

Historical Background

The scope of the challenges our nation faced in World War II generated significant debate regarding the policies, doctrine and authorities required for effective Civil Affairs. The Army's official history of CA and military government recognizes that, "because of the American tradition against the military exercise of civil power under any but desperate circumstances, the civil affairs function of the United States Army evoked bitter debate."¹² Out of this debate emerged the role and function of CA to ensure the U.S. meets its transitional governance obligations under international law to ensure the protection of civilians, the prevention of civilian interference with military operations and the preservation of civilian capacity to deliver essential services. Military necessity and the Hague Convention established the roles and responsibilities for the military's involvement in transitional governance.¹³ In establishing the World War II strategy for CA and military government, both President Franklin Roosevelt and General Dwight Eisenhower agreed that military support to governance, while necessary, should be transitioned to civilian entities as soon as possible.¹⁴

The U.S. Army's World War II experiences in stability and governance provides insight into retooling effective practices for military support to governance. World War II marked the first time in over a century and a half of service where the Army committed proponent solutions — in policy, doctrine, personnel, training and organization — necessary to secure and stabilize civilian populations and infrastructure, consolidate gains, establish transitional governance, build a partners' capacity for governance and transition these responsibilities to a civilian authority. A number of strategic leaders, both civilian and military, anticipated the chaos in the aftermath of combat based on the provisional nature of occupation and stability experiences in the previous 50 years in the Philippines, Cuba, Siberia and the Rhineland. In these previous efforts, the Army lacked the proponent to generate, organize and train forces specifically organized by role and function to execute transitional governance and stability operations in order to consolidate gains.

As the Army prepared for war in the 1940s, the planning for stability and transitional governance occurred concurrently with the preparation for combat operations. Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall played a central role in the development of the Civil Affairs and military government capabilities due to his unique background. In the Philippines, then Second Lt. Marshall conducted stability and counterinsurgency operations as a platoon leader and company commander. Following U.S. agreement to the military government obligations outlined in the Hague Convention of 1907, Marshall, among other future Army leaders, contributed to the Army Staff College (progenitor to Command and General Staff College) 1908 collection of essays on military government operations.¹⁵ After World War I, Marshall participated in the ill-prepared occupation of the Rhineland. Based on his experiences, Gen. Marshall recognized the need for a proponent to generate the critical civil capabilities required for governance and stability operations. As Chief of Staff of the Army he went on to approve the establishment of a school to train CA and military government officers.¹⁶

In 1941, Army Provost Marshall General Allen W. Gullion, who initiated the first manual on CA and military government in 1940 as a Judge Advocate General, spearheaded the efforts to form this school. He realized the importance of civil expertise and deliberately chose to establish this school in a civilian environment.¹⁷ Gen. Gullion recruited, and later direct commissioned, Jesse I. Miller, a civilian attorney practicing in Washington, D.C., to lead the effort.¹⁸

In April 1942, the U.S. Army School of Military Government was established at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Va.¹⁹ This institution prepared officers for worldwide Civil Affairs and Military Government deployments and served as the proponent for CA and military government doctrine, organization and training. It also served as a hub in forming partnerships with premier academic institutions including Yale, Harvard, Princeton, Stanford and Michigan.²⁰

The SOMG generated the governance and stability capabilities that proved critical to achieving U.S. strategic objectives during and following World War II. The first students were civilians with civil expertise who received direct commissions followed by basic military skills training and additional CA and military government training at the SOMG.²¹ These officers also received further diplomatic, language and cultural training specific to the nations and cultures of their expected assignments.

Whole-of-Government Challenges

World War II was drastically different from current and future military operations in which the collapse of Cold War rivalries have, "given way to wars over religious, ethnic, and tribal identity; nuclear dangers have proliferated; inequality and economic instability have intensified; damage to our environment, food insecurity, and dangers to public health are increasingly shared...".²² The ability to confront these problems requires a comprehensive whole-of-government approach to the integrated application of the instruments of national power.

Consistent with the American preference for civilian leadership of governance efforts, current presidential policy directs the Department of State to lead capacity building activities and stability operations. History demonstrates that while civilian agencies lead in these operations, in areas where there is instability, civilian agencies lack sufficient capacity to generate the right skills that allow for the concurrent requirements of maintaining security and implementing governance-related activities. Thousands of government employees volunteered to serve in austere conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan to support national-security objectives. Even with this volunteer effort to support governance and stability operations, the number of deployable civilian employees to support these operations "does not exist in large numbers."²³ Previous and current civilian agency-led efforts to generate additional governance capacity include hiring contracted civilians, temporary hires and the creation of the Civilian Response Corps. These practices came with challenges associated with oversight, turnover and integration as well as recruiting dilemmas related to uncertain employment conditions and locations.²⁴

In unstable areas, in which there are threats to local populations, Civil Affairs is ideally organized, trained and equipped to support joint-force commanders in a wide range of requirements including: steady-state shaping, building partner capacity, humanitarian assistance/disaster response and stability operations. Additionally, CA is the only branch with organic force structure specifically organized in the functions of civil security, governance, infrastructure and economic development, the restoration of essential services and rule of law. This capability is currently organized as the Functional Specialty teams within Army Reserve CA formations.

The current Functional Specialist program is an inherited remnant from the branch's World War II origins. It relies on civilian skills that individual Army Reservists bring into uniformed service. This model worked in World War II, primarily due to the accession of civilians with key skills and the development of a generating platform — the SOMG. A survey by the CA proponent in March 2013 found that out of 559 Functional Specialist coded positions in the Army Reserve, none were filled



IMSG Civil Affairs Soldiers interact with host-nation government officials. In the future, Functional Specialists trained at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School's Institute for Military Support to Governance will be able to efficiently integrate best practices and support interoperability with unified action partners. *U.S. Army photo*

with an officer with the prerequisite qualifications. Furthermore, the civilian skills associated with the functional specialist categories may not inherently apply in a regional/cultural context or translate appropriately in capacity or capability to the strategic, operational or tactical levels.

The atrophy of this program occurred over a 70-year period due to changes in doctrine, personnel policies and operational utilization. Following World War II, the Army's Cold War doctrine focus on conventional containment of the Warsaw Pact drove CA doctrine and training to be heavily weighted on minimizing civilian interference with military operations.²⁵ The lack of focus on utilization of civilian specialties in stabilization, shaping and building partners' capacities minimized the operational demand for these skills. The CA Branch retained its well-considered World War II ability to direct commission civilian experts in Army through the 1970s. The diminished Cold War demand for stability and governance related civilian expertise perpetuated the decline of these authorities. From a force-structure perspective, the number of Functional Specialist positions winnowed from comprising approximately half the positions within the force to a current composition of only 8 percent of billets.²⁶

CA 2020 / 2022 – Retooling CA support to governance

Currently USAJFKSWCS is adapting the CA generating capabilities to meet current and future operational challenges across the range of military operations. In 2011, USAJFKSWCS reorganized from a function-based organization (doctrine, training, personnel) to regimental proponents (CA, PSYOP and SF) with commandants. This streamlined the ability to explore and develop proponent solutions in force structure, personnel policies, doctrine and training development for all CA forces. The optimized proponent structure enables CA to incorporate the required capabilities outlined in Army 2020 and ARSOF 2022 across the doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) domains. *Civil Affairs 2020/2022* is the vision that synthesizes these requirements that unifies

and meets or exceeds projected SOF and conventional demands for the force. Intrinsically woven within CA 2020/2022 is the restoration of effective management of civilian expertise accessible under USC Title 10 and the expansion of the CA force's ability to support Army, ARSOF, joint force commanders and ambassadors in pre-conflict shaping, transitional administration, stability operations and building partners' capacities for effective governance.

The Institute for Military Support to Governance

In October 2012, Lt. Gen. Charles Cleveland, the commander of the United States Special Operations Command, in consultation and coordination with Lt. Gen. Jeffrey Talley, the Chief of the Army Reserve, directed the creation of the Institute for Military Support to Governance. While drawing from the historical legacy of the School of Military Government, the IMSG will serve as a broader entity in coordinating with governmental, private and academic institutions to foster efficient integration, cross-pollinate best practices and support interoperability with unified action partners. Comprised of current and reorganized force structure, the IMSG is currently in its first phase of inception. In this phase it will establish its facility, begin hiring and assigning personnel; developing a research agenda; and analyzing and shaping the policies, authorities and doctrine required to leverage and employ civilian expertise across the range of military operations. In its second phase, the IMSG will provide the Army with a mechanism to procure degreed and credentialed professionals from stability-related fields and adjudicate their capability to support Army, ARSOF, joint commanders and ambassadors at the tactical, operational and strategic echelons.

38G Area of Concentration

The next crucial step is the conversion of existing Functional Specialist billets (559 CA positions) in Army Reserve CA into a distinct area of concentration within the CA career management field. This will allow the IMSG to establish quantifiable accession gates and academic and professional tracks within the fields of civil security, governance,

rule of law, economy, infrastructure and social or humanitarian services. Developing this AOC, with the nominative classification as 38G, combined with direct commissioning authorities will enable CA to procure the necessary civilian experience to support Army, ARSOF and joint commanders across the range of military operations. The direct commissioning authorities of civil experts into civil affairs existed within Army policies for Army Reserve CA from WWII through the 1970s.²⁷

CA and MG Future Operating Concept

The IMMSG will assist the proponent and enable the development of a Civil Affairs and Military Governance Future Operating Concept that will describe the employment of these capabilities across the range of military operations, and demonstrate how they will enable Army, ARSOF and joint commanders to mitigate or defeat threats to civil society in anticipated operational environments. The concept will enable the CA proponent and the IMMSG to scope the future development of DOTMLPF solutions into the required capabilities for future CA forces.

Doctrine

As part of the larger *Army Doctrine 2015* initiative, CA doctrine is planning for the development of doctrine for military government operations. Currently in CA doctrine, military support to governance, exists in the core task Support to Civil Administration in friendly or occupied territory. The development of the IMMSG will enable the civilian expertise required to inform the doctrine development process.

CA 2020/2022 represents the most substantive and cost effective transformation of CA and military governance capabilities and capacities since World War II. These changes provide an affordable solution to enable the Army to prevent, shape and win. Upon completion, the Institute for Military Support to Governance and the 38G Area of Concentration will provide the Army, ARSOF, joint force commanders and ambassadors with viable conduits to build partners' capacity in order to consolidate tactical and operational gains, that in time, will set the conditions for achieving strategic aims. The IMMSG provides the Army with a mechanism to reach out and up to develop best practices among other government departments and agencies, private entities and the academic community in order to achieve unified action. The 38G Officers, recruited, trained and certified through the IMMSG, will provide stability-related civilian expertise across the range of military operations. **SW**

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