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U.S. ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY
SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER AND SCHOOL

MISSION: The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, the U.S. Army’s Special Operations Center of Excellence, trains, educates, develops and manages world-class Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Special Forces warriors and leaders in order to provide the Army Special Operations Forces regiments with professionally trained, highly educated, innovative and adaptive operators.

VISION: Professionalism starts here. We are an adaptive institution characterized by agility, collaboration, accountability and integrity. We promote life-long learning and transformation. We are THE Special Operations Center of Learning whose credibility in producing the world’s finest special operators is recognized and sustained by every single member of our three regiments.
The magazine you are holding in your hand is one of the most popular editions we publish each year. This edition incorporates our 2013 Academic Course Guide with a special edition of *Special Warfare*. In my opinion, this is a publication that should be at the fingertips of every member of our regiments over the next year.

Not only will you find a complete offering of all of the training conducted at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, you will also find the way forward for Army special operations forces as defined by Lieutenant General Charles Cleveland, the commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Together, these two pieces of collateral can help you as a leader or Soldier to chart your path to success.

The training provided by SWCS is among the best in the world. Not only does our training prepare our force for tactical success, it also prepares them for success in the Human Domain. With the Army’s recognition of the Human Domain and the introduction of the 7th Warfighting Function, the importance of the realm in which our force operates has become evident. Over the past several years, we have put a renewed emphasis on unconventional warfare and the associated skills needed to conduct its myriad operations. Looking through the course guide, you will find a number of new courses that further our commitment to excellence in this area of operations.

Our special-operations Soldiers are known for their ability to think out-of-the-box and to take a holistic view when analyzing a problem. For the first time in its 25-year history, *Special Warfare* sponsored an ARSOF Writing Competition. The submissions by members of our regiments were well thought out and showed that our force has a nuanced understanding of its mission and its way ahead. In this issue, you will find the top three papers, as judged by a panel of senior ARSOF officers. Hopefully, you will not be surprised to find that the authors’ vision is in-line with that of LTG Cleveland. It is important to note that these papers were submitted months before LTG Cleveland began writing his ARSOF 2022 vision, which you will also be able to read.

Our regiments have conducted themselves well over the past decade of conflict, and I have no doubt as a force we will continue to do so over the next decade.

Veritas et Libertas

Major General Edward M. Reeder Jr.
This year marks the first iteration of the ARSOF Writing Competition. As a professional-development publication, it is the job of Special Warfare to give the members of our regiments a forum to share their ideas and opinions with their brothers-in-arms. It is also an opportunity for them to challenge ideas and ways of doing things in order to improve our regiments.

When we announced the topic for the 2012 ARSOF Writing Competition, we had no idea that Lt. Gen. Charles Cleveland, commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, would ask that this issue be used to share his vision. This happy coincidence proved that the members of our regiments fully understand the way ahead and have a shared vision for the success of ARSOF. As you read these articles, you will find that they echo the thoughts of Cleveland and support his way forward — even though they were written months before ARSOF 2022 came to fruition.

It is with great pride that we announce the winners of Special Warfare's first ARSOF writing contest. The authors of the winning entries, published on the following pages, will receive cash awards; first place: $1,000; second place: $750; third place: $500. Thank you to everyone who contributed entries to the competition. Keep an eye out in the next issue of Special Warfare for the announcement of the 2013 ARSOF Writing Competition topic. We look forward to seeing even more entries.

2012 Contest Topic

Over the past 11 years, Army Special Operations Forces have become very tactically proficient. Some would say that proficiency has come at a cost of the forces’ language and cultural skills. For ARSOF to successfully fulfill its role in building capacity and shaping the battlefield, the force must maintain a balance in its proficiency to conduct lethal and non-lethal operations.

The last 10 years have shown that while ARSOF’s tactical and technical skills dominate on the battlefield, it is often our skills in the human domain that have the greatest effect. Working in the human domain, ARSOF’s people-centric focus can shape and affect the battlespace.

How do we maintain a healthy balance between the tactical and technical skills needed for lethal operations, while maintaining our unique ability to work in the Human Domain; and how should ARSOF evolve to improve upon its ability to operate in the Human Domain as it looks 15 years from now?

1st Place: Sergeant Hasani Chapman

$1,000 award

Sergeant Hasani Chapman served as a staff logistics supervisor in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2011. From April 2009 until February 2013, Chapman conducted battalion-level logistics as an automated logistical specialist (92A). He currently serves as the stock-control supervisor for the 75th Ranger Regimental Supply Support Activity. Chapman is currently pursuing a Bachelor of Science in Homeland Security.

2nd Place: Master Sergeant Walter Treichel

$750 award

Master Sergeant Walter Treichel is assigned to the Joint Special Operations University. He is in the U.S. Army Reserve.

3rd Place: Chief Warrant 4 (R) William Fingerhut

$500 award

William Fingerhut is an Army civilian instructor at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. He recently retired as a CW4 after 26 years in special operations. Fingerhut began his career in 10th Special Forces Group (A) as an 18D and later as a CWO, assigned at Fort Devens, Mass., 1st Bn. 10th SFG (A) in Germany and Fort Carson, Colo. He was then assigned to Special Operations Command Central and later to the U.S. Army Special Operation Command. Fingerhut served multiple deployments in Iraq, Afghanistan and Southwest Asia.
The topic of the ARSOF Writing question begs an answer to the following question: Who will prevent us from doing what we want at the expense of what is needed and why can’t we do both? The right answer is that we can, we will and we truly must in order to remain an effective military force and deterrent against sub-state actors seeking to globalize any number of local insurgencies. A healthy balance between lethal and non-lethal operations must be sustained by discipline, patience and a very sharp sense of timing. As we are stalking and tracking the enemy across the terrorist Diaspora, our understanding of his motive, morale modus operandi will shape not only the enemy area of operations but our own lethal operations conducted to eliminate his sanctuaries and base areas.

The terrain that our adversaries have chosen to conduct combat and support operations on has ranged from rural, to urban, then mountainous and lately the desert climates of the Middle East. A very serious threat has been identified in the Cyber Domain, with strategic effects that reach beyond OCONUS forces’ military purview. These networked opponents have simultaneously globalized their terrorist agenda and ultra-compartmentalized their individual organizations through the 21st century technological advancements. In true guerilla fashion, they have picked up our weapons and applied them against us on and off the battlefield. In order to counter this asymmetric style of warfare, we must revolutionize our understanding of the battlespace. Necessarily, the lethal operations that are conducted in the physical domain must be, to some degree, supported and reinforced by non-lethal execution in the Human Domain in order to achieve the same success in the Cyber Domain model of the current post-modern terrorist. In the same token, the SIGINT and HUMINT capabilities of our special operations forces are increasingly nullified as the enemy returns to his mountainous and rural roots, essentially moving backwards across the time spectrum of terrorist base operations.

Our tactical skills consist of the practical application of battle drills and individual movement techniques across the battlespace. These are our best force protection tactics, techniques and procedures and offensive endeavors to eliminate the target and bring combat and enemy resistance to a close. We are trained to identify, close with and destroy the enemy. How to best do that is the operational guidance of officers in the Execution paragraph. Tactics affect not only the immediate battlespace, but the operational and sometimes strategic (depending on the political sensitivity) direction of a given campaign. It’s the end state that is given the most concern — and that is right and exact. The technical aspects of special operations forces include service support; all the logistic-, intelligence- and signal-support functions that shape our operations into the spear that kills and captures the enemy with decisive results that resonates through the entire spectrum of operations. The combination of the tactical and technical serve to make SOF operations that much more lethal. The goal isn’t always the perfection of the fighting force, but rather to make fewer mistakes than the enemy. These surgical strike operations are often kill/capture and overwhelmingly have lethal results for the enemy’s individual leadership and their subordinate networks. They are most often associated with direct action, counterterrorism and Ranger-type missions that assault the enemy in their base areas or meeting places and make it a bad day to be a bad guy. In the civilian world, SWAT and FBI Hostage Rescue Teams utilize similar tactics to interdict and disrupt criminal organizations’ plans to shape their own AOs. But is there a Human Domain to these operations? A subset of skills needed to successfully execute these often high profile missions?

At first glance, tactical skills seem universal to the end state of any such mission. But what if your mission involves advising and encouraging a host-nation ally or indigenous force to conduct these operations? Increasingly, SOF forces are required to conduct foreign internal defense and in specific instances, unconventional warfare to acquire mission success. In the realm of special warfare, we identify the need for sustaining and improving the language and cultural skills that are serving our SOF forces in non-permissive, denied and hostile AOs around the globe. A rudimentary understanding of the friendly force’s culture and language is basic to the task of having him understand why cleaning his weapon is essential to combat operations and what the elements of an assault squad do upon contact with the enemy. When dealing with a warrior culture attempting to survive a technological onslaught, how do we prove our very presence is less of a threat than the enemy? And how is the threat of our presence mitigated by the military prowess for which our SOF warriors are known? These questions are answered in the Human Domain by SOF professionals who are trained for both lethal combat engagements and to navigate the human terrain leading to the target.

Are we actually working in the Human Domain? And if so, is our work there unique? Some are of the opinion that soft powers associated with shaping operations are only a means to an end as far as direct action operations are concerned. Others may contend that the raw intelligence and insight acquired by these direct actions are the ends themselves. If our goal is to have an independent combat-intelligence cycle without restricting either capacity, there must be a balance between the honor of attending the loya jirga and the courage of leading the loya jirga’s forces into lethal combat. I offer that we are, in fact, working in the Human Domain of the Global War on Terrorism. But like the human IQ, the results of this work are sometimes intangible and have a cumulative effect on the battlespace rather than an immediate and decisive action. It’s hard to do an assessment on the tactical advantages of an SF tribal engagement team much less forecast second and third order effects of
this kind of deployment. Nevertheless, we must learn to modify our assessments and change our parameters in forecasting events if our work in the Human Domain is to be efficient, effective and relative in comparison with conventional forces and our own tendencies toward the immediate gratification of lethal operations. As we are training foreign militaries in the fundamentals of special operations and re-opening the qualification course to other nations’ officers and NCOs, our own skill set must remain unique and effective against enemies near and far.

In order to put into effect this Military Revolution in Human Affairs, we must accept that there is indeed a need for an evolution. With this acceptance comes acknowledgement that there are barriers to change and improvement; institutional, emotional, psychological even financial. ARSOF will evolve for the better as necessary, but hopefully without the negative reinforcement that all too often precedes miraculous changes in long-standing institutions. The positive evolution of our thoughts into action must necessarily be command initiated, regulated and emphasized. If commanding officers think it’s important to have Soldiers learn and put into practice the skills involved in navigating the human terrain, then NCOs will enforce their efforts. If training in the Human Domain is a part of the mission-essential task list, then it will be accomplished.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan theater was, at its onset, a Human Domain of operations. For all of the bombs that were dropped on Taliban targets in the beginning stages of the war when targets were plentiful, it was the rapport built by Special Forces operational detachments-alpha and other government agency liaison units with Northern Alliance leaders that identified Taliban front lines and negotiated for the release of hostages trapped behind enemy lines. The initial collapse of the Taliban as a political force in Afghanistan was entirely the result of operations in the Human Domain. The current resurgence in the skills necessary for that kind of tactical-political warfare is evidence of the continued need and improved curriculum that addresses the realm of warfare involving human interaction, tactical-strategic communication and interpersonal understanding. We are working in the Human Domain and working well, but we must continue to exercise our people-centric focus in order to remain flexible and ready for a similar future engagement. As our national defense posture shifts to counter emerging threats, our assessments should take into account what truly works and where it works, along with what doesn’t. As has been noted by warriors from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz, prolonged contact with the enemy exposes our TTPs and eventually reveals our battle rhythm, an army’s combat signature once identified, can be effectively countered. This is the deadly dance that confounds long-standing armies as they struggle to win against an enemy that only has not to lose.

In contrast, at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom it appeared to be a strictly direct-action campaign. There were Human Domain assets that provided much needed intelligence, shaping operations and
target analysis prior to the invasion, but our intention was to remove Saddam Hussein from power and defeat the Iraqi army as a necessary prelude. This fight was largely conventional from the outset with the familiar “Shock & Awe” signature; precision-targeted air strikes against pre-established conventional military targets and actual tank battles where superior U.S. fire and maneuver eliminated the Iraqi armored threat within weeks. Even Hussein’s elite forces could not effectively defend against a numerically and tactically superior opponent as Iraqi regular army troops surrendered by the hundreds. Indeed, as Hussein exposed his own people to lethal chemical and biological agents, he himself ended up on the receiving end of a very lethal form of justice by the very same people he once terrified. In the end bullies always get what they deserve. Despite these heroic deeds by SOF while conducting lethal operations in furtherance of clear and concise mission set, our inability to simultaneously conduct a Human Domain campaign in Afghanistan and a direct-action campaign in Iraq led to the slow degradation of SOF’s initial successes in both theatres. Taking nothing away from our lethal capabilities, this degradation is made transparent by the current administration’s reluctance in sustaining counterinsurgency as a viable option in our military’s tool box. This decision may well be influenced by public opinion. Most Americans still like our wars short and sweet a la Kuwait; rather than protracted and media-driven a la Vietnam. We say we want to see a good fight but what we really want is a 1st round knock-out a la Mike Tyson. The institutional differences between conducting these separate types of operations could not be reconciled before Afghanistan became what it is today and Iraq became the modern-day COIN lethal-learning laboratory. The successful evolution of ARSOF will harmonize the elements of lethal operations and the Human Domain skill set in order to eliminate inconsistencies and distractions that take away from our hard-earned victories in both areas of SOF operations. This new and latest Military Revolution in Human Affairs will negate mission creep and ambiguity by reevaluating specific unit missions and providing better mission allocation based on an end-state analysis that takes into account the shaping operations of the Human Domain and the precision targeting of our lethal operators.

For a historical reference of the detrimental results in underestimation and misallocation of Human Domain assets in combat operations, I have examined three instances of the negative and tragic consequences that are the inevitable result. In Vietnam, the village defense of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group under Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support was supplanted by border surveillance and interdiction missions that did not take into account the culture of the Vietnamese people. Large swaths of villagers were relocated into strategic hamlets that were meant to separate the enemy from the people but only served to separate the people from their ancestral homelands. With no loyalty or allegiance to their new digs, morale suffered and resulted in an unwillingness to conduct effective combat operations against an enemy who sometimes promised to return them to their traditional lands. In other parts of the world, people are connected to the earth in a way that we as Americans are not, most of our
forefathers being settlers or refugees or even ambitious entrepreneurs who sought out new lands for better economic opportunities. This is basic to understanding an indigenous culture where their ancestors have lived on the same land for hundreds if not thousands of years while America’s birthday is only July 4, 1776. In El Salvador the so-called hunter-killer teams and assassination squads, even if they were just rumor, served to alienate the population from the government and ally them with the guerrilla faction. When your brother or cousin or mother or father is one of the guerrillas with whatever revolutionary agenda, it’s hard to be for someone who you think is hunting them down never mind against the actual guerrilla force. The U.S. mission was better served by the professional conduct and example of SF teams that revolutionized the El Salvadoran military and police force. This example of the power and effectiveness of human-relations in advising combat forces permeated through SF ranks and reinvigorated the cause of FID and UW as core tasks of ARSOF. Revisiting the Afghanistan campaign, I identified the success of the Office of Strategic Services model coupling intelligence-gathering liaison teams with operational groups in order to synthesize the best combat force to deal with the numerically superior and better armed Taliban. Contrast this with our current political difficulties with high-value targeting and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance profiling and it seems hard to propose the best is yet to come in Afghanistan. These are just a few observations that may help to spark the political and military minds to give a closer look at the benefit of improved training and emphasis in the Human Domain of special operations.

Fifteen years from now we may be actualizing our current defense realignment towards the Asia-Pacific theater. Anyone who has done an area study of the Pacific Rim and Southeast Asian areas of operation knows that the people who live in that part of the world are almost completely homogenous. It goes without saying that a vital part of any campaign strategy in that theater will involve a robust Human Domain element. Their culture is nearly opaque because of this homogeneity and we must learn sooner rather than later to incorporate the human elements of campaign strategy in our endeavors in the Pacific.

As I wrote earlier, my belief is that countering these future threats and developing appropriate contingencies will rest on the shoulders of our SOF leadership. The officers and senior NCOs will make training in the human factors of warfighting a necessary part of not only pre-deployment training, but a sustained unit-training priority. In order for this to happen, our officers and NCOs must support this kind of professional development. It must be natural to conceive the Human Domain of combat operations as integral to its corresponding lethality. This necessitates a change in our military culture like breaking that wall in physical training or that epiphany in academic study that allows a whole new set of questions and answers to challenge our curiosity. Strong, performance-based commitment reduces institutional resistance at the same time that it increases the operational endurance of the unit. This leads to a healthy blend of the lethal skills that allow the U.S. to execute kill/capture missions and those skills that allow us to identify which door to kick in. Sometimes we may even be able to negate the direct action itself or at the very least delegate it to indigenous forces through exercising our newfound and newly appreciated skill set in the Human Domain of special operation.

Each day, month and year we spend in neglect of our human assets in the defense of our great nation is the same time multiplied by our reluctance to do what we ought to do in favor of what we want to do. Let us not wait for the inevitable negative reinforcement of military defeat or strategic stalemate in order to begin to appreciate and nurture the people-centric tools of ARSOF. Instead, let’s lean forward and be proactive in engaging discussion about the pros and cons of an increased awareness of the Human Domain. Discussion is the beginning of awareness and awareness is the end of ignorance. Not knowing the law is not as bad as not wanting to know. And in the international court of warfare we must be proficient actors on the world stage as well as skilled prosecutors of the law. After all, the highest form of warfare is to be able to defeat your enemy without fighting at all. SW

“"The successful evolution of ARSOF will harmonize the elements of lethal operations and the human domain skill set in order to eliminate inconsistencies and distractions that take away from our hard-earned victories in both areas of SOF operations.”

Notes
This essay was inspired by the writings and personal examples of:

1. Admiral Eric T. Olson; Tip of The Spear, Jan 2010
2. Special Forces Advisor; Training Circular
3. Seven Pillars of Wisdom; T.E. Lawrence
4. Subversion, Counter-Subversion and the Campaign against terrorism in Europe; David J. Killcullen
Change of Command
November 10, 2028
Fort Bragg, N.C.
Special Forces Command
Commanding General Hubert Laski

“Good afternoon:

Thank you all for attending. It might seem odd for a change of command to occur in the middle of the night, but it turns out that most of the participants aren’t shaking out the cobwebs and reaching for one more cup of coffee like I am. That is a result of so many of our Soldiers living and working in other time zones besides Eastern Standard. In fact, as you look around at who is in attendance, mostly virtual, you will see Soldiers from six continents, 87 countries, seven UN-administered areas, two contested areas and a war zone. More importantly, with a few exceptions, these Soldiers are not on temporary duty. They are living and working in these diverse areas as a critical forward element of our military. And it is not only these Soldiers, but in many cases, it is their families as well. This forward posture has been decades in the making and represents the fulfillment of a vision stretching back to the earliest days of Special Forces to World War II.

Almost 90 years ago, William “Wild Bill” Donovan had a vision to establish, train, resource and lead a force to provide intelligence and conduct unconventional operations around the world in support of U.S. strategic goals. Believing that doing the same things in the same manner and expecting different results was the road to failure, he struck out to design, train and employ a force that could operate anywhere, with limited resources, communication and direction. With the war bureaucracy sucking up every able-bodied American into conventional war organizations, Donovan sought different people. He found some of them already serving in the military, but with additional skills he could put to use. He recruited paratroopers whose first language was not English. He found skills on Wall Street, in law firms and on college campuses. Notably, he did not just recruit men, but women as well. The Office of Strategic Services, led by Donovan for its entire existence, provided a force of small, highly trained and motivated teams, with language and cultural acumen and a unique ability to lead in ambiguous circumstances. Sound like anybody you know?

These teams conducted unconventional warfare, trained and led partisan units, conducted commando raids and reconnaissance in support of the conventional military in the European and Far East theaters. General Donovan’s vision was so clear and the operations so successful that the vision lived on even though the OSS was disbanded.

The first descendant of the OSS was the CIA, which took over the intelligence and some of the paramilitary operations from the OSS, leaving the large unconventional-warfare realm just waiting for someone to pick it up. Maj. Gen. Robert McClure saw the need and opportunity and recruited, among others, Col. Aaron Bank to develop this capability. Bank’s goal was to create a special force with UW as its mission. This began in June 1952 with eight Soldiers standing in formation. The creation of Special Forces occurred in an environment characterized by little institutional understanding and funding, no organization or doctrine and no appetite for anything new or different. The remedy to this was to take the hard-won doctrine, training and experience from the OSS and incorporate it into Special Forces. It is entirely appropriate and predictable that the father of Special Forces began his military career with the OSS.

In the intervening years, Special Forces grew and contracted and grew again when the nation needed the skills we provided. After 9/11 we saw much growth and success and became a victim of that success. The missions were plentiful; but they began to move us away from our core of UW. We were a force that was high tech, lethal and authorized to act in a unilateral manner. This was most evident in Afghanistan as we ignored the lack of trust between ourselves and the Afghans. We were forced to learn that painful lesson again. Nothing good happens outside of relationships and no relationship exists without trust. We continued to convince ourselves that the unilateral action didn’t make us look like invaders and colonizers, but by the time we decided to pay attention, it was beyond repair. We were seduced by the ability to police the world. Our technology was so advanced that the answer to the question, “Can we do this?” was usually “Yes.” The question we realized we had to ask first was “Is this the only way to accomplish the mission?” to which the answer was almost always “No.”

This problem was recognized within our community and addressed within the U.S. Special Operations Command Pub 1, which stated that successful special operations depend on “long-term relationships with indigenous forces and populations and knowledge of the cultural, societal, economic and political environments in which they occur.” This reorientation of SF toward indirect action began almost 20 years ago. The units you see before you are a result of that effort. It would be easy, and incorrect, to look back and see a straight line of problems and solutions that bring us to today. At each decision point large and small, it took committed individuals and leaders with courage to see the road and maintain the direction. I can take credit for none of it.

So, what has changed in the last 20 years? What hasn’t?

The doctrinal changes were the most difficult to enact. The first hurdle was finding a way to get our Soldiers out of CONUS and into every possible country around the world. TDY was rarely a problem, but actually moving Soldiers and in many cases their families, was a Herculean effort that supported long-term engagement better than
multiple temporary visits. This effort was helped along by Sequestration II in 2017. This was viewed as a low-cost solution and we were prepared to embrace it.

The second hurdle could have been the most detrimental to the survival of SF had it been done without a lot of thought and planning. This became known as the white/black split and finally became official six years ago. We discovered as we began moving our Soldiers out into the world and away from CONUS, our reception by the host nation was generally positive and remained that way right up until our government would act in a unilateral fashion. This could be a drone attack, a direct-action mission or anything seen as usurping host-nation sovereignty. It was difficult, if not impossible to explain to our hosts that yes, we were part of the unit that just conducted that mission, but we didn’t know about it and they should still continue to trust us. Acting unilaterally is inherently distrustful. Finding, fixing and finishing looks no different done by white or black, but it looks completely different to the sovereign nation where it occurs. Our decisions to act unilaterally meant that the end justified the means. This may or may not be true, but we had trouble figuring out what the end was. Is it a terrorist network disrupted, a single event that resolves very little over the long run, or is it partnership strengthened that can accomplish the disruption and more? We used to live in a world run on SIPR, no foreign and compartmentalization. It is still around, mostly because it is hard to actually get rid of anything. However, our communications are mostly in the For Official Use Only, and in most cases, we operate at our partner’s level and on their networks. This has involved risk and has not been without consequences. The consequences have been worth the level of trust we have built and continue to maintain with our partners.

Our training pipeline has morphed along with our force. The cultural knowledge and language skills we needed to field this force would have overwhelmed our training and education and taken years from recruitment to qualified Soldiers. Instead, we looked at the past and learned a few lessons from the OSS and the earliest days of SF. Identify the talents you need, find people that already have most of them and recruit them. The OSS found success on college campuses, not with the students, but the professors. They went to Wall Street and the corporate world. The Lodge Bill allowed foreign nationals to serve in the military and then receive their citizenship within two years. The new Lodge Act, signed into law four years ago has allowed us to find skill sets and people that would otherwise not be available to us. The training requirements shift quite a bit when the language and cultural piece is already in place. So we have become the best place to develop physical and technical skills. It began with the Human Performance Initiative and has progressed to the point that no matter what level of fitness is present; we can provide a physically fit, skilled warrior in 12 months.

Standing with me today are five foreign nationals wearing U.S. Army uniforms and SF Tabs. In their past lives, they were a cab driver, dental hygienist, kindergarten teacher, community organizer and a semi-professional soccer player. In addition to the new Lodge Act, we have expanded the concept of KATUSA’s. The Korean Augmentation to the United States Army allows for foreign nationals to serve as a part of U.S. Army units. We have started to offer this program in 12 countries and the initial reports are posi-
This augmentation provides increased manpower for our smaller teams and might include a path to service within SF. It is not a solution for use everywhere but we have shown our willingness to try different things to meet the needs of our teams.

SF has always prided itself on its ability to work in austere conditions and not immediately begin building permanent facilities. This, more than anything, sets us apart from our conventional brothers and sisters. It seems that when they aren’t sure what to do, building some American-centric infrastructure seems to be the first thing on the to-do list. This is always expensive, sometimes completed and rarely what is actually needed.

About 10 years ago, an informal contest began between some of our teams, which revolved around who had the smallest footprint. The award became known as the Peg Leg Award. It was formalized in the last couple of years and has allowed for a high degree of creativity in ways to keep extraneous equipment, buildings and supplies from taking up resources better spent on mission accomplishment. We realized that mission focus can be enhanced when resources are lacking.

Our initial assessment and selection has found a new focus as well. In the past we looked for physical prowess and an ability to work under pressure. This in turn became our biggest barrier to recruiting outside of what had become our standard; finding young, motivated males serving within the Army with an interest to see if they have what it takes. This was a deficient process and was so stringent that had Col. Bank tried to volunteer he would have been passed over. Turns out he was 40-years-old before he made it into the OSS. We have instead turned the assessment process into looking for those characteristics necessary for our mission and difficult to train; maturity, empathy, an ability to build relationships and operating in unfamiliar regions in a non-judgmental fashion.

Lastly, I would like to address our female SF Soldiers. There were many who deeply believed that females did not belong in SF. The cultural change that was required was foundational. As I have mentioned before, we have rarely traveled on new ground. The OSS found qualified people to meet the mission and did not begin with a men-only club. For years we used physical qualities as a barrier. When that was shown to be ineffective, we resorted to other barriers such as how they would be viewed in the host nations. What we missed was an opportunity. Our country usually views foreign and domestic policy as two unconnected realms. This might have been a reality in the distant past, but since the end of World War II, the rest of the world has looked to the United States and observed not only our foreign policy but also how we act within our own borders. During our country’s struggle with racial reconciliation, there was little concern for what the rest of the world thought. It was seen as a domestic issue with a very local focus. But when you talk of liberty and freedom from oppression and human rights and self determination with regard to foreign policy, those concepts are compared to how we live at home. SF has always set and maintained the highest standards and our integration of females has made us a better and more representative force.

If Col. Bank walked into this formation, he would not be surprised by our people, training or posture, although he might wonder why it took us so long to get here."
Over the past several years, Army special-operations forces have learned a number of lessons and have recognized that:

"Army Special Operations Forces have become tactically proficient. Some would say that this proficiency has come at a cost of the forces' language and cultural skills. For ARSOF to successfully fulfill its role in building capacity and shaping the battlefield, the force must maintain a balance in its proficiency to conduct lethal and non-lethal operations. While ARSOF's tactical and technical skills dominate the battlefield, it is often its skills in the Human Domain that have the greatest effect."

The question posed to the community is this: "How do we maintain a healthy balance between the tactical and technical skills needed for lethal operations while maintaining our unique ability to work in the Human Domain?"

The answer to this question is a return to an emphasis on our core foundation, Unconventional Warfare, and recognition of the fact that the broad capabilities provided through training and exercise of the UW model and skill set offer solutions to a host of operational problems across hybrid operational environments.

The ability to constantly and consistently work and train in the core capabilities of UW is the key to maintaining the proper and required mix of lethal/technical and human-terrain operational capabilities needed in changing environments.

The development of human infrastructure is elemental in all stages of UW. The human terrain skills for mapping, developing and building the human infrastructure executed through seasoned, experienced UW operators with cultural, political, economic and social understanding of their target human environments, are essential in the successful conduct of UW. It is a combination of expertise and experience that may be applied in various other operational environments to great effect. This capability may help resolve a conflict prior to the onset of hostilities or at the least provide ground commanders with various operational and tactical options based on this human development if conflict begins. The successful employment of UW may facilitate a more positive outcome following conflict.

This complex capability has driven ARSOF success in numerous operations historically. In Bosnia, Kosovo and numerous other activities around the globe, ARSOF operators have conducted or facilitated successful operations based on these skills. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated the tremendous potential of the UW capability. Our successful targeting operations are often a more narrow view of working in the Human Domain, while ARSOF actions in the Anbar Awakening, Afghan village-stability operations and other similar efforts highlight the broader potential of the UW capability in the Human Domain.

The model for success is identified: Return to our core capability by focusing on UW in every Special Forces Group. The method for that return—applying the right mix of tactical, technical and human-terrain skills requires rededication to an old operational model and the employment of new planning/training applications.

During the 1980s and 1990s, the 10th Special Forces Group continually emphasized UW capability and operations in its training. Annual training was most often geared to developing insurgency infrastructure, working with indigenous populations, training of insurgents and advanced special-operations training for all operators. Teams from the 10th SF Group were focused on specific regions or countries, studied language, culture and politics of the area of focus. Training and missions in the area of focus were exercised yearly and plans briefed to battalion and group commanders.

In recent years, operational requirements and command emphasis have caused our community to stray from this model of a regional or country focus. Every Special Forces Group must return to this model and every team given a dedicated focus area, if not already assigned. Resources should be provided for training in language, culture, politics, society, economics and current events. Every training exercise within the operational groups should be UW-focused.

The U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School should consider offering mobile training teams to refresh the teams’ UW knowledge and skill, while the operational groups should self-refresh and train in insurgency structure, components and development, as well as other UW-related topics.

The SF operational planning formats should add an annex for UW planning. UW planning should be the norm for all the SF groups and all deploying elements. The main emphasis of this UW planning should be a thorough understanding and evaluation of the given human terrain and its dynamics. Further, each deploying group should create plans for the development of the human terrain using the UW insurgency model to further/reach a designated end-state. Prior to deployment these plans should be tested in pre-deployment training.

It has often been said that if you train for and become proficient in an UW skill-set, you will become proficient in the conduct of all SF core missions. Every UW training event or exercise will present numerous opportunities for tactical and technical training. Nothing will be lost to the groups through a renewed focus on UW; rather the regimental rededication to UW planning and training will strengthen, develop and maintain ARSOF’s ability to navigate and operate effectively in the human terrain in any environment.

A second question posed to the ARSOF community is:

"How should ARSOF evolve to improve upon its ability to operate in the Human Domain as it looks 15 years from now?"

The answer, (assuming a full rededication to UW already implemented) is twofold:

1. Immediately embrace and integrate the development and utilization of operational technologies. This is defined as those types of technology that allow ARSOF operators to understand, monitor, navigate, develop and operate in the Human Domain, as well as those that can effectively support ARSOF core missions in the Human Domain.
2. Immediately develop and execute plans for full integration of ARSOF operations within the Cyber Domain.

New and developing technology presents a tremendous opportunity for Special Forces to gain great advantage in developing and ambiguous operational environments all over the globe. Technology extends reach and vision for the operator and allows eyes, ears and actions in denied or contested areas. Technological eyes, ears and actions act as an additional force multiplier, used by Special Forces operators who are themselves force multipliers.

The Cyber Domain offers the same opportunity for ARSOF operators to extend their reach, vision and impact on the operational environment. An ARSOF cyber capability would present a tremendous opportunity and advantage to trained ARSOF operators in the conduct of core Special Forces missions. The cyber arena is open to the world through social media, e-mail and other Internet-based communications, which presents a new environment for interaction with and intervention in populations that may be otherwise out of reach.

A myriad of new technologies is under development each year and the Cyber Domain is expanding by leaps and bounds. In a time of constrained budget, limited footprints and operational constraints, it is important to consider how the lightening pace of cyber expansion can be harnessed to support ARSOF operators.

At my Special Forces graduation, the featured speaker, the SWCS commander, identified the difference between the rest of the U.S. Armed Forces and the Special Forces community. He stated that “in the regular military, the man is an extension of the weapons system, but in Special Forces, the weapons system is an extension of the man …”

The broader meaning behind this insight is that weapons and equipment, technologies and the use of the Cyber Domain must be adapted to the ARSOF operator, to extend his reach, his vision, his voice and action. The operator must control the system or activity. He must be able to modify and adjust effects. The system is available when, where and how it is required to support evolving and time-sensitive ARSOF operations. These capabilities must be provided by the operator to indigenous personnel, at the time, place, manner and form chosen by the operator.

**Operational Technologies**

Every technological advantage should be explored and exploited by ARSOF. New technology will enhance, not inhibit special operations, as long as the old adage of weapons systems being an extension of the man is applied to new operational technologies. Operational technologies provide the opportunity to monitor the human terrain, as well as to vet and evaluate the veracity of specific indigenous personnel. If utilized correctly, operational technologies may be the primary methods of communication with indigenous populations by ARSOF operators.

This is a critical juncture for ARSOF. Since 9/11 the community has partnered and embedded itself with other government agencies and larger, more complex systems of weapons, communications, logistics and operational technologies. This has been advantageous for our forces in forward operating environments. Some SOF organizations have become enamored with these capable but large and complex systems. Partnerships with these agencies brings additional requirements, constraints, restrictions and layers of approval for use, not always friendly to our unique ARSOF operational environments.

The requirements for development and employment of successful and effective operational technologies for ARSOF operations are:

- The development of an organic technology capability within ARSOF operational units.
- Technology and its effects are controlled by ARSOF operators or operational units.
- Technology must be man portable.
- The capability must be available on demand.
- The capabilities must be tailored to different operational environments and populations.
- Specific equipment must often be innocuous, concealed and or dual use.
- The capabilities require trained ARSOF operators at the operational level.
- The expertise in the capabilities must be sustainable.
- Some forms of operational technologies must be transferrable by operators to selected indigenous personnel.
- New developments in operational technology must be fast tracked to operators as they are developed.
- The operational technologies must be cost effective.

Challenges to fully use and exploit modern operational technologies are first and foremost the cost of the systems and the operational expertise required to fully utilize operational technologies, both current and developing, in an effective and time-sensitive manner.

Current resourcing within the military follows either a commodities or sustainment-based model, both ill-suited to fast developing new technologies suitable for operational use. Commodities-based programs may purchase any current products identified as a legitimate requirement, but do not allow for maintenance of an inventory for operational deployment and training. A sustainment-based program will maintain a troops, organization and equipment inventory suitable for deployment and training, but will normally not be nimble enough to inject new and developing technologies as required in multiple environments and modern fast-moving battlefields.

A hybrid-funding system must be developed that provides the ability to purchase
new advances in technology immediately for operators and yet provides a sustainment capability for a basic load of operational technology with which to deploy and train. In the realm of new and developing technologies, a new funding strategy is a necessity and will become a larger requirement as time goes on.

Development of tech support detachments must be accelerated and fully implemented at all Special Forces groups. This must become a regimental priority in order to maintain the technology inventory and maintain technology skills gained from past schoolhouse training and operational experience. Seasoned ex-Special Forces operators should be hired as technical specialists within the tech detachment in support of training tech skills to maintain the skill set and knowledge base within the force, as well as supporting operations as required.

Providing the machinery and training to construct basic technical devices and environmentally harden those devices would provide long-term cost savings. Many circuits, transmitters and GPS devices can be purchased commercially at very cost effective prices, and provide considerable tactical support. Former Special Forces operators trained in technical modifications as well as active duty Special Forces operators can cost effectively provide capability to the force organically. Maintaining one to two former ARSOF operators as trained machinists able to build, modify and harden different technical capabilities is a must.

Developing a new military occupational specialty as an addition to a Special Forces detachment-alpha to deal with technology is imperative. Former SWCS commander, Maj. Gen. Bennet Sacolick, had discussed the idea of an additional MOS, a new MOS 18 GULF or 18 Gadget. The time has come to incorporate this idea into the SF A-team concept in order for Special Forces to effectively employ new technologies and exploit opportunities for technical support of operations in a time effective manner. At the detachment level, an 18G provides the cross training and refresher training needed to maintain operational proficiency and level of knowledge within the detachment. The 18G would be the primary technology planner and integrator for all operations and training. The 18G, in theory, would provide refresher training and training support from the tech-support detachment.

**ARSOF Cyberspace development**

Cyber operational possibilities are limitless for ARSOF operators. Doctrine regarding ARSOF’s use of the Cyber Domain must be quickly and efficiently developed in order to exploit its advantages. ARSOF movement and activities previously conducted on land, sea and in the air must be adapted to movement and action in the Cyber Domain. All of the UW human-terrain skill sets will apply in the Cyber Domain, but must be adapted to a new, dynamic environment. New innovative operational tactics, techniques and procedures must
be devised for ARSOF cyber operations. Technology has given birth to a cyber-savvy generation and almost everywhere communication devices are available, the Internet is available. The ability to interact at lightening speed with specific populations within the Human Domain to generate sought after effects is immediate.

ARSOF must embrace the concept of weapons systems as an extension of the operator while working in the Cyber Domain, which will extend our vision, understanding, communications, actions and reach. Tools used and cyber TTPs must reflect language, cultural and societal considerations of the population with whom the operator is interacting, communicating and affecting. ARSOF Cyber capability must be responsive to the evolving operational conditions and time-sensitive actions in order to be effective.

The requirements for development and employment of successful and effective ARSOF Cyber operations are:

- Establish ARSOF requirements for operations in the Cyber Domain.
- Develop ARSOF cyber doctrine and operational guidance.
- Begin training of ARSOF cyber operators for each SF group.
- Develop and stand up ARSOF cyber-support and command elements throughout ARSOF units and headquarters.
- ARSOF cyber capability will require all ARSOF operators to acquire basic cyber operational-movement skills.
- Because of the capability inherent in the Cyber Domain, ARSOF cyber operations must be coordinated and integrated fully with other organizations and commands.
- Develop and stand up of coordination and integration mechanisms between ARSOF and all appropriate organizations and commands.
- Utilize SWCS to fully examine application of current UW skill sets and doctrinal guidance within the Cyber Domain.
- ARSOF tools and TTPs must reflect the cyber environment in which we will operate and the Human Domain with which we will interact.
- The expertise in the capabilities must be sustainable.
- Some forms of ARSOF cyber capability must be transferrable.
- Based on the nature of ARSOF operations and targets, cyber capability must be time sensitive and on demand.

ARSOF has slowly re-learned the necessity of integrated operational and intelligence capabilities for maximum effectiveness; now it must employ that lesson to properly integrate operational experience and cyber expertise for maximum affect as well. Proper integration will require ARSOF operators with additional training in cyber skills working with other skilled cyber personnel to insure proper and effective support to ARSOF operations.

Based on the very nature of ARSOF operations, time sensitive and on-demand cyber capability will require execution at some level within ARSOF.

There is a requirement to provide every ARSOF operator with cyber access on a daily basis, as well as focus on the cultural aspects of the human terrain within social media, threat awareness and operational applications. At the detachment level, an ARSOF operator is not required to be a cyber expert, but he must be skilled enough to move through cyber space undetected, offering a low signature and possessing the requisite skills with basic programs and commands to execute basic tasks as directed by skilled ARSOF cyber operators. He must understand and employ solid basic cyber operational-security measures. He must understand, identify and avoid if possible cyber threats. ARSOF must expand infrastructure and computer capability to fully equip the force in order to operate effectively in this new domain.

SWCS must begin development of ARSOF cyber doctrine and guidance, while utilizing the current UW training and guidance to evaluate application of new tactics, techniques and procedures for cyber operations.

New positions for civilian GS employees integrated into ARSOF cyber elements will help provide needed expertise in cyber capability and skills, as well as provide continuity of capability throughout the force.

Utilization of new technology and operations within the Cyber Domain may dominate warfare in the future. A single enemy, equipped with relatively inexpensive computer equipment but provided proper skills might bring large military units to their knees through a few computer keystrokes. Immediate communication and interaction is possible with millions of people through social media, which includes the ability to influence thought and action. New technology and the Cyber Domain will make denied areas of the world accessible, and formerly controlled populations no longer kept in silence. The advantages gained by incorporation of ARSOF Human Domain UW skills with modern technology and use of the Cyber Domain will provide dominance far into the future. Our ability to quickly but wisely embrace and use these new capabilities, to effectively navigate through this new frontier will determine if the weapon remains an extension of the man or the man becomes an extension of the weapon.
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Official distribution is limited to active and reserve special operations units.

By order of the Secretary of the Army:
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1308506
Headquarters, Department of the Army
The relevance of Army Special Operations Forces has never been greater than it is today. As a force, we are the cornerstone of the joint forces fighting our nation’s wars — maintaining alliances, building partner-nation capacity, developing surrogate capabilities and conducting multilateral or unilateral special operations with absolute precision. As long as belligerent nations and non-state actors continue to employ nonconventional means against the United States and its allies, and terrorist networks continue their efforts to strike at our homeland and interests abroad, ARSOF will remain an indispensable partner to the joint and interagency team.

While our success over the past decade of conflict highlights our relevance, both in and out of declared theaters of war, we cannot afford to become complacent or maintain the status quo. As a force, we must continuously learn, anticipate and evolve in order to defeat an adaptive enemy and the uncertain threats of the 21st century. Without question, over the next decade, we will face complex challenges that will test the mettle of our force. To ensure that we can find, fix and finish tomorrow’s enemy, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command is moving forward with a deliberate plan, ARSOF 2022, to recover and revitalize our force.

ARSOF 2022 is a blueprint for change. It describes precepts and imperatives that will enable ARSOF to thrive in a future operating environment that is characterized by uncertainty. The first half of the document provides the intellectual framework for the ARSOF 2022 vision, including a synopsis of the envisioned future operating environment and strategic guidance. Building on these external drivers, the document describes a maturation of foundational precepts including SOF Operational Art, the Human Domain, the 7th Warfighting Function, Special Warfare and Surgical Strike, while also defining the six enabling concepts that provide the framework to achieve the ARSOF 2022 vision.

In the coming decade, ARSOF will be called upon to provide balanced and fully integrated special operations capabilities to the nation. Our force must maintain its high degree of professionalism complemented by cutting-edge training, world-class education and the balanced use of state-of-the-art and indigenous equipment. Our formations must be organized, postured and networked in a manner that enables them to anticipate and prevent or rapidly respond to regional contingencies or threats to the stability of our allies.

Ultimately, we must provide senior decision makers with innovative ideas and viable options to better defend our homeland and achieve our national-security objectives. It is my intention that this document will serve as the azimuth to move ARSOF forward.

CHARLES T. CLEVELAND
LIEUTENANT GENERAL, USA
COMMANING
Future Operating Environment. As we project beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, we will face a challenging security environment. We are not returning to a pre-9/11 era of operations nor the Cold War-era where competing superpowers created a fairly predictable, if tenuous, world order. Instead, this new world will be characterized by an irregular balance of power between both state and non-state actors. It will present a dynamic operating environment that is characterized by uncertainty. The shift in the nation’s tolerance away from large-scale joint operations, coupled with the complexity of the future operating environment, create a growing gap between national action and inaction – this changing dynamic could give our adversaries broader freedom of action and encourage increased instability. The reality of this changing paradigm requires USASOC and the U.S. Special Operations Command to build new strategic options for the nation.

Future threats will range from standing conventional and unconventional forces to irregular militias and paramilitaries to terrorist groups, criminal elements and any number of hybrids. The interaction of several variables within the environment, including human behavior, assures both fog and friction.

We will increasingly act in multi-dimensional, hybrid operating environments, which will require the force to operate within, and seamlessly shift between, ethnic enclaves in the center of sprawling megacities and austere rural villages. These diverse operating environments will also test support elements, including logistics, intelligence and communications. While the rise of non-state and
transnational actors will serve to complicate U.S. government actions throughout under-governed nations, we cannot afford to discount the actions of state-sponsored actors who operate much like other violent extremists organizations, only with the state’s direction and support. Countries where state-sponsored, non-state and transnational actors operate typically have weak and corrupt central governments, high unemployment, exorbitant poverty levels, limited internal infrastructure, deep ethnic and religious divisions and a history of humanitarian issues. It is in these regions of the world that ARSOF units will be the force of choice.

Several aggravating factors will influence the way we operate:

- **Geopolitical Constraints:** Our battlespace will contain agile state actors and non-state actors operating across borders of sovereign nations and outside of declared combat zones.

- **Policy Limitations:** Forward presence will be affected by a reduced budget and national reluctance to act overtly and unilaterally.

- **Hostile nation states:** These states will be more capable and want more resources, but still will be unable to match U.S. forces.

- **Threat networks:** These networks (comprised of both state-sponsored and non-state terrorist groups) will remain active; their attacks will have greater impact; they will use more sophisticated techniques; and they will retain freedom of maneuver.

Conditions across the strategic environment indicate future conflict will not be confined to one category. It will range in scope from major conventional conflicts to humanitarian support and nation-building missions. Very capable adversaries will continue to challenge U.S. interests globally, while rising military powers will work to advance their regional and global interests. Enemies will seek to exploit their asymmetric advantages wherever possible; USASOC’s training; education, capabilities and concept development must reflect this reality.

The momentum of human interaction is reaching unprecedented levels, enabled by generational leaps in personal communication technologies and an associated social-media explosion, with little to no state control of those technologies and applications.

We must be prepared to conduct special operations in more restrictive areas than those that we have experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade. As the challenges for access and placement increase, infiltration and exfiltration options will be reduced and ARSOF will become the more subtle option for decision makers to affect desired change and meet future threats.
It is imperative that our plans are guided by and nested within those of our national leaders and our higher headquarters. The following guidance has defined our role as a force. Using this guidance, we have developed a strategic framework for our way forward.

**DEFENSE STRATEGIC GUIDANCE**

“Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost and small-footprint approaches to achieve security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence and advisory capabilities.”

**2010 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY**

“We will continue to rebalance our military capabilities to excel at counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, stability operations and meeting increasingly sophisticated security threats, while ensuring our force is ready to address the full range of military operations.”
In order to prepare for the future threat environment of the next decade, ARSOF will need to be capable of facing a variety of political and military challenges within a complex operating environment.

“SoCOM must not only continue to pursue terrorists wherever we may find them, we must rebalance the force and tenaciously embrace indirect operations in the Human Domain — the totality of the physical, cultural and social environments that influence human behavior in a population-centric conflict.”

“We must think differently, seek greater understanding of local, regional and global contexts and strengthen trust through interagency and partner cooperation.”

“While SOF is designed to contribute to or support efforts in every domain of warfare, the vast majority of SOF expertise lies in the Human Domain of competition, conflict and war. The Human Domain is about developing understanding of, and nurturing influence among critical populaces. Operating in the Human Domain is a core competency for SOF and we are uniquely suited for successful operations or campaigns to win population-centric conflicts.”

“Vision: The Army is globally engaged and regionally responsive; it is an indispensable partner and provider of a full range of capabilities to combatant commanders in a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multi-national environment. As part of the joint force and as America’s Army, in all that we offer, we guarantee the agility, versatility and depth to prevent, shape and win.”

“Army units will be increasingly focused on preparing for missions within specific geographical combatant commands. This regional alignment will be further enhanced by increasing the integration of conventional and special operations forces.”

“The Army must achieve SOF and conventional force interdependence to lock in the advances of the last decade of conflict, more effectively counter future threats and shape the operational environment. The Army must establish a range of personnel, training and command and support relationships between SOF and CF.”
What We have Learned

Over the past decade, USASOC built a robust capability to target terrorist networks and an unmatched capacity for counterinsurgency operations. At its peak, the level of support to joint-force headquarters in the U.S. Central Command area of operations was the largest sustained effort in our history. As a force, our Soldiers have performed magnificently during two of the nation’s longest wars while executing a wide range of demanding and high-risk operations in hostile environments. As the nature and extent of our engagements in the Middle East change, it is critical to review the lessons learned over the past decade, assess our current situation and explore requirements for the future force.

Perhaps the most significant change of the past decade is the evolution of the Human Domain. During World War I, aerial platforms were used as a means of fire and observation in land combat. By the end of World War II, airspace had evolved into a distinct domain because its control became recognized as a key to success in the war. National leadership directed the establishment of a separate department of the Air Force in order to develop the required and unique doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities solutions needed to dominate this newly, contested space. A similar appreciation for influencing populations now suggests the need for establishment of a Human Domain.

Wars among the people that emphasize influencing population groups rather than an exclusive emphasis on battle is an ancient concept. Since the early 1950s, ARSOF have been specifically designed to work in this Human Domain. The emergence of the Human Domain demands the armed forces and other U.S. government security agencies analyze what it takes to win wars among the people, including defeating terrorist and other VEOs. Evidence of this new domain can be found in the number and type of ad hoc structures and significant repurposing of traditional Land Domain tools.

Based on lessons learned, the Army is updating its concept framework to reflect the work done to advise, assist and influence foreign security forces, governments and people. Adding the 7th Warfighting Function to the other six Warfighting functions will leverage the Army’s recent war-time experiences and help ensure the hard-
learned lessons are not forgotten. The establishment of a 7th Warfighting Function addresses the related tasks and systems that influence the behaviors of a people (friendly, neutral, adversary), security forces and governments and enables the prioritization and synchronization of efforts to achieve strategic effects.

The importance of SOF interdependence with Army conventional forces also became evident. Across the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, we forged relationships with the conventional force that resulted in operational effectiveness unparalleled in our history. By improving interdependence, we enabled seamless and consistent application of combat power across the full range of military operations.

The need for special operations campaigns that tie SOF tactical capabilities to U.S. regional or national objectives became apparent. Efforts over the past decade focused on building partner-nation capacity, advising partner forces and conducting some unilateral activities to safeguard U.S. interests outside of declared theaters of armed conflict. To support the development of these operational-level efforts, theater special operations commands required individuals with competency to design plans. These campaigns, many of them SOF-centric, consisted of multiple lines of effort developed and synchronized by the TSOCs to achieve discrete outcomes in support of the geographic combatant commanders’ overall strategy. We will increasingly need special operations campaign designers and planners who understand the full range of special operations capabilities and can weave their operations together over time to achieve U.S. objectives.

Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom required USASOC to primarily focus on developing the manpower, equipment and command structures necessary to ensure operational success in mature combat theaters. As the war in Afghanistan transitions to an Afghan-led effort, a large segment of our force will be remissioned to other strategic and theater problem sets. Future operations and SOF campaigns will require persistence, distributed command and control, low-visibility operations and small-scale, non-standard logistics support. The current force structure, manpower and equipment are not optimized for this dispersed operational footprint. Therefore, we must develop and validate flexible, scalable and responsive distributed command and control structures. Our regionally expert forces will be called upon to provide continuous, proactive and responsive support to their respective joint-force commands — whether in country or deployed.

WHERE WE WANT TO GO

ARSOF 2022 Objective: In 2022, ARSOF provide joint-force commanders scalable nodes, with unmatched levels of tactical skill and language and cultural expertise, which establish persistent and distributed networks that provide the nation precise and nuanced asymmetric capability. Skilled SOF operational planners and leaders routinely mesh special warfare and surgical strike capabilities to conduct SOF campaigns in support of joint and interagency efforts. As a force, we are uniquely prepared to succeed in the most uncertain conditions and offer solutions to the nation’s most difficult and sensitive problems.

The ability to assess and understand a situation from multiple points of view and to intuitively adapt operations as necessary requires mature Soldiers who have the ability to combine their education and experience to solve a problem.

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<th>USASOC PRIORITIES</th>
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<td>▶ Humans are more important than hardware.</td>
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<td>▶ Strengthen the Global SOF Network</td>
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**ARSOF CRITICAL CAPABILITIES: SPECIAL WARFARE AND SURGICAL STRIKE**

USASOC provides the nation with forces capable of executing two different, but mutually supporting forms of special operations: special warfare and surgical strike. Joint-force commanders leverage ARSOF’s ability to execute these capabilities in the development and execution of their special operations campaigns. Understanding the differences will illuminate how special warfare and surgical strike can best be utilized to achieve strategic effects in support of regional or national objectives.

**SPECIAL WARFARE:** The execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and non-lethal actions taken by specially trained and educated forces that have a deep understanding of cultures and foreign languages, proficiency in small-unit tactics, subversion, sabotage, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain or hostile environment.

**SURGICAL STRIKE:** The execution of activities in a precise manner that employ SOF in hostile, denied or politically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or damage designated targets, or influence threats.

### 10 Title X Core Activities as enumerated by the U.S. Congress:

1. **Direct Action:** Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied or diplomatically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or damage designated targets.

2. **Strategic Reconnaissance:** Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces.

3. **Unconventional Warfare:** Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.

4. **Foreign Internal Defense:** Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism and other threats to its security.

5. **Civil Affairs Operations:** Those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination other interagency, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions and the private sector; (3) involve application of functional specialty skills that normally the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations.

6. **Counterterrorism:** Actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks.

7. **Military Information Support Operations:** Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.

8. **Humanitarian Assistance:** Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance.

9. **Theater Search and Rescue:** Employment of specialized SOF aircraft and uniquely qualified SOF air crews for the rescue of personnel from enemy territory or denied areas whenever conventional combat search and rescue techniques and capabilities are inadequate.

10. **Activities Specified by the President or SECDEF**

Previous attempts to describe our force included descriptions such as “black/white,” “national/theater” and “direct/indirect.” These terms, which describe the force by the nature of the funding, command and control structures, authorities or operational approach have limited utility. The terms special warfare and surgical strike more accurately describe our force based on its capabilities.

Special warfare and surgical strike are distinguished by how they address uncertainty. Our
### USASOC is the proponent for a segment of the U.S. Army’s Range of Military Operations

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### The Army’s Range of Military Operations

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### ARSOF Core Operations – Tailored Combinations of Special Warfare and Surgical Strike Capability

USASOC generates the ARSOF critical capabilities of special warfare and surgical strike to conduct these special operations missions.

Special warfare capability mitigates uncertainty by providing the nation a self-contained force that is designed to accomplish its mission through and with indigenous surrogates and partners. Special warfare Soldiers possess expertise in tactics, combat-adviser skills, military deception, sabotage and subversion, expertise in foreign language, relationship-building skills, cultural understanding, adaptive decision making and cognitive problem solving. This unique skill set is necessary to enhance survivability for our force over extended periods of time in hostile, austere and denied environments. Surgical strike reduces uncertainty through detailed analysis and pinpoint accuracy. Key knowledge, skills and attributes for employment of surgical strike include the execution of robust intelligence fusion, leveraging high-tech collection systems, management of deliberate targeting cycles and the ability to discriminate and engage threat targets with minimal collateral damage.

In August 2012, the U.S. Army published Army Doctrinal Publication ADP 3-05, Special Operations. Although doctrine will evolve over time, the introduction of these terms in ADP 3-05 represents a maturation of special operations concepts. By describing special operations in these two different forms, USASOC’s ability to generate, sustain and articulate ARSOF capabilities is enhanced. Further, this approach highlights the synergy possible through the combination of special warfare and surgical strike capabilities at the operational level.
From the Office of Strategic Service’s operational groups and the exploits of Filipino guerillas led by Russell Volckmann in World War II to the Montagnard Civilian Irregular Defense Groups of Vietnam to support to counterinsurgency operations in El Salvador, the United States has a rich history of special warfare.

More recently, our force led the U.S. overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in the days following 9/11 and have provided essential contributions to the successful efforts against violent extremists organizations in Colombia and the Philippines.

Special Warfare is that form of special operations in which the United States government defends its interests through training, material or even direct combat support to indigenous people and friendly governments whose interests coincide with those of the United States. Special Warfare includes foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare. Unconventional warfare became a mission for the U.S. Army in 1952 with the activation of the 10th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, N.C. A couple of years later, in response to the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense were added to the Special Warfare mission set.

As with conventional warfare, the Army has developed special warfare maneuver units, whose mission includes closing with and destroying the enemy. These are the five active duty and two National Guard Special Forces Groups. Selected, trained and organized to work with indigenous forces, possessing area expertise and language proficiency, exceptional small-unit fighting skills and the ability to operate in uncertain or denied areas for extended periods, Special Forces units are designed to operate in complex and uncertain environments. Also essential to the conduct of Special Warfare are Civil Affairs and Military Information Support Operations units, particularly enabled by their capability to analyze, segment, and
ultimately influence populations in ways desired by the supported commanders. Each of these Special Warfare units (CA, MISO, SF) has an assigned area of responsibility that corresponds to their supported geographic combatant command.

Typically long in duration, special warfare campaigns are conducted in a temporal context that differs from many military activities and is most effectively conducted through a persistent forward presence. Once viewed as separate and isolated operations, the operating environment may change rapidly, resulting in what may begin as a foreign internal defense operation transitioning to a UW operation, or vice versa, as conditions change in the country due to time or disruptive events such as coups d’états. Therefore, it is important, and more accurate, to view FID, COIN and UW as a range of special warfare capabilities that are similar in that they cultivate relationships with partner forces and seek shared security interests.

The most critical gap in ARSOF special warfare capability exists in the UW mission set; our ability to conduct UW in denied areas for extended periods of time. As the Department of Defense and U.S. Special Operations Command lead for UW, USASOC must focus on building such a capacity over the next decade. Over the next 10 years, USASOC will make a concerted effort to address this critical gap and others by rebalancing the force and developing an enhanced ARSOF capability to conduct special warfare in concert with joint and interagency partners. For many in our force and our Army, this will require a paradigm shift and an assessment of the historic role of SOF versus the more publicized role our force assumed over the past decade. The Soldiers in our special warfare units must recognize that their value lies not only in their lethality, but in the fact that they are trained, educated, led, equipped and organized in unique ways to meet the demands of an uncertain future. Our force will possess unparalleled special warfare capabilities that will enable them to support long-duration special operations campaigns in the most sensitive, austere and denied environments to achieve strategic U.S. objectives.
Throughout our nation’s history, Army special operations forces have conducted sensitive military-strike operations to achieve some of our most critical strategic objectives.

Our surgical strike capability has been forged from the daring exploits of the 1st Special Service Force and Ranger Battalions of World War II to the Son Tay Raid deep inside enemy territory in Vietnam. This legacy continues today with the relentless pursuit of our nation’s enemies across the globe.

The modern ARSOF surgical strike requirement was born from our experiences in Operation Eagle Claw in 1979. From this failed rescue attempt of U.S. hostages in Iran, the U.S. was determined to improve its capability to rapidly and surgically conduct sensitive, scalable and unilateral direct-action missions against adversaries anywhere in the world. The conduct of hostage rescue or other unilateral sensitive operations requires special airlift, intelligence and support assets that utilize cutting-edge technologies to ensure success.

ARSOF surgical strike maneuver units include a special mission unit, Special Forces Commander’s In-extremis Forces and the 75th Ranger Regiment.

Executed unilaterally or collaboratively, surgical strike extends operational reach and influence by engaging global targets discriminately and precisely. Strike operations are not always intended to be an isolated activity; they are executed to shape the operational environment or influence selected target audiences in support of larger strategic interests. Although the actual strike is short in duration, the comprehensive planning process and affiliated influence efforts frequently require interagency and host-nation partnerships to develop an understanding of the threat network and facilitate post-operation activities.

ARSOF possess a highly scalable and versatile suite of surgical strike capabilities, ranging from clandestine small-unit raids to overt, regimental-
sized forcible-entry operations. Our elements support enduring, decisive, counterterrorism requirements outside designated theaters of armed, active conflict and maintain a forward presence in order to support and/or conduct precise counterterrorism operations in politically sensitive environments. These operations are conducted with pinpoint precision and minimal collateral damage. Our force is uniquely designed to infiltrate austere, remote locations and rapidly mass combat power to seize, destroy, capture or recover designated targets and exfiltrate in a single period of darkness. The 75th Ranger Regiment has the ability to seize heavily defended airfields for a wide variety of purposes, including non-combatant evacuation operations, precious cargo transfers and establishing a lodgment for conventional or special operations forces.

To enhance our surgical strike capability we must develop innovative means to increase organic ARSOF capability to conduct the find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze and disseminate (F3EAD) targeting cycle regardless of the austerity or complexity of the environment. ARSOF must possess surgical strike capability across a wide spectrum of threats, ranging from sophisticated nation states with advanced anti-access, cyber and defensive capabilities to VEOs operating inside failed nation states. To meet this challenge, USASOC must maintain a robust research and development capability and aggressive experimentation process that continues to identify opportunities to enhance our partnerships and methodologies and leverage cutting-edge technology.

Over the next 10 years, ARSOF will continuously evolve to provide decision makers an ever-increasing range of sophisticated SOF strike options. ARSOF will remain a lethal and agile strike force, capable of projecting discreet, precise and scalable force, without notice, anywhere in the world.
USASOC generates two different but mutually supporting forms of special operations

**Special Warfare**

- “Designed to wade into uncertainty… and prevail”
- Units capable of conducting sabotage, subversion and insurgent activities for extended periods in denied areas and advising, assisting and training partner-nation forces in COIN & Special Operations.

**Surgical Strike**

- “Built to squeeze out uncertainty… then execute”
- Units trained and equipped to provide a primarily unilateral, scalable, direct-action capability that are skilled in hostage rescue, kill/capture operations against designated targets and other specialized tasks.

### 1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 10th, 19th, 20th Special Forces Groups (Airborne)

#### Combatant Commander In-Extremis Force

- Special Missions Unit
- 75th Ranger Regiment
- 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment
- 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne)
- 4th, 8th, Military Information Support Operations Groups (Airborne)
- 528th Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations - Airborne)

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**USASOC** is the proponent for a segment of the U.S. Army’s Range of Military Operations

**SOF Core Operations – Tailored Combinations of Special Warfare and Surgical Strike Capability**

- Unconventional Warfare
- Foreign Internal Defense
- Stability Operations
- Counter-insurgency
- Support to MCO
- Counter-terrorism
- Combating WMD

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**7th Warfighting Function**

- Army
  - Special Operations
  - Force Core
  - Competency
- Army
  - Conventional
  - Force Core
  - Competency

**The Army’s Range of Military Operations**

- UW / CT / CP / FID / COIN / SFA / Combined Arms Maneuver

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**USASOC**

- **TRADOC**
- **FORSCOM**

**ARMY FOUNDATIONAL ACTIVITIES**
**ARSOF 2022 USASOC Commander’s Vision**

Provide our nation the world’s premier special operations units, capable of prosecuting the most sensitive special warfare campaigns and executing the most difficult surgical strike operations, while providing seamless and persistent special operations support to joint-force commanders worldwide.

**Commander’s Intent**

USASOC matures the Army SOF profession, addresses capability gaps and improves integration at the ‘seams’ to better enable seamless application of combat power across the spectrum of responsibility.

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**ARSOF 2022 Priorities**

- **Invest in Human Capital**
  - USASOC fields a diverse, regionally expert force with the world’s best trained and educated special operations Soldiers capable of addressing uncertainty.

- **Optimize SOF/CF/JIIM Interdependence**
  - USASOC optimizes the force multiplying potential of partnership with the Army and interagency to provide the nation with seamless combat power.

- **Operationalize the CONUS Base**
  - Regionally expert forces provide continuous, proactive and responsive support to forward deployed forces.

- **Develop SOF Capabilities at Operational Level**
  - USASOC forces provide expertise to enable operational-level headquarters in their effort to tie tactical capabilities to regional or national strategies.

- **Facilitate SOF Mission Command**
  - ARSOF have developed and validated flexible, scalable and responsive distributed command and control structures.

- **Optimize Resourcing and Commodity Areas**
  - USASOC will rebalance its portfolio while getting better, not bigger.

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**Future Force Development Process**

- **Execute a deliberate and methodical way to change**
- **Build and test concepts that define how ARSOF will fight in the future**
- **Strategic Planning Process**
- **Budget, POM & QDR Inputs**
- **Campaign of Learning**

USASOC develops the future force through mutually supporting processes that are fully integrated into broader Army and USSOCOM processes.

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**SOF Campaign of Learning**

- Develop ARSOF concepts, validate through robust experimentation
- Inform CBA and POM processes
- Integrate with Army and USSOCOM
- Execute workshops, seminars and other learning events
- Link science & technology efforts
- Partner with industry & academia

**Strategic Planning Process**

- Provide operational focus and prioritize required capabilities
- Identify gaps and mitigation strategies, balance portfolios and S&T investment opportunities
- Integrate and allocate resourcing guidance to put capabilities in the hands of the operator
ARSOF 2022 PRIORITIES

In order to focus our efforts over the next decade, we have prioritized our requirements into six categories, which are the enabling concepts that will allow us to direct and shape the future development of the force:

1. Invest in Human Capital
2. Optimize SOF/Conventional Force/JIIM Interdependence
3. Operationalize the CONUS base
4. Develop SOF Capabilities at the operational level
5. Facilitate SOF Mission Command
6. Optimize Resourcing and Commodity Areas

In the following pages, each of these enabling concepts is described in greater detail, including a brief description of their challenges, vision and possible solutions in the near, mid and far-term.

1. INVEST IN HUMAN CAPITAL

Our force is the best educated, trained and equipped special operations formation in the world. Our Soldiers are capable of succeeding in the increasing uncertainty of the 21st century battlefield.

The ARSOF Soldier is our center of gravity. To ensure that our operators will succeed in the future operating environment, we will recruit, assess, select, train, educate and retain only those Soldiers with the knowledge, skills and attributes to thrive in the most demanding conditions. To retain a decisive advantage over our adversaries, we will seek a variety of solutions to optimize our human capital, including: enhanced education and training and increased diversity of human capital. To ensure the health of our force, our focus will continue to be on the preservation of our force and their families.

1A. ENHANCED EDUCATION AND TRAINING

CHALLENGE: Success in the future operating environment places a premium on the mastery of problem solving and highly specialized technical skills; for the special warfare units this includes foreign language and cultural expertise.

2022 VISION: ARSOF will be the most well-educated and well-trained force within the Department of Defense.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS:

SHORT-TERM

» Activate the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School's Special Warfare Education Group (Airborne) as a centrally selected O6 command (FY13).
» Identify SOF assignments that require Defense Language Institute or other advanced language training.
» Send selected Soldiers to the Defense Language Institute for training en route to assignments and TDY.
» Formalize and resource the SOF lifelong-learning model, including expansion of SWCS's education initiatives to enable Soldiers to obtain an associate's degree through its qualification courses and to provide opportunities for Soldiers to earn bachelor's, master's and doctorate degrees. (Prioritize ARSOF Education Program in FY 15-19 POM.)
» Broaden the range of special operations aviation-related individual training and education including unmanned-aerial systems.
» Develop a SWCS SOF Sustainment curriculum and doctrine for sustainment professionals assigned to USASOC.
» Develop required training and education programs to improve asymmetric and unconventional-warfare capabilities.
» Improve cross-command recruitment and assignments.

MID-TERM

» Implement innovative approaches to language and cultural-immersion education.
» Codify and resource SOF doctorate requirements in key/influential positions across the Department of Defense and throughout the U.S. Government.
» Develop a UW Capabilities Manager who supports SWCS's role as the U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence and USASOC's role as the DoD lead for UW, including a comprehensive program of UW education, doctrine and leader development.
Establish a SWCS-enhanced UW operator training program and expand the content of UW curriculum in the ARSOF qualification courses and Army Professional Military Education.

Develop a Special Actions Program Manager at SWCS to support SWCS’s role as the U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence and USASOC’s role as the DoD lead for ASO, including a comprehensive program of ASO, PE and Special Activities education, doctrine and leader development.

Develop advanced Military Information Support Operations education and training.

Implement regional and in-country resident language programs.

Implement overseas internships with industry for selected SOF operators and special operations intelligence personnel.

Implement a Joint/Interagency SOF Sustainment Course in conjunction with the Joint Special Operations University, which prepares mid-career ARSOF sustainment professionals to provide support to SOF operations.

Develop and promulgate U.S. Army and SOCOM personnel policies that promote the development of SOF operators with the expertise required to execute clandestine UW operations.

Develop SOF capabilities at the operational level and educate a cadre of SOF campaign planners.

Create and implement a Military Government (38G) Area of Concern within the Army.

**LONG-TERM**

Consolidate selection and assessment courses across the force.

**1B. INCREASED ADVANTAGE THROUGH HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT**

**CHALLENGE:** The wide array of knowledge, skills and attributes necessary for success in the future operating environment requires USASOC to expand the cultural and ethnic backgrounds of the force.

**2022 VISION:** USASOC units will represent and capitalize on the nation’s broad range of ethnic and cultural composition in order to enhance ARSOF capability to succeed in the Human Domain.

**POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS:**

**SHORT-TERM**

Actively recruit the widest ethnic and cultural range of U.S. citizens, including first-generation Americans with innate foreign-language capability and cultural knowledge.

Expand the Military Accessions Vital to National Interest program with a focused effort to improve recruitment of foreign-born U.S. residents into ARSOF special warfare units.

Continue to execute Cultural Support Team training to meet joint-operational requirements.

Develop a collaborative system that encourages and facilitates cross-command identification assessment, selection, training and retention of ethnically and culturally diverse personnel within USASOC formations.

Develop innovative ways to expand the pool of ARSOF candidates.

Support U.S. Army and SOCOM initiatives to expand service opportunities for women.

Explore concepts to enhance female support to SOF operations.

**MID-TERM**

Explore recruitment and assessment strategies to increase the number of personnel who enter the ARSOF qualification courses with foreign-language proficiency above the 1/1 level.

Build a core of 3/3 and native foreign-language speakers in all critical languages and dialects.

Recruit 25 percent of special warfare operators from target populations.

Implement policies and authorities for recruitment of civil-sector experts to conduct civil-military operations and enhance stability operations.

**LONG-TERM**

ARSOF possess a diverse range of low-visibility, culturally astute means to access populations and operate in denied areas regardless of the nature of the human population.

ARSOF and U.S. allies have capabilities required to conduct nuanced and effective inform and influence activities and cyber-electromagnetic activities in targeted regions.

Maximize career opportunities for special operators between USASOC maneuver units.
1C. PRESERVATION OF THE FORCE AND FAMILIES

CHALLENGE: The challenging nature of special operations, including repeated overseas deployments in austere conditions, places an extraordinary demand on the physical, emotional and spiritual well being of ARSOF Soldiers and their families. ARSOF operational tempo is expected to remain at high-levels for the next decade.

2022 VISION: ARSOF Soldiers and families will understand that they are the number one priority to sustaining a vital and capable force. It is imperative that our force knows that they have access to any and all programs that contribute to the health of their families. Behavioral health is a necessary and integral aspect of overall Soldier fitness. The ARSOF community will be aware of and encouraged to utilize behavioral health services for operators and families in the same way that Tactical Human Optimization Rapid Rehabilitation Reconditioning, or THOR3, enables physical health and recovery. The high demands that SOF operations place on Soldiers and families are effectively mitigated with a healthy incorporation of preventative maintenance in the same way that prevention is the preferred method to counter physical injury.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS:

SHORT-TERM
» Continue to invest in programs including the THOR3 Program, Strong Bonds, Gold Star Family Program, Operator Resiliency Program and Unit Ministry Programs.

MID-TERM
» Develop DOTMLPF solutions to institutionalize ARSOF Human Performance Optimization, including improvement and management of: USASOC THOR3 Program, Special Operations Center for Enhanced Performance, Human Dynamics and Operator Resiliency Programs.
» Ensure relationships/programs are in place to react immediately to negative stressors on SOF families.

LONG-TERM
» Lead the Army in innovative, proactive programs that offset the demanding and sometimes harmful effects of sustained SOF operations.

2. OPTIMIZE SOF/GF/JIIM INTERDEPENDENCE

USASOC optimizes the force multiplying potential of partnerships with the Army and interagency to provide the nation with seamless combat power.

CHALLENGE: ARSOF must bridge the critical seams of SOF-Conventional Force and SOF-Interagency relationships to effectively contribute to unified action in the 21st century by partnering with the Army to meet its Title 10 collective training responsibilities. We must facilitate the interdependence of SOF, the interagency and conventional forces in support of unified action and unified land operations through the Mission Command Training Program.

2022 VISION: ARSOF will create an integrated training environment to improve USASOC’s ability to provide trained and ready operational-level SOF to ground combatant commanders worldwide, while promoting increased SOF/CF interdependence.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS:

SHORT-TERM
» Nest the efforts of SOF and Army regionally-aligned forces and SOF and the interagency.
» Embed SOF doctrine in all Army Professional Military Education.
» Reestablish the Military Assistance Training Advisor Course and reconsider the reestablishment of the Institute of Military Assistance at SWCS.
» Develop/implement concepts to increase 75th Ranger Regiment inclusion in TSOC plans, exercises and operations.
» Partner with U.S. Army, Marine Corps and SOCOM in the establishment of a Strategic Landpower Task Force that explores and develops means to increase U.S. strategic landpower.
» Develop a concept, in partnership with Combined Arms Center-Training, for a new Mission Command Training Program Operations Group to design and execute integrated operational level collective training for Joint SOF Operational elements

MID-TERM
» Partner with the Army to explore the consolidation of the Army’s Active and Reserve Military Information Support Operations and Civil Affairs forces under a single multicomponent command.
Expand institutional support to JIIM relationships.
Mature SWCS’s role as the U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence as the advocate for all aspects of ARSOF capabilities (special warfare and surgical strike).
Leverage Army and joint theater-logistics capabilities.
Establish the Institute for Military Support to Governance to strengthen partnerships with interagency and further leverage the other ‘5th Forces Providers’ such as academia, non-governmental organizations and civil enterprises.
As a part of MCTP establish an operations group that facilitates the collective training requirements of ARSOF.
Explore assignment of the Army’s Information Operations capability to MISOC.

**LONG-TERM**
Facilitate the blending of capabilities between the Department of Defense and the interagency into one uninterrupted spectrum of options for U.S. policy makers, while acting as the Army lead for SOF/CF interdependence.

3. OPERATIONALIZE THE CONUS BASE
Regionally expert forces provide continuous, proactive support to forward deployed forces.

**CHALLENGE:** There is an under utilized operational capacity in CONUS-based regionally expert forces. This capacity is vital to mission success and cannot remain untapped. By establishing mechanisms and leveraging technology, we can harness CONUS-based capacity to better support OCONUS deployed forces. Like Artillery in major combat operations, regionally expert forces should not be “left in reserve” in the conduct of special operations.

**2022 VISION:** ARSOF will be capable of providing regional expertise to the TSOCs from CONUS-based regionally expert forces. By physically and virtually synchronizing the capacity of regional experts from across the U.S. government, academia and industry, ARSOF will leverage the nation’s CONUS-based regional expertise for continuous support to global special operations mission requirements.

**POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS:**

**SHORT-TERM**
- Develop the capability of the Military Information Support Operations Command to synchronize the U.S. government’s global MISO efforts, providing an influence. This capability is realized through the establishment of the MISOC Effects Group and the UW Social Theory Academy.
- Develop the capability of the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade CONUS-based headquarters to leverage the U.S. government’s civil-sector expertise through the establishment of the Civil Military Advisory Group with global CMOC capability.
- Conduct experimentation to determine the optimal balance of forward- and CONUS-based forces.
- Develop CONUS-based capability to provide enhanced UW capability to TSOCs including tailored packages to habitually and routinely support GCCs and interagency special activities requirements.

**MID-TERM**
- Develop CONUS-based capability to enhance partner-nation rotary-wing capability (ARSOAC).
- Develop CONUS-based capability to develop partner-nation SOF doctrine, training and education institutions (SWCS).
- Man and resource the MEG and UWSTA appropriately as stand-alone organizations under the MISOC. Enable the MEG to integrate and synchronize the expected long-duration, whole-of-government influence efforts in support of GCCs objectives. UWSTA continues research, theory development and testing and policy formulation for the use of the Internet, social media and emergent means of singular and mass communication technologies and capabilities.

**LONG-TERM**
- Explore the development of CONUS-based force packages that can be deployed as tailorable Special Warfare Task Forces and capability to execute support to national-level influence strategy operations.

—— Lt. Gen. Charles T. Cleveland, Commander, USASOC

“Like Artillery in Combined Arms maneuver, regionally expert forces should never be in reserve — even in CONUS, they need to continue to support the fight.”
4. DEVELOP SOF CAPABILITIES AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

CHALLENGE: SOF must improve its capability to design and plan long-duration, low-visibility, SOF-centric contributions to campaigns that bridge tactical SOF capability to strategic objectives.

2022 VISION: ARSOF capability will be seamlessly integrated into campaign plans and routinely leveraged to achieve campaign goals.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS:

SHORT-TERM

- Implement a Special Operations Campaign Planners curriculum at SWCS to educate selected officers to effectively integrate SOF capability into campaign plans.
- Establish a Special Operations Campaign, Design and Theory Office at SWCS, which will partner with School of Advanced Military Studies and other advanced schools for military operational art.

MID-TERM

- Assign ARSOF Operational Artists to Joint, Army and SOF operational headquarters, including TSOCs, in order to enhance the campaign-planning capability.
- Enhance ARSOF Liaison Elements in direct support of each TSOC by the realignment of sustainment planners who ensure Army Service Component Commands fulfillment of ARSOF requirements in low-signature campaigns and named operations.
- Develop and Assign operational-level CMO/stability operations planners at TSOCs.

LONG-TERM

- Foster the development of ARSOF operational and strategic planners with the requisite experience and education to contribute in positions of increasing influence in Joint, Army, Interagency and SOF operational headquarters.

5. FACILITATE SOF MISSION COMMAND

CHALLENGE: The greatest single challenge facing SOF today is outdated command and control structures. Over the last decade, there have been numerous and diverse efforts to address this critical gap. This includes the establishment of hybrid C2 nodes, such as TSOCs-Forward in Yemen, Lebanon and Pakistan and Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines, JSOTF-Trans-Sahel and JSOTF-Caribbean Central America. Ad hoc in nature and insufficiently resourced, these efforts have yielded disparate effects, resulting in missed opportunities to effectively integrate SOF capabilities. In addition, some national security challenges increasingly require SOF-centric solutions that require unique combinations of SOF/CF capability and SOF operational level mission command.

2022 VISION: ARSOF will possess a wide array of scalable and deployable C2 nodes, capable of projecting SOF mission command in the most austere and politically sensitive environments, with the requisite level of expertise, experience and architecture to plan, integrate and synchronize SOF operations and SOF campaigns at any echelon of joint command, in an interagency country-team environment or with partnered indigenous forces of any size, including SOF operational headquarters above the TSOC level that are designed to conduct SOF-centric campaigns.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS:

SHORT-TERM

- Conduct a thorough review of our existing organizations, formations and mission-command paradigms, all the way down to the detachment level.
- Conduct experimentation with alternative forms of SOF C2 nodes.
- Develop tailored packages to provide a mission command plug to TSOCs for the conduct of special activities including advanced special operations, military source operations and unconventional warfare.

"People sleep peaceable in their beds at night only because rough men stand ready to do violence on their behalf."
—George Orwell
MID-TERM

» Explore hybrid SOF-conventional force command structures that build on legacy efforts, such as the 1960s-era Special Action Forces, which will leverage the inherent strengths of SOF and CF formations.
» Experiment with operational- and divisional-level headquarters for the conduct of special warfare to include a Joint Special Warfare Command capable of conducting global SW missions in support of TSOC and national objectives.
» Develop an agile mechanism to routinely reassign units and personnel within USASOC to build hybrid teams comprised of special warfare and surgical strike capabilities to meet global mission requirements.
» Enable Army Special Operations Aviation forces to execute mission command of joint capabilities in support of ground forces.

LONG-TERM

» Experiment with hybrid (SOF/CF) corps-level headquarters with organic interagency and intergovernmental plug-ins designed to conduct COIN, humanitarian assistance, FID and limited combined arms maneuver.
» Develop an integrated ARSOF architecture that incorporates, analyzes and displays a common operating picture from SF, CA, PSYOP, etc.

6. OPTIMIZE RESOURCING AND COMMODITY AREAS

OVERVIEW: The current resource allocation reflects a significant commitment to the U.S. Central Command combat theaters. While national policy and SOF requirements regarding Afghanistan will solidify in the coming months, we anticipate that we must begin to realign resources in FY15 in order to better meet our global-mission requirements. Our forces must be equipped to operate in any environment in the world for extended periods in a low-visibility and clandestine fashion. Instead of taking a one-size-fits-all approach, we must equip our formations to meet the specific needs of their assigned missions and area of operations, especially our regionally aligned special warfare units. We should embrace an approach to resourcing that is highly agile and encourages our regionally aligned forces to be as varied and unique as their areas of operations and missions require, including leveraging COTS solutions and improved mechanisms to locally procure equipment that is indigenous to the area of operations.

6A. MOBILITY SYSTEMS

CHALLENGE: The ARSOF mobility fleet is not properly balanced to meet SOF global-mission requirements, including over investment in expensive to maintain and unwieldy platforms such as MRAPs and GMVs.

2022 VISION: ARSOF will possess a wide range of mobility platforms that are able to penetrate denied areas clandestinely by air, sea or land, including the use of stealth technologies. These platforms are designed to allow the force to operate for extended periods of time in denied areas.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS:

SHORT-TERM

» Field the commercially available four-seat variant of the Lightweight Tactical All-Terrain Vehicle.
» Improve management of individual vehicles such as ATVs, snowmobiles and motorcycles to provide more agility to meet specific mission requirements.
» Consolidate aerial-delivery capability within sustainment mission command in order to provide robust delivery options in limited-access environments.
» Invest in non-standard commercial vehicles that provide a low-visibility and survivable platform that is sustainable in austere environments around the world through locally available parts and service.

MID-TERM

» Replace the legacy GMV fleet one for one with the GMV 1.1, which will offer greater mobility and internal air transportability via CH-47. The GMV 1.1 is scheduled for incorporation into the operational fleet FY15.
» Utilize a pooling strategy to maintain a wartime contingency fleet of MATVs utilizing Army sustainment and storage.

LONG-TERM

» Leverage new science and technology initiatives including but not limited to lightweight armor, stealth technology, unmanned capabilities and decreased fuel consumption with added range.
» Field Regional MISO Task Forces capable of leading and executing high-end UW and other politically sensitive missions.
**6B. AVIATION**

**CHALLENGE:** Maintain pace in modernization of platforms and force structure to provide comparative advantage to execute precision aviation missions in the future operating environment.

**2022 VISION:** ARSOF will possess a fully functional SOF Aviation Enterprise that synchronizes efforts to generate the world’s premier special operations aviation capability.

**POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS:**

**SHORT-TERM**
- Field approved modernization for the mission-enhanced Little Birds.
- Field approved modernization of MH-60M Blackhawks.
- Improve Army unmanned aerial-system programs of record (Raven, Shadow and Gray Eagle) to meet joint expeditionary tactics, techniques, procedures, forward-based networking and sensor requirements.
- Retain flexibility within the acquisition process to explore potential non-program of record solutions to support ground-force reconnaissance and fires requirements.

**MID-TERM**
- Evaluate operational and maintenance costs in the Heavy Assault (MH-47G) fleet, which has been the preferred platform of SOF operators. Ensure these high-demand, low-density aircraft meet SOF requirements through the 2030s.
- Research replacement options for MELB that will extend the capabilities required by Joint SOF customers.

**LONG-TERM**
- Develop SOF Mission Equipment Packages to ensure ARSOF aviation maintains an advantage in command and control, survivability, navigation and targeting.

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**VERTICAL LIFT ROADMAP**

-Mission

**Near Term (Prior to FY 15)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>SOF</th>
<th>Joint</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Decision Points</th>
<th>GRAY EAGLE (QRC)</th>
<th>2.8L ENG</th>
<th>HD</th>
<th>TSP</th>
<th>LPM</th>
<th>ER/MP, INC II</th>
<th>Manned/Unmanned Teaming</th>
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<tr>
<td>Fixed Wing</td>
<td>CASA 212 (w/SLEP)</td>
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**The POM Years (Fiscal Year 15-19)**

- Extended Endurance/Range — Global Reach
- Improved Gray Eagle

**The EPP Years (Fiscal Year 20-28)**

- Gray Eagle MQ-1C-20

**Beyond the EPP (Fiscal Year 29-beyond)**

- Future Vertical Lift (MVU/MH)

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**Future Vertical Lift (MPL/MH)**

**SLEP / Re-Published CASAs**

**Life Cycle Replacement**

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**Joint Future Theater Lift**
6C. TARGET ENGAGEMENT

**CHALLENGE:** Many problems in the future will require a different set of lethal and non-lethal options with varying levels of discrimination, feasibility and acceptance.

**2022 VISION:** ARSOF will leverage emerging technology to continue to develop innovative, low-visibility means and when required, non-attributable materiel solutions, that enable new means for ARSOF to discriminately engage the most sensitive targets around the globe.

**POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS:**

**SHORT-TERM**
- Field visual augmentation systems (PVS-31), weapons systems and munitions that are critical to the success of ARSOF in ongoing combat operations.
- Focus USASOC research, development, test and evaluation on innovative solutions and maximize the utility of other advancements made throughout the Department of Defense and the interagency.
- Collaborate with SOCOM, Naval Post Graduate School and the Defense Intelligence Agency on development of social-media mapping capabilities.

**MID-TERM**
- Continue investments in RDT&E in advanced digital multi-spectral night-vision goggles with color, thermal and wide-field-of-view capability and precision sniper rifle.
- Employ initial social-media mapping capabilities that enable predictive behavioral analyses and both precision and mass-target engagement in support of special warfare and surgical strike via non-attributable or delayed attribution mean.

**LONG-TERM**
- Rebalance the target-engagement portfolio including a wide array of scalable, precision lethal- and nonlethal-weapons systems and munitions that better enable the SOF operator to conduct all aspects of unconventional warfare.

6D. COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTERS

**CHALLENGE:** Technological advances and operational paradigms continue to drive increased requirements for secure and non-secure, real-time communications leveraging multimodal, cloud-based mesh-network technology.

**2022 VISION:** ARSOF will be equipped with innovative systems that provide low-visibility, reliable, secure and seamless video, data, imagery and voice services that provide integrated, on the move, timely and relevant information to enable SOF C2 in any environment with any echelon of joint command or partner force.

**POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS:**

**SHORT-TERM**
- Build agility into existing systems to better facilitate distributed SOF C2, including real-time secure and non-secure communications that enables SOF tactical formations to communicate with GCCs and TSOC headquarters.

**MID-TERM**
- Increase forward presence of 528th Sustainment Brigade (SO) (A) signal detachments in each TSOC in order to provide satellite on the move, individual high-definition video and enhanced executive communications support.
- Utilize a versatile combination of COTS and joint systems.
- Develop a wide variety of technologies characterized by their simplicity, durability and disposability.
- Develop an enhanced capability for multiple secure communications via satellite, wireless and WiFi systems for irregular forces, including long range communications to support widely distributed operations.

**LONG-TERM**
- Develop interoperable, scalable and tailorable net-centric information infrastructures that support flexible information sharing across organizations and cultures, including instantaneous reach back to government and non-government sources of cultural and other expertise.

“One need not destroy one’s enemy. One need only destroy his willingness to fight.”

— Sun Tzu
6E. SOLDIER SYSTEMS

**CHALLENGE:** Over the last 10 years, ARSOF have focused Soldier system program investments in combat survivability, including body armor and other personal protective equipment. The future operating environment requires non-overt, clandestine, scalable Soldier systems.

**2022 VISION:** The ARSOF operator will be equipped to infiltrate, operate and survive in denied areas for extended duration in a low-visibility fashion, with a minimal burden of equipment bulk, weight and mass.

**POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS:**

**SHORT-TERM**
- Rebalance the Soldier-systems portfolio toward operations outside major combat theaters, including increasing anti-access/area-denial capability with the introduction of the high-glide canopy.
- Develop a wide variety of technologies characterized by their simplicity, durability and disposability.

**MID-TERM**
- Increase aerial-delivery capability, including low-visibility equipment.
- Develop means to defeat advanced biometric identification/verification technologies.

**LONG-TERM**
- Leverage existing technology such as freeze-dried plasma and emerging technology such as signature management/reduction technology to better enable the SOF operator in any environment.
- Increase organic medical capability including the establishment of deployable, scalable surgical teams modeled after the Joint Medical Augmentation Unit.

6F. CYBER OPERATIONS

**CHALLENGE:** Mastery of the Cyber Domain will require Army Special Operations to have training in cyber operations, knowledge of supporting systems and organizations and the ability to utilize cyberspace to enable operations while mitigating the inherent security risks.

**2022 VISION:** ARSOF personnel will be prepared to utilize the Cyber Domain to enhance operations both with internal means and external support.

**POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS:**

**SHORT-TERM**
- Formalize cyber synchronization, manning, training and capability development across USASOC echelons and units.
- Coordinate with SOCOM and Army Cyber Command to ensure ARSOF-unique cyber requirements are included in emerging doctrine, manning and capabilities development.
- Establish support relationships to enable ARSOF formations with expertise and means.

**MID-TERM**
- Identify and certify ARSOF personnel through cyber training and education from previously established external organizations.
- Introduce cyber experts into ARSOF organizations to enable operations.
- Establish support structures that facilitate operations between the lowest level through combatant command and national organizations.
- Nest ARSOF requirements and Title 10 responsibilities for cyber within all service and joint governing documents and regulations.

**LONG-TERM**
- Normalize cyber operations as part of operational planning, experimentation and operations.
- Train and certify ARSOF personnel in appropriate cyber skills as part of their MOS initial training.
### 6G. MISO SYSTEMS

**CHALLENGE:** Proliferation of smart phones, mobile devices and social media present unprecedented opportunities for both adversary and U.S. MISO efforts.

**2022 VISION:** ARSOF will be the strategic nexus for all Department of Defense influence activities and recognized as the partner of choice for influence campaigns.

**POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS:**

**SHORT-TERM**
- Develop and implement training and education in military deception, SLE and other advanced MISO skills to develop master MISO practitioners.
- Develop innovative tactics, techniques and procedures for use of social media and other tools to influence foreign target audiences in support of special warfare and surgical strike efforts.

**MID-TERM**
- Develop innovative methods of subversion to support enhanced ARSOF UW capability.
- Invest in high-end communication and influence practices and technologies, including establishment of the Social Theory Academy at SWCS.
- Reinvigorate the Cultural Intelligence Element including subject-matter experts in marketing, persuasive and traditional communication, use of social media and other cyber-based tools.

**LONG-TERM**
- Explore next generation ground-based and flyaway broadcast systems, social media and leaflet delivery system.
- Increase advanced technology and tools and substantially increase intelligence support, executing mass and precision influence missions in all environments.

### 6H. INTELLIGENCE SENSORS AND SYSTEMS

**CHALLENGE:** Intelligence systems are currently weighted to support current combat operations, enemy-focused collection and kinetic targeting.

**2022 VISION:** ARSOF tactical elements will have an unprecedented level of organic and tactical exploitation of national capability, regardless of the austerity or sensitivity of their environments.

**POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS:**

**SHORT-TERM**
- Invest in technical-collection systems, identity-operations systems and intelligence support systems.

**MID-TERM**
- Explore emerging technologies to enhance ARSOF organic F3EAD capability.
- Develop capabilities focused on providing enhanced cultural intelligence to globally deployed SOF, both in real time and leveraging reach back to CONUS expertise, including Department of Defense, U.S. government agencies and academia.

**LONG-TERM**
- Enable SOF to tactically exploit national intelligence capacities including space-related technologies, better clandestine tagging, tracking and locating, cyber and social-media capabilities.
ChALLENGE: Currently our nation’s premier special operations units are housed in a variety of facilities ranging from dilapidated World War II-era structures and temporary modular facilities to 30-year-old legacy facilities. Some units are just now starting to see the benefits of the robust SOCOM MILCON investment program, which began in 2008. At the current rate of MILCON investment, existing USASOC facilities requirements will not be built until 2028.

2022 VISION: USASOC will continue to modernize our infrastructure, including sustained investment in the institutional force to realize the SWCS Campus vision and provide world-class facilities for our operational units that fully support the mission requirements and capabilities of ARSOF 2022, with a vision to build to the same standards as the new 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) facilities in Florida.

POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS: MILCON is a long-duration, sustained effort over time, to provide the finest, modernized facilities to support our forces including unique ISR, mobility, training and operational requirements. We will synchronize our facility modernization efforts with ARSOF 2022 rebalancing and restructuring efforts within existing resourcing levels without deferring the replacement of sub-standard existing facilities.

SHORT-TERM

» Conduct holistic review of current MILCON program to ensure as we move forward we are meeting ARSOF 2022 priorities and capitalizing on opportunities to share common support and maintenance facilities.

» Assess current facilities, with an emphasis on barracks, to ensure sustainment, restoration and modernization requirements are included in all ARSOF Installation Annual Work Plans.

» Complete hangar facilities for Grey Eagle Fielding.

MID-TERM

» Conduct facility compatibility studies to ensure existing and programmed facilities are adequate and optimized to meet mission requirements.

» Improve our ability to compete for Army P2 funding and develop a facilities recapitalization strategy to anticipate future resourcing requirements and compete in the MILCON POM process.

» Develop engineering master plan to facilitate generating and operational force requirements across the USASOC Aviation Enterprise.

LONG-TERM

» Modernize existing facilities to meet evolving equipment, power and C2 requirements.

» Develop, in partnership with SOCOM, a long-range, steady-state funding profile for MILCON.
**ARSOF 2022** articulates the USASOC commander’s vision to provide the nation an unprecedented range of SOF capability and strategic options. It is an ambitious articulation of the commander’s transformational roadmap over the next 10 years.

The USASOC Strategic Planning Process will implement this guidance and translate it into action. It will inform ARSOF Operating Concepts that influence and are further developed in conjunction with the USASOC and U.S. Army Resourcing and Planning Documents. The SPP develops a capabilities-based, mission-focused plan to inform effective resource allocation and an investment strategy across the enterprise.
This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins — war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of combat; by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It requires — in those situations where we must encounter it — a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore, a new and wholly different kind of military training.

— President John F. Kennedy, 1962

EXPERIMENTATION/CAMPAIGN OF LEARNING

THE ROLE OF EXPERIMENTATION IN THE CAMPAIGN OF LEARNING

Experimentation supports the USASOC Campaign of Learning through the conduct of live, virtual and constructive experiments to determine current and future capability vulnerabilities, test/validate functional concepts and shape the development of DOTMLPF solutions.

USASOC Experimentation priorities are found in the ARSOF Concepts Research Experimentation Guidance, which is a part of the USASOC concepts and capabilities development plan used to identify concept and capability vulnerabilities for both the current and future force.

Experiments culminate in the transition of their results through event reports, observations, findings and recommendations that can be readily used to facilitate decision-making. The results will be standardized and made available through a supporting IT system and will directly lead to a DOTMLPF solution to eliminate the current vulnerabilities or best prepare the future force to meet the challenges of the operating environment.

ENDSTATE: Given a future operational environment, determine what capabilities and capacities are required to meet strategic, operational and tactical challenges that ARSOF can expect to encounter in 2022 and for which existing doctrine and concepts are inadequate.

USASOC will host its own exercise series called SILENT QUEST and participate in TRADOC and SOCOM experiments.

THE SILENT QUEST SERIES VISION:

SILENT QUEST is a biannual, commandwide exercise that builds on future operating environment concepts. While normally projected against environments beyond the POM years, selected DOTMLPF findings may be brought forward earlier. The exercises will:

» Be the culmination of our SOF Campaign of Learning to support and inform concept development and future SOF design initiatives.
» Identify and validate SOF concept development for SOF campaigns and operations and the Army’s full range of military operations.
» Produce outcomes that generate input for DOTMLPF and the POM to support ARSOF 2022 initiatives.
» Identify gaps and overlaps in USASOC’s current and future capabilities.
CONCLUSION

For more than 60 years, Army Special Operations Forces have been at the tip of the spear in the defense of our nation. While the way we fight may change, our core tenets have not. We remain in contact with the enemy, making significant contributions to the nation through extraordinary sacrifice from our regiments and our families. Yet, even while in the fight, we must become students of not only our adversaries but also of our past to build on lessons learned from previous engagements; and of the future, in order to develop the techniques and strategies necessary to remain the force of choice for decision makers. It is imperative that we are prepared to meet these challenges head on, and the way we do that will be through preparation. As your commander, I can prepare you for these threats in no better way than by planning for your success. That’s why this map of our way forward is so important.

The future of Army Special Operations Forces is built upon the foundation of past experience, customs, traditions and proven employment concepts among the diverse organizations that make up USASOC. ARSOF have always functioned as a strategic bridging force, serving as connective tissue among indigenous forces and populations and within our military and the interagency community. While that cannot change, we are not content to maintain the status quo, because failure is not an option.

We must posture ourselves to meet and sustain the growing demands for increased cultural access and enhanced mobility required in support of national and theater strategies.

By embracing the changes outlined within ARSOF 2022, we will be prepared to thrive in the complex operating environment of the 21st century. By honing our special warfare and surgical strike capabilities and matching them with state-of-the-art technology used by educated and culturally savvy Soldiers we can ensure the defense of our nation and help to shore up that of our partners.

Without action, the words here are just that, words. It is imperative that our entire force inculcates these changes into the way they do business. If we move forward in a connected, reasoned manner, we will be able to face the uncertainty of the next decade and emerge a stronger force. It is in your hands.

“History teaches us that the nations that grow comfortable with the old ways and complacent in the face of new threats, those nations do not long endure. And in the 21st century, we do not have the luxury of deciding which challenges to prepare for and which to ignore. We must overcome the full spectrum of threats – the conventional and the unconventional; the nation state and the terrorist network; the spread of deadly technologies and the spread of hateful ideologies; 18th century-style piracy and 21st century cyber threats.”

—President Barack H. Obama, 2009