



CIVIL ENGAGEMENT A Civil Affairs Team meets with Afghan villagers. Photo courtesy of Capt. Shawn R. Jokinen

AN UNCONVENTIONAL ROLE FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS BY STEVE LEWIS

Introduction

Unconventional warfare is one of the eight core activities of U.S. Army special-operations forces. ARSOF units are responsible¹ for understanding their potential role and requirements in a UW campaign. Unconventional Warfare is defined as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.”² The U.S. military’s role in a UW campaign is to work with an indigenous organization to facilitate changes in the behavior or structure of a regime unfriendly to the U.S.³ An organized insurgency is a struggle to wrest legitimacy and influence⁴ within a population away from the state by using political mobilization, violence and insurgency. ARSOF Civil Affairs,⁵ with the mission to engage the population and civil institutions, can play a critical role in a UW campaign.⁶

The Nature of Unconventional Warfare

Indigenous organizations that seek to alter or replace a regime start from a position of weakness as they have a deficit in terms of military power and material resources.⁷ To overcome their initial weakness the challengers must create alternative sources of power. The population is the source of this power; it has the potential to supply the nascent insurgency⁸ with members, resources and political power with which to challenge the regime. In order to leverage this potential source of power the insurgency may use a mixture⁹ of violence, non-violent protest and civil unrest, propaganda and other information operations, subversion, economic manipulation and political mobilization.¹⁰ The insurgents seek to “seize, nullify

or challenge political control of a region.”¹¹ An insurgency must design and execute a campaign that combines a variety of political, social, informational, economic and military activities that allow it to gain influence and legitimacy over a population.¹² It is then the role of the U.S. unconventional warfare joint and interagency adviser force (UW JTF) to advise and assist the insurgency as it develops and executes this campaign. Within this complex environment, all elements of SOF must understand their specific roles and how they can support the designated UW commander.

U.S. Army Special Operations Forces Civil Affairs

Soldiers working within SOF CA units are specially trained and organized and are assigned to the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne), which is part of the U.S. Army’s Special Operations Command. CA Soldiers establish, maintain, influence or exploit relations between the military and the population and civilian institutions. CA Soldiers also conduct analysis of the civil and social systems within an area to determine the weaknesses and vulnerabilities¹³ within those systems.¹⁴ Since September 2001, CA forces have been deployed to a variety of unstable regions and have gained considerable experience working with partner nations to identify and mitigate civil vulnerabilities.¹⁵ In a UW environment CA can apply the same skills and experience in support of the insurgency.

Members of a CA team can execute four essential tasks: 1) conduct tailored civil reconnaissance, 2) advise and assist the insurgency on the development of a parallel or shadow civil government, 3) support the insurgency’s ability to achieve a high level of political mobilization within the population and 4) assist the insurgency in the facilitation of civil unrest and non-violent protests.



HEARTS AND MINDS A civil affairs officer reads a newspaper with local Afghan villagers. Photo by Air Force Tech Sgt. JT May III

Civil Reconnaissance

Civil Affairs operators are masters of mapping the human and physical domain of an operational area. In a UW environment the understanding and articulation of the Human Domain is essential to a successful campaign design and remains critical throughout the execution of the campaign.¹⁶

Civil reconnaissance has been an essential element of most successful insurgencies. Mao's civil reconnaissance and social system analysis in China led him to select a rural peasant-based insurgent organization as opposed to a Leninist urban-based insurgency.¹⁷ Between 1959 and 1964, the Communist insurgency in South Vietnam and the North Vietnamese Army devoted considerable resources to civil reconnaissance and mapping of the civil systems in South Vietnam. The NVA helped the VC send teams to villages with the specific task of mapping the social system, influential leaders and civil vulnerabilities within that village. This information was used later as the VC leveraged the identified civil vulnerabilities to create causes for political mobilization.¹⁸

a. Map the civil and social system that supports the regime and identify civil weaknesses which can be used against the system.²⁰ In most cases the regime is supported by a strong and loyal security apparatus and a powerful group of pro-regime elites. However the majority of the population does not enjoy the privileges of elite status and is the source of the regime's power and resources.²¹ During the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Islamist Movement influenced oil-industry workers to strike because they understood the oil industry was essential to the regime's survival; however, the oil workers did not enjoy any improved status.²² The regime is dependent on the continued participation of the non-elites in this system in order to keep its society stable and maintain its power. In a UW environment, SOF CA can help the UW JTF as well as insurgency leadership understand the civil/social system and its weaknesses.²³

Mao called these weaknesses "political problems" and "unsolved contradictions" and claimed they were essential to crafting a successful insurgency.²⁴ Professor Doug McAdam describes these weaknesses as opportunities that exist within the broader sociopolitical environment of which the insurgency may be able to take advantage.²⁵ These opportunities are described as civil vulnerabilities by CA doctrine and SOF CA teams are experienced in identifying civil vulnerabilities within the target society.²⁶

The Vietcong were masters at using the frustrations of landless peasants attempting to gain land ownership and converting those frustrations into political mobilization.²⁷ The resistance movement in Tunisia leveraged popular frustration due to the corruption of the Ben Ali government and their inability to seek redress for government imposed injustice to mobilize

mass protests that lead to the government's collapse.²⁸ Civil vulnerabilities are powerful tools but they must be understood to be used.

b. Social group analysis. Within a regime there exists a variety of non-official groups that emerge in response to social issues. These groups may not be overt supporters of the insurgency but their organization can contribute valuable resources. The New People's Army, a Communist insurgency active in the Philippines for more than 40 years, leverages a relationship with sympathetic social groups such as PISTON (transportation workers), Gabriela (women's group) and the League of Filipino Students as a tool to recruit members, collect information and resources and to create social pressure through protests and work stoppages.²⁹ A thorough understanding of the social groups that are active within the UW environment is essential to the UW JTF.³⁰

Governance

Renowned insurgency expert Dr. Bernard Fall noted a government that is being beaten by an insurgency is not being out fought, rather it is being out-administered.³¹ Thus resistance movements that understand the political necessities of the conflict and seek to gain support from the population must be able to legitimately administer the population.³²

Shadow governments are usually associated with insurgent movements that seek to overthrow the regime or create a breakaway state such as the very well developed shadow state created by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam in northern Sri Lanka. The Tamil Tigers had a sophisticated civilian infrastructure from mayors to healthcare professionals to a banking system, all functioning as if they were already an independent Tamil state.³³ However other insurgent groups have created parallel governance structures as a tool to pressure the state or to improve the resiliency of the resistance. In Poland, in the late 1970s and 1980s, the Solidarity Movement created parallel orga-

nizations to provide social services and support to its members and increase their capacity to withstand state repression.³⁴ The goal of this parallel government “was not to seize state power, but rather to forge an autonomous civil society so that the opposition could subsequently engage the state from a stronger position.”³⁵

Based on SOF CA training and experience working with, advising and mentoring local governments throughout the world, CA teams are uniquely qualified to mentor shadow civil governments.³⁶ The principles of good governance and legitimacy remain the same whether dealing with the standing government or a shadow government challenging the regime, and SOF CA teams have the requisite training and education, that allows them to draw on appropriate institutional knowledge to assist a shadow government.³⁷

A functioning and legitimate shadow government can play a significant role in the success of an insurgency. Some specific shadow-government functions are: establishment of insurgent legitimacy and influence/displacement of regime legitimacy and influence;³⁸ management of community resources in support of the insurgent organization;³⁹ and preparation for the transition to post-regime governance.⁴⁰ The seventh and final phase of a UW campaign is the transition phase. In this phase the UW JTF assists the victorious insurgent movement in transitioning into a legitimate

(with the help of CA teams) should identify civil vulnerabilities that appeal to a broad section of society, that the regime would have difficulty in addressing and that the resistance movement can take action against.⁵⁰ Some examples are the Vietcong facilitation of land redistribution and the Taliban’s organization of Islamic courts to handle community disputes.⁵¹

b. Raise the “insurgent” conscientious of the population and help the people understand that change is possible. Mao called this raising the insurgent conscientiousness⁵² and Professor McAdam refers to this as cognitive liberation⁵³ — some oppressed populations have accepted their role in the regime’s social system and do not see the potential for social change that would offer them greater opportunities. This can be defined as a type of fatalism in which the population accepts the unjust behavior of the regime. This can be a significant hurdle for the resistance movement, but through the skilled combination of strategic messaging and actions that establish the resistance movement’s legitimacy, the people will begin to accept that the potential for change is possible. The resistance movement must engineer a “diminution of fatalism coupled with a perception that conditions are unjust, yet subject to change through collective action.”⁵⁴ This is the strategic framing process described in McAdams political-process model.

“The support of the population is an essential element of a successful insurgency; however, support is not simply gaining the sympathy or the hearts and minds of the population. It is imperative that the insurgents move the population to take action.”

government.⁴¹ The Vietcong’s construction of a functioning shadow government that satisfied all the functions of governance is the best documented.⁴² Other examples include the sophisticated governance and social-assistance organizations created by Hezbollah,⁴³ Hamas⁴⁴ and the Tamil Tigers,⁴⁵ all of which led to substantial legitimacy and influence for their parent insurgent organization.

Political Mobilization

The support of the population is an essential element of a successful insurgency; however, support is not simply gaining the sympathy or the hearts and minds of the population. It is imperative that the insurgents move the population to take action. The process of converting inactive individuals into an active organization is mobilization.⁴⁶ This is the core problem for the insurgency “to mobilize the people in a struggle for political control and legitimacy.”⁴⁷

The insurgency must organize the population in order to gain advantage from their support. Thus the process for political mobilization is a) leverage civil vulnerabilities to create collective grievances b) raise the “insurgent” conscientious of the population and c) organize the population.

a. Leverage Civil Vulnerabilities to create collective grievances. Individual problems are not sufficient to mobilize support for the insurgency.⁴⁸ The resistance movement has to identify potential causes (information gained through the civil-reconnaissance process) that can be transformed into collective grievances.⁴⁹ The insurgency

c. Organize the population. An organized population is the tool that will create change in a society. McAdams calls this the mobilizing structure of his political-process model.⁵⁵ Civil vulnerabilities and the creation of strategic frames only create potential, it is the insurgent organization that converts that potential to desired change.⁵⁶ Successful insurgencies leverage existing social groups and expand and synergize existing organizations and networks to create a broad organization. Successful insurgencies such as the Vietcong⁵⁷ and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua⁵⁸ synchronized a variety of social groups to create mass appeal and a strong organization. CA teams can become that “connective tissue” that links disparate social groups together to support the insurgency.

Civil unrest/non-violent protest

Civil unrest and non-violent protest activities can be a valuable tool for the insurgency to pressure the regime. Civil-unrest activities, like all other potential lines of effort for the insurgency, need to be planned and organized to ensure that they are integrated with other lines of effort. Events during the Arab Spring demonstrated the tremendous utility of civil unrest to an insurgency. The regimes in Tunisia and Egypt fell as a result of a mostly non-violent campaign, whereas Libya and Syria are examples of armed conflict with a significant civil-unrest component.⁵⁹ The insurgency will benefit from dedicated advice and assistance of CA advisers in the planning and execution of civil unrest and non-violent protest activities

that can, as part of a coordinated effort, ensure coordinated and sustained pressure on the regime. The use of civil unrest can benefit the insurgency in several ways:

a. Expand the appeal of the movement. Non-violent protests tend to draw in a larger group of recruits who are willing to protest but prefer not to engage in violence or military operations.⁶⁰ Non-violent protest also tends to draw in other social organizations (such as the church) that are willing to support the movement but not violence. A broader base of support for the insurgency increases the pressure on the regime and offers the insurgency a greater chance of success.⁶¹

b. Improve the legitimacy of the resistance and undermine the legitimacy of the regime. Non-violent protests that are made public tend to garner local and international support for the protesters' cause. If the regime uses violence to repress a non-violent protest then the regime loses legitimacy for its over reaction both in the eyes of its own population and the international community.⁶²

c. Create opportunities to fragment the ruling elites. Some ruling elites may be reluctant to use violence to repress a non-violent protester. Non-violent protests can generate an internal disagreement within the ruling elites; some may be willing to compromise with the protesters where as some elites will favor severe repression. This internal fracturing can disrupt the harmony of the elites and offer opportunities for the insurgency to gain supporters within the elites.⁶³

d. Create opportunities to disrupt the regimes system. The regime is ruled by the elites, but the non-elites make the system run: bus drivers, factory workers, donut makers, street sweepers. One worker can be easily replaced but a mass strike or walkout is difficult to manage. Collective action taken by non-elite workers has the potential to severely disrupt the regime and place considerable pressure on the state. Kurt Schock observes, "In any society, the state directly depends on segments of its own populace to rule. If any of these segments, such as military personnel, police officers, administrators or workers in energy supply, transportation, communications, commerce or other key sectors refuse or threaten to refuse to carry out their duties the state's power is significantly undermined."⁶⁴

Conclusion

Unconventional Warfare is a complex and risky political-military endeavor and the U.S. Government has rarely considered UW as a viable policy option to achieve its geopolitical goals. However the risk and rarity of UW does not abrogate the responsibility of all SOF elements to maintain a basic understanding and appropriate capacity for UW. The U.S. support for the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan as a tool to defeat the Taliban in 2001 and the support for insurgent political organizations in Eastern Europe during the Cold War demonstrate the utility of UW. To ensure that SOF CA can play a role in UW campaigns in the future, it must be prepared.

SOF CA must continue to develop appropriate concepts and doctrine for its employment. It must develop appropriate tactics, techniques and procedures for its operational teams and it must develop the campaign design and planning abilities of its planners and leaders. Further, the command must train and educate some portion of SOF CA to ensure it has the ability, understanding and skills to successfully plan and execute a UW campaign as part of a UW JTE. **SW**



HUMAN DOMAIN A Civil Affairs Team listens to the concerns voiced by Afghan villagers. Understanding of the human domain is essential to a successful UW campaign. U.S. Army photo by Spc. Jenny Lui

MAJ Steve Lewis transferred to the Civil Affairs Branch in 2004 and upon completion of the Civil Affairs Qualification Course, regional orientation training and language training was assigned to Bravo Company, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne), where he deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines. Upon completion of his second Philippines deployment Maj. Lewis was assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia in support of Special Operations Command -Pacific. Maj. Lewis completed the Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict Program at the Naval Post Graduate School in Monterey, California and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

MAJ Lewis has commanded Bravo Company, 98th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne) from November 2009 to March 2011 and led the company on two deployments, first to Haiti in support of Operation Unified Response, and second to Central and South America in support of Special Operations Command-South's civil-engagement program. MAJ Lewis served as the 98th Civil Affairs Battalion S3 from April 2011 to September 2012. MAJ Lewis is the CA Division chief for Special Operations Command-South.

Notes

1. Headquarters, United States Army, Field Manual 3-05, *Army Special Operations Forces*, December 2010, 2-1. This document references US Code Title 10 sec 164 & 167
2. *ibid*, 2-1
3. One example is the US policy after the Iranian Revolution in 1979. By 1982 the US Government resigned itself to accepting the Revolutionary Government of Iran and decided instead to develop a covert campaign to alter its behavior not to overthrow the government - see David Crist, *The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2012) 70-71.
4. Unconventional Warfare is a subset of irregular warfare which is broadly defined by JP 1-02 as "A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s)." see Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1-02 Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2001).
5. SOF CA is currently represented by the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) see <http://www.soc.mil/>

6. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-05 *Special Operations Forces*. page 1-4 specifically states that SOF CA has a responsibility to execute unconventional warfare
7. Professor Gordon McCormick, Lecture given as part of Guerilla Warfare Class, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA January 2008
8. The term insurgency is used in the broad sense of a movement which seeks to challenge the state using non traditional methods
9. A thorough UW campaign plan would synchronize all of these factors. See *The Three Circles of War* introduction by Heather Gregg, Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla. (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2010)
10. Headquarters, United States Army, *Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency*, (US Government Printing Office: Washington DC, December 2006), 1-1. *ibid* pg 1-1. Insurgents use all available tools—political (including diplomatic), informational (including appeals to religious, ethnic, or ideological beliefs), military, and economic—to overthrow the existing authority
11. U.S. Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, US Government Counterinsurgency Guide (Washington DC: US Department of State, 2009),6.
12. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1964).
13. Civil vulnerabilities is a term used to represent potential weaknesses with a society that may be exacerbated by non-state actors in order to subvert state order and stability, to build influence and challenge state influence and legitimacy over relevant populations. See current edition of FM 3-57
14. Headquarters, United States Army, *ADRP 3-05 Special Operation*, (US Government Printing Office: Washington DC, August 2012).
15. USASOC fact sheet for the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) found at <http://www.soc.mil/Assorted%20pages/95th%20CAB.html> and at <http://www.soc.mil/UNS/Fact%20Sheets/95CABde%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf>
16. Headquarters, United States Army, *Field Manual 3-57 Civil Affairs Operations*, October 2011 chapter 3
17. Thomas X Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the Twenty-First Century* (St Paul: Zenith Press, 2006) chapter 7.
18. Robert Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province 1960-1964* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1973).
19. Doug Adams, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 11&19. - The authors classify the population as either polity members, challengers or subjects
20. Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 37.
21. *ibid*
22. Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic on Non-violent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). chapter 4
23. Headquarters, United States Army, *Field Manual 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations*, (U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington DC, December 2011), 2-4.
24. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1964), 21.
25. Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of the Black Insurgency, 1930-1970* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 40-43.
26. *Field Manual 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations* list one of the principle task of the SOF CA brigade as "Provide in-depth, operational- and strategic-level research and analysis of civil information and the civil vulnerabilities of indigenous populations by means of an organic research and analysis team."
27. Jeffery Race, *War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).
28. Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren, *The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter-Revolution and the Making of a New Era* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), Chapter 4.
29. The International Crisis Group, *The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks* (Jakarta: crisisgroup.org, 2011) downloaded from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/202-the-communist-insurgency-in-the-philippines-tactics-and-talks.aspx> and interviews with members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines conducted by the author Manila, 2006
30. Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 22.
31. Taken from a lecture given by Dr Fall at the Naval War College in December 1964 and republished in the Naval War College Review, Winter 1998 downloaded at <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/art5-w98.htm>
32. David Kilcullen makes a similar argument and draws upon two other classical counterinsurgent theorist -Thompson and Galula to make the same argument that the winning side is the side that is best at "governing". Kilcullen created his Theory of Competitive Control which states, "the local actor that a given population perceives as most able to establish a normative system for resilient, full spectrum control over violence, economic activity, and human security is most likely to prevail within that populations residential area." Kilcullen, David, *Counterinsurgency*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012 see chapter 5.
33. Mampilly, Zachariah C., *Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governments and Civilian Life During War* (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2011), 116-128.
34. Kurt Schock, *Unarmed Insurrection: People Power Movements in Non democracies*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 150.
35. *ibid*, 149-151
36. Headquarters, United States Army, *Field Manual 3-57, Civil Affairs Operations*, (US Government Printing Office: Washington DC, December 2011), 3-17.
37. The 95th CA BDE (A) maintains partnership programs with several academic institutions focused on efficiency in local government.
38. Zachariah Cheria Mampilly, *Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 236-239.
39. Jeremy M. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (New York: Cambridge, 2007), 163. and Zachariah Cheria Mampilly, *Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 236.
40. LTC Mark Grdovic, *A Leaders Handbook to Unconventional Warfare*, SWCS Pub 09-1 (Fort Bragg: US Army Special Warfare Center and School, November 2009)
41. Headquarters, United States Army, *Training Circular 18-01, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare*, (US Government Printing Office: Washington DC, January 2011), Chapter 3.
42. Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong. The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam* (Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1966).
43. See New York Times article 31 may 2000 at <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/31/world/hezbollah-offers-a-helping-hand-in-southern-lebanon.html>
44. According to the Council of Foreign Relations - "Approximately 90 percent of its work is in social, welfare, cultural, and educational activities," see <http://www.cfr.org/israel/hamas/p8968>
45. Zachariah Cheria Mampilly, *Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).
46. Mobilization is defined as -"The process by which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active participant in public life." John Scott, and Gordon Marshall, *Oxford Dictionary of Sociology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 420.
47. Headquarters, United States Army, *Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency*, (US Government Printing Office: Washington DC, December 2006), 1-8 to 1-10.
48. Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 15.
49. Headquarters, United States Army, *Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency*, (US Government Printing Office: Washington DC, December 2006), 1-10. FM 3-24 calls these "unresolved contradictions" which is the term used by Mao.
50. Galula, David, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, (Praeger Security International, Westport), current printing 2004 original published in 1964. chapter 2. Galula states that the first prerequisite for a successful insurgency is a cause and that this cause should be something that appeals to a large section of the population, it should have longevity and it should be difficult for the regime to address.
51. Kilcullen, David, *Counterinsurgency*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 147-161.
52. Tse-tung Mao, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1961).
53. Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
54. Kurt Schock, *Unarmed Insurrection: People Power Movements in Non democracies*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 27.
55. Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999) Chapter 3.
56. *Ibid.*, 42
57. Nguuyen Van Thieu. "Our Strategy for Guerilla War" in *Guerilla Strategies: A Historical Anthology From The Long March to Afghanistan*, edited by Gerard Chaliand (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982) 314.
58. Thomas X Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the Twenty-First Century* (St Paul: Zenith Press, 2006), chapter 7.
59. Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren, *The Battle for Arab Spring: Revolution, Counter-revolution and the Making of a New Era* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012).
60. Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic on Non-violent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).
61. *Ibid.*, 39 & 46.
62. Kilcullen, David, *Counterinsurgency*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012. 147-161
63. Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic on Non-violent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 46&58.
64. Kurt Schock, *Unarmed Insurrection: People Power Movements in Non democracies*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 53.