Special Warfare

January - March 2014 | Volume 27 | Issue 1

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U.S. ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY
SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER AND SCHOOL

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DSN: 239-5703

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly publication of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, N.C. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas.

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By order of the Secretary of the Army:
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Throughout the month of November, the Philippines dominated international news; not for the hard won success of its government to combat violent extremist organizations and transnational terrorists, but rather for Typhoon Haiyan, the mega storm that wreaked havoc on the country’s central region.

While reading about the storm, you probably didn’t read about the efforts of the men and women of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command to open airfields and get aid to the people in the affected region. But they were there, quietly, professionally going about their jobs, just as they have been for the past 12 years operating under the auspices of Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines.

JSOTF-P, which was established by Special Operations Command-Pacific in July 2002, has as its mission support to the Armed Forces of the Philippines as they wage their war against terrorism. Prior to the establishment of JSOTF-P, members of the U.S. Special Operations Command operated under the auspices of Joint Task Force 510.

The mission of JSOTF-P, which operates at the request of the Government of the Philippines, is to work alongside the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police and other designated units to defeat terrorists and create the conditions necessary for peace, stability and prosperity in the Southern Philippines.

Over the past decade, the men and women of JSOTF-P have done a magnificent job in fulfilling the mission, making it one of the most successful unconventional warfare missions of this century. It has occurred without much fanfare, but rather with the determination and hard work of the U.S. advisers working in the area.

In this issue of Special Warfare, you will not only read about the success of JSOTF-P, you will also read about the larger role of the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) in the PACOM area of operations. The Soldiers of the 1st SFG(A) have spent the past decade quietly conducting missions in countries throughout their AOR. They have remained tied to the historical role of Special Forces, advising and assisting our partner nations, and in doing so have developed a strong understanding of the unique cultures of the countries within their region.

Far from the flagpole, the 1st SFG(A) has embraced its historic lineage and serves as a stabilizing force in the Pacific realm, supporting our partners and building relationships with developing countries throughout the region.

Brigadier General David G. Fox
The sacrifice, patriotism and heroism of the service members of Task Force Dagger was commemorated at Meadows Memorial Plaza on Nov. 7, 2013 during a paver dedication ceremony.

Task Force Dagger was the first operational task force in Afghanistan from October 2001 to April 2002, which led to the fall of a terrorist government in Central Asia and eviction of al-Qaeda leadership from Afghanistan.

“I would like to thank each and every one of you who made it out here today to this great event in honor of some great men,” said Lt. Gen John F. Mulholland, deputy commanding general, U.S. Special Operations Command. “This day, the men of Task Force Dagger are truly walking in the footsteps of giants as we are recognized with the other members of special operations forces in this memorial plaza.”

Soon after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Task Force Dagger was directed to conduct special operations missions in support of a number of Northern Alliance commanders in Afghanistan, and to work with them to gain their active assistance in overthrowing the Taliban regime.

“As we rolled that task into one machine it was absolutely phenomenal. All of our joint brothers in arms were absolutely amazing,” said Mulholland.

Mulholland chronologically described each and every moment of emphasis that changed the outcome of the task force and the importance of each of them. He made it a point to pay tribute to the families who supported their warriors.

“We are 12 years into this and we have a very solid process and great support. But, that was not the way it was when we had our first casualties — it was all starting from scratch,” said Mulholland.

“The ladies of the 5th Special Forces Group had to figure that out. For the exceptional job that they accomplished, I would like to say thank you.

“This day is about the commemoration of Task Force Dagger. This represents our place in history. We have extraordinary men who took on our nation’s most difficult and dangerous enemies,” continued Mulholland. “It was the men on those alpha-teams and their interagency counterparts figuring it out on the ground — guiding us, informing us and letting us shape and bring things together when we saw opportunities.”

For its actions, Task Force Dagger earned the Joint Meritorious Unit Award while its subordinate units earned six Presidential Unit Citations and four Valorous Unit Awards.

“The nation is truly in debt to these men, from the 5th Special Forces Group and the Night Stalkers who flew incredibly perilous missions; to our Air Force Special Operations Command brothers in the fixed-wing world, combat controllers, pararescue jumpers, weathermen and our interagency partners who got the job done on behalf of our country,” said Mulholland. “If there is one strategic lesson to take away from this, it is when the United States brings all of the elements and capabilities together there is nothing that can stop us — nothing that can stand in our way.” — USASFC (Airborne) Public Affairs.

Command Sgt. Major, Tony L. Duncan, 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne), was presented the 2013 Col. Aaron Bank Award at an awards luncheon hosted by the Association of Special Operations Professionals at the Fort Bragg Club, Nov. 5, 2013.

Duncan holds the highest noncommissioned officer position in the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade.

“I’m not standing here because of things I’ve done,” said Duncan, whose military career spans more than 30 years in the U.S. Army. “I’m standing here because of things other people have done.”

Presenting the award was the 2012 winner, Command Sgt. Maj. George A. Bequer, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s top noncommissioned officer.

Bequer praised Duncan’s many duties and accomplishments since his enlistment into the Army in 1983, calling him “one of the finest professionals in the U.S. Army.”

Bobby G. Suggs, ASOP executive vice president, also presented the ASOP figurine to CSM Duncan.

Col. Aaron Bank was an officer of the United States Army, and is considered the founder of the U.S. Army Special Forces, commonly called Green Berets. The Aaron Bank Award, established in 1990, is awarded annually to the individual whose contribution is significant and above the outstanding performance normally associated with his/her duties. — USASOC Public Affairs.
Fox Assumes the Reigns of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School


Fox has been serving as the SWCS Deputy Commanding General, Brig. Gen. Fox began his military career as an enlisted Soldier. After completing Officer Candidate School in 1982, he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Infantry. His first assignment was with the 6-31st Mechanized Infantry Battalion at the National Training Center, Ft. Irwin, Calif., where he served as a platoon leader and company executive officer.

After completion of the Special Forces Officer Qualification Course, he was assigned as a Detachment Commander for Operational Detachment-Alph 544 in 2nd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, N.C. His next assignment was to Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne) as a small group instructor in the Officer Qualification Course. He later served as the executive officer of Company G, 1st Battalion.

His next assignment took him to Little Rock Air Force Base, Ark., and the Joint Readiness Training Center, where he served as an Operational Detachment-Alph observer/controller. During this time, the Joint Readiness Training Center was restationed to Fort Polk, La., where he finished his assignment as the Special Operations Training Detachment’s operations officer. He again returned to Fort Bragg, where he commanded Company B, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne). During his tenure, he led his company to Haiti during Operation Uphold/Restore Democracy.

After completing company command, he attended the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. Returning to Fort Bragg, he served in multiple assignments, culminating as the executive officer to the Commanding General, United States Army Special Operations Command.

Completing his assignment at United States Army Special Operations Command, he moved to Fort Campbell, Ky., where he served as the deputy commander of the 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne). After selection for battalion command, he assumed command of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne). While in command, he led 2nd Battalion during its deployment to Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan as part of Task Force Dagger.

His follow-on assignment was at the Joint Readiness Training Center, where he commanded the Special Operations Training Detachment and was the senior Special Operations Forces observer/controller. While assigned to Joint Readiness Training Center, he was selected for the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pa. After graduation, he was assigned to the Army Staff as the executive officer to the Military Deputy for Financial Management and Comptroller.

He then served as the Fort Bragg Garrison Commander before returning overseas to serve as the Commander of the Iraq Assistance Group, United States Forces-Iraq. His next assignment was to Korea, where he served as the Commanding General of Installation Management Command, and as the Deputy Commanding General of Eighth United States Army. He returned to Afghanistan as the Deputy Commanding General (Support), 1st Infantry Division.

Brig. Gen. Fox’s military education includes the U.S. Army War College, Command and General Staff College, Combined Arms Services Staff School, and the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses. His civilian education includes a bachelor of arts from the University of Nevada at Las Vegas, and a masters in strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College.

His awards and decorations include the Legion of Merit, Purple Heart Medal, Bronze Star Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with six oak-leaf clusters, Joint Service Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal with oak-leaf cluster, Army Achievement Medal, National Defense Service Medal, Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, Armed Forces Reserve Medal, Multinational Force and Observer Medal, Joint Meritorious Unit Award, Army Reeder commanded the USAJFKSWCS, the Army’s Special Operations Center of Excellence, since August 2012, and is departing to assume command of the Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan/NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan.

Warrant Officer Institute Change Of Command

On Friday, Nov. 22, Chief Warrant Officer 5 Tommy Austin assumed command of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School’s Special Forces Warrant Officer Institute from Chief Warrant Officer 5 Daniel Wilkie. This is Austin’s second time at the helm of the Warrant Officer Institute.

The Special Forces Warrant Officer Institute is an adaptive and collaborative learning institution that provides the most current and relevant professional military education for SF warrant officers at every level of their career in support of operational requirements. The Special Forces Warrant Officer Institute supports all of the lifelong learning requirements of both warrant officer candidates and senior warrant officers in the 180A MOS. The institute educates, mentors, trains and appoints warrant-officer candidates to the grade of WO1 as well as provides education and training to senior warrant officers at key points in their career. The institute produces highly capable combat leaders and innovative planners capable of planning and executing SF missions.

Austin, a native of Anderson, Ind., joined the Army in September 1983. He served in various Infantry assignments prior to his completion of the Special Forces Qualification Course in December 1991. Between 1991 and 1996 he served as...
USAJKFSCSWCS Doctrine Update: Unconventional Warfare

BY JEFFREY HASLER

Army Techniques Publication 3-05.1, Unconventional Warfare, 06 September 2013

ATP 3-05.1, Unconventional Warfare, Sept. 6, 2013 is the Army’s doctrinal foundation for UW and is the broadest and most comprehensive United States Government doctrinal publication on the subject of UW. ATP 3-05.1 provides doctrine directly useful to all users within the U.S. Army, but is deliberately intended to be useful to other services in the Department of Defense and joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational audiences. Although UW is inherently a sensitive subject, ATP 3-05.1 is intentionally kept unclassified to make it accessible to civilian policy makers with a role in oversight and support of UW activities.

ATP 3-05.1 is written to emphasize the strategic and operational utility of UW as a policy option available to national-level and theater-level decision makers. The ATP is therefore written for planners at the theater special operations command and Special Forces group level who would be charged with recommending and planning strategic and operational options to geographic combatant commanders, ambassadors and interagency decision makers at all levels of the government.

The ATP does not replace TC 18-01, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, Jan. 28, 2011, which is written primarily for executing units at the SOTF; advanced operational base and Operational Detachment – Alpha levels.

Chapter 1 provides a conceptual overview of UW, sets it within the context of national policy and discusses why UW is a valuable policy option. The chapter provides an appreciation for the criticality of considering when and to what degree UW is feasible.

Chapter 2 considers how and why populations resist. It outlines the seven-phase model of U.S.-sponsored insurgency and explains the classic and affiliated components of insurgent and resistance organizations.

Chapter 3 is a detailed discussion of the activities that comprise UW: preparation of the environment, subversion, sabotage, unconventional assisted recovery, guerrilla warfare and intelligence operations. Although these subjects have always been referred to in UW publications, detailed discussion of them has been reduced in Army SOF doctrine since the end of the Cold War. This chapter reintroduces a detailed discussion of this content.

Chapter 4 provides practical information on supporting activities for UW, with a significantly expanded section on logistical support and sustainment planning.

Chapter 5 outlines a procedure for UW campaign planning. This is a new feature in UW doctrine intended to reinforce the strategic and operational utility of UW, and contribute to ATP 3-05.1 being a single-volume resource for UW campaign planners.

Appendix A is an unprecedented list of joint SOF component capabilities for UW derived from the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Directive 525-89, (S/NF) Unconventional Warfare (U). The list adds conceptual clarity to service roles in UW useful to any joint and interagency planning group.

Appendix B provides a list of characteristic attributes for those most likely to succeed in executing UW based on the Army SF Soldier.

Appendix C presents examples of previous U.S.-sponsored UW useful to UW campaign planners’ design process.

Appendix D presents examples of previous international practitioners of insurgent or resistance warfare useful to UW campaign planners’ design process.

Appendix E analyzes the characteristics of significant recent revolutionary and insurgent warfare movements that provide instructive examples of modern irregular warfare.

Appendix F is a comprehensive analytical tool for strategic and operational analysis of potential UW target countries.

Joint Publication 3-ZZ, Unconventional Warfare, (Author’s Draft) November 2013

For 60 years, UW-specific doctrine has been produced by the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, N.C. Although Army UW manuals have always been intended for use by JIM partners, there has long been a requirement for a joint publication that specifically highlights the inherently joint nature of UW; UW is not “just something that Special Forces guys do.” There are five pillars of irregular warfare; four of which are in support of the state (foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and stability operations) and have had their own joint publications. UW is the one pillar of irregular warfare that is designed to undermine/ oppose the state, and has been the only IW pillar without an explanatory joint publication. The Joint Staff has now authorized the development of a JP specifically for UW, and USAJKFSCSWC is collaborating with the U.S. Special Operations Command J7/9 on the initial draft. The JP 3-ZZ is scheduled for completion on/about October 2014.


The Army Training and Evaluation Program documents of the late 20th century gave way to the Army’s Combined Arms Training Strategies. The cadre at SOTD, Joint Readiness Training Center rotating units and others in the SF regiment have identified the need for more detailed UW-specific task lists for training and evaluation of ODA’s, ODBs and ODCs. The SF Division is developing the handbook in collaboration with the SOTD cadre for use with the RTUs and eventually to be provided to the entire SF Regiment. The SWCS Pub 14-01 initial draft is scheduled for completion on/about December 2013. SW

WOI Change of Command continued from page 06

a noncommissioned officer on ODA 754, 2nd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) as a Special Forces weapons sergeant and intelligence sergeant. In June 1996, he attended Warrant Officer Candidate School and the Special Forces Warrant Officer Basic Course. As a warrant officer, Austin served as the Assistant Detachment Commander, ODA 715, Detachment Commander and Assistant Detachment Commander, ODA 714, Assistant Detachment Commander, ODA 795, Detachment Commander, ODA 797, Company Operations Warrant Officer, ODB 780, senior instructor, SF Warrant Officer Technical and Tactical Certification Course, 1st SWTG(A), Commandant, Warrant Officer Institute, S3X Special Plans Officer and the S35 OCONUS Manager for the 7th SFG(A) as the Command Chief Warrant Officer.

He has numerous deployments to the SOUTHCOM and CENTCOM areas of operations. Austin’s awards and decorations include the Bronze Star Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal (3rd award), the Army Commendation Medal (4th Award), the Joint Service Achievement Medal, the Army Achievement Medal (4th Award), the Good Conduct Medal (4th Award), the National Defense Service Medal with bronze star, the Afghanistan Campaign Medal, the Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, the NCO Professional Development Ribbon with numeral 3, the Army Service Ribbon, the Overseas Ribbon with numeral 2, the NATO Medal, the Inter-American Defense Board Service Medal, the Navy Commendation Unit Award, the Army Superior Unit Award, the Master Parachutist Badge, the Military Freefall Jump Master Badge, the Pathfinder Badge, the Air Assault Badge, the Expert Infantryman Badge, the Ranger tab, the Special Forces tab and foreign parachutist badges from Colombia, Guatemala, Chile and Ireland.
SCAPE

- 3 largest economies
- Over 1,000 languages
- 52% of Earth’s surface
- 36 countries
- 16 time zones
- World’s six largest armed forces
- Two oceans
- Over half the world’s population

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

- 10 trillion dollars of annual bi-lateral trade
- Five of seven U.S. Mutual Defense Strategies
- 1 trillion dollars of U.S. commerce
- Region a key driver of global politics

RISKS

- Nuclear weapons
- Growing tensions between states
- Radicalization / VEOs
- Economic disparity
- Energy, food, water security issues
- Natural Disasters
On any given day, multiple teams of the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), stationed at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, are deployed throughout their regional area of responsibility. Like their SF brothers in the other groups, members of the 1st SFG(A) are also deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan; however, it is the work quietly undertaken over the past decade that has made a significant difference in one of the most critical regions of the world: the Pacific.

In early 2012, the nation’s attention was refocused on the Pacific through the issuance of the National Defense Strategy, which was designed to rebalance the nation’s global posture and presence by placing a greater emphasis on operations in the Pacific. For the members of the 1st Special Forces Group (A), this was not news.

Regionally aligned to the Pacific, the 1st Special Forces Group’s AO is home to three of the world’s largest economies. More than 1,000 languages are spoken throughout the region. The area covers 52 percent of the Earth’s surface, spanning 16 time zones and is comprised of a multitude of countries. Those countries, by the way, are home to more than half the world’s population; they are also home to six of the world’s largest armed forces. The region has great strategic importance to the United States. Annually, more than $10 trillion in bilateral trade is conducted in the region. Five of the seven U.S. Mutual Defense Strategies are tied to the region, a region which is also a key driver of global politics. With all that the region has going for it, it has more than its share of issues. There is a huge economic disparity between the haves and the have-nots, which lends itself to radicalization of the populace by violent extremists organizations. The region is also rife with a plethora of natural disasters from typhoons and earthquakes to mudslides and tsunamis. Add to that the growing tensions between states, the race for nuclear arms, the ever present influence of China and the importance of this region for trade and transportation and one can see the efforts of the 1st SFG(A) become increasingly more important.

1st SFG(A) has two forward deployed elements: 1st Battalion stationed at Torii Station, Okinawa, which is under the operational control of the Commander U.S. Special Operations Command-Pacific; and SF Detachment 39, which is forward deployed to Songnam Korea, where its members work directly with the Republic of Korea Special Forces Brigades under the operational control of Special Operations Command-Korea. U.S. Special Forces have been working

AT SEA Members of the 1st SFG(A) conduct maritime operations with Philippine Special Forces in the Pacific. U.S. Army photo.
directly with their Korean counterparts since 1957, building the ROK Special Forces Brigades from the ground up. The detachment, which operates on “the frontier of freedom,” has unequaled access and placement with their counterparts.

“This is a very complex AOR,” said Maj. Matt Gomlak, operations officer, 1st SFG(A) “In many of these countries there is no overt conflict. The question becomes how do we stay engaged in countries without that overt conflict. Nowhere we go is really the ‘wild west’ like Afghanistan or Iraq. These are really more established democracies.”

Throughout the Pacific, 1st SFG(A) participates in a wide array of engagements. This year alone, the group has deployed on 41 operational deployments to 19 countries. In 2015, that number will increase by 63 percent, with 65 planned operational deployments. The deployments will include everything from one to two men serving in embassies to ODAs conducting joint combined exchange training to company-level deployments in support of large-scale regional Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises.

“This AOR is challenging and rewarding and it exemplifies what Special Forces were designed to do,” said Col. Max Carpenter, the deputy group commander. “It’s not dry. The food is awesome, the people are friendly. Our troops are not sequestered behind walls. They get out into the country. They interact with the people on a daily basis. Many of them go to Asia and never leave. We have a robust auxiliary of retired SF guys in the region.”

The dynamic of the region lends itself to the small footprint SF teams utilize while in country. The ability to plan and to work...
far from the flag pole is something the teams have embraced and have mastered.

“Here at the 1st SFG(A) we have the ability to quickly deploy units and plug them into the host-nation infrastructure with minimal support. We do our own planning. We arrange everything from our own lodging to letting our own contracts,” said Gomlack. “Our guys do a great job of figuring out how to leverage the host-nation infrastructure. Our ODA’s have become very capable of operating with minimal assistance and more often than not, are quite capable of operating with complete autonomy while taking care of business for the Country Team. We probably do that better than anyone.”

Due to the AOR’s massive size, the group has divided the AOR into four very specific regions; South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and Oceania. Additionally, the group helps fill the PACOM Augmentation Teams that serve in the various U.S. Embassies throughout the AORs.

The 1st SFG(A) is distributed throughout the AOR but it is Southeast Asia that captures a large portion of its attention and its force. This year, 36 of the group’s missions have been in Southeast Asia, with 22 JCETS being the bulk of those missions. Training is conducted extensively in each of the regions. Within Southeast Asia, 1st SFG(A) has trained with Thailand, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia and Vietnam, with Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia and Malaysia being more constant partners. In other countries, like Indonesia, the training that can be provided by the 1st SFG(A) is non-lethal and aimed more toward planning and building the force. In Vietnam, doors are just beginning to open for the group.

“The more we expose ourselves to Vietnam, the more opportunities we see for growth,” said Gomlack.

That was evident during a recent visit to JBLM by Vietnamese Army leaders. While the Vietnamese contention was at JBLM visiting the conventional forces, they were excited to hear of the Special Forces presence on the installation. They asked if there was a way they could visit with the SF troops. The 1st SFG(A) quickly pulled together a demonstration that highlighted a few of its capabilities and gladly welcomed the contingent. This particular contingent was led by the Vietnamese equivalent of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was comprised of 14 flag officers. Although the encounter was brief, it helped open more doors in the country.

In South Asia, the 1st SFG(A) is definitely focused on India, which is in support of the PACOM Commanders priority of efforts. While the number of U.S. forces in India is small, as mandated by the political environment, the relationship between the two forces has grown considerably, and is developing more with each training iteration and unit exchange visit. Members of the Indian special operations forces routinely visit Joint Base Lewis-McChord for bilateral training; the latest visit was in August of 2013 and was designed to build interoperability between the forces.

Building relationships within India is of key importance. The country not only has the largest growing economy in the world, its strategic location is undeniable. It is also a nuclear state that is adjacent to areas where violent-extremists organizations flourish. While language is key throughout the Pacific AOR, in India it does not have a huge affect on training. Many of the Indian officers and noncommissioned officers speak English and have received formal military training at schools like Sandhurst in England. The group frequently partners with the 1st Parachute Regiment, which is among the oldest and most battle-hardened in the country. It is the equivalent of a battalion in the U.S. Special Forces.
Early in FY13, the 1st SFG(A) had the opportunity to conduct an extended rotation to India for training. “Our training in India was definitely unique. We had worked with this unit on two previous exchanges. On our latest exchange, we were the first U.S. forces to train in the foothills of the Himalayas,” explained Maj. Judd Floris, a company commander in 3rd Bn., 1st SFG(A), who has deployed to numerous countries in the region including Malaysia and Indonesia.

“We did jungle, mountain and altitude training. They are not a historic partner, so we had a little longer period of getting to know each other. In many countries in which we operate, we have habitual partners, but this latest visit to India was a developmental experience for us,” he continued.

In many countries, long-term partners and infrastructure are already in place. In PACOM, that isn’t always the case.

“In India we haven’t yet established that rolodex of people and skills. We have conducted assessments of what they need from us, what training we can offer and what we can learn from them, in order to get the maximum output from every training engagement,” continued Floris.

Beyond unique, sharing training and skills the groups share their cultures. During its latest training mission to India, the Special Forces Soldiers were escorted to the Taj Mahal and other cultural points in the historic country.

“It’s important to see what they are proud of in their country,” said Floris, adding that it is important to understand and respect their military heritage. “Normally when we go on a JCET, the unit we are training with is very deferential to us and will willingly receive whatever training we are ready to offer. In this case, they were not only eager to learn, but also to teach us. It is a very reciprocal relationship.”

While there, the Indian forces showed the 1st SFG(A) Soldiers how they conduct mountaineer training, and execute navigation and survival in a jungle setting. Back at JBLM, the SF teams taught close-quarters combat, planning and marksmanship.

While the Soldier skills shared are a large part of the exchange, the Soldiers of 1st SFG(A) take away something even more important: cultural expertise and new found relationships.

“We have some highly capable speakers within the group, but there are so many variations of the language within the country it is hard to master,” he explained. “To help us be more prepared for these JCETs, we laid on immersion training to improve our language skills, our awareness of the culture and provide us the increased capacity to have successful engagements in theater. Our cultural expertise was a significant part of our success.”

That knowledge served the small teams well as they navigated the logistical systems in many of the countries.

“Just getting there is an experience. It’s literally planes, trains and automobiles. We literally travel across the world to get to India, but once we got there, the journey was just beginning,” he explained. “There aren’t military landing strips, which makes bringing our equipment in difficult. We have to contract for trucks to take us in country to the Himalayas. It’s a four to six hour drive on roads as big as the truck, with no side rails. Once you get to where you are going, there is no equipment to off load the equipment or carry it up to the base camp. So you rely on your partners and that shared suffering and hardship builds the relationship with your partners.”

Lt. Col. Mike Lackman, the group executive officer, noted that the geography and language are two of the major challenges to operating in that part of the world. “But it’s also what makes 1st SFG(A) really unique.”
As a new team leader, his first mission in 1999 was to lead a JCET to Sri Lanka. “We were given $225,000 and told to go forth and do great things,” he recalled. “I didn’t even know where Sri Lanka was. Fortunately, I had a senior E7 who had traveled around the world and was able to teach me what needed to be done when planning a mission from start to finish in Asia.

Part of the complication came from the fact that the country was in the midst of a bloody civil war with the Tamil Tigers, otherwise known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a guerrilla organization that sought to establish an independent Tamil state in northern and eastern Sri Lanka.

“You have to understand, this was pre-9/11. SF teams did not have a lot of combat time and we were going in to advise the 4th SF Regiment, which had been in constant battle for years,” said Lackman. “They started asking us about our combat experience. It took about six weeks for us to build rapport and overcome the credibility issue of not having seen combat. Our NCOs made that connection and shared their experience and skill in small-unit tactics with the regiment’s officers, who had just recently faced a horrible defeat. They took that training and went right back up north to engage the insurgents.”

In Northeast Asia, long-established partners like South Korea and Japan are beginning to take much of the attention of the 1st SFG(A). The developing relationship with SOCKOR is one the most interesting in the AOR. SOCKOR has a relatively small AOR as compared to SOCPAC; however the requirement for the 1st SFG(A) to be able to deploy on short notice in support of a multitude of operational plans and crisis situations is a no fail requirement. The relationship with South Korea special operations forces has always been one of the strongest in Asia, but the radical behavior of North Korea has increased the attention that the 1st SFG(A) is giving to the Korean Theater of Operation. 1st SFG(A) executes numerous JCS exercises, JCETs, subject-matter expert exchanges and OPLAN rehearsals with both SOCKOR and Republic of Korea SOF.

Master Sgt. Mark Koopman has become something of an expert operating on Detachment 39. “What's really unique about the Korean experience is that you are constantly doing your job with your ROK partners. I would get phone calls from them every day, even when I was at home,” he said. “They want to do their job. They know the importance of doing it.”

Koopman added that working with Korean forces is really a dream job for an SF Soldier. “We are entrusted to work daily with the ROK Brigades as the sole American representatives. That's where we, as SF guys, really flourish. We are given the latitude to do the mission and adapt as the need arises. The people there are always happy to have our assistance and advice. They want us working with them,” he continued.

In regards to Japan, 1st SFG(A) habitually conducts a bilateral training exercise, Silent Eagle, with the Japanese Ground Self Defense Force Special Operations Group. This training normally takes place at JBLM each fall. The exercise is designed to improve interoperability between the units. Japanese forces can only be trained as a defensive force, so the skills that can be taught differ than those that are taught with other partners.

One of the most significant events to occur in Northeast Asia in the last 14 years was the opportunity to train in Mongolia in August 2013. The historic event was important for not only the United States, but also for Mongolia. The event included attendance by the President of Mongolia. The exercise, known as Balance Magic 13-1,
was designed to increase the proficiency of the Mongolian force to conduct UW and FID operations. Of significant note, the Mongolian partner unit has supported operations in Afghanistan and Iraq through regular rotations, so the participants had been exposed to U.S. Special Forces previously. The training focused on small-unit Infantry tactics and combat casualty care. At the conclusion of the exercise, U.S. and Mongolian forces conducted an airborne op from a Mongolian helicopter, which resulted in the first awarding of U.S. Parachutist Wings to Mongolian soldiers.

“One thing that is unique about the 1st SFG(A) is that we look at things from a different perspective because of the diversity of our AOR. The problem sets we encounter are much more diverse,” added Gomlack.

As are the benefits. For Master Sgt. James Olive, a JCET in Thailand resulted in a rare experience. “While in Thailand, we were surveying a dropzone for an air exercise,” he recalled. “They use elephants for a lot of things in the country and on that particular day, the elephants were coming down the mountain and passed the proposed dropzone. We had the opportunity to ride an elephant that day. That was a pretty unique experience.”

Lackman also had unique experiences in Thailand patrolling its border with Burma. “Pre-9/11, we were doing counterdrug operations on the Burmese border. A lot of heroin moves through that area,” he said. “We taught the Thai Army how to use sensors to monitor the jungle trails. We also talked a lot about human rights. In every JCET, we conduct in the AOR, the first thing we talk about is human rights.”

For more than 11 years, the 1st SFG(A) has devoted considerable forces and assets to the nation’s success in Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines, where they work under the operational control of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines. For many in 1st SFG (A), the Philippines is their Afghanistan. They have spent the past decade building the Philippine Special Operations Forces and the Special Action Forces of the Philippine National Police from the ground up. It is these units that have made special connections and long-lasting ties to the men of 1st SFG(A). They have trained them for more than a decade, and have watched them grow in many different ways. Now, combat advising at higher levels, the group can see the progress that has been made. They can also see the losses. Students training in Philippine military courses do not graduate without a culmination exercise. Unlike those CULEXs held in the states, the Philippine CULEX involves a real-world mission to real-world combat. If a Soldier completes the exercise, he graduates. For many that isn’t the case, as they are killed in battle. It is the reality of operating in the Philippines.

In the Philippines, the 1st SFG(A) takes a collaborative approach to building interoperability between agencies and improving positive civil-military relationships in order to enhance operations while building the credibility of the government to the local populace. Today’s operations are designed to move the country into a steady state, where terrorist organizations are marginalized and stability is more than just a dream. They do this by sustaining the counterterrorism gains of the past decade, enhancing friendly networks, setting conditions for development and governance and supporting the transformation of the Philippine Security Forces. While the steady state is in sight, continued relationships, training exchanges and collaboration between 1st SFG(A) and its Philippine counterparts will continue in the coming years.

There will be an ongoing need for planned, focused training with the force even when the steady state is reached. Like the established and new partnerships within the region, the U.S. mission in the Pacific is a long-term commitment.

Janice Burton is the editor of Special Warfare.
COlONel ROBeRT McDOWELL  
Commander, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne)  
Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR BRIAN K. JOHNSON  
Command Sergeant Major, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne)  
Command Sergeant Major, Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines

The 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne), located at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash., is regionally aligned with the U.S. Pacific Command and has two forward deployed elements, the 1st Battalion, 1st SFG (A) at Torii Station, Okinawa, and Special Forces Detachment-39 at Songnam, Korea.

In June 2012, Col. Robert McDowell took command of the 1st SFG(A). McDowell is currently serving as the group commander and the Commander, Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines. McDowell’s previous key assignments in the Special Forces community were with the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), the 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) and at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, where he served as the Deputy Commander, 1st Special Warfare Training Group and as the Director, Directorate of Training and Doctrine.

Command Sgt. Maj. Brian K. Johnson, 1st SFG (A) and the JSOTF-P has a wealth of experience in the Pacific Command area of operations and has served in 1st SFG(A) for more than 15 years of his career. Johnson’s recent key assignments were as the battalion command sergeant major for SWCS’s 1st and 2nd Battalions, 1st SWTG (A) and as the Battalion Command Sgt. Maj. 1st Battalion 1st Special Forces Group (A) in Okinawa, Japan.

The 1st SFG(A) is currently deployed in more than 11 countries this quarter, has forces serving in Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines and Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan and is the lead operational special-operations forces element for two Joint Chief of Staff exercises in the AOR that are scheduled for execution in February and March.

For 10 days in November, Special Warfare had the opportunity to be on the ground with the command and the men of the 1st SFG(A) in the Philippines and then visit them at their home station in Washington as they prepared for follow on missions to the PACOM and CENTCOM AORs. The following Q&A was developed throughout the course of the visit and touches on a variety of topics from the overall mission in the PACOM AOR to the traditional advisory role of Special Forces and the quiet success of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines.

**SW:** The 1st Special Forces Group has a lot of irons in the fire. Does it become difficult to prioritize the long list of priorities you are assigned?

**McDowell:** Not at all. There is no question that the job is 24/7. We have Soldiers serving in Afghanistan as part of OEF-A, in the Philippines as part of OEF-P and we have the majority of the load for SOF in Asia. The professionals serving in this group make it very easy to serve several masters. The vision and intent that we get from the Special Operations Command Pacific and the Special Operations of Korea is synchronized to ensure we are maximizing the potential of the group while remaining very meticulous in those times that we have to over-extend our force for the most critical of surge operations. In just the past 90 days we have executed detailed theater campaign planning with both SOCPAC and SOCPAC that has resulted in a prioritization of efforts. We have ensured our actions support the theater campaign plan of the PACOM Commander and we have leaned forward in helping U.S. Special Operations Command develop the Global SOF Campaign.

**SW:** What is your biggest challenge with having to operate in the largest AOR?

**McDowell:** Within the PACOM AOR, there are 36 nations for which we are responsible. The force is finite and thus the biggest challenge is ensuring we do more than just meet the large demand signal placed on us by the commanders of SOCPAC and SOCPAC. The leaders in the 1st SFG(A) have to ensure that we have an adequate amount of time to train and prepare to ensure we remain ready to operate in the most expansive Human Domain that any Special Forces group will encounter. To ensure success, we spend a considerable amount of time and effort balancing long range commitments, maintaining a daily dialogue with our theater SOCs to properly address any and all emerging topics and we deliberately focus on finding time for our Soldiers to train.
**SW:** The sheer size of your operational environment carries with it diverse cultures and languages. How do you meet the diversity that is demanded from your force?

**McDowell:** What is unique to the 1st SFG(A) mission in PACOM is our requirement and our ability to maintain such a broad cultural astuteness and language capability. We know that we have to have the language and knowledge that makes us operational and connected the moment we arrive anywhere in theater. One of our biggest challenges is language because we have such a diversity of languages in the AOR. There are many times that we might only have one individual that is qualified in the target language of the country we are operating in, but we compensate for this by ensuring the remainder of the team learns key phrases and words while developing a very strong appreciation of the culture and nuances of that particular country. Our cultural awareness is an area that we constantly have the opportunity to capitalize on due to the diversity of our deployments. I believe we have more opportunity to develop this cultural knowledge than do the Soldiers serving in the other groups.

**SW:** In looking at the ongoing missions in PACOM, there appears to be a very connected relationship between the 1st SFG(A), the Civil Affairs and Military Information Support Operations teams that work in region. How has that relationship developed?

**Johnson:** When you look at what we are doing and how everyone’s contribution builds a synergistic effect, you easily come to realize that if you take out one piece of the equation the whole mission suffers. PACOM has every conflicting ideology in existence and there are numerous flash points in this AOR alone. It is important to understand that the wrong action or the wrong message can either make you alienated from a key partner or it can set conditions that foster a lack of trust. So when you mention CA and MISO and how they work with the 1st SFG(A), we can confidently say that it is a combined effort.

**McDowell:** The recent typhoon in the Philippines is a great example of how we pulled together multiple capabilities to obtain a successful outcome. The employment of Special Forces assessment teams provided the eyes and ears for the Ambassador, the Commander of PACOM and the JTF Commander; these teams consisted of SF and CA Soldiers, and at key locations we had combat camera and MISO Soldiers. The combat camera and MISO Soldiers helped capture and project critical messages while the CA Soldiers helped local government units get operational again. The SF Soldiers provided a tactical and strategic picture of the activity on the ground that was needed to ensure aide was delivered to the right places and the mechanisms for the delivery of that aide were in place.

**SW:** Unlike the CENTCOM AOR, PACOM does not have any active lethal engagements, which leaves 1st SFG(A) working in the historic role of Special Forces advisers. Has this affected the readiness of the group and its ability to execute surgical strike operations?

**McDowell:** I would like to say that this probably postures the 1st SFG(A) to be the most ready of all the groups to execute both special warfare and surgical strike operations. We maintain a battalion focused on surgical strike and three battalions focused on special warfare. We are deployed constantly in the AOR conducting advise and assist operations in both of the above disciplines. Prior to joining the ranks of the 1st SFG(A) I had the opportunity to jump with the SWCS’s Special Warfare Medical Group and spend some time talking with a few of the Soldiers who had previously been assigned to the 1st SFG(A). Since the jump was delayed due to weather, we had a lot of time to sit and talk on the drop zone. One of the young sergeants on the jump had just finished a four-year assignment to 1st SFG(A). He had served in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as OEF-P and on a multitude of TSCP events. He was a guy who raised his hand to go on every mission and was a great example of what our Special Forces Soldiers were doing in and out of combat.

What was interesting about the conversation is that the only things he would talk freely about were things that he had done in Iraq and in Afghanistan. It seemed that in order to validate his role as a Special Forces Soldier, he had to discuss the lethal aspect of his chosen profession. It was hard to fault him; for the past decade the media has focused on the fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. There had been very little attention paid to the actions being executed throughout Asia that were ensuring we stayed ahead of those adversaries that were setting the conditions for anti access/area denial of the most vital region in the world. When I did get him and the others to talk about OEF-P, JCETs and other activities, now encapsulated under special warfare, that they conducted in PACOM, the first comment back to me was, “That’s just training, it’s not combat.”

He was trying to make a distinction between what he was doing in the PACOM AOR and what he was doing in Afghanistan and Iraq. When I got him to talk about the JCETs, the countries he had been to, the OEF-P mission, I think it was the first time he was able to realize that what he was doing in those missions, was the classic Special Forces mission. It’s what we do better than anyone else. It’s where Lt. Gen. (Charles) Cleveland has envisioned us operating in the Human Domain, executing Special Warfare and prepared to execute surgical strike. It’s what the 1st SFG(A) has never lost the capability to do and what we have leveraged to make ourselves
successfull when dealing with indigenous combat forces in OEF-A and OIF.

So, while Afghanistan and Iraq have been ongoing for more than a decade, the 1st SFG(A) never lost the skills required to conduct special warfare operations and the understanding of what the Human Domain is. As a force, the Soldiers of 1st SFG(A) have continued to operate as singletons in Asia, they have continued to do JCETs, they have continued to execute OEF-P with absolute success, and they have been highly successful in every OEF-A and OIF rotation that the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (A) commanding general has directed us to execute. To a 1st SFG(A) Soldier, the execution of special warfare is just doing ‘day-to-day’ business. As the commander, I think that they are comfortable wading into uncertainty and bring success from chaos and capability from the willing. Then, when a 1st SFG(A) Soldier does take on the combat mission, he takes all of those skills that he employs on a daily basis in the execution of special warfare and finds it very easy to lead an indigenous force into combat. Understanding how to operate with and through others comes naturally to the 1st SFG(A) Soldier.

Johnson: When Operations Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan and Iraq kicked off — and even back in Desert Shield — 1st SFG(A) guys were told to hold fast. We were told, “You have Korea over there that can kick-off at any minute.” It was always a motivating factor because we wanted to get into ‘the fight’, because, whether we admit it or not, that’s what we all came to do. When 1st SFG(A) Soldiers did get the opportunity to begin rotating into ‘the fight’, it was noted by numerous senior leaders that they were very comfortable working through and with others and bringing the most out of the host nation. It is a natural tendency for a warrior to want to take charge, get on point and eliminate the enemy; what is unique about Special Forces is that we are supposed to get others to do the majority of that work. When the 1st SFG(A) Soldiers stepped in, we felt right at home developing capacity and capability and we readily welcomed the challenge to train, advise and assist the host-nation warriors to take the fight to the enemy. We showed them how and then let them do it, and in doing so, we left them with an increased capability; just like we do every day in the PACOM AOR and what we have done amazingly well in OEF-P.

Being able to combine the skills that are required to operate through and with others is what our regiment needs us to do in the execution of special warfare and surgical strike. We never lost the ability to advise or to fight. We stayed engaged. We have experience in the lethal battlespaces, but we have stayed connected to our AOR and never lost the ability to do the special warfare mission that our regiment was designed to do.

SW: We keep hearing the words relationships and reputation. That seems to be key to your success, why is that important?

McDowell: We have all heard a lot about the rebalance to Asia and the refocus on the Pacific. The 1st SFG(A) never left the Pacific. We have always seen it is a vital region and have enjoyed the opportunity to operate in an area that has exemplified Special Forces conducting special warfare. The best part is that success is often built on reputation and relationships and we have been blessed to be aligned to the same geographical area for nearly 56 years. The Special Forces tab and the gold flash on our Berets have long served as far and near recognition symbols of excellence to our friends and one of concern for our adversaries.

Relationships matter, and they can make all the difference in the world. We have learned that more often than not, you are going to find yourself in places where you need to leverage a relationship to gain or maintain access and placement in order to complete the mission you have been given. Our relationships enable us, the Special Forces, to be in places and accomplish tasks that are simply out of the reach of our conventional force brothers.

The Soldiers in the 1st SFG(A) are expected to create the conditions, meet the right people and maintain the access and placement in Asia that will enable our senior leaders, military and civilian, to know that they have a strategic weapon, the Green Beret, in country X, that is able to deliver ground truth, execute operations with the skills and equipment that he showed up with, and keep us ahead of our adversaries – the 1st SFG(A) takes this responsibility seriously.

In the past 90 days I have had the privilege to see Green Berets leverage relationships in crisis, build capacity and capability in a local government that had lost everything in a typhoon, and advise and assist fellow warriors in a conflict that would result in more than 200 enemy dead and nearly 30 friendly warriors killed in action.

In Zamboanga, the Government of the Philippines found itself in the midst of an uprising that rapidly went out of control. In the ensuing 21 days, there would be more than 100,000 people internally displaced, entire villages burned to the ground, more than 185 people taken hostage and used as human shields, and the massing of Philippine Special Operations Forces, who had been trained by Green Berets, from around the country who were sent into Zamboanga in order to secure the hostages and eliminate the threat.

As the crisis was unfolding, the reputation of our forces and the capabilities that we possessed to the President of the Philippines to make a visit to the Joint Operations Center being run by Green Berets one of his first stops. There, he gained ground truth that helped him and his senior leaders develop a plan.

The connectivity and relationships that the Green Berets had with those SOF units and those military and civilian senior leaders pro-
vided critical reach-back and situational awareness to the Embassy and to the Commander of U.S. Forces Pacific. It enabled Green Berets to facilitate the first delivery of humanitarian assistance/disaster relief to those who had been displaced; it provided information that directly enabled the Ambassador to determine how the U.S. could help and how he needed to work with the Philippine President; and lastly it would serve as a validation to many, as to the success of what Green Berets had spent the previous 11 years doing.

**With and through** others may not always be sexy, but it is a force multiplier that builds a network; ensures access and placement when we may need it the most; and is a significant factor in our nation’s ability to defeat the anti-access/area-denial efforts that are employed by our adversaries.

These relationships that existed prior to Zamboanga were not only strengthened in crisis they further solidified a reputation that has been in place for many more years than most of us have been wearing this uniform.

Over the next five days, we would see Green Berets, Civil Affairs and Combat Control Teams taking a leading role in opening up airfields, organizing chaos, facilitating the stand up of local governments, relaying critical ground truth to the JTF Commander and the U.S. Ambassador; and providing aid to thousands of people who had lost everything in a matter of minutes.

You can go nearly anywhere in Asia and you will be greeted as a friend; however, just like in the United States, if they know you personally, they are more willing to help you out and do things with you that will help you make mission. In Asia, by continuously going there and understanding those relationships, we are the force that can be counted on to always make mission. We know that one of the young Soldiers we work with on a JCET today, will be someone who is going to be very important in just a few years to our senior leadership at PACOM and SOCOM. We have never forgotten that our relationships and reputation in the PACOM AOR enable us to get past the initial ‘Who are you, why are you here?’ They help us rapidly get on with the mission at hand.

**Johnson:** As the Group command sergeant major, I have personally witnessed the importance of long-term and new relationships with every team I have visited in the AOR. I have watched my young sergeants talk to senior officers or people in the embassy as if they have known them their whole lives. That isn’t the case. That sergeant may have just met that individual, but someone on the team had the bona fides that got them in the door and allowed them to begin building the relationship. Our Soldiers don’t have to start at ground zero. They start with an established relationship and then continue to create the conditions for the next ODA to be regarded as a friend.

**McDowell:** While these kinds of relationships are not new to Special Forces, it has been phenomenal to watch. It takes you back to Robin Sage. At Robin Sage, we all had to work hard to get into the G-base and we had to continuously prove ourselves until one day we were accepted as equals and then we were able to accomplish the impossible, through development and building capacity and capability in the Philippine SOF. We will maintain the relationships that have been earned in combat and further developed in training. We will demonstrate our resolve to have a strong partnership that moves forward together. We will ensure that we maintain the relationships that support the PACOM Commanders Theater Campaign Plan and expand our successes in operating in the Human Domain in Asia.

**SW:** What is next for the U.S. Special Forces in the Philippines and those relationships you have built?

**McDowell:** Currently being discussed between our governments is something referred to as the Increased Rotational Presence. For most Department of Defense forces, this will actually mean increased exercises in the Philippines. For SOF, it is more or less a transition from what we have done for 11 years in the Southern Philippines, to a more structured, capability-based, institutional-development relationship with Philippine SOF outside of...
the Joint Operational Area. The Filipinos are very sensitive to the appearance of U.S. forces establishing bases and thus we are going to leverage TSCP events and our habitual training relationships with Philippine SOF to design a future that sees us working shoulder to shoulder for many years to come.

**SW:** As the commander of JSOTF-P? How would you rate performance of U.S. forces in the Philippines?

**McDowell:** We have been executing counterterrorism operations with our Philippine counterparts for more than 11 years. It’s been predominantly an advise-and-assist mission. Our forces have been critical in establishing and developing the capabilities and capacity in the Philippine Armed Forces to engage terrorist elements located in the Southern Philippines. We have strengthened the local government units through our work with the Philippine National Police Special Action Forces and the myriad of partners located on the U.S. Country Team. And we have consistently demonstrated our concern and support for the people of the Philippines, which has resulted in one of the most successful FID/CT efforts every undertaken by the U.S. military.

The Philippine Government has created an Internal Peace and Security Plan to increase the capability/capacity of local government units. They are working with the local police, leveraging the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police Special Action Forces, to demonstrate to the people of Mindanao that they can have a say in controlling their own destiny and taking care of their own people. In many areas we are seeing the LGUs and the local population pushing away the lawlessness that has existed for so long.

**SW:** How has the SF role in OEF-P evolved and where and how did we make the biggest strides?

**Johnson:** Speaking from a historic perspective, I think that we came here with a pretty solid plan. We had to look at what they needed and work within their rules and laws. We identified the problem set, and a lot of it is tied to development. The people of the Southern Philippines really just want hope for a better future. The terrorists down in those regions have capitalized on the lawless region holding the local residents hostages in a sense. As we came in and brought the military force to them and increased their capacity, they were able to create an environment of security, which allows us to do development projects.

It allowed the Philippine Government to work and do projects that created the space for development. It empowered them to push back against the insurgents who have wanted to terrorize the country.

Some of the biggest things I’ve seen is the creation of standards within the Philippine Armed Forces. Before our presence, the Philippine Marine Corps was very heavy-handed because that was they believed was necessary for success. They would go in and try to get people to do certain things and acted in a very heavy-handed manner. When they saw the success of applying the right amount of military power to the right amount of civic action in the development of these townships and barangays, it didn’t take long before they were nominating their own projects. They were going into towns, doing their own assessments and finding funding for their own projects and not relying on us to do those things. As those steps progressed further, that snow bailed into where we are today — enabling the civil authorities. The military has set the conditions so that they can turn the security of the region over to the civil authorities. The local government and police can now ensure the safety of their people in numerous areas in the southern Philippines. In the military sense, they have grasped the importance of being more than just a combat unit. They can do counter-insurgency. They can do messaging. They can add civil action to the military solution.

**SW:** In the recent typhoon that devastated the Philippines, why do you feel that SOF was so successful in such a disaster?

**McDowell:** We were successful because of relationships and the understanding of what it means to actually get involved with the people who are around you. We were able to combine the skills of the Green Berets, CA, MISO, intel and aviation to tailor 3-to-8 man teams, put them on the ground and then let them accomplish the mission through mission command. Even though we were here for the JSOTF-P mission, it was very easy for us to configure effective and efficient units that could move anywhere in the region to affect the commander’s intent.

**Johnson:** When I got onto the airfield at Tacloban, I linked up with Capt. Trinidad, a Philippine SEAL from the Naval Special Operations Group, whom I knew and had trained with many years earlier. Capt. Trinidad had been put in charge of all ground operations in the area. Tacloban was the most devastated area in the region that had been hit by the typhoon. Capt. Trinidad and I had instant recognition and trust. We both knew what we were capable of and we were able to get to work. As he saw my other Soldiers, who were wearing the Special Forces shoulder patch, he knew he could approach them as well to get help and solutions that would make a terrible situation better. **SW**
Although a fictitious state of affairs, the expeditionary and lodging requirements described above are not much different from the conditions resembling those that 5th SFG(A) experienced in Karshi-Khanabad, Uzbekistan while preparing for the invasion into Afghanistan in October 2001. However, there is one significant difference in terms of supporting capability. In 2001, Special Forces groups did not have organic support battalions as SFGs do today. When 5th SFG(A) launched from K2, the task force relied on a supporting, composite logistics task force gained through the request for forces process under Global Force Management. The ad-hoc LTF consisted of the headquarters and one support company from the 530th Supply and Service Battalion and one maintenance company from the 7th Transportation Battalion, all from the 1st Corps Support Command superimposed above a single SOF Support Company, Company A, 528th Special Operations Support Battalion.

Today, groups avoid the lengthy, bureaucracy associated with the RFF process to gain dedicated support, thanks to significantly more enabling and sustaining power with organic GSBs. For the 1st Special Forces Group Support Battalion, the conjured scenario is not just a possibility. It is rather, a situation considered the impetus for realistic training and maintaining the highest possible readiness posture in order to respond immediately when emergencies occur — whether a national crisis in an uncertain environment or humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts in the PACOM area of responsibility. Authorized quantities of enabler and support assets have grown remarkably since 2005 and proportionately, so too the quality of the supporting efforts.

1ST SPECIAL FORCES GROUP SUPPORT BATTALION: Enabling and Sustaining an Uncertain Future

By Lieutenant Colonel Joseph R. Kurz, Major Michael G. Mourouzis and Major Christopher S. Jones

Imagine, less than 20 days ago, guerrilla forces in a small nation-state in the western sub-region of the Pacific Ocean desperately invited U.S. military assistance to force the ouster of a controlling political regime that threatens the free global economic trade through the nearby shipping channels. In fulfillment of an execution order supporting the U.S. Pacific Command Commander’s flexible deterrence options, Commander, Special Operations Command–Pacific directed the immediate and rapid deployment of the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) to a classified cooperative security location adjacent to a denied area to conduct activities directly partnered with the guerrillas. Lead elements of the 1st SFG(A) are enroute to immediately establish a Special Forces operating base and form the core element of a combined/joint special operations task force. The advance party from 1st SFG(A) consists primarily of the Group Support Battalion Headquarters with multiple expeditionary combat support and combat service support capability sets designed and resourced to deploy to an austere environment and establish the temporary staging base required to sustain the CJSOTF-led special operations, actions and activities. Until the theater adequately matures as planned in Phase II of the operations plan, the GSB has sole responsibility for integrating supplies and services provided by existing sustainment organizations stationed in Hawaii and Japan as part of a developed comprehensive concept of support to directly enable and sustain all special warfare and surgical strike missions throughout Phase I.
The 1st GSB mission is unchanged from providing rapidly deployable logistics, medical, administrative, communication, chemical, all-source intelligence support and advanced Special Forces operations training to the 1st SFG(A). However, what is new is an emphasis on getting back to basics and training against a holistic approach to support with an expeditionary mindset. The 1st GSB divides its efforts along three lines of operations. The first LOO, and top priority, is obviously providing direct support to the group headquarters and SF line battalions in order of forces deploying to combat operations, forces participating in exercises and then home station training. The second LOO, also not surprisingly, is routine garrison support in maintaining the highest possible readiness posture for the 1st SFG(A). The third LOO, Mission Essential Task List-related training and leader development is, however, the extra effort beyond simply what the group headquarters and SF line battalion requests of the 1st GSB.

Support for the 1st SFG(A) has never been better largely because resourcing has never been stronger. Not only has the GSB grown in structure, but in 1st SFG(A), the GSB continues growing daily by building competencies and relevancy through providing world-class logistics support to the group headquarters and four SF battalions. With 1st SFG(A) elements steadily deployed to Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan, Operation Enduring-Philippines and more than 52 joint combined exchange training missions to more than 18 Asia-Pacific countries over the past year, for which, the 1st GSB deployed 310 Soldiers (more than half of the battalion) in various combinations in supporting efforts. 1st GSB Soldiers participated in a high volume of small team training events. Exercises including Key Resolve/Foal Eagle, Ulchi Freedom Guardian, Talisman Saber 2013, Ellipse Charlie, Balkatan and Cobra Gold, just to name a few, created tremendous opportunities for support Soldiers to gain experience and hone skills in a manner seldom realistically replicated in garrison environments. The real value comes in subsequently reinvesting those gained experiences and skills back into home-station training to prepare for future operations and exercises.

Generating Sustainment

Adequately generating sustainment for the 1st SFG(A) starts with getting back to training basics. Through a command vision centered on an overall strategy for improvement, the 1st GSB initiated a careful self-assessment, starting with a key-leader planning conference that developed a METL at battalion and company levels. The 1st GSB recently returned to conducting quarterly training briefings of unit training plans based on a careful self-assessment and the collective tasks determined by the key-leaders, then followed with published quarterly training guidance. From that training guidance, the GSB adopted the standard Army 8-Step Training Model for managing unit training with specific guidance to implement “Sergeant’s Time” training. Although not necessarily initiatives, these Army basics each rescinded from the GSB over time, having fallen victim to a rigorous operations tempo. Bringing these basics back to the ranks proved beneficial allowing the battalion to make initiatives that do matter.
Enhancing the 1st GSB’s ability to generate sustainment, 1st GSB units developed and increased special operations forces—conventional forces interoperability. The 1st GSB Support Operations section fostered relationships with adjacent units and installation-managed supporting organizations and agencies by regularly attending the I Corps G4 Transportation Synchronization meeting. The SPO increased operational planning and coordination with the 593rd Sustainment Brigade at JBLM, and participated in semianual events such as the I Corps G4 Logistics Conference resulting in increased interoperability with CF capabilities that contributed to local OEF-A pre-mission training events and theater security cooperation program deployments. The battalion also reestablished a collaborative training relationship with 4th Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment with multiple iterations on establishing forward arming and refueling points. Recognizing that the PACOM area of responsibility contains more than 50 percent of the Earth’s surface, and 70 percent of that is water, the 1st GSB implemented a quarterly water-purification training program for the first time in the seven-year history of the battalion.

The SPO, in a combined effort with the group S4, developed and implemented a group-level material readiness review and weekly production snapshot to capture logistics commodity production and analyze trends to predict shortfalls to group operational support. Maintenance technicians from each battalion, and the sustainment technicians from each of the GSB direct support commodity shops, developed the MRR to improve the management of support and ultimately maintain the group at the highest possible readiness posture. The logistics leaders across 1st SFG(A) conduct a working iteration of this meeting monthly for coordination and collaboration with battalion executive officers as the principle audience, followed by a quarterly executive iteration prepared for battalion commanders to increase the overall command emphasis on readiness. Newly developed information management systems now track data previously unrecorded. Key performance indicators now allow the logistics leaders to monitor commodity shop production allowing for increased response time to drops in performance. One example of this added benefit to the group was when the SPO corrected a problem with the group’s supply support activity that failed to send requisitions via the file transfer protocol. The resulting fix shortened the customer wait time for Class IX repair parts by two weeks.

Rapidly Establishing an Operating Base in an Uncertain Environment

Over the past year, the 1st GSB has renewed its command emphasis on ensuring the unit can perform its mission essential tasks consistent with the battalion’s doctrinal design and resourcing. This includes striving to maintain readiness toward establishing an SFOB in an austere environment in response to national emergencies or crisis in the AOR, and if requested, providing tailored capability packages that respond to natural disasters and humanitarian-assistance efforts. One particular 1st GSB initiative proved to matter a great deal in terms of educating the group on the relevancy of the GSB and its contributions. The GSB conducted a capabilities exposition that provided leaders across the group including all battalion command teams, company command teams, SFODB and SFODA key leaders, with an overview of the GSB mission, structure and capabilities available to enable and sustain SOF training and operations.

Practicing the 1st GSB’s requirement to establish an SFOB and conduct reception, staging, onward movement and integration activities, the produced two concepts. First, the SPO developed an intermediate-staging base support plan supporting two Task Force Sulu Relief-in-Place deployments in support of OEF-P. By recognizing a gap in support to the deployment of advanced operating bases during planned rest-over-night locations into and from the JSOTF-P, the GSB provided lodging, transportation, administrative support to operators of multiple ODBs at locations without troop deployment infrastructure in place specific to deployment/redeployment operations. As a result, the deployment and redeployment of these ODBs proved successful and ensured accurate personnel and equipment accountability. The second concept toward increasing RSOFI competencies arrived in the associated tasks in preparing the 1st SFG(A) for participation in TS13, for which the SPO planned, coordinated and synchronized the marshalling and deployment of personnel and equipment to Australia. One particular factor of coordination that proved vital to deployment was bringing a bio-inspection team from the Australian Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry to Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash. Working in a collaborative effort led by the SPO Team, along with representatives from the 1st SFG staff, and several JBLM garrison elements, all made the marshalling process and projection a success. Because of the thorough planning efforts, 1st SFG(A) completed the DAFF Bio-Inspection two days ahead of schedule, and smoothly shipped a total of 15 20-foot containers and seven trailer-mounted generators. All combined, amounting to more than 133 short tons of equipment and supplies. The result on arrival at the aerial port of debarkation, the Port of Brisbane, Australia, was that 1st SFG(A) sat postured for Phase III operations and a successful exercise with key systems fully prepared and awaiting follow-on transportation.

Leveraging Reinforcing Sustainment Providers

To increase SOF support mechanisms and synchronization within U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the three theater special operations commands that 1st SFG(A) has forces apportioned to, the SPO aggressively pursued multiple venues to engage the 528th Sustainment Brigade, U.S. Army Special Forces Command G4, SOCPAC SOJ4 and Special Operations Command–Korea J4 along with the ARSOF Liaison Element-Korea in support of 1st SFG(A) objectives. Through establishing routine secure video-teleconferences and attending conferences the battalion enhanced support to TSCP events, JCS exercise Key Resolve/Foal Eagle 13 and improved contingency planning at log conferences to refine plans, including OPLAN S027, that were not updated since 2010. The SPO also established and executed a weekly 1st SFG Logistics Synchronization meeting with SF line battalion S4s and service detachment representatives. The addition of a group transportation warrant officer effectively shortened the distance between operational requirements development and subsequent support execution. The battalion increased its rapid-deployment capability by ensuring that Transportation Coordinator’s Automated Information for Movement System II deployment data matched Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced property data, which
Enabling the Elimination of the Uncertainty

Unlike a decade ago, two new capabilities within the GSB, a chemical reconnaissance detachment and a tactical unmanned aerial vehicle platoon, are enabling the elimination of uncertainty in conducting special warfare or surgical strike activities. During pre-mission training at the Yakima Training Center in preparation for 2nd Battalion, 1 SFG(A)’s combat rotation to OEF-Afghanistan, the TUAS platoon successfully integrated with ground-force commanders by providing 24-hour, near real-time intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance coverage. The TUAV platoon deployed for more than 30-days in which they flew more than 140 flight hours during 39 sorties all while achieving the highest readiness level for all operators and maintenance personnel, setting a platoon training record and the first-ever integration at the SOTF level.

The 112th Chemical Reconnaissance Detachment embedded with ODA-1335 during Vector Balance Canoe 12-1 to conduct CBRN-specific foreign internal defense with Cambodian CBRN forces — the first FID mission in PACOM for the 112th CRD. To focus on their primary METL task of site exploitation, the CRD conducted several training events in their Exploitation Analysis Center, met with the Washington State Highway Patrol to conduct interoperability training in the Seattle Crime Lab, and completed interdependence training with the Explosive Ordnance Disposal to receive updates on the most recent enemy tactics, techniques and procedures in Afghanistan. Additionally, the CRD met with CBRN personnel from the British Royal Air Force and discussed the challenges of basic site-exploitation and latent fingerprinting to help the RAF reorganize their forensic and CBRN units next year. The CRD also conducted a site visit with the Nuclear Disarmament Team in Oakridge, Tenn., to assess future training opportunities with the 20th Support Command on disablment operations and counter radiological/nuclear threats for combating weapons of mass destructions missions. The battalion significantly enhanced routine training with these events, often at no cost to the battalion, and allowed each unit to share new TTPs and gain different ways to conduct their primary missions thereby again, reinvesting into 1st SFG(A) operations. In coordination with their METL development, the CRD developed CBRN reconnaissance training that included a 36-hour reconnaissance at night in difficult weather and terrain where the detachment leadership assessed each chemical detachment team and tested their reconnaissance equipment.

1st GSB Way Ahead in PACOM

The 1st SFG(A) and its GSB, already function at the foremost edge of emerging U.S. Department of Defense strategy. “While the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region … The maintenance of peace, stability, the free flow of commerce and of U.S. influence in this dynamic region will depend in part on an underlying balance of military capability and presence.” Even as the Army departs OEF-A and refocuses, or orients forces to the PACOM AOR, it does so in a budding manner behind the mature activities, actions and operations that 1st SFG has been conducting in the PACOM AOR without interruption since September 1984. As the 1st SFG(A) remains the largest maneuver force immediately available to the PACOM Commander and supports the objectives for both the SOCKOR and SOCPAC commanding generals, the 1st GSB looks ahead in building upon the requisite capabilities for enabling and sustaining an ARSOF presence. Now, more than ever, the 1st SFG GSB is instrumental in ensuring the group remains positioned for responding to crisis and able to be the strategic force in defeating the anti-access or aerial denial strategy employed by our adversaries. The 1st SFG(A) GSB must prove itself every bit as important as our operators, when it comes to actually delivering on promises when we speak of special warfare and long-duration operations in an immature or hostile theater in the PACOM AOR. In the next 12 months, the 1st GSB will expand on the bare base configuration lessons learned from JCS exercise TS13. In the traditional sense of the “crawl-walk-run” progressive methodology for training, TS13 served as a foundational proof of concept for establishing a bare base SFOB. In November 2013, 1st GSB deployed its expeditionary CS and CSS capabilities to YTC for a week-long unit training event for the further advancement of the capabilities as a rehearsal to the next true test. The 1st GSB is developing plans for participating in the forward establishment of an SFOB for the group headquarters overseas in the Korean Theater of Operations during combined/joint exercise KR/FE 14 to exercise its role in unconventional warfare, FID and counterterrorism in support of PACOM operational plans.

“As the 1st SFG(A) remains the largest maneuver force immediately available to the PACOM Commander and supports the objectives for both the SOCKOR and SOCPAC Commanding Generals, the 1st GSB looks ahead in building upon the requisite capabilities for enabling and sustaining an ARSOF presence.”
Conclusion

In seven years since inception, organic GSBs in USASFC (A) have matured significantly in enabling the group’s increased special warfare contribution to the TSOCs helping make SFGs the combatant commander’s land force of choice during continuous Phase Zero operations and potentially, on through to phase III. In the PACOM AOR, it is the requirement of the 1st GSB, to be prepared to rapidly establish and expand an operating base in an austere and uncertain environment, generate sustainment and leverage existing reinforcing joint theater sustainment providers to extend operational reach and prevent culmination, and enable the elimination of uncertainty. Through direct supporting CS, and CSS capability sets, along with realistic mission essential training events, the 1st GSB proves itself a game-changer to enable ARSOF to conduct special warfare and surgical strike. SW

Notes

2. Ibid., 61

Maj. Michael G. Mourouzis is the Commander, Group Support Company, Group Support Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne). He was commissioned from Penn State University in 1998 as a second lieutenant in the Infantry. Maj. Mourouzis graduated the Special Forces Qualification Course in 2004. He has had numerous assignments within the 1st SFG(A) and frequent deployments in the PACOM AOR. Maj. Mourouzis has a bachelor’s of science in biochemistry from the Pennsylvania State University at University Park, Pa. He also has a master’s of science in defense analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School and a master’s of science in chemical and life science from the University of Maryland, College Park, Md.

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph R. Kurz is the Commander, Group Support Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne). He was commissioned a second lieutenant, Armor, through the Reserve Officers Training Corps at the University of Central Florida in 1995. From 2004 through 2009, he served in several ARSOF assignments including support operations officer in the Special Operations Sustainment Brigade and later, in 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) as the Group S4 and 3rd Group Support Battalion executive officer. He has deployed in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom including duty as the J4 Director of Logistics for Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan. He most recently served as the J5, Chief of Strategic Plans, Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan. Lt. Col. Kurz earned a bachelor’s in public administration from University of Central Florida, a master’s in logistics management from the Florida Institute of Technology and a master’s in military art and science from the School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Major Christopher S. Jones is the Support Operations Officer, Headquarters, Group Support Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne). Maj. Jones was commissioned a second lieutenant, Infantry, through the Reserve Officers Training Corps at the University of Arizona in 2000. Under the branch detail program, he transferred to the Quartermaster Branch, and from 2005 through 2008, he served in 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) in Stuttgart, Germany, as the battalion S4, later, Commander, Service Detachment, and later, Commander, Headquarters and Support Company. During this assignment, he deployed twice to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. From 2008 through 2011, he served as a Brigade Support Battalion Support Operations Observer-Controller at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif. In 2011, Maj. Jones joined the 1st Special Forces Group (A) as the Group S4 and subsequently deployed to the Republic of the Philippines in support of Operation Enduring Freedom with duty as the J4 Director of Logistics, for the Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines. Maj. Jones earned a bachelor’s in sociology from the University of Arizona and is currently in the final stages of pursuing a master’s in diplomacy and military studies from the Hawaii Pacific University.
The U.S. is overly focused on partner-nation capacity building when in reality relationship building is the key to strategic success.

This paper is focused on U.S. special operations forces’ activities in peacetime or semi-permissive environments short of war, referred to here as Phase Zero engagements. Phase Zero is admittedly an unpopular term with some because it implies that subsequent phases are to follow, like those found in a traditional military operation. The reality, however, is that the U.S. may never move beyond Phase Zero engagement in a given country or region. Nevertheless, I use the term here.

The words “building partner capacity,” are listed 25 times in the Department of Defense’s January 2012 publication, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.” In October 2013, members of Congress stressed the need for partner nations to strengthen their military capabilities to contribute more to their own defense, with specific emphasis on Asia.

We are perhaps comfortable with building partner capacity because it’s quantifiable and can therefore be recognized when a certain degree of capacity is achieved. For example, Country A is capable of conducting X, Y and Z operations under certain conditions. For sure, capacity is much easier to measure than say, a relationship: Capt. Smith has an intimate, professional relationship in Country B with the Chief of Defense and can help to arrange 1, 2 and 3 in that country, under certain conditions.

Our Country Action Plans often lists certain degrees of partner-nation capacity that we hope to build after 5 years, 10 years, etc., with a desired end state. I would suggest that the term end state should not be used with regard to Phase Zero planning as it implies a culmination point rather than a continuous cycle that lasts into perpetuity, or until the U.S. changes its strategy. It is important to acknowledge that if some quantifiable level of capacity or interoperability is achieved in a partner nation, it requires constant attention to maintain, and always risks dropping below levels reached because of lapses in time until follow-on U.S. engagements, loss of continuity among U.S. and partner-nation personnel and forecasted and unforecasted fluctuations in available resources for both the U.S. and the partner nation.

This is not to say that building partner capacity is unimportant. It is extremely important for obvious reasons. “Teach a man to fish…,” as the saying goes, because the U.S. cannot and should not be in all places at all times to deal with threats and instability around the world. From the U.S. perspective; however, a capable partner nation may have a finite degree of effectiveness in the event of a contingency, or in shaping regional dynamics, if America has only limited access and with key leaders. Any shortcomings in partner capacity and interoperability can typically be mitigated by the ever-growing array of tools that the U.S. military, State Department and other interagency partners bring to the table when needed. On the contrary, if the U.S. does not have access and influence then options are limited, regardless of partner-nation capacity.
The means by which SOF and others assist in attaining these strategic objectives — access, influence, the ability to build capacity — is through Phase Zero relationship building. Genuine relationships, built over time and nurtured regularly, are what differentiate the U.S. from other countries which have only traditional, mil-to-mil cooperation with our partners.

**People with Purpose**

SOF plays a critical role in relationship building by putting the right people in the right places. An important component of SOF Phase Zero success is the long-term presence of U.S. special operators stationed in the countries in which we operate, and in close physical proximity to the countries in which we desire greater access. As Lt. Gen. John F. Mulholland Jr., then Commanding General of U.S. Army Special Operations Command, wrote in 2010, SOF must invest in the line of effort known as “People with Purpose.”

Selecting the right people for the right jobs is a challenge. Our leaders must first contend with an antiquated DoD personnel-management system that does not adequately identify or assign people based on individual talents. After that hurdle is overcome, there are several key prerequisites that should then be met. Professional Military Education is an important foundation which lends itself to a greater understanding of U.S. national and theater strategic objectives. Combined/coalition experience, language training, joint qualification and a broad understanding of all U.S. SOF components and their missions is unquestionable. The human dynamic, however, will prove to be the most important when working in the diplomatic, interagency environment abroad. On any given week, SOF representatives assigned to the country team find themselves meeting with officials from the Department of State, USAID, other government agencies, visiting Department of Defense organizations, foreign diplomats, host-nation customs and immigration, contractors and vendors, partner nation and multinational military and law enforcement leaders and members of the host government’s ministries or departments. Functioning on a professional level with such a wide variety of people, from the most junior to the most senior-level, requires keen interpersonal skills and diplomacy.

Country Team “buy-in” to special operations is a requirement for any Phase Zero activity to occur abroad. Inside the embassies, SOF representative must be able to inform leaders, educate interagency colleagues and articulate to all the value of SOF contributions to Chief of Mission objectives. Linda Robinson, a senior policy analyst at the Rand Corporation with unique access to the SOF community writes, “...the special operations community’s vision is not entirely clear to other partners in government. Understanding and a common plan are more important than speed in these [SOF strategic] endeavors, in contrast to the urgency that undergirds many special ops undertakings.”

As uncomfortable a subject as it may be for some military professionals, understanding and planning within the political landscape of a particular country or region is necessary for success. To do otherwise is to create an ill-informed plan which will not be long-lived. Asia, just like anywhere else in the world, is an extremely complex network where regional competitors, non-state actors and each country’s internal dynamics influence politics. Politics influence the security forces with whom we work, and it influences what the U.S. is and is not able to achieve. For any forward-deployed special operator, it is not a matter of if, but when, he must navigate politically sensitive waters.

It is only after this all-encompassing synergy is achieved can the special operator then get to the difficult task of actually making SOF activities on the ground a reality. The importance of competent, motivated, mature, experienced, culturally-aware SOF personnel assigned to these positions cannot be overstated. Putting the wrong person on the job can prohibit SOF from realizing its maximum effectiveness and spell disaster for relationships that take decades to develop but only days to destroy.

**SOF Phase Zero Engagement and Relationship Building in Thailand**

This final section provides insight into SOF Phase Zero engagement in the Kingdom of Thailand.

In 2013, the United States and Thailand commemorated 180 years of formal relations between the two nations. Thailand, designated as a major Non-NATO Ally, is America’s oldest ally in Asia. Security cooperation between the two nations continues to flourish through increased strategic dialogues, civilian and military senior-leader meetings, military and law-enforcement engagements and information sharing.

Through the United States Pacific Command’s Security Cooperation Plan, and Chief of Mission Bangkok’s Mission Strategic Plan, our leaders have articulated strategic
guidance aimed at further developing the long-established friendship, trust and cooperation that the U.S. is honored to share with this regional leader in Southeast Asia. It is with this guidance and authority that Special Operations Command – Pacific develops its Country Action Plan for engaging the Royal Thai military and law enforcement in Phase Zero activities.

Despite the realities of sequestration and other recent hurdles confronting the U.S. government, SOF engagement in the Kingdom of Thailand has either remained at steady state, or in some cases increased compared to previous years. This is due in part to unique U.S. Special Operations Command funding authorities, a decrease in wartime deployments and because of the larger U.S. government’s realignment — or “pivot” — to Asia. The activities of U.S. SOF in Thailand, in concert with other tools of U.S. national power, provide our senior leaders with an instrument of consistency to be applied toward the achievement of strategic objectives.

SOF basically has two, non-doctrinal “models” for Phase Zero engagement. The first model is the long-term advisory mission. The second is the use of frequent engagements in countries where the U.S. does not have a permanent presence.

Special Forces Detachment 39 in the Republic of Korea, formerly known as Det-K, is an example of the long-term advisory mission model. The unit is permanently stationed in Korea and has developed close relationships with its ROK counterparts with whom it continuously engages. As Robinson writes, “Special operations forces can easily be frittered away in tactical and episodic missions that have no enduring or strategic value. Thoughtful application of their capabilities generally means two things: persistent presence combined with either conventional and/or multinational partners...This [SOF] footprint does not have to be thousands or tens of thousands [of personnel on the ground] — most often a few hundred can have an enormous impact — if they are deployed in back-to-back rotations for five to 10 years. The key here is for policy makers and U.S. ambassadors, who are the gatekeepers for U.S. forces in non-war theaters, to embrace the value of these long-term advisory missions.”

In Thailand, the alternative model utilizes frequent, well-planned engagements to develop capacity, but more importantly to build relationships. The training objectives of SOF events, whether they are focused on counterterrorism, doctrine development, military information support, small-unit tactics, humanitarian assistance, etc. — subject matter which considered alone speaks to capacity building and interoperability more than access and influence — are important. The fact that these training events occur on a regular basis with habitual training partners, however, highlights the strategic value: Relationships are built and are more important than the actual tactical outcomes.

Phase Zero activities in the Kingdom of Thailand consist of joint and combined exchange training, counterterrorism training, subject-matter expert exchanges, Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises Cobra Gold and Tempest Wind, Military Information Support Team engagements, combined airborne operations, sponsorship of Exercise Related Construction projects, regional conferences such as the Pacific Area Special Operations Conference, Pacific Area Security Sector Working Group and SOCOM’s International SOF Week conference. The U.S. also dedicates several million dollars annually to sending Thai personnel, including SOF representatives from all services, to the U.S. for International Military Education and Training and Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program schooling. Finally, there is a robust U.S. SOF presence on the Thailand Country Team’s permanently assigned staff, and among other long-term augmentees, who synchronize special operations activities in support of strategic objectives.

One of the most visible SOF engagement tools utilized in Thailand is the JCET. Currently conducted by U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force special operations personnel, JCETs are executed almost 12 months out of every year, primarily alongside Thai SOF units. The JCET itself, however, is not without its limitations. In his book on SOF Phase Zero Engagements, U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel Brian Petit writes:

Known as the workhorse of USSOF, the JCET itself is an “ill-suited mechanism to build partner capacity and capability.” A former TSOC operations officer, Colonel Greg Wilson, plainly stated, “JCETs are inadequate tools to build capacity. A new platform is needed.” JCETs retain their utility because they are convenient to program and resource for both USSOF and host nation units...The principle shortcoming is that JCETs are episodic events that are subject to wide variations in host nation hosting units, regions and desired capabilities.6

With that arises the question of why the JCET remains one of the cornerstone special operations engagement tools in Thailand, and throughout Asia for that matter? JCETs nested under an inadequate country...
plan and unsynchronized with other activities are counterproductive. In Thailand, however, these engagements are carefully programmed along with other U.S. SOF and conventional-force engagements, synchronized with host-nation requirements, and play a significant role in complementing the overall strategic landscape in which the U.S. operates. U.S. conventional military forces are neither trained, organized nor equipped to routinely deploy small, culturally oriented teams, with little to no logistical support and senior leadership, to engage host-nation security forces. Consequently, we come to an understanding of why the JCET remains a critical centerpiece of strategic engagement. There is currently no other tool like it that allows the U.S. military to develop relationships with the host nation on a routine basis in Asia.

The engagements discussed to this point are important but do not take full advantage of all that special operations can offer to strategic success in a country or region. Other activities must be implemented to complete the picture, such as developing command-and-control skills through JCS exercises and tabletop drills involving mid-to senior-level leaders. These events rise to the level of operational and strategic planning and leadership of SOF in a joint/combined/coalition environment which cannot be replicated anywhere else, short of war. Another important tool used often in Thailand and elsewhere is SOF senior leader engagement. Commanders from SOCOM, SOCPAC and all of the SOF components in the PACOM area of responsibility have engaged with Thai SOF and conventional leaders through regional conferences and professional and social meetings. These engagements give leaders an opportunity to articulate their objectives, discuss challenges and build relationships. By taking the time to send our senior leaders to meet with partner-nation representatives, the U.S. shows our allies how important their cooperation is to America.

Our friendship with Thailand is founded on trust and mutually agreed-upon objectives. It is built while conducting office calls in the daytime, training in the jungle at night and when friends gather off-duty for golf or dinner. Our cooperation is beneficial for both countries, which is why Thailand routinely consults with the U.S. When the Thais are considering ways to restructure their personnel-management system or create a counter-IED training center, they ask the U.S. for a model. When they are interested in redesigning their Special Warfare School’s organization, doctrine or selection and assessment program, it is the U.S. that’s invited to assist. Thai military doctrine, both SOF and conventional, is primarily U.S.-based as a result of decades of cooperation.

The U.S. relationship with Thailand is qualitatively different from that of other countries in the region that engage with this important ally of ours. The U.S.-Thai relationship is built on trust, and because of that the U.S. remains the partner of choice for the Kingdom of Thailand.

Conclusions

While we have examined the engagement in Thailand, the conclusions are universal for SOF Phase Zero. First, relationship building should be our primary objective. It fosters trust and leads to access, influence and the ability to build partner capacity. Second, precision programming of SOF Phase Zero engagement plays an important part in achieving Chief of Mission, geographic combatant commander and U.S. national objectives. Third, putting the right special operators in the right jobs overseas is an important precursor to developing meaningful relationships and maximizing the SOF contribution to U.S. strategic goals. SW

**Notes**

5. Robinson.
As in any protracted war, the military of the United States has adjusted to the contemporary environment by restructuring its forces, shifting the way it trains to meet the current threat, and focusing on a rotational cycle of train, deploy and reset. The Special Forces Regiment has not been immune to these changes as all the groups within the regiment have deployed in support of combat operations in the CENTCOM theater of operations. The pitfall of focusing on the current conflict is the high potential to compromise readiness in preparing for the next fight. In Special Forces, this means sustaining the regiment’s proficiency in waging unconventional warfare.

The 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) has been unique within the regiment in that the advanced operational bases and operational detachment–alphas have been executing theater campaign plan events within the PACOM area of responsibility and then quickly reposturing to execute combat deployments in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines and Operation Enduring Freedom–Afghanistan. The AOBs and ODAs of 1st SFG(A) hone their experience and expertise in waging unconventional warfare through a cycle of diverse mission sets in OIF, OEF-A, OEF-P and TCP operational engagements by leveraging relationships with host-nation counterparts and exporting tactics, techniques and procedures from one mission to the next.

With large parts of the military focused on winning the current fight in Afghanistan and beginning to shift focus toward redefining regional engagement through regional alignment and operationally tailored forces, the Special Forces Regiment continues to execute missions all over the world through the entire range of Special Forces doctrinal missions. Every day, throughout the PACOM area of responsibility — an area encompassing about half of the Earth’s surface — the 1st SFG(A) is preparing, teaching, training or executing its doctrinal missions. These operations are being conducted by special operations task forces, AOBs and ODAs that are immediately cycling from one mission to the next. Often times, these Special Forces units are planning for their next operation while in the middle of another operation and sometimes deploying directly from one mission to the next. It is not uncommon to have an ODA return from a deployment in Afghanistan, conduct a Joint Chiefs of Staff exercise on the Korean Peninsula, execute a joint, combined exchange training exercise in Thailand, deploy to support OEF-P and prepare for their next joint, bilateral exercise. This high operational tempo and changing environment allows for the units to maintain and build proficiency in their diverse doctrinal skill sets.

The 1st SFG(A) has an operational focus, vision and strategy that entails everyday operations and training to synchronize with theater special operations command and theater objectives in combat and in training. The missions of 1st SFG(A) form a unique operational cycle whereby each mission develops and expands the skill sets that contribute and feed into the success of the other mission sets.

The 1st SFG(A) Cycle

The unique mission cycle that 1st SFG(A) executes lends itself well to maintaining readiness for the conduct of UW. Each mission set (OEF-A, OEF-P and TCP events) accomplishes the operational objective of the TSO and supports the execution of the other two missions. To prepare for combat operations in Afghanistan, the most relevant training Special Forces Soldiers can conduct is through the execution of JCETs and theater campaign plan events. Working with and through soldiers from various host nations and training both the Special Forces element and our host-nation partnered force to a standard provides lessons that cannot be replicated anywhere else but overseas. Working through the diverse set of cultures and languages provides a unique insight that translates directly to conducting...
unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense. These skills also enhance the ability of the AOBs and ODAs to conduct combat operations in Afghanistan. In turn, conducting combat operations in Afghanistan provides the AOBs and ODAs with current TTPs to be used in training with host-nation forces during JCETs, TCP events as well as working with senior Philippine officials as they conduct counterinsurgency operations in the southern Philippines.

At the core of UW is the ability to build rapport with any indigenous population in order to influence them to support U.S. objectives. In PACOM, 1st SFG(A) Special Forces Soldiers operate in 36 nations encompassing more than half of the world's population where 3,000 different languages are spoken. As teams move from one country to the next in the course of their operations, Special Forces teams and individuals must quickly identify and adapt to the different cultures, languages, social mores and politics of the region in which they are operating. The diversity of geopolitical and social dynamics in PACOM provides an apt environment for the development of skills required for UW. The units of 1st SFG(A) currently conduct their seven doctrinal missions while supporting three major types of operations: Operation Enduring Freedom–Afghanistan, OEF-P and various operations in support of the PACOM theater campaign plan. In OEF-A, AOBs and ODAs primarily conduct foreign internal defense while living amongst the population in village stability platforms and partnering with the Afghan Special Operations Kandak forces to develop counterterrorist capability. In OEF-P, AOBs and ODAs partner with the Philippine Armed Forces at the senior command and staff levels to advise in counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism in the southern Philippines. During TCP events, AOBs and ODAs train and develop their capabilities alongside the special operations forces of other nations of the PACOM area of responsibility. In each type of operation, the skills and lessons learned in one mutually supports the conduct of the other two.

**Combat Operations in Afghanistan**

In support of Operation Enduring Freedom–Afghanistan, 1st SFG(A) AOBs and ODAs conduct foreign internal defense through stability operations at the village, district and provincial levels, as well as train and develop the Afghan Army's special operations units. The teams live amongst the population in village and district stability platforms where they develop relationships with the local population to increase stability and promote the legitimacy of the Government of Afghanistan in areas where an established shadow government exists. Teams that are partnered with Afghan SOK units are conducting combat foreign internal defense by training, planning and executing combat operations against insurgents. Both mission sets directly feed into and contribute to the success of follow on missions to OEF-P or TCP events in the PACOM AOR. Two critical aspects of OEF-A operations, threat tactics, techniques and procedures and combat experience, export extremely well to locations in PACOM.

The AOBs and ODAs of 1st SFG(A) deploying to combat in Afghanistan obtain first-hand experience in the latest threats that adversaries in Afghanistan are employing to achieve effects against the U.S. military and the TTPs that effectively counter those threats. As teams from 1st SFG(A) cycle from combat in Afghanistan to TCP events, the latest TTPs are incorporated into training events and are shared with partnered nations’ forces. The TTPs of enemy forces are not exclusive to the area in which they operate. As the most effective enemy TTPs cross transnational borders and battlespaces, the experience of a 1st SFG(A) AOB and ODA is extremely valuable to the host-nation partners they train with during TCP events. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have accelerated the development of improvised explosive devices; Special Forces Soldiers, fresh from the combat theaters, are able to import the latest information on the TTPs to partnered countries during TCP events. The latest TTPs from Helmand, Afghanistan can be taught and discussed in Ipoh, Malaysia where the Malaysian Pasukan Gerakan Khas trains to conduct counterterrorism operations to secure their homeland. In February 2013, eastern Sabah was invaded by hundreds of armed Filipino insurgents. Members of the PGK unit that responded had just completed a JCET in late 2012 with a 1st SFG(A) ODA that trained them on small-unit tactics and planning for crisis operations. This training provided the PGK with an increased capability to effectively respond to this threat and restore order to eastern Sabah. In the southern Philippines, the most significant threat to the Philippine Security Forces and to the Philippine population is the threat of IEDs. The AOBs and ODAs from 1st SFG(A) that deploy to the southern Philippines import their knowledge of the latest in counter-IED TTPs from their experiences in Afghanistan to train the Philippine Armed Forces and increase their level of readiness to the IED threat.

The ability to gain and build rapport with the soldiers of other countries is critical to the mission of the 1st SFG(A). There is no better way to build rapport and gain credibility and legitimacy than to demonstrate capability and competence. Soldiers everywhere understand the realities and value of boots on the ground and when Special Forces AOBs and ODAs deal with host-nation forces that are currently engaged in combat, practical experience — not academic experience is what matters. For 1st SFG(A), the venue where the AOBs and ODAs gain that combat experience is in Afghanistan. The “on-the-ground” tactical-level operations that teams execute in Afghanistan translate well into staff-level operations in the Philippines where Special Forces Soldiers can knowledgeably guide their partnered forces while conducting FID. During TCP events, combat experience gained in Afghanistan translates into legitimacy and a more realistic and applicable program of instruction for the host-nation force and for the Special Forces Soldiers.

Experience in tactical-level combat and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan is critical to the Special Forces primary mission of unconventional warfare. The AOBs and ODAs of 1st SFG(A) deploying to combat in Afghanistan obtain first-hand experience in the latest threats that adversaries in Afghanistan are employing to achieve effects against the U.S. military and the TTPs that effectively counter those threats.
Deployments to the Philippines in support of OEF-P provides the AOBs and ODAs of 1st SFG(A) with a distinct flavor of executing FID. The units are prohibited from directly participating in combat because of provisions written into the Philippine Constitution. FID is executed by Special Forces Soldiers by training with their Philippine counterparts and assisting and advising the Philippine Security Forces at the staff levels, primarily at the battalion level and higher. Special Forces ODAs are partnered with battalions, brigades, divisions, and in some cases, regional commands where the level of influence is not tactical, but operational and strategic. 1st SFG(A) Soldiers develop skill sets that allow them to influence sovereign leaders of a sovereign country and master the ability to work with and through other government agencies and host-nation counterparts.

The Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines operates at the behest of the sovereign government of the Philippines. This is a fundamental difference from Afghanistan where the U.S. is still essentially an occupying force in a nation that has an inconsistent history of sustainable national-level government. To operate in the Philippines and achieve the objectives of the TSOC, units from 1st SFG(A) must truly operate through and with their Filipino counterparts; there are no unilateral operations by U.S. forces in the southern Philippines. As the mission to Afghanistan reduces in size and security responsibility is transferred over to the government of Afghanistan, a reduced amount of Special Forces units will be required to operate at higher levels, just as in the Philippines. The experiences and expertise that the AOBs and ODAs acquired in the Philippines operating at an operational and strategic level will be used as the focus in Afghanistan shifts from tactical to operational and strategic. All PACOM TCP events occur in sovereign countries, each with distinct laws governing how visiting military forces are allowed to operate within their borders. In the Philippines, Special Forces operators must be aware of the standing Visiting Forces Agreements that have been put in place by the Republic of the Philippines and the United States. During TCP events, the AOBs and ODAs research and ensure that they are aware of the laws of the sovereign nation in which they are operating.

While executing their mission in support of OEF-P, AOBs and ODAs work extensively through other agencies of the U.S. government, as well as those of the Philippine Government. The U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Department of State are heavily involved in the political aspects of the OEF-P mission and frequently visit with AOBs and ODAs within the joint operating environment in the southern Philippines as well as in Manila. Involving other government agencies provides the units of 1st SFG(A) with a level of expertise in the workings of Philippines from foreign service officers and members of other agencies that have years of experience in the Philippines, as well as access to funding that provides another tool to meet the objectives of JSOTF-P. The skills developed by the Soldiers of 1st SFG(A) towards interagency cooperation translates well to the Afghanistan theater of operations where many of the same agencies exist. The planning and execution of TCP events within PACOM cannot occur without a level of cooperation between the executing 1st SFG(A) AOB or ODA and the U.S. Embassy of the host nation. Cooperation with the U.S. Embassy and ensuring their involvement in the TCP event is critical to the success of the event and ensuring future persistent engagements with the right units.

Although the United States Army Special Operations Command is the proponent for conducting unconventional warfare in the U.S. military, unconventional warfare is an interagency affair. It is critical that Special Forces Soldiers understand and are able to navigate through the
ODAs Building Strategic Partnerships

The AOBs and ODAs of 1st SFG(A) conduct various TCP events throughout all of Asia, to include Joint Combined Exchange Training events, Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises, counterterrorism events and subject-matter expert exchanges. These exercises are entirely planned and executed by the executing unit from the initiating directive to the final after action report. Often times, these missions occur in countries where the executing AOB or ODA is the only U.S. military presence. The Special Forces ODAs build personal and professional relationships with their counterparts in the militaries of foreign countries to further strengthen the ties and interdependency between the U.S. government and foreign governments.

The nature of TCP events allows for the AOBs and ODAs of 1st SFG(A) to operate independently, far from a higher headquarters and develop their FID skills in, what is often, an austere environment. The AOBs and ODAs conduct all planning and execution of their TCP events unilaterally. TCP events provide an ideal venue for teams to develop the fundamental and critical skills to conduct a FID mission. When operating far from an American support structure, teams are forced to rely on their counterparts and the local environment for support. These events primarily occur in more forgivable environments where the development of these skills can occur with lesser consequences from a misstep. The skills developed by AOBs and ODAs operating independently during TCP events are useful in Afghanistan when presence is needed in districts or provinces that have had little American presence. Teams are able to apply those skills to developing an understanding of the local social, geographic, economic and political landscape in those remote areas of Afghanistan to sustain themselves and accomplish their objectives. The skills developed during TCP events allow for the AOBs and ODAs to effectively conduct FID in the Philippines in remote areas and austere environments with their Philippine Security Force counterparts.

The units of 1st SFG(A) are the face for military-to-military relations for the United States within PACOM. With a continuous and persistent presence throughout PACOM, ODAs are able to maintain relationships through the execution of multiple TCP events over the course of years. This persistent presence by AOBs and ODAs amounts to a strategic relationship between the U.S. military and the military of the partnered nations. Special Forces Soldiers continue these relationships as they and their host-nation counterparts rise through the ranks and hold positions of greater responsibility and authority in the U.S. and in those partnered countries. Today's AOB and ODA commanders are tomorrow's battalion and group commanders while today's host-nation brigade and corps commanders are tomorrow's policy makers. The rapport built by the teams, over time, turns into a strategic asset for the U.S. Special Forces paired with host-nation forces at the tactical level pays dividends at the strategic level over time. In Afghanistan, 1st SFG(A) AOBs and ODAs have been able to use the same strategy in building relationships with their Afghan counterparts thereby creating the potential for future strategic engagements between the U.S. and those counterparts. In the Philippines, those relationships have already paid dividends and continue to be advantageous as the decision makers at JSOTF-P have conducted TCP events years ago and developed relationships with their Filipino officer counterparts as part of an AOB or ODA. Those Filipino officers are now colonels and generals with influence which greatly eases the frictions of interoperability between U.S. forces and the Philippine Armed Forces.

TCP events are the method in which SOCPAC is able to maintain awareness on the countries of Asia and increase interoperability of forces. The FID skills and interagency skills developed during TCP events are the same skills that are critical in the execution of a UW operation. The continuous execution of TCP events in the diverse geopolitical landscape of the Asia Pacific region ensures that the AOBs and ODAs of 1st SFG(A) are prepared to conduct their primary mission of unconventional warfare.

The 1st SFG(A) has had the unique opportunity to continuously participate in OIF, OEF-A, OEF-P and TCP events throughout the PACOM AOR and use those experiences to develop and hone their skills in conducting UW. With the war in Afghanistan drawing to a close, the workload for the Soldiers will not diminish. With rapidly growing economies, including two of the three largest economies, and several of the largest militaries, the attention of the U.S. government has shifted to Asia. The Soldiers of 1st SFG(A) will continue to be called upon to conduct operations and maintain awareness on the political and social stability throughout Asia by leveraging relationships and exporting TTPs from one mission to the next. The 1st SFG(A) cycle has produced a special breed of Green Beret who is especially well suited for conducting UW.

Capt. Rimas Radzius has served as the Detachment Commander, SFODA 1224 and currently serves as the Future Operations Officer for 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne). He has served on combat tours to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines and on JCET Balance Mint 12-2 in Malaysia.

CW4 Keith Pang is a Special Forces Warrant Officer who is currently serving in Helmand Province as the Senior Warrant Officer for 2nd Battalion, 1st special Forces Group (Airborne). He has more than 27 years of enlisted and commissioned service serving more than 22 years with the 1st SFG(A) in numerous positions conducting operations within the PACOM and CENTCOM AORs.

CW3 Shane Gandy is a Special Forces Warrant Officer who is currently serving in Helmand Province as the Targeting Officer for 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne). He has more than 11 years of experience in 1st SFG(A) having served in Afghanistan, Thailand, Nepal, Korea, Singapore, and other countries throughout the PACOM AOR.

Notes

5. Malaysia invaded: The sultan’s Sabah swing | The Economist, 2013
6. Tritten, 2009
7. The 1st SFG(A) also gained combat experience while deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2006-2010.
Why India?

India is a growing trading partner for the United States in large measure because of open market polices instituted by India in 1990. The country has experienced an average of 6.5 percent annual growth over the last 10 years. Some additional facts taken from the CIA Fact Book in the most recent update as of May 2013 reveal: India has the fourth largest GDP in the world; the second largest workforce; the second largest population, 87.5 percent of the population is under 54; and the United States is its fifth largest import partner.

In 2009 the United States began what the State Department calls a "strategic dialogue," bilateral talks involving energy, trade, climate change, education and counterterrorism.

Since the State Department strategic dialogue began, "Bilateral trade between our two countries has gone up 40 percent..." A quick analysis of the economic possibilities highlights several potential opportunities. India represents a huge potential consumer market for American goods. Thanks to a large English speaking and educated class, foreign direct investment could open up manufacturing possibilities and provide an alternative to Chinese-based factories for American corporations. The picture is not at all perfect as India does indeed face challenges inhibiting continued growth: sprawling poverty, government corruption and control over the free-market system pose risks to corporations wishing to invest. Despite the risks, India can provide important economic opportunities for the United States and for the people of India. Just as economic ties are a part of the strategic dialogue and beneficial for India and the United States, mutually supporting efforts in counterterrorism could also benefit both countries.
Border disputes and terrorist attacks are constant reminders of the remnants of colonialism and extremism for the govern-ment of India. There are numerous disputed areas, stretching from the eastern border of Afghanistan across the Kashmir to the Arunachal Pradesh area bordering Myanmar and the large disputed area known as the Line of Actual Control to the north bordering China. The most important and strategically contested area is the Kashmir where India, Pakistan and China each claim all or portions of the area. The current status of forces has Pakistan occupying Kashmir to the north bordering Afghanistan and India retaining the Jammu and Kashmir area to the south bordering India proper. The deeply held convictions of the dispute between Pakistan and India in the Kashmir can be easily identified; J&K is approximately 77 percent Muslim but holds many religious holy sites for Buddhism and Hinduism. Religious convictions aside, a more pragmatic look at J&K crystallizes the economic impact the area has for both countries. Water rights are a major issue between India and Pakistan as it relates to the Indus River basin, the largest source of water for Pakistan, which originates in the Himalaya’s of Indian controlled J&K.

As a result, India has struggled with an ongoing counterinsurgency throughout J&K. The most feared arm of the insurgency opposing Indian rule in J&K is Lashkar-e-Taiba. Initially focused on opposition to Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan, it is believed that LeTs current goal is to create a liberated united Kashmir. LeT is well known for recruiting and radicalizing members of the Islamic faith to join the fighting in Kashmir and to conduct terrorist attacks against India. The most spectacular and deadly was the 2008 attacks in Mumbai, where 12 coordinated attacks over three days killed 166 people and wounded 308. The United States designated the LeT a terrorist group in 2003, which makes targeting this group of mutual interest to the United States and India. In the defense of Pakistan’s claims to J&K, the UN mandated self determination vote contained in UNSCRs 47 and 80 relating to the Kashmir region has not taken place. As described by a paper written by Lt. Gen. Talat Masood, a retired member of the Pakistani Army, “From a Pakistani perspective, Kashmir is the core issue and the root of tension with India. It maintains that India is in unlawful occupation of J&K and it is the right of the people of the state to determine their future in accordance with their aspirations.” Negotiations between India and Pakistan have produced minor agreements, but a permanent solution is still elusive. One of the chief fears of Indians at large as it relates to the Kashmir, is that as the U.S. draws down in Afghanistan, the Indians suspect increased insurgent activity from hardened Afghanistan fighters. The border dispute between India and Pakistan, where Pakistan is a critical U. S. partner in the fight against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, makes the U. S. relationship with India and Pakistan diplomatically challenging in that cooperation from both countries is needed to help combat regional terror groups.

In addition to the challenges previously discussed, China also has claims in the Kashmir region, specifically Aksai Chin. A Chinese article by Sander Ruban Aarten, an intern at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi in 2013 describes it succinctly “The origins of the dispute date back to the British Raj which failed to clearly demarcate its border between its colony and China. By and large, its border issue revolves around two main boundary designs that have been put forward by the British. One of them, the Johnson Line, places Aksai Chin under Indian control, whereas the other, the McDonald Line, classifies it as Chinese territory.” There are several key reasons why the Chinese find the Kashmir strategically important. First, highway G219 runs along China’s western border and is the only Line of Communication connecting Xinjiang province in the north to Tibet in the south, it transverses Aksai Chin turning this disputed area into key terrain for national defense. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly
Sander Ruban Aarten, an intern at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi 2013, postulates that in the event of potential conflicts that bind up sea lanes, China needs an alternative land route to shipping lanes. That route would lead out of Aksai Chin, across the Kashmir and down through Pakistan to reach ports in the Arabian Sea. The potential partnership between China and Pakistan will make J&K vitally important to India in the event hostilities break out with China.

“The U.S.-India relationship is the strongest it has been since India gained its independence in 1947. A strengthened U.S.-India strategic partnership is imperative to achieve U.S. national interests including securing regional security, strengthening the international trading system, protecting shared domains, countering terrorism and bolstering international non-proliferation.” — Adm. Samuel J. Locklear III, PACOM Commander, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 9, 2013.

Military Engagements

There is a growing and mutually beneficial military relationship between the United States and India. A quick look at a map of the United States Pacific Command area of responsibility reveals the extent to which it is covered by water. This places the U.S. 7th Fleet in the forefront of U.S. presence in the Pacific and an important leader in partnership development. As early as 1992, the United States, Japan, Australia, Singapore and India have conducted Exercise Malabar. The U.S. 7th Fleet is the American beneficiary of this exercise and in 2012 Navy SEALs participated with the Indian Navy Marine Commando’s, a natural SEAL alignment for SOF-to-SOF engagements. This same type of natural alignment also exists between the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) and the Indian Parachute Regiment where Green Berets are the force of choice. The Parachute Regiment of the Indian Army is organized into 10 PARA Battalions, seven of which are designated as Special Forces Battalions. The genesis for the development of the SF PARA Battalions was to create counterinsurgency experts and to provide a deep-strike capability. Their other core missions closely mirror those of U.S. Green Berets. An Indian PARA Battalion is organized into four troops consisting of 20 to 24 men in each troop. Each troop is organized into six-man teams lead by an officer. Each Soldier has a specific skill, very similar to our military occupational specialties, where each man is trained in a primary skill: navigation, demolitions, communications, weapons or medical and they are also cross trained in a secondary skill. The SF Battalions are expected to operate in high altitude, mountainous terrain; therefore every Soldier is trained in mountaineering. They can be deployed as a troop or as small operational teams. During Exercise Vajra Prahar 2011, two troops from the 1st and 4th PARA (SF) performed extremely well conducting troop level direct-action training missions.

Vajra Prahar is an annual bilateral exercise between the United States and India that involves conventional and SOF engagement. In 2011 Alpha Company, 4th Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) hosted Vajra Prahar in the United States mainland, a significant milestone for the governments of India and the United States. The Company sponsored two troops from the 1st PARA and 4th PARA (SF) respectively at Joint Base Lewis McChord and Yakima Training Center. The company leadership served as the lead agent for planning and execution along with three of the company’s ODAs who participated in and conducted the training. Alpha Company leadership led the exercise through all phases of the operation. It began with the reservation of resources at JBLM and YTC to include: ranges, training areas, billeting, sustainment and air assets, moved into execution at both JBLM and YTC and finally redeployment back to India. The company split its training at two sites approximately 170 miles apart, which required a ground convoy of over 100 personnel with weapons and equipment to conduct two weeks of rigorous close-quarter combat and aerial sniper training. As part of the newly formed Alpha Company validation requirements, the unit established an AOB headquarters to orchestrate the round-robin training and support the culmination event by providing C2 for the PARA troops and ODAs on a combined direct-action training mission. Alpha Company concluded the exercise with a layout of SOF-specific equipment and attendance to the 4th Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) activation ceremony. This exercise was a unique opportunity for the 1st PARA (SF), who brought elements of the battalion command to provide leadership, planning and command and control, to take advantage of the great training facilities at both JBLM and YTC. Fortunately for 1st PARA (SF), Alpha Company was able to incorporate 4/160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, the premier SOF rotary-wing asset, to make the exercise a world-class training event. The company sergeant major during the exercise, Sergeant Major Klingenberg, agrees “There was a huge benefit for the Indian participants as they rarely leave the country as part of a JCET program. They departed with an introduction to new techniques in close-quarters battle, fast-rope insertion and extraction system and sniper marksman-ship to include aerial sniper training. We also conducted a 70-man combined hit on a target at an urban-training site complete with FRIES infil from 4/160 Special Operations Aviations Regiment. This was a rare opportunity for the Indians to participate in this scale of an operation.”

As part of the Special Operations Command Pacific Country Action Plan, the 1st SFG(A) conducts numerous JCETs to India annually. The engagements are almost exclusively with the Indian Parachute Regiment. One of the most significant elements of the relationship is the ability to grow capability, to build, not only expertise at the Soldier level but collective skills at the troop level and higher. This correct SOF-to-SOF alignment occurs in other nations in the PACOM AOR and is another example of what right looks like. By aligning with a specific unit,
in this case the Indian Parachute Regiment, ODAs can move well beyond individual Soldier tasks and work on collective tasks, battalion long-range planning, embedding of enablers as examples, at the tactical and operational levels.

In 2012, Alpha Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st SFG(A) deployed with three ODAs on a JCET conducted with the 1st PARA at the Indian Special Forces Training Facility at Nahan Cantonment, India. This was a mutually beneficial training event where both units alternated instructors to conduct combined training. The skill level of the Indian instructors was first rate as highlighted in the after-action review by Alpha Company. "Indian SOF has very knowledgeable instructors and good instructional materials leading to well taught classes. Transcending Indian operations, USSF should continually assess their partner-nations’ expertise and levy lessons-learned briefs and case studies to not only build combat effectiveness but also build rapport.” Because of the experience and expertise of both SOF units, a true peer- to-peer style exchange of training and TTPs occurred. By aligning with the right unit, building a habitual relationship, establishing peer-to-peer relationships that create trust and respect, tangible and measurable gains at organizational effectiveness can be realized. A backward glance towards Iraq and Afghanistan and the Green Beret creation of and partnerships with Special Weapons and Tactics and SOF units are examples of the right SOF-to-SOF alignment and how establishing habitual relationships can produce very effective units.

Future Roles

In India, the United States could have another strong partner with mutually supporting interests in economic development, regional stability and combating terrorism. As senior U.S. policy makers look East in the pivot to Asia, in terms of the case for India and future partnerships with the United States, the future does hold promise. While 1st SFG(A) is one small piece of U.S. efforts with India, their role in building capability with the Indian Parachute Regiment and its role in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts for the country of India will have strategic implications. The economic opportunities for both nations could shape the balance of power in South East Asia and provide strategic impacts on world markets. Finally, a mutually supporting effort in combating terror in the remote and historically volatile region of the Kashmir could help create space and time for the fledgling government of Afghanistan to find its identity and move forward as the United States begins to pull its forces and resources back home. SW

Command Sergeant Major Gregory L. Hayes is the command sergeant major for 4th Bn., 1st Special Forces Group (A). He has served in several capacities in the PACOM AOR, serving as the Demining Coordinator-Cambodia, serving as a team sergeant to ODA 172, 3rd Bn., 1st Special Forces Group in support of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines. He has a bachelor’s in psychology and a master’s in business administration from Webster University.

Notes

ZAMBOANGA

BY JANICE BURTON
On September 8, the quiet lives of the people of Zamboanga were shattered when the Zamboanga Crisis kicked off leading to more than three weeks of fighting on the crowded streets and ultimately leaving more than 100,000 people homeless.
The town square in Zamboanga City is historic. Fort Pilar sits at the mouth of the city, where it has stood sentinel over the town on the tip of Mindanao since the 1600s when the Spanish constructed it. On weekday afternoons, as students leave the seaside schools and colleges and gather outside sari sari stores, their parents and grandparents say afternoon prayers and confession at the outdoor chapel attached to the fort.

Known as the City of Flowers, Zamboanga is a friendly town. The people wave to neighbors and bid a warm “Hello!” — even to strangers.

On Sept. 8, their quiet lives were shattered when the Zamboanga Crisis kicked off leading to more than three weeks of fighting on the crowded streets and ultimately leaving more than 100,000 people homeless.

The crisis, while devastating to many in the civilian population, is nothing new to the region. The southern area of the Philippines has been in long-standing dispute over the representation of the majority Muslim population in the government. Over the past four decades, much time, ink and effort has been put into creating a peace plan that will allow the resident Muslim population to live in peace with their transplanted Christian neighbors.

To understand the crisis, you must first put it into a historical perspective. The Philippines have been in a state of insurrection since 1896; however, the heart of the problems now plaguing the island nation date back to the U.S. Army Pacification of guerrilla fighters in 1900. The guerrilla fighters had given aid to the U.S. to force Spain from the island with the expectation of a liberated Philippines. Those fighters, led by Emilio Aguinaldo, were disappointed and turned their sights on the U.S. President William McKinley ordered the pacification of the islands, which led to years of widespread guerrilla warfare between U.S. forces and the guerrilla bands. The Muslim Moros in the Sulu Archipelago continued to fight long after President Theodore Roosevelt declared the Philippine insurrection over. The U.S. then put its sights on the southern portion of the country, and from 1902 until 1915, jungle campaigns were waged in the area. In 1915, the Sultan of Jolo, Jamalul Kiram II gave up his authority, which led to the integration of Moroland with the Philippine Christian majority.†

Over the years, many olive branches have been extended between the Government of the Philippines and the insurgents in the south. In the
1960s, the Moro National Liberation Front was founded to fight for Moro autonomy. Its leader, Nur Misuari, turned to large-scale guerrilla warfare to make his point. In 1996, a peace agreement was signed between the MNLF and the Government of the Philippines, which called for the creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao; the appointment of Misuari as governor the AARM and integration of his guerrilla fighters into the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Misuari’s peace agreement led to dissent within his forces, which formed several splinter organizations, including the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which at one time was among the most active terrorist groups in the southern Philippines. In 2001, a second government pact was made; however, the MILF felt again that it had not had a seat at the table. Over the past decade much progress has been made in reaching an agreement between the MILF and the Government of the Philippines, which has resulted in recognition of the Bangsamoro people and inclusion of their voice in government.

Renewed talks were scheduled to begin in October 2013, but were derailed by the Zamboanga Crisis, which was started by a rogue element of the MNLF known as the Sulu State Revolutionary Command, led by Ustadz Habier Malik and Khaid Ajibon.

At the outset, the group was reportedly planning a peaceful march in Zamboanga, with the hopes of raising the Bangsamoro Republik Flag over the town hall. The peaceful process proved to be a guise. On the evening of Sept. 8, a Philippine Navy patrol boat intercepted a large motorboat and eight other smaller vessels carrying armed men near the coastal barangay of Rio Hondo. Gun fire was exchanged, which resulted in the deaths of individuals on both sides of the conflict. Intelligence gathered during the crisis indicates that many members of the Sulu State Revolutionary Command were unaware that they were going to the island to fight. They came to the island peacefully, and once assembled had weapons assigned and were forced into the fight.

Throughout the morning, the fighters occupied four barangays: Rio Hondo, Barbara, Catalina and parts of Talon-Talon. The group initially took 20 civilians hostage, with the number growing throughout the day to close to 200. The hostages were to be used as human shields and as a bargaining tool.
ZAMBOANGA CRISIS

The local government immediately declared a “no classes and no work” day and a citywide curfew was imposed that immediately shut the city down. Insurgents continued to flow into the city, crawling through the canals that lead from the ocean into the inner city, where they were quickly armed and joined up with their band of fighters.

Within 24 hours, the Government of the Philippines began deploying troops from all over the country to the city. A naval blockade was put in place. At dawn on Sept. 10, insurgents began firing on government troops. On Sept. 12, the Government of the Philippines issued an ultimatum to the insurgents through Edwin Lacierda, a presidential spokesman, “While the government is exhausting all avenues for a peaceful resolution of the situation, let it be clear to those defying us that they should not entertain the illusion that the state will hesitate to use its forces to protect our people.”

Negotiations with the rogue faction of the MLNF broke down over the next several days, and on Sept. 16, Philippine forces began fighting in earnest, which led to the release of some of the hostages. Over the next several days fighting spread throughout the city, with more than 180 insurgents killed; however, the city was devastated by the attacks. The coastal residents known as the Bajau, or water people, took the brunt of the fighting. Their homes, built on stilts over the water, quickly went up in flames. Bullets fired into homes hit propane gas tanks, which exploded and spread fire throughout the closely built homes.

As the death toll rose among the insurgents and others gave up their weapons and surrendered, the Philippine Government took control of the city. But there was a cost. Philippine service men were killed during the encounter and more than 100,000 of the city’s residents were left homeless. Today, the majority of those people are still living in the seaside stadium and on the median of the roads that line the coast, and along the small beach that surrounds the city center. They live in tents, constructed from tarps. They get their drinking water and food from humanitarian aid brought in from the UN and other non-governmental organizations.

With all that was lost during the 28 day crisis, U.S. military leaders see some important things coming from the crisis.

“The successful response by the Philippine armed forces and national police and the

BAJAU — THE WATER PEOPLE

The Bajau are nomadic, sea-faring people commonly called “sea gypsies.” They live over the water by erecting houses on stilts and travel using handmade boats called lepa-lepa. Fishermen by trade, they consider being away from water to be bad luck.

- A Bajau settlement in the Philippines, similar to what the area in Zamboanga looked like before the crisis.
- Fires quickly burned through the stick-made Bajau homes, leaving only stilts protruding from the ocean.
- Inland homes made of concrete were also devastated by the fires. The entire area was left uninhabitable.
- While more than 60,000 refugees from the barangays fill the high school stadium, the Bajau remain close to the sea, packed in make-shift tents along the shore and medians in the roads.
Government of the Philippines to stand up to this terrorist threat and to restore peace to the city validated what the 1st Special Forces Group has been doing over the past decade," said Col. Robert McDowell, commander of Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines. "It validated what it means to operate in the Human Domain. It validated what it means to conduct special warfare and what it means to understand the mission of Special Forces.

"We like to use National Training Center and Joint Readiness Training Center as vehicles to test our forces prior to them going into combat. When you go to JRTC/NTC, you have a set enemy force that you will face. You have a particular objective that you have to accomplish. You've got a set date for the exercise to start and end. Nobody dies and you all get together at the end and everyone is safe and sound. We do our after action reviews and prepare for the next round of training," he continued.

"If you look at what happened in Zamboanga through the lens of an NTC rotation, then there is no doubt it was a success for the Philippine forces. They had no idea of the magnitude of the invasion that was coming. They had an unknown enemy that increased rapidly to more than 400. They had to deal with a hostage situation that encompassed nearly 200 hostages. There were live rounds flying. You had close-quarter combat occurring in an area that is unlike any we have in the United States. There were snipers in towers," he explained.

"The leadership of the entire country, from the President of the Philippines all the way down to every organization from conventional to special operations forces to naval to marine, to air force, police and special action forces all converging on the city. It was the first time they had to go from zero activity to standing up a fully operational TOC that truly was joint and had every facet of national leadership involved. That's incredible."

McDowell said that within a three day period, they were able to establish command and control and isolate the enemy. Further, they were able to marshal enough forces to into the city and demonstrate a gauged response in order to not only eliminating threat but also preserving the lives of the hostages and the city.

"They brought all of that together," he said. "We like to take some pride that we were a part of how that all came together from the soldiers in the streets to the leaders running the operations
because we had been a part of all of those organizations for the past 11 years. I think yes, Zamboanga was more of the true test mission than any mission we have ever given our own guys."

"I think it all ties in together," said Command Sgt. Maj. Brian Johnson, Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines. "All of the forces we have trained over the past 11 years all converged to that one site. Every single one of them coming out of it was thankful to us in the sense that they recognized the value of what we had taught them. They told us it was our training that really helped them to be successful. For us, the biggest mark of success is the capabilities that they now have to execute that complex of an operation."

Both men noted that it was very difficult for them, as well as their men, to sit in the TOC and watch and listen as the fighting occurred because of the personal relationships they have developed with the forces that were in the battle.

"From the get go, we were unable to assault objectives with our counterparts because of the agreements between our country and the Philippines," said Johnson "That has always been a frustration of this mission. We train them to the best of our ability, and because we know we can't be there with them, we put more heart into it. We have to work within the parameters of their laws, which make it more of a thinking man's game: How do we motivate them? How do we train them to get after these targets without us being on the ground and being shoulder-to-shoulder with them? That's a huge challenge for us."

"What I would say is that even though we couldn't engage lethally with those elements we have known for so many years, we were with them in spirit," said McDowell.

He spoke of one unit, the Joint Special Operations Group, which 1st SFG (A) helped stand up, in particular. The JSOG was one of the primary elements in the fight in Zamboanga. It was the lead element that conducted hostage rescues and close-quarter combat. When the JSOG was put on alert, men of the 1st SFG (A) were with them. While the Philippine forces boarded one plane, their American counterparts jumped aboard another and arrived at Camp Navarro a couple of hours before their counterparts. When both forces were in place, they went into mission planning — together. In the midst of the battle, members of the JSOG were texting their
American counterparts and apprising them of the situation or seeking advice.

“There was still a bond that existed between those units, even though they were not side by side. So even after the fighting in Zamboanga ended, there wasn’t this feeling that you deserted me or left me when the fighting started,” said McDowell. “The Philippine forces knew we were there. There was never a loss of connectivity.”

“Throughout the whole crisis, I was in constant contact with the guys I helped train. It really ripped me apart that they were there, and we couldn’t be with them. But we stayed in constant contact. Throughout the situation, there were texts flying back and forth,” said Master Sgt. James Olive, 3rd Bn., 1st SFG(A), who has been training forces in the Philippines for most of the past decade. “We get very close to these guys, to their families. I have watched many of them move through the ranks and they are in important positions now. We watched what happened in Zamboanga, and we took pride in them and we looked at what we needed to work on; how we could make them better.”

As the Philippine forces withdrew from the city, they took with them the men who had fallen in combat. Some of those men had left training classes with Olive to go into the fight. It was their test mission. One of those soldiers was a recent graduate of jump school. His commander had authorized leave for him to go home and see his new baby, a little girl born while he was in training.

“He wouldn’t go home,” recalled Olive. “He wanted to be with his men, and he was killed. We were very close to this young officer and his family. I had the opportunity to go to his funeral and walked with his family out to the gravesite. These people are family to us. I loved him, like I love my SF brothers.”

Janice Burton is the editor of Special Warfare.

Notes:
The United States Military has been involved in persistent counter-insurgency and counterterrorism operations for well over a decade. Since 9/11, special operations forces have played an integral, if not lead role in these efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq and the lesser-publicized Philippines. Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines serves as a compelling model of success, not only for COIN and CT but also for the larger umbrella concept of the ARSOF core activity: foreign internal defense. This success is due in large part to the evolution of the mission, and the adaptability of the U.S. special operations forces assigned to the Philippine Islands. The current U.S. military effort in the Philippines is entering a period of transition, prompted by changes to the operational environment based on security gains achieved over the past 11 years, as well as to support developments such as the United States’ “Asia Rebalance,” and the Armed Forces of the Philippines Internal Peace and Security Plan. The OEF-P way forward will set the stage for continued mission success in the Philippines and support to U.S. security objectives in the region.
ADVERTISE & ASSIST

U.S. Army Soldiers conduct close-quarters battle drills with Philippine Army Scout Rangers at Subic Bay in the Philippines. Within weeks of the Zamboanga Crisis, the SF cadre had already rewritten the program of instruction for the course to include more medical and close-quarters combat training. U.S. Army photo.
Background & Evolution of OEF-P

OEF-P officially began in 2002, fueled by the country’s renewed commitment to counterterrorism in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. However, the U.S. security interest in the Philippines had been piqued earlier, initially by the rise of the Abu Sayyaf Group, and their shift in tactics to kidnapping for ransom in order to finance and further their cause for separate Islamic state. As a result of these changes the Government of the Philippines requested assistance from the U.S. in dealing with the ASG threat. This resulted in the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) assignment to assist with the activation and training of the Philippine Army’s Light Reaction Company, which would be trained in advanced CT doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures in order to fulfill the request for assistance with the rising ASG problem. Training was conducted by 1st Battalion, 1st SFG(A) from March to July of 2001. In May 2001, the ASG conducted an attack and KFR of several tourists on the resort island of Palawan, prompting Special Operations Command Pacific to increase efforts from training the LRC to also providing intelligence assistance and conducting further assessment of the AFP for further support. Following 9/11 the Presidents of the United States and the Philippines agreed to military assistance and economic initiatives in support of the CT efforts that would become OEF-P.

The initial focus of operations was the southern island of Basilan, the ASG safehaven. As part of exercise Balikatan 02-01, U.S. Special Forces teams worked through and with their host-nation partner forces to separate the ASG from the population and destroy the terrorists and support networks. Based on earlier successes, the OEF-P model evolved, and operations expanded beyond the island of Basilan to areas of Jolo in the Sulu Archipelago and throughout other areas of Mindanao in order to meet the ASG threat and other transnational terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah. During the transition period from SOCPAC’s JTF-510 command element to Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines, the task force became a smaller, more tailored organization. While overall force strength was reduced, elements of U.S. Navy Special Warfare, Air Force Special Operations and Marine Special Operations Command joined the core of the Army’s 1st SFG(A), which has remained the connective tissue on an enduring basis. Additionally, force multipliers such as Civil Affairs Teams, Military Information Support Teams and other tailored enablers for mobility, intelligence and support were added. JSOTF-P employs the liaison coordination element construct as the core unit to embed with selected host-nation partner forces in strategic locations and key junctures of host-nation military command structure. The LCEs, which are small unit-level SOF teams, such as a Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha, that partner with AFP conventional and special operations units, and Philippine National Police and PNP-Special Action Force (the PNP’s paramilitary commandos) units to advise, assist and coordinate for U.S. support of the units’ CT efforts. The LCE is flexible, adaptive and scalable unit capable of interfacing at the tactical through strategic level, including advising military and police units on how to interact with their interagency counterparts in the realms of intelligence, development and joint operations. From 2002 to the present, JSOTF-P has worked using the indirect approach of through and with host-nation forces while remaining closely synchronized with the U.S. Country Team and their 3D approach of diplomacy, development and defense.

After more than a decade of engagement and operations in the Southern Philippines, significant progress has been made at the tactical level. Through continued combat operations, and subject matter expert exchanges on topics from troop leading procedures and the military decision making process to small unit tactics, marksmanship and combat medical skills, the partnered forces have gained a large amount of self-sufficiency to operate and train on their own at the unit level. By mid-year 2012, LCEs and task force commanders were reporting that almost every aspect requiring improvement during host-nation combat operations were the result of operational considerations such as planning gaps or coordination and synchronization issues. In very few isolated cases, could combat effects be markedly improved by additional advice or assistance at the tactical level. At the direction of the JSOTF-P commander, task force commanders began to guide their LCEs’ assessment and assistance on host-nation battalion, and JTF headquarters versus continued tactical subject-matter expert exchanges with subordinate units. The recent trend therefore, and to begin to frame the OEF-P Way forward, is to move almost entirely to focus at the operational level. Although several Philippine special operations units have previously received episodic engagement at the operational level, continued shortfalls during operations and planning are evident, indicating this is currently the level where advisory forces...
should be primarily focused. Many of the LCEs, as part of the legacy OEF-P construct remain task organized and partnered at the company level, allowing only minimum engagement and therefore only minimal capability enhancement. As part of the OEF-P way forward this balance would be inverted, with a bulk of the engagement at the JTF (brigades or higher) level, in order to build the relationships required to affect change, but still allowing for episodic engagement with subordinate tactical units. The adaptable nature of the LCE model is well suited to this task, and still maintains the flexibility to assist at the tactical level when the need arises.

**Philippine Security Forces’ Internal Reforms as Guide for Developing the OEF-P Way Ahead**

At the direction of the Government of the Philippines, the PSF have produced two major plans which have already begun to, or will require significant reform, investment in and development of both the military and police forces at large; the AFP’s Internal Peace and Security Plan and the Philippine Army Transformation Roadmap 2028. These ongoing initiatives require adjustments to the OEF-P campaign design in order to maximize effective assistance and security gains through FID activities. It also provides an opportunity to develop a longer-term way forward for OEF-P for both U.S. SOF and PSF.

The first item is the AFP’s Internal Peace and Security Plan referred to by the PSF members as “Bayanihan.” Coupled with “Samahan,” which is the complementary PNP plan, are jointly referred to as the Internal Peace and Security Plan. The plan was completed in 2010 and set for a six year implementation beginning in 2011. The IPSP provides for a holistic approach to national defense, acknowledging that peace and security requires a multi-stakeholder approach with emphasis on four key elements: governance, delivery of basic services, economic reconstruction and sustainable development and security sector reform. The plan refers to the stakeholders as national and local government agencies, non-government entities and the entire citizenry. More specifically to the AFP, the IPSP directs an equal emphasis on combat and non-combat dimensions of military operations. The plan defines the AFP’s end state as “capabilities of internal armed threats are reduced to a level that they can no longer threaten the stability of the state and civil authorities can ensure the safety and well-being of the Filipino people.”

The most significant changes that affect OEF-P take the form of the PSF’s phased plan to transition responsibility for internal security from the AFP to other “appropriate government agencies.” In most cases with respect to OEF-P and the bulk of JSOTF-P’s CT efforts in the Southern Philippines, this translates to the PNP-SAF assuming the role as the nation’s primary CT force against internal threats. As noted earlier, the IPSP is to be implemented over the period of six years. The first phase, occurring from 2011 through 2013 is defined by the AFP focused on addressing internal armed threat groups. The second phase, is set to occur from between 2014 to 2016 is defined by the AFP handing over the lead for ensuring internal peace and security, again from the OEF-P CT perspective, to the PNP-SAF. This transition is predicated on the assumption that during the first phase of the IPSP that the AFP would have essentially achieved its prescribed end state of degradation of internal threats to a level which allows for the PNP-SAF and other law-enforcement agencies to assume responsibility to combat.

What is clear about the IPSP is that by 2016, at the completion of the six year period, the GPH expects internal security for matters of insurgency and terrorism to be firmly in the hands of government agencies such as the PNP and more specifically the PNP-SAF as the elite commando force, leaving the AFP to focus on territorial defense and external threats. What is unclear is the exact process of transition during the second phase, or the next three year period. This transition provides a key opportunity for the JSOTF-P and OEF-P’s way ahead. The prospect would seem to make a good case for refocusing OEF-P’s CT efforts to the operational level, the most likely and effective realm where transition from AFP to PNP-SAF will take place. Another grey area with implications to U.S. SOF is the nature of AFP elements such as the Light Reaction Battalion, Special Operations Command, Philippine Army and the AFP’s Joint Special Operations Group all of which are currently partnered with U.S. LCEs, and all which by virtue of their mission statements have a specific role to play in counterterrorism. The IPSP, as noted earlier, is addressed to the AFP at large, and no specific guidance has been provided to the AFP’s elite CT units. Logically, following the year 2016, these units will be a supporting, if not an integral partner in the internal CT fight.
The transition period brings to light another significant gap and therefore another potential avenue for the U.S. way head. As U.S. advisory elements focused at the tactical level, certain operational-level short falls were illuminated. For those LCEs already working at the operational level, institutional shortcomings originating from the PSF qualification pipeline (i.e. Scout Ranger Course or Philippine Special Forces Qualification Course) are being identified, and as more LCEs shift focus to operational-level partners, a better assessment of where institutional-level advice and assistance would be warranted will be developed. Several key PNP-SAF leaders indicate that more PSF skill development, especially in the way of mission planning, is needed for their units to assume full responsibility for internal security and CT under the provisions of the IPSP. Great strides are already being made in terms of cooperation between AFP and PNP-SAF units with joint operations, joint training events and fusion. JSOTF-P and LCEs’ focus on interoperability add to this effort, but at present there are few firm institutional measures to create baseline standardizations. The development of AFP/PNP interoperability is essential for timely and effective transition of security responsibilities from the armed forces to law enforcement elements in accordance with the IPSP timeline.

The second PSF reform initiative with potential significance to OEF-P is the Philippine Army Transformation Roadmap 2028. The ATR, initially authored in 2010, is the Philippine Army’s 18 year strategic vision for creating a world-class Army that is a source of national pride, and able to defend its borders

LCE partnered with Philippine Army Special Operations Command to identify what measures could be taken at the institutional level in support of the OEF-P CT and FID mission. SOCOM’s mission consists of training, equipping and organizing special operations forces in support of the AFP mission, and is a force provider for almost every U.S. LCE partner force. During the initial internal mission analysis in February 2013, Col. Mark A. Miller, the JSOTF-P commander gave guidance on a strategy he termed “functional CT.” The concept behind “functional CT” is that while not directly advising and assisting the units conducting CT in the Southern Philippines, assisting at the institutional level with specific emphasis on tactical and operational capability gaps would eliminate the need for repetitive SMEEs, significantly improve operational capacity in the joint operational area, comprising the southern Islands of the Philippines. Additionally seeking to assist with standardizing of core SOF capabilities and specialty skills, institutionalizing these skills so that they are taught during qualification pipelines, and professionalizing the skill level at which the skills are taught remains in direct support of the ATR and the OEF-P mission. This method serves two important purposes for host-nation partner forces and the U.S. FID mission: ensure the right skills are taught to the right people; and to create efficiencies in the training pipeline. The end result would be leaders and operators arriving for duty at tactical and operational units with a firm grasp on the skills required to conduct successful CT and facilitating the LCEs refocus to the operational level. As an example of developing core SOF capabilities, junior officers assigned to host-nation SOF units have minimal training outside of what they receive in their Infantry Officer Basic Course, leaving capabilities like SOF mission planning to be learned during on-the-job training or through a U.S. LCE SMEE. In the realm of creating efficiencies, many of the individual SOF elements maintain their own specialty skill courses, such as sniper school, which create a wide range in standards and lack of efficiency in the training system. These are two poignant examples, as these are two of the most requested SMEEs.

Upon discussion with partner-force key leadership, JSOTF-P and Philippine Army SOCOM leadership hosted a series of Roadmap Conferences beginning in April 2013, during which U.S. advisers and AFP SOF key leaders exchanged ideas of ways to improve ATR base camps. The main FID advantage for this concept was the creation of a focal point at which to synchronize U.S. SOF efforts among key partners, with the additional emphasis on SOF and Intra-PSF interoperability. In essence creating something of a “SOF Center of Excellence” at SOCOM, U.S. SOF can focus LCEs, JCETS and other engagements to maximize their own efficiencies in supporting the CT efforts. The potential to include elements like the PNP-SAF in support of the second phase of IPSP transition was highly favored as well. Additionally, including Joint U.S.
Military Assistance Group and Special Operations Command Pacific representatives as part of the effort opened doors for synchronizing other forms of military assistance and programs.

Although this process is still ongoing, and its full potential is yet to be realized, it serves as yet another example of the success of the indirect approach. The SOCOM leadership already had a vision of where they wanted to take their force, with some advice and assistance from their U.S. counterparts they were able to take the lead in continuing to develop the SOCOM Roadmap.

**The Way Forward**

In the near term the refocusing on operational-level advisory missions will support the phased transition of the IPSP to internal security forces like the PNP-SAF while continuing to assist our enduring AFP SOF brethren. OEF-P is but one facet of the U.S.'s renewed strategic emphasis on the Asia-Pacific arena, and therefore like every other effort in today's fiscal environment the theme for the foreseeable future will be “doing more with less.” This is not new territory for SOF and JSOTF-P doing the critical analysis on what units, at what level, and in which key geographic areas or terrorist safe havens to partner to achieve greatest effects. This is the impetus behind the shift from the tactical to operational-level units such as Joint Task Forces of AFP, PNP and other interagency actors. LCEs advising and assisting host-nation commanders and staffs at this level will provide the JSOTF-P commander with the ability to follow on the past 11 years of successes by focusing on the new center of gravity in the CT and FID efforts.

1st Special Forces Group (A), which has been the long-time primary, force provider for OEF-P will soon assume full responsibility for JSOTF-P. During the period of transition for both OEF-P and the PSF this provides an array of options in support of a successful way ahead. JSOTF-P will also look at where it partners relative to the LCEs now advising at the operational level, in order to advance initiatives to improve and synchronize the institutional level through “functional CT.” To complement this shift in emphasis at the higher headquarters level will also be an adjustment of some LCE missions to support this institutional focus.

The Philippines provides a unique and complex operational environment in which to conduct FID. The successes of OEF-P continue to be won by the highly adaptive men and women of U.S. SOF and their dedicated host-nation partners in the pursuit of mutual security objectives. JSOTF-P has developed viable initiatives for the next step in the evolution of OEF-P. While certainly not the model for FID, OEF-P serves as a very successful model of FID to be studied for possible application in other operations. *SW*

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**Capt. Richard Oakley** served as commander of the Counterterrorism Liaison Coordination Element during OEF-P in 2012-2013. He is a Detachment Commander in 4th Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (A). Oakley has extensive experience with Philippine Special Operations Forces, and his LCE contributed significantly to the development of several initiatives currently being undertaken by the AFP and JSOTF-P. Oakley earned his bachelor's degree from East Tennessee State University in 2005.

**Notes**

4. Ibid
7. IPSP, VI.
JOINT SPECIAL-OPERATIONS TASK FORCE - PHILIPPINES

OPERATION DAMAYAN
Super Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) swept through the Philippines on Nov. 8-9, 2013 and was the strongest Philippine typhoon in history. Prior to its landfall, the staff at the Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines began conducting mission analysis and prepared to assist the Philippines Government should the need arise. Using historical lessons learned from the Typhoon Bopha (Pablo) relief effort in late 2012, JSOTF-P identified multiple tasks that it could support with organic personnel and assets located throughout the southern Philippines and on the northern island of Luzon.

Utilizing imagery attained through aerial-reconnaissance flown by JSOTF-P aircraft within hours of the storm's strike, JSOTF-P provided the first operational 'eyes on' to fully capture the scope and depth of devastation for the Philippines Government, U.S. Country Team and Pacific Command. This information helped formulate the U.S. response when the request for assistance was received from the Government of the Philippines.

To metabolize the magnitude of the destruction and influx of relief supplies, immediate assessment and organization were of absolute necessity. The rapid response time of the JSOTF-P to reposition assets and extend its reach to the affected areas enabled immediate employment of assets and personnel at key nodes to enhance ground truth and posture follow-on elements for success; consequently, JSOTF-P was heavily involved in the first critical 13 days of Operation Damayan, the newly identified operational humanitarian assistance and disaster relief for Typhoon Haiyan.

JSOTF-P's main effort was to assess the immediate problems affecting aid distribution, open up airfields and bridge the gap between local, national and international organizations to synchronize relief efforts. Our unique organization of special operations forces provided assessments of the damage, established austere communications where there were none, managed expeditionary airfield and air traffic control, identified and subsequently connected the networks of effort, and then facilitated the conditions for follow-on relief personnel.

This document provides the JSOTF-P Commander’s assessment of the mission, operational environment and some discussion on the way ahead for the role of SOF in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief. The information contained herein is not intended as a complete and thorough analysis of all aspects of JSOTF-P involvement and support. Rather, this document presents observations and perceptions of JSOTF-P’s role in the relief effort. We have already noted in our own assessments and with the Commander of the III Marine Expeditionary Force, that overhead imagery is essential and some of those observations will be captured in another document.

**Overview Points for JSOTF-P 13-day involvement:**

- SOF agility directly enabled the rapid mobilization to facilitate relief efforts.
- With 11 years of operational experience in the Philippines, SOF teams leveraged their cultural understanding of Filipinos to form networks between local government units, Philippine Security Forces, relief organizations and U.S. forces.
- Unique SOF capabilities played a significant role in enabling coordination between LGUs, Armed Forces of the Philippines, relief organizations and U.S. forces.
- The magnitude of SOF core skills and dynamic capabilities enabled the fielding of tailored teams to support HA/DR.

**Summary of Events**

JSOTF-P’s response was immediate and among the very first to send in response/assessment teams in Tacloban, Guiuan, Ormoc and Borongan to facilitate follow-on forces and relief.

The morning after Typhoon Haiyan made landfall throughout the islands of Leyte and Samar, JSOTF-P conducted aerial reconnaissance missions over the disaster-affected areas. As the full extent of the storm’s impact began to be realized, JSOTF-P received the official order to assist with HA/DR operations and immediately began preparing to insert SOF teams into the areas. By 6 p.m. that evening, the first JSOTF-P SOF team, consisting of an Air Force OIC, a Combat Controller, two Civil Affairs NCOs and a Special Forces medic and communications sergeant, were successfully inserted into Tacloban Airfield, the epicenter of the destruction caused by the storm. In subsequent days, two similarly organized SOF teams were organized, equipped and inserted into airfields at Guiuan and Ormoc along with CCTs from the 353rd Special Operations Group (SOG) out of Kadena Air Base, Japan.

Over the coming days, JSOTF-P served a supporting role to the Third Marine Expeditionary Brigade Commander. The support by
the SOF teams was paramount to the III MEB HA/DR efforts. SOF teams provided critical leadership and organization as the Government of Philippines, UN, U.S. Agency for International Development, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance and nongovernmental organizations established the initial foothold in the eastern Visayas islands.

SOF first evaluated local security conditions for the III MEB Commander, the initial overall commander of U.S. forces supporting the relief effort. As each hour passed, the request for additional SOF teams and their unique skill sets increased. Teams were conducting ground and aerial movements around the clock to assess remote areas and interact with local populations and relief agencies. The SOF patrols gave III MEB and Joint Task Force 505, which eventually superseded III MEB, insight into the conditions of the affected areas and facilitated accurate planning for the allocation of Marine Corps and international assets, as well as, the tasking of inbound U.S. Naval vessels.

Throughout the time that JSOTF-P SOF teams were on the ground in the affected areas, their capabilities were influential and at many times reassuring. They interfaced with III MEB, numerous local and national Filipino agencies, international efforts and U.S. Navy maritime and aerial assets.

JSOTF-P provided overall air support for SOF and missions conducted at night through the Joint Special Operations Air Detachment and the 353rd Special Operations Group. The 353rd SOG was already inbound to the Philippines to conduct a series of combined exercises; once the Department of Defense was asked to assist with recovery efforts the 353rd SOG was placed under JSOTF-P’s tactical control. The 353rd SOG was critical to the emplacement and support of JSOTF-P personnel, the movement of hundreds of internally displaced persons, and the delivery of thousands of pounds of relief supplies.

With assistance from the UN, USAID and other international government organizations and NGOs, the relief effort shifted to local and national Philippine governmental agencies. Each passing day saw the international relief effort becoming more established and the Government of the Philippines increasing stabilization in affected areas. After two weeks, JSOTF-P personnel had completed their assigned tasks and began redeploying back to their OEF-P mission locations to continue executing counterterrorism and foreign internal defense. The three airfields Tacloban, Ormoc and Guiuan, that SOF teams had been positioned in the first few days, were successfully transitioned to Philippine Civil Aviation Authority air traffic controllers and local government units. The 353rd SOG assisted JSOTF-P in facilitating the exfiltration of all SOF team personnel and equipment and then redeployed to their home station in Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Japan.

Rapid deployment of assets

Within the first 12 hours of the storm, JSOTF-P aircraft conducted critical aerial assessments to facilitate the actions of follow-on forces. Prior to theater-level airborne collection assets arriving in the Philippines, JSOTF-P aircraft provided the bulk of near real-time aerial imagery. JSOTF-P assets surveyed and identified the conditions of airports, lines of communications in the vicinity of the airports, and general conditions of the islands of Leyte and Samar. While III MEB and JTF 505 were establishing operations in the Philippines, the JSOTF-P Intelligence Section bridged the collection-management function and initiated communications. JSOTF-P collections maps and imagery were used across relief-effort organizations to make a common-operational picture. Imagery of the devastated areas provided essential data that enabled JSOTF-P III MEB and supporting
agencies to initiate relief-effort operations and begin relief flights to disaster-stricken areas.

JSOTF-P pre-storm war-gaming, combined with JSOAD post-strike imagery of the damage created by the typhoon, enabled JSOTF-P to organize, plan and rapidly deploy forces when needed. JSOTF-P’s organic aerial reconnaissance assets flew 28 sorties, with more than 140 flight hours logged. Aerial assessments and imagery helped locate 80 ground-to-air signals for assistance, 38 helicopter landing zones and 26 aid centers. The air assets surveyed 24 airports, 30 seaports, 150 towns, 350 miles of road and 330 miles of coastline during the initial days of the relief effort.

JSOTF-P’s pre-storm disposition found SOF teams spread over an area the size of New York to Chicago. JSOTF-P marshaled these teams at airfields in Luzon and Mindanao and put together a variety of communications systems to provide each team with communication redundancy. The opening of airfields allowed for the follow-on SOF teams to conduct site surveys, assess the scope of damage and identify the prioritization of follow-on efforts. Upon completion of these initial tasks, SOF teams integrated and developed local networks that facilitated the flow of supplies and the positioning of relief forces.

SOF teams at each location consisted of a Special Forces 18A commander, for command and control; Special Forces 18E communications sergeant, to maintain communications; Special Forces 18D medical sergeant, to ensure lifesaving skills for team members; two 38 series Civil Affairs Soldiers for assessments; and an attached Air Force combat control team. Each skill set was selected to enable mission execution.

The SOF team commander’s role was to coordinate with senior local government and military officials, direct assessment priorities, identify opportunities for relief — based on emergent conditions, and reporting to the higher headquarters. Special Forces communications sergeants were put to the test during the operation as JSOTF-P equipped each team with communications gear upon its arrival at the marshalling airfield, these sergeants had just a few hours to organize systems, conduct checks and ensure they would be able to operate for at least 72 hours without resupply. The reason for the assembling of communications gear at the airfields was due to the fact that operational sites in the joint operations area could not entirely be stripped. The CT mission was still ongoing, which required the JOSTF-P to maintain communications with the remote locations. The Special Forces medical sergeant’s were not intended to treat the thousands of internally displaced personnel, this would be an impossible task. The medical sergeant’s initially provided triage to the IDPs that were gathered at the operational airfields. These IDPs were hoping to ride a transport aircraft to Manila intending to link up with waiting family. American citizens were placed on an aircraft without being checked. These checks were done quickly, but it ensured that the force was positioned to help those in critical need before they boarded a plane. There would also be medical personnel from the Marines and host nation at the destination airfield to receive individuals who were cleared for the flight but would need assistance at the other end. When the 18Ds were able to depart the airfields and participate in the assessments, their input facilitated follow-on aid packages and the establishment of hasty clinics. The Civil Affairs Soldiers were the workhorse of this operation when it came to assessments, linking in NGOs and IGOs, establishing networks and providing a common operating picture that would help the III MEB Commander allocate...
resources. Their familiarity with Government of the Philippine’s disaster procedures provided invaluable insight — what to look for and who to speak with — for the post-disaster organization. The Civil Affairs elements were praised continuously by HN and senior U.S. leaders for their exceptional handling of the disaster created by the typhoon. They were instrumental in bringing organization to chaos when dealing with many of the LGUs.

The JSOTF-P was asked to provide ground truth, ground truth through the eyes of someone who knew what bad looked like and what needed to be done first. The magnitude of destruction would cause most to stop and fix the problems right in front of them or simply render reports that everything was gone and it was the worst storm they had ever seen; the leaders of the relief effort needed elements who could see beyond the first ridge line; they needed to help identify problems and solutions that would have the greatest impact in the shortest period of time to get things moving and people taken care of immediately.

The HA/DR networks developed by SOF teams were facilitated by JSOTF-Ps ability to rapidly establish distributed command and control from the southern Philippines, into the devastated areas in the Visayas Region and throughout key nodes in Manila. JSOTF-P would maintain the hub of communication and intel fusion at Camp Navarro in Zamboanga but mission analysis led to the establishment of four additional C2 nodes at Villamor Air Base with III MEB and PAF Headquarters, Clark Air Base with Marine and SOG Aviation Units, III MEF headquarters at the Philippine Staff College, and the Mactan airport (near Cebu) which served as the hub for international aviation and the relief supply depot. This JSOTF-P C2 network enabled rapid decision making, around the clock connectivity and a common operating picture that directly enhanced the situational awareness and mission effectiveness of the III MEB and III MEF Commanders. Most importantly, it provided the JSOTF-P Commander near real time situational awareness and a responsive control network to maintain operational agility despite the geographic size of the area and complex web of supporting entities.

Establishment of Aerial Points of Departure (APOD)

Upon identification of usable airfields, combat control teams performed a vital role in aerial point of debarkation operations.

The opening of airfields by CCTs was absolutely critical to the success of the entire relief effort and it was one of the most visible actions that showed the host nation and the world that help was coming to the Philippines. CCTs were deployed within 48 hours of the storm and their skill and expertise immediately alleviated the bottleneck of inbound traffic to the relief effort and outbound evacuees. CCTs conducted around the clock operations. They enabled U.S. Marine Corps and international C-130s to conduct air operations during the day and SOF MC-130s during the night. The CCTs were essential for organizing host-nation cadre to manage airfield operations. During its 13 days of support, JSOTF-P and the 353rd SOG assets were heavily employed and conducted around-the-clock operations. JSOAD and the 353rd SOG aircraft completed a total of 128 HA/DR airlift-sorties transporting more than 3,200 IDPs, more than 676K of relief supplies and evacuating two injured Filipino citizens.

In addition to the relief effort, JSOTF-P and the 353rd SOG aircraft supported the task force ground-operation mission by flying 59 sorties to move 138 JSOTF-P personnel and $50K worth of field gear and supplies. JSOAD and the 353rd SOG advisers were linked-in at all levels and phases of the operations — from being the first U.S. military personnel on the ground at Tacloban to advising Philippine Air Force senior staff at the relief effort’s headquarters. SOG pilots and JSOAD advisers were an integral part in scheduling and de-confliction between PAF, host nation, U.S. and internal aid flights.

Assessments and synchronization of networks

SOF assessment teams excelled in identifying and synchronizing key stakeholders to integrate lines of communication within compressed timeframes. SOF’s greatest capability was the ability to rapidly form strong relationships with the civil authorities, AFP, PNP, and IGOs/NGOs and then utilize those relationships to connect entities and create a friendly network.
Relief efforts could not take place without organization, direction and fusion among the myriad of victims and aid workers. In an environment consumed with chaos, SOF teams identified and connected the networks of Philippines Security Forces, aid workers and U.S. and international military forces. SOF teams organized and advised HN security and local leaders to provide a Philippine face on airfield security, the management of thousands of IDPs, the prevention of looting, receiving NGOs and the design and implementation of distribution networks to move life-saving relief goods to clusters of people in need.

Typhoon Haiyan had disrupted cell-phone towers and electricity in the majority of areas and thereby caused additional hurdles of communication. SOF teams targeted their primary effort to fusing the government, nongovernment, host and international effort together.

The use of native language speakers, cultural understanding, austere communications and a capacity to navigate in an uncertain environment with travel maps and local sketches allowed SOF teams to integrate all agencies to UN cluster meetings. Connecting the networks of relief efforts allowed for the synchronization of capabilities of all organizations to maximize relief support to end users — the storm survivors.

SOF teams were not limited to ground aid agencies. SOF teams coordinated with U.S. Navy, Philippine Air Force and other international militaries to conduct aerial reconnaissance. These relationships cross-leveled information and increased common situational understanding for planning, the effective distribution of supplies and for follow-on ground missions. The initial site assessments and follow-on linking of networks allowed SOF teams to coordinate the further insertion of supplies to remote locations, reducing duplication of efforts and systemic tracking of HA supplies distributed by both forces.

**Recommendation**

*Open source geo-tagging.* Typhoon Haiyan destroyed all cell phone and Internet connectivity in the wake of its path. Humans have become dependent upon these technologies and their temporary elimination added an additional problem set on how to communicate and coordinate. Equipped with a BGAN, laptop and cell phone, one of the assessment teams began geo-tagging pictures during patrols and then instantly uploaded them to an online map.

If geo-tagging is standardized on one system and replicated on a larger scale among all teams, SOF real-time planning and deployment could drastically improve. Furthermore, this use of technology has enormous potential to revolutionize the operating picture for future HA/DR civilian, military and governmental organization and response. With the establishment of off-the-shelf satellite connection and wireless routers, personnel and victims on the ground can use smart phone apps like Google’s Photo Earth to rapidly build a common operating picture for relief efforts. With geo-tagged pictures online, relief efforts can immediately analyze the affected areas, identify resources needed, coordinate with other agencies, target the location of the supplies then collaborate with the authorities in place to receive the assistance.

**Conclusion**

The post-disaster environment is marked by complete disruption, austere conditions, stunned victims and piecemeal support from across the globe. Planning, operating and supporting for this environment requires highly adaptive personnel — proving the SOF imperative, *humans are more important than hardware.* The adaptive staff of the JSOTF-P, spread across the Philippines, was able to rapidly task organize SOF teams, complete the fielding of liaisons, establish the prioritization of efforts and demonstrate the ability to execute operations within a very short period of time when the commander identified a need.

SOF teams on the ground demonstrated that there is no substitute for culturally astute operators who can leverage existing relationships and rapidly build new relationships with both individuals and organizations. Philippine Special Forces and Philippines National Police Special Action Forces instantly recognized their U.S. SOF brethren and began collaboration. Experienced SOF operators intuitively knew where to go to find the centers of gravity in the Human Domain and force multiply by orchestrating existing networks. While SOF teams bring high impact, they are innately designed to be the small-footprint,
low-signature asset that enables others (HN and relief elements) to remain the epicenter of attention.

Humans are the core of SOF success, but hardware was essential in projecting forces into a geographically-isolated area that had lost all services. This disaster validated the utility of the forward-deployed Global SOF Network and its supporting mobility assets. JSOAD’s C-12s, contracted Bell Helicopters, CASA 212s and C-146s allowed JSOTF-P to marshal assets and insert forces in hours rather than days. The rapid response and positioning of 353rd SOG assets cannot be lauded enough. At the height of media scrutiny and with large portions of populations suffering, the ability to open airfields and deliver supplies at night was a turning point for success.

HA/DR will continue to be a critical/no-fail mission for U.S. forces operating in the PACOM AOR. For SOF, this mission will always serve as a test and validation of its ability to support partner forces. When things go awry, SOF is frequently turned to and expected to help in some measure. The SOF teams that were employed were money in the bank (natural skills, the right equipment and grounded in cultural sensitivities). The fact that 353rd assets were available, enabled SOF to cover nearly the entire spectrum of HA/DR around the clock and do things in a much more rapid manner than other forces.

As natural disasters continue to increase in the PACOM AOR, there is no way that forces can be postured to always be on recall for response, but every mission into the PACOM AOR should be synced with Special Operations Command Pacific for response capability. The assets in theater that are under the operational control of the SOCPAC Commander must include HA/DR planning in their toolkit and be prepared to identify forces and capabilities that can be leveraged the fastest to respond. Further, the linkage to the U.S. Country Team cannot be underestimated.

In the Philippines, SOF has one of the most solid Country Team relationships in the entire PACOM AOR. The ability to communicate rapidly with nearly all 27 agencies in the embassy — especially the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group and the Ambassador, based on personal relationships and proven capability, enhanced SOF’s effectiveness when the crisis arose.

The ability for SOF to maintain the ability to operate through and with other services cannot be understated. SOF prides itself in conventional force-SOF interdependence. That interdependence must be carried over to all of the services. Professionalism and competency are often proven in a few minutes, and once that bridge is built then success can follow rapidly. SOF must strive to ensure it has an understanding its sister services that may be present during HA/DR. The JSOTF-P did not understand all that it should have about the USMC that came ashore, but every operator understood how to define his capabilities to support the mission, demonstrated a professionalism that was all about team play and worked daily to identify where gap could be filled or bridged built. JSOTF-P worked itself out of a job — just like it is supposed to do with every mission that comes its way. SW

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Preparing for ODA Level Initial Entry UW Operations in Korea

BY CAPTAIN BRIAN HARTIGAN AND CAPTAIN BEN LEE

In March 2013, the Republic of Korea and U.S. forces assumed an increased alert level as "North Korea continued to intensify its aggressive rhetoric ahead of March 11, when Pyongyang said it would withdraw from the 1953 Armistice Agreement that ended the Korean War. In addition to annulling the armistice, Pyongyang said it would shut down its military hotlines with Seoul and ignore its non-aggression pact with South Korea." The increased alert level was initially due to North Korea's underground missile test on Feb. 12, 2013. ROK and U.S. forces, not to be bullied by the North, went ahead with plans for Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise Foal Eagle 2013, against the requests of the North Korean government. Projected against the canvas of an untested, aggressed and belligerent state actor with limited weapons of mass destruction capability was Balance Knife 13-1, a joint combined exchange training exercise serving as the initial-entry force for the strategic mission of FE-13. Contrary to initial-entry operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, BK13-1 was not an initial entry operation that took place after a period of relative peace (the 1980s and '90s). This article intends to address the challenges that Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alphas, accustomed to numerous Central Command combat rotations, might encounter if tasked to conduct unconventional warfare in the Korean Theater of Operations. It uses the OIF/OEF environments as a benchmark from which to compare two dissimilar operational environments. It also intends to highlight the challenges an ODA might confront if tasked with the KTO problem set.

BK13-1 was a two team (ODAs 1336 and 1333 from Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash.) JCET from February to March 2013 at Iksan and Damyang, Republic of Korea. The JCET developed the capability of the 7th and 11th ROK Special Forces Brigades with regard to UW in support of potential contingency operations in the KTO. The JCET culminated in a three-day UW exercise that put into practice a month's worth of ROK-U.S. combined UW training. While preparing for simulated combined UW operations in Korea, ROK and U.S. Special Forces operators were faced with challenges that forced the combined team to reexamine initial entry operations with respect to common doctrinal framework, infiltration, movement in a denied area, logistics, communications and MEDEVAC in effect, going back to the roots of the Special Forces Regiment.

The last 13 years of constant conflict in the mature theaters of Iraq, Afghanistan and the Philippines has brought to light the need for an aggressive course correction if U.S. forces ever hope to successfully execute UW operations as a strategic option in the KTO. The U.S. military has come to associate the "super forward operating base" concept with a new normal in the western way of war. The ubiquity of establishments like Burger King, Green Bean and an abundance of civilian-support personnel has fundamentally changed the way the U.S. military views expeditionary warfare, and ultimately UW. This mindset becomes problematic when U.S Special Forces attempt to overlay the last 13 years of combat experience into a UW environment, specifically the KTO UW environment.

The KTO provides a myriad of challenges to UW operations. ODAs that took part in BK 13-1 were forced to reconsider much of what they have become accustomed to over the last 13 years, and transition back to the self-sustaining force multiplier the ODA was designed to be. BK13-1, by design, exercised traditional SF operations in that two ODAs set the conditions for the arrival of a special operations task force, rather than the post 9/11 atmosphere in which ODAs deploy only to be assigned under pre-existing SOTFs. In short, UW operations require the ODA to assume more risk, sacrifice command and control and delegate to a level not regularly exercised in the post 9/11 environments.

The concept of combined UW is still in its infancy, due in part to USSF’s focus on the CENTCOM area of responsibility over the last decade. It is no surprise that in the period of decreased emphasis on the Korean problem set that ROKSF has come to define its fundamental role in KTO contingency operations differently compared to their U.S. counterparts. The U.S. definition of UW is specific in that it defines UW as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying power or government by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.” The ODAs observed that the ROKSF definition is more all encompassing in that they view all operations conducted by Special Forces in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as UW operations. The resulting disparity in the definition of UW had the potential to generate stumbling blocks while preparing to operate as a combined element. The first challenge...
faced by the ODAs was the development of a common doctrinal and operational framework. Not necessarily indoctrinating ROKSF with U.S. doctrine and practice but instead finding a middle ground from which to begin to work through the differences.

Combined UW in the Korean context provides USSF a distinct high-end capability. Korean culture is complex, and as a result not easy to prepare for operations. A counterpart that speaks the language and understands the complexity of Korean culture is invaluable to the ODA. Also, the division of Korea is not so old that it transends pre Military Demarcation Line familial relationships. Many ROKSF soldiers still have family in the north that they may or may not maintain contact with. These divided families provide strong relationships that transcend NK ideology and can serve as a foundation for the development of a loyal resistance organization.

ODAs conducted a reassessment of infiltration methods and the various risks the KTO poses to each. ODAs were first forced to rethink the primacy of rotary-wing infiltration. The last 10 years has forced ODAs to work around aviation timelines due to competing interests in theater. Just the opposite is the case in the UW context. Concrete times for planning can be hard to come by; as most coordination is done last minute to prevent compromise, requiring most air crews to be on standby. There is less room for deviation with regard to air corridors and landing zones due to a robust Air Defense Artillery threat. More than likely, during the initial stages of a UW campaign, air movement would be limited to infiltration only, due to the risk to personnel and mission that air movement presents. The subsequent option of crossing borders as multiple elements at various locations with indigenous vehicles requires the ODA to assume considerably more risk. ODA leadership must be prepared to manage longer periods of radio silence as a result of the mountainous terrain and KTO intercept capability. A drastic reduction in battle command capability stands in stark contrast to the OIF/OEF mindset. This massive assumption of risk on behalf of the ODA and SOTF is in direct response to the technical and tactical capabilities a large standing conventional army poses to a UW task force.

The ODAs also rethought movement inside a denied area. The KTO is dominated by mountainous terrain with very few trees due to rampant deforestation over the past 50 years. Davis Halberstam notes in his work “The Coldest Winter” on the Korean War that “The Americans and their UN allies faced terrible, mountainous terrain, which worked against their advantage in hardware, most notably their armored vehicles, and offered caves and other forms of shelter to the enemy.” As a result of the terrain and the threat’s capabilities, combined UW teams are forced to work almost exclusively at night to avoid compromise. Distances covered by foot are miniscule compared to the vast distances covered during the mounted desert operations that have dominated post 9/11 environments. Attempting movement by vehicle through an auxiliary also poses a significant risk to personnel and mission. The mountainous terrain and underdeveloped civil infrastructure in likely UW environments allow a single checkpoint to control substantial amounts of territory. If that movement in a denied area with an indigenous resistance force results in enemy contact, then assets such as a quick reaction force and readily available indirect fires and close-air support will be the exception rather than the rule, as is the case in the OIF/OEF environments.

MEDEVAC operations in a UW environment unfortunately compel ODAs to divorce themselves from the dependence on the “golden hour.” “The Golden Hour is defined as the time period of one hour in which the lives of a majority of critically injured trauma patients can be saved if definitive surgical intervention is provided.” The “golden hour” is a testament to how far we have come as a military in our transportation and treatment of wounded servicemen, but poorly translates into UW initial entry operations. The ability to evacuate wounded personnel within one hour requires a large scale U.S. or coalition footprint. For the ODA operating in a denied area, the “golden day” or “golden week” is in all probability a more realistic time frame. During the initial-entry stage in the KTO, the movement of wounded personnel will be from inside a denied area, across a border, to a secure area by clandestine means. The comparison in this case being the post 9/11 environment in which MEDEVAC assets are pushed to the team rather than the team developing internal assets and pushing wounded personnel to higher levels of care. More responsibility will inevitably be placed in the hands of the detachment medic. The post 9/11 environment has not exercised the 18D MOS to its full potential with regard to long-term patient care because of a robust medical footprint. In the UW framework, the 18D will be required to develop a medical treatment/MEDEVAC infrastructure, complete with
supplies, treatment facilities and capable of sustaining life under austere conditions.

ODAs were forced to look internally for their logistical infrastructure rather than externally in the OIF/OEF environment. As the U.S. military transitions from the large OIF/OEF logistical footprint, predictable resupply via ground or air will be tough during the initial stages of a UW campaign.

Logistical resupply will be especially difficult in a society that has weathered decades of food shortages. Detachment engineers, just like the 18Ds, will be forced to develop their own infrastructure rather than rely on a predictable theater resupply system. By in large, our force is excellent at working through mature theater provided systems. The challenge the ODA will confront is the development of sustainable infrastructure that can supply the combined UW team, but also provides for the growth of an indigenous resistance organization.

Communications, in the form of effective and articulate reporting is essential to a successful combined UW campaign. The post 9/11 reliance on large scale information-technology systems (both unclassified and classified), satellite communications and line-of-sight communications has created an insatiable appetite at higher echelons for information. Terrain, intercept capability, satellite communications and even cell phones should all be considered when developing a communications plan. Inevitably the communications architecture during initial-entry will not be capable of delivering the massive amounts of near real-time information SOTF staffs have become accustomed to.

By in large, the U.S. military has had very little need to counter a robust intercept capability possessed by large standing armies. Every communication, internal or external, needs to be assessed for risk to personnel and mission. Each time a communication is made and a signal is transmitted, the ODA is putting itself, their counterparts and their resistance organization at risk. The development of multifaceted communications architecture at the ODA level is a necessity.

The OIF/OEF communications architecture is such that in almost all cases constant communications are available in some form. With the risk to personnel and mission that each transmission represents, there will inevitably be a cultural shift in the way we conduct tactical communications. Lt. Col. Mark Grdovic notes in his article “Developing a Common Understanding of Unconventional Warfare” that, “the higher the level of command, the greater the factors of space, time and force, the greater the importance of the commanders intent.” So in the case of initial entry operations, broad weekly guidance from a SOTF is more realistic than the daily, and in some cases real time, guidance of our current environment. This lack of communication is a double-edged sword for the ODAs on the ground. While the ODA gains significantly more autonomy, they also lose the enormous support structure that a SOTF can provide.

BK 13-1 only initially defined the intricate problems facing the Korean Peninsula. As the war in Afghanistan comes to a close, the regionally aligned SF groups will again focus their emphasis on their AORs. Persistent engagement that develops a common doctrinal and operational framework with regard to UW instruction, infiltration, movement, logistics, communications and MEDEVAC is the only way to effectively master combined ROK-U.S. UW. The KTO is arguably the last bastion of conventional conflict with two large standing armies prepared for war at a moment's notice. A combined ROK and U.S. UW campaign provides the UN Combined Forces Command with a strategic-level asset adept at solving the complex cultural, ideological and operational problems that define the KTO. SW
Introduction

In March-April 2013, SOTF-13 deployed to the Korean Theater of Operations to conduct combined unconventional warfare full mission profiles with 7th and 11th Republic of Korea Special Forces Brigades as part of Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise Foal Eagle. The 253 personnel of Special Operations Task Force–13, including the Headquarters, two Advanced Operating Bases and 12 Operational Detachments–Alpha, conducted combined UW operations with more than 800 ROK SF soldiers in five locations throughout the country. SOTF-13 exercised its core capability to execute real-world UW initial entry operations in a denied area: austere living, non-standard communications and auxiliary supply operations.

The North Korean political and military response to the UN Security Council Resolutions and Key Resolve-Foal Eagle-13, and its increased belligerence showed just how real and relevant the threat is on the Korean peninsula and this training and scenario could not have been better timed. At its core, this exercise broke the paradigm of the last 10 years of SF operations in a desert environment, and served to refresh younger generations of SF operators who have all framed their perspectives on repeat combat rotations in mature theaters. Replicating the challenging terrain, limited resupply and human environment during Foal Eagle tailored combat hardened SF operators to the operational environment in the KTO. The lack of secure forward-operating bases or village-stability platforms; lack of immediate quick-reaction force, medical evacuation, air support; and limited logistical supply challenged ODAs as they “re-learned” much about initial entry UW operations into denied areas.

The objectives of the exercise were to:

• Conduct U.S. Army Special Forces Command UW Certification to develop SOTF, AOB and ODA proficiency in UW operations
• Integrate joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational elements into combined UW planning and operations
• Exercise real-world CONPLAN to enable joint force commander’s flexibility
• Validate SOTF-13 deployment order to enable deployment globally

The purpose of the exercise was to enhance SOTF-13’s UW capabilities, and increase capacity and flexibility for the Special Forces Regiment and theater special operations command commanders. The exercise enabled SOTF-13 to complete U.S. Army Special Forces Command UW Certification in accordance with the commanding general’s certification tasks. Execution within the U.S. Forces Korea joint force commander’s over arching Foal Eagle framework ensured the SOTF’s UW operations served to expand the joint force commander’s options to implement regional mechanisms and enable innovative campaign design. Combined full mission profiles executed during Foal Eagle refined the SOTF’s ability to infiltrate ODAs discreetly, conduct precise operations to shape the environment, and ensure scalable capability through advisory of ROK SF and/or partisans in the enemy rear areas in the KTO, Pacific Command or as directed globally.

SOTF-13 lessons learned during Foal Eagle are captured in three focus areas: preparation, execution and the transition staff exercise. Preparation covers the revolutionary manner in which SOTF-13 prepared the scenario based on real world intelligence, a preparatory cyber pilot-team exercise and incorporated combined, joint, inter-

FOAL EAGLE 2013:
Combined Unconventional Warfare

BY MAJOR JOSHUA THIEL, CAPTAIN SAONG YOU AND CAPTAIN JASON COUTURE
agency and enablers. The execution section covers UW infiltration methods and highlights of UW tactics, techniques and procedures employed during the training. Lastly, the combined joint transition staff exercise covered planning considerations for UW operations post-conflict to deter insurgencies and enable stability operations.

**Tension on the Peninsula**

Foal Eagle played out against the backdrop of an increasingly hostile and belligerent North Korean regime under the leadership of Kim Jong-Un. KJU received control of the hermetic, authoritarian government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in December 2012, at a time when the country was suffering from the worst drought in 100 years. In order to avoid famine, North Korea relies heavily on food aid from the international community, which it receives through a coercive cycle of provocation. Examples of the inflammatory rhetoric and actions by the DPRK that drive this cycle range from defiant underground nuclear tests, to the alleged sinking of a ROK Corvette (a craft used by the ROK Navy) to the shelling of Yeonpyong Island. In February 2012, the U.S. offered 240,000 metric tons of aid to the country as an olive branch to the new leader, but promptly rescinded the offer after North Korea attempted to launch a rocket in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions. KJU’s action’s may seem out of place to the international community, but he needs to maintain a balance between providing for his people, and retaining the support of the ruling Korean Workers Party as a strong and confident leader, while maintaining control of the country in the face of a looming famine. This balancing act causes KJU to play to his internal audience, perpetuating the perception that there is an impending threat from a U.S.-led invasion, and that it is the sacred duty of North Korea to liberate South Korea from its western oppressors. To the rest of the world, this appears to be lunacy, but internally, it supports the juche ideology (absolute support of the supreme leader) and dedication to the “final victory” that results in a reunified Korea. South Korea, understandably, is not comfortable with these types of provocative actions and rhetoric, but in the recent past has taken them in stride. However, with the December 2012 election of the conservative president, Park Geun-Hye, the dynamics have changed. Following the most recent cycle of provocation by North Korea, Park addressed a joint meeting of Congress in May stating the “Republic of Korea will never accept a nuclear armed North Korea. Pyongyang's provocations will be met decisively.” Given the height of tensions on the peninsula, Foal Eagle could not have been better timed. Despite the fact that it is an annual exercise, the deterrent effect can be directly correlated to decreased rhetoric by North Korea. On March 11, 2013, at the start of Exercise Key Resolve, North Korea declared that they would unilaterally invalidate the 1953 Armistice. However, by the time Foal Eagle was in full swing, they changed their position to say that Armistice should be replaced by a peace treaty.

**The Long Road to War**

SOTF-13 took a methodical nine-month approach to ensure that units were prepared to operate in denied areas with limited support. To reorient the force, the battalion hosted two UW-focused mobile training teams from the 6th Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Groups (Airborne): the Network Development Course and Unconventional Warfare Operational Design Course. In addition to the MTTs, the battalion conducted several leader professional-development sessions and in-depth area studies. Prior to the SOTF deployment, two ODAs conducted joint combined exchange training events with the ROK SF BDEs that eventually participated in Foal Eagle. This ensured that the ROK units had a good understanding of UW and were prepared to execute the demanding and dynamic training in the exercise.

SOTF 13 elected to establish HQ and operations at five locations across the ROK. Though difficult to support and communicate, the decision for dispersed disposition was intentional to replicate dispersion in a UW environment and to partner with two ROK SF BDEs. SOTF-13 HQs was established on Kunsan Airbase to ensure airfield access. The location enabled rigging operations, supply operations, movement of personnel and reliable power sources. The AOBs co-located with ROK brigade and battalion headquarters to maximize situational awareness on the employment of ROK-ODAs adjacent to combined ODAs and to advise ROK forces on UW operations. ODAs were infiltrated into two different UW operations areas. Dispersed locations simulate ODAs operating in denied areas. The dispersed locations created a constrained communications environment to weaken units off of reliable high bandwidth data flow and instant access to information.

SOTF-13 requested Military Information Support Operations, Civil Affairs and chemical reconnaissance detachment planners and teams six months prior to execution. These enablers were involved with the scenario development, which directly contributed to the development of exercise injects to test the ODA and enable teams. The planners helped ensure themes were connected in each UW planning cycle and exercised the coordination of the whole area command. The result was a complex scenario that integrated joint special operations capabilities with actions that stimulated all echelons in the combined UW task force command and control.

**Combined Task Organization**

SOTF-13 integrated with ROK SF at all levels and capacities: SOTF, AOB, Exercise Support Group and ODA. Combined task organization created a synergistic confluence of ROK cultural expertise with U.S. UW expertise. The SOTF aligned with the ROK BDE headquarters by integrating liaisons into the SOTF-13 Combined Operations Center at Kunsan Airbase. The SF companies established advanced operational bases and co-located with the ROK BNs. The ODAs combined at the team level in ratios from 1:1 to 1:6 based on combined mission analysis. The exercise called for two exercise support groups comprised SOTF-13 HSC, U.S. ODAs, ROK battalions and ROK ODAs to serve as auxiliary, role players, advised partisans and operational force.

ROK interest and willingness to support Foal Eagle and the UW scenarios was greater than expected. The level of integration highlighted above with 7th and 11th ROK SF BDEs during future exercises will continue to shift the ROK SF mindset away from surgical strike and move towards special warfare. From the SOTF to ODA-level, U.S. SOF mentored ROK counterparts on mission-command style commander’s intent versus a directive approach, which was terrain focused and geographically constrained freedom of movement. Transition to commander’s intent is essential for survival and mission accomplishment in the fluid nature of UW environment with limited communications. Conversely, ROK SF’s deep understanding of how to tactically leverage terrain and culture aided training U.S. Special Forces operating in rugged terrain while being pursued in a denied environment. This shared learning helped to revalidate critical UW skills in a combined atmosphere.
Infiltration Without a Rotator Flight

Infiltration into denied areas presents an immediate challenge to UW operations due to the presence of an effective integrated air-defense system. Taking advantage of the unique skill sets possessed by SF, the teams used four methods of infiltration for the exercise: fast-rope insertion and extraction system; deep penetration rotary wing; high-altitude high opening; and rat-line to train infiltration into denied areas. All three methods focused on low-signature methods of entry to allow the teams to enter a rear area without compromise. The teams infiltrated without vehicles or dedicated lift assets; therefore, once they were inside the exercise “play box” all movements were locally or internally sourced. The exercise support group therefore, once they were inside the exercise “play box” all movements were locally or internally sourced. The exercise support group acting as the role players had vehicles available that the teams could coordinate through their networks.

ODA 1334 and 1234 conducted 54 HAHO operations including rehearsals and during the night of infiltration. The HAHO detachments navigated in the air under night-vision goggles to a suitable dropzone. This capability allows ODAs to discreetly enter, clear a dropzone, confirm resistance linkup before calling in follow-on ROK SF static-line jumpers. SOTF-13 and ROK partners conducted 381 static-line infiltrations and five combined bundle drops. These operations validate our combined ability to saturate critical areas or targets to shape or disrupt on behalf of the JTF commander’s plan.

SOTF-13 conducted 109 FRIES insertions during March. FRIES provides a precise and rapid infiltration capability that allows SF to interdict or seize key terrain or complete the counter-proliferation mission anywhere in the KTO. While FRIES successfully enabled combined detachments to rapidly seize objectives, the method and initial direct action mission does not facilitate follow-on UW due to the absence of supplies inserted during infiltration.

SOTF-13 utilized rotary-wing air landings with MH-47s to conduct deep insertion of ODAs and large quantities of supplies. The insertion established an initial base of logistics in rough-terrain sanctuary that allowed ODAs to move more rapidly through the UWOA, while retaining a contingency stock of supplies.

SOTF-13 ODAs conducted more than 146 kilometers of foot movement in the mountainous areas of central ROK. By “training like you fight,” ODAs were able to recognize the added difficulty of terrain into a UW campaign in the Korean Theater of Operations. Many teams quickly learned that maneuvering in challenging terrain quickly depletes energy and critical resources. The resulting challenges forced teams to conduct emergency resupply operations by resistance auxiliary and slow movement in order to preserve combat power.

Combined Unconventional Warfare

Teams entered the play box to link up with various resistance movements. None of the organizations had all three components of underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force. This forced teams to organize and train their forces to meet the requirements of their specific mission and coordinate through the AOB to secure assistance from adjacent unit’s surrogate forces. During the employment phase teams worked through and with their ROK ODA counterparts and their surrogate forces to conduct operations.

As outlined in ARSOF 2022, the SOTF exercised the two mutually supporting forms of special operations, special warfare and surgical strike, in its UW fight. In the surgical-strike role and using the find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze and disseminate model, teams conducted intelligence driven-direct action raids in order to exploit key personnel associated with programs of strategic value. The resulting exploitation presented teams with intelligence for driving future operations. With these operations, the force applied their skills honed during OEF/OIF, such as time-sensitive target direct-action raids, sensitive-site exploitation and tactical questioning to UW operations in denied areas.

Through the exercise, U.S. and ROK forces have developed an enhanced understanding and appreciation for logistics in a denied area. Scenarios involving initial entry into a denied area do not generally have the benefit U.S. air superiority; consequently, only one containerized-delivery system pass was allocated for one ODA in each area. Over reliance on CDS and air resupply during the last 10 years caused ODAs to assume that supplies would be administratively infiltrated via the auxiliary — some ODAs were sorely mistaken. Each ODA auxiliary had a preponderance of one type of resource, which required the AOB to coordinate the area complex while ODAs were required to develop ratlines. While some detachments performed better than others, all detachments learned about the complexity of planning ratlines to cross-level supplies in a UWOA.

Transition from a JIM Perspective

Drawing from the lessons of both Iraq and Afghanistan, it is apparent that transition needs to be planned and prepared prior to invasion. In this exercise, SOTF-13 integrated all of its “themes” to support transition and took the lead in beginning the planning for a joint, combined and interagency working group to plan for the transition of surrogate forces and post-regime leadership.
In order to set the stage for transition, SOTF-13 began with a template of government-support mechanisms titled “pillars of support.” This concept highlights key groups within societies that give government institutions power. From this template, the transition working group highlighted its view of a society and how the pillars of support were affected by UW operations. From this foundation, the working group went further highlighting the state of resistance organizations in their respective UWAs at the transition phase.

The working group briefed SOCKOR SOJ5 and the ROK Civil Military Operations Directorate on their findings and recommendations. ROK officers were immediately impressed with the pillars of support concept and quickly recognized how critical early planning and coordination is during UW operations. The meeting resulted in promises for follow on discussions and a better understanding of how UW can support stability operations.

Conclusion

ARSOF 2022 guidance highlighted the two mutually supporting special operations: surgical strike and special warfare. In this training, both were exercised. Up front, teams “re-learned” what it took to operate in austere, denied environments separate from the extensive support mechanisms available today. The lack of these support methods forced teams to address the physically and mentally draining challenges of survivability and sustainability in denied environments.

The immense challenges faced in the KTO problem set were immediately apparent as SF and SF support personnel studied the operational environment. Bringing a fresh look to these challenges provided innovative approaches to UW and focused the SOTF away from an OEF/OIF mindset. Cyber pilot team operations, clandestine communication methods and the modern MISO operations were all products of this focus and fresh look. Combined operations with sister services and multinational partners leveraged the strengths of each organization and enabled a shared learning environment.

Lessons learned during the execution of this exercise focused on rebuilding the capability to conduct initial-entry UW in a denied area. This required, from the start, a fundamental change in thinking and relooking at SF operations from defining the problem set, to rucksack rigging, to infiltration methods. The painful adjustment from operating in areas with an abundance of support assets to low-signature operations in a denied territory was apparent throughout the exercise. Logistical operations shifted to a survival and sustainability focus using non-standard resupply methods.

Overall, feedback from AOBs and ODAs was extremely positive. Junior Green Berets were challenged to recall skills trained during the school house, while senior members of the unit were able to pass down UW and survival tradecraft that has been nearly lost.

CPT Jason Couture is the S2 for 3rd Bn., 1st Special Forces Group (A). Previous assignments with 1st SFG(A) include MI Detachment Commander deploying in support of Operation Enduring Freedom as the Joint Intelligence Support Element Director for Special Operations Task Force-West.

Notes

A COMPANY IN THE LSF

The Execution of the “Hub-and-Spoke” Concept in the Logistical Support Facility

BY MAJOR GREG STROUD

While the design and purpose of the United States’ global military presence can be debated, it is a fact that the U.S. military operates across the world. Despite the perception that global communication networks and exponentially interconnected Internet systems are making the world smaller, the physical distances between a crisis and those who respond remain the same. For the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that the U.S. will abandon its capability to respond to crises at anytime, anywhere. To accomplish this, the U.S. will continue to utilize allies and partners to stage personnel and logistics. A “hub-and-spoke” concept executed from the Logistical Support Facility in Singapore is just one such place that SOF can use to coordinate and facilitate missions to support a wide variety of operations.

Operations conducted away from the parent or originating country always require a staging base or facility to conduct logistical support. These sites can be referred to as “hubs” and serve as a central location from which to support operations. As logistical support and communications move from the hub to the operation, “spokes” are created. While the hub-and-spoke concept is not new, Maj. Gen. Norman Brozenick, former Special Operations Command Pacific commander 2011-2013, sought to employ this concept in the Pacific Command area of responsibility. He envisioned increased efficiency from this concept by supporting current operational missions, stationing a forward special operations force presence that could react to contingencies, and enable cost savings while utilizing a logistical base. It is important to note that this cost-efficient vision of operation was developed well before the current era of fiscal restraints imposed by sequestration.

In March 2013, Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) deployed an operational detachment-bravo to Singapore to support current operations that began with two operational detachments-alpha executing a joint combined exchange training event in Nepal. These detachments utilized two non-standard aviation platforms to deploy into Nepal significantly reducing the military signature and thus improving operational security and force protection. While the NSAv aircraft are useful for keeping a low military signature, their capabilities are significantly less than a MC-130 or C-17. These aircraft operate with a much reduced payload that is inversely proportional to the distance traveled. Typically, all baggage and equipment must be floor loaded and entry is limited by the cargo door which is approximately a 3x4 ft opening. While these constraints present challenges, these aircraft are more than capable of getting units in and out of austere locations with a sufficient balance of gear and personnel. With proper planning and fuel stops programmed, one aircraft moved two ODAs and 2,000 lbs. of equipment into the mountainous country of Nepal with no issues.

Upon arrival into Nepal, the teams were faced with a significant challenge. Another scheduled military training event in Nepal severely affected the JCET, resulting in numerous changes to the schedule and training locations on short notice. With the ODB(-) in Singapore and its access to a secure communications infrastructure ranging from HF to satellite communications, the ODB proved to be a vital link between the ODAs, 1st Battalion, the American Embassy in Kathmandu and SOCPAC which enabled the detachments on the ground to receive immediate support in coordinating changes in training sites, resources and dates. With this increased level of support, the detachments on the ground salvaged the training event and gained invaluable training in the high altitude environment of the Himalayan Mountains. At the end of the Nepal mission, the ODB coor-
inated a complex movement of the ODAs from Nepal to the Philippines requiring multiple lifts of aircraft to redeploy two detachments worth of equipment, training ammunition and personnel over a one-week period back to home station and another mission in the Philippines. One detachment began training with Philippine police units to assist them in countering narcoterrorism in their country while the remaining detachment continued on, redeploying to Okinawa. During this time, the ODB also facilitated the deployment of two other ODAs from Okinawa into Indonesia and Malaysia where they trained with Indonesian and Royal Malaysian SOF, respectively. Each of these units provided unique training opportunities that not only built interoperability between partnered forces, but also lasting relationships.

Furthermore, the forward location also enabled the company to respond to emerging opportunities to improve relationships. Some Indonesian military units with a history of human-rights violations have been trying to rebuild trust and confidence in their ability to abide by international law. These same Indonesian units operate in a counterterrorism role for Indonesia and the U.S. has an interest in furthering the capabilities of these units in order to more effectively counter both domestic terrorists and terrorists abroad. As part of this process and in the interest of building a positive relationship with this Indonesian unit, U.S. military representatives in the country organized a subject-matter expert exchange to further their professional education. The ODB rapidly responded to this emerging opportunity and re-tasked an ODA to plan and prepare. With little notice, the company was prepared to execute this SMEE within 10 days of receiving the emerging requirement.

As part of a forward SOF presence, the ability to respond quickly to emerging events is critical, whether it is a SMEE, humanitarian crisis or other contingency event like disaster relief.

Moreover, threat reporting began building intelligence on a credible threat to U.S. personnel within a U.S. consulate. This threat caused the SOCPAC Commander to consider staging rapid response forces closer to the potential crisis site. With the ODB already forward, one option discussed was to stage elements from the ODB in a place to facilitate reception, staging, onward-movement and integration for the response forces, greatly increasing their ability to quickly react to the potential crisis by decreasing the amount of coordination required to become fully operational.

By utilizing NSAv aircraft for deployment and redeployment, the company saved hundreds of thousands of dollars that were used for training instead of funding military aircraft for travel in and out of numerous locations throughout the PACOM AOR. Nepal’s budget for training was $330,000. If the company could not have used the NSAv for deployment into Nepal, military aircraft costs would have totaled more than $200,000 to utilize a MC-130 to conduct the deployment and drastically reduced the training opportunities for the ODAs on the ground. Additional cost savings came from the fact that the company utilized LSF contracted lodging instead of hotels and the company deployed on partial per diem taking advantage of a food contract that provided two meals a day. Total cost savings added up to more than half a million dollars allowing 1st Bn., 1 SFG(A) to support additional team training objectives.

This concept will return value to 1st SFG(A) as it continues to execute missions around the PACOM AOR. 1st SFG(A) in the future will utilize this concept to deploy a full ODB and six ODAs to conduct up to 12 theater campaign-plan engagements in a six month period. These teams would execute one JCET training event and then transition to the next JCET utilizing the logistics and aircraft to reset and deploy while staying in theater versus redeploying back to the United States and then deploying back into theater. Utilizing the LSF in this manner would save hundreds of thousands of dollars alone in transportation costs per planned engagement. This way of operating over the course of a year would amount to millions.

In closing, ODB 1110’s deployment to the LSF-Singapore from March to June 2013 validated COMSOCPAC’s vision of a forward staged SOF presence in support of Admiral Bill McRaven’s (current Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command) Global SOF Network utilizing the “hub-and-spoke” methodology. This deployment demonstrated the value of a forward-deployed Special Forces company through supporting missions from infiltration through exfiltration, positioning a forward SOF presence that could react to contingencies, and enabling cost savings while utilizing the logistical base. The “hub-and-spoke” methodology creates efficiencies of support and increases value to mission that should be replicated in the future on a consistent basis. This would assist in creating lasting relationships between U.S. SOF and engaged countries that would improve the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in permissive, uncertain or hostile environments during future conflicts. Finally, the LSF-Singapore is just one of the many potential locations that will improve the responsiveness of SOF to engage operationally while building the Global SOF Network that will assist the U.S. military in securing the global commons and ensure world access to markets and resources — this concept plays a significant role in America’s Rebalance towards Asia.

Major Greg Stroud is a battalion operations officers in the 1st SFG(A). His 15 years of service include deployments to the Philippines, Iraq and Afghanistan. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan.
The employment of pilot teams in cyberspace would operationalize our CONUS base through militarizing social-media networks to shape the physical environment while simultaneously decreasing the strategic risk, exposure and attribution to U.S. forces in sensitive, hostile and denied environments.

The world has witnessed the militarization of social media over the last several years, from the serendipitous Arab Spring revolutions to the Israeli Defense Force’s social-media warfare. Social-media networks possess great utility and extraordinary military potential, especially when harnessed for unconventional warfare. The advanced pilot team concept is a capability meant to harness social-media networks and execute specialized activities to shape the physical environment through digital means. Pilot teams in cyberspace would accomplish most of the traditional pilot team tasks by fusing advanced SOF tactics, techniques and procedures, clandestine methods, mission planning, UW assessments and other advanced skills in the 5th domain of warfare — Cyberspace.

The Human Domain of Cyberspace

The essence of social media is about exchanging information and ideas in virtual communities resulting in unlimited possibilities. With more than 35 percent of the world’s population already having access to the Internet, the connectivity across the globe is staggering. There are roughly 1.2 billion Facebook users, 72 hours of video uploaded every single minute on YouTube, almost 400 million tweets on Twitter every day and more than 200 million LinkedIn users. Social media’s allure and penetration of societies is vast, and its ubiquity will only continue to flourish. Additionally, Metcalfe’s Law will ensure global penetration whether it’s a closed or open nation. “The law posits that with every nodal connection to the Internet it exponentially increases the networks value.” Therefore, it’s truly only a matter of time before every nation is penetrated by the Internet’s compounding effects. The future opportunities for nations, non-state actors or individuals to exploit social-media networks to their advantage are also vast. With more than 2.5 billion current Internet users and another 5 billion current mobile broadband connections opportunities are obvious. Those that seize the key terrain of social-media exploitation will have strategic military advantage.

The proliferation of smart phones continues to connect a growing global middle class. Economies of scale for increased smart-phone production will continue to drop the average price per unit from $188 in 2011 to a projected $152 in 2017. Even North Korea is not immune from the cell phone’s reach, having doubled from 1 million to 2 million legal users on their 3G network in 2012 alone. Of course, this figure doesn’t account for the illicit phone users who control the robust black-market economy which keeps North Korea afloat. Social-media applications are the Trojan Horse of the modern age. Their allure, penetration...
and availability provide pilot teams in cyberspace unique and innovative options that range from monitoring, influencing and engaging people to shaping and controlling resources. A trained operator’s ability to affect the physical domain is only bounded by his imagination, or more accurately, his authorities to execute specific cyber UW activities.

Social media is a weapon

The Arab Spring demonstrated the sweeping effects of social media on the physical domain seemingly by accident. "Handheld technologies and social-media connectivity aggregated small acts of resistance that produced frenzied revolutionary momentum."14 In a few short weeks, Revolution 2.0 swept across the Middle East inspiring masses to take action.25 In Tunisia, crowds overthrew El Abidine Ben Ali. In Egypt’s Freedom Square, protests, riots and mass unrest led to Hosni Mubarak’s abdication. In Libya, social media was employed to coordinate disparate rebel forces to expel President Muammar Qaddafi.

Words, pictures, texts, tweets, posts, videos, all much cheaper than bullets, motivated thousands of seeming strangers to take decisive action with regional and global impact. “Even if revolution was not the aim, it was the outcome. Social-media collaboration generated accidental revolutionaries.”16

By contrast, the Israeli Defense Force’s social-media warfare during Fall 2012 was a highly effective and calculated strategy. “The IDF cut out the media middle man and took their message straight to the masses.”17 Ironically, it was the media outlets that propagated IDF blogs, messages, posts and tweets and unwittingly played into the IDF’s intentions. The IDF’s social-media strategy left less room for misinterpretation, media spin or uncontrolled sound bites by successfully integrating the three major categories of social media. They integrated collaborative platforms like blogs and YouTube, networking platforms like Facebook, and communicative platforms like Twitter. The IDF also boldly initiated its military offensive with a tweet. “The IDF has begun a widespread campaign on terror sites and operatives in the #Gaza Strip.”

Although Nov. 11, 2012 was the first time a tweet served as the opening salvo for a major military offensive, it probably won't be the last. The IDF incorporated teams of social-media warfare operators into its force “Armed with Facebook profiles, Twitter accounts and Lavazza espresso, warriors fearlessly and tirelessly scoured the cyber battlefield searching for enemy (blog) outposts. Outfitted with high-tech ammunition like HD video cameras, fire wire 800s and white phosphorescent keyboards, they attacked one-sided videos, slanted essays and enemy propaganda with propaganda of their own.”19

Social media is a weapon, because it is a “21st Century weapon”20 and can be used as a “tool of manipulation”21 or as a “tool of control”22. As the author of this book said, “Cyberspace is a new environment that requires a new approach to warfare.”23

Defining pilot teams in cyberspace

Pilot teams operating in cyberspace are doctrinally and conceptually no different from its older physical version. They would employ the same UW principles to execute most of the traditional pilot-team activities, but would instead leverage digital tools and cyber methods to do so. Additionally, pilot teams in cyberspace would provide fresh ideas and new approaches to some of the same military problems vexing us for years.

As paraphrased by the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare and School’s Unconventional Warfare Training Circular (TC 18-01) pilot teams are comprised of USSF members, augmented by interagency and joint experts, designed to infiltrate designated areas for sensitive preparation of the environment activities as well as conduct UW assessments.24 The pilot team’s missions are to conduct detailed area assessments and develop their understanding of the human and physical domain, as well as assess the viability of future UW efforts amongst the population. Ultimately, traditional pilot teams evaluate indigenous information capabilities to determine the level of support necessary to fully mature those capabilities for maximum military effectiveness.25 From a doctrinal perspective, “what” a traditional pilot team is and “what” it does is no different than its virtual variant. It is only the “how” that’s the difference, with advanced pilot teams being digitally empowered to harvest, process and sift, through the Internet's rich and readily available social-media networks. Operators harness specialized software and hardware, clandestine methods, dual-purpose technology and networks of advantage as well as leverage widely available shareware applications and commercial software. The beauty of the advanced pilot team capability is its scalability. Although force investment to outfit the teams could require a host of expensive technical capabilities using a wide range of technologies, the capability could also be fielded on a shoe-string budget. And in today’s era of fiscally constrained military portfolios, pilot teams in cyberspace would offer disproportionate value for any level of investment.

Just like the IDF’s social-media teams, pilot teams in cyberspace would likely be comprised of a younger demographic ranging in age from 25-35. These adults came to age in a pre-wired world and are “digital natives” versus the “digital immigrants” that account for almost all of today’s senior military leaders.26 Author Marc Prensky coined those phrases in 2001 to reflect his theories of difference between digital natives and digital immigrants. He asserted natives and immigrants differ with respect to their behavior and thought process, as well as, the disadvantage suffered by immigrants because of their inability to incorporate technology into their everyday life. Although in this author’s opinion, age and social-media literacy may not be as mutually exclusive as once thought, pilot teams operating in cyber-
space would undoubtedly be anchored by the rare breed of talented younger operator who possesses both the technological creativity and the strategic-level maturity required for sensitive missions. A collateral benefit of advanced pilot teams would be flatter organizational communications between talented operators and their senior military leaders. This fruitful exchange would serve to both professionally develop the next crop of senior leaders as well as vertically integrate operational decisions back at the CONUS base.

**Operationalize the CONUS base**

Pilot teams in cyberspace would operationalize the CONUS base by offering innovative options and viable capabilities for UW campaigns in sensitive, austere and denied environments. ARSOF 2022 states, “Our formations must be organized, postured, and networked in a manner that enables them to anticipate and prevent or rapidly respond to regional contingencies or threats to the stability of our allies.” Tailor-built pilot teams in cyberspace navigate social media’s grey and dark networks to identify leaders, assess motivations, categorize sub-networks and even stitch together UW complexes from the virtual environment. Just like modern day threat networks, advanced pilot teams can “cloak themselves in the human activity of the modern, increasingly interdependent and virtually connected world.” They would open doors to social network communities while simultaneously decreasing exposure and attribution. By removing time limitations imposed by physical constraints, virtual pilot teams instead offer a long-term understanding through blending into the backdrop of social media. CONUS-based advanced pilot teams could also support real military plans by militarizing social-media networks to prepare conditions in a designated physical environment. They could remotely identify UW planning vulnerabilities and shortfalls, as well as, identify, map and expose networks of influence to exploit. Once the advanced pilot team achieved acceptable physical conditions and authority for initial entry UW operations, pre-established regional mechanisms would conduct pre-designated activities to decrease the risk to the force. Ultimately, the same SF ODA who once digitally initiated their planning in the Cyber Domain would now execute their plan in a denied and hostile physical one.

**Conclusion**

Pilot teams in cyberspace would operationalize our CONUS base by militarizing social-media networks to provide unique options and capabilities for future UW campaigns in sensitive, hostile and denied environments. They are a viable modern day enabling UW concept that strategically offers ways to shape the physical environment while decreasing the risk, exposure and attribution to U.S. forces.

Lt. Col. Pat Duggan is the Commander, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group (A) and was previously assigned to 5th Special Forces Group (A). He participated in the invasion of Afghanistan and invasion of Iraq and has deployed multiple times across the Middle East and Asia, including Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines and Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise Key Resolve/Foal Eagle.

**Notes**

22. Ibid.
24. ARSOF 2022
25. CORE Quarterly Newsletter April 2013. Naval Post Graduate School
26. ARSOF 2022
PROMOTION/COMMAND BOARDS

Third-quarter FY14 Selection Boards

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RETENTION

CMF 37

CMF 37, or Psychological Operations, has undergone a significant increase in authorizations in FY 14 that have affected the overall strength of the regiment. Current strength of the entire CMF is currently 76 percent with a projected decrease to 69 percent when the remainder of authorizations hit the Personnel Management Authorization Document. The total increase of authorizations is 7 x E9, 49 x E8, 38 x E7, 105 x E6 and 212 x E5s.

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The future of the regiment lies in the hands of its Soldiers. Now more than ever, the regiment needs to retain qualified and competent 37F Soldiers. In order to encourage 37F Soldiers to remain in the career field, FY 14 reenlistment bonus amounts are approved.

Bonus Amounts:

- 37Fs with Defense Language Proficiency Test score of 3/3 in AZ*, CM, CX, HU, KP, PF, PG, PL, PU, PV, RU, TA, TH, TU, UR may receive, a minimum $19,200 or a maximum $72,000. Soldiers with a 3/3 DLPT may also qualify for the $7,500 language kicker on top of the Tier 10 bonus.
- 37Fs with DLPT score of 2/2 in AZ*, CM, CX, HU, KP, PF, PG, PL, PU, PV, RU, TA, TH, TU, UR may receive, a minimum $13,400 or a maximum $50,400.
- 37Fs with DLPT score of 3/3 in FR, JN and QB may receive a minimum $10,700 or maximum $40,300. Soldiers may be eligible for an additional $7,500 kicker based on a 3/3 score.
- 37Fs with DLPT score of 2/2 in FR, JN and QB may be entitled to receive a minimum $8,600 or a maximum $32,200.
- 37Fs with a DLPT score less than 2/2 or who possess a language that is not listed, may receive a minimum $6,000 or a maximum $22,500.

*Language Identifier “AZ” Includes all Arabic dialects (AD, AE, AJ, AK, AL, AM, AN, AP, AQ, AU, AV, BS, BW, DG, DH, IC, QE, AND QW)

Other significant changes to FY 14 retention program are the deletion of the A, B and C Zones for reenlistment, and all 37F Soldiers reenlisting for three or more years are entitled to a bonus.

Career counselors within your organization can help you understand current reenlistment incentives and specific organizational incentives, such as the Commander’s Education Incentive, Defense Language Institute, Partner Language Training Center-Europe and other career-developing schools.

Additional information is included in MILPER Message 13-262, Selective Reenlistment Bonus Tiered Program.
OFFICER

Special Forces

Due to either inactivation or transition from Brigade Special Troops Battalions to Brigade Engineer Battalions, Special Forces lieutenant colonels competed for approximately eight less Special Troops Battalion commands during the FY15 Command Select List Board. No new command opportunities for SF officers were added to the FY15 CSL. The Army is currently undergoing an audit of commands directed by the Chief of Staff of the Army to determine if the current distribution of commands is equitable across the branches.

Despite Global War on Terror Planners filling a critical role in the Special Forces groups, both downrange and in the group S3 shops, the billets are not hard-coded positions and are not part of the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment for the SF groups. The U.S. Army Special Operations Command, the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne), SF Proponency and SF Branch are working to codify the positions in spite of a zero-growth Army. From a branch perspective, the GWOT planners have provided a critical means to key-develop our majors and increase the volume of majors returning to the SF groups to complement the traditional KD positions (battalion executive officer, S3 and company commanders). Currently GWOT Planners are on the slate for the upcoming 14-02 manning cycle (Summer 14 moves), but each group will determine how many GWOT Planners it will slate for next summer.

When a Department of the Army Board is announced, SF Branch assignment officers and techs email out the associated MILPER Message that pertains to that board. The MILPER Messages provide all information associated with that board and it is crucial for every officer to completely read the MILPER message to make sure all of the eligibility requirements are met. If, after reading a MILPER message for an upcoming board, any item is unclear, please contact the SF Branch for clarification.

WARRANT OFFICER

Structure

The 180A Proponency Office’s focus for 4th Quarter Fiscal Year 13 was the 1st Special Forces Regiment Warrant Officer manning conference, better known as the slating conference. For the Army’s manning cycle FY14-02 (April-September 14), the number of 180As PCSing is approximately 70 or 12 percent of the force. Once approved by the USASOC, USAESFC and U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School commanding generals, the Human Resources Command will commence the process of building the requisitions for the moves.

In October 2013, the Personnel Management Authorization Document, which dictates the structure of each unit in the U.S. Army by rank and military occupational specialty, was published. The PMAD 1310 decreased the number of 180A authorizations from 654 to 641, 13 authorizations less than in FY13. The Regimental Personnel Proponent identified 30 additional 180A requirements throughout the Army. The Special Forces Warrant Officer Proponent Office is working with the RCCWO, CWOB and the respective G8s to ensure the manning of these new requirements in the future.

Development

The Chief Warrant of the Branch and the SF Personnel Proponent have established the prerequisites for attending full-time civilian/military education such as the Naval Postgraduate School or National Defense University. CMF 180A warrant officers desiring to attend NPS/NDU must be in the pay grade of CW2 (P) to CW4 with no more than two years time-in-grade when classes commence. Waivers may be granted on a case-by-case basis for this prerequisite.

Additional prerequisites are: the individual must have a minimum of 36 months of documented service on an ODA, must have successfully completed the Special Forces Warrant Officer Advanced Course, possess the requisite operational experience to serve in an assignment at battalion-level and above, and a letter of recommendation from the group commander/deputy group commander. If the individual is in a Table of Distributed Allowances assignment, the first O6 in the warrant officer’s current chain of command must also recommend the individual.

ENLISTED

AR 614-200, Enlisted Assignments and Utilization Management

Human Resources Command published a recent MILPER message that contains the updated Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations chapters to AR 614-200. This AR is important to the Career Management Fields since it identifies the CMF prerequisites and utilization for Soldiers interested in becoming a SF, CA or PO Soldier.

Special Forces key changes:

• Physical exam requirement now requires a prospective candidate to be able to meet eye and vision requirements listed in AR 40-501, Standards of Medical Fitness, Paragraph 5-6.G.1-4 or be willing to undergo PRK or LASEK surgery
• Security Clearance be eligible for a secret or top-secret security clearance
• Changes Special Forces Qualification Course utilization requirement from 24 to 36 months

Civil Affairs key changes:

• The requirement for a prospective candidate to have a minimum General Technical score of 100
• Requires the candidate to be a successful graduate of the Civil Affairs Assessment and Selection to be eligible to attend the Civil Affairs Qualification Course
• Provides recruiting information for U.S. Army Reserve Soldiers interested in becoming CA

Psychological Operations key changes:

• Physical exam requirement now requires a prospective candidate to have a current SERE physical
• Requires the candidate to be a successful graduate of the Psychological Operations Assessment and Selection to be eligible to attend the Psychological Operations Qualification Course
• Changes Psychological Operations Qualification Course utilization requirement from 24 to 36 months
CAREER NOTES

LANGUAGE

The Regimental Personnel Proponent has noticed an increasing trend in issues relating to language pay. Warrant officers are unaware of the language policies established by AR 11-6 and are losing money due to unqualified payment of language pay to the Soldier. The issue surrounds the proper identification of a Soldier’s control language. A Soldier must be qualified in his CLANG before he can receive payment for any other qualified language.

According to Army Regulation 11-6 (RAR 23 AUG 13), Para 3-9(2), for AA Soldiers with skills in more than one foreign language, the CLANG is the language for which the Soldier most recently attended a full-length basic language course or was recruited. If the Soldier has not attended a full-length basic language course and has instead attended a language conversion course, such as Persian Farsi to Dari, the CLANG will not change.

The Soldier, however, can be assigned against a requirement in this new language called a mission language. The first language trained or recruited will be the Soldier’s CLANG until the Soldier is no longer under an active-duty service obligation for the language or as determined by the appropriate branch manager.

HRC branch managers will determine the CLANG based on proficiency level and requirements. Soldiers who meet the 2/2 standard can request via DA Form 4187 (Personnel Action) to change their MLANG to their CLANG with AHRC approval based on the availability of authorizations/requirements. All requests to change a CLANG will be based on the needs and discretion of the Army.

FOR THE STRUCTURE & PERSONNEL IDENTIFIERS

38G – Military Government

Civil Affairs functional experts are currently identified by the use of skill identifiers that include economist, public education, public transportation, civil supply, public safety, agriculture, facilities, public communications and cultural affairs. The preponderance of force structure for these capabilities resides in the U.S. Army Reserve to leverage civilian education, training and experience gained in the civilian workforce.

There are two problems with the current system. The first problem is the lack of and inability to properly document levels of civil-skill expertise. The second problem, capacity, is not having enough of the capability in inventory to meet operational requirements.

The establishment of a separate Area of Concentration under the CA Career Management Field permits the Army to effectively manage and build real capability of functional specialists by being able to distinguish them from general CA officers. Civil Affairs Branch will retain the existing Skill Identifier structure to identify specialties within the AOC and add criteria for degree of proficiency coding to distinguish between competence levels corresponding to strategic, operational and tactical employment. Levels of expertise range from a basic functional skill practitioner to a master functional skill practitioner and are determined by experience, education and certifications. This, for example, will allow the distinction between a high school economics teacher and a World Bank PhD-level economist.

The challenge is the lack of ability by USAR CA to maintain functional specialty capability. To increase this capability requires the creation of a professional development model based on civilian skills and credentials that distinguish it from the greater Civil Affairs officer pool. For example, the Unit Status Report identifies Duty Military Occupational Specialty Qualification to three digits and not five. A 38A Civil Affairs officer, without one of the CA-related skill identifiers reports qualified when sitting in a functional specialist authorization requiring the CA skill identifier.

A Military Occupational Classification and Structure packet is being staffed at DA G1. We anticipate approval of the concept by 2nd Quarter FY14. The next step is publication of the Notification of Future Changes. Anticipate October 2016 as the effective date of authorization documents containing the 38G AOC.

Skill Identifier K9

On July 30, 2012, the Department of the Army G1 (Classification and Structure Branch) approved the creation of Skill Identifier (SI), K9, Special Operations Support, to identify officers in any Area of Concentration except AOC 18A, 37A, 38A completing an assignment with a special operations unit. This SI became effective Sept. 1, 2012.

More recently, on Oct. 17, 2013, the DA G1 approved establishment of Additional Skill Identifier K9, Special Operations Support, to identify Warrant Officers in any Military Occupational Specialty except MOS 180A completing an assignment with a special operations unit. This ASI became effective Dec. 1, 2013. Both SI and ASI will facilitate the movement of officers and warrant officers between special operations forces and non-SOF assignments. The SI and ASI will assist with rapid identification in support of contingency operations and forecasting of officers and warrant officers availability to serve additional tours in SOF units.

Qualifications for both the SI and ASI are the same. Officers and warrant officers must complete the following:

1. Successfully complete 22 months in an active-duty capacity in any MOS with a SOF-designated unit (USSOCOM, TSOC, USASOC, USAFSC, USAJFKSWCS, USA-SOAC, USAMISOC, 95TH CA Bde or 528TH Sustainment Bde) or a 12 month SOF deployment.
2. Army Reserve or National Guard warrant officers must meet the same qualifications but require a cumulative 22 months of assignments in a SOF designated unit or a 12 month SOF deployment.
3. Must be airborne qualified.
4. Must have a current APFT and meet height/weight standards.

The approval authority for these identifiers is the first ARSOF O6/colonel in the chain of command or O6 assigned to USASOC. The process for receiving the SI or ASI is through the unit S1 with a DA Form 4187 personnel action. Officers and warrant officers who have previously served in a SOF unit and meet the above qualifications must contact the DCS G1, ATTN: AOPE-MPD, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 2929 Desert Storm Dr, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9110 for award of the ASI.
ANTI-INFLAMMATORY NUTRITION

BY CHRIS HALAGARDA, MS, RD, CSSD, CSCS

During times of mental and physical stress, an anti-inflammatory diet can make the difference between recovering or breaking down. Whether you are recovering from surgery, returning from deployment, recovering from physical training or just trying to perform optimally every day, an anti-inflammation diet can help you with your mental and physical performance. Inflammation in the body has been linked to memory loss, muscle wasting and disability, which can advance to several chronic diseases (heart disease, diabetes, Alzheimer’s disease, irritable bowel syndrome, cancer). It can also be responsible for a poor healing rate after injury/surgery and slow recovery from PT. Follow the recommendations made here to ensure that your daily performance is at its best both mentally and physically.

First, maximize the nutrient density of the foods that you eat. Foods loaded with anti-oxidant-toting vitamins like vitamin C; minerals like manganese and zinc; and healthy fats such as Omega-3 fatty acids promote an anti-inflammatory environment. Foods such as Greek yogurt and kefir are also loaded with probiotics to promote gut health, ensuring proper absorption. Although supplementing with some of the recommended antioxidants may offer a single antioxidant, choosing a variety of foods offers thousands of antioxidants that work in synergy to maximize against inflammation. Choose food first to maximize results.

Be sure to use seasonings beside salt in your food preparation, too. Dill, basil, cumin, rosemary and paprika offer great flavor, aroma and texture while reducing inflammation. Another plus is that they do this without adding any calories. Try a new seasoning every month to learn how to cook with different flavors. Look online for specific recipes using the seasoning you’ve purchased. Some of the larger seasoning companies have websites with recipe databases using their product.

In addition to increasing the consumption of anti-inflammatory foods and seasonings, it’s also important to decrease or eliminate habits that promote inflammation. Diets high in saturated fats, trans fats and sugar will promote inflammation with effects similar to that of binge drinking and using tobacco. All will slow the rate of recovery and reduce mental and physical performance. Finally, eliminating mental and physical stress from daily life is all but impossible, but it is important to be able to manage daily stress. Sleep, physical activity, yoga and meditation are all excellent stress-management techniques. Incorporate them regularly and speak to your healthcare provider about stress or anger management classes to learn more.

Chris Halagarda, MS, RD, CSSD, CSCS is the U.S. Marine Corps Special Operations Command Performance & Resiliency (PERRES) Dietitian.

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Anti-Inflammatory Sample Diet

**BREAKFAST**

1 Cup cooked oatmeal (plain)
2 Tbs. raisins
1 tbs. almond butter
Cup of Greek yogurt
1 Cup of green tea

**SNACK**

Handful of almonds
Cup of popcorn
Banana

**LUNCH**

Tuna salad
4 ounces tuna canned in water
2 cups spinach leaves with tomato, green peppers, olives, cranberries, blueberries, walnuts, chic peas
Olive oil/red wine vinegar dressing
Whole-wheat pita bread points
Green tea

**SNACK**

Pistachios (shelled or unshelled)
Cherries

**DINNER**

6 ounce salmon steak topped with dill
1/2 cup quinoa with kidney beans and mushrooms
Cup of cooked broccoli stalks

**SNACK**

1 cup of soymilk
Large apple
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak can attest to the fact that the combination of technology and social movements can rapidly be the undoing of the state. Even social movements that lack a purpose can seemingly occupy the press and Wall Street indefinitely. In a time when the mighty tank is helpless in the face of rocks thrown in front of the camera, it is worth the military professional’s time to reflect on the nature of social movements.

Erik Hoffer offers the reader a meditation on the fundamentals of social movements throughout time using historical examples both contemporary and venerable, from the transformation of the English Commons to the proselytizing Christian in the bowery. For Army and Marine Corp captains in the countersurgeny business, as well as special operations officers in the insurgency business, Hoffer’s magnum opus, The True Believer, should be considered a primer.

Hoffer was the orphan of German immigrants. Blind as a result of a childhood malady, he was later inexplicably cured and subsequently developed an intense passion for the written word. He spent 10 years on Skid Row in Los Angeles, worked as a migrant worker during the depression and later as a longshoreman. During this time, Hoffer accomplished two remarkable things that make him an authority on the subject: first he observed first-hand the work of socialist labor organizer and proselytizing Christians alike in the era of Steinbeck and second, he accumulated library cards from every library, in every town in which he worked.

Hoffer begins his work with a general discussion of the underlying “appeal of mass movement” and change that is constantly present in a portion of society. He goes on to ponder the psychology that drives the “desire for substitution” that is innate in the movement participant, and considers the interchangeability of movements, citing great movement organizers of the 20th century:

“The petit bourgeois social democrat or trade union boss will never make a national socialist, but the communist always will.” — Adolf Hitler.

The True Believer goes on to discuss the segments of society that are vulnerable to the siren’s call of the movement, generally the nèer do wells of society and varieties of poor. In this, Hoffer uses fantastically crafted sentence and phrase to arrive at the same conclusion that Chalmers Johnson arrived at using tedium in Revolutionary Change, namely that a sudden change in status and wealth makes a given demographic vulnerable to mobilization.

The meat of Hoffer’s work is devoted to the tools of the mass movement. With great wit, Hoffer describes the power of the collective identity, the requirements of the doctrine of the fanatic and the need for the movement to denigrate the flawed present in favor of the ideal utopian future. He shows himself to have a deft hand at history in citing the pageantry of the national socialist and the Soviet call for self-sacrifice in the name of the greater good, all tools to be used in the propagation of the mass movement. In this, Hoffer explores “unifying agents” that weld a group of malcontents into a relatively cohesive organization that is capable of action, for better or worse. Ultimately, Hoffer argues that the communal framework of the movement, the demand for sacrifice, forsaking the past in favor of the future and an appeal to the emotional needs of movement’s participants all combine to form the mass movement.

The final chapters of The True Believer are devoted to the life cycle of the movement. Hoffer describes the disenfranchised “men of words” that, cheated of their place in society, provide the doctrine that moves the masses and attracts the fanatics (think extremists Muslim leaders in Afghanistan and Iraq). At the heart of it, the author argues, the man of words is moved by a frustrated desire for a place in society (think about the kidnap-for-ransom gangs in Philippines that emerged from the true believers of the Abu Sayaff.

Once the man of words has issued forth his doctrine, however, the fanatics rush to take up a poorly understood doctrine in a desire to see the establishment crumble. Hoffer tells the reader that the ‘successful’ fanatic comes from the ranks of “the uncreative men of words”, frustrated men like Adolf Hitler, who have failed to express themselves artistically or are otherwise experiencing great disappointment with life. When coupled with a “practical man of action” who can “transform the mass movement to a means for self-realization for the ambitious.” In keeping with the national socialist example, Hoffer cites (among others) the political marriage between Hitler and Heinrich Himmler; the purpose of the practical man of action being that of using the doctrine to pursue pragmatic means.

Ultimately, Hoffer says the mass movement will endure only so long as it attracts adventurers and change seekers, and that movement will cease when it begins to attract the ambitious that seek to use the movement for self-advancement. Along with the movements converts, so does the movements nominative leader determine the duration of the movement; a Ghandi, for instance knows when to end a movement in favor of a more practical course of action, a Stalin does not.

Hoffer’s The True Believer is a wonderfully written piece that makes great use of history and observation. The book is an easy read, easily understood piece that succinctly puts to verse the observations of social scientists such as Diani and McAdam, while avoiding the shallow water of Gladwell. For special operations detachment and company commanders, The True Believer deserves a place in the cargo pocket next to the TC 18-01.