore, the Civil Affairs branch defines Civil Information as data related to civilian geographic areas, infrastructure, capabilities, organizations, people and events.04 The doctrinal definition of civil information covers at least four of the five elements outlined by the Human Domain Concept; a clear demonstration of the relationship between the Civil Affairs core task of civil information management and the requirement from SOCOM for SOF to increase understanding and competency of the Human Domain. The correlation between the Civil Affairs core task of CIM with the concept of understanding the Human Domain also shows that Civil Affairs will continue to play a key role for U.S. success in the Gray Zone.

Civil Affairs Field Manual 3-57 describes the core task of CIM as a systematic process by which Soldiers manage reports, documents, assessments and other humanitarian and non-lethal information gathered by United States Government agencies in the field regarding the human terrain.05

Through the simple execution of CIM, the Civil Affairs branch has already been working in — and helping leaders understand — the Human Domain through the gathering of civil information. Additionally, it is important for SOF, particularly Civil Affairs Soldiers, to understand that civil information and the elements of the Human Domain encompass threat and conflict reporting to illuminate the civilian population such as an auxiliary or parallel government that is susceptible to recruitment and exploitation by a sophisticated enemy. One recent and increasingly relevant example of why this type of civil information is so important comes from examining how Daesh is recruiting for non-insurgent roles such as teachers, engineers and doctors for Syria. To understand the Human Domain, SOF are consistently asked to work in a Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational environment through operational plans, executive orders, and operating concepts such as SOCOM 2020, ARSOF 2022 and the Human Domain Concept. To be successful in that environment, SOF must capitalize on the programs, experiences and resources that other parts of the government work towards to meet national security objectives. Now more than ever, it is important for SOF, and particularly the Civil Affairs branch, to capitalize on the JIIM environment and use all available resources to understand the Human Domain. Civil information and data is traditionally gathered by civil reconnaissance in the field; however, programmatic data and reporting from agencies such as the Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development are equally important, yet commonly undervalued. These agencies conduct the preponderance of their work in the steady-state, pre-crisis, and left of Phase 0 in countries where the U.S. Government has strategic national security concerns and objectives.

Since 2012, before any other U.S. military force was directly involved, the 92nd Civil Affairs Battalion provided Civil Affairs Soldiers as the knowledge management team to work with the USG Syria Transition Assistance Response Team, based in Turkey. The team manages civil information on the Human Domain in Syria for START and
the broader civilian assistance and train and equip enterprise. The team’s work serves as a proof of concept for the importance and relevance of civil information and the task of CIM in furthering USG national security objectives and SOCOM directives to operate in the Human Domain.

**PART I: CIVIL INFORMATION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERAGENCY INFORMATION SHARING?**

Civil information includes data regarding civilian areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people and events. This data can include leaders, businesses, government entities, infrastructure, media organizations, civil society organizations and even cultural networks within a population. Civil information includes the data and means to identify the uncommitted middle population that have the potential to evolve into an auxiliary (be it by force or support for the cause) for organizations such as Daesh. The criticality of civil information cannot be understated in modern conflict as the civilian population serves as a potential recruitment pool for armed opposition groups and civil governance leaders in Daesh governed areas. There is a variety of methods used to gather civil information and understand the Human Domain. One of these methods used by START’s knowledge management team is the analysis of programmatic data, field reports, and feedback from DoS and USAID agencies. Effective and transparent information sharing protocols are critical to DoS for a whole-of-government comprehension of the civil environment.

Since the events of 9/11 the criticality of interagency dialogue, synchronization and intelligence sharing cannot be understated. Domestic security laws, executive directives, fusions cells and interagency intelligence centers that focus on interagency intelligence sharing and collaboration were developed to address the gaps that lead to catastrophic tragedy. The synchronization and sharing of intelligence are intended to prevent future terrorist attacks and address domestic and international security vulnerabilities. It is equally critical to develop a parallel requirement for synchronizing and sharing civil information derived from development, diplomatic and humanitarian assistance programs. Established information sharing protocols for these efforts has the potential to broaden the utility and applicability of this data when it is shared with agencies and organizations that are not regularly associated with civilian programming efforts in the steady-state. Without such protocols, SOF risks losing civilian data throughout steady-state planning efforts when it is arguably the most relevant.

The 2015 national security strategy recommits us to “advance democracy, human rights and building and sustaining coalitions to combat corruption and to support open societies.” To better meet these objectives, the data about the individual programs and operations conducted daily by organizations such as the DoS, USAID and the Department of Defense is not intelligence but simply civil information and programmatic data that can help intelligence but simply civil information and programmatic data to foster interagency collaboration and synchronization for meeting long-term national strategic goals.

Foreign assistance programs implemented by agencies such as DoS and USAID are a form of long-term security for the United States. If basic human needs are met while democratic principles and social change are instituted abroad then our nation will be more secure and have more opportunities to prosper. Through the implementation of programs such as establishing civil society organizations, teaching about democracy and human rights and in Syria in particular, establishing local governance organizations that provide essential services, there is immense effort towards supporting our national security objectives. The civil information from the reports and data from these programs supports the visualization of the Human Domain that is important during planning efforts for future crisis. In the 2009 GAO report on Interagency
Collaboration, the GAO repeatedly sites the importance of not just sharing terrorism related information and intelligence but also information related to reconstruction, capacity building and disaster response both nationally and internationally. Civil Information sharing not only promotes better collaboration and synchronization, but it allows for better analysis by leaders and policy-makers while at the same time providing a well-rounded common operating picture of the activities and organizations in a geographic area.

Policy-makers and leaders require a wide variety of information to make the best decisions to support our national security objectives. Intelligence itself is just a subset of information, thus leaders cannot simply rely on intelligence. Understanding the goals, objectives and members of a civil society organization or local council can help leaders both at the strategic and tactical level to decide not only to support that organization in the future, but also how that organization fits into the broader landscape of organizations supported by the USG. Knowing that there are existing trusted networks and organizations in a country means that agencies such as the Department of Defense need to the country, or even the battlefield, do not have to establish new links to the civilian population. There are trusted networks already established and supported by U.S. agencies and most likely those trusted networks are supportive of U.S. goals and objectives. Agencies must understand and internalize that cataloging and sharing information on civilian-focused programs, organizations and populations support national security objectives in the steady-state and becomes paramount for decision making in a crisis.

PART II: KMT MODEL: HISTORY AND INFORMATION SHARING

After the last 15 years of war, our national interests and objectives have expanded two-fold internationally; consequently, there have been many ways to try to resolve the issue of synchronization and information sharing about development and diplomacy programs and humanitarian assistance from the United States. Since the start of the Syrian complex emergency crisis the United States has been providing non-lethal, development and humanitarian assistance to the Syrian population from both Turkey and Jordan. In an effort to synchronize the assistance across the USG, the Syria Transition Assistance Response Team was established. START is an interagency coordination mechanism based out of Embassy Ankara that is comprised of six offices and bureaus from the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development that provide assistance primarily into northern Syria. The Southern Syria Assistance Platform is an interagency team based out of Embassy Amman that coordinates the provision of assistance to the southern governorates of Syria. Without U.S. diplomatic representation in Damascus, the START and SSAP platforms are now responsible for coordinating and synchronizing U.S. foreign assistance efforts in Syria. These platforms work with international organizations, NGOs, the Governments of Turkey and Jordan, and the Syrian opposition to ensure assistance effectively addresses the needs of the Syrian people and meets U.S. policy objectives.

In 2013, with the various reports and updates generated by the START agencies and bureaus, through the implementation of their robust assistance initiatives into Syria, the Ambassador to Turkey recognized the need for a knowledge management capability within START. Under the definitions of CIM and the Human Domain, the KMT conducted CIM for START and helped the START offices, and eventually the CJIAF understand the Human Domain. KMT gathered the various reports from over seven different DoS agencies, USAID departments, various contracted implementers and international agencies. The KMT established the Protected Internet Exchange-Syria (PIX-Syria) as the universal data-sharing platform for the Syrian Crisis and created civil information products in order to illuminate the human networks within the Syrian Opposition governing bodies, security councils and actors, and other civil society organizations START identified since the beginning of the Syrian Crisis.

The systematic collation of information is the first step the KMT conducted in CIM and applies to all START and USG relevant data. The KMT consolidated and processed DoS weekly, monthly and annual diplomatic cables, weekly roll-ups, analytical papers, field surveys, implementer reports, daily cross-border delivery updates, readouts of training and equipment provided to the Syrian moderate opposition and educational articles from USAID, DoS, implementers and other international organizations. These various reports include but are not limited to, information on how START’s assistance efforts are being distributed to the Syrians, to whom and what populations these assistance initiatives affected and supported, and the situational perspectives of various Syrian populations who are being controlled and affected by the warring factions within Syria (Regime forces, ISIL, Al Nusra etc...).

Next, the KMT then data mines the various reports, with particular interests and focus on identifying the resilient human networks within the Syrian Opposition. KMT identified early on the need to share and collaborate this information with not only other interested DoS partners but the CENTCOM and EUCOM DoD elements.
with focus and concern in this region as well. KMT established Protected Internet Exchange (PiX) Syria as the primary data repository system for START reporting. PiX is funded by NGA and is a Wikipedia-structured, interactive, searchable, repository presented at the unclassified or sensitive but unclassified level. The KMT identified PiX as the preferred data repository for START reporting for several reasons; PiX is accessible by Web access utilizing a login and pin, ensuring all users can access the information as long as they have access to the internet. The fact that PiX is not a standalone system, or requires the use of a common access card to access the data, ensures information can be easily accessed and shared by all stakeholders and interested parties. Finally, PiX content managers extract information from START reports and interweave it with other forms of open-source information; conducting a continual process of updating old and changing information as rapidly as the information in the environment changes.

KMT has designed and produced several products from the various reports and cables START produces. Perhaps one of the widest disseminated products across the interagency is the KMT Turkey/Syria Border Crossing Product. The information compiled in this product is derived from START implementers, and the local NGOs and contractors on the ground in Syria and Turkey who transit these various border crossings in order to deliver assistance into Syria. The Border Crossing Product illustrates who is in control of each border crossing station, whether the border crossing is open or closed, and the type of traffic utilizing the border crossing, be it private, commercial, humanitarian or passenger. The KMT Border Crossing Product also contains general information, satellite imagery, and a historical time line of significant events concerning the border dating back to the beginning of the conflict. The KMT updates this border-crossing product as events occur to the digital, collaborative, interactive, border-crossing product site hosted on PiX-Syria. The Border Crossing Product is consistently used by DoS and DoD partners for planning cross-border activities, showing that a complete civil information picture is a crucial resource that isn’t necessarily provided by the intelligence community.

The KMT also creates ad hoc products in response to a specific request for information from various stakeholders such as the Ambassador, theater special operations command staffs and agency bureau chiefs. One such example is the combined Civil Defense Map for Northern Syria. This particular map features an overview of the scope, location and country providing support, for all civil defense initiatives from USG, coalition partners and NGOs to Syrian civil defense assets in Northern Syria. The U.S. provides robust support to Syrian civil society through an array of activities to bolster their organizational and technical capacity, foster linkages between civil society groups and local and national governance institutions and enable them to effectively provide services to their local communities. Syrian Civil Defense Units are inherently neutral, impartial and humanitarian in nature. Their relief work predominantly consists of search and rescue, and debris removal in the wake of Daesh destruction and Syrian Regime barrel bombs and indirect fire in urban centers. The USG coordinates assistance specifically for civil defense units and the local councils that support

The products such as this Turkey/Syria Border Crossing Status Map, developed by the CA knowledge management serve as invaluable tools for government partners to plan and execute cross-border activities.
Before consolidating various civil defense initiatives on one map, the USG, and other partners had little to no knowledge of each other's civil defense initiatives or areas of concentration in Northern Syria. The KMT’s Civil Defense Map of Northern Syria provided the common operating picture that facilitated necessary discussion among all stakeholders for combining, leveraging and de-conflicting efforts where civil defense initiatives were succeeding, failing or in areas where the programs declined due to Daesh or Jabhat al-Nusra involvement. The collation of Civil Defense initiatives represents the KMT’s unique capability to provide civil information fusion and analysis, as the conduit of information flow and fulfills the requirement to the capability gap among interagency and our foreign partners in sharing information.

KMT’s Civil Defense Map and the Turkey/Syria Border Crossing also represent how operationalizing the CONUS base increases effectiveness and becomes a force multiplier for teams in theater. The 92nd Civil Affairs Battalion CIM cell created and routinely updated the Civil Defense Map and the Turkey/Syria border-crossing product. By operationalizing the CONUS base, the 92nd CIM cell allows the KMT to conduct knowledge-management operations 24 hours a day. Both of these products were transitioned to PiX Syria and the KMT digitally updates in real time as information changes on the ground.

**PART III: INCLUDING THE DOD IN INTERAGENCY INTEROPERABILITY TO COMBAT THE SYRIAN AND DAESCH CRISIS: A PARADIGM SHIFT FOR SYRIA**

While the overall concept of closing civil information gaps remains constant, the approach is slightly modified and enhanced by the unique placement of a Civil Affairs element in a civilian assistance platform. Whereas military efforts are usually the first and main effort in a crisis of this proportion, with civilian programming efforts initiating after security and order is established, the Syrian Crisis is a unique paradigm shift. This shift is characterized by civilian efforts initially leading the response and postured to continue providing assistance until the realization of a stable and secure political solution. In the case of Syria, civilian assistance programming for humanitarian and political transition assistance predates military involvement by almost four years. Hence, the State Department and USAID program officers initiated and developed Syrian political and armed opposition networks through non-governmental implementing organizations. A critical factor in interagency interoperability in this case was the effective institutional transfer of information and knowledge of these networks. This transfer transcends mere information management; requiring instead an interagency relationship that...
is based on trust, transparency and cross-organizational literacy. Trust and transparency go hand in hand to ensure civilian counterparts are confident that DoD planners and engagement teams understand and respect the proprietary nature of their relationships with Syrian opposition activists, fighters and humanitarian contacts. Moreover, DoD planners are dependent on the transfer of lessons-learned and institutional knowledge that civilian counterparts have accrued after nearly five years of work in response to the Syrian Crisis.

In 2014, as the U.S. strategy for Syria evolved from a purely civilian-led response to a shared partnership with the Department of Defense, the KMT was intimately involved, both forward deployed in Turkey and in the U.S, in facilitating the exchange of civil information and the relationship between START and the broader train and equip enterprise. This exchange was initiated at the tactical level between DoD engagement teams in Turkey and included routine coordination with civil-military planning efforts at the headquarters responsible for the train and equip program: Combined Joint Interagency Task Force - Syria. Tactical-level information sharing is most recently and relevantly illustrated by the KMT’s efforts to provide context and initially streamline information sharing protocols to support the development of a no-strike list for Northern Syria. The KMT was a natural choice to conduct the initial consolidation of USG humanitarian and governance assistance activities, in a geospatially-referenced document, for CENTCOM air strike efforts. The KMT’s status as a member of START ensured the security and privacy of proprietary information that DoS and USAID program officers provided. This security protocol was critical in ensuring that program officers shared current and reliable data with CENTCOM planners while maintaining the assurance that the information would be safeguarded. These protocols laid the groundwork for future information exchanges that ensured military planners were aware of civilian efforts on an increasingly complex and dynamic battlefield. Additionally, products such as the previously mentioned Civil Defense Map, Border Crossing map and the reporting repository PIX illuminated Syrian civil networks as well as political leadership, organizational and non-standard logistical networks for military opposition groups. The relationships and information exchange facilitated by the Civil Affairs Soldiers in Turkey in support of CJJATF-S efforts encouraged SOCCENT to duplicate the KMT concept by embedding a similar element in the SSAP headquartered in Jordan; effectively integrating defense, diplomatic and development efforts across the EUCOM and CENTCOM theaters.

As the U.S. response to the Syrian Crisis approaches its fifth year and with the initiation and expansion of the Defense Department’s response to the Syrian and Daesh crisis, the State Department and USAID also embedded liaisons with the DoD train and equip headquarters to ensure effective coordination between civilian and military efforts. The initial intent of emplacing civilian program liaisons in a military headquarters was to ensure the military command understood the fundamental concept and approach of U.S. civilian assistance programming and support in Syria. These liaisons collaborated closely with the KMT as the train and equip program expanded to ensure mutual understanding and effective cooperation between all echelons of the train and equip program. Embedding interagency liaisons in a military command is not necessarily a new concept for military organizations, as we have all seen political advisers and USAID reps at combatant commands and commands across Afghanistan; the difference with the interagency liaisons in the CJJATF-S and START construct is the empowerment of the liaisons and their close information exchange facilitated through the Civil Affairs resourced KMT.

**CIVIL AFFAIRS REPRESENTS A CRUCIAL LINKAGE NOT ONLY AT THE STRATEGICAL BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY AT THE TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL LEVELS OF INTERAGENCY INFORMATION SHARING AND CIVIL MILITARY COOPERATION**

**PART IV: THE WAY AHEAD**

As SOF refruct to training and for operating within the Gray Zone and understanding their respective pieces in meeting these challenges, Civil Affairs represents a crucial linkage not only at the strategic but more importantly at the tactical and operational levels, of interagency information sharing and civil-military cooperation. The demand for conducting targeted CIM to providing a common understanding of the Human Domain will only continue to grow as SOF maneuvers within the Gray Zone. In the case of Syria, our interagency partners were conducting assistance initiatives from the onset of the Syrian opposition uprising in early 2013. The Syrian conflict and the onset of USG assistance to stabilize the conflict
represent critical opportunities for SOF and interagency cooperation and information sharing as a component of Preparation of the Environment. As the only DoD component attached to a civilian interagency platform responding to the crisis, the Civil Affairs knowledge management team, through targeted CIM, began the arduous task of mapping the potential Syrian Opposition fighters, governing structures, resilient networks, displaced populations, neutral actors and identifying those who threaten this network. The KMT provides yet another proof of concept for a Civil Affairs capability to engage in the gray zone through the support of our interagency partners. The teams capability to provide the support without being in the conflict zone, is particularly critical given that in addition to unsuitable security conditions, it may be politically unfeasible to deploy civil affairs or other SOF teams during this phase. The KMT’s management of civil information and program data effectively fills an interagency capability gap that is not addressed through the intelligence sharing community, and is uniquely positioned to provide DoD components the degree of continuity that is necessary to understanding the Human Domain prior to an escalation of the conflict. Through the disparate reporting channels, dynamic information requirements and various competing end-states predominant throughout the interagency, the KMT functions as the neutral broker; data mining the human networks and support structures in preparation for SOF activity and continued support to DoS and USAID activities. Synchronizing and sharing civil information from diplomacy, development, humanitarian assistance programing, through the KMT between START and the CJIAF-S, continues to be a proof of concept into the role of civil information in achieving national security objectives.

The structure of the KMT does not have to be replicated in other interagency or purely SOF operations; the task of CIM, in understanding the Human Domain, must no longer be an afterthought to other Civil Affairs activities. CIM must have a central role in all Civil Affairs operations, as its importance in current Gray Zone operations in not just the fight against Daesh but also operations such as countering Russian aggression, is paramount to successful military and interagency led activities. Civil Affairs Operators need to continue refining and training CIM and knowledge management, CA core tasks, in all phases of operations, but most critically for phase zero. Through the various CMSEs and Civil Military Operations Centers established around the world, Civil Affairs interagency partnerships and targeted CIM must provide the critical elements and building blocks to understand the Human Domain to navigate effectively in the Gray Zone.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Maj. Alexander, a Civil Affairs officer, is currently attending the Naval Post Graduate School in Monterey, California. Maj. Moore, a Civil Affairs officer is currently attending the Naval Post Graduate School. Capt. Sogge is assigned to the 92nd CA Battalion.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

3RD QUARTER FY16 PROMOTION SELECTION BOARDS

10-26 MAY 2016: CW3/4/5 Promotion Selection Board
16-20 MAY 2016: AC CSM/SGM Nominate and AC-USAR (AGR) CSM-QSP
01 JUN - 01 JUL 2016: AC-USAR (AGR) SFC Promotion/SSG-QSP

Be sure to periodically check for updates to the FY16 promotion/command/school schedule at: https://www.hrc.army.mil/TAGD/FY16%20Army%20Selection%20Board%20Schedule

MILPER MESSAGE 16-067

Human Resources Command published this MILPER, Change to Special Promotion Category for Career Management Fields (CMF) 18 and 38 for Promotion to Staff Sergeant that authorizes CMF 18 and CMF 38 Soldiers to be automatically promoted to Staff Sergeant providing they meet specific prerequisites on the first day of the following month when all of the prerequisites have been met.

CMF 18: Special Forces Qualification Course Advanced Leader Course (ALC) Graduate; Award of MOS 18B, 18C, 18D or 18E; 42-months Time in Service; 6-months Time in Grade

CMF 38: Civil Affairs Qualification Course ALC Graduate; Award of MOS 38B; 42 months TIS; 6 months TIG

For more information, eligible Soldiers should contact their Unit S1.

AR 11-6, ARMY FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROGRAM

This updated Army Regulation went into effect on 18 MAR 16. Key changes of interest to Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Special Forces Soldiers include:

- Special operations forces Soldiers will receive foreign language proficiency bonus for below 2/2 proficiency for their control language. They can receive pay for up to three languages, control language, deployment language and language supporting the Commandant Commander.
- Authorizes the use of Army Language Program funding for CMF 18, 37 and 38 Soldiers assigned to or assigned to support general purpose forces.

If you have questions about the updated AR, please contact howellsr@soc.mil.

FROM THE CIVIL AFFAIRS PROONENT

ARMY STRUCTURE UPDATE. On Oct. 15, the Army released a structure update, known as an ARSTRUC that directed the decrease of 30 percent of the active component Civil Affairs force. The majority of lost positions were from the 85th Civil Affairs Brigade, but there were also decrements in other formations including the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade and in both the Corps and Division G9s. The Proponent remains committed to ensuring that despite our smaller structure, CA Soldiers will remain competitive with respect to promotions, DA Command Select opportunities and other nominative assignments. Our efforts to that end include ensuring that the career development regulations are accurate and remain a valuable tool for you (expect updates to DA Pams 600-3 and 600-25 to be released over the next fiscal year), conducting strategic engagements with the Army G1 to ensure our promotion, Enhanced Separation Early Retirement Board and QMP/QSP rates remain fair and consistent with the rest of the Army and that they are proportionate as we draw down our inventory.

LOSS RATES. As you might expect and have likely already noticed, retention incentives will be more specialized and fewer in number as we work to right size the Civil Affairs force. The most current CSRB for Civil Affairs expired with the previous fiscal year and was not renewed. We as a branch have been able to retain more than average over the last several years due to the fact that we were trying to grow but will likely see even more changes as we move forward. There are two important things to remember with respect to this:

1. CA Officers and Noncommissioned Officers must remain focused on ensuring they understand DA Pam 600-3 and DA Pam 600-25 and what they must do to remain competitive and relevant within Civil Affairs. We cannot stress enough the importance of taking control over your own career and committing to educating yourself and your leaders on what's available to you and what you need to do to advance to the next level.

2. As mentioned before, we at the Proponent will do everything within our power to ensure that promotion and loss rates remain fair and competitive so that we continue to promote the best Civil Affairs Officers and Noncommissioned Officers ultimately ensuring that choosing a career in Civil Affairs is a viable way to achieve your personal and professional goals.

QUALITY. Finally, despite the loss, bringing quality individuals into the branch is still a top priority. Officers and Soldiers possessing a desire to shape the civil environment and set the conditions for military operations should contact the SORB at http://www.sorbre-cruiting.com/CA.htm or (910) 432-9697 and volunteer to attend one of the nine Civil Affairs Assessment and Selections held throughout the upcoming Fiscal Year.

For questions or more information contact the Civil Affairs Personnel Division at swscapersonnel@soc.mil
SF PROMOTION BOARD RESULTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SF MAJ</th>
<th>SF LTC</th>
<th>SF COL</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AZ</td>
<td>PZ</td>
<td>BZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>97.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>74.2%</td>
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FY14 Army MAJ = 65.3%  
FY14 Army LTC = 60.4%  
FY14 Army COL = 39.4%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SF CW3</th>
<th>SF CW4</th>
<th>SF CW5</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AZ</td>
<td>PZ</td>
<td>BZ</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>91.9%</td>
<td>0%</td>
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</table>

FY15 Army CW3 = 58.5%  
FY15 Army CW4 = 61.8%  
FY15 Army CW5 = 19.3%

When we analyze this year’s promotion results, we find some commonalities in what it took to get promoted. In most instances, the analysis holds true for FY14, and we expect it to remain constant next year, too. The bottom line is that performance and potential on your OERs matter!

- COL: 2 x MQ OERs in battalion command
- LTC: MQ OERs in all KD assignments; a minimum 3/5 MQ OERs overall
- MAJ: MQ OERs as a Detachment Commander
- CW3: Strong OERs (majority MQ) + PME complete
- CW4: Strong OERs (majority MQ) + PME complete
- CW5: Strong OERs (majority MQ) + PME complete + TDA assignment

> The Army will conduct a FY16 (Enhanced) Selective Early Retirement Board (e/SERB) on 12 JAN 16. Please visit the MilSuite Post below for the MILPER (Number 15-352) a comprehensive explanation of the process.  
https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/special-forces-branch-lieutenent-colonels/blog/2015/11/05/fy16-ltc-eserb-12-jan-16
SPECIAL FORCES WARRANT OFFICER

SF BRANCH UPDATE

WARRANT OFFICER SLATING
The Special Forces Warrant Officer slating board convened at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on Oct. 14-16, 2015. The conference was hosted by the Warrant Officer Institute and attended by the Senior and Command Chief Warrant Officers of the United States Army Special Operations Command to discuss and validate the TDA and Broadening assignments for the summer 16-02 distribution cycle (April-September). Notifications via RFO will begin in January 2016 with the earliest movers that start PCS in April 2016 and working towards the last movers that will PCS in August/September 2016.

FY15 PROMOTION RESULTS
The results of the FY15 CW3/4/5 Promotion Selection Boards were released on Oct. 14, 2015. The SF Warrant Officer population was promoted close to the same rate as FY14 and at or above other technical Warrant Officers. CW3 saw a 92 percent promotion rate in the Primary Zone. CW4 saw a 100 percent promotion rate in the Primary and Above Zones. CW5 saw a lower rate in the Primary Zone at 5.6 percent but an 18.8 percent in the Above Zone and an 11.1 percent in the Below the Zone categories.

WARRANT OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION
The Warrant Officer Institute (WOI) located at Fort Bragg, NC has requested and received approval to conduct two classes annually for the Warrant Officer Advanced Course (WOAC) (2-33-C32) reducing it from three per year previously. This is in effect for FY 16 and will ensure the CW2 population plan and schedule attendance according to their operational tempo, time in grade as a CW2, and available seats for each of the courses. Professional Military Education (PME) is a factor regarding promotion to the rank of CW3. Each course will have 30 seats totaling 60 seats per year. There is no change to the number of course seats.

The WOI will conduct two courses of Special Operations Warrant Officer Intermediate Level Education (SOWOILE) (2E-FOS-C8) annually, beginning FY 17 up from one course in FY 16. The SOWOILE is in addition to the Warrant Officer Intermediate Level Education taught at Fort Rucker, Alabama. To receive credit for WOILE you must complete both courses. This PME is a factor regarding promotion to the rank of CW4 and you may attend them in any order.

These scheduled changes will ensure the staffs at the WOI have the proper time and resources to maintain the high standards they have the responsibility of upholding. Please see the scheduled dates for the courses below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSE #</th>
<th>CURRENT SCHEDULE</th>
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<tr>
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<td>3 Jan 16</td>
<td>4 Jan 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>24 Apr 16</td>
<td>25 Apr 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFWOILE 001-16</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFWOILE 002-16</td>
<td>10 Jul 16</td>
<td>11 Jul 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>19 Mar 17</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFWOILE 002-17</td>
<td>9 Jul 17</td>
<td>10 Jul 17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For more information, contact the SF Warrant Officer Proponent at 180AProponentManager@soc.mil, DSN 239-7597 or commercial at (910) 432-7597.

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> What do you dislike?
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> What would you like to see in future issues?
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> Just tell us what’s on your mind.

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Include your full name, rank, address and phone number with all submissions. Select letters to the editor may be published in an upcoming issue of Special Warfare.
Have you ever felt like your ankle is “stiff”, “gets stuck” or just “won’t loosen up”? Do you have difficulty getting into a deep squat? After a lower leg injury, your body’s ankle mobility can become significantly limited. Along with an appropriate strengthening and functional rehabilitation plan, mobility exercises can play a large role in recovery of lost range of motion and help to reduce the risk of future injury.

**Importance of ankle dorsiflexion:** Ankle dorsiflexion occurs when you raise your foot towards your shin; or when you are bearing weight through the foot, it is the motion that occurs as your shinbone moves forward towards the top of your foot. Dorsiflexion mobility, especially while bearing weight through the foot, is extremely important in reducing risk of injury when squatting, running and rucking. Limited mobility into ankle dorsiflexion can lead to decreased motion and increased force at your knee, hip and low back putting you at risk for injuries to these joints, as well as putting you at risk for future recurring ankle sprains.

**How to assess your ankle mobility:** According to several recent studies, the weight bearing lunge test provides the most simple and reliable assessment for measuring ankle dorsiflexion. To perform the weight bearing lunge test you can follow these steps:

1. Place a tape measure on the floor with the 0 measure right against a wall.
2. Assume a half lunge position with your test ankle in front and your big toe 10 cm from the wall. [01]
3. Bend your front knee as far forward as you can without allowing your heel to rise off the ground. [02]
4. If your front knee cannot touch the wall without your heel coming off the ground, move your foot 1 cm closer to the wall. Repeat this step until your knee touches.
5. If you can touch your knee to the wall without your heel rising, move 1 cm away from the wall. Repeat this step until your knee can no longer touch the wall without your heel rising off the floor.
6. While bending your front knee to the wall be sure to keep your kneecap in a line directed over your second and third toe.
7. Measure the final distance you achieve from the wall to your big toe.
8. Repeat these steps to test your other ankle.

**Note:** When looking at the distance measured during the weight bearing lunge test, a normal value is a distance of >10 cm between your big toe and the wall. You should also see that the distance measured for your right and left ankle are symmetrical to each other.

**How to improve your ankle mobility:** A simple mobility exercise to help improve your ankle dorsiflexion range of motion is very similar to the test position. You can follow the steps listed below:

1. Assume a half lunge position with the ankle you are working on in front. [01]
2. Making sure your kneecap falls in a line over your second and third toe, lunge forward as far as you can without your heel rising off the floor. [02]
3. Maintaining this lunge position, lightly pulse at your knee for 20-30 reps.

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**BY DR. MEGAN BRUNELLE, THOR3 Physical Therapist**

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84 SPECIAL WARFARE | WWW.SOC.MIL/SWCS/SPECIALWARFARE
Social network analysis provides a methodology to address the ambiguity of conflict and security challenges of the post-9/11 era. In *Disrupting Dark Networks*, Professor Sean Everton claims social ties play an important role in the recruitment of individuals into groups that seek to conceal themselves and their activities from authorities. Social Network Analysis, according to Everton, is the basic theories, methods and assumptions describing how behavior is affected by these relational ties. This comprehensive study of SNA must be understood and implemented by moral analysts to properly inform national decision makers. Everton determined that misspecification of an illegal network’s boundaries leads to metric errors and inappropriate strategies. With his book, social-network analysts will learn to navigate the standard SNA software packages and a simple SNA strategy process. However, he does not suggest detailed courses of action perhaps because SNA is but one of many tools used to craft strategy.

Everton dedicated almost five years of research to this book and now teaches a master’s degree course at the Naval Postgraduate School that follows the outline of the first eight chapters. The book and course are designed to teach analysts how to hypothesize strategies, collect and analyze relevant data, estimate SNA metrics and then refine strategies consistent with the findings. Everton can teach complex concepts to the networking novice. However, while the centrality metrics in the book are described as intuitive, an understanding of statistical models will prepare readers for the equations presented, including those for network change detection and genuine or spurious correlations.

Everton accomplishes his goal of placing SNA methods into a larger strategic framework of lethal and non-lethal approaches to disrupt, track or destabilize networks. With his emphasis on non-lethal strategies, this book is highly recommended for members of Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units discovering key positions, Intelligence operators and Special Forces mapping network structures, and law enforcement organizations identifying criminals’ roles. Social context can shape the behavior of actors, and SNA uses methods to identify the groups receptive to non-coercive strategy approaches. For example, it may be of interest to elevate the centrality of an actor who is more sympathetic to stability. On the other hand, after proper analysis of social dynamics, incentives may be offered to compel members to cut ties with a network. Such defectors may cause paralysis within the network as the associate actors become unsure if they are compromised.

*Disrupting Dark Networks* is thoroughly organized with every chapter in parallel format. Everton structured the work like a textbook. Most chapters are stand-alone lessons using different SNA techniques. By reading *Disrupting Dark Networks*, readers learn to appreciate SNA as a tool for understanding these networks. To achieve this goal, the book does not need to be read in its entirety by all readers. Chapters 1, 2 and 12 teach SNA terms, opportunities, and limitations for policymakers. Chapters 2, 8, 10 and 11 provide social network analysts with strategic options. Scholars looking for more ways to analyze terrorist networks will find chapters 5, 6, 7 and 9 most useful. Finally, new students of SNA can use chapters 3 and 4 to learn the four software programs incorporated in the book as well as how to collect data. The appendices and tables are rich with structural terms, definitions and typologies. All readers will find the exhaustive research efforts by Everton worth the cost of the book.

Any new users of the SNA software packages will need to download all programs and pay for one of them, which is required for anyone planning to follow Everton’s work. The book is well written and easy to follow, and the equations are clearly explained. This book will be helpful for anyone working with social networks and will be an excellent tool for teaching and research in the field of SNA.
CONSPICUOUS AND PERSISTENT ABSURDITY

BY HY ROTHSTEIN

The views presented are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or the U.S. government.

Three senseless and ultimately harmful “urban legends” that have become almost bedrock special operations beliefs are:

**BELIEF ONE**

The 5th SOF truth — “Most Special Operations Require non-SOF assistance.”

This “truth” is pointless. Almost every undertaking requires some degree of external involvement. For example, conventional forces need outside assistance to move troops and equipment. On the other hand, successful conventional operations will rarely require SOF assistance and most special operations do not require non-SOF assistance to the extent that it becomes an imperative for successful action. In fact, any outside assistance must be minimal and by exception only. “Smallness” and being relatively self-contained are two of the virtues of SOF. This “truth” is propaganda at best, and at worst, a lie. One can see why conventional leaders perpetuate this “untruth,” but SOF leaders?

A more accurate “truth” would say: “The greater the involvement of non-SOF partners in SO, the greater the likelihood of another organization, especially when lives are at stake? Also, a task force should be structured only after the mission is clearly understood. Interdependence puts the cart before the horse by engineering “in,” conventional formations regardless of mission requirements. Furthermore, the cost for interdependence means a larger footprint on the ground that can delegitimize an ally and just about guarantee that a special operation will be turned into a conventional mess.

“Independence” is a more appropriate organizing principle for SOF. A more accurate principle would be expressed as follows: “The strategic utility (overall contribution to a war or campaign) of SOF is inversely proportional to the degree of “interdependence.” SOF’s strategic utility lies in its ability to operate independent of conventional forces in both special warfare and surgical strike roles and taking the lead in doing so. The greater the interdependence, the greater the likelihood of conventionalizing a SO and losing sight of the mission’s original purpose.”

**BELIEF TWO**

The belief that optimizing special warfare necessitates “interdependence” with the conventional military and the interagency.

This priority in ARSOF 2022 (and highlighted in other documents as well) is also senseless. First, interdependence means dependence. It is very different from interoperability. Why would any organization link its success to dependence on another organization, especially when lives are at stake? Also, a task force should be structured only after the mission is clearly understood. Interdependence puts the cart before the horse by engineering “in,” conventional formations regardless of mission requirements. Furthermore, the cost for interdependence means a larger footprint on the ground that can delegitimize an ally and just about guarantee that a special operation will be turned into a conventional mess.

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**BELIEF THREE**

The belief that SOF can educate conventional leaders sufficiently to allow, when needed, Special Operations-centric campaign plans to emerge and be executed under the command of a Special Operations HQ.

The fallacy of this belief should be visibly obvious even to Stevie Wonder. SOF have never been in the lead regardless of the accommodations made between senior special operations and conventional commanders over the last 12 years.

Professional Military Education institutions have avoided seriously incorporating special operations requirements into their curricula despite significant special operations resource
investments at Army schools. The Command General Staff College does insist, however, that each section have a SO officer as a “training aid” for their conventional students. Conventional leaders are rightfully concerned about the education of conventional leaders. SO leaders who attempt to “educate the conventional force” by saturating conventional PME institutions with SO fail to change conventional thinking and undercut their responsibility to properly educate SOF for SO requirements.

Although there is something to be learned by SO attending conventional educational institutions, SOF leaders cannot lose sight of what C.E. Callwell said about Small Wars more than one hundred years ago: “…the conditions of small wars are so diversified, the enemy’s mode of fighting is often so peculiar, and the theatres of operations present such singular features, that irregular warfare must generally be carried out on a method totally different from the stereotyped system….The conduct of small wars is in fact an art by itself.” Accordingly, specialized education must complement SOF specialized training first, and if time permits, support conventional education.

CONCLUSION

SOF cannot fail in SO missions. Accordingly, SO must offer expansion of choice and economy of force, strategically, to the NCA and combatant commanders. Supporting conventional forces is a secondary mission. To offer SO capabilities primarily to conventional force commanders redefines SOF as a hyper-conventional force in a conventional camp. This results in reducing SOF’s strategic utility at best and misuse at worst.

SOF must strive to:

• Preclude the necessity for costly conventional war—(strategic shapers)
• Provide intelligence and situational awareness to key decision makers—(global scouts)
• Maintain forward presence—(strategic shapers)
• When necessary, facilitate the conduct of decisive operations—host nation, combined or unilateral—(operational combat outposts)
• Facilitate conflict termination and secure the victory—(strategic shapers)
• Provide global economy of force—(operational combat outposts)

STRATEGIC PRECLUSION

This term represents the idea of introducing military capabilities early so that an adversary cannot gain or consolidate a significant operational advantage. It involves strategic maneuver often leveraging allies. Properly employed, SOF can strategically preclude attacks against U.S. interests by keeping enemies from acquiring or maintaining the capacity to attack the U.S. or our allies.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Hy Rothstein is a retired Special Forces colonel and holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the Fletcher School at Tufts University. He is currently on the faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

DISRUPTING DARK NETWORKS

continued from page 85

effects. The software programs are continually updating, making the programming steps slightly inaccurate. So it is best to work through the examples as soon as possible; that way students and analysts can understand the relevant concepts and then evolve with the technology.

Everton suggests numerous network strategy options throughout the text. For example, disrupting many types of social ties at once can pressure some actors to make conflicting choices. Another approach is to track a network until it is maximally illuminated. With the positioning of a broker, activities will vary depending on the actor, so closer observation may be necessary before deciding on a lethal strategy. Finally, a different option is to steer an actor toward a legal network conducting peaceful activity. The software and the methods of SNA are the necessary tools to help make these observations before implementing effective strategy.

With a thorough understanding of SNA techniques and methods, readers may be armed with the wisdom to reduce the disadvantages of entrenched governmental bureaucracies as mentioned in the Sept. 9, 2015 White Paper titled The Gray Zone by the United States Special Operations Command. Everton provides numerous solutions and feasible planning approaches to identify networks of individuals and organizations that operate in the gray zone between peace and war. Also, with information-sharing between social network analysts and government leaders, some policies may be improved to appropriately deal with threats in the gray zone.

As Everton describes, SNA is one way to determine the nature of a network. As a guidebook, Disrupting Dark Networks may assist allied forces to link relationships before a crisis in order to understand the potential for conflict. Everton shows ways to change a social structure to erode a threat’s effectiveness while also illuminating the underlying conditions of instability. However, readers should limit their expectations. They will also receive a comprehensive, step-by-step tutorial for SNA software manipulation, while learning the ethical implications of disrupting human relations. Social network analysts should expect to find a supporting process for modifying an adversary’s dark behaviors.