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ARSOF NEXT

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A RETURN TO FIRST PRINCIPLES
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U.S. Army Special Operations Command
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By order of the Secretary of the Army:
Raymond T. Odierno
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:

GERALD B O’KEEFE
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 1432502
Headquarters, Department of the Army
The United States Army special warfare forces have a long and storied history. From our inception, Army special warfare forces have worked as small, elite teams that conduct special warfare in what are often highly complex and ambiguous environments. Through the years, the results of these special warfare efforts on behalf of our country have been both numerous and undeniably effective.

As we continue to mature special warfare, and as we build on hard-earned operational and combat lessons from around the globe, we recognize we must continue to develop and build interoperability between special warfare forces and conventional forces to further enhance mission effectiveness.

In line with this desire for increased SOF/CF interoperability, in this issue of Special Warfare, Eugene G. Piasecki, a U.S. Army Special Operations Command historian, traces the evolution of special warfare from inception to today, highlighting key moments in its development — including increased interoperability with conventional forces. Of additional note, Mr. Piasecki’s article is endorsed within by General Ray Odierno, the 38th Chief of Staff of the United States Army.

Lieutenant Colonel Pete Russo takes interoperability a step further, discussing the importance of SOF-CF interdependence at the joint level. Russo, a former cadre member at the Joint Multinational Training Command in Germany, highlights the importance of joint exercises like the recent Combined Resolve exercise in building SOF-CF interdependence.

From the Joint Readiness Training Center Operations Group, an article that discusses the importance of an often overlooked aspect of building interoperability between SOF and CF — liaison elements. The JRTC Operations Group points out that if properly utilized, liaisons can increase understanding, build cohesion and enhance effectiveness between SOF and CF prior to, and during, operations.

Within this issue you will also find ARSOF Next: A Return to First Principles, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s effort to build not only interoperability and interdependence with conventional forces, but also within the USASOC family between its surgical strike and special warfare components. ARSOF Next helps to create a common language and understanding of the rich heritage that exists throughout all ARSOF, and expands upon the unique characteristics and desirable traits of both our surgical strike and special warfare units, as well as their individual personnel.

Major General Eric P. Wendt
After more than a decade of war, U.S. and partner-nation special operations forces have come to appreciate the criticality of interoperability. U.S. and partner-nation SOF have learned to operate together despite differences in language, operational culture and national caveats. Maintaining and expanding our current ability to operate together as part of the Integrated Global SOF Network poses a challenge in an era of constricting budgets and reduced manning. Moreover, with operational requirements likely to remain at a steady state, training opportunities for SOF must be multi-faceted to be viable.

Understand the Operational Environment

Joint combined exchange training efforts have long been the main pillar of regional engagement strategies at the theater special operations command level. A key component of efforts to promote interoperability between U.S. and Allied SOF, JCETs remain critical to building, expanding and maintaining the Integrated Global SOF Network. With requirements far exceeding resources, we should seek to identify additional venues that augment our ability to meet this requirement.

Despite their utility, JCETs lack opportunities for SOF integration and interdependence with conventional forces. While U.S. SOF has internalized the importance of SOF-CF interdependence, allied SOF (many of whom are primarily direct action forces) has not fully embraced this paradigm. Identifying opportunities to foster an operational cultural shift in this area will be critical to the long term success of the Integrated Global SOF Network. Historically eschewed as among the least lucrative training venues for SOF, Combat Training Center rotations in the European Command area of operations represent a valuable opportunity for SOF.

CF brigade-centric CTC rotations have historically bordered on the precipice of “nice to do” rather than mission essential because they compete with operational deployments. For CTC rotations to have maximum viability as SOF training venues, they need to combine SOF appropriate unilateral training attractive to both U.S. and partner nation units with opportunities for SOF-CF interdependence. In essence, CTCs would need to evolve from their legacy construct to become short duration “poor man’s JCETs” which combine the normal emphasis of JCETs with SOF-CF interdependence. A conceptual way ahead for using CTC rotations in this manner should include the following to maximize their attractiveness and their effect:

- SOF-appropriate mission sets executed in conjunction with allied SOF.
- U.S. and partner SOF-CF interdependence structured for interactions at the correct level.
- Realistic live fire, close quarter battle and force-on-force training.
- Close air support training for SOF joint terminal attack controllers.

While this construct does not address foreign internal defense or unconventional warfare as delineated tasks, it pre-supposes both U.S. and partner-nation SOF partnered during the rotation for a “defacto” FID effect.
SOF Truth #5: Most Special Operations require non-SOF assistance.

With increased emphasis on the importance of SOF-CF interdependence and the need to maintain and expand interoperability with partner-nation SOF, Special Operations Command Europe, U.S. Army Europe and the Joint Multinational Training Command have collaborated to establish a SOF Cell at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. Chartered to support CTC rotations as well as U.S. and allied unilateral SOF events, the SOF Cell coordinates and supports training at both Hohenfels Training Area and Grafenwoehr Training Area.

Located at the crossroads of Europe, JMTC and JMRC are uniquely situated to facilitate engagement with allies from both the U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command AOR. With extensive live-fire training facilities and maneuver areas, as well as a robust capacity for simulations (through the Joint Multinational Simulation Center), the organization hosts partner-nation and U.S. SOF and CF units on an almost daily basis. Beyond the capacity for U.S. to U.S. SOF-CF interdependence, the organization is well poised to enable U.S. to partner nation SOF-CF interdependence as well. With coalition operations rapidly becoming the norm, setting the conditions for CF commanders to expand their comfort level with SOF from other nations is a critical underpinning of the Integrated Global SOF Network.

Exercise Combined Resolve

Combined Resolve 1 served as a “proof of principle” for the concepts outlined above. A multinational training rotation with partner-nation soldiers from seven nations (Czech Republic, France, Croatia, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Serbia and Sweden) executed in November 2013, this event included both U.S. and Allied SOF. A Task Unit from SEAL Team 5 and an Allied detachment from France’s Commando Parachutiste de l’air no. 10 (CPA-10) participated in Combined Resolve 1. During the first half of the three week rotation, both units executed live-fire training, JTAC events and other SOF-specific events. During the latter half of the rotation these units formed Special Operations Task Group 14 and executed SOF-appropriate operations in coordination with the multinational brigade participating in Combined Resolve 1.

SOF Appropriate mission sets executed in conjunction with Allied SOF.

Based on input from the leadership of SEAL Team 5 and CPA-10, the SOF Cell (working in conjunction with the USSOCOM J-7 FMD/ Special Response Planning Cell) developed “injects” for the training operational environment based on those units’ training emphasis. Given the direct action and personnel recovery focus of SEAL Team 5 and CPA-10, the scripted injects reflected those priorities. For additional depth and granularity, DA and PR missions incorporated warrant based operations, interagency considerations and a realistic level of coordination with the conventional-force commander in order to gain approval and support for the operations.

SOF Imperative #3: Facilitate Interagency Activities

JMRC has been a pre-deployment “gateway” for allied CF supporting Operation Enduring Freedom in recent years. As a result, the SOF Cell was able to capitalize on resources already in place in order to maximize the realism and relevance of the missions for participating SOF units. The law-enforcement professionals, legal advisers, interagency and media staff at JMRC assisted in the development of the training scenarios, and acted as role players during Combined Resolve 1. In an effort to increase the realism for CPA-10 participants, the legal advisor staff/role-player supporting the scenario employed only the target language (French) and remained in character throughout all interactions with the unit, which was so successful that participating personnel did not realize that he was a U.S. national prior to the final after action review.

The overall context of the rotation also set the conditions for improved U.S. and Allied SOF interoperability. While the participating units had an inherent DA focus, the requirement to operate as a SOTG required them to work as equal partners. Given the high skill level of the French CPA-10 detachment, it would be inappropriate to categorize this effort as building partner capacity, and would more appropriately be defined as supporting allied SOF interoperability. The underlying value of Combined Resolve 1 was that it required two DA-centric forces to bend some of the cultural taboos within the DA “tribe” and operate across national lines. This dynamic is critical to the success of the Integrated Global SOF Network in the years to come.

U.S. and Allied SOF-CF interdependence structured for interactions at the correct level.

Following the transition from the live-fire training conducted during the first half of Combined Resolve 1, the SEAL Team 5 Task Unit and French CPA-10 detachment formed SOTG-14. In order to structure the operational environment in a SOF-appropriate manner, the SOF Cell ensured this unit was written into the scenario as a SOF element whose operations spanned several battlespace owner boundaries, and had a SOF chain of command independent of the CF battlespace owner. The SOTG received its missions and guidance from its CJSTF (i.e. the SOF Cell), but had to work with the CF command structure and abide by the caveats of his multinational task force in order to prosecute targets. In order to gain approval during the CONOP process, the SOTG-14 leadership and staff had to contextualize their actions within the framework of the over arching strategic goals of the Combined Resolve 1 scenario.

As an additional forcing function for SOF-CF interdependence, SOTG-14 was required to rely on the CF command structure for rotary-wing support, outer cordon security and logistics. By design, no programmed assets were simply given to SOTG-14. The SOTG-14 commander and his liaisons (who worked in the division tactical operations center throughout the scenario) were required to negotiate with the battlespace owner and make their case for high demand assets (i.e. rotary-wing support). One added benefit to these negotiations was that they also provided an opportunity for the U.S. battlespace owner to gain exposure to the concept of an allied SOF unit executing sensitive operations in his area of operations.

Realistic Live Fire, Close Quarter Battle, and Force on Force Training

During the final planning conference for Combined Resolve 1, SEAL Team 5 and French CPA-10 toured the live-fire training facilities at both Hohenfels and Grafenwoehr and developed their own program’s of instruction for execution during the rotation. Each unit initially conducted training unilaterally, but executed combined training during the latter portion of the live-fire phase of the exercise. Both elements developed programs incorporating combat marksmanship and close-quarter battle as the foundation of their live-fire training.
The French CPA-10 detachment that participated in Combined Resolve 1 had a high level of training and was a seasoned force with several recent combat deployments together. As a result, they moved at a rapid pace and used the assets available during the rotation to fine tune their standard operating procedures. They began with a short program of CMMS, followed by a week of intensive live fire training in GTA’s multiple shoot-houses. As CPA-10 transitioned from stand-alone events to scenario-driven full mission profile’s they coordinated with the CF aviation units participating in the rotation, and were able to integrate rotary-wing infiltration into their mission sets. CPA-10 also conducted numerous iterations of force-on-force DA missions with all participants employing simunitions.

With a recent influx of new teammates, the SEAL Team 5 Task Unit that participated in the rotation used it as an opportunity to integrate recent Basic Underwater Demolition School graduates into the platoon. The SEAL leadership developed and executed a program of instruction, which emphasized CMMS and SOP integration. With the lead petty officers acting as instructors, the unit trained and assessed members on operations standards, CMMS events similar in scope and execution to Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat Critical Task Evaluations. Following the CMMS segment of training, the task unit transitioned to a force-on-force close-quarter battle emphasis, rotating through several shoot houses on a daily basis in order to present a broad scope of diverse problem sets to new platoon members.

Following immersion in the operational environment phase of the exercise, SOTG-14 (SEAL Team 5 and CPA-10) operators conducted combined CMMS training each morning prior to receipt of mission. Each unit alternated responsibility for hosting CMMS training for each other while the SOTG leadership began planning and preparation for the days’ mission.

**Close Air Support training for SOF Joint Terminal Attack Controllers**

With a dedicated U.S. Air Force element, rotary-wing aviation participation, and an extensive simulations package, Combined Resolve 1 offered a diverse series of CAS and close-combat attack opportunities. Both the SEAL Team 5 Task Unit and the French CPA-10 detachment participating in Combined Resolve 1 had SOF JTAC’s either organic to them or attached for the rotation.

During Combined Resolve 1 the USAF element at JMRC (BULLS-EYE Team) developed CAS situational training exercises, designed for JTACs to control live aircraft in the context of an overarching tactical problem set. Prior to, and during each iteration, JTACs from BULLSEYE mentored SOF JTACs and provided them with insight on emerging tactics, techniques and procedures as well as best practices within the JTAC community of interest. Both SEAL Team 5 and CPA-10 participated in multiple iterations of the training.

In addition to the CAS STX, both SOF elements participating in Combined Resolve 1 had the opportunity to execute simulated controls via the AC-130 virtual call for fire simulator. Dialoguing live with former AC-130 sensor operators and fire control officers located at Hurlburt Air Force Base via the Joint Training Exercise Network, personnel executed a multitude of five line AC-130 CFF scenarios. Of note, this training satisfied some of the requirements for JTAC currency as specified in the Theater Air Control Information Computer System used by both U.S. and NATO JTACs.

While adverse weather and other factors precluded live controls during the exercise, future rotations (Combined Resolve 2 in late spring of 2014) have excellent prospects for supporting JTAC currency with both fixed-wing (F-16, Tornado) and rotary-wing (AH-64) aircraft slated to participate in the exercise. While the SOF Cell did not fully meet its vision for JTAC training during Combined Resolve 1 (JTAC controls of aircraft dropping live ordinance), participating units were able to increase their proficiency in CAS-related tasks during the rotation.

**Conclusion**

SOF participation in Combined Resolve 1 provided an initial template for future SOF participation in CTC rotations. As a strategic tool, CTC rotations could set the conditions for regionally aligned SOF to execute training with Allied SOF as part of a long-term persistent engagement strategy in support of the Integrated Global SOF Network. With consistent Allied SOF participation, these "poor man’s JCETs“ could be used to promote interoperability, build trust and expand the reach and influence of USSOCOM.

As a mechanism for preserving the hard-won lessons learned for SOF-CF interdependence, there is no better resource than the CTCs. In order to draw SOF, however, the CTCs must represent the best possible use of available time. The underlying opportunity to promote SOF-CF interdependence must be buttressed with opportunities for unit-driven training tailored to SOF requirements. SOF-appropriate missions, live-fire exercises, and CAS training are and will remain the supporting pillars of this effort.

**Lieutenant Colonel Pete Russo** served as a special operations liaison at the International Special Training Center.
THE HISTORY OF SPECIAL
From the U.S. Army Chief of Staff

In the early 1960s, General George H. Decker, the 22nd Chief of Staff of the Army, made special warfare a part of the Army’s range of military operations by combining unconventional warfare with counterinsurgency. He did so in response to Communism’s increased use of insurgency to destabilize vulnerable governments friendly to the United States. The Viet Minh victory over the French military at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, had shocked Western military professionals. President John F. Kennedy endorsed special warfare as critical to the nation’s defense and charged the Army’s Special Forces to lead that global fight for the Army. Gen. Decker realized expertise needed to successfully conduct UW in Communist-dominated occupied Europe and Asia would provide a sound base from which to develop a viable response to this form of warfare.

Today special warfare remains an important Army mission. Our primary combat maneuver element is the regionally expert Special Forces, the Green Berets, supported by our Psychological Warfare and Civil Affairs units. Conventional forces, such as the Regionally Aligned Forces, work alongside SOF in what is an increasingly complex world where the lines between war, conflict and competition are blurred. Unique in the Army and the Department of Defense inventory, special-warfare units are that component of the Army’s Special Operations Forces that are specifically trained to work with and through indigenous forces, across the spectrum of conflict between unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense.

It is with Gen. Decker’s vision in mind that I commend this article on special warfare. It clarifies the origins of the Army’s special-warfare mission and our special operations forces that perform unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, Military Information Support Operations and direct-action operations as directed by the national command authority. ARSOF remains the vanguard of America’s asymmetric defense and is ‘point’ for the nation’s special-warfare mission.

Raymond T. Odierno
Chief of Staff of the Army
From 1952 through the end of the Vietnam War, the Army’s leadership recognized special warfare as one of its core missions. Since the 1970s, the concept of special warfare has been superseded by the term special operations. First introduced during the Korean War by Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, the first chief of Psychological Warfare, special warfare described those military and paramilitary measures and activities related to unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency and psychological warfare. Army special operations was organized to operate interdependently in the Human Domain.

Reporting directly to Gen. J. Lawton Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, McClure was charged with formulating and developing “psychological and special operations plans for the Army in consonance with established policies” and supervising “the execution of Department of the Army programs in these fields.” To do this, McClure created propaganda and unconventional warfare divisions in his Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare and filled it with World War II unconventional warfare veterans. In particular, Col. Russell W. Volckmann and Col. Aaron Bank were key staff officers. Col. Volckmann, author of FM 31-20, *Operations Against Guerrilla Forces* and FM 31-21, *Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare*, codified special warfare operations as an integral element of conventional ground combat, and not separate from it. His combat Infantry experience led to his selection by McClure to prepare the position, planning and policy papers that established Special Forces within the Army. Consequently, the Army Field Forces and the Army staff created the Psywar Center and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to develop and refine Army Psywar and special warfare capabilities.

Under the tutelage of its first commandant, World War I and World War II Infantryman Col. Charles H. Karlstadt, the former Chief of Staff at Fort Benning, the U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Center and School was accredited by Army Field Forces on May 29, 1952. The school consisted of Psywar and Special Forces departments. The Psywar Center was responsible for developing and implementing Psywar and UW doctrine, tables of organization and equipment, tactics, techniques and procedures, education (course programs of instruction), field and training manuals and research, development, test and evaluation of Psywar and Special Forces equipment. The proponency for special warfare resided at Fort Bragg and the first Soldiers were being recruited, trained and organized to execute this new Army mission. On June 19, 1952, the Army’s first Special Forces unit, the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) was activated at Fort Bragg and commanded by Office of the Strategic Services veteran, Col. Aaron Bank. The first Special Forces courses (officer and noncommissioned officer) for volunteers began on Oct. 22, 1952. While the focus was Europe, the Army took note of France’s counterinsurgency operations in Indochina (1946-1954) and activated a second Special Forces Group. The 77th Special Forces Group, based at Fort Bragg, was formed in October 1953, with the purpose of meeting SF global contingencies outside of Europe. Shortly thereafter, in December 1953, the 10th SFG (A) deployed to Germany to bring its expertise in unconventional warfare to the frontline of the Cold War.

Regional conflicts came to the forefront with the Vietminh victory over French forces at Dien Bien Phu. This prompted the Army to take measures to formally educate its leaders on UW and address strategies and tactics to counter insurgencies. On March 4, 1954, Gen. John E. Dahlquist, Chief of Army Field Forces, assigned responsibility to the Psywar Center to develop Army counterinsurgency doctrine, tactics and techniques as well as to publish the training literature on guerrilla warfare used to educate officers and sergeants. Communist-sponsored ‘wars of national liberation’ against colonial regimes and U.S.-supported post-World War II military dictatorships in Latin America had flared up like wildfire across the globe, in places such as Algeria (1954-1962), Aden (1962-1967), Angola (1961-1965). The Army
realized that for it to adapt to meet this emerging requirement, it had to incorporate special warfare as a core mission.

In December 1956, the renaming of the Psywar Center to the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center, gave official credence to this umbrella term. Gen. Dahlquist realized that the Army had to quickly prepare for enemy UW operations. The social, economic, political and psychological impacts of UW and COIN and counter warfare had to be incorporated in current and future Army contingency and war plans. The increasing emphasis on special warfare resulted in a host of articles appearing in Army publications.

In June 1960, Col. William H. Kinard Jr., a Coast Artillery officer and World War II veteran assigned to the Special Warfare Office, DA, Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, explained special warfare in an article in Army Information Digest: “This is Special Warfare U. S. Army Style.” His subsequent address to the Army Limited War Symposium in March 1962 in Washington, D.C., “The New Dimensions of Special Warfare,” was very timely, and caught the attention of recently-elected President John F. Kennedy, an enthusiastic advocate. World events, that dictated a change in U.S. strategy, soon provided the right moment for integrating special warfare into the Army’s mission profile.

The ill-fated Bay of Pigs operation against Fidel Castro in Cuba caused President Kennedy to replace the Eisenhower administration’s security strategy of nuclear deterrence with one of “flexible response.” This meant that the American military had to field forces that were structured to deal with conflict at any level. In his State of the Union address on May 25, 1961, Kennedy directed Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara “to increase and reorient Special Forces and unconventional warfare units.” Congress approved a 3,000 man increase in special warfare Soldiers. Gen. George H. Decker, the Chief of Staff, announced that the U.S. Army was “uniquely capable of confronting the Communists face-to-face in the struggle for freedom in the less developed countries.” To implement this new strategy, the Army needed a new, more adaptable organization. The end result was the Special Action Force.

Gen. Decker’s initial guidance was to form two regionally-oriented Cold War task forces each composed of an airborne brigade and a Special Forces group. After a careful analysis of the president’s intent, the Army staff dropped the airborne brigade and changed the SAF mission from direct action to one of advising and assisting foreign countries dealing with “low intensity cold war situations.” Four Special Action Forces were formed around existing SF groups (SAF Asia - 1st Special Forces Group on Okinawa; SAF Middle East - 3rd Special Forces Group; SAF Africa - 6th Special Forces Group in CONUS; and SAF Latin America - 8th Special Forces Group in the Canal Zone). Each SAF was built around the SF Group with a range of assigned specialty detachments, including Engineers, Military Police and Civil Affairs. The SAF was designed to augment in-country Military Assistance Advisory Groups with task organized mobile training teams. The SAFs assisted foreign armies to perform UW, COIN, civic action and nation-building activities, the cornerstones of foreign internal defense and development. The SAF was ideally suited to support America’s bipartisan national strategy of ‘Communist containment’, which was expanded to stop the spread of insurgencies in the Third World. America was not going to rely exclusively on its nuclear arsenal to halt the growth of Communism.

President Kennedy emphasized economic development and political reform over military assistance to meet the preeminent threat of the day, Communist-supported ‘wars of national liberation’ in the Third World. In his remarks to the newly-commissioned lieutenants at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in June 1962, Kennedy emphasized special warfare in the Army: “To cite one final example of the range of responsibilities that will fall upon you, you may hold a position of command with our Special Forces, forces which are too unconventional to be called...”
Kennedy’s remarks at the graduation reflected his belief in the importance of unconventional warfare. He established an Executive Department Special Group (Counterinsurgency) in January 1962 that reinforced his emphasis on UW. By this time, special warfare was so widely accepted that the Secretary of the Army, Elvis J. Stahr Jr., directed the Office, Chief of Information, Department of the Army, to publish “Special Warfare U. S. Army, An Army Specialty,” to help Soldiers “prepare for the performance of this most important mission.”

Special Warfare was the answer for countering Communist-supported insurgencies in Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America. After the assassination of President Kennedy on Nov. 22, 1963, President Lyndon B. Johnson gradually tilted the Internal Defense and Development emphasis to military assistance and committed increasing numbers of conventional forces to reinforce the counterinsurgency fight in Vietnam. Eventually there were two Army-dominated commands Military Assistance Command, Vietnam and U.S. Army, Vietnam directing the U.S./allied COIN effort alongside the South Vietnamese. Army special warfare assets were divided with the majority of PSYOP and Civil Affairs units assigned to USARV; with Special Forces and some Civil Affairs units assigned to MACV. When the war ended 13 years later, the post-Vietnam Army purged COIN and IDAD from doctrine, although its special warfare forces (SF, PSYOP and CA) were still tasked with the mission. Communist-sponsored “wars of national liberation” had not gone away. Foreign internal defense was adopted to replace Vietnam-tainted IDAD; COIN was buried under UW. Then, international terrorism threatened the Western world in the late 1970s, and the Army again looked to special warfare.

The 1979 failed Iran hostage rescue at Desert One added special operations to the Army’s special warfare capabilities (UW, PSYOP and CA). The Army then consolidated its active duty special warfare assets under 1st Special Operations Command in 1983, adopting the new operational sobriquet. Just before Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Department of Army transferred the special warfare elements of the Army Reserve and Army National Guard to its newest Army Component Command, U.S. Army Special Operations Command. The units added the special warfare dimension to the Gulf War. They multiplied the UW capabilities of coalition forces and provided the strategic reconnaissance, combat search and rescue and special operations for the combatant commander. Through subsequent operations in Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, Army SOF, special warfare, and strike capabilities earned increasingly important roles in these campaigns.

Following 9/11, Army SOF assumed historic roles in the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. In Afghanistan, 300 Army SF Soldiers supporting the Northern Alliance helped to topple the Taliban. In Iraq, the 10th SFG(A) advised 65,000 Kurdish Peshmerga, assumed tactical control of the 173rd Infantry Brigade (A) and the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit and successfully tied down three Iraqi corps. Both ARSOF campaigns demonstrated the renewed relevance of UW and the subsequent combat advisory missions that highlight the value of contemporary special warfare. Over the past 13 years, the criticality of SOF campaigns elsewhere became evident. Lebanon, the Philippines, Pakistan and Yemen, along with earlier missions in El Salvador and Colombia, were milestones in Army SOF maturation. SOF had moved from its traditional role of supporting conventional campaigns and executing strategically important but episodic operations to being in many cases the main effort in SOF-centric campaigns.
ARSOF 2022 is the U.S. Army Special Operations Command blueprint for the future. Based on national security threats, it addresses capabilities, force structure, equipment, training, education and resource management through the coming decade. Army SOF is adapting from its past, incorporating the lessons of current operations, and looking to the future to update and clarify the Army special operations mission. It cements SOF-conventional force relationships that were hard-earned overseas in combat by today’s Army leaders.

Recent institutional advancements include: publication of Army SOF Doctrine in ADP 3.05; standup of Operations Detachment J (SOF) of Mission Command Training Program; designation of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School as the Army's Special Operations Center of Excellence; the Army’s adoption of a 7th Warfighting Function, “Engagement,” that outlines SOF-CF interdependence. Tremendous progress has been made in the last three years.

Future considerations should include:
1. Designating the Commanding General, USASOC, as the Special Warfare Adviser to the Chief of Staff of the Army and as the principal Army Staff Special Warfare Officer.
2. Developing and integrating ARSOF Operational Art and research development, test and evaluation programs across the Army and the joint force to enhance operational capabilities.
3. Undertaking a comprehensive Army-wide review of policies that should be changed to better accommodate the Army’s responsibilities to build and maintain the nation’s premier special warfare capability.

USASOC is U. S. Special Operations Command’s largest component, but remains an integral part of today’s Army. Its surgical strike units are the world’s best, and its special warfare capability is more relevant, and necessary, today than ever. SW

Eugene G. Piasecki is a retired Special Forces officer who has been with the USASOC History Office since 2006. A U.S. Military Academy graduate, he earned his master's degree in military history from Norwich University and is currently pursuing a PhD. His current research interests include the history of Army Special Forces, Special Forces since its beginning in 1952 and the History of Camp Mackall, N.C.

Notes
3. Michael E. Krivdo, “Right Man for the Job: Colonel Charles H. Karlstad,” Veritas, Journal of Army Special Operations History, ARSOF in the Korean War: Part V, PB 31-05-2, Volume 8, No. 1, 2012, 77. At the time he was selected to Command the Psywar Center, COL Karlstad was the Infantry School Chief of Staff. From this position, COL Karlstad brought with him lessons learned that established the initial guidelines and priorities that shaped the development of each SOF unit into eventual service branches. Karlstad also created and saved the Psywar School as an independent Army service school responsible for Psywar and SF training.
4. McClintock, “Toward a Doctrine of Special Warfare,” 17. Army Field Forces was the WWII fore-runner to the Continental Army Command (CONARC).
8. Elliot V. Converse III, Rearming for the Cold War, 1945-1960 (Washington, DC: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2012), 596. President Dwight Eisenhower’s “New Look” policy and strategy stressed nuclear weapons, along with the deployment of the first operational guided missiles to provide security and make it possible to reduce military spending (p. vi). On the other hand, “flexible response,” which had been articulated as early as 1956 by General Maxwell D. Taylor, represented a ‘balanced’ military capability that included strong conventional forces (p. 596).
10. Andrew J. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1942-1976 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History United States Army, 2007), 165. Quote is from Presentation, General George Decker to General Staff
As our Army moves forward with the formalization of the concept of interdependence, conventional and special operations forces will continue to work through the implementation of this activity during joint training and operations. This implementation in training and operations is imperative as the future operational environment demands a seamless unified effort between all U.S. military units. Unfortunately, understanding the imperative does not inform the practical application of a concept. So how do conventional forces and special operations forces execute this concept of interdependence?

While there are many aspects to interdependence, including interoperability of communications platforms, integration of assets and communication between leaders and staffs, one specific action enables successful implementation of interdependence more than any other: the proper selection and utilization of a liaison officer. The liaison officer is the critical link to successful CF-SOF interdependence and is the single biggest factor in enabling operational effectiveness and ensuring consistency in CF-SOF unified action.

Interdependence is defined in TRADOC PAM 525-8-5 as: “...the deliberate and mutual reliance on one unified action partner (UAP) on another’s inherent capabilities to provide complementary and reinforcing effects. ...[Interdependence] applies to both Army units working interdependently and to unified action partners working interdependently with those Army units.” This discussion will focus exclusively on the relationship between CF and SOF, but many of the comments and recommendations can be applied further by both CF and SOF in their interactions with other unified action partners, whether they are U.S. Government entities, IGOs/NGOs, host-nation entities or private groups. While CF and SOF can and will be deployed in unilateral operations in the future, this discussion assumes CF-SOF operation in a shared or adjacent operational environment.

**Bridging the Gap: Making Two Forces One**

The culture that exists in the Army’s conventional force is different than the culture that exists in special operations. This is not a pejorative statement, nor is it a statement implying difference in cultures and understanding that difference. This understanding is critical because it allows us to bridge that cultural gap which, in turn, is the foundation of CF-SOF interdependence. This cultural difference is about systems and process; how a brigade combat team plans versus how a Special Forces advanced operating base plans. It’s about how a special operations task force processes information and how a BCT shares information. It is beyond what we wear and how we wear it — it is a difference in how we conduct our operations. When these two cultures share an operational area, are stakeholders in a non-contiguous or non-adjacent operational area or are in some other combination of planning or operating with common interests, the most efficient single touch point for those two cultures is the establishment of a LNO (or team). Our doctrine tells us that the nature of military operations is an inherently human endeavor; therefore, it ought to follow that the conduct of military operations and how we execute military operations is also a human endeavor. Rather than using this to inform our suppositions of the enemy forces, operational environments and civil populaces, we also ought to allow this principal to inform how we interact with our own military partners. As important as nodes, functions
and systems are to the implementation of the interdependence activity, they cannot replace the genuinely human aspect of putting Soldiers from one culture into the other (and vice versa) to bridge the cultural gap.

**Interdependence as a Requirement of the Future Operational Environment**

TRADOC PAM 525-8-5 discusses the future force requirements for engagement and interdependence in the future operational environment in detail. But what does that look like at the BCT, battalion task force, SOTF and AOB level? During the past 18 months, rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center have increased the importance of what we don't know in addition to what we do know. Three of the six principles of mission command: build cohesive teams through trust, create a shared understanding and accept prudent risk, are examples of why mission command construct requires interdependence more so than the outdated construct of command and control. Mission command's acceptance of wicked problems inherent in complex, ever-changing and uncertain operational environments demands that all forces within an operational area or stake-holders in a general geographic area develop a strong relationship to create shared understanding, build the cohesive UAP team, and understand what they don't know to help better inform their acceptance of risk.

“To truly reap the benefits of interdependence, CF and SOF organizations must build relationships with each other. Employment of an LNO is the most discernible and productive way to build organizational relationships.”

by multiple current operations in the Africa Command AOR where 1st Infantry Division Regionally Aligned Forces, from brigade to company level, are working adjacent to or within effects of 10th Group Special Operations Forces from SOTF to team level. During the joint readiness training center rotations, interdependence has validated its relevancy multiple times. The significant highlights of this validation includes disparate planning efforts leading to conflicting mission execution, inability to develop common operating pictures and lack of information sharing. Each of these observations can be analyzed in detail, but proper selection and utilization of LNOs is a common denominator in addressing the solutions. In short, CF and SOF must synchronize and coordinate various activities to ensure the effective accomplishment of the geographic combatant commander's endstate.

Additionally, Mission Command of Army Forces is heavily reliant on a holistic approach to conducting operations and agility and adaptability. As opposed to the old construct of command and control, where the underlying philosophy assumed that with more information and more systems commanders could come close to a perfect description, mission command understands the importance of what we don't know in addition to what we do know. Three of the six principles of mission command: build cohesive teams through trust, create a shared understanding and accept prudent risk, are examples of why mission command construct requires interdependence more so than the outdated construct of command and control. Mission command's acceptance of wicked problems inherent in complex, ever-changing and uncertain operational environments demands that all forces within an operational area or stake-holders in a general geographic area develop a strong relationship to create shared understanding, build the cohesive UAP team, and understand what they don't know to help better inform their acceptance of risk.

**Building Relationships and Addressing the Cultural Divide**

As stated earlier, systems, nodes and functions are important. But the interoperability that those networks enable are only a component of interdependence. To truly reap the benefits of interdependence, CF and SOF organizations must build relationships with each other. Employment of an LNO is the most discernible and productive way to build organizational relationships. Commander-to-commander dialogue is more effective, but occurs at irregular and lengthy intervals. Additionally, commander-to-commander dialogue often times excludes key staff. Co-locating or co-basing, while also highly effective, is often not practical due to mission requirements for one or both of the forces. Systematic information exchange is readily available and informing, but is far less effective at developing relationships. To get beyond interoperability and integration, units must employ and properly utilize LNOs in the interdependence activity.

“Connectivity gives us the illusion of knowing … Real connections come when people engage, when there is eye contact, when there is a hand on the shoulder, and when the conversation is not one way.” — Gen. (R) Stanley McChrystal.

In the end, organizational relationships are much like individual relationships. Sending the right LNO to another organization is like looking them in eye and having a fruitful conversation with them, to use Gen. McChrystal's example. Much of the cultural divide stems from familiarity with each force. SOF officers and NCOs are being assessed earlier in their careers than in the past and, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan notwithstanding, CF and SOF units rarely train or operate together. While they may have the same home station or conduct operations in the same operational environment, they rarely train or operate together. All of the discussion below is applicable to both CF LNOs sent to SOF units and SOF LNOs sent to CF units.

**Planning Considerations**

An excellent example of the difference of cultures is the planning methodologies utilized by each force. The brigade combat team generally uses an in-depth military decision making process methodology that generates mission orders and is sometimes informed by an abbreviated design methodology. Notably, it is the tactical mission and the tactical tasks that they will utilize to accomplish that mission that is driving the brigade's planning effort. The advanced operations base and special operations task force often use a planning effort based on MDMP, but is more operational in nature. Considerations such as centers of gravity, target audience analysis and time and space are weighted much more heavily. While grounded in MDMP and Army doctrine, it can appear to be a mission tailororable confluence of MDMP, design and joint operations. Special Forces teams are, like their conventional counterparts, conducting tactical tasks in the operational environment; however, unlike their conventional counterparts, the missions are often operational or strategic in nature. This is often what drives the difference in planning process. An LNO that is exposed to and can see the fight at the
tactical-, operational- and strategic-level can provide irreplaceable perspective to both forces when friction might arise. Additionally, the planning horizons will often be different between CF planning and SOF planning. In the future operational environment, the seven phases of unconventional warfare will often drive SOTF planning. CF planning efforts will not start at the same time that SOF planning starts. CF planning will likely not start until Phase V of the UW planning process and employment — if it occurs — will be in Phase VI or later. More significant than the fact that the planning efforts are different is that planners at each force are not familiar with the other’s process and sometimes aren’t aware that a different process even exists. An LNO that is grounded in his parent unit’s planning process and involved in the attached unit’s planning process can provide invaluable insight to both organizations to better inform each planning process.

Finally, the BCT’s planning process is heavily dependent upon a large staff and leveraging all of the warfighting functions present in that staff. The SOTF’s, and certainly AOB’s, planning process is much less dependent on warfighting functions because of the lack of a robust staff. The effectively employed LNO can help facilitate critical staff-to-staff interaction that helps each element identify and leverage the other’s inherent capabilities.

Multiple & Alternate Perspectives

Probably the most important human element an LNO can provide a unit is a different perspective, specifically the perspective of his organic unit. Again, there are several fundamental differences in how SOTFs and BCTs conduct operations. These differences are necessary for each force to accomplish their assigned mission. One such multiple perspective is the nature of tasks and endstates for each force. In general, brigade combat teams will conduct tactical tasks that achieve tactical endstates. Historically, brigades operate at the tactical level of war. While modern warfare — molded by the information revolution — has blended the levels of war, brigades still achieve tactical endstates in support of a larger headquarters’ operational objectives. The SOTF, on the other hand, often conducts operations directly in support of operational or strategic objectives. Particularly in the conduct of UW, SOF elements operate in a different level of war. Certainly they are still conducting tactical tasks (destroy, seize, neutralize, etc.) but these tactical tasks gain operational and strategic effects by way of operating with, through and by indigenous forces (at the tactical level) and garnering legitimacy for a shared cause.

Partnered units often cannot see the difference of purpose between the two units. One unit might not understand another focusing on something they see as inconsequential while the other unit might not understand the ramifications of targets that they are not tracking. The mature liaison element, grounded in his unit’s modus operandi and adapted quickly to his partnered unit, can provide a different and alternate perspective that helps paint a much clearer picture of partnered-unit operations. This perspective can greatly inform planning sessions, the targeting process and other integrating processes and continuing activities within a force headquarters.

Another area where perspective is important is methods and information sharing. All too often, miscommunication occurs simply because we don’t understand how to transmit. We know what to communicate, but get lost in how to transmit information. Sometimes this is a mission-command systems issue, sometimes it is a time-management issue and sometimes it is organizational dynamics. Whatever the reason, the most effective method for mitigating these miscommunication mistakes is a quality LNO.

Information sharing is an important consideration in interdependence. Unfortunately, this is an area where units will often harm relationships by either not sharing enough or not handling information accordingly. Appropriate clearances for LNOs is just the beginning. How each force headquarters integrates the LNO into their main command post or operations center and what information they are willing to share is critical to building the relationship.

“It was the idea that we were now part of a team where information became the essential link between us, not a block between us.” — Gen. (R) Stanley McChrystal.

Alternate control/compensatory measure programs and other need-to-know type operations obviously cannot be violated; but, in general, the more information partnered units share the better refinement to each other’s shared understanding of the operational environment. Again, the liaison element serves as the critical link and can be of most benefit to each force by ensuring both comprehensive information sharing and ensure each unit is responsible and understands sensitivities attached to information.

Each unit is unique. With this uniqueness, each unit develops its own distinct perspectives. From non-standard logistics to the way in which they see the civil environment, a quality LNO can serve as a small investment that can bring an entire organization’s perspective to another unit. This ability to help a partnered unit understand its partner will also help them provide that unit complementary and reinforcing effects on the battlefield.

Integrating the LNO to Operationalize Interdependence

Recommendations

Effective integration of liaison officers and teams is — like most everything else in combat — easier said than done. However, one of the key purposes of JRTC is to provide the force with observable practices that enable tactical success for BCTs and SOTFs. As any unit has experienced, just providing a liaison team to another headquarters doesn’t solve anything. We must properly resource and integrate these LNOs so that they may operationalize the concept of interdependence.

Changing the Meaning of LNO

The absolute first step in proper integration of liaison teams is a cultural shift in attitude about what the LNO is and what the LNO does. The very term “liaison officer/NCO” and “LNO” carries a tremendous amount of baggage. The assignment is viewed negatively for several reasons.

First, you are away from your unit (and your supervisor and team) working for someone that has little vested interest in your success or failure, other than that tied to his own success or failure. Second, LNOs are rarely provided the detailed resources (specifically CCIR, reporting criteria and daily communication with senior leaders from their organic units) that are required for successful execution of their jobs. Finally, the term is usually associated with junior officers or NCOs who go to a higher headquarters just to serve as a communications link. It is imperative that we reframe our concepts about what constitutes a liaison team and its mission.

An LNO that successfully operationalizes interdependence really looks more like an area specialist team from the special operations forces. They embed during planning, integrate themselves into the team, are viewed as part of the team and work as a part of the staff rather
than an outsider just observing. Again, this change in perspective is required from both the supported and the supporting unit. A SOTF headquarters that receives a CF LNO and doesn’t integrate him into their staff is just as negligent as a BCT that sends an inexperienced lieutenant with no security clearance to a SOTF. In fact, proper integration and utilization by the supported (receiving) headquarters is probably more important than anything the supporting (losing) headquarters can do insofar as preparation of the liaison team. Reframing our organizational concepts of what an LNO is — at least with regards to interdependence — is critical in the effort to operationalize and effectively execute interdependence.

Getting the Right Person

Selecting the right Soldier for the job seems self-evident. Organizationally, however, we often select liaison teams as a matter of rank, positions or military occupational specialties. We limit ourselves to junior officers or mid-grade NCOs, maneuver or intelligence Soldiers and those around the headquarters staffs. The selection of the LNO ought to be more about personality, interpersonal skills and intellectual ability than rank, position or MOS. As discussed earlier, SOTFs conducting UW have different perspectives on the missions and operations to be accomplished. Brigades should consider selecting Soldiers who see the big picture and think in terms of the operational and strategic levels of war. They should consider intellectual agile thinkers who can quickly assimilate SOTF-specific terminology and concepts. It is not enough to know what to say; you must understand the meaning behind these terms and concepts as well. SOTFs ought to consider sending those with interpersonal skills that will facilitate their integration into a larger organization; someone who will not get overwhelmed with the friction created by such a large staff and the processes that define it.

And, of course, it should hurt. If the loss of the selected Soldier(s) doesn’t hurt your organization, that is an indicator that you are not doing enough to enable interdependence. Commanders and leaders should remember that the loss of your LNO will be offset by the commensurate abilities brought to the staff by the reciprocal liaison team of your partnered unit. If two organizations exchange quality liaison teams, then they are enabling a far greater understanding of the operational environment, consideration of perspectives and bridging of organizational cultures than if those Soldiers stayed in the unit.

Contrary to the aforementioned misconception that selecting the right Soldier to be an LNO is self-evident; sending an LNO to a supported headquarters that hurts your unit actually helps your unit in the longer term and in the bigger picture. Commanders and leaders invariably come to this realization at the end of each rotation after seeing the many missed opportunities of interdependence.

Commander and Staff Officer Responsibilities

The liaison team is only part of the equation. Supporting (organic) and supported (receiving) headquarters also play a critical role in the proper implementation of LNOs. For supported headquarters, expectations and critical information requirements are absolutely necessary to enable the liaison officer. While we want to select mature, smart people, none of our LNOs will have the experience or insight into what the commander wants or needs like the commander or his executive staff. The commander ought to consider having a thorough discussion with the liaison team to clearly outline requirements. Someone on the commander’s executive staff ought to have an open line of communication with the LNO and establish a daily reporting or communications window. Additionally, the brigade staff officers must know the liaison teams capabilities and requirements. The staff must understand where they can leverage the LNO, when they are wasting their time and when the staff can assist the liaison team in its duties. Much as with a commander, the staff must anticipate their partnered unit’s needs and assist them through either staff-to-staff coordination (facilitated by the LNO) or by leveraging the liaison team. As interdependence is defined as an “activity” of the Engagement Warfighting Function, it is inherently a staff task.

The supported unit has responsibilities as well. The supported unit must integrate the LNO immediately and as much as possible into the unit’s planning and operations. This includes the current operations floor of the main command post/operations center, working groups, planning sessions and TAC operations, if neces-

Filling the Sangari

Vacuum of Power

During a recent JRTC rotation, the CF brigade had successfully repelled the enemy attack and was postured to conduct a brigade attack on the city of Sangari. The brigade realized that this attack would expel the enemy forces from the province, but was not looking beyond the attack to transition to stability operations. The SOTF LNO understood the SOTF’s unconventional warfare operations in the Sangari area. Working with the BCT S9, he coordinated through the offensive MDMP planning sessions and BCT targeting meetings for SOTF-trained and connected guerilla fighters to assume the vacuum of power. After gaining approval and constantly coordinating between the BCT and SOTF headquarters, they were able to have a plan in place to secure the peace after the BCT’s attack. At the conclusion of the BCT’s attack on Sangari, the BCT commander actually meet the guerilla fighters and effectively transitioned responsibility of the area over to them under the authority of the host-nation provincial government.
sary. The supported unit needs to provide the liaison team with its own information requirements and shape the LNOs understanding of the unit and its systems and processes. Additionally, the supported unit ought to be receptive to the contributions of the liaison team. It does no good for the LNO to bring alternative perspectives and attempt to bridge the cultural divide if the supported unit does not consider his input and contributions. Finally, the supported headquarters staff should leverage the liaison team and work with or through them to leverage the capabilities and resources of their counterparts in the partnered headquarters. The success of the LNO rests as much on the ability of the supporting and supported commanders and staffs as it does on the individuals executing the LNO mission.

**Conclusion: The LNO as an Operational Imperative**

The contemporary operating environment continually demonstrates to our Army the necessity for forces working closely with other forces. Gone are the days when operations and missions in one unit’s AO or another district or province did not impact another unit operating adjacent or near another force. The future operational environment — at least the understanding, prediction and evidentiary prognostication that we have of it — further necessitates functional relationships between forces operating in, around and near each other. Most importantly, the implications of failure in our interconnected global commons compel us to find ways to work better as a team. There are many ways in which units can further interdependence and tasks to accomplish this activity. But none of these tasks or methods are as valuable as establishing a quality and effective liaison team to build the organizational relationship. This concept, that organizational relationships are what really matter in interdependence, is what drives the importance of the LNO. It is the LNOs ability to enable operational effectiveness and ensure CF-SOF unity of effort that truly makes them the critical link in CF-SOF interdependence. SW


MAJ Israel Villarreal, Jr., Special Operations Training Detachment, JRTC Operations Group.

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**Notes**

1. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-5, U.S. Army Functional Concept for Engagement, FEB ’14, is the most comprehensive and authoritative articulation of Interdependence to date. It lists Interdependence as the fourth of four key activities of Engagement, the seventh Warfighting Function. It broadly outlines the concept of Interdependence and discusses force requirements.

2. TRADOC PAM 525-8-5, pp. 18, para (2) and (3).

3. For a comprehensive summation of Interdependence at JRTC, see Henry, LTC Lawrence W. “Hank”, Institutionalizing Interdependence, Special Warfare, April-June 2014, pp. 18-22. Of note, LTC Henry outlines the concept of ACPEA (Acknowledge, Coordinate, Plan, Execute and Assess) for executing Interdependence.

4. GEN (R) Stanley McChrystal in TEDx talk published 20 APR 2014, accessible at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pvzc6hiZ8Aeg

5. GEN (R) Stanley McChrystal on Transparency in TEDx talk published 07 MAY 2014, accessible at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9jRkACywckE
**ANNOUNCEMENTS**

4th Quarter Board Schedule

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**NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS**

Service Remaining Requirement for ARSOF Qualification Training

Regardless if a Soldier is reclassifying to a Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations or Special Forces MOS, upon completion of training there is a 36 month service remaining requirement for all enlisted (IAW AR 614-200 paragraph 5-10f) and a three to one year service obligation for the officers (IAW AR 350-100 Paragraph 2-7). This service obligation is small in comparison to the specialized skills acquired during training and the dedication and time required to be awarded a MOS from one of these branches.

If a Soldier is interested in reclassifying to an ARSOF MOS, the first step is to contact the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion and submit a volunteer statement and a complete application packet. If selected for training by the respective Assessment and Selection Committee, the Soldier (if enlisted) must re-enlist or extend in order to meet the SRR to attend training. After being awarded the MOS/branch, the SRR or ADSO begins.

**DA Pamphlet 600-25 or DA Pamphlet 600-3 and Your Career**

Regardless of rank or number of years in service, it is important to regularly review DA Pamphlet 600-25 U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide and DA Pamphlet 600-3 Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management, both of which are living documents and constantly under review to maintain relevance with the changing needs of the force due to structure, career opportunities available, terminology and what constitutes the best or most qualified candidate for promotion consideration. These regulations will ensure that you are abreast of the latest changes that affect not only our own career progression, but the career progression of those you lead and the leader you aspire to become.

The U.S. Army is going through a reduction period; the current estimate is that the active duty Army will reduce to below 450,000 by 2019 making retaining our most qualified members paramount to the success of ARSOF.

If you are being reviewed by a board, regardless if it is for promotion consideration or involuntary release from service consideration, ensure that your records are current and as competitive as possible. These two DA Pamphlets will assist in ensuring you are reviewed based on the expectations of your career field. If approaching a promotion board, ensure at a minimum you have your ERB/ORB and DA photo up to date. Not having these documents prepared tells the promotion board members that you do not care to be selected for promotion. Ensure the records reviewed actually reflect the Soldier. Remember that you are your own best career manager and these two documents will assist you in becoming the best leader you can be.

**Psychological Operations Regimental Honors**

The Psychological Operations Command’s Training Development Division is responsible for the design, development and redesign of all PSYOP courses taught at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. While course redesign is never-ending their current focus lies on a few initiatives: redesign of the PSYOP Qualification Courses for Soldiers, NCOs; implementation of PSYOP advanced skills and tasks into pre-existing courses; and the development of an Expert PSYOP Badge. TDD is working with the active and reserve operational forces and 5th Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group (A) to completely overhaul the PSYOP Officer Qualification Course. Portions of the culmination exercises have been removed allowing officers to spend more time on planning operations and affording enlisted more opportunities with role players during key leader engagement scenarios. The officer course will be research intensive. The group is also looking to improve the PSYOP Specialist Course’s technical PSYOP skills instruction. TDD has been involved in the redesign of courses to enhance the competencies of PSYOP Soldiers. Operational Planning Teams, composed of personnel from the three ARSOF branch commandants, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command and operational MISO units have collaborated to enhance or redesign courses to include more MISO-specific tasks. Simply put, all courses will have CA, SF and PSYOP working together to foster ARSOF interdependence while honing and advancing skills of Soldiers within the three regiments.

In May 2014, USAJFKSWCS Commanding General, Maj. Gen. Eric P. Wendt directed the PSYOP Commandant to look at the feasibility of an Expert PSYOP Badge; similar to the Expert Infantry and Expert Field Medical Badges. TDD developed and collected survey samples throughout the entire regiment. The Expert PSYOP Badge is currently pending a test proof-of-concept event and review prior to moving forward to Army G-1 for final approval.
CAREER NOTES

HUMAN RESOURCES COMMAND CORNER

Civil Affairs
On Dec. 3, 2014, the Army released an update to DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management. Chapter 18 outlines the CA officer’s professional development model and there were a number of changes that impact the CA Regiment. It is important to note that these changes are not retroactive in nature.

If a position was previously considered key developmental and is no longer highlighted, the officer will not be disadvantaged by the change. Every officer should strive to meet the KD requirements as outlined in Chapter 18. While serving in KD positions is important, the officer’s overall manner of performance (as outlined on their Officer Evaluation Reports), is the most important factor in consideration for both promotion and selection for command. I strongly suggest you review the update to best understand your career development model.

For more information, contact the Civil Affairs Branch Chief, Lieutenant Colonel Jay Liddick at floyd.s.liddick.mil@mail.mil.

Special Forces
We want to take this opportunity to thank everyone for their patience as we work through the manning cycles and ensuring we get the right person to the right job in a timely manner during this period of high OPTEMPO with increasing operational requirements. Below is an update on the state of Special Forces (SF) Branch from the US Army Human Resources Command (HRC) perspective.

We would like to bid farewell to Mr. Richard Bell, who served for over three years as the Company Grade Human Resource Tech at SF Branch and numerous years of civil service to the nation. Mr. Bell departed in February, and we wish him well.

Centralized Select List
We want to congratulate the officers who were selected for the FY16 Lieutenant Colonel Centralized Selection List. The final CSL slating list will be out in late March/early April and will provide the pinpoint CSL assignments.

FY15 ARSOF Officer Accessions Panel
U.S. Army Human Resources Command has released MILPER Message 14-220 that outlines the application process and eligibility criteria for active duty YG 2012 Officers (with a DOR for 1st Lt. between 01APR13 and 31MAR14) to apply for accession into one of the three ARSOF Branches: Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations.

Officers interested in applying are encouraged to read through the MILPER message located on the HRC website and contact their local Special Operations Recruiting Battalion (www.sorbre cruiting.com) for more information.

Complete applications must be submitted to the SORB no later than 20 March 2015. The ARSOF Accessions Panel will convene in April 2015 and the results are expected to be released in May 2015.

Take Away Corner
- The Army is continuing to restructure, and this will affect SF Branch/Officers with potentially lower promotion rates across all pay grades, selective early retirement boards for lieutenant colonels and colonies and officer separation boards for select year groups.
- OERs, particularly in Key and Developmental jobs, continue to be the primary contributor for promotion and CSL selection. Senior raters must ensure that their message is clear to the boards.
- Operational requirements are increasing while we still struggle to meet Army Manning Guidance for units outside of the US SOCOM/USASOC Enterprise. Emerging requirement must be scrutinized to avoid creating 18A/180A gaps not only within the SF Regiment but the rest of the Army.
- The Army continues to stress the importance of broadening assignments for our officers. It is imperative that our best officers are challenged with assignments outside of the US SOCOM/USASOC Enterprise.

Milsuite
Please ensure that you and your subordinates possess a Milsuite account. Milsuite is the primary method of transmitting information to the field. Below are URLs for the Assignment Officers’ Milsuite pages.
- Major MilSuite: https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/special-forces-majors
- Captain MilSuite: https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/special-forces-lieutenants
- Warrant Officer MilSuite: https://www.milsuite.mil/book/groups/special-forces-lieutenants

SPECIAL FORCES WARRANT OFFICER ILE

The revised Army Regulation (AR) 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development has been in effect since Aug. 19, 2014. Of all the changes specified in AR 350-1, the most influential is the Warrant Officer Intermediate Level Education follow-on courses. Paragraph 3-36 states, “a follow-on phase may be required by some proponent branch centers and schools to ensure intermediate level WOs receive the latest technical/functional PME within their career field...officers who do not successfully complete the course will not be awarded MEL Q until all phases are complete.”

The SFWOILE consists of three modules of advance-level education encompassing military history, theory, doctrine and application. SF Warrants can attend SFWOILE prior to attending WOILE phase I (distance learning) and/or phase II (residence) at the Warrant Officer Career College, Fort Rucker, AL. The SF Warrant Officer Institute offers the SFWOILE twice each fiscal year. Each class has the capacity to seat up to 30 students, with a minimum of 10 students. To enroll, submit an A-1 request to your Group Schools NCO through ATTRS, as this is a MFP-11 funded school. Currently the HRC Leadership Development Division requires a justification statement for CW2s to attend. The “need for follow-on assignment” must be stated on the A-1 request when it is submitted to the ATTRS system.

SFWOILE as a follow on became effective on Aug. 19, 2014. SF WOs with WOILE prior to this date are grandfathered, and the course is optional. For more information contact the SF Warrant Officer Proponent Office at 180AProponentManager@soc.mil, DSN 239-7597 or kommerial at (910) 432-7597 or SFWOI at (910) 396-6068.