

# ORDER FROM CHAOS

# RESTRUCTURING

# ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS

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The last 12 years of war have increased the size of Civil Affairs and the reliance of commanders on its ability to accomplish difficult population-centric missions around the world. However, the resulting increased demands, along with the impacts of bifurcating the CA forces, have negatively impacted the Army Civil Affairs capabilities.

The stress on active-duty special operations forces CA units is illustrated by PERSTEMPO rates that are much greater than those directed by the Secretary of Defense and the commander of the United States Special Operations Command. Moreover, while the active-component Civil Affairs Force has increased 10-fold, there has been a significant decrease in CA staff presence within most SOF and joint commands, affecting not only the ability to support commanders, but also the CA officer-development model. Much of this has occurred as the result of seemingly short-term fixes to a long-term problem. As we prepare to support a new focus within the Defense Strategic Guidance,<sup>1</sup> and the inevitable budgetary constraints, it is time to restructure the Army's Civil Affairs forces with an emphasis on both efficiencies and maximum support to commanders.

The United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, with regard to Civil Affairs, was established as both the CA-generating force provider and operational headquarters for the CA function within the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Since its inception, USACAPOC has been forced to balance these two very different requirements. As a force provider supporting ground combatant commanders and their maneuver units, USACAPOC often lost the ability to control deployed units since the operational control of these units rests with the supported commanders. This left USACAPOC's deployed CA battalion and brigade headquarters with only an administrative control relation-



ship with their deployed CA units. They continued to maintain this ADCON relationship in an effort to fulfill the operational headquarters responsibilities, which resulted in confusion not only for the CA Soldiers, who have two masters, but also for the supported brigade combat team commanders, working with a CA unit that was organizationally different from the rest of their assigned units.

In addition, to the duality created by being a force provider as well as an operational headquarters, the high demand for CA forces resulted in USACAPOC filling the majority of their requirements with adhoc organizations, often built during the mobilization process. This left units stripped of their own trained Soldiers and unable to man their own upcoming deployments, triggering a cycle of restructuring units with each new set of mission requirements.

These problems were even more severe for CA Functional Specialist with the added challenge of providing properly trained and educated specialists in a way never before envisioned.

For years, USACAPOC has been limited in its ability to provide qualified Functional Specialists.<sup>2</sup> It was not provided sufficient resources and authorities to recruit, train, credential and professionally develop Functional Specialists, forcing USACAPOC to work with what it had within its own ranks. While this concept that later became the basis for today's Functional Specialists was manageable when it was developed during World War II and could leverage a force of millions, the pool of "experts" is much smaller within the current all-volunteer force. This is further exacerbated by a validation process that does not discriminate between a high-school economics teacher and a senior-development executive at the World Bank, as long as they are both educationally qualified. This has resulted in the deployment of many unqualified Functional

Specialists. For example, a third grade teacher with only classroom experience could be deployed as a validated public education specialist to develop a province-wide literacy program in a contested region in Iraq or Afghanistan.

The command and control and manning issues plaguing USACAPOC were further complicated by the lack of effective and experienced GCC and Army Service Component Commands staff. Prior to Operation Enduring Freedom, the 352nd Civil Affairs Command commander and his staff were to augment the Central Command staff to provide senior-level CA representation and to integrate Civil Affairs operations within the staff. However, over the past decade this has degraded to a Civil Affairs planning team, manned from disparate units, that is often distributed throughout the CENTCOM staff, performing many duties that have little, if anything, to do with Civil Affairs. While this staff augmentation is presumably valuable, it does little to support the commander with an efficient and effectively leveraged CA capability. This lack of CA planning capacity has resulted in CA forces being one of the first units withdrawn during Operation New Dawn and in the current draw down in Afghanistan. In reality, the commanders' Civil Capacity expertise should be one of the last to leave during these critical transitions.

## How we got here

The growth of the CA force, the concurrent restructuring of CA organizations and the reassignment of USACAPOC to the U.S. Army Reserve Command have created unintended consequences<sup>3</sup> With the 10-fold expansion of the active CA force, and the designation of 95th CA Brigade (A) as the only SOF CA organization, the community quickly split into two distinct groups: SOF (active) and conventional (USAR). The creation of the 85th CA Brigade further exacerbated the problem by creating a split between active and reserve components seeking resources within the conventional CA forces. The resulting operational territorialism is further aggravated by a reduction of CA staff representation within the commands that the CA forces support. For example, there are no AC CA colonel positions on any of the GCC staffs, with the exception of United States Africa Command. The reserve staff available to commanders is often transitory and limited in experience with the varied CA capabilities throughout the force. While the CACOMs have worked diligently to compensate, they are limited by the fact that many of the most experienced and capable of officers and NCOs are deployed or unable to be recalled to active duty, leaving them unable to fill this critical gap.

Prior to USACAPOC losing its SOF designation, Active Guard Reserve soldiers manned the majority of theater special operations command CA staff positions. Afterwards, the AGR personnel were

pulled from the TSOCs (and other SOF positions) since there was no longer a justification for AGR positions in formations without RC CA personnel. The TSOCs attempted to compensate for the loss of personnel but failed, since it could not recode USAR billets as AC billets, and an inability or unwillingness to either grow those billets or designate existing AC billets as CA.


The 95th CA Brigade (A) continues to support a demand for forces that results in a dwell rate consistently below its goal. Both active CA Brigades are sourced from a single active-duty CA pipeline at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, producing one pool of Soldiers leveraged by both units. This limited ability to fill its ranks, coupled with the consistently high operational tempo, has resulted in the inability of the 95th to resource some missions requirements. Furthermore, the 85th CA Brigade has had to restructure its forecasted growth by the loss of one company per battalion. With the commencement of FORSCOM directed deployments, the 85th CA commander and his staff are continually balancing growth against mission requirements.

Efforts to identify these and other capability gaps have been ongoing for the past few years. The two most significant efforts are the Joint Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Change Recommendation (JROCM) 162-11<sup>4</sup> and the TRADOC Analysis Center - Fort Lee (TRAC-LEE) CA Capabilities Based Assessment.<sup>5</sup> In December, 2011 JROCM 162-11 was signed, identifying 23 tasks addressing Civil Affairs issues. In February 2013 TRAC-LEE CA released the CBA.

## What Right Looks Like

The Civil Affairs Regiment must develop a common goal for providing support to commanders of joint, special operations and conventional forces that includes both CA Generalists and Functional Specialists to support unified land operations in every environment across the range of military operations.<sup>6</sup> To reach this goal several factors must be incorporated into potential solutions. These include uniting the various tribes within the CA community, ensuring that there is no degradation of support to SOF or conventional missions while maintaining a manageable dwell rate and a well-managed Functional Specialty structure. Further, commanders must be supported by an organic CA staff capable of maximizing these capabilities. All of this should be applied in a no-growth, phased approach. Additionally, there should be one standard for tactical CA forces, regardless of component, based upon required capabilities.

CA is a unique function that is often not fully understood, even within the SOF community. Active component CA is an Army-



specific branch and comprised of SOF Soldiers with unique skills and abilities. However, since 2006 there is an ever widening divide in defining what it is to be a Civil Affairs Soldier. Active-duty CA Soldiers have an assessment and selection process and are trained in an intensive pipeline which includes regional and language studies and a rigorous branch-related curriculum. The USACAPOC Soldier receives a much more abbreviated curriculum. This has created an environment of two separate communities within CA, and a convoluted understanding of what a CA Soldier brings to the fight.

A unified CA Command would not only serve to mitigate this divide, but would result in operationally relevant improvements, to include: unifying CA C2 as well as training and education by applying unified proponent and doctrinal standards; the ability to meet requirements by leveraging all units within the force; the ability to form multicomponent teams and task forces to meet specific GCC and TSOC requirements; and a focus on capabilities, rather than component. This would allow the CA Regiment to better support maneuver units (both SOF and conventional) and persistent engagements, primarily Civil-Military Engagement and Theater Security Cooperation. Furthermore, this unified structure should include a global rapid response capability, with the ability to quickly deploy in support of humanitarian assistance and disaster response missions. As the U.S. military is always in a supporting role in these missions, it is critical to integrate military activities early with other humanitarian and relief organizations and their efforts. CA is uniquely structured to be a commander's conduit for this integration, if it has a timely capability to do so.

This unified tactical CA organization should fall under USASOC, and would require a mechanism to represent the equities of both the U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Forces Command and the ability to assign missions to meet the requirements of both conventional and special operations forces. Furthermore, this would allow these forces to leverage MFP-11 funds to maintain a standing capability to support both conventional and SOF missions.

For this to be effective, it will likely require a further revision to the Joint Staff Business Rules for allocation of forces and Guidance for the Employment of the Force. This would ensure fair and equitable distribution among operational headquarters requesting CA forces for named operations, contingency response, participation in exercises supporting war plans and episodic or persistent theater engagement. This revised guidance would address the procedures for Army Commands, Army Service Components, Sub-unified Commands and direct reporting units when requesting forces within the Force Allocation Decision Model.


A unified CA force could achieve the goal of a 1:2 dwell rate for active-duty Soldiers and a 1:5 dwell rate for USAR Soldiers. The current PERSTEMPO dwell rate for Soldiers in the 95th is consistently well below this goal. Any reunification plan must not only be able to support current demand, but be structured to survive the demands of future conflicts. Within recent years the demand for a persistent CA presence has increased. The USSOCOM Civil Military Support Elements have proven valuable assets to both commanders and ambassadors throughout the world. Any future plan should be structured to provide this critical presence, even as operational demands increase during conflicts.

The current system of managing Functional Specialists is not effective. At its birth during World War II, the expertise of the government team specialists came from their civilian professions. Since that time the importance of this critical niche capability within the Army has been continually recognized. However, without the millions of Soldiers of varied backgrounds available 70 years ago, CA should have a viable method to recruit, assess, validate and leverage the expertise of its citizen Soldiers as CA Functional Specialists.

Functional Specialists should be organized separately from the tactical force, creating a focused and dedicated force-provider organization for these Soldiers. This will allow appropriate integration of the right specialists in support of specific operational requirements, as well as Functional Specialist staff support to commanders.

Additionally, Functional Specialist standards should be tiered and quantifiable, drawn from the professional and academic communities in each discipline. This would identify the experience level of each specialty from novice to journeyman to master. Once this is complete, the Army must develop the authorities to allow the recruitment of experts at each level, through innovative means including direct commissioning. Such a system should be applied to current Functional Specialists with a mechanism to allow for professional and educational development, as well. This hierarchy would result in a separate Officer Professional Development model tied specifically to the Functional Specialists.<sup>7</sup>

In order to effectively employ this improved tactical and functional CA capability, there must be an associated Increase in the CA staff of the GCC, TSOC and ASCC. CACOMs play a critical role in providing theater-level CAO planning, coordination, policies and programs to support the GCC's regional CMO strategy as well as stabilization, reconstruction and development efforts. This is usually accomplished by deploying a theater-level operations or planning team. These teams develop and manage the strategic-level civil inputs to the commander's common operational picture and



provide the commander with the critical civil considerations for planning and executing operations. However, this rotational and often episodic presence does not provide commanders with a consistent capability. This can be mitigated by aligning an organic CA staff within the staffs of the GCC, TSOC and ASCC. This staff can be multi-component and capable of developing the CA and CAO plans to support these headquarters' theater specific plans.

The fiscal realities of waning resources and the associated reductions within the military ranks require that any solution attempt to achieve either no growth or negative growth in manning. Civil Affairs is a multi-component branch, with the majority of the force residing within the reserve forces. It is therefore appropriate to develop a multi-component structure, particularly in echelons above battalion, to achieve solutions with little or no growth of forces.

It is critical that any structural change to CA have a phased approach. As the regiment moves towards a single operation headquarters, each phase of the process should be capable of standing on its own. This will allow forward progress even if resource constraints prohibit transitioning to the next phase. It is critical to the process that deliberate assessments of progress are conducted prior to advancing to the next phase. Below is an example to illustrate this process.

**Phase I.** This proposal starts with the creation of a Civil Affairs Special Operations Command, constructed from existing assets from within the two active-component CA brigades. This would be a very small, lean organization with the primary duty of managing the USASOC force-provider functions for CA forces supporting conventional and SOF missions. The new command will essentially perform the operational tasks currently performed by FORSCOM and USASOC as they relate to CA. The next step within the phase is the transfer of the 85th CA Brigade to USASOC.

**Phase II.** Two USAR CA brigades, ultimately trained to the SOF CA standards, transfer to the CASOC which, at this point, would grow into a more traditional headquarters structure assuming the operational duties now performed within the CACOMs and USACAPOC.

While this is occurring, USACAPOC transitions to a Civil Affairs Governance Command. First, the CACOMs are transitioned into a staff organization integrated into the staffs of the GCC, TSOC and the ASCC. The brigades within the CAGCOM transform into a Functional Specialist organization, organized around functional teams with capabilities at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.

At the end of this phase, the tactical force is fully established and there is a singular standard for all Functional Specialists within CA, resulting in a standing, relevant and able functional specialty capability.

The tactical force has an increased capability to support SOF and conventional missions with a reduced dwell time ratio for all active CA units, as a result of the efficiencies of combining of training, support and the quick response force responsibilities of the two brigades.

Phase III. The final phase reintegrates the disparate CA organizations. This involves Civil Affairs Command with a subordinate CAGCOM and the reintegration of the CASOC and the separate USAR brigades in Europe and Hawaii. All of this is subordinate to USASOC as all of the CA force, once again, becomes a SOF asset with the mission to support both SOF and conventional CA missions.



## The Hurdles on the Road

Of course, any solution will require a deliberative approach that addresses inevitable issues which will result from any AC/RC force modification. These include such challenges as: grade-plate issues; developing a singular training standard for tactical CA that is appropriate for USAR Soldiers; establishment of a professional development model for the Governance Specialists; the authorities required for direct commissioning of civilian experts; acceptance of increased CA staff presence by the GCC commanders; and USSOCOM Force Cap issues.

However, none of these are, in and of themselves, prohibitive of progress. There is a need to adapt the CA force to more efficiently and effectively support commanders and their operations. Now is the time to start formulating this adaptation. **SW**

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## Notes

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3. Hugh C. Van Roosen, Implications of the 2006 Reassignment of U.S. Army Civil Affairs, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 30, 2009), 1.
4. Joint Staff, 1 December, 2011, Memorandum, "Civil Affairs DOTMLPF Change Recommendation"
5. Office of the Chief Army Reserve, 4 February, 2013, OCAR Memorandum, "Official release of the Office of the Chief Army Reserve (OCAR) AR 5-55 Study: Civil Affairs Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA), conducted by the U.S."
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7. Department of the Army, 31 October, 2011, Field Manual 3-57, "Civil Affairs Operation", accessed 28 March, 2013, <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-57.pdf>
8. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations Within DOD September 2005 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Washington, D.C. 20301-3140, P. 1-55.