On the Cover

The Academic Issue:
In this issue, Special Warfare takes a look at some bright ideas coming out of the advanced education programs sponsored through the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.

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Cover illustration by Doris Jo Carson, USAJFKSWCS Office of Strategic Communication.
U.S. ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY
SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER AND SCHOOL

MISSION: The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the U.S. Army's Special Operations Center of Excellence, trains, educates, develops and manages world-class Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Special Forces warriors and leaders in order to provide the Army special operations forces regiments with professionally trained, highly educated, innovative and adaptive operators.

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Submit graphics, tables and charts with source references in separate files from the manuscript (no embedded graphics). Special Warfare accepts only high-resolution (300 dpi or greater) digital photos; be sure to include a caption and photographer's credit. Do not send photos within PowerPoint slides. Prints and 35 mm transparencies are also acceptable. Photos will be returned, if possible.

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Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

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By order of the Secretary of the Army:
Raymond T. Odierno
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Gerald B O'Keefe
Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army
1424802
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Two of the hallmarks of our superb ARSOF special operations Soldiers are their knowledge of languages and cultures. Additional hallmarks are the key education programs established by the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. These programs further professionalize the three ARSOF Regiments and increase our operational effectiveness.

These education programs pay tremendous dividends in the development of Army Special Operations. Through several of these programs, special operations Soldiers can earn associate’s, bachelor’s, master’s and doctoral degrees. These advanced education opportunities provide our special operators a smorgasbord of effective tools to utilize as we conduct our missions around the globe.

In this issue of *Special Warfare*, we have collected some of the many excellent papers written by recent graduates from the various masters’ programs in which ARSOF Soldiers are enrolled. These papers cover a wide variety of topics, but help bring new angles and ideas to bear on existing problems. The ability to look at a problem, assess it from a number of perspectives, and yield new, different and effective approaches to solve the problem is one trait that makes ARSOF operators the world-class operators they are.

Maj. Casey Mills, who received his master’s in strategic studies from the SWCS-sponsored program at The National Defense University, proposes a new model for evaluating terrorist threats. Mills’ model looks at the scale, scope and salience of terrorist organizations to determine the nature of the threat and to prioritize efforts to combat them.

Lt. Col. Tobias Vogt, who is a U.S. Army Professor of Strategic Intelligence in the School of Science and Technology Intelligence at the National Intelligence University in Washington, D.C., wrote “Weapons of Mass Destruction-Terrorism (Nuclear): A Special Operations Primer.” In his article, Vogt gives SOF Soldiers a guide to the technical aspects of design and potential impacts for the two primary capability routes for nuclear terrorists.

1st Sgt. Andrew J. Prescott tackled the difficult task of dealing with interagency conflict. Prescott suggests that an understanding of human social behavior and organizational theory has the potential to solve problems before they start. Prescott also earned his master’s in strategic studies at NDU.

These articles, and the others in this edition of *Special Warfare* magazine, are only a sampling of the outstanding academic work produced by our ARSOF operators using the advanced education opportunities available. I suggest all ARSOF operators constantly challenge ourselves to make ourselves better, stronger, smarter and faster. Applying for an advanced educational opportunity may be the right path forward as you progress in your ARSOF career.

Major General Eric P. Wendt

Wendt, the former commander of Special Operations Command-Korea, the Theater Special Operations Command for the Korean Theater of Operations, replaced Brig. Gen. David G. Fox, who is retiring after more than 34 years in the U.S. Army.

"Maj. Gen. Wendt is the right man to step up and take command of SWCS. He is an exceptionally well-rounded leader and uniquely qualified to command SWCS," said Cleveland, who added that SWCS is the most complex command within USASOC. SWCS is comprised of three groups, the 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne), the Special Warfare Education Group (Airborne) and the Special Warfare Medical Group (Airborne). Additionally, it is home to the Special Forces Warrant Officer Institute, the Non-commissioned Officers Institute and the Joint Special Operations Medical Training Center.

"...[Eric] made substantial strides [in Korea] to improve our relationship with our Korean partners and to build the foundation for a multinational special operations forces approach to any impending problems on the Peninsula," said Cleveland. "Eric will, without a doubt, carry on SWCS’s well-earned legacy of excellence; making better the initiatives we have underway."

Maj. Gen. Wendt holds a bachelor of arts from the University of California-Santa Barbara, as well as a master of arts from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif.

He has served an active duty, Regular Army officer since 1986. He served for nearly five years as an Infantry officer, attended and was selected at the Special Forces Assessment and Selection course and graduated as Distinguished Honor Graduate from the Special Forces Qualification Course before assignment to the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne). Maj. Gen. Wendt then served for 21 years as a Special Forces officer before becoming a general officer. Before serving as a TSOC Commander, Wendt served in the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) as an ODA commander, company commander, battalion commander and group commander. He has also served in a variety of command and staff positions, including multiple operational and combat deployments with both SOF and conventional forces. Since 9/11, Wendt has served as team chief for the Pacific Special Operations Assessment Team to Indonesia, in Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, in Operation Iraqi Freedom (two tours) and in Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan. Wendt served in the Pentagon from 2009-2011 on the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff as the Director for Special Opera-

tions Policy, and then as the Principal Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. Prior to assuming command of SOCKOR, Maj. Gen. Wendt served in Afghanistan (2011-2012) as the sole Deputy Commanding General for the 13,500 troops from 17 countries in ISAF’s Regional Command-North in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Maj. Gen. Wendt’s awards and badges include the Defense Superior Service Medal with oak-leaf cluster, the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star Medal with two oak-leaf clusters, the Afghanistan Campaign Medal with one campaign star, the Iraq Campaign Medal with three campaign stars, the Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, the Humanitarian Service Medal, the German Gold Cross of Honor (for combat service in Afghanistan), the Republic of the Philippines Presidential Unit Citation (for service in OEF-Philippines) and the Republic of Korea Order of Cheon Su Medal. Maj. Gen. Wendt has earned the Air Assault Badge, the Master Parachutist Badge, the Korean and Thai Master Parachutist Badges, the Ranger Tab, the Special Forces Tab, the Expert Infantryman Badge and the Combat Infantryman Badge.

Wendt said taking command of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School is an “honor,” noting that he was "thankful for the opportunity."

Wendt, whose remarks were brief, took a moment to praise the staff — Soldiers and civilians — for their efforts to train an ever evolving force in defense of the nation, adding, “Together, we will travel the path that lies ahead.” — by Janice Burton, Special Warfare Editor.
95th Civil Affairs welcomes new commander


Storey assumes command after completing his most recent assignment as the Directorate of Operations for Special Operations Command Africa in Stuttgart, Germany.

Outgoing Commander, Col. James C. Brown, will continue his career in special operations by joining Maj. Gen. Ed Reeder in support of his efforts as a senior leader for the Special Operations Command in Afghanistan.

"Coming to the command is an exceptionally qualified Special Operations officer in Col. Scot Storey," said Cleveland. "He's nearly done it all in our business. He has served in the Infantry, the Rangers, as a Special Forces ODA [Operational Detachment Alpha] Commander, SWCS [U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Command and School] and USASOC staff officer, and in the hard jobs of the Civil Affairs both at the tactical level and above. Scot's tailor made to take on the challenge of commanding this brigade."

The 95th CAB (A) consists of more than 1,200 Soldiers, including five battalions, the 91st, 92nd, 96th, 97th, and 98th Civil Affairs Battalions. The brigade is tasked to support department of defense special operations command task forces and the five U.S. geographic combatant commands.

"I want to thank you and the entire brigade for your service and recognize your vital contributions to the fight in Afghanistan and around the world," said Cleveland, addressing the Soldiers in formation representing the 95th CAB (A).

"Your unit above all others has, over the longest period, had the highest [operative] tempo. That the unit has successfully sustained the work load, excelled in your missions overseas and innovated so well back home is a testament to your dedication and commitment."

USASOAC(A) farwell continued from page 05

USASOAC commanding general, we have seen dramatic changes in our special operations aviation capability. Clay’s tenure has seen the development of a greatly enhanced aviation foreign internal defense capability, a maturing of the command as an advocate for the entire special operations aviation enterprise, the procurement of the C-27J and of course, the continued world-class support that the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) continues to provide around the world.

Along with the newly developed Aviation Foreign Internal Defense detachment and the arrival of the C-27J aircraft, USASOAC also transformed from a provisional to active unit and the U.S. Army Department of Heraldry approved unique distinguished unit insignia, beret flash and shoulder-sleeve insignia. Another major accomplishment during this time was the development and activation of Company E, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, USASOC’s first organic Gray Eagle Unmanned Aircraft Systems company.

Hutmacher achieved his many accomplishments amid a time of rising budget concerns for the Army and the Department of Defense.

Prior to taking command, Hutmacher said he had several goals for himself and the direction he hoped USASOAC would be heading towards upon his departure.

"One goal was to continue the good work of Maj. Gen. Kevin Mangum," he said. "He did an excellent job of establishing the command and pointing it in the right direction, but there was still a lot of work to be done. Commands sort of have a life cycle and we are in the early stages, where we have to mature."

"Another goal was to be a good teammate with various stakeholders like USASOC, the Special Forces Command and the other units that we support across the SOF enterprise," he said. "I also put a big priority on being a good teammate with Army Aviation, the Department of the Army and SOCOM. My final goal was to strengthen the relationship with the 160th and the other units that make up the ARSOAC enterprise and to continue to build on the teamwork and to work towards achieving our charter, which is to reduce the span of control of the operational units. I think we have done that;"

Although Hutmacher believes things are moving in the right direction, he knows the command still has work to do following his departure.

"Are we done yet?" He asked. "No. Is the ball further down the field? Absolutely! I think we are perceived as transparent and a good teammate with everyone we work with, both inside the SOF community and outside of it."

Hutmacher is replaced by Brig. Gen. Erik C. Peterson. Peterson’s previous role as Deputy Commanding General of Support, 2nd Infantry Division, is Hutmacher’s next assignment.

Hutmacher’s departure will mark his final time commanding an Army special operations aviation unit, a job he never took lightly and of which he wants all ARSOA Soldiers to realize the importance.

"No matter where you serve in the ARSOAC enterprise, you’re in a great unit," he proudly said. "I predict that after you leave this unit, you will look back on your service here with great pride and fondness. So don’t take serving in special ops aviation for granted. It’s a privilege and you are part of a team that produces a capability for the United States of America that no other country in the world has. You are all critical to that and you are all part of the team and I couldn’t be happier to have the opportunity to serve with each one of you." — by Sgt. 1st Class Thaddius S. Dawkins II, U.S. Army Special Operations Aviation Command (Airborne).
The Special Operations Forces Tele-training System, or SOFTS, is a Web-based training system that provides live language training to SOF Soldiers around the globe. The Special Operations Forces Language Office runs the program, and classes are of no cost to individual U.S. Special Operations Command students.

A teleconferencing platform called the Collaborative Learning Environment presents live audio and video for students and instructors interacting in an online virtual classroom. Participants need a PC, webcam, headset and dedicated Internet access to the virtual classroom and all the collaborative tools within.

SOFTS provides flexible training times for SOCOM students, and classes are not limited by location. Students can choose a schedule that accommodates both work and personal schedules, and can participate in class from anywhere there is dedicated broadband Internet. Additionally, instructors can teach from any location, creating a wider pool of available instructors to teach classes.

SOFTS classes are for SOCOM students only. Other active duty and Department of Defense government civilians may participate in SOFTS classes on a space-available basis only.

Enrollment is easy and flexible. SOCOM students can enroll in classes at any time and can register for any level that is appropriate for them. Classes start on a weekly basis, allowing students to receive training as needed without having to wait for training cycles to start or end. This is especially helpful for students who are attempting to prepare for their oral proficiency interview and Defense Language Proficiency Test or upcoming deployments.

Classes are organized by proficiency level according to the ILR scale. Standard classes consist of 16 weeks of language instruction. Classes typically take place three nights per week for two hours at a time. Tutoring appointments are also available during weekends for students who need extra help. A complete course amounts to 96 hours of instruction, in addition to the number of supplemental tutoring hours completed.

SOFTS classes are not limited to core languages, a benefit that is enabled by a wide pool of available instructors. Class content can be adjusted to accommodate training needs, and courses can be geared toward specific schedules and objectives outside the scope of standard instruction. Classes with special requirements can be requested at least two weeks prior to the start date by stating clear objectives so that class content can be adjusted. Common overall objectives include:

- Initial Acquisition
- Sustainment
- DLPT Preparation
- OPI Preparation
- Pre-deployment
- Culture and Regional Studies

To register for a SOFTS class, go to www.softsonline.org and click “Register.” Provide the appropriate information to make an account, and then users can register for a class. Once students are registered, the SOFTS Helpdesk will help them prepare for class. The helpdesk works with students to schedule a time before the first day of class to test their computer equipment and Internet connection. The help desk also provides training to each student on how to use the CLE.

Additionally, the SOFTS Helpdesk provides technical support to all SOFTS participants, including students, instructors and command language program managers. The helpdesk is present in every class to provide on-demand technical support and is available outside class time to schedule support and training appointments.

While classes are in session, CLPMs receive weekly attendance notices and updates on any attendance or other issues that occur during class. At the end of the course, students receive a certificate of completion indicating the languages they trained in and the number of training hours they attended.

SOFTS is a no-cost, flexible solution for language training regardless of physical location as long as Internet access is available. Students can register any time at www.softsonline.org.

Any questions regarding SOFTS training can be sent to solanguageoffice@socom.mil or helpdesk@pecinc.com/315-214-7311.

Derrick Martin is assigned to the USAJFKSWCS Special Warfare Education Group (Airborne).
THE FLIP SIDE OF INTERROGATION

The following article was written in response to the article published in the April-June 2014 Special Warfare by Philip A. Mullenix, “Interrogation Theme Selection for Jihadist Combatants.”

Special operators who follow Philip Mullenix’s recommendations in his article, “Interrogation Theme Selection for Jihadist Combatants” in the April issue of Special Warfare may find themselves breaking the law. Mullenix conflates law enforcement questioning that seeks confessions of crimes admissible in court with intelligence interrogation to answer intelligence collection requirements to prevent future attacks. Mullenix is an instructor in the Reid Technique of Interviewing and Interrogation. This technique focuses on obtaining confessions from criminals by guiding the conversation to shift blame for the crime from the criminal to the victim. Intelligence interrogators never seek to determine a detainee’s guilt or innocence. They focus on gathering information about the detainee’s network and activities to prevent future attacks. Time spent trying to elicit a confession is time wasted and may lead to more Soldiers’ deaths. Answering current intelligence requirements will save lives. The “special operators” Mullenix discusses are neither certified nor qualified to conduct either law enforcement questioning or intelligence interrogation. Throughout his article, Mullenix assumes that any Soldier can interrogate any time he or she confronts a detainee. This is absolutely false and illegal. This essay examines the meanings of “interrogation” and “themes” under current Army and Department of Defense policy and U.S. law and presents solutions that utilize resources already available to the commander that preserve freedom of action and comply with current law, regulation and policy.

Interrogation is not an additional duty; it is a full-time profession held to the highest professional, legal and ethical standards. To press special operators to perform this complex mission places the commander at high and unnecessary risk.

The only DoD personnel who may ever interrogate anyone are “personnel trained and certified in the interrogation methodology, including personnel in military occupational specialties [35M], 351M (351E), or select others as may be approved by DoD policy. Interrogations are always to be conducted in accordance with the Law of War, regardless of the echelon or operational environment in which the human intelligence collector is operating.” The “select others” are those properly certified by graduation from one of the four certifying interrogation courses offered by the Department of Defense: the Human Intelligence Collector Course, the Joint Interrogation Certification Course, the U.S. Marine Corps Counter-intelligence/Human Intelligence Course, or the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Interrogation Course. Within the Army, the HUMINT collector, holding MOS 35M is the only MOS trained to conduct intelligence interrogations. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 establishes the U.S. Army Field Manual on Interrogation as the DoD’s standard for interrogation operations, including certification for intelligence interrogation. Executive Order 13491, Section 3 (b) expands this standard to encompass all interrogations conducted by any member of the United States government.

The source of this confusion is Mullenix’s divergent use of the term interrogation. Since Mullenix is concerned with obtaining confessions, a better term to distinguish this type of questioning from intelligence collection is “law enforcement questioning.” This author has used this term to distinguish between law enforcement interviews and intelligence interrogations for many years and finds it the most useful term to distinguish between the complementary goals of law enforcement and intelligence collection.

To the Army, interrogation is “the systematic effort to procure information to answer specific collection requirements by direct and indirect questioning techniques of a person who is in the custody of the forces conducting the questioning.” The Oct. 11, 2012 DoD Directive 3115.09 adjusts the definition slightly to read, “The systematic process of using interrogation approaches to question a captured or detained person to obtain reliable information to satisfy foreign intelligence collection requirements.” Additionally, only personnel trained and certified in the interrogation methodology may conduct intelligence interrogations. To interrogate without certification violates U.S. law, theater commander’s orders, DoD policy, and comprises a Questionable Intelligence Activity under Procedure 15 of Army Regulation 381-10 which falls under the purview of the Department of the Army Inspector General for Intelligence Oversight.

Mullenix applies his background in the Reid Technique of Interviewing and Interrogation to recommend themes for interrogators to use to elicit information from detainees. He defines themes using the Reid Technique taxonomy as an “argument (presented in monologue fashion by the interrogator to the suspect)” which “facilitates the task of self-incrimination.” What Mullenix calls a “theme” is in fact an interrogation approach which DoD Directive 3115.09 defines as a technique “used by trained and certified interrogators to establish and maintain control over and rapport with a detainee in order to gain the detainee’s cooperation to answer the interrogator’s questions.” The use of approaches is strictly limited to employment by trained and certified interrogators. For a SOF operator to employ an approach to question a detainee for intelligence information constitutes an interrogation, which only trained and certified interrogators may perform. Furthermore, in accordance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, the only interrogation approaches and techniques that are authorized for use against any detainee, regardless of status or characterization, are those authorized and listed in the AFM.

Some elements of the Reid Technique find their counterparts in the approaches authorized in the AFM; however, interrogators may only use approaches described in the AFM. Employment of
the Reid Technique violates the Detainee Treatment Act.

Mullenix employs numerous unclear terms to identify interrogators: “the interrogator,” “special operations interrogator,” “special operations field interrogator,” and “an interrogator, the SOF operator.” These terms suggest Special Forces-qualified Soldiers holding 18-series MOSs; however, as specified in the Army Field Manual, DoD Directive, and Detainee Treatment Act, only certified interrogators may interrogate. Anyone who follows Mullenix’s advice breaks laws, policies and regulations established since 2006. Special operations Soldiers such as a Special Forces Intelligence Sergeant, or a Civil Affairs specialist or a Psychological Operations specialist, or the officer or warrant officer equivalents are not authorized, certified or allowed to ever conduct interrogations.

Mullenix’s term, “special operations field interrogator” raises another issue. The term “field interrogation” has specific meaning within the intelligence community. It usually means interrogations conducted (by a certified interrogator only) at a location that is not a “fixed facility.” Paragraph 5-96 of the AFM states, “Field interrogation operations constitute the vast majority of interrogation operations at echelons corps and below. Field interrogations include all interrogation operations not conducted at a fixed facility.” Fixed facilities are those permanent structures built generally for interrogation operations not conducted. These facilities are usually tied directly to cultural and social issues of concern to the host or occupied country and results from agreements between the theater commander and the head of state.

Mullenix does provide many excellent recommendations for certified interrogators to incorporate into their approach strategies when dealing with fundamentalists, nationalists, and common criminals. Understanding the different motivations of detainees is critical to gathering intelligence information to prevent future attacks.

Special operations Soldiers may question detainees in some circumstances. Any Soldier can employ the techniques of tactical questioning — the expedient initial questioning for information of immediate tactical value. Tactical questioning is generally performed by members of patrols, but can be done by any DoD personnel. Direct questioning completely deletes all approaches, themes or other verbal or psychological ploys to obtain cooperation. It is limited questioning for limited ends. DoD Directive 3115.09 covers tactical questioning as well as intelligence interrogation and detainee debriefing. All three questioning techniques operate under specific and clear parameters.

Commanders already have a solution. Army special operations forces already have the right Soldiers for the job of interrogating — the HUMINT Collectors assigned to the Special Forces groups and the 75th Ranger Regiment holding MOS 35M and 351M. These Soldiers have the training, certification, authority and primary mission to interrogate detainees.

By leveraging these scarce and highly-trained assets, the commander maximizes his intelligence operations and complies with law, regulation, policy and orders. No other SOF specialty either enlisted, officer or warrant officer is certified to interrogate. Commanders already task-organize their forces to meet the requirements of combat within the parameters of law, regulation, and policy. Any questions about interrogation, tactical questioning or detainee debriefing can be answered by the interrogators assigned to or supporting the command. The HUMINT Collection Technician or the S-2X is the commander’s subject-matter expert on HUMINT and interrogation operations and policy.

CW4 Kevin S. Gould is the USASOC Senior HUMINT Technician, advising the USASOC commander through the G-2 and all the USASOC components on HUMINT and interrogation policy. His previous assignments include combat interrogation and policy officer duties beginning in 2003 with 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, XVIII Airborne Corps and Multi-National Corps-Iraq G-2X and Joint Special Operations Command J-2X. Like Mr. Mullenix, he is a graduate of the Reid Technique of Interrogation as well as the HUMINT Collector Course, HUMINT Warrant Officer Basic Course and the Joint Interrogation Management Course. Upon his retirement in September 2014 he became the Interrogation Policy Officer for the Department of the Army G-2X.

Notes:
7. AFM, vi.
9. Ibid., 16.
10. Ibid., 14.
11. Ibid.
12. AFM, para. 1-17.
WMD-TERRORISM (NUCLEAR): A SPECIAL OPERATIONS PRIMER

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL TOBIAS VOGT, PH.D.

“I continue to be much more concerned, when it comes to our security, with the prospect of a nuclear weapon going off in Manhattan.”

—President Barack Obama

Counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one of the core activities for the United States Army Special Operations Command and a Special Forces principal task. Despite this designation, Field Manual 3-18, Special Forces Operations, dedicates only a single paragraph to the topic with the disclaimer that “Specific CP [counterproliferation] activities conducted by Special Forces are classified.” There are numerous other service manuals dedicated to counterproliferation, to include Field Manual 3-05.132, Army Special Operations Forces Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Operations, but most of these are unknown to the typical operator. The separation at the tactical level between operators and supporting specialists is not unique. At the national level a similar phenomenon exists between the counterproliferation and counterterrorism communities, as these areas have historically been segregated by mission, organization and interest. National WMD experts in the United States government reside in support settings, and largely outside of the Defense Department. This community — comprised of scientific and policy expertise — has primarily concentrated on large, nation-state WMD capabilities, not terrorists. Similarly, the counterterrorism community has focused generally on non-state actors — e.g., terrorists or violent extremist organizations — not specifically on WMD terrorism.

Since the attacks of 9/11, government officials have worked to address this systemic segregation, but deep-seated organizational barriers identified in works such as Combating the Bureaucracy: U.S. Nuclear Defense Policy Development and Implementation following the Cold War have prevented integration beyond limited joint, interagency and specialty elements designed to augment planning staffs and operational forces. While this article cannot influence bureaucratic stovepipes, it can provide a basic background on nuclear capabilities to the special operations community. Armed with this information, the special operator will have the ability to ask pointed capability questions of the supporting WMD communities, and separate fact from popular cultural fiction regarding unconventional weapons. This article provides a general understanding of the nuclear weapons that a non-state actor may construct or acquire, and the immediate effects that might arise from a device with a potential yield measured in tons to thousands of tons of TNT equivalent.

Nuclear Capabilities

When discussing WMD-Terrorism the acronym CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) often replaces NBC. Despite the additional fidelity associated with the separation of radiological and nuclear, this article focuses solely on nuclear weapons. In contrast to radiological scenarios that account for chemical explosive devices paired with radiological material “dirty bombs,” less dramatic radiological emission devices, and infrastructure attacks, nuclear weapons are those devices that produce a nuclear explosive yield. Nuclear detonations include blast, prompt and residual radiation, thermal and electromagnetic pulse effects. While each of these effects is alarming, it is the yield of the blast — measured in TNT equivalent — that quantifies the distinct difference between chemical and nuclear explosives. For example, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing was estimated at three-and-a-half tons while the 1945 Hiroshima bombing was estimated at 13 kilotons (thousands of tons - kt). Little Boy’s, a World War II bomb, 13kt yield was later dwarfed by the Soviet Union in 1961 with the Tsar Bomba, the largest nuclear device ever tested at more than 50 megatons (millions of tons - mt). It is this enormous yield potential, coupled with the other effects mentioned previously, that places nuclear weapons in a class of their own for destructive power. Luckily, the thermonuclear designs associated with megaton yields are limited to only a few state stockpiles and are beyond the capacity of non-state actors. In the context of a violent extremist organization there are two potential routes to a nuclear capability — development of an improvised nuclear device or transfer of an intact nuclear weapon.

Non-State Scenario

Only the most determined transnational terrorist organizations would be capable of executing a non-state nuclear attack from start to finish, and be willing to risk complete annihilation of the organization in the aftermath of such a heinous act. Unlike the state-sponsored scenario discussed later, non-state actors must first acquire fissile material suitable to construct a crude nuclear device. Arguably, acquiring this special nuclear material is the keystone to constructing any nuclear weapon as plutonium does not appear in nature and uranium-235 is only a small fraction — .7 percent — of naturally available uranium ore sources that are comprised primarily of uranium-238. Both nuclear weapon isotopes — U-235 and Pu-239 — must be produced in man-made acts, plutonium as a byproduct of nuclear reactor operations and reprocessing and U-235 through the enrichment process. Fabrication requires either a nuclear reactor for plutonium or an enrichment facili-
ity for U-235, with neither fuel cycle available internally to a non-state actor. Thus, terrorists would need to acquire a substantial amount of fissile material from a state actor before they could build an improvised nuclear device.

Weapon design is the next hurdle during mission analysis for any violent extremist organization limited in resources and expertise. The two basic designs for nuclear weapons are gun-type and implosion. Gun-type using U-235 is by far the easiest, whereas the Pu-239 implosion option is much more difficult to design and construct. It is important to understand that special nuclear material is not interchangeable. While plutonium may produce a small detonation in a gun-type weapon, its unstable nature — because of the presence of Pu-240 — produces a premature spontaneous supercritical reaction that results in a fizzle if used in a gun-type design. Plutonium is also highly radioactive and flammable, making it much more difficult to work with and transport because of its inherent risks to handlers and potential for detection.

Human capital is another area of concern. Experts have debated the level of education needed to potentially construct an IND for many years. While not impossible, several areas related to physics, engineering and metallurgy require education and experience coupled with specific items and tools. South Africa, Pakistan, Russia and multiple other countries have trained nuclear experts that could be sympathetic and/or motivated by payoff to potentially fill requirements in this area. The al-Qaeda Khan network and other suppliers to pre-1990 Iraq serve as examples of high-end global networks willing to deal in nuclear weapons related design, material and expertise. The United States invested large sums of money retraining and employing Russian nuclear weapons personnel, but many of the open source supply and expertise examples come from Western Europe, South Africa and Pakistan. While the extent of the high- and low-end nuclear black markets remains unknown, experts such as Charles Ferguson and William Potter surmise that it is within the realm of possibility for a well-resourced transnational terrorist organization such as al-Qaeda to assemble sufficient men and materials to construct a functioning IND.

Of the weapon design choices, a terrorist organization with even the most basic understanding of nuclear weapons would decide to use U-235 in a gun-type IND. A gun-type design is based on exactly that premise; a gun barrel serves as the body of the weapon with two subcritical pieces of uranium — a larger amount of highly enriched uranium at one end serving as the target, and a smaller HEU bullet at the other. Additional aspects of the design include a conventional explosive propellant for the HEU bullet, a neutron trigger such as polonium or beryllium and sufficient reflective tamping material to maximize the chain reaction by containing the escaping neutrons and keeping the material intact for as long as possible. The process, like the design, is theoretically simple. The chemical explosive propels the nuclear bullet down the barrel and smashes into the HEU target, activating a neutron trigger and causing the assembled U-235 to go supercritical.

In contrast, an implosion design requires precise calculations and engineering for symmetrical initiation of the chemical explosives to correctly compress the fissile material. Using the example of a soccer ball, an implosion device would have a detonator on every patch that must be exactly sequenced for symmetrical compression. Without symmetrical compression the implosion design would likely fizzle. The increased risk of malfunction is an important point when the fear of failure aspect of the terrorist psyche is considered. This multiple, versus single initiation requirement is an example of the simplicity of a gun-type design with a nuclear bullet compared to the complexities of an implosion design.

While the gun-type device is the easiest and most reliable nuclear weapon design, it presents employment challenges based on weight and dimension. In this regard, terrorism expert Brian Michael Jenkins emphasizes that the comparable U.S. design of Little Boy weighed four-and-a-half tons. Thus, this type of IND is not man-portable. Potential barrel assemblies and other bulky components are of considerable weight and would require a large rectangular configuration. Remote detonation is possible, using the same technologies for conventional explosives employed around the world by any number of violent extremist organizations. Of note, the gun-type design used on Hiroshima in 1945 was considered so reliable that it was not tested prior to employment. While this design is less efficient than an implosion design, it is well within the technical reach of non-state actors with access to significant quantities of U-235.

The Homeland Security Council Interagency Policy Coordination Subcommittee for Preparedness and Response to Radiological and Nuclear Threats’ Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation uses 10kt as the base for effects and response planning for terrorist IND scenarios. While the origins of this figure are highly debated, this yield serves as the basis for the initial figure while a more realistic 100t estimate is demonstrated in the subsequent section. The guidance uses three zones to represent the potential damage associated with nuclear detonations — no-go, moderate damage and light damage zones. These zones are difficult to delineate and do not take into account the fourth dangerous fallout zone identified in the planning guidance. For the purpose of comparison, a detailed description of blast, thermal and radiation effects was not deemed applicable. Variations in effects based on terrain and weather would detract from the clearer representation of each of the zones. As a rule of thumb, fallout from a 10kt nuclear blast would travel 10 to 20 miles in the direction of the wind, but width and dispersion doses would vary significantly. Most fallout would return to earth within the first 24 hours, with the most severe radiation threats subsiding in two to six weeks.

The no-go zone is the immediate area surrounding the point of detonation. It is identified by complete destruction, with high radiation levels that prohibit lifesaving efforts. Peak overpressure calculations for no-go zones are factored at 5 pounds per square inch. The moderate damage zone is described much like a movie depiction of a post-nuclear detonation: burning and destroyed buildings and cars with downed power lines and severed utilities. This zone would be clouded by fallout and survivors would be moving about with different levels of injury. Of the three zones, this is the area where the most opportunities for immediate lifesaving assistance would exist. Peak overpressure calculations for moderate damage zones are factored at 2psi. The light damage zone is the outermost ring of each diagram. There would be some damage, broken windows and in- and outpatient care requirements, but from a triage perspective, this zone is a distant second to the moderate damage zone. Peak overpressure calculations for light damage zones are factored at .5psi.

State-Sponsored Scenario

Should a country be disposed to employ nuclear weapons it would be more likely use internal forces and delivery systems rather than forfei control to a proxy. Although a state may share religious and/or political views with a non-state actor, once it provides a nuclear weapon or material it relinquishes all control of when, where and how the nuclear device is employed. Given the amount of effort and
resources required for nuclear weapon production, combined with the dire consequences for fixed state actors, the scenario of a declared or undeclared nuclear state policy that includes supplying non-state actors is not probable. In the event a state knowingly supplies a nuclear weapon to a violent extremist organization, the attack would likely be a single nuclear weapon. While transfer of weapons-useable nuclear material is also a concern, that scenario would follow the one described previously in the non-state section. Should a nuclear weapon be transferred, the logistics of transport and employment would be severely limited by size, weight and shielding restrictions. Although they are commonly referred to as “suitcase nukes,” tactical nuclear weapons are actually much larger and heavier than popular culture or uninformed individuals such as former Congressman Curt Weldon have suggested. At the heart of these fission weapons is either the gun-type or implosion design. For the sake of argument, assume that the implosion design is used in order to miniaturize the weapon to a point less than the four-and-a-half tons of the initial gun-type design. A soccer ball provides the best example of this type of device. On the outside there is a detonator on every patch that must be exactly sequenced for symmetrical compression. These detonators initiate the conventional explosive that compresses the plutonium. As the plutonium begins to go supercritical the neutron initiator, commonly comprised of deuterium and tritium, injects neutrons to begin the chain reaction. By using a graphite or beryllium reflector, the amount of fissile material is minimized and the yield maximized because the chain reaction is sustained for a greater period.

The United States’ former man-portable special atomic demolition munition provides an excellent depiction of this class of nuclear device. The same warhead used for the famous “Davy Crockett,” the man-portable version was fitted with a carrying container and harness instead of recoilless rifle deployment. According to the Nuclear Weapon Archive, the entire cylindrical system measured ~16x24” and weighed ~150lbs. While the yield of this type of weapon was far below a thermonuclear warhead, and the weight and dimensions were much larger than depicted in popular culture, this class of tactical nuclear weapon does pose a serious problem to national security if possessed by the wrong state or non-state actor. Fortunately, the United States has retired this category of nuclear weapon, and the much-sensationalized Soviet-era suitcase nukes were actually much larger than the previous dimension and weight.

Of the two scenarios, the state-supplied tactical nuclear weapon would suggest earlier sub-kiloton nuclear terrorism estimations than the 10k planning factor that was adopted by the George W. Bush administration. The relatively low yield is also closer to high-yield conventional explosive attacks such as the 10t Khobar Towers bombing in 1996. The 100t light damage, moderate damage, and no-go zones are only a fraction of the 10k example, measuring radii of .57, .22, and .13 miles respectively. The .13 mile radius of the no-go zone is comparable in size to the radius of the U.S. Capitol building. This “small” yield brings into question the value of this type of unconventional weapon. The psychological impact of detonating a nuclear device is a factor, along with issues of residual radiation and economic impacts, but threat of retaliation against a supplier state and its non-state proxy is significant enough to impact decision cycles. Would either of these actors risk complete annihilation for a weapon that produces questionable levels of damage? Most informed rational actors who understand the lack of effects from a man-portable nuclear device would select another form of terror that would allow them to make a sizable statement without risking retaliatory attacks on the scale of those associated with response to a nuclear first-strike.

“The no-go zone is the immediate area surrounding the point of detonation. It is identified by complete destruction, with high radiation levels that prohibit lifesaving efforts.”

**Conclusion**

This short article addressed the technical aspects of design and potential impacts for the two primary capability routes for nuclear terrorists – construction of an IND or transfer of an intact nuclear weapon. Readers should have a better understanding of the two special nuclear materials, uranium and plutonium, and weapon designs, gun-type and implosion, as well as the potential blast effects for low- and high-end estimates of corresponding nuclear detonations. While these weapons are theoretically simple, obstacles related to access to weapons-useable nuclear materials, technical human capital, financial resources and charismatic leadership dedicated to the acquisition and use of unconventional weapons remain stiff barriers to entrance for any aspiring violent extremist organization.

On the spectrum of possible unconventional weapon attacks, a nuclear detonation consistently ranks as the lowest probability with potentially the highest impact. While the chances of this type of event are remote in the current security environment, the fear of weapon effects, economic impacts, and residual psychological damage will keep nuclear terrorism at the forefront of senior policymaker concerns for years to come. This article demonstrated that nuclear weapons truly represent the term weapon of mass destruction.}

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Notes


3. Ibid., pp. 2:15 and 2:16.

4. The WMD community is further segregated by counterproliferation (state) and WMD-terrorism (non-state) organizations. While the national laboratories profess to be proficient in both, these government-owned-contractor-operated facilities administered by the Department of Energy were designed to support the U.S. nuclear stockpile, not serve as all-source state and non-state WMD analysts.


11. Ibid., p. 3.

12. Ibid., pp. 14-43.


16. Ibid.


19. For more on this period see Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Security, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network; Kidhir Hamza with Jeff Stein, Saddam’s Bombmaker: The Daring Escape of the Man Who Built Iraq’s Secret Weapon; and Mahdi Obedi and Kurt Pitzer, The Bomb in My Garden: The Secrets of Saddam’s Nuclear Mastermind.


25. Ibid., pp. 128-129.


28. For more information on nuclear blast effects see Federation of American Scientists, “Nuclear Weapon Effects Calculator,” or “Nuke Map” at Alex Wellerstein’s blog Nuclear Secrecy.


30. No-go zone is represented by the inner dark circle, the second light gray circle is the moderate damage zone, and the outer dashed-line circle is the light damage zone.


32. There are both static and dynamic pressures, but general psi damage is described as: 10psi sweeps everything in a high-rise building onto the street; 4-8psi topples water towers; 3-5psi shatters windows, destroys brick structures, and can uproot trees; and 1-5psi destroys cinderblock structures. For more on nuclear weapon effects see Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, third edition, 1977.


34. Ricca, John, “Diagrams to-scale for nuclear surface burst detonations for 10kt and 0.1kt. In each case, the inner dark circle is the no-go zone, the lighter gray circle is the moderate damage zone, and the outer dashed-line circle is the light damage zone, in accordance with the Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation, January 2009. Calculations of distances were derived from the Nuclear Bomb Effects Computer included as a part of The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, third edition, Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, 1977. These distances would increase for low air bursts.”


36. For example, the bombs described previously weighed four-and-a-half tons (Little Boy), and more than 30 tons (Tsar Bomba), Jenkins, Brian Michael, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? 2008, p. 45; Younger, Stephen M., The Bomb: A New History, 2009, pp. 37-39.


46. Ricca, John, “Diagrams to-scale for nuclear surface burst detonations for 10kt, and 0.1kt. In each case, the inner dark circle is the no-go zone, the lighter gray circle is the moderate damage zone, and the outer dashed-line circle is the light damage zone, in accordance with the Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation, January 2009. Calculations of distances were derived from the Nuclear Bomb Effects Computer included as a part of The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, third edition, Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, 1977. These distances would increase for low air bursts.”


48. The views expressed in the article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its components. Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review case number 14-227.
3S - SCALE, SCOPE, SALIENCE

A NEW MODEL FOR EVALUATING TERRORIST THREATS

BY MAJOR CASEY MILLS

Introduction

This article details a new framework for analyzing the critical nodes of information based upon the Scale, Scope and Salience (3S) of terrorist organizations. This framework is designed as a tool to assess and track the evolution of terrorist organizations as they transform from domestic movements into global terrorist threats. Additionally, it assists practitioners and researchers evaluate several interconnected aspects of terrorist organizations comprehensively, with the intent of offering pertinent analysis related to the level and type of threat posed by any given specific terrorist group.

Determining the nature of the threat is critical to prioritization efforts. The Secretary of Defense has proposed military budget cuts and troop reduction in every military service in an effort to prioritize U.S. strategic interests.

The Army is downsizing, scheduled to drop to 490,000 Soldiers by October 2015, down from 570,000 during the peak years of war.

A methodology for prioritization will become critical as human and fiscal capital available to combat terrorist threats decreases. A base model by which the critical nodes of information are identified, connected and evaluated, could be applied to multiple terrorist organizations and a commander would have a consistent model to use when determining priorities of effort. This model would also provide a common framework for intelligence analysts and operations personnel to categorize information.

The intent of the 3S model presented is to develop a comprehensive, adaptable, sufficiently accurate and easily digestible framework in which to evaluate information pertaining to terrorist organizations. The scale, scope and salience of an organization are interconnected, with several factors having direct correlation or effect on another. For example, the size (an aspect of Scale) of an organization is, arguably, directly related to the salience of the group’s message and its ability to recruit new members. The scale, scope and salience of an organization should be viewed together, as inherently connected. However, the breakdown of individual aspects of the model would also allow decision makers the ability to discuss the relevance of individual factors of a terrorist organization, and then explore and describe the relationship between different aspects as required. The model should enhance interagency discussion and cooperation by presenting a common framework, criteria and set of terms.

Scale

Scale is designed to measure the size, capacity and capability of a given group. It is intended to gauge current capabilities but also evaluate the potential for growth and future capability. Scale looks at the current size (actual or estimated) of a terrorist organization’s membership; the size, intensity and operational success of attacks; the type of weaponry and tactics, techniques and procedures used, as well as the evolution of TTPs throughout their existence. Finally, the potential for growth is analyzed based upon the possible base of recruits that might exist.

Size (as measured by the number of members) of an organization is not sufficient to determine the effectiveness or capabilities of a group alone but it is a pertinent data point. The size of the enemy is a critical operational intelligence requirement for forces preparing to engage the enemy. The size of the opponent potentially drives the desired tactics and the force ratio to achieve success. Beyond the operational importance, size is also linked to the strategic success and longevity of terrorist organizations. According to a RAND study examining 648 groups that existed between 1968 and 2006 and how and why terrorist groups end, the authors determined, “Size is a significant determinant of a group’s fate. Big groups of more than 10,000 members have been victorious more than 25 percent of the time, while victory is rare when groups are smaller than 1,000 members.”

The 9/11 hijackers created an enormous amount of carnage with just 19 members partaking in the actual operation, but acting under the direction of al-Qaeda leadership. Those 19 individuals were responsible for 2,977 deaths and over $247 billion in economic damages. In addition to the immediate casualties and economic implications, the action committed the U.S. to an ongoing war that has now been pursued for 13 years on multiple fronts. However, the 9/11 hijackers were part of a much larger organization, al-Qaeda, which had trained 10,000 – 20,000 fighters in terrorist training camps in Afghanistan prior to 9/11 and had an estimated annual operating budget of $30 million.

This is not to suggest that small groups cannot wage effective terror campaigns. Theodore Kaczynski, better known as the Unabomber, single handedly instilled fear in the U.S. population through a terror campaign consisting of mailed and hand delivered bombs. He was able to conduct this campaign for 17 years before being captured. Although Kaczynski’s actions consumed the time and resources of more than 150 full-time investigators and analysts, his bombs only claimed the lives of three individuals and injured 24. Despite his technical capability, Kaczynski was limited by what he could accomplish as a single individual. In the study of terrorist groups, other things being equal, larger groups have more resources which equates to increased sustainability and longer duration as it takes government forces longer to root out and break up larger groups.

The size, intensity and success of attacks are another data point. Does the group conduct large-scale attacks with large causal-
ties or does it primarily focus on targeted killings of individuals? Do they attack soft targets such as civilians, schools, unguarded facilities, etc., or do they attack hard targets such as armed military, police forces, guarded facilities, etc. Is the terrorist organization operationally successful in its attack? Has operational success led to or resulted in strategic success such as acquiescence to the terrorist group’s demands? Using Dr. Louise Richardson’s definition, “Terrorism simply means deliberately and violently targeting civilians for political purposes”? Has the group achieved their strategic political goals? The definition of operational success can be subjective, but it is pertinent to examine whether an operation inflicts casualties on an intended scale or kills a targeted individual when planned. Another aspect is the frequency with which a group conducts operations and its resilience. Does it take the group a significant amount of time to regroup, reorganize and refit prior to the next attack or do they have a rapid turnaround? Are they capable of attacking multiple targets simultaneously? The ability to launch multiple coordinated attacks is partially reliant on the size of the organization, and if the multiple attacks are spread out over several different locations it is also directly tied to the scope of the group’s operations.

Types of weapons used during attacks and tactics employed are both important factors. The increased sophistication of weaponry results in increased lethality. An improvement in weaponry can also drive adjustments in the TTPs employed by terrorist groups. Examples of these points are the acquisition of anti-aircraft weaponry and improvised explosive devices. Anti-aircraft weaponry, such as surface to air missiles dramatically alters the lethality and capability of a group. Acquisition of anti-aircraft weaponry may negate the air advantage that a state possesses over a terrorist organization or may provide the opportunity and capability to stage a dramatic attack on a civilian aircraft. The presence of IEDs increases the lethality while simultaneously providing new TTPs. With an IED, a terrorist group can inflict casualties without engaging in direct combat. Diverse weaponry and evolving TTPs allows terrorist groups to adapt to their operational environment.

A final aspect of scale evaluates the base of recruits that potentially could be activated based upon the salience of the organization. Are there significant “push” and “pull” factors that contribute to the recruitment and radicalization of a portion of the population? Push factors are those that can alienate people or cause them to reject mainstream society, while pull factors are those that draw in individuals through radical messages and terrorist networks. Push factors may be socio-economic disparities, unemployment, discrimination, political marginalization. Pull factors may be a uniting ideology, reputation, promise of glory and a sense of belonging. Push/pull motivations serve as an initial impetus towards terrorist activity and can be mutually supporting, such as an economic grievance pushing an individual toward the allure of a terrorist group and the prospect of money pulling the individual closer to the group. Does the terrorist group receive widespread support amongst the civilian community in which it operates and is there a large recruiting pool available? Terrorist groups are far more dangerous when they have close ties to the community and can thrive in a complicit society where the population may not engage in terrorism directly but are loathe to turn the terrorists in. Are there diasporas around the world that may be sympathetic to the cause and provide material or logistical support to expand terrorist operations?

Scale in this proposed model thus includes multiple factors and the interconnected nature of each, providing intelligence analysts, operations personnel and ultimately commanders a tool with which to evaluate and determine the capability, lethality and potentiality of increased operations of a specific terrorist organization.

Scope

Scope evaluates both the ability and desire of a terrorist group to expand its area of operations and measures the evolution and/or transformation of a group’s operational scope as well as political ambitions. By looking at the stated aims and aspirations of a group, one can begin to analyze the operational requirement of the group to expand their operations in order to meet their objectives. Evaluating the geographical, operational range of a terrorist organization helps determine if the terrorist group is expanding its reach to achieve their mission and also begins to measure the level of threat to domestic, regional and potentially global, stability. The expansion of operations may be indicative of the terrorist group’s focus on the near and/or far enemy. Finally, if a terrorist group begins to expand the scope of its operations, it may provide the opportunity to enter into an alliance with other regional actors, specifically groups who share a common ideology or enemy.

The aspirations and aims of a terrorist movement are key items to determining the ability and/or desire to expand from a domestic movement to a global terrorist campaign. Terrorist groups may have grievances with local government and security forces, national government and institutions or even global institutions and foreign countries. Groups that are primarily focused on domestic issues, such as distribution of wealth in their native country, may neither need nor desire to expand their scope of operations outside of their own country; the objective is domestic change and the targets are domestic in nature. Expanding operations outside of the domestic zone may even detract from their stated goals. However, if a group is ideologically motivated and their perceived enemy is beyond just the local or state government, then regional or global attacks may be a realistic aspiration. The desired aims and aspirations of the group ultimately drive the required operational area and geographical reach of the organization, as necessitated by the desired end state.

The geographical reach and area of operations can determine the level of threat a group represents beyond one state’s borders. Is the terrorist organization primarily operational in a single province, a region, a country, multiple countries or globally? Based upon where the group is operational, and what their stated goals are, could the group expand to become regionally or globally active? Does it make sense strategically for the group to expand based upon the salience of the group’s message? The terrorist group that is focused on the overthrow of a local government official may only require an area of operations that directly affects the local government. The terrorist group that seeks to overthrow an entire country may need to expand their operations to a broader landscape. Terrorist groups often identify near and far enemies. An example is al-Qaeda and jihadists who refer to the near enemy as the presence of western powers in holy, Islamic lands and the apostate regimes that allow it. The far enemy is considered the U.S., its Allies and the West in general. Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, the organizer of the 1981 assassination of Anwar al-Sadat, coined the terms “near enemy” and “far enemy” and assigned priority to the former, believ-
ing everything was secondary to fighting the
local apostates. In his work, The Neglected
Duty, Faraj stated, “The fight against the en-
emy nearest to you has precedence over the
fight against the enemy farther away . . . In
all Muslim countries the enemy has the reins
of power. The enemy is the present rulers.” For
more than two decades, throughout the
1970s, 1980s and to the mid-1990s, jihadi
theory and practice focused on the near
enemy and domestic agendas. However, in
the late 1990s Ayman al-Zawahiri, formerly
an advocate of prioritizing the overthrow of
the near enemy (Mubarak's regime in Egypt)
over attacking the far enemy, came to the
realization that it was no longer possible to
remain focused on the near enemy because
of the influence of the “Zionist-Crusader
alliance” in the Muslim world. Bruce Hoff-
man characterizes the current environment,
post Arab Spring, of jihadists as a “hybrid
character,” one that is necessarily focused al-
most entirely on the near enemy but remains
poised to attack the far enemy as opportuni-
ties present themselves. Viewing the far
enemy as targets of opportunity allows ter-
rorist groups to maintain domestic agendas
but remain associated with the global jihad
movement when an opportunity arises.
When evaluating the level of threat and
intention of a specific terrorist organization,
who does the group view as its near and far
enemy? In order to engage their enemies, the
group may be required to expand their op-
erations in order to strike effectively at either
their near or far enemy. At specific points in
time, is the terrorist group focused on their
near or far enemy? Does it only strike at the
far enemy when an opportunity presents
itself or does it seek out the far enemy spe-
cifically for attack? Identifying the phase of
the terrorist’s operations and understanding
their focus and priorities, allows analysts and
decision makers to evaluate the potential
threat they may represent.
Forming an alliance is one way for ter-
rorist organizations to expand the scope,
operational reach, and fulfill their aspira-
tions of their organization. Groups that share
similar ideologies or similar enemies may
benefit from forming an alliance. An alliance
allows groups to pool their knowledge and
resources, potentially expanding their threat
capability as well as operational area. Similar
to individual push and pull factors, these
factors exist amongst terrorist groups as well.
Factors that may push a terrorist group to
form an alliance may be increased counter-
terrorist activities by the government, the
lack of training or capability, or the need
for resources such as money, weapons or
equipment. Factors that pull terrorist groups
towards an alliance may be the prestige of
being affiliated with a larger group, such as
al-Qaeda, or potentially increased legitimacy
if a smaller group is able to link with a larger,
more established organization.
Scope is an element in understanding the
intention and necessity of terrorist actions in
regards to their stated goals, aspirations, and
desired outcomes. Combined with aspects of
scale, one can begin to evaluate and analyze
the evolution of terrorist organizations based
upon their capability in conjunction with
their priorities.

Salience
Salience measures the importance and
resonance of the message and the desired
objective. The general concept of salience
is the ability of a factor, such as a group or
an ideology, to ‘stand out’ from its environment or background. The salience of a terrorist group’s message is intertwined with multiple aspects of both scale and scope. Depending upon the aims and aspirations of the particular terrorist group, the message communicated may be political in nature; ideological, based upon values perceived by the organization to be important; religious, similar to ideological but tied to a specific religious belief; economically based upon the need for reform to address inequalities; or nationalistic, based upon pride and identification of a population with a nation and could also imply belief in the superiority of an ethnicity or religion.

It is possible for a terrorist group to span multiple classes of motivational factors, such as political and ideological. One example is terrorists espousing the implementation of Sharia rule based upon Islamic belief, contains political, cultural, ideological and religious motivations. All of these motivations are subject to individual and group interpretation as well. John Voll, professor of Islamic history at Georgetown, details the complexity and debate surrounding the relationship between Islam and democracy, arriving at the conclusion that it is possible to make a case that Islam and democracy are compatible and that they are not. The argument is based upon perspective, definition, and interpretation of information and each side can manipulate the information accordingly to meet their intent. Terrorist groups use propaganda to attempt to increase the saliency of their message, interpreting and delivering the information in a manner that supports their objective. The political salience and value of the ideology must generate a support base in order for the terrorist group to survive, and potentially grow and expand.

Saliency also involves domestic, regional and global factors and implications. In the case of global jihad, David Kilcullen describes the existence of local actors, issues and grievances within each country of the jihad theater, many of which have little to do with global jihad objectives. While these local groups may not be connected directly to the global jihad, there are regional, theater-level actors which may span the gap. These regional groups are tied to the global jihad and may support the local groups, spreading influence throughout the region.

Domestically, political and/or religious salience generates the base of support from which a terrorist group recruits, directly contributing to the potential scale of the organization in size, funding, freedom of maneuver and capability. Does the message of the terrorist organization, their claims and legitimizing ideologies, resonate with a wide audience within their area of operations? The salience of their message may determine the level of support provided by the community in which they operate. Is the community sympathetic to the cause? Does the population relate to the grievances described by the group? Are the actions of the terrorist group increasing the saliency of their message; do their actions improve the security and livelihood of their supportive constituency or perhaps invoke an ideological motivation?

Motivations such as “political exclusion” or a perceived lack of legal avenues for pursuing political demands, highly repressive regimes which use heavy handed tactics and violate human rights; or the perception of an illegitimate government may lead the belief that violent extremism and terrorist actions are acceptable. Many terrorist groups claim that no other strategy is available and those who commit terrorist acts claim that terrorism works but Louise Richardson contends that other options are always available and a turn to terrorism indicates a lack of broader support or the desire for immediate results and terrorism has never been proven to accomplish what the terrorists wanted where other means could not. It is possible for a terrorist group to detract from its saliency as well, such as the targeting of innocent civilians among their support base, effectively alienating the population. Does the message speak to prevalent local issues and does it inspire outright support, or at a minimum complicity, amongst the population?

Regionally, the salience of a group’s ideology or aspirations may resonate with other populations that may share similar ideals, ethnicities and religions all of which are frequently transnational. This is especially true in regions of the world where colonial boundaries established borders that did not necessarily coordinate with ethnic, tribal, or religious landscapes. The Tuaregs, for example, a Berber speaking population in North and West Africa are common throughout Algeria, Libya, Mali, Niger and Nigeria. Due to porous borders, these desert nomads, numbering an estimated 900,000 in the late 1900s, regularly cross national borders and influence populations in several countries.

Terrorist organizations whose members share some form of commonality with populations which may cross national borders represent transnational relations defined by Keohane and Nye in 1972 as “contacts, coalitions and interactions, across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of government.” Additionally, transnational movements and relationships enable the potential for the formation of regional alliances between terrorist organizations which share a common ideology, enemy or endstate. The formation of an alliance is dependent upon whether or not the goals and messages are salient enough to evoke commitment. In an interview with Dr. Tricia Bacon, an expert in terrorist alliances, she emphasized, “Alliances between terrorist groups are statistically an anomaly, not the default. There are far more hurdles than benefits to an alliance. Terrorist groups conduct cost-benefit analysis to determine if an alliance is important enough to undertake.” The relative salience of a cause is one of many driving factors in the ability to form an alliance, along with the desire or necessity to increase capability and resources, and potentially expand operational reach.

Globally, a terrorist group must communicate its message effectively to a broad population in order to meet its strategic goals. If its message is primarily domestic in nature, such as the struggle for an
autonomous region, does it resonate with diasporas which may contribute to the cause? If its goal is global jihad, or the infliction of pain to the U.S., does it appeal to the greater global jihadist movements and supporters? Does it communicate a salient message to larger, global terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda? Does its ideology, aims and aspirations inspire support from sympathizers whom they have never met and have no personal relationship. Al-Qaeda courts Muslims throughout the world using radical rhetoric, denouncing the evils of the West and urging action and support. Al-Qaeda utilizes mass media and speaks in a common language, such as Arabic, to reach a broader population.

The salience of a terrorist organization and their objectives is a key component to effectiveness. If their message is not important to a base of fighters and supporters, the movement dies. Terrorist groups often must become large to win and a lack of growth is a harbinger of defeat, supported by the fact that small groups under 1,000 members rarely achieve victory. If the group wishes to expand, their message must be salient enough to support their desire through recruitment. As the group transforms and when/if their priorities shift from a domestic focus to a regional or global focus or they shift from targeting the near enemy to the far enemy, the salience of the group will play a major role in their ability to successfully transform and survive.

Conclusion

Scale, scope and salience are three components that when viewed together, as interconnected, supportive and at times, necessary to each other, it provides leaders with a clearer understanding of the threat potential of a specific terrorist organization; thereby providing requisite information when determining priorities of effort.

Future research and application of the model will be critical to further validate the 3S model as a method of determining the level of threat presented by a terrorist organization and evaluating the evolution of a group from a domestic terrorist group to a global threat.

For continued evaluation of the model, use an overlay of the model on a variety of terrorist organizations located in various regions around the world and with differing driving ideologies and desired end states. Additionally, historical overlays of the model on past terrorist organizations would be beneficial to attempt to identify when the group may have made the transition to a global threat and if connecting aspects of scale, scope and salience would have provided indications of such a shift.

Finally, it is important to note that any terrorist organization poses the potential to strike at Western targets and there are always gaps which cannot be accounted for, such as lone wolf actors who seek out terrorist organizations in order to conduct a specific attack with little to no indication of previous terrorist affiliation. It is impossible to anticipate every change of a terrorist or group’s motives or goals but through a comprehensive analysis of the data available, one can be better prepared to do so than looking at individual aspects as single, stand-alone entities. The interconnected nature of scale, scope and salience provides indicators that a shift may be occurring before it actually takes place.

Major Casey Mills, a U.S. Army officer, is a recent graduate of The National Defense University with an MA in Strategic Security Studies. He has served overseas throughout the AFRICOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM, and PACOM areas of responsibility in addition to multiple assignments in the U.S. Maj. Mills is currently assigned to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC).

Notes

ton, DC: United States Agency International Development.
U.S. ARMY PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS SOLDIERS: Best Suited for U.S. Diplomatic Posts Overseas and NSDD-38 Inclusion

BY MAJOR KEVIN E. SMITH

The purpose of this position paper is to present the idea U.S. Army Psychological Operations Soldiers, “Diplomatic Warriors,” are best suited for U.S. diplomatic posts overseas and National Security Decision Directive 38 inclusion from special operations forces based on their unique skill sets, professional attributes, technical competencies, funding resources and authorities.


This paper will highlight MIST contributions as a SOF force multiplier for the DoS, the strategic relationships that materialized and military information support operations programs implemented in direct support of global operations.


Despite having a set of U.S. Special Operations Command deployment orders on hand, a MIST departs home station with no guarantees. In one case, I forward deployed without a signed memorandum of understanding or memorandum of agreement in place between the U.S. Ambassador and the special operations command in the area of operations officially recognizing a formal agreement to establish the MIST. For nine months, the team remained in country despite not having a signed MOU or MOA in hand. With this in mind, the team put forth the recommendation to change the current policies set in place regarding PSYOP Soldiers assigned to U.S. diplomatic posts overseas.

Based on ill-conceived notions about the other working relationships between DoS and SOF stationed at U.S. diplomatic posts during times of peace, or in support of military operations other than war historically have been problematic. No one side specifically is to blame for fostering this type of dysfunctional behavior per say, but one solution would go a long way towards resolving friction inside U.S. diplomatic posts among DoS and SOF: Deploying SOF under the protection of NSDD-38 for a 36-month period.

From discussions with DoS officials stationed in the AO, the U.S. Embassy Country Team perceived the MIST as another “rogue” temporary SOF element operating in country. Deploying PSYOP Soldiers under the protection of NSDD-38 for a 36-month period provides a number of distinct advantages for the U.S. Embassy Country Team: a full-time politically astute and culturally attuned advise, inform and influence activities SME, MISO programs, funding resources and authorities.

In addition, assigning PSYOP Soldiers under the protection of NSDD-38 for a 36-month period will reduce negative stereotypes, foster a more team-oriented environment, increase collaboration, synchronization and coordination in the use of diplomatic, informational, military and economic instruments of national power.

As a final point, assigning PSYOP Soldiers under the protection of NSDD-38 for a 36-month period helps to mitigate the “risk” of SOF operating freely in a country without a signed MOU or MOA in place.

Assigning PSYOP Soldiers on permanent change of station orders to U.S. diplomatic posts overseas on a full-time basis (36-months) instead of episodic (9-months) will create good will with the country team and will dismiss any perceived issue regarding NSDD-38. As a result, these “diplomatic warriors” would become permanent members of the U.S. Embassy Country Team. The DoS perception of the MIST being just another “rogue” temporary SOF element operating in country becomes invalid.

MIST: “SOF Force Multiplier for the U.S. Embassy Country Team”

In the final 120 days of a 9-month deployment, the MIST developed and provided funding for the following MISO programs: Teaching Basic First Aid in Schools Program and a Community Policing Program.

Additionally, as part of the Special Operations Command Commander’s Augmentation Team, the MIST sponsored a series of SOF Academic Exchange Programs, which vetted and trained more than 112 Soldiers from the Armed Police Force and national army. The MIST-sponsored SOF Academic Exchange Programs with the country’s security forces included the following subject areas: tactical loudspeaker operations, interactive Internet activities and Seven Step MISO Process. Finally, the MIST established a monthly Countering Violent Extremist Working Group.

MIST innovation also designed two Department of Defense Rewards Programs that expanded the role and capabilities of the team in country. Traditionally, a DoD Rewards Program offers monetary incentives for information that leads to the arrest of
wanted persons and/or seizure of weapons caches.

Adhering to Burrhus Fredric Skinner’s Law of Effect-Reinforcement, the MIST designed DoD Rewards Programs that rewarded the behavior of police and military personnel based on performance. According to Skinner, “Behavior which is reinforced tends to be repeated (i.e. strengthened); behavior which is not reinforced tends to die out-or be extinguished (i.e. weakened).” Therefore, by rewarding the behavior of security personnel ensured that this type of behavior would most likely be repeated in the future.

The MIST’s DoD Rewards Programs not only expanded the role and capabilities of the team, but also served as a force multiplier for the U.S. Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program and U.S. Agency for International Development’s Disaster Risk Reduction Office, which supported joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational operations in the country. Consequently, the aforementioned tangible contributions made by the MIST resulted in endorsement by the Ambassador through approval of the MIST’s programs and complete buy in from the U.S. Embassy Country Team.

Conclusion: “Mission Accomplished”

At the end of the day, the MIST conducted MISO in support of the U.S. Department of State’s Mission Strategic Resource Plan and CONPLAN, which is the U.S. Department of Defense’s campaign strategy against terrorism. As a result, the MIST gained a better understanding of the operational environment, served as a force multiplier for the DoS and established partnerships with country security forces, which supported joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational operations.

In sum, PSYOP Soldiers, “diplomatic-warriors,” are best suited for U.S. diplomatic posts overseas and NSDD-38 inclusion based on their unique skill sets, professional attributes, technical competencies, programs, funding resources and authorities.

Maj. Kevin E. Smith is a U.S. Army Psychological Operations officer with more than 32 months of combat (Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation New Dawn) experience and 16 months of joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational experience in the Middle East and South Asia. Currently, Kevin is attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Officer Course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Notes


INTERAGENCY CONFLICT
A Scientific Approach to Understanding Human Social Behavior and Organizational Theory

BY FIRST SERGEANT ANDREW J. PRESCOTT

U.S. Government solutions to interagency conflict focuses on symptomatic operational shortcomings rather than addressing underlying factors that contribute to organizational conflict. Selected key concepts of sociobiology and organizational theory explain why interagency conflict is probabilistic. Therefore, organizations should implement best practices that seek to mediate — not alleviate — the pitfalls of internal organizational structure and behavior and the external unpredictable and adaptive environment around them. Internal best practices include implementing policies that mitigate adverse human social behavior and employing a leadership model that manages intraorganizational cooperation, competition and conflict. Furthermore, organizations are — and operate in — a complex adaptive system therefore, external best practices include establishing an organizational model that seeks not to control its environment, but rather to increase its organizational form.

Since the close of the World War II, the U.S. has transitioned its organizational structure to meet the demands of a national grand strategy. The National Security Act of 1947 provided the president with a more unified armed forces, creating the National Security Council, and establishing the CIA. During the Vietnam War, the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support program demonstrated the first concerted effort between the CIA, USAID and the Department of Defense. After the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975, non-state actors began to present a threat to U.S. interests. Failed efforts of Operation Eagle Claw in 1980 prompted the Goldwater-Nichols Act that sought to align its military services to complement, rather than compete against each other. Despite legislative action aimed at decreasing organizational rivalry, why does it continually persist?

Human Social Behavior

Since recorded history, humans have survived in groups. Examples of commonalities within these groups include kinship, race and ethnicity. In modern societies these have progressed to include religious, political and occupational commonalities. One of the most significant problems that groups face is that individual desires and needs often conflict with the group’s collective good. For example, if each individual or group hoarded food for themselves, then others would starve. As others begin to die off, the group’s overall survival would be jeopardized. Over an extended time, this could threaten the entire group’s existence.

In 1873, Charles Darwin argued that not only were organisms’ anatomical and physiological traits hereditary, but their behavioral traits were as well. These traits existed to aid the survival and reproduction capabilities of the species. An example of this process is in a herd of zebras that collectively will increase their overall running speed over generations. This is because each individual zebra’s running capability is genetically predisposed; therefore, predators will most likely eat zebras that do not possess enough speed.

Implicit in the theory of natural selection rests the critical elements of scarcity and competition. Evolution is an inherently competitive process — the faster and more intelligent predators will most likely catch more zebras than their competitors will. Furthermore, if the predators existed in an environment of an unlimited supply of prey, the speed and intelligence would provide no advantage. The scarcity of prey — or resources — provides an environment in which those who want it must compete to acquire it. The principles of scarcity and competition are two of the most important underlying factors in understanding how natural selection shapes the social landscape. These principles are applied to predators and zebras, corporations and money, professional sports and government institutions and power.

The theory of natural selection yielded insights in explaining selfish behavior, however it failed to explain concepts like altruism. The idea of comparing one’s own interest with others’ interests, and deciding that others’ are more important presupposes a notion of moral agency that was absent from the evolutionary perspective on behavior. Two prevailing theories attempted to explain individual human motivation: psychological hedonism and psychological egoism. The understanding of these motivational theories are critical, and provide the framework for applications to game theories, such as the prisoner’s dilemma, that attempt to analyze the gains and losses from conflict and cooperation between individuals and groups. The prisoner’s dilemma demonstrated the tension between individual
Organizational Theory

Almost all modern collective action is executed in organizational contexts. Because organizations pervade human society the capacity for social change often rests within organizational structure. Conversely, organizations can demonstrate the capability to adapt to the dynamic environment — specifically in response to other organizations’ adaptations. The organization’s survivability in a competitive environment often depends on whether it can adapt to the environment. This survivability is often dependent on an organization’s form, which presents two characteristics: routines and competence elements. Routines and competency elements are fundamental when acknowledging that organizations do not operate in a static and unchanging environment. The world is dynamic; when organizations face challenges, often times they must adapt to their environment by altering their routines, competence or both.

The organizational form can evolve from multiple causalities at many organizational levels including the individual, group, population and even larger communities of organizations. This evolution is seen as organizations evolve from both internal and external factors, as well as from the relationships that exist between multiple organizations. Typically, organizations are established at the level of technology and knowledge available at the time and through their efficient utilization of this technology, the organization becomes stable. Over time however, this environment will typically change, necessitating organizational evolution. While the mechanisms that established the organization’s initial success can contribute greatly to its stability, the organization’s resistance to change can hinder an organization’s ability to adapt to its environment. Numerous contributing factors to organizational imprinting include organizational culture, mission statements and the organization’s existing products or services. While there are numerous reasons that attempt to explain why organizations fail to adapt, this section will focus on how these changes can affect organizational natural selection. One of the determining factors of an organization’s ability to survive is the organization’s niche width.

Niche width theories are formulated to explain how environmental variations affect the life chances of specialist and generalist organizations. This presence can be either positive or negative. Therefore, organizations often face the problem of whether their model should be a “jack-of-all-trades,” or if they should focus their efforts towards a narrow and deep field of work. Generalist organizations typically have a wide niche, while organizations possessing a narrow niche are referred to as specialists. Generalists, organizations that have a broader field of expertise and resources, often perform better during volatile environment because of their ability to diversify risk across different product lines. Specialist organizations have a greater chance of survival in environments that are stable; however, they perform poorly in volatile conditions because they have difficulties outlasting unfavorable periods which demand expertise in fields outsider their traditional specialty.

As groups compete for resources, they will most likely adapt their best practices in order to survive, most often through technological innovation, restructuring, mirroring other successful competing groups or sometimes attempt to eliminate groups that threaten their security. One of the hallmarks of successful groups is the inherent cooperative relationships between its individuals. In this sense, groups that cooperate the best, compete the best. Empirical evidence indicates that both individuals and groups cooperate when necessary; however, over a large enough scale, competition is seen. Organizational competition can produce effects; however, unhealthy competition can sometimes lead to conflict. Intra-organizational conflict can originate from any one or multiple conceptual models; common symptoms emerge ranging from ongoing conflicts over a long period of time to people who have simply given up at attempting to resolve the conflict.
**SOF Applications**

The U.S. Special Operations Command is a formal organization that operates as an agent within a larger, complex adaptive system. Equally important is the recognition that the agents within USSOCOM (as a complex adaptive system itself) are groups of people and organizations that demonstrate many of the probabilistic behavior characteristics of human social behavior theories. Furthermore, as a predominantly hierarchical structure, USSOCOM is predisposed to many of the pitfalls that are inherent with a formal chain of command. Given its size, age and organizational culture, USSOCOM is also predisposed to many of the adverse effects of organizational form and niche width. Despite these challenges, USSOCOM has developed a strategic planning process that seeks to mitigate human social behavior and organizational shortcomings by expanding the Global SOF Network while directly supporting the Defense Strategic Guidance.

It can be argued that while projected budget cuts are not the most welcome, USSOCOM can maximize this opportunity to increase its organizational form. Resource scarcity can actually increase USSOCOM’s organizational capacity. Scarcity encourages competition among and between agents. Whether it is zebras, advanced operating bases or civil military support elements, resource-poor environments will set conditions that expose (human) social behavior patterns. USSOCOM has demonstrated the ability to mitigate hedonism and egoism, while promoting altruism. At the individual (operator) level, one mechanism that USSOCOM utilizes is implementing higher entry barriers to the organization. Organizationally, USSOCOM seeks to mitigate adverse social behavior by establishing an interagency network that partners with Combined Arms Center-Training, for a new Mission Command Training Program Operations Group to design and execute integrated operational-level collective training for joint SOF operational elements. Abroad, USSOCOM aims to broaden its organizational routines, competencies and niche-width through the expansion of the Global SOF Network. Unfortunately, organizational cultures tend to resist interoperability even with other similar organizations. Nations and departments or agencies within nations, all have distinct cultures, mission-sets and priorities. This is particularly difficult when national agendas do not necessarily synchronize with one another and organizational compartmentalization and information sharing present interoperability challenges.

Whether organizations recognize it or not, they instinctively address the adverse effects of how human social behavior influences organizational form. One method that organizational leaders may consider is the establishment of performance metrics that indicate optimal levels of inter- and intra-organizational competition. Robert Axelrod proved that seemingly irrational behavior — like cooperation — can facilitate a greater collective good despite agency or organizational declines. This was reinforced by the “Tragedy of the Commons,” as egoist and hedonist behavior ultimately demised social groups that would have otherwise survived had they demonstrated altruism. Furthermore, what is the tipping point between interagency competition and conflict? Interagency cooperation, collaboration, synchronization and similar subjects, are covered in FM 6-22 Army Leadership (2006), the 2012 Defense Strategic Planning Guidance, the 2009 National Intelligence Strategy, the 2014-2017 DOS USAID Strategic Plan, 2012-2016 Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan, SOCOM 2020, ADP 5-0. The Operations Process (2012), JP 5-0 Joint Operations Planning (2011), ADP 3-0 Unified Land Operations, FM 1 The Army (2005) and FM 3-0 Operations (2008). None of these critical documents, manuals or reports mention interagency conflict — not once. Given research on human social behavior and organizational theory, interagency conflict is not inevitable however, it is highly probabilistic. Doctrine, organizational structure and leadership are keys to building and sustaining functional human social groups; however, they are by no means a panacea to mitigating interagency conflict. This article, however, argues that acknowledging the existence of interagency conflict — and providing organizational leaders with guidance grounded in the understanding of human social behavior — may yield positive results that can complement organizational adaptations that target the interagency cooperation, competition and conflict. SW

**Master Sgt. Andrew Prescott** served as the company senior healthcare specialist assigned to Co. D, 98th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne), and deployed to Mauritania, Afghanistan, Guyana and Colombia. He is currently slated to perform duties and responsibilities of the first sergeant of Special Operations Medical Detachment, 528th Special Troops Battalion (A), 528th Sustainment Brigade (A). Prescott holds a master’s in strategic studies from The National Defense University and a bachelor’s in political science with a concentration in international relations from Troy University.

**Notes**

10. Ibid.
ANNOUNCEMENTS

2nd Quarter Human Resources Command/DA Secretariat Board Schedule

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<td>13 JAN 15</td>
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<td>21 JAN 15</td>
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FY 15 ARSOF OFFICER ACCESSION PANEL

The Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations branches are currently recruiting officers from YG12 to try out for Army Special Operations. Officers interested in applying to one of the ARSOF branches must submit their packets by March 20, 2015 to the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion. If selected by the ARSOF Officer Accession Panel, officers will undergo a rigorous assessment and selection process prior to attending the regimental qualification courses. Upon graduation from the qualification course you will be assigned as a commander of a small specialized team of dedicated professionals. The specific details can be found in MILPER message 14-220. Packets must be submitted to the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion at http://www.sorbrecruiting.com or contact them at 910-432-1818.

SPECIAL FORCES

CMF 18 PSA  Former enlisted Special Forces Soldiers have an opportunity to rejoin the SF Regiment in an Active Duty status thru the Prior Service Accessions (PSA) program. The PSA is open to CMF 18 qualified noncommissioned officers who previously served in the active component (AC) or the National Guard Component (NGC). For more information contact MSG Pope at popeb@soc.mil or commercial 910-432-7359, DSN 239-7359 or MSG Puga at carlos.puga@soc.mil or commercial 910-432-6995 or DSN 239-6995.

Warrant Officer Professional Military Education  On Aug. 19, 2014, Department of the Army G-1 released the Rapid Action Review of AR 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development. The majority of the changes to the warrant officer cohort related to professional military education. The regulation defines the new Army Physical Fitness Test standard to attend PME, Warrant Officer Candidate School and Officer Candidate School, clarifies “PME backlog” to eliminate confusion, it links PME to promotion and renames the Warrant Officer Education System to align it with the Commissioned Officers Education System.

Chapter 3-13, (Physical Readiness and Height and Weight Requirements for Military Institutional Training), stipulates that successful completion of the APFT is mandatory for entry and graduation of PME, WOCS and OCS. However, if the Soldier fails the initial APFT, he or she is allowed one retest. Based on subparagraph c.(2), the retest “will be administered no earlier than seven days and no later than 24 days after the initial failure of the APFT.” Soldiers who fail to meet APFT standards the second time will be removed from the course. These rules apply to the height and weight screening standards as well. An exception to the APFT policy will only be granted for the run event. According to j. (3), if there is a permanent profile this “must be a result of extraordinary circumstances” to be approved. The approving authority for this exception to policy is HQDA DCS, G3/5/7.

Chapter 3-10, (Officer and Noncommissioned Officer Professional Military Education Backlog definitions), set expectations for completion of the respective PME prior to the Soldier’s promotion to the next grade, it links PME to promotion, future assignments and career management models, and it eliminates the 1-year Time in Grade requirement for PME attendance. In addition, the regulation defines backlog to mandate that PME takes place in a timely manner through the force generation cycle and prior to assuming position requiring appropriate levels of PME. A detailed definition by grade is in Chapter 3-19, c.-e. In addition to Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course/Warrant Officer Senior Service Education, the Chief Warrant Office of Branch/Regimental Chief Warrant Officers will attend Pre-Command Course (PCC) Phase III only; Combat Aviation Brigade Chief, Chief Warrant Officers and Special Forces Group Chief; Chief Warrant Officers will attend PCC Phases I and III.

Finally, the 180A Proponent Office has added two additional board dates to the FY15 accessions boards. The 180A board dates are during the months of September, November, March and May. The September and November boards will feed into the January start date of Special Forces Warrant Officer Technical and Tactical Course and the March and May boards will feed into the July start date of SFWOTTC.
The mass marketing of protein supplements as an ideal post-training recovery option has resulted in confusion by many special operations Soldiers. So, which is more ideal to optimize post-training muscle protein repair, recovery and the subsequent muscle building: Food or supplements? Protein is important in the Soldier's diet and is involved in almost every structural and functional component of the human body. Additionally, both the increases in protein breakdown caused by endurance training and the need for dietary protein after resistance training to support muscle gains impact the body's need for protein, particularly the amino acids, or compounds that combine to make protein. During post-training recovery, optimal nutrition intake is important to replenish all of the primary nutrient stores that were used during training in order to facilitate the much needed repair and recovery of the muscle damage from training.

Besides the replacement of muscle carbohydrate stores, muscle damage repair and muscle reconditioning are important determinants of post-training recovery. A positive muscle protein balance is needed to facilitate the repair of physical training-induced muscle damage and to allow the muscle's adaptive response to physical training to take place. Post-training nutrition is required to achieve the positive muscle protein balance. Multiple studies have shown that AA and/or protein intake increases protein repair, recovery and rebuilding rates after resistance and endurance-type training. However, what are the optimal doses, types and timing recommendations for dietary protein intake to maximize muscle protein repair, recovery and the subsequent muscle building?

Research has shown that post-training intake of 40 grams of mixed amino acids or essential AAs effectively stimulated muscle protein repair, recovery and rebuilding. Since the intake of either 40 grams MAA or 40 grams EAA resulted in a similar net protein balance, it was suggested that ingesting non-essential AAs during immediate post-exercise recovery may not be needed. Follow-up studies then took a look at the impact of only 6g EAA with and without carbohydrate and found that this amount was also effective in stimulating post-exercise muscle protein repair, recovery and rebuilding. However, the intake of such a small amount of EAA post-exercise only resulted in a net positive protein balance for a short period (~2 hours), after which the net protein balance returned to a negative balance, therefore it was determined this small amount of AAs is not enough to maintain a muscle building state. Upon further investigation, it has been found that 20 grams of complete protein (all EAA and non-essential AAs) is enough to support muscle protein repair, recovery and rebuilding after resistance training, which aids in maximizing the subsequent muscle building response to resistance training. Researchers also found that consuming more than 5-6 doses of ~20 grams of protein daily would not further maximize the muscle protein repair, recovery and rebuilding process after training and would ultimately result in protein being lost as waste and that chronic excess protein consumption beyond this dose could actually lead to dampening the protein repair and recovery response to suboptimal (~20g) protein doses.

Studies have shown the ingestion of dietary protein including whey, whole milk and/or fat free milk, egg protein, soy protein, casein and beef all stimulate the muscle protein repair and recovery process. Milk protein and its components, whey and casein; seem to provide an advantage over soy. Casein and whey also seem to have distinct muscle-building properties, which are attributed to differences in their digestion and absorption properties. Whey protein is a soluble protein with fast intestinal absorption, in fact casein clots in the stomach delay its digestion and absorption and the subsequent AA release into circulation in the blood stream. Despite these differences there has not been any difference found in the net protein balance during recovery from resistance training following casein versus whey protein intake. Additionally, due to a higher leucine (specific AA) content, whey protein may be more effective at promoting muscle protein repair and recovery than casein. This finding suggests that a more rapid entry rate of AA into the bloodstream after feeding enhances muscle repair, recovery and signaling to the muscle cells for building after resistance training than a slow entry rate of AAs into the bloodstream. Collectively, this information further supports that protein digestion and absorption rates are important factors in human muscle protein repair, recovery and rebuilding. Recent studies also indicate that the form of food (liquid vs. solid) may be important in regulating the AA availability in the blood after meals, with liquids achieving quicker results than solids.

Timing of protein ingestion should also be considered important in stimulating muscle building post-training. Researchers have found that by consuming a supplement that contained carbohydrate, protein and fat together immediately post-training improved post-training net protein balance versus consuming the same supplement up to three hours later. More recent studies also suggest that consuming both carbohydrate and protein before and/or during training may further enhance post-training muscle building. It could also be speculated that protein ingestion before and/or during resistance training already stimulates muscle repair and recovery during exercise, thereby creating a larger time period for muscle repair and recovery to be elevated. Additionally, since different types of protein differ in digestion rate, the type and timing of protein consumption are related. Finally, the post-training dose of protein also depends on the AA/protein source.

In summary, post-training protein intake can stimulate muscle repair, recovery and rebuilding, can limit protein breakdown and allow for muscle building. Soldiers should consume ~20-25g liquid protein, milk or whey, within 1 hour post-training. Soldiers should also aim to consume 5-6 total servings of ~20-25g protein daily, including the post-training dose. Supplements do not seem to provide any advantage over food. However, Soldiers might consider supplements over food due to convenience, training location (i.e. field/deployed vs. garrison) and/or storage limitations. Further research is needed to investigate the variance in protein digestion and absorption kinetics as well as in regard to the timing of protein ingestion in relation to specific types, intensities, durations and frequency of physical training.
NETWORKS OF REBELLION: EXPLAINING INSURGENT COHESION AND COLLAPSE

The factors required to succeed in building an insurgent group capable of challenging the state is a major area of current research on civil wars. While past research on civil wars tends to explain insurgent groups' growth based on factors related to tangible support, superior ideology, state policies or popular support, Networks of Rebellion takes a markedly different approach. An assistant professor of political science at the University of Chicago, Dr. Paul Staniland brings new life to the debate over those factors necessary to organize an insurgency. Departing from mainstream approaches that have mainly focused on the importance of resources (e.g., money, equipment and charisma) to explain insurgent growth, Staniland takes a social-institutional approach to explain insurgent organization, explaining that variance in insurgent organization is a result of an insurgent group's ability to latch on to and use existing pre-war social relationships.

While resources may be necessary for insurgent success, they are insufficient for explaining insurgent success. Insurgents go to war with the organization they have at the start of the conflict, Staniland observes. Insurgent groups evolve differently over time, with some becoming better equipped to conduct the tasks of armed rebellion, while others fall apart in the face of state pressure. By advocating the importance of social networks in determining insurgent success, Staniland brings attention back to the fact that insurgency is a human activity. Without social networks organized to employ resources, those material assets cannot be used and, thus, tend to not have an impact on an insurgent's success.

Defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as a network of social interactions and personal relationships, social networks form the basis of collective action. The ties developed between humans through mutual activities, shared experience and family relations enable the flow of trust, information and cooperation amongst a human network. According to Staniland, the major factor behind these differing insurgent outcomes is the way an insurgent group is organized to conduct the tasks of rebellion. The process of organizing is one that takes a group of willing volunteers and arranges them to accomplish a multitude of tasks necessary to conduct insurgency. Chief among these tasks is the dissemination of the group's strategy and accepted group values, the incorporation and socialization of new members, the maintenance of discipline within the group and the collection and distribution of external resources.

Staniland theorizes that the way insurgents use available social networks—through horizontal linkages to fellow insurgent factions and vertical connections to local social networks—leads to their ability to create an organization capable of defeating a state. This theory generates four types of organizational structures based on the social structures to which insurgents have access. Integrated organizations pull together networks of organizers with connections to local communities through a combination of strong horizontal and vertical ties. As a result, integrated organizations display unified leadership, strong centralized discipline and have high levels of cohesion at the local level—characteristics necessary to sustain an insurgency. Vanguard organizations maintain the strong horizontal ties between committed insurgents but have weak or nonexistent vertical ties to local social networks. Without this connection, vanguard organizations remain alien to the population, limiting their presence and control at the local level, thus preventing them from establishing local processes by which to recruit and wage insurgency. Parochial organizations, in contrast, have robust vertical ties between individual insurgent leaders and local networks, but have weak or nonexistent horizontal ties amongst fellow insurgents. Lacking horizontal ties, little trust is generated between insurgent leaders, leading to a lack of cohesive strategy and coordinated action amongst the insurgent group. Finally, having weak or non-existent horizontal and vertical ties, fragmented organizations are completely socially isolated. As a result, insurgents with a fragmented organization rarely endure.

The bulk of the book is devoted to illuminating Staniland's theory through a number of detailed case studies. Stepping away from the typical cases of modern insurgency — Algeria, Malaya, Kenya, Indochina/Vietnam, Oman, Northern Ireland — Staniland presents fresh research from South Asia. Acquired through extensive fieldwork, he uses robust cases from insurgencies in Kashmir, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka to highlight the importance of an insurgency's ability to co-opt existing social networks to organize rebellion. Within each of the three conflicts, multiple armed groups are examined to compare levels and patterns of organizational cohesion throughout the course of the war to provide the data to support the theory. Demonstrating that his theory is not unique to three conflicts, Staniland also applies his theory to a set of cross-conflict comparisons to explain the dynamics of insurgent organization during communist rebellions in Southeast Asia from 1928 to 1960.

This book is a very useful tool for analysts, planners and practitioners of both unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency to further their understanding of insurgent behavior. While the book's main focus is to explain the approaches that insurgents use to develop an organization capable of wresting power from the state, it also provides insight to ways that the state can disrupt insurgent groups through a variety of strategies based on the way the insurgency is organized. With the resurgence of interest in understanding the human domain, Army special operations forces leaders at all levels will find the concepts outlined by Staniland extremely beneficial to the building or destruction of insurgent organizations.