BUILDING THE GLOBAL SOF NETWORK
On the Cover
The Global SOF Network:
Through a series of initiatives by the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the Global SOF Network is getting stronger and increasing its reach.

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U.S. ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY
SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER AND SCHOOL

MISSION: The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the U.S. Army’s Special Operations Center of Excellence, trains, educates, develops and manages world-class Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Special Forces warriors and leaders in order to provide the Army special operations forces regiments with professionally trained, highly educated, innovative and adaptive operators.

VISION: Professionalism starts here. We are an adaptive institution characterized by agility, collaboration, accountability and integrity. We promote life-long learning and transformation. We are THE Special Operations Center of Learning whose credibility in producing the world’s finest special operators is recognized and sustained by every single member of our three regiments.

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Submit graphics, tables and charts with source references in separate files from the manuscript (no embedded graphics). Special Warfare accepts only high-resolution (300 dpi or greater) digital photos; be sure to include a caption and photographer’s credit. Do not send photos within PowerPoint slides. Prints are acceptable. Photos will be returned, if possible.

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In today’s uncertain operating environment, there is a growing need for greater relationships and interoperability with our partners around the world. The February 2015 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, signed by the President of the United States of America, reinforces that idea with its call for U.S. forces to build partner capacity, facilitating the efforts of partner governments to tackle problems using a preponderance of their own forces. The U.S. Defense Strategic Guidance also directs us to use “innovative, low cost and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives.”

The Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command took this guidance to heart, and has directed his subordinate elements to develop the Global SOF Network as a part of the solution. The Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army has also provided his vision to develop a Global Landpower Network.

Our initiatives at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School are directly nested with the guidance provided to us by these strategic documents and leaders. Within this issue of Special Warfare you will find our USAJFKSWCS initiatives to embed Volckmann operators into key positions of special operations forces and conventional forces units around the globe; to systemically embed U.S. SOF and CF Roosevelt teams into ongoing UN missions around the globe; to increase Security Force Assistance capabilities using a number of different initiatives; to develop a Global SOF Training, Education and Doctrine Center of Excellence; and to link these forward deployed and training-base initiatives and efforts to our national decision-making apparatus in Washington D.C., to ensure our leaders are provided the best possible information as they make decisions for our country.

The USAJFKSWCS initiatives have been shepherded from idea phase to pilot year implementation by my USAJFKSWCS Commander’s Initiative Group. The proper paperwork has been prepared to provide submissions for the FYDP 18-22 POM to then turn these programs into programs of record. A tremendous amount of superb work and innovation has been done by the “family business” of the USAJFKSWCS to make these ideas a reality.

You will also find the USAJFKSWCS Course Catalog in this issue of Special Warfare. This catalog will be useful as you plan and prepare to conduct training and education at the USAJFKSWCS, the mothership of special warfare training and education around the world.

It has been my distinct honor to have been provided the opportunity to command the magnificent institution that is the USAJFKSWCS, and as I depart command, I am thankful to have served with such tremendous people and in such a fine, world-class organization.

Major General Eric P. Wendt
Security Force Assistance Foreign Weapons Course

As the Army continues to drawdown from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and continues its rebalancing of forces, one of the concepts that is becoming more important is the Army’s Regionally Aligned Force Concept, which designates Army units to a combatant command with the intent of providing “tailored, trained and consistently available Army forces, responsive to all requirements, including operational missions, bilateral and multilateral military exercises and theater security cooperation activities.”

In 2012, the first Regionally Aligned Brigade, 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division from Fort Riley, Kansas, “aligned” with U.S. Army Africa and began training for a series of small unit deployments across the African continent. As the Dagger Brigade began to train for its upcoming deployment, it quickly discovered the uniqueness of the mission, which required additional skill sets on which they were not trained. One of the requirements that posed a significant challenge was effectively operating, employing and maintaining the foreign weapon systems used by partner forces.

As the Army explored options to prepare RAf units to address this training requirement, it turned to the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, N.C. The school, the Army Special Operations Center of Excellence, was asked to develop a training concept to meet this need. The result was the Security Force Assistance Foreign Weapons Course, which is taught by the cadre of the 4th Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne). The cadre, which also instructs the 1B Special Forces Weapons Sergeant Course, applied years of operational and institutional expertise, along with that of the USAJFKSWCS Training Developers, to create the SFAFWC program of instruction.

Company C, 4th Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne), comprised of both Special Forces and conventional forces Soldiers, is responsible for instruction and support requirements needed to execute the course. Fourteen CMF 11 Infantry NCOs serve as the primary instructor cadre for the course. In their preparation to serve as instructors, they had to pass the demanding 18B Special Forces Sergeant Light Weapons Module along with the U.S. Army Training Requirements and Resources System under school code 331 presenting in the spring.

Units wanting to send Soldiers to the SFAFWC should reserve seats through the Army Training Requirements and Resources System under school code 331 and course title “SFA FOREIGN WEAPONS.” The SFAFWC can support up to 30 classes per fiscal year, with 30 students per class, for a total throughput of 900 students. For more information about the SFAFWC, contact the 4th Battalion S3 at (910) 432-6460.

Regimental Awards

For those entering the military, service isn’t just a word, it’s a calling. For those who enter Army special operations it is a way of life. The men and women who serve, don’t ask for recognition or thanks, instead, they serve quietly, seeking only the approval of their team and the safety of their nation. In an effort to recognize the selfless service that is a hallmark of ARSOF, the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, as the proponent, has created an awards program to recognize the active duty member of each regiment with the longest tenure in ARSOF. In January 2015, Maj. Gen. Eric P. Wendt, commanding general, USAJFKSWCS approved each of the regimental awards - The Elder Statesman, The Silver Knight and The Old Grey Fox - with the first awards presented in the spring.

The Elder Statesman Award recognizes the longest serving, active component Civil Affairs officer or noncommissioned officer. The term statesman captures the essence of the consummate CA professional; as one actively engaged in conducting the business of a government, or in shaping its policies. This closely aligns with the primary function of CA, which is to engage the civilian component of the operational environment to facilitate military operations, and to build capacity which enhances civilian governance at all levels. The Civil Affairs mission requires a “Soldier diplomat” who can liaison and positively influence the operational environment by enabling effective governance and by shaping the policies that support U.S. goals abroad. Utilizing the term “Elder Statesman” in recognition of the longest serving CA Soldier in the Regiment is both accurate and appropriate.

The Silver Knight Award recognizes the longest serving, active component member of the Psychological Operations Regiment. The function of military information support operations is to change the behavior of foreign audiences through influential messages and actions. This requires an experienced, cross cultural communicator, functioning across the spectrum of war.

The Silver Knight captures the character of a mature, experienced PSYOP Soldier and goes to the heart of what is expected of all PSYOP Soldiers: eloquent persuasion - signified by the color silver - and the ability to act obliquely to influence all types of warfare, which is signified by the chess knight. Both of these symbols are drawn directly from the PSYOP Regimental Insignia. The first Silver Knight will embody the legacy of the many honorable members of the PSYOP Regiment.

The Old Grey Fox Award honors the longest standing, still serving member of the Special Forces Regiment. The Old Grey Fox Award is symbolic for the character of a mature, experienced SF Soldier and is a fitting tribute to the longest serving member of the regiment. The award will recognize the longest serving Green Beret still on active duty. The knowledge and experience gained as the longest serving member of the regiment is symbolized by the color grey.

The characteristic behaviors of the fox are synonymous with those skills needed of an SF Soldier to survive in a hostile environment; it is clever and cunning, with an ability to outwit its adversary. The symbolic use of the fox is a nod to Francis Marion’s use of guerrilla tactics in the Revolutionary War. Today’s Special Forces trace their roots in unconventional and guerrilla warfare to Marion.
The National Security Strategy outlines the major security concerns of the nation and how the administration plans to deal with them. The 2015 National Security Strategy describes the challenges our nation must overcome in the complex environment we face, providing a vision for strengthening and sustaining American leadership around the globe.

In response to complex threats and an uncertain future, U.S. Special Operations Forces prepare and train to adapt to the changes in the national defense priorities shifting from Iraq and Afghanistan to an ambiguous, steady state environment of doubtless “dynamic uncertainty.”

In 2014, the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the Army Special Operations Center of Excellence, expanded its reach in both scope and scale, adding new, innovative courses, developing programs supporting the force, the Army and our partner nations’ training centers around the world. This was in addition to maintaining 104 unique courses while managing and resourcing the professional growth for Soldiers in the Army’s three distinct special operations branches of which USAJFKSWCS is the proponent: Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations.

USAJFKSWCS Adaptations for the Changing World

While the role of U.S. Army, and its special operations units adapts and evolves, it is imperative that innovation, flexibility and adaptation come to the forefront. It is also imperative that commanders enable a culture that promotes creative solutions with a clear understanding of the problem.

Although some aspects of challenges of the current operating environment seem to harken back to the Cold War, they are exacerbated by conditional factors that clearly change our approach; population growth, increased urbanization and the rise of social media are a few examples of environmental drivers that influence the way we operate and in turn how we train.

Beyond Training: USAJFKSWCS Initiatives

Traditionally, the USAJFKSWCS is known for its training during the qualification courses for the ARSOF special warfare regiments. While these courses remain vital to the force, the other side of the organization the “Center,” which includes proponent management and doctrinal development support USAJFKSWCS efforts to develop new programs.

These seven initiatives (Figures 1 and 2) range from helping the Army develop a deployment check list for regionally-focused forces that support geographic and functional combatant commands and joint requirements to expanding special warfare instructor positions world wide. While noticeably diverse, these initiatives all support the National Security Strategy, the Army Strategic Priorities and the U.S. Special Operations Command’s commander’s intent.

The USAJFKSWCS Commander’s Initiatives Group moved forward with
the initiatives from the conceptual phase toward making them programs of record. This includes drafting documents for the U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s Guidance for Development of the Force, as part Strategic Planning Process that addresses capability gaps. The final product of the SPP will be a Program Objectives Memorandum, which displays the resource allocation decisions of the military department in response to, and in accordance with, the Guidance for Development of the Force and Joint Programming Guidance. Simply, this means that the initiatives are funded and have moved from the conceptual phase to programs of record. The next POM cycle will start at the end of FY15 and address the FY 2018-22 period.

**Interdependence Initiative**

As evidenced by the past 12 years of conflict, future military operations will require enduring employment of ARSOF capabilities in concert with conventional forces in a larger structure. This requires interaction with CF stakeholder capabilities to continually shape desired environmental conditions in support of the National Security Strategy and defined end states. This complex operational environment, with varying levels of stability, security, governance, intractability and problem clarity, demands purposeful collaboration between ARSOF and CF to achieve U.S. interests. The 2015 National Military Strategy notes that in order to succeed in these complex environments, the U.S. must update, balance and integrate all of the instruments of American power and work with joint interagency, intergovernmental and multinational partners to do the same. Interdependence demands that ARSOF work with sister services to understand and develop sustainment mechanisms – both standard and non-standard – for all seven ARSOF core operations, which avoids unnecessary overlap of function and wasted resources, while allowing synchronization with external Army entities.

**Security Force Assistance Initiative**

"Arguably, the most important military component of the struggle against violent extremists is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we help prepare our partners to defend and govern themselves." — Secretary Of Defense Robert Gates, 10 October 2007

Security Force Assistance is defined as: Unified action by the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and the multinational community to generate, employ, sustain and assist host nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. SFA is a broad framework that spans the spectrum of conflict focused on assisting foreign security forces in support of U.S. and coalition interests regardless of operating environment. In this regard, SFA is well suited as both strategic and operational strategy in the complex and uncertain future.

As the National Security Strategy outlines, extended operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, are drawing down while the U.S. military pivots to focus on the demands

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**FIGURE 1** USAJFKSWCS Commander’s initiatives, shown in gold, support the National Security Strategy.
of the steady state in a complex global security environment. The geographic combatant commands conduct activities to build partner-nation capacity and capability, but face challenges planning for and tracking security force assistance as a distinct activity. In order to leverage the SOF’s worldwide experience conducting foreign internal defense operations, the USAJFKSWCS developed a SFA Handbook to enhance Army readiness, training and leader development in support of security cooperation missions. This initiative supports USSOCOM’s LOO2: Global SOF Network, and the Army Strategic Priority: A Globally Responsive and Regionally Engaged Army.

Security Force Assistance (SFA) Metrics Initiative

As USAJFKSWCS assists in translating the lessons learned from FID to SFA, we also began to look at how these efforts were measured and how effects were captured. In an effort to quantify the effectiveness and value of SFA, this initiative focuses on the development of a methodology to collect, collate, analyze and quantify SFA operations in order to better educate and inform senior military and civilian leadership as to the value and necessity for continued resources and support. Specifically this improves USSOCOM LOO 2.4: Align Enterprise to Support the Network and LOOs 4.1: Balance and Focus Resourcing and 4.3 Achieve Auditability. It also supports efforts for Army Strategic Priority: A Globally Responsive and Regionally Engaged Army.

Continued development and adoption of a standardized SFA Metric construct will assist leaders at all levels of the DoD in collecting, analyzing and effectively reporting the effects of SFA efforts.

The Global SOF Training, Education and Doctrine Community of Interest Initiative

On April 14, 74 countries, spread out on six continents, participated in the Global SOF Training, Education and Doctrine Video Teleconference. This was the second in a series of global outreach efforts to partner-nation SOF training centers around the world, which built on the original 45 countries who participated in January 2015. Increased participation engaged all countries the U.S. Special Operations Command interacts with under Theater Security Cooperation Plans and other building partner-capacity activities.

These quarterly web conferences, hosted by the Commanding General, USAJFKSWCS, foster a global SOF Center and School partnership exchanging best practices, standard operating procedures and initiatives to improve Global SOF capabilities and interoperability. These web conferences allow nations to present topics of interest to the SOF community and enable follow-on discussions and networking opportunities with any interested nation.

Beyond building relationships, interoperability and interdependence within U.S. forces this initiative allows USAJFKSWCS to build relationships to expand the Global SOF and Global Landpower Networks, while helping to minimize the friction experienced when multinational forces initially work together in combat or other than combat operations. By communicating and collaborating on matters of SOF training, education and doctrine, this initiative supports US-SOCOM LOOs 1.1: Sustain Persistent Global Activities and 2: Global SOF Network.

Powell Initiative

The initiative is named after Secretary Colon Powell, in recognition of his service in both the Department of Defense and Department of State, and extraordinary efforts to create synergy between them. The Powell Initiative will PCS senior Special Forces Warrant Officers to work in State Department Regional Bureaus, leveraging their regional and SOF expertise to place them in a specific bureau.

Officers designated as part of the Powell program will advise the regional bureau based on their professional experience and interaction from multiple years of operating in a specific region at a Special Forces Group or other ARSOF unit. The Powell Initiative will also connect to regionally aligned Volckmann personnel, and the Global SOF Training, Education and Doctrine Community of Interest for pertinent input to the regional bureau. Powell personnel will PCS to the National Capitol Region for the duration of their careers.
The "whole-of-government" approach to current and future challenges is not a new concept. The United States government is a large organization comprised of multiple components and capabilities, which means that no one entity has the capability to face challenges independently. Through collaboration, coordination and cooperation, organizations and agencies can effectively apply expertise and resources.

**Roosevelt Team Initiative**

During World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt began discussions on the development of a new international body as a successor to the failed League of Nations. As a result of his efforts, the United Nations was established on Oct. 24, 1945, to promote peace and international cooperation. At its inception, 51 countries were member states, with 193 states serving as current members of the organization. Within the UN’s six principle offices, the Security Council is the body charged with establishing and maintaining UN resolutions for peace and security.

In an effort to expand opportunities for the Department of Defense, this initiative developed a concept for the formation, training and deployment of Department of Defense teams in support of ongoing and planned UN missions to increase placement and access for U.S. personnel in strategic regions of the globe. This initiative directly supports USSOCOM’s LOO2: Global SOF Network and the Army Strategic Priority: A Globally Responsive and Regionally Engaged Army.

Taking advantage of existing multinational organizations, peacekeeping and humanitarian missions greatly enhances the ability of the United States to maintain its presence and access in vital regions. USAJKSWCS is presently working with Special Operations Command-Korea and the U.S. Military Observer Group-Washington to embed an ARSOF element in a Republic of Korea force supporting UN missions in South Sudan.

**Volckmann Operator Initiative**

The Volckmann Operator is a hat-tip to then-Capt. Russell Volckmann, who served as an embedded officer in the Philippine 11th Infantry Regiment during World War II. His actions, including raising a guerrilla army of more than 22,000 men after the Japanese began occupation of the Philippine Islands. Volckmann, along with his army of irregulars conducted a highly successful unconventional warfare campaign, and continued fighting behind enemy lines for more than three years.

The special warfare elements, particularly Special Forces, are masters of unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency. It is this expertise, coupled with their regional alignments that make the uniquely qualified to fill the billets created by this new initiative. The Volckmann Initiative focuses selected individuals on a single country with persistent engagements. These individuals will work in conjunction with the theater special operations commands and remain focused on the same countries throughout their careers, progressing within their host-nation’s SOF structure as they are promoted in the U.S. Army. The first test case of Volckmann operators will enter the force this year.

**Conclusion**

The addition of these courses and training and the USAJKSWCS initiatives, rooted in the strategic vision of the nation, the Army and SOCOM and ARSOF in general. Ultimately they foster the development of innovation, interoperability, interdependence creating better-trained SOF leaders of the future and positions that support a globally responsive and regionally engaged force. SW

CW 4 Maurice Duclos is a Special Forces warrant officer who is assigned to 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), formerly assigned to the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School’s Commander’s Initiative Group.

**Notes:**

THE GREEN BERET
VOLCKMANN PROGRAM
MAXIMIZING THE PREVENT STRATEGY

BY THEN-COLONEL ERIC P. WENDT
At the outset of World War II, Army Captain Russell W. Volckmann was serving as a full-time embed in the Philippine army (the executive officer of the 11th Infantry Regiment, 11th Division of the Philippine Army). Volckmann fought alongside his unit when the Japanese invaded the Philippines, and later, rather than surrender, Volckmann disappeared into the jungles of North Luzon and raised a guerrilla army of more than 22,000 men. For the next three years, he led his guerrillas against the Japanese, and they killed more than 50,000 enemy soldiers. When the Japanese commander of the Philippine occupation force, General Tomiyuki Yamashita, finally surrendered, he made the initial surrender overtures not to MacArthur but to Volckmann. Volckmann went on after the war to help design and create the Green Berets of the U.S. Army Special Forces.

The Problem

Throughout the world, al-Qaeda, or AQ, and its affiliates are conducting a multiregion insurgency designed to establish the Caliphate. The United States does not have the capability, measured in either blood or dollars, to lead a fight throughout multiple regions of the world against AQ and its affiliates. If we attempt to conduct the large number of U.S. unilateral operations needed to defeat this AQ assault, we quickly play into AQ’s hands, exhausting ourselves and, in the process, negatively affecting long-term, global perceptions of the U.S.

The question then crystallizes — how do we break the current operational paradigm and stop this multiregion insurgency without an overwhelming loss of life, expenditure of funds and loss of international favor because of large, unilateral U.S. actions or unfocused security-assistance efforts? If we attempt to use large-scale security-assistance efforts and funding to build entire host-country militaries and security forces around the world and let them address this AQ

Editors Note: This article was the genesis of the Volckmann Project which is currently in a test phase. This article was written by then-Col. Eric P. Wendt, while he was assigned as the principal military assistant to Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates.
problem in their own countries, can we be assured that we are wisely spending U.S. taxpayer dollars funding the most critical host-country units in the fight properly? Are we unintentionally squandering our national treasure on units or organizations that are not key contributors in the fight against AQ? Are we using centralized drive-by assessments of the needs of key host-country units in the fight against AQ? Is there a way to remove what may currently be a myopic view of the requirements of these critical host-country units? Is there a way to synergize the capabilities inherent in Title X and Title XXII authorities? See Figure 2.

This article will discuss two items: first, the adoption of a strategy that helps host-country security forces prevent (as opposed to pre-empt or defeat) the enemy, and second, the creation of the Volckmann Program, which would be composed of a small number of culturally savvy Green Berets who would serve repeated rotations to a single country within their region of expertise while embedding inside critical host-country units. With the unique “behind-the-curtain” perspective offered by service as a host-unit embed, the Volckmann operators would not only train and operate against AQ alongside their host units, but direct with focused precision the U.S. security-assistance efforts that address the real needs of these critical host units, with the net result of fewer U.S. taxpayer dollars being spent and a greater operational effect against AQ.


Prevent > pre-empt > defeat - See Figure 3. As we anticipate the battle with AQ and its affiliates — block by block, town by town, country by country and region by region — the first hypothesis is that it is better to help host-country forces prevent a widespread AQ problem than to deal with it after it blossoms. Prevention limits the cost in U.S. blood and treasure.

If we fail in the prevention phase, and AQ and its affiliates begin to build a substantial capability in a country, then it is better to pre-empt the problem through the use of U.S. raids on high-value targets and a continuous, fairly significant U.S. presence in the countries. If we fail at pre-emption, and the problem grows into a full-fledged war, then we will have to fight to defeat it, using massive numbers of U.S. forces and treasure in large-scale combat.

We can liken this prevent strategy to restricting the spread of cancer. As in fighting cancer, it is better to take relatively cheap, proactive measures with diet, exercise, sunscreen, etc., to prevent the cancer rather than to neglect the matter and have the cancer grow. If prevention fails and a small cancer begins to develop, it is better to pre-empt the cancer with early treatment or removal than to wait until it spreads and requires more invasive surgery, coupled with radiation or chemotherapy, to defeat it.

How do we best posture ourselves to prevent AQ and its affiliates from establishing significant footholds? If we fail in our efforts to help the hosts prevent the AQ problem, can we at least position ourselves during the prevent effort so that we would be more capable if we have to move to the pre-empt or defeat options? Being forced to use U.S. resources to pre-empt represents the failure of proactive prevention, and the use of U.S. resources for large-scale defeat operations represents the failure of both prevention and pre-emption. As unattractive as pre-empt and defeat operations are, that does not change the fact that we must wisely use prevention efforts that can be leveraged, if necessary, to facilitate pre-empt and defeat missions. The bottom line is that we must strive to use prevention as the most effective strategy.

Host country-led efforts for the prevent strategy - See Figure 4. Given that prevention is the most effective strategy for confronting widespread insurgency, we must grapple with the question of who provides the bulk of the effort and resources to implement a proactive, anti-AQ prevention approach. Should we attack the problem with U.S.-led effort and minimal host-country effort, or with equal involvement, effort and resourcing between the two countries? Or should we attack the problem with host-country led effort and minimal U.S. resourcing?

Attempting to use primarily U.S.-led and resourced efforts or to working in an even split of efforts and resourcing with host countries around the globe is problematic. Using
these approaches will exhaust the U.S. supply of blood, treasure, political will and public support, as well as weaken its international standing. We must strive to maximize the usage of host-country resources to fuel the prevention strategy. The smaller U.S. footprint that results will also yield a more positive world perception of the United States.

**Organize, Train, Equip and Deploy Volckmann Operators to Execute the Solution**

**Role of the numbered SF groups.** During his presidency, John F. Kennedy confronted what he believed to be a multiregion problem by creating the Peace Corps and the U.S. Agency for International Development, as well as expanding the U.S. Army Special Forces and creating the Navy SEALs — all separate and critical tools in a multiregion fight.

While the solution to the anti-AQ multi-region problem obviously involves the comprehensive efforts of the entire combined, joint, interagency, international and private sectors, a detailed discussion of all these areas is beyond the scope of this essay. Just as they were when Kennedy expanded the Green Berets to help wage what he saw as a multiregion fight, the Green Berets of the numbered Special Forces groups are ideally suited and capable of being organized, trained, equipped and deployed so that they can optimally assist host-country militaries, key security agencies and other select host-country units to prevent AQ and its affiliates from establishing (or increasing) footholds in host countries with a minimal U.S. footprint. These members of the Volckmann Program would work “with, through and by” foreign forces.

**Green Beret Volckmann Program.** The proposed Volckmann Program would stress the need for a few Green Berets from each numbered Special Forces group to be thoroughly steeped in select languages and cultures, and would produce Soldiers who are experts in individual countries and select key units (unlike foreign-area officers, who are regional experts) in support of a persistent-presence approach. Volckmann operators would embed in key host-country units using the authorities of the Title X Partnership Exchange Program, or PEP, and while operating as a part of those units would enjoy an insider perspective that would allow them to identify units’ shortfalls in equipment, schooling, training and operational capability. A portion of the Volckmann operator training would include attendance at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management Course, or DISAM, so that the Volckmann operators, with their embedded insights, could correctly identify key host-unit requirements to the U.S. embassy’s security cooperation office, or SCO, for proper attention and fielding. The Volckmann program offers a synergistic approach, using Title XXII security-assistance authorities along with the Title X PEP embed status of the SF Volckmann operators.

It must be clearly understood that to holistically address the special-operations portion of the multiregion insurgency problem would require multiple elements of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and joint SOF elements. To correctly cater to the localized terrain and problem set of each host country requires a joint SOF program, but the design and discussion of the numerous and distinct programs required by each service to bring this joint SOF goal to fruition is simply beyond the scope of this essay. Instead, this essay focuses on the Volckmann Program, which specifically focuses on the Green Berets of the numbered SF groups, who have been designed from their inception to be force multipliers and are therefore a natural fit for this effort.

**Organize, train, equip.** Using one Army SF Soldier to illustrate the Volckmann Program, the Green Beret would serve at least three years on an A-detachment (officers would serve two years on an A-detachment and a third year in another assignment within the SF group). At the end of that three-year apprenticeship in the regionally focused SF group, the Soldier would be eligible to apply for a three-year Volckmann position in his SF group’s area of responsibility, or AOR.

After a Green Beret has been assigned a target country, he and his family (if he has one) attend a one- to two-week course that prepares him for living and working overseas alongside other members of the U.S. embassy’s country team.

At that point, the Soldier and his family could still choose to opt out of the Volckmann Program, or the instructors of the orientation course could recommend his removal. If a Green Beret is approved at the end of the orientation course, he would attend the full-length language-training course for his target language, achieving at least a 2/2/2 language rating. His spouse would also be eligible to attend language training at that time, which would pay enormous dividends for the U.S. as the complete family builds rapport in the target country with repeated tours of duty.

Finally, after graduation from language school, the Soldier would attend the DISAM course, followed by a one- to two-week primer that presents the absolute latest tactics, techniques and procedures, or TTPs, for special-operations forces, or SOF, and counterinsurgency, or COIN, that can be taught to the host-country security forces.5 With those qualifications, he would deploy to his target country with his family (whenever possible) and be administratively assigned to the SCO at the U.S. embassy for a three-year, nonextendable assignment. As a full-fledged, permanent member of the SCO, the Volckmann operator and his family would live in the same type of quarters as other embassy employees. The Volckmann operator’s children would be eligible to attend the same high-quality international schools that children of other U.S. embassy personnel attend. Once the SF Soldier completed the three-year tour at the SCO, he would receive the Volckmann skill identifier and return to his regionally focused SF group or theater special operations command, or TSOC, for another three-year tour of duty.

The Volckmann operator would provide experience and knowledge of the latest COIN and SOF TTPs, coupled with his security assistance DISAM qualification and embed-level understanding of his key host-unit’s security-assistance needs. That powerful combination of attributes would result in the targeted, streamlined and effective usage of the U.S. security-assistance system on behalf of these vital host-country units. Forcing departure and return to the regionally focused SF group after three years in country would keep the individual Soldier current with TTPs, prevent an overly long overseas tour for his family, and bring his wealth of knowledge from the in-country Volckmann tour back to his SF group, where it could be fully leveraged.

After three years back in his SF group or TSOC, the Green Beret would be eligible for a second three-year Volckmann assignment in the same country (not just the same region). The Volckmann operator would have to maintain assignments to the same country if he is to achieve deep relationships, knowledge and expertise. The cycle of
they would build tremendous relationships with the leaders, families and members of the host-country military and security units they worked with. As the Volckmann operators assessed, trained and deployed with the host-country security units, they could add significantly to the anti-AQ proactive prevention strategy with the small U.S. footprint that we desire.

SF NCOs who have completed an initial tour of duty on an A-detachment, as well as SF officers from CW2 to O6, should be encouraged to serve in the Volckmann program. Volckmann service would come at some expense to other SOF headquarters’ staffs, but the forward presence and increased capabilities and effects for the U.S. would be well worth the reduction to other SOF staff headquarters elements.

To establish SF Volckmann PEP participation at all levels in key host units, we would initially fill these positions with senior and junior SF officers and NCOs who have some level of country and language expertise. Eventually, young SF officers working as Volckmann operators would grow into the battalion, group and TSOC commanders of the future. Promotion boards would have to be instructed to promote and select (not inhibit) Volckmann operators for key billets in the SF groups and TSOCs at rates commensurate with their peers. The presence of the Volckmann operators in-country and in the SF groups and TSOCs would provide a quantum leap forward in the fight against AQ.

Volckmann operators would be true force multipliers.

New headquarters not required. The Volckmann program does not require a new headquarters. Volckmann operators would be administratively assigned on permanent change of station, or PCS, orders to the SCOs that exist around the globe (joint U.S. military assistance and advisory groups, military groups, etc.) in target countries. Once Volckmann operators have been assigned to these target-country SCOs, they would be further assigned to Title X PEP embed positions within key host-country security units. There are many countries that would accept and immediately place PEP Volckmann operators of all ranks into their key host-country units.

The U.S. country teams would embrace Volckmann operators because they would not be perceived as “rogue” temporary SOF elements or individuals within the country. Instead, Volckmann operators, as PCS members of SCO and the country team, would avoid any perceived issues with National Security Decision Directive 38, or NSDD 38.

The number and paygrades of Volckmann operators in each country would vary based on an analysis of the country’s key military and security units needed to conduct the anti-AQ fight. In many countries, there would be only a few Volckmann operators. They would train and operate daily with the key host-country units with whom they embedded. Volckmann operators would deploy with their host-country units if the hosts deployed to conduct operations against AQ or its affiliates, either within or outside their country’s borders.

Volckmann operators assigned to embassy SCOs. The U.S. embassies worldwide are the only practical hubs for these prevention efforts. Volckmann operators must join the embassy SCO on a full-time PCS basis, not during episodic SOF engagements in a host country or as temporary embassy squatters. The correct office of assignment for Volckmann operators in this full-time effort would be the SCO rather than the defense-attaché offices, or DAOs. DAOs perform a highly valuable mission with information gathering, but the DAO (and its known status as an information-gatherer), is anathema for Volckmann entrance into U.S. country teams, where building long-term relationships and trust within host units is required. Assigning Volckmann operators within the SCO, where they can immediately use their DISAM training to inject needed security assistance into the critical units in each host country, would also help develop the trust and relationships that we desire with the host country.

The baseline is that Volckmann operators should be assigned in PCS status as overt, nonclandestine, non-attaché, SCO personnel. The Volckmann operators must be fully accepted by the country team and fully accepted as “non-spies” by the host-country units in which they embed.

Where to deploy Volckmann operators. First, we look at the world and define those places where AQ and its affiliates either thrive, could likely thrive or gather key support in the future. Second, we look at countries that would likely volunteer to export their own forces to assist in the anti-AQ fight of a different country (should a selected host-country fight develop into pre-empt or defeat status). The countries identified with these criteria are now “target countries” for the Volckmann Program.

Once target countries have been identified, relevant host-country units will be identified, along with key PEP-embed positions for the Volckmann operators.

“Volckmann operators can serve repeated tours of duty in-country and remain competitive for command-sergeant-major, CW5 or battalion/group/TSOC-command positions.”
Command relationships. Volckmann operators must be PCS-assigned to the U.S. embassy SCOs to avoid all real or perceived NSDD 38 issues and to be fully accepted by all members of the country team.

The SCO chief in each country would have administrative control of the Volckmann operators, and with it the constant visibility of the whereabouts of Volckmann operators and their families. Volckmann operators would constantly interface with the SCO chief as they submit the security-assistance needs of the key host-country units to the SCO. The rating chain and operational control of the Volckmann operators would both run directly from the Volckmann operator to the TSOC. That rating chain would keep the Volckmann operator competitive for promotion, while the line of operational control to the TSOC gives the commander of the geographic combatant command, or GCC, the ability to nest the effects of the Volckmann operators with other tools used by the GCC commander, and allows the TSOC (which is receiving reports from multiple Volckmann operators in multiple target countries) to help network that critical information. Since it takes a network to fight a network, the decentralized network of Volckmann operators would increase with compounded interest the effects the United States desires against AQ.

The TSOC would provide frequent executive summary reports on the plans and actions of Volckmann operators to each respective chief of mission, or COM, thereby ensuring that COMs are fully aware of and comfortable with all Volckmann activities in their country.

In sum, the Volckmann operators’ PCS status would facilitate optimal anti-AQ effects while simultaneously ensuring full COM oversight and country-team acceptance of the Volckmann operators and their families.

How many Volckmann operators are needed? Manning key units in up to 60 host countries with Volckmann operators of all ranks and maintaining a continuous cycle of three years in-country, three years back at the SF group or TSOC, and the Volckmann-operator training pipeline might eventually consume one to two SF battalions’ worth of manpower. We should therefore measure twice and cut once as we prioritize, scale and pace our movement into selected host-unit PEP billets and countries. We must prioritize countries and units and begin manning a few pilot countries with Volckmann operators immediately.

With the nickel-on-the-dollar investment that we make today to establish the network of proactive, preventive, decentralized Volckmann operators in host countries and key units around the globe, we can leverage prevention effects and synergize the capabilities inherent in Title X and Title XXII authorities to facilitate victory in the fight against AQ and its affiliates. We can save large sums of U.S. taxpayer dollars by effectively targeting our security-assistance efforts on relevant host-country units that are key in the anti-AQ fight, and with the help of the PEP-embedded Volckmann operators, scratch the needed security-assistance itch with precision while increasing the operational capability of key anti-AQ host units with the daily training and assistance that only an embed can provide. Our Volckmann operators and families will operate with purity of motive and purity of effort from the SCOs around the globe and will build goodwill internationally for the U.S. If these prevention strategy efforts should fail, the deep relationships, access, knowledge of host-country geography, personalities, and language and cultural understanding harvested by these forward-stationed Volckmann operators will ideally position us for U.S. pre-emption events, or in the worst case, for actions in a large-scale U.S. general-purpose-forces war against AQ and its affiliates.

It is all about relationships. Green Beret Volckmann operators would develop those relationships, and the U.S. would be the ultimate beneficiary for decades to come. With the support of senior leaders in DoD, SOF, the GCCs and the U.S. Army, a quick implementation of the Volckmann Program is possible. The fight is on, and the implementation of the Volckmann Program offers our country a powerful and continuous series of blows to AQ for a minimal price in U.S. blood and treasure. SW

Notes:
2. The correct problem-solving sequence is shown in diagram 1. Often problems are incorrectly addressed by starting analysis with an organization that already exists (step 3), then trying to develop a solution the current organization is capable of executing (step 2). This backward problem-solving process often yields solutions that may or may not have any relation to the actual problem (step 1), thereby yielding disjointed, sub-optimal results. The correct problem solving order shown in diagram 1 will yield better results.
3. The terms “with, through and by” have been codified in order and meaning in the definitive Department of Defense Instruction 5000.68, dated 27 October 2010. Per the new DoD Instruction definition: with, though and by describes the process of interaction with foreign security forces that initially involves training and assisting (interacting “with” the forces). The next step in the process is advising, which may include advising in combat situations (acting “through” the forces). The final phase is achieved when foreign security forces operate independently (act “by” themselves).
4. The models discussed in the article, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling” (Eric P. Wendt, Special Warfare; September 2005; 2-13), should be taught as a part of the final preparation course for Volckmann candidates prior to deployment so that they, in turn, can then teach these models to key leaders in their target countries. Many of the models contained in the article (including Dr. Gordon McCormick’s brilliant diamond model, which has been successfully operationalized since 9/11) were created, developed and continue to be taught by Dr. Gordon McCormick of the Naval Postgraduate School’s SOLIC program (now called the Defense Analysis Program).
5. Some forward-leaning TSOC commanders (SOCCENT and others) have developed TSOC forward, regional SOF C2 nodes within their theaters in addition to single country JSOTFs. When not serving in an in-country three-year Volckmann tour, Volckmann operators will be ideal candidates to serve within these TSOC forward, regional C2 nodes, as well as within JSOTFs located within their target country.
6. Volckmann operators in different units and different countries should be encouraged to communicate directly with each other on a frequent basis (as well to periodically meet face-to-face at selected TSOC sponsored venues) to enhance the networking effects of this concept.

The 21st Century Environment

Unlike the battles of World War II, today’s operational environment power is shifting below and beyond the nation-state. Governments once able to operate with few checks and balances are increasingly expected to be more accountable to sub-state and non-state actors — from mayors of mega-cities and leaders in private industry to a more empowered civil society. They must also contend with citizens enabled by technology. The younger generation has become a majority in many societies, and there exists a growing global middle class with higher expectations for governance and economic opportunity. While largely positive, these trends can foster violent non-state actors and foment instability — especially in fragile states where governance is weak or has broken down — or invite backlash by authoritarian regimes determined to preserve the power of the state.

The Restated Problem

Throughout the world, al-Qaeda and its affiliates are conducting a multi regional insurgency designed to establish the Caliphate. As a measure of their success.

In competition with AQ, another organization called the Islamic State has evolved into a hybrid entity that cannot be defined by our conventional understanding of terrorism and conflict. IS literally presents an enemy, the like of which has never been fought before; an entity that is historically relevant because nothing in its likeness has ever existed and thus presents new challenges and problems. It is a terrorist group that is also a conventional army, which fights in the style of urban guerrilla warfare. Its asymmetrical expertise in recruiting foreign fighters is matched by its expertise in fielding a conventional standing army of trained militants. Despite its lack of statehood, ISIL now controls expansive swathes of territory. This hybrid nature is matched by a post-conflict mastery of the conquered populations under its control. Of notable concern is the organization’s ability to quickly and brutally bring order and stability and political functionality to the towns and cities captured. Finally, a commonality between both organizations is their appeal to the younger generation in many societies, providing the ability to recruit from the mass because of the call to jihad and a growing rift in global middle class with higher expectations for governance and economic opportunity that cannot be fulfilled.

The United States does not have the capability, measured in either blood or dollars, to lead a fight throughout multiple regions of the world against AQ and IS. If we attempt to conduct the large number of U.S. unilateral operations needed to defeat both AQ and IS assaults, the United States along with its partners quickly play into their hands, exhausting ourselves and, in the process, negatively affecting long-term, global perceptions. There
are numerous lessons learned that demonstrate this from both Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. The United States has the potential to further develop existing capabilities and introduce innovative capabilities into the environment that no other state or group in the world has, and that is why we must lead the effort to counter violent extremist organizations like AQ and IS that present us with these complex challenges.

The Solution

While these challenges are new, there have been solutions recommended in the past that were not fully realized that may have been ahead of their time. Once such initiative proposed by then-Col. Eric Wendt, suggested looking at the success of U.S. embedded Soldiers and officers to create a network of U.S.-aligned partner nations and create a global network in close relationship with them.

Is this initiative still valid? Now almost four and half years later as the Commanding General, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Maj. Gen. Wendt revitalized this concept. The idea is to implement the Volckmann Operator initiative to assist host-country forces in mitigating and preventing internal destabilization, while operating in support of U.S. goals by embedding U.S. military personnel with host-nation units in an advise and assist capacity. Framing the initiative at that strategic level, the Volckmann operator is ideal for shaping operations (Phase Zero) during any type of campaign or operation. This initiative provides engagement agility and increases interoperability and combat power within the human domain. Therefore, the Volckmann operator is a deterrence tool that decreases populace support to threat groups and host-nation and U.S. blood and treasure.

Army Special Operations Forces are focused on geographical regions; the Volckmann Operator Program focuses selected individuals on a single country with persistent engagements. These individuals will work in conjunction with the theater special operations commands and remain focused on the same countries throughout their careers, progressing within their host-nation’s SOF structure as they are promoted in the U.S. Army system.

Volckmann Operator Requirements and Duties

The Volckmann operator is an overt single-country expert with 2/2-speak/listen language rating. He or she is the primary TSOC point of contact in the country, creating and maintaining enduring relationships that contribute to the Global SOF Network supporting a globally responsive and regionally engaged Army.
and synchronizing with the National Security Strategy. Selected Volckmann operators will have language and cultural skills, along with individual country and select partner-nation unit expertise, differentiating them from the foreign-area officer community. Additionally, Volckmann operators will embed in key host-country units using the existing authorities of the Title X Partnership Exchange Program, and while operating as a part of those units would enjoy a unique perspective, which will assist them in the identification of the individual unit’s shortfalls in equipment, schooling, training and operational capability. The end state of the Volckmann program is the creation of a synergistic approach; leveraging Title XXII security assistance authorities along with the Title X PEP embed status of the SF Volckmann operators.

**Volckmann Operator Training**

Training includes attendance at applicable Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management courses. As a result, Volckmann operators are equipped to identify key host-unit requirements to the U.S. Embassy’s security cooperation office for proper attention, processing under Foreign Military Financing or Foreign Military Funding Sales programs and fielding, if approved. If potential positions appropriate to their rank. The Volckmann Program allows all Professional Military Education to occur on schedule.

As of the date of this article, TSOCs are coordinating with applicable U.S. Embassy and partner-nation armed forces to gain concurrence and determine unit and position placement. Each TSOC has the USD-P template for the memorandum of understanding to establish or modify a U.S. Army Military Personnel Exchange Program. Concurrently, with confirmation of the partner-nation unit, USAJFKSWCS will submit official requests to establish or modify the MPEPs to the Headquarters, Department of Army G-3/5/7 MPEP Manager.

**The Pilot Phase**

By the time this magazine is on the stands, there will be several Volckmann operators in place as part of a pilot phase being implemented by the USAJFKSWCS Commander’s Initiative Group to test the initiative. The pilot phase targets three countries where the Volckmann Operators will embed as operations officers in select host-nation special operations units in Italy, Colombia and Korea. The Volckmann Operators will embed using the MPEP and MOA mechanisms discussed earlier.

“**The pilot phase targets four countries where the Volckmann Operators will embed as operations officers in select host nation special operations units in Italy, Colombia and Korea.”**

Volckmann operator candidates are identified earlier on in their military careers, there exists the potential for additional language training to take place at the Defense Language Institute; increasing language ratings to 3/3, which includes reading comprehension.

Volckmann operators will PCS to the country of assignment with dependents (if applicable) on assignment to the partner-nation unit in an equivalent key-developmental position. Volckmann operators will serve tours under the administrative control of the U.S. Embassy Security Cooperation Offices (or equivalent) and OPCON to the respective TSOCs.

Using an Army SF officer to illustrate the Volckmann Program, the selected officer would serve at least three years on a Special Forces A-detachment (officers would serve two years on an A-detachment and a third year in another assignment within the SF group). At the end of that three-year apprenticeship in the regionally focused SF group, the Soldier would be eligible to apply for a three-year Volckmann position in the SF group’s area of responsibility within a country chosen by the TSOC. After selection, the individual would serve an initial tour with the partner unit, return to the parent SF group and after three years return to the partner-nation unit to serve in an additional equivalent key-developmental position.

Between tours to their partner unit, the Volckmann can PCS to a TSOC, 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) (Provisional), U.S. Army Special Operations Command, USSOCOM or other commands that can use their country expertise and have available

Individuals have already been identified, interviewed and selected against the requirements. Special Forces officers bearing the ranks of captain and major comprise the Colombian and Korean Volckmann Operators while the Italian Volckmann Operator is a Psychological Operations officer. These individuals will serve in assignments with U.S. Army equivalent duty title of operations officers. As a part of the pilot, all the Volckmann Operators will attend the Defense Institute of Security Management course as part of the criteria to be awarded the Personnel Development Skill Identifier. The USAJFKSWCS Commander’s Initiative Group will carefully monitor and assess the pilot to keep it on track and to capture lessons learned, best practices and obstacles that need to be addressed prior to the Volckmann Operator initiative becoming a program of record.

Secondly, the pilot will test that Volckmann Operator actually meets its designed purpose, which is it assists host-country security forces to mitigate and prevent internal destabilization and support U.S. Government goals in a country or region by providing consistent and dedicated U.S. military personnel as embeds in host-nation units who advise and assist. Metrics are measured and captured in the identification of the host units’ shortfalls in equipment, schooling, training and operational capability. Finally, there is a consensus that the Volckmann Operator is seen as part of an overall solution set that demonstrates engagement through interoperability and interdependence.
Way Ahead

In order for the Volckmann Operator Initiative to become a successful program of record, administrative requirements need to address professional development models that capture the initiative as “most-qualified” key developmental assignments, address criteria for awarding Personnel Development Skill Identifiers and board guidance to mitigate risk to participating service members’ careers and ensuring they remain competitive for promotion, and facilitate talent management. Once Department of the Army G1 approves the PDSI request for the Volckmann Operator, the revisions to DA Pam 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management and DA Pam 600-25, U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide will be published by Department of the Army and Strategic Communication informing the force and leadership dispersed.

The USAJFKSWCS Army Special Operations Forces Human Resources Directorate, in cooperation with the USAJFKSWCS Commander’s Initiative Group, requested establishment of a Personnel Development Skill Identifier for Volckmann Operators. Once approved, an announcement will occur through a Notification of Future Change to Army-wide Force Managers and Department of the Army, G1 will top-load the PDSIs as well as update the PDSI roster in DA Pam 611-21, Military Occupational Classification Structure. Volckmann Operators are eligible to apply for PDSI after 12 months of serving in their respective assignments. The award criteria for the Volckmann Operator PDSI: 2/2 foreign language proficiency rating (cannot be waived), completed a designated Defense Institute of Security Management course and have served an approved tour of duty embedded (non-liaison officer) in a foreign special operations forces unit. Upon Commanding General, USAJFKSWCS approval, ARSOF Human Resources will provide the service member’s name to DA G1 to top-load the PDSI designator into the candidate’s record.

Concurrent to execution of the pilot individuals’ emplacement the Volckmann initiative is also being submitted into the USASOC Strategic Planning Process at the Capability Analysis & Solution Identification step. When executed the initiative will address capability gaps identified by USASOC and the operational force and once approved in the SPP it will be included in the USASOC Guidance for Development of the Force. Volckmann will continue in the SPP to the Resourcing & Integration step, culminating in the Program Objectives Memorandum cycle for FY18-22, as a program of record and capability for the ARSOF Operational Force and TSOCs. Simultaneously, the Volckmann initiative is being presented as a topic during the 2015 U.S. Army – U.S. Special Operations Command talks for further discussion and implementation.

CW 4 Maurice Duclos is a Special Forces warrant officer who is assigned to 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), formerly assigned to the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School’s Commander’s Initiative Group. CW 3 Ronald Dempsey is a Special Forces warrant officer who is assigned to the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School’s Commander’s Initiative Group.

Notes:

2. Each of these acronyms (AQI, ISI, ISIL, IS) is used consciously by the authors of the multiple reports, executive summaries, and research journals depending on the time period in which they are discussing the organization. The use of the term “Islamic State” has been avoided by many for being seen as empowering the organization by legitimizing its expansion. The purpose in restating the problem is not to legitimize the organization or its expansion, but to use one acronym versus the many variants being used to identify the group. Whether the acronym is ISI or ISIL or IS (all of which refer to something of “state-ness”), the name used does not elevate the organization to that of a legitimate state.
5. The three-phase construct presented is a historical representation of how insurgencies mature based on the Chinese communist model as articulated by Mao. From the perspective of the insurgent, Mao referred to the three phases as “Strategic Defensive,” “Strategic Stalemate” and “Strategic Offensive.” Respectively, current doctrine refers to the phases as “Latent or Incipient,” “Guerrilla Warfare” and “War of Movement.” Refer to Army Techniques Publication 3-05.1, Chapter 2, Unconventional Warfare for more information.
6. For more information on the specific Army military personnel exchange program (MPEP), refer to Army Regulation 614-10, Assignments, Details, and Transfers Army Military Personnel Exchange Program with Military Services of Other Nations. This regulation sets policies, procedures, and responsibilities for conducting the Army military personnel exchange program.
7. For more information on the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) use the URL listed: http://www.disam.dsca.mil.
Let's pose a hypothetical situation: You own and operate a business (Company A) that focuses on assisting others to become stable and prosperous as well as protecting your own interests. You also invest in Company B, and have done so for more than 70 years. Company B’s goals and objectives are very similar to yours and your investments average approximately a quarter of Company B’s annual budget. As you continue to operate Company A, operating costs have continued to increase as you seek to expand your efforts. How will you be able to continue to expand to achieve your goals with dwindling resources? Conversely, an opportunity exists within Company B that allows portions of your employees to work there, as it outsources its labor to other investors. Your employees would work for Company B on a temporary basis and continue to answer, to some extent, to you. Additionally, their associated costs would be paid for from the Company B consolidated budget. Other investors routinely take advantage of these incentives, while you have not fully committed. Does this seem like a plausible business model: Taking advantage of opportunities within Company B to continue your work while maximizing your own resources. For the United States, a similar situation has existed since 1942, when the United Nations was established.

In an effort to expand the Global Landpower Network, build partner capacity and meet the guidance provided by the President of the United States in The 2015 Nation Security Strategy to expand our interactions with the UN, the U.S. Army and the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the U.S. Army’s Special Operations Center of Excellence, has developed a concept for the formation, training and deployment of special operations forces and conventional forces U.S. Army teams (Roosevelt Teams) to support ongoing and planned UN missions around the globe. This initiative directly supports President Barack Obama’s guidance of expanding the scope of U.S. cooperation and building capacity to prevent conflict; as well as the U.S. Special Operations Command’s Line of Operations 2: Develop a Global SOF Network and the U.S. Army Strategic Priority of a Globally Responsive and Regionally Engaged Army.

This initiative, dubbed Roosevelt Teams pays homage to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s efforts to establish an international organization aimed at promoting peace and international cooperation. During the Second World War, President Roosevelt began discussions on the development of a new international body as a successor to the failed League of Nations. The League of Nations was formed after World War I in an attempt to establish an international body that would protect and enforce peace. Unfortunately, the United States did not become a member of this organization, as many feared that U.S. involvement would reduce the country’s ability to protect its own interests, ultimately resulting in the organization’s failure. Applying the failures of the League of Nations, Roosevelt championed a concept for an international body and as a result of his efforts, the UN was established on Oct. 24, 1945. At its inception, 50 countries were initial members states, with 193 current member countries within the organization.

Within the UN’s six principle offices, the UN Security Council, established in 1946, is charged with the establishment and maintenance of UN resolutions pertaining to peace and security. A UN resolution is a formal agreement that is adopted or ratified by the majority of the 15 members of the council. From a resolution, a mandate or mandates are developed to provide the legal basis for execution of peacekeeping operations. UN peacekeeping missions are managed within the Security Council by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, with missions that include disarmament, mine action, security sector reform and protection and promotion of human rights. Development of the personnel and equipment requirements are conducted through Military Planning and Force Generation Services within the UNSC. The requirements for each mission are fulfilled by the UN member countries through the contributions of personnel and other resources. For the United States if a requirement is requested or under consideration, it is reviewed and approved through the Department of State and National Security Council. If a requirement is approved for military assistance, orders are generated by the Secretary of Defense to the respective services.

Currently more than 120,000 UN peacekeepers are deployed to 15 countries on four different continents supporting and executing operations. In 2014, the U.S. contributed approximately 28 percent of the overall $7 billion FY14 UN peacekeeping budget. Of that support, a small number of U.S. individual augmentees are deployed in support of peacekeeping missions. Conversely, countries such as Bangladesh, India and Pakistan make up the largest contributors of uniformed service members supporting peacekeeping missions. The U.S. played an active role on the ground in the post-Cold War UN peacekeeping missions of the early 1990s.

In 2006, a Government Accountability Office study concluded that UN peacekeeping missions are eight times less expensive than funding unilateral U.S. forces. Furthermore, the Office of Management and Budget gave the U.S. contributions to UN
peacekeeping its highest standing under the OMB Program Assessment Rating Tool. Finally, another study found that in the first three years after a conflict, UN peacekeeping missions have a substantial affect on a country’s gross domestic product, with annual growth rates nearly 2.4 percent higher in post-conflict countries where peacekeeping missions are present as opposed to those where they are not. Therefore, support to UN peacekeeping missions is both economical as well as facilitates long-term stability.

To assist with approved DoD support to UN missions, the U.S. Military Observer Group–Washington exists within the Headquarters, Department of the Army G3/5/7 offices. The Secretary of Defense established the USMOG-W in October 1993 to serve as the command and control node for all DoD personnel deployed in support of UN missions. The USMOG-W also conducts command assessments of ongoing UN missions and executes staff agent responsibilities for Headquarters, Department of the Army concerning multinational force and observers in the Sinai.

The Roosevelt Team initiative will take advantage of multinational opportunities to deploy small DoD teams as part of UN peacekeeping missions. Roosevelt Teams are scalable, with the initial concept of 13 uniformed personnel. The teams will provide expanded planning support, command and control, logistical and civil support to UN missions. Other skills sets the teams are equipped with include joint fires observer capabilities as well as expanded counter-improved explosive device training and resources. The teams will include select service members from within the conventional forces and/or members of the special operations community (see Figure 1). Members of the team will be trained and equipped to operate within a multinational environment, equipped with critical language and cultural skills as well as trained to support humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Finally, these teams will be fully funded through the DPKO, as traditional “blue hats” and deploy from their units/organizations on a rotational basis to provide the commander of the UN mission with continuity and a greater capability, but moreover provide senior U.S. leadership with subject-matter experts for a country or region.

The end state of the Roosevelt Teams is to be persistent engagement forces that are able to rapidly and effectively advise, assist in support of U.S. strategic goals and objectives.

Personnel supporting UN missions. The USMOG-W is charged with the training, equipping, deployment and redeployment of all DoD personnel as well as serving as the operational controlling headquarters for DoD personnel deployed in support of UN missions. The USMOG-W also conducts command assessments of ongoing UN missions and executes staff agent responsibilities for Headquarters, Department of the Army concerning multinational force and observers in the Sinai.

A suitable mission for a Roosevelt Team was proposed by the Republic of Korea in a request to the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. In the winter of 2015, the Republic of Korea requested that a U.S. Army Special Operations Forces be embedded with one of its Korean Special Operations Forces elements scheduled to deploy in support of the UN mission to South Sudan in the first or second quarter of 2016. The SOCKOR commanding general has concurred with this request. USAJFKSWCS along with the USMOG-W and other U.S. special operations elements are working to develop the concept for the sourcing of the mission, conducting permission training at the UN training base in Korea and the associated administrative, operational and logistical requirements to support the Republic of Korea’s request.

SOCKOR continues to work with their counterparts in the Republic of Korea SOF to finalize coordination for ARSOF support to the ROK and their UN Missions.

They are also in contact with G3 SOD and a DASD point of contact for Peacekeeping Operations to facilitate final staffing for a pilot team. The SOCKOR COA is for two-to-four ARSOF personnel and a JIEDDO rep, which may lead to the catalyst for employment, in the form of possible CIED training in-country for/with the ROK SOF.

The Roosevelt Initiative is concurrently being submitted into the U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s Strategic Planning Process at the Capability Analysis & Solution Identification step. When executed, the initiative will address capability gaps identified by USASOC and the operational force and once approved in the SPP, it will be included in the USASOC Guidance for Development of the Force. Roosevelt will continue in the SPP to the Resourcing & Integration step, culminating in the Program Objectives Memorandum cycle for FY18-22, as a program of record and capability for the ARSOF Operational Force.

Additionally, the USAJFKSWCS is coordinating with the various TRADOC Centers of Excellence and other commands to assist with the expanded development of the Roosevelt concept; specifically the integration of this concept into the Regionally Aligned Force structure. For development of the Roosevelt construct within TRADOC RAF formations, the recommendation of three teams of 16 personnel has been made. This proposed force composition would facilitate optimally trained and deployable RAF forces, readily able to support ongoing UN missions within their regions and further expand the U.S. Army’s Global Landpower Network. The USAJFKSWCS recommends the rapid development of this concept for initial employment of RAF Roosevelt teams in the first quarter of FY 2016.

The ability to leverage opportunities to either establish or maintain relationships
as well as access and placement in strategic locations throughout the globe is a critical component of U.S. strategic objectives abroad. The concept is echoed throughout multiple U.S. agencies, national-level reports and guidance documents. The 2015 National Security Strategy states, “We will continuously expand the scope of cooperation to encompass other state partners, non-state and private actors and international institutions — particularly the UN.” Expansion of U.S. participation in multinational peacekeeping efforts is at the very core of the Roosevelt initiative.

The United States has invested in the UN, both intellectually and financially for more than 70 years. In a time of diminishing and/or constrained resources, it only makes sense to leverage our long-term investments to promote working alongside our current and/or future partners, while assisting to expand the United States’ ability to establish, increase or maintain stability and promote prosperity throughout the globe. President Roosevelt believed in the development of an international body to promote peace and international cooperation. Subsequent U.S. Presidents have also believed and supported this idea. For the United States, the future is uncertain, leveraging our relationships and investments to better protect our own interests only makes sense, as President Roosevelt once said, “The only limit to our realization of tomorrow will be our doubts of today.”

Maj. Aaron Southard is a Psychological Operations officer who is assigned to the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School’s Commander’s Initiative Group.

Notes


6. Ibid


**Introduction**

John Foster Dulles, U.S. Secretary of State from 1953-59, said, “There are plenty of problems in the world, many of them interconnected.” He went on to talk of an existential threat, in the context of the Cold War. Today most people would not see the threat of Communism, but would readily agree with the interconnected nature of problems. Jared Diamond, in his research of interconnectedness in anthropology wrote in *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed*, “Any society in turmoil today, no matter how remote...can cause trouble for prosperous societies on other continents and is also subject to their influence (whether helpful or destabilizing). But we also are the first to enjoy the opportunity of learning quickly from developments in societies anywhere else in the world today, and from what has unfolded in societies at any time in the past.”

In lieu of an existential threat, he saw a global decline. Despite this difference of potential outcomes the thread between the two quotes, taken as representatives of their times, is the idea of common threats made possible by interconnectedness, noted by both Dulles in the Cold War and when Diamond’s book was published in 2005. A cursory review of 2015’s contingencies, crisis and current events certainly upholds the idea that the globe is interconnected and actions in one country, region or province do affect the situation in other areas.

For the U.S. Special Operations Forces community foreign internal defense, building partnership capacity and security force assistance and the concept of ‘with, through and by’ address the concept of interconnectedness. We conduct these activities so a foreign soldier can accomplish a new task or do an old one better; collectively these activities train foreign security forces that have some affect on the associated populace and the region. The regional effects can be enhanced by working with regional neighbors that share aspects of language, culture and general situation. In light of the last decade of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in the assessment of current crises, U.S. SOF should train and educate with the intent that their current foreign training partner will have some level of interoperability with U.S. forces, so that when the time comes that they are a foreign operational partner, the startup cost associated with a crisis are not as severe.

**The Initiative**

The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School created and facilitated the Global SOF Training, Education and Doctrine Community of Interest, seeking to create a network of units and military personnel that are involved in SOF training, education and doctrine. This network has two main lines of effort: quarterly VTCs among global SOF special warfare centers and schools and the exchange of instructors between foreign SOF schools and the USAJFKSWCS.

The Global SOF Training, Education and Doctrine initiative is being submitted into the U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s Strategic Planning Process at the Capability Analysis & Solution Identification step. The initiative already addresses capability gaps identified by USASOC and the operational force and once approved in the SPP, will be included in the USASOC Guidance for Development of the Force.

The Global SOF TED will continue in the SPP to the Resourcing & Integration step, culminating in the Program Objectives Memorandum cycle for FY18-22, as a program of record and capability gain for

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**TAKING SOF GLOBAL:**

**THE GLOBAL SOF TRAINING, EDUCATION AND DOCTRINE COMMUNITY OF INTEREST**

**BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL LEE BRIAN**

**INTERCONNECTED** The Global SOF Training, Education and Doctrine Community of Interest initiative seeks to create a network of SOF units and personnel through the use of technology and exchange of instructors between foreign SOF schools and the USAJFKSWCS.
the ARSOF operational force and the U.S. Special Operations Command.

**Quarterly VTCs**

The Quarterly VTCs are key to the exchange of best practices, standard operating procedures and initiatives; collaborate on SOF training that enhances partnerships and capacity in SOF employment; and to deep dive into operational problems and success that SOF are having around the world.

The inaugural Global Training, Education and Doctrine Community of Interest event on Jan. 26 was attended by 45 nations from six continents, and four multinational training centers, making it the largest collection of nations focused on SOF training, education and doctrine. This level of interest serves to stress the importance of collaboration in enabling operational interoperability. The connectivity this event yielded also facilitated informal relationships that will help nations access effective SOF training options regionally and around the globe. Thailand, South Korea, the International Special Training Center, a Norwegian SOF representative and the USAJFKSWCS briefed topics that represent best practices for SOF training in their schoolhouses.

The Royal Thai Army’s Special Warfare Command briefed a challenge that faces all of our forces. The operational force interacts with multinational forces on deployments and may have the lead on operations at home; therefore they have the most up to date tactics, techniques and procedures and firsthand access to other nation’s doctrine and their forces to discuss it. In turn, SOF schoolhouses and training elements are responsible for meeting operational force requirements by training new SOF soldiers. Often it is a challenge for the schoolhouse to stay current and synchronized so it can operate from the same TTP and doctrinal base.

The Thai Special Warfare Command intends to address this with a combination of long-term training plans, integration of lessons learned, instructor training and TTP synchronization. It noted another venue to improve both internal; and external interconnectedness — joint combined exercises.

The Cobra Gold Exercise is seen by the Royal Thai Army’s Special Warfare Command as a valuable source of interoperability opportunities, gaining new TTPs and experiencing the nuances of multi-national command and control. Cobra Gold and other joint combined exercises are held around the globe each year, as well as more local, bilateral events, all of which offer opportunities for observation and participation. These events assist SOF schools in remaining synchronized with their operational force and enable the operational force improving its interoperability.

The International Special Training Center in Pfullendorf, Germany, briefed its model of “Bridging the Gap” — building interoperability between SOF allies and partners to standardize skill sets. The nine charter nations formed a partnership with equal ownership, increasing interoperability, standardization and cost savings to the nations. ISTC is an excellent example of a brick-and-mortar solution that provides multi-national interconnectedness to generate efficiencies and interoperability. In 2014, the center worked with 27 nations offering the following courses: NATO Special Operations Combat Medic Course, Desert Sniper Course (North Africa operations), Urban Sniper Course, Military Assistance Course (core task as outlined by NATO Headquarters) and a Conduct After Capture Symposium. These courses are attended by soldiers from the nine nations and are available to students, cadre and operational units from any nation.

Norway briefed its Desert Sniper Course (Pilot) concept, the requirement was proposed to ISTC member nations during the 2014 ISTC Sniper Symposium. At the symposium, 11 nations discussed future requirements for NATO Sniper training and operations in environments, such as Afghanistan and North Africa. A combined solution was found, which reduced the cost and resources that would be expended by each nation if it conducted the training unilaterally. The combined solution also offered use of appropriate terrain by conducting the course in Alicante, Spain. This also provides Spain increased access to NATO SOF Allies and cross-level instructor knowledge. Overall, utilizing instructors from multiple nations, with a multi-nation student base, encourages sharing of operational tactics, techniques and procedures and standard operating procedures. In 2015, ISTC will validate the Desert Sniper Course and continue to host professional symposiums with sniper subject-matter experts across the SOF Community of Interest.

Joint Fires Observer course development and implementation was briefed from both Korean and U.S. perspectives. Korea’s Special Warfare Command and the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School talked about their progress implementing the internationally accredited training. Joint Fires Observer provides the ability to employ fires from air, sea and land platforms in support of lethal actions during both offensive and defensive operations, and is the maneuver commander’s entry point into the close-air support lethal kill chain. The Joint Fires Observer also assists with the timely planning, synchronization and responsive execution of joint fires and effects. JFO training requirements are coordinated with the international community and the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill, Okla. The program was developed in accordance with an established memorandum of agreement to ensure standardization and interoperability between U.S. services and multiple partner nations. After the Jan. 26 Global SOF TED VTC, multiple nations expressed interest in the JFO program. This is just one example of how a multi-national approach can address complications and expenses of SOF training and capability development.

The Republic of Korea’s Special Warfare Command, Special Warfare Training Group also briefed its requirement for winter warfare/mountaineering capabilities. The ROK Special Warfare Training Group identified a plan to enhance the capability of mountaineering skills and tactical skiing operations while conducting special operations in mountainous Korean terrain and under

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**24 Special Warfare**
extreme weather conditions. The training center will increase instructor capability by conducting combined unilateral and bilateral Winter Warfare/Mountaineering training with partner SOF and is seeking increased connections to international SOF elements that have similar requirements.

As the force whose raison d’etre is ‘with, through, and by’ a foreign partner, it is critical for U.S. SOF to have those partners intimately involved in training future SOF Soldiers. The USAJFKSWCS has acknowledged this criticality and is actively seeking foreign SOF personnel to instruct, in various positions, within its courses. From an efficacy viewpoint, who better to teach the AK-47 weapons system than a foreign military NCO who has one as his primary weapon? From a cultural viewpoint, who better to advise U.S. SOF’s future advisers on interaction, dos/don’ts and other techniques than a native who understands their own culture and general military culture?

As an example of international SOF training from the U.S. Government lens of the International Military Education and Training program, the United States Government spent an estimated $100M on IMET in FY14. One hundred and thirty-seven countries received support to send military personnel to U.S. military courses. The USAJFKSWCS trained soldiers from 21 countries in FY14. Of the $100M an estimated $13M went to African nations, for the same period the USAJFKSWCS received an average of one to two African students every other qualification course. Conversely financially well off countries are well represented in USAJFKSWCS courses.

Heavily represented countries are often the most common partner nations that U.S. SOF works with during international responses to contingencies and crises. As an example, the nations who contributed forces to ISAF also have routinely significant numbers of soldiers in USAJFKSWCS courses. Having these nations also help train future U.S. SOF benefits both sides. Newly minted U.S. SOF enter the force already having interacted with foreign instructors, and likewise for the foreign instructors returning to their nations. These instructors have first-hand knowledge of U.S. military TTPs, doctrine, task organization and capabilities. They can effectively transfer this knowledge to their home nation based on their experience instructing. Additionally, this complements existing theater security cooperation plans that drive the need for interoperability and interconnectedness.

Foreign instructors at the USAJFKSWCS from less well represented countries serve as a training multiplier. While a nation may not be able to send a large number of students, having an instructor at a course enables the same transference of TTPs and doctrine, as well as first-hand familiarity with training methodologies and processes. Connecting these instructors with U.S. SOF conducting TSCP events can also mitigate the limited number of students. Regardless of the nation, foreign SOF instructors can also help focus IMET for their nation’s SOF. In conjunction with the U.S. Theater Special Operations Commands a plan for more effective numbers of students and course selection can also be developed.

Conclusion

In his book, The World is Flat, Thomas Friedman wrote, “By ‘flat’ I did not mean that the world is getting equal. I said that more people in more places can now compete, connect and collaborate with equal power and equal tools than ever before. That’s why an Indian in Bangalore can take care of the office work of American doctors or read the X-rays of German hospitals”.

The U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School seeks to “connect and collaborate” with foreign SOF partners so that where Friedman writes of one foreign national reading x-rays from another nation we can say one nation’s SOF improved its unit’s jungle skills at another nation’s school because they were connected through the Global SOF Training, Education and Doctrine Community of Interest. That bidirectional multilateral connections were, and are, being made to improve SOF capacity globally and decrease the startup capital needed when two or more nations work together in a contingency of crisis environment. Combined SOF responses are more effective because of shared TTPs, doctrine and training enabled by the exchange of instructors. In a world that is continually seeking ways to address contingencies it is certain that some of the responses will be military forces, whether it be in combat or a humanitarian mission, and the forces of choice are often SOF.

Post Script

Separate articles in this issue cover the Volckmann Operators and the Powell Initiative, the former embedding ARSOF personnel in foreign militaries, the latter embedding them in the interagency. Collectively, Volckmann and Powell, in conjunction with the information flow and connectivity of the Global SOF Training, Education and Doctrine Community of Interest, offers a powerful synergy to increase interconnectedness and thereby generate effective response options for the U.S. and our partner nations. The second Global VTC was held on April 14 and SOF from 74 countries on six continents participated. The next VTC is July 23.

Lt. Col Lee Brian is a Special Forces officer who is assigned as the Chief of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School’s Commander’s Initiative Group.

Notes:

The United States has actively assisted our allies and partner nations throughout the globe as early as the 1940s. Conducting or supporting security cooperation efforts from direct military assistance in the form of training and education to sales of equipment and establishment of financial programs to assist in the procurement of materials, the United States has developed and continues to expand and solidify a global network of partners and allies. The United States Army has been a critical component of this effort. The Army serves as the largest force within the Department of Defense to establish and maintain global land power networks. Within the DoD the execution of security-force assistance operations is a supportive effort for ongoing strategic security cooperation efforts. For the DoD and the U.S. Army, continued support for security-force assistance operations is critical to maintaining partner capabilities and networks to defeat or deter threats around the globe.

The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the Army's Special Operations Center of Excellence, is developing a concept and methodology to collect, collate, analyze and quantify SFA operations in order to better educate and inform senior military and civilian leadership as to the value and necessity for continued resources and support. This supports The 2015 National Security Strategy guidance to be “innovative and judicious in the usage of national resources.” This initiative also supports the United States Special Operations Command’s Lines of Operations 2.4: Align Enterprise to Support the Network and 4.1: Balance and Focus Resourcing and 4.3: Achieve Audibility as well as the U.S. Army Strategic Priority: A Globally Responsive and Regionally Engaged Army.

For the purposes of this article, a clear definition of both security cooperation and security-force assistance operations will need to be established.

**Security cooperation** is all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, while providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation (JP 3-22). Security cooperation includes all security assistance programs administered by the Department of Defense that build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests. Security assistance programs include all international armament cooperation activities and other security assistance activities.

Support to security cooperation is further delineated to security force assistance and is defined as:

**Security Force Assistance** is the Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the United States Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (JP 3-22). Consistent with DoD policy for security force assistance (known as SFA), the Army develops, maintains and institutionalizes the capabilities of its personnel to support DoD efforts to organize, train, equip and advise foreign security forces and relevant supporting institutions. Security forces are duly constituted military, paramilitary,
common security challenges. The 2015 National Security Strategy identifies support to allies and partners and cooperate with others to address globally, in order to preserve regional stability, deter adversaries, partner and allies as one of its three strategic pillars: “build security

At the national levels, support to partners and allies is a recurring theme within multiple strategic guidance documents. For instance, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review identifies support to partner and allies as one of its three strategic pillars: “build security globally, in order to preserve regional stability, deter adversaries, support allies and partners and cooperate with others to address common security challenges.” The 2015 National Security Strategy also identifies security cooperation efforts as a critical component to global stability and defense of U.S. interests, to “build the capacity of our partners to join with us in meeting security challenges.” For the United States, ensuring partners are capable to defeat or deter aggression and provide security promotes stability and prosperity throughout the globe. For the Department of Defense, “Building partnership capacity elsewhere in the world also remains important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. Across the globe we will seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations.”

In FY14, more than $5.6 billion was allocated by the United States Government for the execution of security-assistance and security-
cooperation operations throughout the world. These efforts were conducted to increase partner-nation security force capabilities and capacities to conduct stability operations, humanitarian assistance and maritime security operations in order to protect civilians, infrastructure and deter or defeat internal and external threats. For continued support to DoD SFA activities, senior U.S. officials and leaders must be able to rapidly understand the value and grasp the importance of continued support.

In an effort to standardize SC/SFA reporting, the DoD recently transitioned its reporting to a Defense Security Cooperation Agency managed database, the Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information Systems. This database was developed to ensure all components of the DoD captured SC/SFA activities within respective combatant command theater security cooperation plans into a consolidated system to ensure continuity, uniformity and moreover provide senior leaders with a global picture of DoD SC/SFA activities. The G-TSCMIS was fielded in 2014, and COCOMs have begun to transition and input SC/SFA data into this database. But, populating this database will take time and effort on everyone’s part to ensure accurate information is captured.

With the end result being data and information that clearly articulates the savings in U.S. personnel (blood) and resources (treasure) gained by continued support for increasing our allies and partner-nation capacity, vice unilateral U.S. DoD operations and activities.”

Currently, the G-TSCMIS does not yet have the ability to quantify and moreover analyze DoD SC/SFA activities. As such, a standardized methodology for analyzing SC/SFA activities does not exist within the DoD. Multiple organizations and commands have developed independent analytical tools and constructs in an attempt to quantify and manage their SC/SFA activities. The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School SFA Metrics initiative creates a simple and sustainable methodology for DoD entities, staffs and senior leaders to collect, analyze and report the benefits and effects of SC/SFA activities. This methodology conceptually compares data sets along the following major categories (1) U.S. actions and investment, (2) partner-nation actions and investments; and (3) changes to a country’s social, economic and security environment (see Figure 1).

With the end result being data and information that clearly articulates the savings in U.S. personnel (blood) and resources (treasure) gained by continued support for increasing our allies and partner-nation capacity, vice unilateral U.S. DoD operations and activities.

USAJKFSWCS will continue its work with representatives from multiple analytical, academic, theoretical and SC/SFA management agencies to refine the initial data points. To support the collection and management of the data, reporting agencies, organizations and other JIIM information streams are being identified. Next, various existing and/or new metrics tools will be tested to validate data points. Finally, the automated or web based SFA metrics tool will be presented to senior leaders for review and consideration. The finalized tool will be capable of generating outputs, containing information arrayed amongst three different levels of descriptive reports. The construct, in part or in total, must be adopted and implemented throughout the greater DoD enterprise to effectively highlight the value of continued U.S. investments in SFA and the commensurate reduction in required U.S. blood and treasure.

The SFA Metrics construct received its final review within the USAJFJKSWCS in April, and was disseminated as an easy to fill out spreadsheet to the TSOCs, U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Army Africa Command in May for initial usage. Concurrently, work continues with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to determine how it will be incorporated into the Global-Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System, currently in use by Combatant Commands, DoD services and USG agencies. The end state of this construct will be to plug into existing constructs, vice replace them, in order to provide a product to convey the value of Theater Security Cooperation Plans and SFA activities to senior military and civilian leadership.

The SFA Metrics initiative is also being submitted into the U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s Strategic Planning Process at the Capability Analysis & Solution Identification step. When executed, the initiative will address capability gaps identified by USASOC and the operational force and once approved, will be included in the USASOC Guidance for Development of the Force. The metrics will continue in the SPP to the Resourcing & Integration step, culminating in the Program Objectives Memorandum cycle for FY18-22, as a program of record and capability for the ARSOF operational force, USASOC and USSOCOM.

For the United States Government and the Department of Defense, continued support to SC/SFA activities is critical to the protection of our national interests, as well as building partner-nation capacity and capabilities to secure peace and prosperity through the world. The USAJFJKSWCS Metrics Initiative develops and formally establishes a simplistic mechanism for leaders at all levels to manage SC/SFA events to ensure that the United States remains the premier global power in an uncertain future and other times nebulous operating environment. SW

Maj. Aaron Southard is a Psychological Operations officer who is assigned to the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School’s Commander’s Initiative Group.

Notes:

2. Ibid.
Introduction

Over the last decade, the United States engaged in extended operations in Iraq and Afghanistan while simultaneously contributing to the complex demands of the global security environment. “As U.S. forces draw down in Afghanistan, our global counterterrorism efforts will become more widely distributed and will be characterized by a mix of direct action and security force assistance.”

In order to take a globally networked approach, investment in regional partnerships is required to maintain regional access, destabilize threats and build lasting relationships to further future stability and growth. “Building partnership capacity elsewhere in the world also remains important for sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. Across the globe, we will seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations.”

To ensure we are meeting the defense objectives outlined in *The 2015 National Security Strategy*, *The 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance* and *The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review*, the theater Army provides the geographic combatant command with Regionally Aligned Forces and specially trained forces to address the full spectrum of regional security challenges in support of Army security-cooperation missions.

Shaping the Security Environment

As early as World War II the United States began to take an active role in building partner-nation capacity by working with allied nations to protect against threats, improve access around the world and strengthen relationships. Security cooperation is an integral part of the Army’s global mission and the “Army principally supports security cooperation through interoperability, modernization and most notably leader development, which ensures that our organizations and leaders at all echelons possess the skills, knowledge and understanding necessary to meet the varied conditions encountered for our security cooperation mission.”

Although security cooperation, security force assistance and foreign internal defense (see definitions sidebar on page 12) are different doctrinally, they have complementary and nested goals that facilitate the United States defense objectives throughout all five phases of an operation. For example, security force assistance and foreign internal defense have much in common in that both enable partners’ capacity to provide for their own security, with a collective goal of contributing effectively to broader regional or global security challenges in support of U.S. policy and interests.

The United States Army is an essential part of the Global Landpower Network consequently adapting to the global threat and defense security objectives, by creating Regionally Aligned Forces that provide responsive capabilities to the geographic combatant commands in support of security cooperation programs, to enhance our readiness to conduct all aspects of Unified Land Operations. The U.S. will work to strengthen regional partnerships to build capacity and prevent conflict “…we will continue to work with partners and through multilateral organizations to address the root causes of conflict before they erupt and to contain and resolve them when they do.”

However, lessons learned and after action review comments have shown that there is institutional shortfalls surrounding Regionally Aligned Forces pre-deployment training/preparation, interagency knowledge and country-specific requirements. In an effort to ensure the U.S. Army maintains an expeditionary mindset, the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the Army’s Special Operations Center of Excellence, has developed a Security Force Assistance Handbook to enhance Army readiness, training and leader development in support of security cooperation missions.
SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

What is the SFA Handbook?

Imagine you are a lieutenant or sergeant who has never deployed before and your unit has been tasked to deploy a small team of Soldiers to Eritrea in support of U.S. Africa Command. You specifically have been assigned this mission and must begin the Military Decision Making Process with the order provided. As a leader who has no deployment experience and is unfamiliar with small regional missions, you find that you have many questions and information gaps that cannot be answered within your unit chain of command. You begin to ask what references exist or where do I begin when planning and coordinating for this mission. As you overwhelm yourself with various field manuals, Army doctrine publications, training circulars and Google websites, you still do not have a comprehensive guide that streamlines your planning process. As a leader in a time and resource constrained environment, something as simple as a comprehensive guide would be value added when planning and executing missions more efficiently and effectively.

The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School’s Security Force Assistance Handbook facilitates a leader or Soldier who is faced with a similar mission or situation. The handbook is a reference that was developed using experienced input from various special operations forces and conventional forces that have deployed in support of regionally aligned missions. The handbook is intended to provide Army units and personnel scheduled to support regionally-aligned missions with references to successfully plan, train for and carry out their missions. The publication describes unit and personnel requirements, training, employment and sustainment operations in support of a regional deployment. The handbook is not intended to instruct a Soldier on how to execute security force assistance missions; rather, it is intended to provide generic guidelines for a Soldier to utilize in preparation for deployment and redeployment in support of an SFA, SEC 1203 training or regional mission. Echelons and timelines listed within the handbook are generalizations used to drive planning and execution and are not hard times that are mission or region specific. Information regarding security cooperation, security assistance and SFA is provided in joint and service doctrine; however, these publications do not sufficiently cover how an individual or unit might plan and prepare to deploy on a regionally aligned mission in support of these programs. This handbook provides guidance to enhance the activities of some individual and unit functions and to improve planning and coordination for regional deployments.

The principal audience for this handbook is all members of the profession of arms. It is designed for use at all levels in any region or theater and provides guidance for forces that are planning and training for a regionally aligned mission. This handbook is intended to assist a Soldier or unit in identifying, establishing, certifying and validating required tasks to deploy and redeploy in support of an SFA, SEC 1203 training or regional mission; it is not intended to instruct a Soldier or unit on how to execute SFA. The handbook incorporates information extracted from existing joint and service doctrine publications and directives, as well as joint and service lessons-learned, subject-matter expert input and other identified best practices. Because all geographic combatant commands are different and their theater requirements vary, the Security Force Assistance Handbook is a general guide that units or personnel can tailor based off their respective geographic combatant command’s or Army Service component command’s requirements.

In order to refine the handbook and move forward with its development, USAFKSWCS hosted the Security Force Assistance Summit in March 2015. Participants from the Army Capability Integration Center; the Aviation, Fires, Maneuver, Maneuver Support, Mission Command, Sustainment, Cyber and Intelligence Centers of Excellence; the U.S. Army Medical Department Center and School; U.S. Special Operations Command, and the United Kingdom Ministry of Defense met March 10-11 to analyze, assess and recommend inputs to the handbook. The representatives provided inputs from three working groups (battalion to division level, squad to company level and sustainment), each facilitated by a 180A, to provide top-down and bottom-up perspectives to a generic 90-180 day conventional force pre-deployment, deployment and redeployment checklist. The working groups generated more than...
The cargo-pocket-sized handbook is scheduled to be published in early July.

**SFA Course**

As we reach the end stages of the Security Force Assistance Handbook development, the feedback provided by the centers of excellence and commands will assist in the creation of a Security Force Assistance Handbook Course. The intent of the course is to bring together Soldiers and leaders from various units and levels to teach the intricate aspects of the Security Force Assistance Handbook in order to create institutional knowledge throughout the force and to prepare personnel for regional deployments. The outcome for the course is to provide conventional forces officers or noncommissioned officers, in support of a geographic combatant command, with the ability to synchronize the administrative and staff actions required to conduct a security force assistance mission through its predetermination, deployment, and redeployment phases.

As a final innovative step to reach multiple units and maintain the information's relevance; we have teamed up with Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory to create a desktop and mobile application that will provide the user with an option to query particular tasks by D-date, country and phase. Additionally, this application will allow a user to scroll through the tasks completed over time or still pending completion via a D-date time bar and will feed the user with real-time information and alerts per their respective search; allowing the user to access country-specific weather, holiday, culture, language and news information. The overall objective for this application is to provide the user with a tool that can filter information to assist in their planning and execution of operations and will be easy to use regardless of the country or mission.

The Security Force Assistance Deployment Handbook is the final stage of revision. Pending final review in April at the USAJFKSWCS it will be sent to the Combined Arms Center for review, approval as a Training Circular, and publishing. Concurrently, it will be proposed to CAC for their ePublishing Initiative, which would be a positive step in mobility for a document designed to support deploying and deployed Army forces, enabling them to take it with them on computers, tablets, smart phones and other devices.

The Security Force Assistance initiative is also being submitted into the USASOC Strategic Planning Process at the Capability Analysis & Solution Identification step. When executed, the initiative will address capability gaps identified by USA- SOC and the operational force and once approved will be included in the USASOC Guidance for Development of the Force. The initiative will continue in the SPP to the Resourcing & Integration step, culminating in the Program Objectives Memorandum cycle for FY18-22, as a program of record and capability for the Army.

**Conclusion**

The Army is faced with global responsibilities that challenge us to balance available resources and security needs; thus the Army must maintain the ability to adapt, respond and overcome the challenges presented by the ever-changing complex environment, while simultaneously supporting strategic plans to meet the demands of the U.S. National Security Strategy. Providing Soldiers and leaders with the knowledge and skills to operate autonomously in an ambiguous environment is critical to building partner capacity and fostering U.S. security objectives. **SW**

**Capt. Rachel Rice** is a Civil Affairs officer who is assigned to the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School’s Commander’s Initiative Group.

Notes:

2. Ibid., 3.
5. 2015 National Security Strategy (President Barack Obama).
Interdependence is a relationship in which each member is mutually dependent on the others, which differs from a dependent relationship where some members are dependent, and some are not. In an interdependent relationship, participants may be economically and ecologically reliant on and responsible to each other.

Interdependence within services will require the enduring employment of special operations, Mission Command and other military capabilities, working in concert with stakeholder capabilities to continually shape desired environmental conditions in support of the national strategic end state. This complex operational environment, with varying levels of stability, security, governance, intractability and clarity, demands purposeful collaboration and nesting of stakeholder plans and capabilities to maximize desired conditions for U.S. interests.

Interdependence of services provides support to President Barack Obama’s 2015 National Security Strategy by providing consistent and dedicated U.S. military personnel to set conditions that position the services to effectively work with our partners to build capacity and prevent conflict while strengthening the Global SOF Network and Global Landpower Network. Theater special operations commands and Army Service combatant commands are identifying a number of positions against validated requirements that directly support a globally responsive and regionally engaged Army.

An interdependent relationship can arise between two or more services. Interdependence can be a common ground between these services. This concept benefits the Army by codifying hard-fought lessons learned, strengthening SOF–CF interdependence, optimizing performance of regionally aligned and mission-tailored forces.

The Army interdependence process is necessary to ensure Army Special Operations Forces efforts are broadly supported by the Army. Building rapport and collaborating with Army counterparts will achieve successes. Interdependence will secure the advances learned from the current fight.

Interdependence of SOF–CF command and support relationships are moving toward Modular CF and Regional SOF to provide worldwide response. Initiating integration with unified action partners to simplify structure and command processes affect the battlespace and improve contingency response capabilities. Interdependence allows for the creation of Regionally Aligned Forces that are resourced, trained, organized and ready for particular critical Defense Strategic Guidance-specified mission. The Army must establish a range of personnel, training, command and support relationships between SOF and CF. Interdependence between SOF and CF will improve security assistance, security force assistance and foreign internal defense in a global environment while maintaining a flexible, adaptable and responsive force structure. Future Army forces will conduct integrated operations to prevent, shape and win utilizing agile, responsive and adaptive combined arms and special operations guided by mission command. The Army must also possess a broad range of capabilities to shape future operational environments, maintain its lethality on the battlefield and leverage unified action partners to reduce demands and prevent and end the conflict. This initiative fully supports National Security Strategy guidance to be innovative and judicious in how resources are used to build national power, and promotes talent and diversity in our national security workforce, as well as the U.S. Special Operations Command goals to optimize SOF/conventional force/JIIM interdependence and U.S. Army Strategic Priorities: Adaptive Army Leaders for a Complex World and A Ready and Modern Army.

The 2011 National Military Strategy notes that to succeed, the U.S. must update, balance and integrate all of the instruments of American power and work with unified action partners to do the same. In addition, the U.S. military must maintain its conventional superiority. The U.S. must invest in diplomacy and development capabilities and institutions in a way that complements and reinforces its global partners.

The importance of interdependence between Army forces and UAP to assess, shape, deter and influence aspects of the global security environment and focuses on routine contact and interactions that build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities and maintain influence. To consolidate gains and transition responsibility to sustainable governments, Army forces must achieve unity of effort with UAP based on a common understanding of security forces, governments and people.

Interdependence will demand that ARSOF work with sister services to understand and develop sustainment mechanisms — both standard and non-standard — for all seven ARSOF core operations by avoiding wasteful duplication of resources, while allowing synchronization with external Army entities.

Service interdependence will also remain critical to the success of future unconventional warfare campaigns. ARSOF will develop interagency relationships in the National Capitol Region and at the country-team level to foster long-term relationships and develop the GSN. The success of future operations will require persistent engagement between ARSOF and other government agencies to ensure that all activities are nested and deconflicted.

Interdependence will bring situational awareness, stability, continuity and critical capacity in times of crisis. This initiative enhances the reach and effectiveness of the geographic combatant commanders, USSOCOM, the ASCCs, the TSOCs and the country teams. Increasing options to develop and reinforce interdependence benefits the Army by codifying hard-fought lessons learned, strengthening SOF–CF interdependence and optimizing performance of regionally aligned and mission-tailored forces. Interdependence will secure the lessons learned from the current fight. Improving interdependence within the Army is necessary to ensure ARSOF efforts are broadly understood and therefore supported.

The Army must establish a range of personnel, training, command and support relationships between SOF and CF to improve security assistance, security force assistance and foreign internal defense in a global environment, while maintaining a flexible, adaptable and responsive force structure. **SW**

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The United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Forces Warfare Center and School Powell Program Initiative is named after Secretary Colin L. Powell, in recognition of his service in both the Department of Defense and the Department of State, and his extraordinary efforts to create synergy between the two organizations. Secretary Powell was a muddy-boots combat soldier for 35 years, serving two tours in Vietnam, culminating with his last assignment as the 12th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In 1991, General Powell led the campaign that successfully expelled the Iraqi army from Kuwait during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm putting him in the national spotlight. President George W. Bush nominated him on Dec. 16, 2000 as Secretary of State. He was sworn in as the 65th Secretary of State on Jan. 20, 2001 after being unanimously confirmed by the U.S. Senate. Secretary Powell placed an emphasis on reaffirming diplomatic alliances throughout the world, supporting a national missile defense system, working toward peace in the Middle East and prioritizing sanctions instead of force in potential hot spots such as Iraq. He also focused on reinvigorating U.S. diplomacy through pragmatic reforms in the Department of State’s organizational culture and an infusion of resources for personnel, information technology, security and facilities. Powell’s multifaceted approach won praise for his efficient administration of the State Department and cordial relations with other governments. Secretary Powell took a leading role in rallying America’s allies for military action in Afghanistan following the 9/11 terrorist attacks demonstrating his “whole-of-government approach”.

**Framing the Contemporary Environment and the Problem**

Using the whole-of-government approach to current and future challenges is not a new concept. The U.S. Government is a large organization comprised of multiple components and capabilities, which means that no one entity has the capability to face challenges independently. In an environment of finite resources, ensuring that effective collaboration and cooperation occurs is imperative to ensure the success of our nation for addressing complex issues. To date, U.S. Special Operations Forces are limited to counterterrorism positions advising the National Security Council. This creates a seam where there is a lack of SOF regional expertise and experience within government organizations at the highest levels. Specifically, advising personnel at select agencies and departments in concert with *The 2015 National Security Strategy* directive to combine all of our strategic advantages to expand and solidify the interdependence between agencies and organizations within the United States Government.

The question then materializes — how do we leverage the expertise and experience of the SOF personnel within government organizations to expand and solidify the interdependence between agencies and organizations without spending an exorbitant amount of funding in a budget-constrained environment? Further analysis caused other potential obstacles to surface that require attention. These obstacles encompass overcoming potential manning issues and determining the framework that will enable SOF proponency to track and manage the inventory of candidates who possess the required prerequisites to work at the highest levels within the government. Additionally, an education pathway that includes civilian and military education should complement SOF personnel assisting and advising in this capacity. If we attempt to use DoD programs in place already and begin making changes, then we incur potential risk in the counterterrorism fight for what those programs were specifically designed. For example, special operations support teams are made up of United Special Operations Command personnel who serve at DoD and non-DoD agencies where Headquarters, USSOCOM has an enduring requirement to synchronize DoD planning for global operations against terrorist networks. Finally, looking through different sets of lenses inside and outside the DoD, the assumption can be made that we will encounter institutional resistance that comes with change or implementing new and fresh initiatives. This will have to be addressed.

**The Solution**

Seeing these challenges and the value of providing SOF regional expertise to the interagency environment, USAIFKSWCS Commanding General, Maj. Gen. Eric P. Wendt, established the Powell Program as an innovative mechanism to place senior SOF Officers
The Powell Program looks to increase the collaboration between the DoD, U.S. Government agencies and Capitol Hill by bringing the capabilities that come from decades of on-the-ground regional and language expertise, formal graduate level, in-country, regional studies education and long-term PCS assignment to the National Capitol Region. Due to U.S. Army Special Forces warrant officers (180A) longevity of uniformed service (30 years of service minus any enlisted service based on the Soldiers Compensation Act of 1949), they are the target population to become Powell personnel. The Powell Program will PCS select senior Special Forces warrant officers to the National Capitol Region to serve at critical country desks in the regional bureaus of the U.S. Department of State, the Office of Congressional and Legislative Liaison and other key positions within the National Capitol Region supporting interagency interoperability and engagement. Officers designated as part of the Powell program are ideally suited to work within the National Capitol Region based on their professional experience and interaction from multiple years of operating in a specific region at a Special Forces group or other SOF units. Additionally, senior Special Forces warrant officers are well suited to work in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment based on their education, developed critical thinking skills and understanding of special warfare capabilities and leveraging those capabilities to accomplish common ends. Finally, members serving in the Powell Program may have previously served as Volckmann Operator embeds, serving in developmental embed positions within partner-nation SOF. This service will have provided these warrant officers years of personal experience living in their target country and working directly with host-country personnel, civilians and leaders.

**Powell Program Candidate Requirements**

The requirements for the Powell Program candidates are mid-grade to senior chief warrant officer four or chief warrant officer five 180As in order to maximize their time at the battalion level and above for higher level experience, in addition to greater regional and language experience, education and SOF-specific related training, which includes courses like the Special Warfare Operational Design Course where graduates receive education and training on planning at the operational levels and above.

If comparable education is where Special Forces Warrants are weaker, regional experience is where they are strong. In order to represent the force in regional-specific matters, the ideal candidate would have a wide range of operational experience in the region. While it is difficult to track this time from Officer Record Briefs, candidates should be able to list the specific missions (joint operational experience, education and SOF-specific related training, combined exchange training, embassy assignments, and Special Operations Command-Forward assignments, etc.) in the region and the number of months in order to show their actual time in theater. The best-qualified candidate would have at least 48 months combined regional experience.

While a regional-specific degree and field of study or experience are highly valued nothing demonstrates commitment and knowledge of a region as much as speaking the language. It would be difficult to represent oneself as an expert in country X if you could not speak the language. More than any other outwardly recognized ability a regional-specific language demonstrates a dedicated effort and knowledge of the region and culture. Language ability is respected and expected by Foreign Service, intelligence community and academia as the minimum standard. Best qualified applicants should have a current DLPT rating of 2/2, or a 2/2 in two or more regional languages in order to demonstrate their expertise in their region.

Education is the bona fides in the beltway. As graduate education is required in most positions, the lack of a formal degree would limit the acceptance and challenge the credibility of the Powell Program officer. While the military mindset often values experience over education, this is often not the case in an environment where not having a graduate degree is the exception not the norm. For this area specifically, the fully qualified candidate would have an advanced degree from an overseas accredited college or university in any field of study but ideally related to international affairs or regional specific studies.

In lieu of the above requirement, the education requirement is a post graduate degree (MS/MA) from an accredited college or university that included a combination of courses, with at least 24 semester hours in international law and international relations, political science, economics, history in the region, sociology, geography, social or cultural anthropology, language studies, psychology, or regional specific studies.

**Career Path and Education Pathway**

The Powell Program assignments are classified developmental. As of February 1, the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School is recommending changes to the Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, to Headquarters, Department of the Army G1, to reflect Powell as a “most-qualified” developmental position. Career tracks and professional development models for those individuals are being developed and codified with these changes. For promotion boards convening in fiscal year 2016 and after, board guidance will identify that service members serving in Powell assignments are developmental and “most-qualified”. Also regimental slides decks are available for professional development purposes and for
Soldiers who might sit on a promotion/school/command board. This is necessary to ensure these Soldiers remain competitive for future positions and promotion and to facilitate talent management.

The Directorate, Army Special Operations Forces, Human Resources in cooperation with the USAJFKSWCS Commander's Initiative Group is requesting establishment of a personnel development skill identifier for Powell personnel. Once approved, an announcement will occur through a Notification of Future Change to Army-wide Force Managers and the Department of the Army. G1 will top-load the PDSIs as well as update the PDSI roster in DA Pam 611-21, *Military Occupational Classification Structure*. Powell candidates are eligible to apply for PDSI after 12 months of serving in a Powell assignment. The award criteria for the PDSI: 2/2 foreign language proficiency (may be waived, pending approval Commanding General, USAJFKSWCS), 24 months foreign regional experience and possess a master's degree, upon Commanding General, USAJFKSWCS approval, the Special Forces Commandant will provide the service member's name to Department of the Army, G1 to top-load in the personnel's record.

Currently, the USAJFKSWCS Commander's Initiatives Group is examining sending warrant officers, in Powell Program positions, to graduate-level education at foreign universities in their targeted area of responsibility in cooperation with the Special Warfare Education Group. The intent of this education is twofold: to provide education on par with Powell coworkers in the NCR and to grow a Powell network of significant personalities (other students) in their specific AOR. Degrees should be in a field that directly contributes to their work in the NCR including, but not limited to, political science and international relations fields.

**Pilot Phase**

The USAJFKSWCS Commander's Initiative Group conducted a test run with a Powell pilot in the Department of State. Initial reactions and feedback for the proposed Powell pilot was extremely positive and created a demand signal for the Powells. Additionally, this has prompted the Department of State Diplomatic Security Service's Special Operations Division to create a proposal within the DoS for Powell personnel to be assigned in their division as regional desk officers. The Special Operations Coordinator from DoS Bureau of Diplomatic Security Service is assisting the USAJFKSWCS in creating detail positions in concert with their proposal circulating with the leadership at DoS.

Separately, the USAJFKSWCS will also pursue placing Powells in the U.S. Army's and U.S. Special Operations Command's Offices of Congressional and Legislative Liaison. The Powells assigned to the OCLL will facilitate the partnership between USSOCOM, the Army and Congress in order to ensure support for USSOCOM's and the Army's needs, serve as a liaison to the House and Senate Armed Services Committee's members, professional staff and personal staff to achieve the necessary authorities and funding to support Army and USSOCOM needs, provide liaison to Congress on Army programs, plans and policies, provide expertise and insights on the Congressional aspects of Army programs, plans and policies and liaison support to the USSOCOM Washington Office and the Army Secretariat, Army Staff, Army Commands and direct reporting units.

The Powells serving in future pilot programs will provide feedback in order to capture lessons learned, best practices and any obstacles that they might encounter that might hamper progression of the initiative into a fully recognized program of record.

The USAJFKSWCS Commander's Initiatives Group, in conjunction with the pilot, is moving forward with the initiatives from the conceptual phase to programs of record by preemptively drafting the Guidance for Development of the Force in the programming process addressing capability gaps. The final product of the programming process within the Department of Defense, a component's Program Objectives Memorandum displays the resource allocation decisions of the military department in response to, and in accordance with, the Guidance for Development of the Force and Joint Programming Guidance. The next POM is scheduled for fiscal year 2018.

**Way Ahead**

At full capacity, the Powell Program will provide five-to-seven senior Special Forces warrant officers to serve at critical country desks in the regional bureaus of the U.S. Department of State, the Office of Congressional and Legislative Liaison and other key positions within the National Capitol Region supporting interagency interoperability and interdependence. The Powell Program fully supports *The 2015 National Security Strategy* outcome: build capacity to prevent conflict through combining all of our strategic advantages to expand and solidify the interdependence between agencies and organizations within the United States Government. The NSS states that the interconnection of weak governance and widespread grievance allows extremism to take root, violent non-state actors to rise up and conflict to overtake state structures. To meet these challenges, we will continue to work with partners and through multilateral organizations to address the root causes of conflict before they erupt and to contain and resolve them when they do. Additionally, the Powell Program engages the Special Operations Command's Line of Operations 2: Global SOF Network and the Army Strategic Priority: A Globally Responsive and Regionally Engaged Army. The Powell Program carefully nests into these efforts by directly leveraging the regional expertise and experience of seasoned and politically astute Special Forces warrant officers who understand the “whole-of-government approach” and addresses the gap within USG organizations, specifically the Department of State. This will facilitate effective collaboration and cooperation occurs, which is imperative to ensure the success of our nation for addressing complex issues.

**CW 3 Ronald Dempsey** is a Special Forces warrant officer who is assigned to the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School's Commander's Initiative Group.

**Notes:**

ASIAN CULTURAL FESTIVAL — SPECIAL WARFARE EDUCATION GROUP (AIRBORNE)