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In October 2011, a small group of U.S. Special Forces Soldiers from the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) arrived in Africa to advise and assist in the hunt for Joseph Kony and his followers who comprise the Lord’s Resistance Army. Kony’s group made headlines through much of the beginning of the year, as a social-media campaign, *Kony 2012*, was launched to bring the group’s actions to the forefront of western society. While many people, including those in the United States, took a closer look at Africa and the presence of U.S. troops on the continent because of the Kony campaign, most did not realize that U.S. special-operations forces have been working side-by-side with African partner nations for decades. The spotlight on the Counter Lord’s Resistance Army mission may overshadow the significant contributions made by Army special-operations forces over the past decade, but in this issue, we will highlight some of the areas and ways that our regiments are making an impact in Africa — a land that President Barak Obama has noted “…is more important than ever to the security and prosperity of the international community, and to the United States in particular.”

The conduct of special warfare, which is the “execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain or hostile environment,” is key to our success in Africa. In his article “Special Warfare in Africa,” Lt. Col. Guillaume “Will” Beaurpere, of the 10th SF Group (A) discusses how SOF, working in a complex, geographically vast and ethnically and culturally diverse environment is achieving U.S. objectives discreetly without a large-scale military investment. In his article, Beaurpere, who is a veteran of numerous African deployments, utilizes his time on the ground as a basis for the analysis of the full spectrum of activities conducted over the past few years including the application of special warfare to support partner-nation internal defense and development, SOF support to U.S. Africa Command sub-regional campaign plans aimed at disrupting and degrading al-Qaeda and its many affiliates and support to African partners struggling to quell regional, violent insurgent movements.

Maj. Darrin Tangeman and Capt. Jonathan Lindsley discuss the problems inherent in the advise and assist mission to Counter-Lord’s Resistance Army. In their article, “Conducting Non-Standard Logistics in Central Africa,” they discuss the problems encountered working in such a large geographic area that is under-developed and under-served. While many special-operations Soldiers have faced hardships in recent deployments, Africa has its own unique challenges from lack of airfields and roads to lack of communication and medical expertise. While all of these issues proved problematic during the deployment of troops in the Counter-LRA mission, the men of the 10th SF Group (A) proved their ability to adapt to their environment and find a way to continue the mission.

Soldiers from the Military Information Operations Command and the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade have been working side-by-side with their ARSOF brothers in fulfilling the diverse missions in Africa. You will also find articles in this edition on the strategic application of their efforts to support the overall Special Operations Command Africa missions to the continent.

As we enter a new year, we must remain ever mindful of those who are deployed in harm’s way and those we have lost in our efforts to protect our great nation.

De Opresso Liber,

Major General Edward M. Reeder Jr.
Through or With: A UW Refresher

In June 2011, the commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, approved a new definition of unconventional warfare. While those who work within the confines of the school house are aware of the change in doctrine, many in the field are not. In an effort to ensure that all special-operations forces know the new definition, we are offering a short primer.

The official definition of unconventional warfare is:
“Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.”
— Source: JP 3-05 (18APR11) as listed in JP1-02 (15NOV12)

Of particular note is the phrase “...by operating through or with...” Previous versions of the UW definition included the phrase “...conducted through, with or by...” as listed in JP 3-05 (17DEC03). In common and popular usage, this phrase has been turned into a stock phrase of “...by, with and through;” a construction that is melodious and rolls easily off of the tongue. Melodious or not, and regardless of its popularity, this phrase is not an element of official doctrine, and is not to be used with regard to anything concerning UW.

In a follow-on message from the Commanding General, United States Army Special Operations Command, it was noted, “Commander United States Army Special Operations Command has approved a new unconventional warfare definition. The approved definition for unconventional warfare is as follows: ‘Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area. This definition is now the only approved official definition of UW within the SOF community.”
— Jeffery Hasler, USAJFKSWCS Doctrine Writer/Analyst

10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) celebrates 60 years as “The Originals”

Family members, retirees and distinguished visitors honored the history of the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) as the unit celebrated its 60th Anniversary as the original Special Forces unit throughout the month of June 2012, with a multi-day event that included a kick-off ceremony, golf tournament, compound tours, weapons familiarization for family and friends, commander’s motorcycle ride, picnic and a military ball, which was held at a five-star hotel.

“Incumbent with wearing the flash of the 10th Group is a responsibility to uphold the lineage, tradition and honor of the U.S. Army Special Forces. We are “The Originals,” said Col. John Deedrick, commander of 10th SFG (A) Group. “We wanted to recognize the tremendous history of the 10th Special Forces Group with a celebration befitting the unit’s distinguished accomplishments and to honor its warriors both past and present.

The celebration of the Army’s first Special Forces unit was tremendous both in scale and the importance of attendees, which included five original members of the 10th SFG (A), seven active-duty and retired general officers, a Medal of Honor and Distinguished Service Cross recipient, five former group commanders, three former group command chiefs, three former group command sergeants major and four Gold Star families.

Lt. Gen. Charles T. Cleveland, commander of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, was the guest speaker at the ball.

The celebration was opened in a formal ceremony that included the induction of 50 current group Soldiers into the unit’s Century Jumper Club. Members of this organization achieved the rare feat of having made more than 100 airborne jumps and are a certified jumpmaster. The ceremony was highlighted by a patriotic parachute demonstration from the Black Daggers, the United States Army Special Operations Command’s official military free-fall demonstration team.

The sharp report of weapons being fired and golf balls being whacked sounded as family members and visitors fired a variety of weapons employed by the group’s Soldiers and enjoyed the camaraderie of friends both old and new. Approximately 250 civilians, retirees and friends got a taste of a Special Forces Soldier’s life by firing numerous weapons utilizing live ammunition while nearly 150 golfers enjoyed a golf tournament at the Cheyenne Mountain Resort.

The sight and roar of approximately 250 motorcycles filled the roadway as the commander’s motorcycle ride headed out of Fort Carson on its way to MacCandless Veteran’s Home, led by Cleveland. There, the riders interacted with, and showed their appreciation to, veterans at the home whose pride in their service touched many of the bikers who rode in the largest commander’s ride in the group’s history.

“The 60th Celebration of the 10th Special Forces Group was a magnificent success,” said Deedrick. “Through the tremendous effort of hundreds of Soldiers and family members, we were able to recognize the incredible accomplishments 10th SFG (A) Soldiers, past and present, have made in their selfless service to this nation.”
— by Lt. Col. Steve Osterholzer, 10th SFG(A) PAO.
**Special Forces Qualification Course to incorporate military free-fall training**

In today's global environment, areas of conflict are becoming increasingly difficult for military forces to access. Through advances in technology, tactics and training, potential adversaries are prepared to prevent unwanted forces' physical presence and the U.S. military must adapt to face these challenges.

A collective military free-fall capability throughout the Army's Special Forces Regiment will ensure the U.S. Army's unconventional-warfare force can effectively enter and perform within the operational areas of today and tomorrow.

Traditional forced-entry techniques such as low-altitude, static-line airborne operations have lost viability as a clandestine entry technique, especially in special-operations missions where silence and accuracy are crucial to mission success. A 12-man unit, armed with the cultural and tactical expertise, is small enough to maintain its MFF qualification, and use the capability to enter a remote area where a larger, conventional Army presence would not be feasible, necessary or cost-effective.

To meet this challenge, the Special Forces Regiment has re-evaluated its training methodology to ensure its Soldiers have an expansive skill set to meet the demands of our current and future operational environment. This reevaluation has established that while Army Special Forces units do include select MFF-capable ODAs, the force lacks a formal, widespread clandestine infiltration capability, which would be available through regiment-wide military free-fall qualification.

To increase the U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) units' proficiency in MFF, the U.S. Army John F Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, N.C., is prepared to incorporate military free-fall training into the Special Forces Qualification Course. This initiative will increase the regiment's collective forced-entry and global-response capabilities.

This initiative will institutionalize MFF operations by investing in the Military Free-Fall School at Yuma Proving Ground in Yuma, Ariz., which is the U.S. Special Operations Command's proponent for military free fall. The school is restructuring the Military Free-Fall Parachutist Course so that it will offer sufficient annual training slots for all SFQC candidates while maintaining allocated slots for qualified Special Forces personnel already assigned to operational units. Beginning in February 2013, the MFFPC will transition from a four-week to a three-week course.

The first week will remain the same, consisting of vertical wind tunnel body-stabilization training, MC-4 parachute packing and an introduction to MFF operations. The remaining two weeks will encompass a jump profile of three airborne operations per training iteration, totaling 30 MFF operations per course encompassing various conditions and equipment loads.

In fiscal year 2013, SWCS plans to host up to 358 Special Forces Soldiers through the MFFPC. By fiscal year 2015, with the addition of 18 MFF instructors and dedicated aircraft, the MFFPC will reach its optimal throughput of 1,026 MFF parachutists, including 766 Special Forces Soldiers. When fully manned and equipped, the Military Free Fall School will conduct 19 MFFPC classes each fiscal year with 54 students in each class.

Simultaneously, the MFFPC continues to evolve its program of instruction to send the highest-quality MFF parachutist into the military's special-operations forces. The course incorporates the use of body-armor carriers and modular integrated communications helmets as the baseline equipment load for all jumps. Instructors use this communications technology to interact with their MFFPC students while under canopy to foster proper canopy-control techniques. As a result, MFFPC graduates are capable of landing as a group on a designated point, fully prepared to execute follow-on missions.

**USASOC, UNC conduct Human Domain Workshop**

The first Human Domain Workshop was held at the Airborne and Special Operations Research overture Nov. 14, in Fayetteville, N.C. This workshop brought academic specialists and military experts together for the first time to discuss the science of the human domain as it pertains to the needs of special-operations forces.

"This is a rather unique group in the sense that it mixes Special Operations opinion leaders with the very cutting edge of the research community," said Dr. John S. Morgan, Ph.D. U.S. Army Special Operations Command, command science adviser.

The University of North Carolina sponsored the workshop as part of its ongoing partnership with USASOC to provide a range of educational, training, scholarship, research and scientific support to the command. The event featured more than 20 experts, including faculty from various UNC system and outside academic institutions and industry technologists discussing their fields of study, and how each applies to the study of the human domain. The presentations and panel discussions covered areas such as political science, social media and social networking analysis, geospatial analysis, modeling and simulation and game theory. The workshop focused on the opportunity to learn more about the field of quantitative social science and what it can to do help give military experts and opinion leaders a better understanding of the human domain.

"My belief is we can now measure how well Special Operations is doing in an area of operation through quantitative metrics derived from things like levels of violence, sentiment and other indicators in an area of operations and use that to guide strategic flexibility," said Morgan.

As ARSOF continue to encounter the human domain, a broader knowledge base and a scientific approach are in demand.

As the U.S. Army Special Operations Command continues to develop new strategies to respond to the emerging human domain, the social sciences lectured upon during the workshop become a more integral part of the solution.

"One of the most important things that we need to look at as we look forward is what does the world look like?" said Col. Ernesto Sirvas USASOC G9 director.

"What are the emerging trends? As it relates to culture, social issues, political layout and everything is important as we look forward; defining that and trying to basically get at what we think our future operating environment will be."

"We're trying to define what the future looks like, so we can also prepare for it," said Sirvas. "Prepare for it by having the right equipment and having the right knowledge set within our soldiers." – by Sgt. Daniel Carter, USASOC Public Affairs.
The Future of MISO in Unconventional Warfare

“The United States Army’s MISO forces are the Department of Defense’s only capability specifically selected, trained, organized, equipped and networked to manage and influence through psychological effects on foreign target audiences; and, therefore, are critical to managing perceptions of legitimacy and fulfilling the Army special-operations forces’ imperative of anticipating and controlling psychological effects in unconventional warfare.”

— Strategic Value of MISO in UW Memorandum 3 August 2012

Introduction

Similar to the rest of the ARSOF community, the 4th Military Information Support Group is invested heavily in the evaluation of its role in 21st century unconventional warfare. The Arab Spring provides UW practitioners with multiple case studies where governments ceded power to mobilized populations without the application of guerrilla forces and hostile regimes fell to a combination of guerrilla forces and a mobilized populace. Learning from each study, 4th MISG developed contemporary UW tactics, techniques and procedures grounded in historically-sound UW principles to apply to three major emerging conditions of the 21st century UW information environment:

- Information moves among populations at a velocity that is unprecedented and uncontrollable.
- Populations in the UW operational area are more connected to the rest of the world than ever before, and,
- Hostile regimes will attempt to monitor and control the flow of information.

Over the past six months, UW planners from 4th MISG sought to evaluate and validate many of these emerging TTPs, primarily through UW exercises such as Joint Readiness Training Center Rotation 13-01. This article is a compilation of many of these ideas and initiatives, now presented to the greater SOF community as a discussion starter. Some of the topics include: an overview of the future of MISO in UW, MISO integration with intelligence efforts, social media in UW and a look at MISO requirements that go beyond the seven phase UW model.

JRTC 13-01 and Contemporary UW Concepts

JRTC 13-01, a UW exercise conducted across three U.S. states with 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) as the special-operations task force mission command, provided a unique opportunity for 4th MISG to validate MISO’s role in the seven phase UW model, explore the relevance of recent cultural and social phenomena and evaluate emerging influence tactics in preparation for future UW environments. To accomplish this, 4th MISG provided more than 50 hand-selected MISO practitioners from a variety of backgrounds.

In preparation for the training event, MISO planners conducted extensive studies of current and historical U.S. Army UW doctrine, classic and contemporary irregular-warfare theorists and related sociological theorists and trends. From these diverse sources, MISO planners developed a menu of operational-influence concepts for contemporary UW. These concepts balanced UW-specific divisive operations with legitimacy campaigns and also included the traditional UW roles for MISO.

One of the most noteworthy discoveries in the team’s research was the influence-based revolutionary tactics theorized by Gene Sharp, which were not traditionally employed by U.S. military planners. Sharp, a political science professor emeritus at the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, is a proponent of nonviolent revolutionary activism. He has authored several works on the subject. His historically-substantiated writings on nonviolent resistance provide almost 200 tactics to affect hostile governments or occupying forces. Sharp’s work, From Dictatorship to Democracy, has been translated into more than 30 languages and was fundamental in several revolutionary movements, from the Yugoslavian Bulldozer Revolution in 2000 to the Iranian Velvet Revolution in 2009. Although not all of Sharp’s theories and techniques are applicable to UW, his techniques can be used to unify disparate resistance groups, combat population resource-control measures and mobilize the masses. The most visible of his techniques is the application of protests, marches and demonstrations against a hostile government, which are arguably some of the most powerful psychological actions trending in modern times. JRTC 13-01 allowed 4th MISG to validate many operational concepts and TTPs based off Sharp’s works; however, these will require further research and training prior to application to a real-world UW operation.

Laid out in Figure 1, page 8, some of the other contemporary UW concepts and methods implemented during the JRTC 13-01 were focused on emerging dissemination methods, Diaspora-supported social-media messaging and MISO infiltration of denied areas to shape the deep fight throughout the seven phases of UW. Additionally, using a combination of social media and boots-on-ground MIS forces, indigenous resistance-force propaganda cells were organized, built-up and employed to exploit the combat actions of resistance guerrilla forces, promote the resistance locally and conduct divisive operations to degrade the hostile regime. These approaches provided substantial potential as a scalable menu of contemporary concepts that can be provided in future UW operations. To facilitate the application of these contemporary concepts, MISO must be integrated with the intelligence community.

MISO Integration with Intelligence Efforts

Contribution by: CPT Rob Otwell

Influence operations, by their very nature, are incredibly intelligence intensive. As such, early integration and synchronization of MISO with intelligence efforts has proven to be a common element of many of our most successful missions over the past 10 years. To institutionalize this vital skill set, 4th MISG established the first course of the Master Intelligence Practitioner concept with the Intelligence Support to Military Information Support Operations Course. Four weeks in length, this course provides the MISO practitioner with the ability to conduct the following:

- Advise the team leader on all spectrums of DoD and interagency intelligence activities;
- Provide administrative oversight to the interface of MISO units of action with intelligence activities;
- Incorporate and synchronize core intelligence functions into all aspects of the MISO process with emphasis on target-audience analysis and joint targeting; and,
- Operate intelligence-based software systems designed to input, analyze and transform vast amounts of data into a specific and quantifiable products that will drive the MISO process.

The course is instructed by a combination of intelligence professionals and experienced MISO practitioners and is now a prerequisite for all deploying MISO teams.

During JRTC 13-01, the IS2MISO skill set was put to the test. From developing the information environment and human-domain products for
the initial intelligence estimates, to providing critical inputs to the SOTF’s center-of-gravity analysis, it was clear that from the initial planning stages that the MISO element had not only successfully integrated with the SOTF S2, but that this integration ensured that MISO was a key player in the entire military decision-making process. Throughout this exercise, the detachment showed that MISO integrated with intelligence operations provides a mutually beneficial relationship due to the unique perspective in which MISO practitioners conduct their analysis. During execution, the RMD had two dedicated seats in the SOTF SCIF — allowing the ability to input MISO requirements into the SOTF collection plan. Furthermore, they were also able to inject key-impact indicators and measures of effectiveness into the SOTF Daily Intelligence Summary. This not only provided key MISO information to the commander and his staff in a familiar format, it also ensured the all MISO information was synchronized and deconflicted with the S2’s intelligence — greatly enhancing the credibility of our input. JRTC 13-01 not only validated the curriculum of the course, but also show how essential the skill set provided is to the MISO practitioner, especially in contemporary UW, which is heavily reliant on the information environment.

A quick look into the Intelligence Support to MISO Course. The IS2MISO course is organized into four modules designed to teach a multitude of skills. The first module covers the introduction of how the interagency intelligence community operates, intelligence oversight and a variety of other topics. The second module covers intelligence administrative actions such as physical security, information security and personal security. The third module teaches MISO practitioners to use digital intelligence systems that are available to the intelligence community in order to inject this intelligence into the MISO process. Finally, the fourth module covers the core-intelligence competencies, which include: in-depth instruction on the intelligence cycle, operational design, intelligence preparation of the environment, targeting theory and various other topics critical to MISO. These four modules are followed by an intensive 72-hour culmination exercise using real-world problem sets submitted by the students’ respective battalions that concludes with a target-nomination brief to the students’ battalion command teams. The end result is a product that can be taken back to the respective battalions to be operationalized.

The desired outcome of this course is not to create an intelligence analyst. Instead, this curriculum is focused on giving MISO practitioners the information required to fully integrate and synchronize real-time intelligence and analysis into the MISO Process, while also providing key MISO input into the supported unit planning process. On a final note, the charter of a graduate of IS2MISO is to begin a career-long learning path that will enhance their knowledge of the intelligence field. Graduates continue to seek advanced training, bringing cutting-edge techniques back to 4th MISO. For example, Soldiers from this RMD attended the Open Source Academy’s basic open source analysis courses, allowing them to develop ways to utilize social media in contemporary UW operations.

Social Media in UW

Contribution by: Staff Sgt. Butkevics and Sgt. Hannaford

Social media has made a significant impact on the way information and ideas are exchanged. There have been several articles published surrounding the topic of social media in UW, and although MISO utilizes social media as a dissemination platform at every geographic combatant command, the application of these TTPs to a UW scenario has only recently come to the forefront. Like the IS2MISO skill set, JRTC 13-01 afforded us the ability to implement existing TTPs to a UW environment and also test and validate new emerging TTPs. Below is a sampling of some of the initiatives 4th MISO is exploring in this arena:

Enhanced Target Audience Analysis.

Researching a target audience has always been challenged by the concept of space; populations have traditionally had an internal and an external space that needs to be analyzed and with the introduction of the Internet, these populations are now communicating within a virtual space as well. Detecting this shift in the information environment, the 4th MISO has invested significant effort into establishing an open-source monitoring and analysis cell in order to enhance target-audience analysis and provide near real-time data to inform
the seven-step MISO process. Once at full-operating capacity, the model for this cell will be applied to all of the other regionally aligned MISO battalions.

4th MISO is now acquiring the required hardware and software while simultaneously sending specially-selected MISO practitioners to receive advanced training. A majority of courses being attended are focused on open-source monitoring and analysis but also include courses such as the Basic Computer Network Operations Planners Course to ensure that contemporary UW practitioners understand the distinction between MISO efforts and Computer Network Operations.

Using Center of Gravity and Social Network Analysis skills learned from IS2MISO in combination with the Open Source Center’s methodology for social-media monitoring and analysis, our current open-source monitoring and analysis cell is able to systematically analyze websites using a qualitative and quantitative approach to apply to TAA. This methodology produces the following: narrative analysis, identification of key influencers and an understanding of baseline sentiment within the online network. The focus is not on understanding a specific social-media platform but instead applying a methodology that provides a more holistic picture of our target audience.

There will always be key sites such as YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, WordPress and other country-specific platforms that will dominate the social-media scene. However there exists a multitude of other sites, platforms and varying forms of virtual communication that must be integrated into our processes. This particular line of effort did not require validation in JRTC 13-01; however, the enhanced analysis resulting from the application of this new skill set proved invaluable to increasing depth, quality, accuracy and real-time relevance of our planning products, and as a result, a marked increase in the effectiveness of our influence series and programs. Although it hasn’t been applied to a real-world UW operation, this new skill set will prove critical in conducting analysis of audiences in denied or media-controlled environments that are characteristic of almost all potential UW scenarios.

Virtual Pilot Team Operations. Doctrinally, MISO may augment pilot teams or provide them "population-specific information requests to facilitate the evaluation of indigenous information capabilities and the determination of the level of support necessary to fully develop those capabilities and increase their operational effectiveness." The widespread virtual space connectivity of potential UW target audiences has provided an opportunity for a new two-pronged approach to pilot-team operations that can be conducted from Fort Bragg. First, MISO practitioners can assess baseline sentiment in the UW operational area in a way that provides a unique perspective and better understanding of the population and potential target audiences. Second, MISO practitioners can identify, analyze the sentiment of, and virtually link up with, key communicators in the UW operational area. These techniques could be conducted prior to traditional pilot-team operations to provide better fidelity of ground truth, decrease risk and increase success of traditional pilot-team operations.

In an operational environment where physical pilot-team operations are not feasible or there is a requirement for information faster than a pilot-team operation can be planned and executed, virtual pilot-team operations could be conducted in lieu of the traditional approach. Though there is no substitute for traditional pilot-team operations, a combination of traditional and virtual pilot-team operations would provide the most holistic picture of a UW environment and if the political situation prevents traditional pilot teams, virtual operations provide alternate options.

MISO and What Doesn’t Fit into Seven Phase UW Model

Contribution by: Sgt. 1st Class Chris Heidger

TC 18-01 captured a large portion of MISO’s role in the seven phases of UW, and the Strategic Value of MISO in UW memorandum from August 2012 filled in the remaining gaps. Going into JRTC 13-01, we intended solely to validate our traditional role within this seven-phase model along with the new additions from the memorandum. However, within a few days we quickly realized that from a MISO perspective the seven-phase UW model alone is insufficient to achieve all of the desired psychological effects in the UW operational area.

U.S. forces are typically limited to no unilateral or combined lethal operations in the early stages of UW. Though lethal operations rapidly produce effects in the environment, influence operations and other non-lethal effects often take longer to appear. Therefore, if influence operations are to shape the environment and to amplify lethal effects, they must begin as early as possible. Preferably, they would commence in the initial contact phase and would continue throughout the operation focusing on divisive operations to isolate the hostile regime both inside and outside the UW-operational area, as well as setting the conditions to maximize effects during the employment and transition phases (see figure 1).

The means to achieve this would include the social media TFPs explained above as well as the employment of the episodic and enduring engagements of the global MISO network. Whether or not these unilateral influence operations are appropriate would be situational dependent. There is a possibility that MISO’s role in a UW operation would not call for unilateral influence operations or that the political risks and implications make them unfeasible. Given the connectedness of the world, these unilateral shaping operations will be required in some form or fashion in almost all potential future UW operations.

Conclusion

Considering many of the concepts presented in this paper, historic and contemporary doctrine and literature, the psychological nature of UW, combined with the complex information environment of 21st century makes MISO a key force of choice for UW. Although much work is yet to be done, 4th MISO is continuing on a campaign of learning based on the initiatives laid out above and the outcomes of JRTC rotation 13-01 to develop contemporary UW influence concepts, capabilities and to ensure the MISO community is postured to meet the demands of potential UW operations. Future 4th MISO efforts will include, but won’t be limited to: investing in future UN-focused Combat Training Center rotations, facilitating operational UW war gaming, pursuing development of open-source monitoring and analysis cells in every battalion and establishing a social-theory academy to facilitate nonstandard tactics.

Article compiled by Maj. Jeff Souter and Sgt. 1st Class Chris Heidger. Sections contributed by Capt. Robby Otwell, Staff Sgt. Janis Butkev and Sgt. Leah Hannaford.

Notes

1. Key sources used in preparation for JRTC 13-01 included: the traditional UW roles for MISO derived from doctrine from the FM 3-21.5 Guerrilla Warfare (1961) and Special Forces Operations through TC 18-01 Special Forces Unconventional Warfare (2011); the mobilization theories from Mao Tse-Tung’s On Protracted War (1938) and Ernesto “Che” Guevara’s Guerrilla Warfare (1960); irregular warfare insights from General Sir Frank Kitson’s Low Intensity Operations (1971) and Rufus Phillips’ Why Vietnam Matters (2008); and social theories from Gustave Le Bon’s The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind (1895) and Dr. Gene Sharp’s The Politics of Nonviolent Action (1973).


3. Paul Dourish, “Re-Space-ing Place: “Place” and “Space” Ten Years on” (University of California Irvine, 2006).


5. Ibid, Chapter 3.
The West African landscape is dominated by the Saharan Desert that separates many of the centralized governments from portions of their populations. These countries are a mixture of several divergent ethnic groups that speak a wide range of languages and local dialects. These autochthonous groups not only have to contend with the harsh natural environment, but also a struggling economy that often cannot support its robust youth population. Historically, the governments of the Trans-Sahel region of West Africa have been unstable with frequent regime changes and coups, which has precipitated frequent rearranging of national policies and priorities.

It is within this historical, political, and social context that violent extremist organizations such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Boko Haram, have sought to carve out a foothold and exploit the vast and largely ungoverned areas along the edge of the Sahel. VEOs have proven to be savvy social operators who exploit familial social allegiances and divisions, political instability and feeble economies in a bid to recruit, train, equip, sustain, deploy and retain fighters. The complicated nature of the natural, political and social environments creates a unique messaging problem set for the host-nation governments that often cannot be adequately addressed without external support and assistance.

Military information support teams serve on the front lines of the United State's efforts to execute effective messaging and influence operations in deployed locations around the world. MISTs based at Fort Bragg, N.C., are organized primarily by geographic area of specialization and provide the Department of Defense, interagency partners and select host-nation partners the messaging subject-matter expertise and nuanced cultural knowledge necessary to address the increasing spread of VEOs in the Sahel and counter the proliferation of violent-extremist ideology.

MISTs in West Africa deploy in support of the United States Special Operations Command Africa and the U.S. country team, and assist the HN government and the U.S. Embassy in messaging operations, persuasion and influence campaigns and military-to-military engagements with the end state of creating behavior change in specific foreign audiences. Each MIST is composed of a blend of military occupational specialties that can be tailored to fit a specific operational environment. During the planning, execution and evaluation of military information support operations the MISTs coordinate their activities with other special-operations forces elements and the U.S. Embassy’s country team in order maximize their messaging capabilities and message effectiveness. In order to accomplish their assigned missions and effectively counter the influence of VEOs, the MISTs employ a wide range of techniques and address a spectrum of counter VEO-related activities such as: advising and assisting host-
nation forces; combating trafficking and smuggling; and countering VE ideology. All MIST activities are nested in the various theater, operational and tactical plans as well as the U.S. Embassy’s mission support resource plan. MISTs develop and execute all MISO series through and with the HN and/or partner-nation militaries, governments and civic organizations.

**Military to Military Engagements**

MISTs contribute to engage with HN military forces through joint combined exercises for training, military exercises and other military-to-military engagement venues where MISTs advise and assist HN forces in the development of MISO-related skills and messaging capabilities. MIST input is tailored to the specific needs of each individual military unit and their primary mission and can be executed in conjunction with other military training such as small unit tactics, mission planning or weapons training.

At the most rudimentary level, the MIST works to increase unit professionalism and effectiveness by providing training modules that are designed to increase the military organization’s esprit de corps and instill an ethically-based decision making process for use in their operational environment. Effective and cohesive small units are the building blocks of successful militaries, and this is especially true in the case of the Sahel region where vast terrain, minimal communication networks and limited manpower resources necessitate a more decentralized approach to internal security and military operations.

Building upon this basic foundation, the MIST may also provide assistance in the creation, development and training of a curriculum that advises the HN unit in the most effective employment of key-leader engagements and the formation of developed talking points. This provides the basic skills necessary for the unit to conduct tactical-level messaging during the course of military operations. Positive and effective messaging between HN militaries and the civilian populace they come into contact with on a daily basis fosters trust, builds credibility and helps to retain the cooperation of the population leading ultimately to an increase in the effectiveness of the military unit to accomplish their assigned mission.

Many segments of the local HN population have had only infrequent interaction with the their military, many of which have historically utilized authoritative and heavy-handed tactics towards civilian populaces. Soft skills and communications’ techniques have proven to be effective especially when complemented with humanitarian-assistance programs and community-outreach activities.

In addition to unit-level training, the MIST may also provide the HN militaries with specific technical assistance such as multimedia graphic illustrator support in order to create a more professional and developed messaging product that will effectively engage the selected target audiences. Technical assistance from the MIST not only increases HN capacity in the short term and serves as an opportunity to come side-by-side with the partner nation to provide mentorship, but also allows the HN to expand its sphere of influence at a manageable rate while continuing to perform its current obligations.

Beyond unilateral assistance to HN forces the MIST plays an important role in coordinating messaging during multi-national exercises between the HN military, foreign militaries and the U.S. interagency community. Large multi-nation exercises, such as Exercise Flintlock, which is held annually in West Africa, provides an excellent training opportunity for the MIST to work closely with their HN military partners to both train and execute a strategic communications plan that is nested in the larger exercise plan. The MIST serves as the primary liaison between the participating military units and the other exercise participants in the planning and execution of the exercise’s communications plan, which occurs both within HN leading up to the commencement of the exercises and continues for the duration of the exercise between both military exercise participants and the inhabitants of the exercise’s hosting country.

**Anti-Trafficking/Anti-Smuggling**

Another important area of the MIST focus in the Trans-Sahel region is the issue of trafficking and smuggling. The region is characterized by thousands of kilometers of national borders most of which lie in sparsely populated regions on the edge of the Sahara desert. These vast borders are rarely marked, poorly enforced and often times disregarded by the local populations whose traditional lands were established far before today’s modern borders. The net effect is extremely porous national borders, which allow for the often-unregulated movement of persons, weapons and illicit goods. The lucrative business of trafficking and smuggling across these borders benefits both criminal and VEOs and is a continuing challenge to the national sovereignty and security of the affected West African nations.

MIST efforts to combat trafficking and smuggling in the Sahel have focused primarily in the areas of increasing the capacity of law enforcement and border officials and creating attitudinal change in order to engage local populaces. The MIST’s engagement with the HN may occur at the local, regional or national level depending upon the structure of the HN’s current border authority and security forces, and the unique threat situation of the affected country. Many local populations in border areas have historically not taken ownership or responsibility for the illicit activities that occur in the regions where they reside. Smugglers and traffickers are often viewed by these populations as businessmen, entrepreneurs, or, at worst opportunists. These prevailing perceptions make the enactment of reporting hotlines or even rudimentary cooperation with law enforcement difficult and largely unsuccessful.

In order to address this issue MISTs have pursued an approach where messaging campaigns are conducted in partnership with local or national-level border enforcement authorities in order to link negative societal conditions such as communal violence and weapons proliferation with the criminal actors who traffic the majority of the small arms, munitions and explosives into the affected communities. Once an attitudinal change has taken place, the groundwork is then set for the MIST to proceed with MISO series that can achieve behavior change in the target audience.

A second approach employed by MISTs is the collection, publication and dissemination of effective tactics, techniques and protocols for the interdiction of smuggled goods. Working with HN authorities to capture their most effective practices, and marrying them with lessons learned from other countries and theaters, enables the MIST to provide instructional materials that are used to increase the HN’s capacity to combat smugglers and traffickers. This methodology has proven to be particularly effective in cases where a new threat has emerged more quickly than the HN’s ability to identify the most effective techniques to combat it.

A recent example is the rise of homemade explosives and their employment in vehicle-borne IEDs. In this case, West African MISTS worked quickly to disseminate the information and tech-
iques that would equip the HN’s security forces with the information necessary to allow them to effectively identify and interdict this previously unseen threat.

A final approach to the Trans-Sahel issues of trafficking and smuggling harnesses the power of emerging cellular communications technologies. In the past two decades an explosion of cell-phone use has occurred in West Africa. The rate of mobile phone usage is growing by 50 to 60 percent a year, faster than anywhere else in the world.12 The spread of cellular service (particularly in to more remote regions) has allowed for the establishment of national-emergency call lines (similar to 911 in the United States and 999 or 112 in the UK). These HN operated call centers can be used to not only contact emergency services but also in some cases to serve as a tip line for the local populace to provide information to the HN security services.

In order to aid in the establishment and acceptance of national emergency lines, MISTs have developed a multi-stage approach that begins with the socialization and popularization of the national line through an educational information campaign. Once the targeted population has been informed and support has been garnered for the new national call line, the campaign then transitions to additional messaging that disseminates detailed instructions mixed with social reinforcement for the use of the line in order to provide tips and information to security forces. Finally, depending on the particular HN, the media campaign may be supplemented by a rewards program to encourage use, reinforce the newly formed behavior and increase the programs overall effectiveness.

Countering Violent Extremist Ideology

MISTs are ideally suited to address the growing issue of the proliferation of VEI in West Africa. As communication networks in the region expand, youth and vulnerable populations are increasingly exposed to the ideology, teachings and messaging of violent extremist organizations who seek to garner popular support, recruit new members and justify their actions to a worldwide audience.13

The reality of the West-African messaging landscape is that extremist ideology does not exist in a vacuum, nor does it go unchallenged. There is, however, in many regions a pronounced messaging imbalance with moderate and conservative viewpoints underrepresented in the media environment.14 This may occur for many reasons including a lack of qualified spokespersons, a lack of training or sophistication in messaging activity, a lack of funding available for moderate messaging and/or a fear of violent reprisal against those who challenge the VEO’s message.

The MIST’s work in countering VEI often begins with the identification and vetting of credible local voices already active within the community who are advancing themes and messages consistent with the MIST’s desired attitudinal or behavioral change. Most often a MIST will seek to identify and promote messages already organic to the environment in lieu of creating new and foreign messages. It is the rare messaging environment where the desired themes and messages are not already present, albeit often not to a degree where they are currently achieving the desired effect. Time and again, the utilization of a local credible voice has proven to be a best practice in the countering of VEI.

Once a credible voice has been identified and their personal/organizational background, messaging history, and activities examined for suitability of partnership, the MIST begins the development of a robust messaging plan (referred to as a MISO series) designed to increase the effectiveness of the partner’s messaging and ensure the proper targeting and scope of the desired audience. Central to the development of the MISO series is the identification of current target-audience behavior and the establishment of metrics that will allow the MIST to evaluate series progress over time and facilitate in the periodic evaluation and necessary improvements over the life of the series.

MISTs tailor their support to locally identified messaging partners to best meet the needs of the partner organization and the mutually desired end state of the messaging campaign. MISTs will often provide subject-matter expertise and technical advice in the area of target-audience selection, message construction, product development, data collection and measures of effectiveness. Additionally, the MIST has the ability to not only contract locally for messaging products but also to coordinate for the production assets of the Media Operations Center at Fort Bragg, which is capable of producing and editing radio and TV broadcasts, as well as printed media.

Looking Toward the Future

Regionally, the Counter VEI, anti-trafficking/anti-smuggling and military-to-military engagement lines of influence are coordinated by the regional information support team. The RIST is charged with the synchronization of MISO efforts across the region as well as providing support to SOF elements operating in countries without a MIST present. The RIST and reports directly to and advises the theater special-operations command on all MISO relevant issues. RISTS are a critical entity in the coordination and synchronization of persistent MISO, such as MISTs and the planning and execution of episodic MIS engagements like JCETs and multi-national joint military exercises.

Regional training and exercise will continue to play an important role in the exchange of effective messaging tactics and are an important venue where partner nation forces learn and practice messaging and influence skills. U.S. MIS forces also have an opportunity to observe regional partner operations as well as foster communication and exchange between partners. Ultimately, this will allow for greater cooperation and the development of more coherent, complementing and reinforcing messaging themes between nations in the Tran-Sahel region that face similar and related problem sets.15

As new communications platforms and their uses continue to increase in the Trans-Sahel region, MIST teams are drafting plans and implementing series that capitalize on the growing popularity of the Internet and, specifically, social-media platforms.”
behind more developed regions, the Internet is a growing messaging platform that can be used to target and selectively disseminate messages to the growing youth bulge that comprise the majority of its users. As seen in the case of the Arab Spring, social media, Internet-based news and information sites and even entertainment-based sites all serve both individually and collectively to bring Internet users together, facilitate communication, incubate and spread ideas and serve as a catalyst for action. The implications for this technology on both local and national levels in the Sahel region likely constitutes the future of messaging and is an ever growing area of interest and activity for MISTs who will sit at the intersection of time-tested messaging practices and emerging technologies in the evolving media landscape of the Trans-Sahel region of West Africa. 

Capt. John Boehnert and Capt. Jamie Nasi are Psychological Operations Officers currently serving in the 4th Military Information Support Group (Airborne), Fort Bragg, N.C. Each officer has deployed multiple times as the officer in charge of military information support teams in the Joint Special Operations Task Force -Trans-Sahara region of West Africa. They have a combined 40 months of experience living and working in five West Africa nations.

Notes

14. Jason Ipe, James Cockayne, and Alistair Miller, “Implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in West Africa” Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (SEP 2010), 7-8

1. Anatomy of a Revolution by Crane Brinton
2. Black Boomerang by Sefton Delmer
3. Counter Insurgency Warfare; Theory and Practice by David Gallua
4. Freakonomics by Steven D. Levitt and Steven J. Dubner
5. From Dictatorship to Democracy by Gene Sharp
6. From OSS to Green Beret by Aaron Bank
7. Influence; The Psychology of Persuasion by Robert Cialdini
8. Leadership: Giving a Farewell address to Graduating Student Officers by Maj. C. A. Bach
9. Lone Survivor; The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of SEAL Team 10 by Marcus Luttrell and Patrick Robinson
10. Money Ball; The art of winning an unfair game by Michael Lewis
11. Once an Eagle by Antony Myrer
14. Psychological Warfare by Paul M. A. Linebarger
15. Rules for Radicals by Saul Alinksy
16. Start With Why: How great leaders inspire everyone to take action by Simon Sinek
18. The Logic of Failure: recognizing and avoiding error in complex situations The Peloponnesian War by Thucydidres
19. The Tipping Point: How little things can make a big difference by Malcolm Gladwell
21. The USMC Small Wars Manual
22. The Warrior Ethos by Steven Pressfield
23. Thinking, Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman
24. Unconventional Conflicts by Sam Sarkesian
26. Why Men Rebel by Ted Gurr

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MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT TO CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN LIBYA
BY CAPTAIN GEOFFREY CHILDS

When the Arab Spring swept across North Africa and the Middle East during the winter of 2010 the world watched. Nations were shocked when the 26-year-old vegetable vendor in Tunisia lit himself on fire in protest of his oppressive government. States awaited the outcome of the unrest in Egypt that ultimately saw President Hosni Mubarak cede control of the country to a military (tribunal). When Moammar Gadhafi and his 42-year-old regime opened fire on protestors in Benghazi the world was appalled...

By the end of February 2011, U.S. forces monitoring the human-rights violations of the Libyan regime were poised to intervene. Commando Solo and a small Military Information Support support element were sent forward to Europe to facilitate an orderly noncombatant-evacuation operation of third country nationals out of Libya and into Tunisia and Egypt. Over the next eight months, the MSE's mission expanded considerably. Disseminating messages in support of humanitarian assistance, law of land warfare, non-interference and the protection of civilians among others. The Gadhafi regime was forced to respond to the combined joint tax force's MISO messages throughout the conflict and was ultimately defeated. This article aims to explore the success and failures of American MISO during contingency operations in Libya and capture lessons learned that other enablers can apply in support of future mission sets.

Authorities

The MSE arrived into theater in early March and immediately began conducting target-audience analysis and series development in conjunction with a cultural intelligence analyst and a product-development detachment.

MISO approval authority was limited in scope to support exclusively the noncombatant-evacuation mission, which therefore remained the singular focus of the 6th Military Information Support Battalion (A). When UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorizing the use of force to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under the threat of attack was ratified on March 17, 2011, the company, at Fort Bragg, supporting the MSE began developing a MISO series based on the secretary of defense's pre-approved psychological operations programs in anticipation of coalition lethal actions against the Gadhafi regime.

MISO product approval, throughout the duration of both named operations, was retained at either the combatant command or component-command level. Though commanders had the option to delegate their approval to their designated representatives, neither did, which was understandable given that at times American policy seemed fluid in regards to Libya. The end result, though, for the PSYOP practitioner was that it was practically impossible to provide responsive, timely products to the CJTF.

The U.S. African Command learned from Operation Odyssey Dawn and delegated
direct authority to the component command for Operation Unified Protector. However, neither the COCOM or component is singularly focused on the task force, nor should they. In the future, task forces should have a greater degree of autonomy to approve their series. The most likely and effective solution being delegation to a designated representative within the task force, that is still attuned to U.S. policy and interests - in this particular instance, the TF J-3.

**Joint Integration**

The Forward element was ideally located to upload MIS product to Commando Solo, but was too far removed from the series approval authority, which was retained by the AFRICOM commander, to effectively ensure the series was staffed and ultimately approved. The MISO battalion, identified the requirement to have a unit representative present at AFRICOM as the situation within Libya was devolving but before UNSCR 1973. The battalion was able to deploy a MIS planner, without an approved request for forces, to augment the AFRICOM Information Operations Directorate days before the bombing campaign began March 21, 2011.

The MIS battalion was able to generate a GENTEX order authorizing the deployment of the aforementioned MIS planner to AFRICOM. That process, though quicker than waiting on an RFF, was not fast enough to effectively integrate MIS assets into the AFRICOM Joint Planning Team, Targeting Cell or Humanitarian-Assistance Working Group.

Ultimately, when Operation Odyssey Dawn began lethal activity, MISO was integrated. Commando Solo flew its first sortie, broadcasting 11 MISO messages in three languages...messages were dedeveloped, approved, translated, recorded, uploaded and disseminated within a 17-hour time frame.”

“Commando Solo flew its first sortie, broadcasting 11 MISO messages in three languages...messages were dedeveloped, approved, translated, recorded, uploaded and disseminated within a 17-hour time frame.”

have been synchronized within the overall campaign and served to amplify the lethal effects being delivered on the ground.

**Transition to NATO**

The MISO team, utilizing CONUS-based support continued providing content to Commando Solo throughout the 12-day duration of OOD. The same team remained in place with the MISO dissemination aircraft providing direct support to the NATO CJTF-Unified Protector, which had agreed to expand its mandate from merely enforcing embargo and air exclusionary-zone operations to include the protection of civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack.

With the center of gravity shifting from AFRICOM to the CJTF headquarters at Joint Forces Command Naples, the team no longer required a liaison/planner at AFRICOM; instead the team’s commander and noncommissioned officer in charge nested themselves within the establishment of the new task force’s joint effects management cell. The team remained arrayed dispersed between the CJTF headquarters and the aircraft until the end of Operation Unified Protector, from April 1, 2011 to October 31, 2011.

**Measures of Performance and Impact Indicators**

More than 50 messages were disseminated throughout the 12-days of OOD and an additional 200 were disseminated during the seven months of OUP. Pending the execution of directed post-testing it is impossible to offer concrete measures of effectiveness; however, there are several impact indicators worth mentioning.

On several occasions the CJTF was able to interrupt the Gadhafi Regime’s propaganda observe-Orient-Decide-Act loop and force them to respond to MISO messages. In April, NATO disseminated a leaflet exploiting Gadhafi’s indictment by the International Criminal Court. Within days a website sympathetic to Gadhafi modified the NATO leaflet encouraging Libyan’s to continue killing the rebel forces.

Around the same time, the CJTF developed and disseminated a radio message highlighting the reported use of rape as a means of attacking rebels and suspected rebel families. The regime became aware of these messages and circulated a press release categorically denying NATO’s accusations that they were in any way condoning or encouraging violence against women.

In the closing days of the operation, during the month of September, a regime radio station in the vicinity of Bani Walide, one of the final two regime strongholds, was reportedly refuting NATO’s claims that the Libyan dinar was somehow less valuable than it had been previously, that the regime would be unable to pay its debts, and that the regime was employing mercenaries.

Most significantly, a correlatve if not causative relationship, can be shown between Commando Solo messaging and the fall of the following regime strongholds; Misratah, Tripoli, Sirte and Bani Walide. Each of the aforementioned cities was deliberately targeted and messaged by Commando Solo. After persistent MISO messaging supported by lethal activity, Transitional National Council forces not only were able to capture the cities, but in some cases, as with Tripoli, did so with relatively little regime opposition.

**Lessons Learned**

Forcing the Quaddafi regime to respond to MISO messaging and his ultimate demize proved a successful MISO mission. There are several lessons that can be weaned from these operations that can be applied by MISO elements throughout the force. These lessons must be explored in somewhat more detail.

**MISO as holistic information operations practitioners**

Military Information Support Operations practitioners are set apart from the other information operations disciplines due in large part to the organization of MISO as a branch. MISO is able to offer “green-tabbed” leaders able to leverage the collective resources of the Military Information Support Operations Command (Airborne) (Provisional) against mission-specific problem sets.
Electronic Warfare is the most obvious and best example of an IO deficiency. Relevant communications and signals intelligence to Commando Solo and its supporting MISO team was classified above the CJTF’s shared classification level. Relevant intelligence was classified secret releasable to Five Eyes (an international intelligence sharing network) countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United States and Great Britain) thus rendering The CJTF EW officer, a Spaniard, incapable of coordinating and synchronizing frequencies for the TF.

The way ahead for the PSYOP branch requires these leaders to become holistic IO practitioners. PSYOP officers must become educated in other information-operations core capabilities such as military deception and electronic warfare. In future contingency operations, such as OUP, MIS soldiers will likely again be the only IO representatives forward deployed. The Military Information Support Operations Command representatives must be able to fill the void created by niche IO capabilities.

The Relationship with the TSOC

Operation Unified Protector had tactical control over Commando Solo, an American special-operations asset. Special Operations Command - Africa, rather than coordinate and deconflict their operators’ efforts, exercised no level of command or control over SOF MIS efforts in Libya. The MISO effects being delivered in Libya should not have been implemented in isolation, but instead should have been integrated and synchronized with effects throughout the Trans-Sahel region. Instead, the only SOF element continuously engaged with Libya over the course of the two contingency operations was left in isolation within the respective task forces.

Over the coming years, SOF operators will likely continue operating throughout Africa’s Trans-Sahel region. The messages disseminated in Libya are not contained strictly to the target nation. TSOCs must avoid the temptation to view future contingencies linearly in isolation from the rest of their area of responsibility. CJTF-UPS messages were fairly benign and will likely have little lasting impact on the region beyond the death of Gadhafi; however, had the situation evolved differently, SOC Africa would have, in all likelihood, ultimately inherited the mission set along with a MISO program developed and executed in isolation from the TSOC efforts elsewhere in the AOR.

Working within the Framework of NATO

Without going into the specifics of the RFF process bringing the MSE to Europe in support of Commando Solo, the MSE was designed to work subordinate to a MISO Task force (RFF submitted, but never filled). When NATO assumed responsibility for the AOR the JEMC effectively became the CJTF JISTF.

On paper, the JEMC was a hierarchical organization with subordinate divisions reporting to the cell’s head, a member of the Great Britain Royal Air Force OF-5. In practice, the cell operated as a flat organization with division chiefs all OF-4s reporting to the deputy JEMC head another OF-4. The PSYOP chief, whom the MSE ultimately reported to, was an Italian PSYOP officer that, like the Spanish EW officer, was not read onto the capabilities of the aircraft.

A NATO task force is as much a political organization as much as it is a military one. The fact that the MSE could share some information with the PSYOP chief’s superior (a GBR officer) but not the PSYOP chief did not go unnoticed. It is imperative for the PSYOP branch to fill key billets not only within the SOF community but also in areas such as NATO’s Peacetime Establishment. An American field-grade PSYOP officer is authorized but unfilled at Joint Forces Command Naples, and would undoubtedly been included in the CJTF’s crises establishment.

This is not to say that SOF junior officers and NCOs are too junior to work effectively in a CJTF construct. However, they must be cognizant of the relative importance some nationalities place on rank verses position and vice versa and the implications of their actions in such an environment.

NATO PSYOP

The CJTF’s approach to Psychological Operations during OUP was episodic at best. The PSYOP section lacked the ability to view the problem set of Libya through the lenses of both a microscope and a telescope. They tended to fixate on singular points of interest and snapshots of time and wanted to develop individual messages exploit that singular isolated event. In the end, the CJTF had developed close to 300 approved products, none of which were part of a series of messages.

In order for MISO to effectively affect behavioral modification, a more sophisticated approach must be employed. Libyan fighters, both for and against the regime, were in a very real way fighting for their survival. For more than 40 years their world had been ruled by one authoritarian man, the decision to fight in February 2011 was a significant emotional event for both sides. NATO messages encouraging the two sides (because NATO was officially neutral) to “stop fighting” were ineffective.

The Seven Step Process

MISO messages must be designed with a specific target audience in mind, as opposed to large segments such as all belligerents in Libya. These messages must have a specific desired effect for that target audience. Then, based on careful and detailed analysis of the target audience, the MISO professional crafts persuasive arguments to modify the targets’ current behavior to fall in line with the desired behavior. Often times, as was the case with NATO’s “stop fighting” messages, these arguments may require the target audience to accept facts that they currently reject. A single message, more often than not is insufficient to inform the target of other possibilities while at the same time persuading them to accept and execute the desired one.

Phased MISO series’ coordinated and synchronized with other lethal and non-lethal effects is the only way to achieve success in modifying behavior. Rather than telling all Libyans to “stop fighting” two series should have been developed targeting the two factions offering them persuasive arguments for engaging in non-hostile conflict resolution (if ending hostilities was in fact the desired effect). Benchmarks in the target audiences’ acceptance of the arguments, based on observable and quantifiable measures of effectiveness, cue the transition from one phase of the series to another until you are messaging the target audience to accept and execute the desired behavior.

Conclusion

It is impossible to empirically prove that the OOD/OUP MISO campaign directly caused the eventual collapse of the Gadhafi regime. While NATO’s approach to PSYOP was, at times, at odds with the American process for effective MISO there is anecdotal evidence to suggest 6th MISB (A)-enabled NATO messages contributed to the overall success of contingency operations in Libya. Each of the cities targeted by the CJTF’s primary MISO dissemination platform,
Commando Solo, fell to TNC forces, under which civilians were deemed by NATO to no longer be under threat of attack. Of the more than 9 million leaflets disseminated, only a few achieved their desired effect, but most were credited to have bolstered the spirit of the TNC forces and civilians in fear of the regime alike.

The inability to articulate quantifiable MISO success stems in large part from the way in which the CJTF constructed its PSYOP program, as individual products rather than narrowly tailored series. The CJTF also attempted to create behavior changes that were either imperceptible or had no way of measuring without an engaged ground component.

There is another factor involved that made measuring effectiveness problematic. NATO as an institution was neutral in the Libyan civil war. Their legal basis for action was to protect civilians and populated areas under threat of attack. National agendas varied within the coalition, the United States included. The MSE, directly supporting the CJTF, could only disseminate messages advocating the protection of civilians. There is a clear pro-TNC bias.

MISO during Operations Odyssey Dawn and Unified Protector provided the special-operations framework required for mission success in this SOF-enabled conventional force-executed contingency operation. MISO lessons learned from Libya can be applied to all SOF branches, especially as the Army draws down to steady state operations with Operation New Dawn over and requirements to support Operation Enduring Freedom lessening. SOF capabilities are able to provide high-impact, low-cost solutions to the sort of episodic contingency mission seen in Libya and are uniquely suited to “lead-from-behind” enabling international Allies and coalitions to accomplish the mission.

**Notes**

1. NATO grade, U.S. military O-6 equivalent
2. NATO still uses PSYOPS for Military Information Support Operations, for the purposes of this article; the two may be used interchangeably.

**Can You Hear Me Now?**

Military Information Support Soldiers created several products in support of the United States’ mission in Libya. The products were quickly copied by the Ghadaffi regime who flipped the message against them to a message against the United States. The handbills asked the populace to cease support to Ghadaffi’s government because of the way he violated international law and basic human rights. The messaging further let the populace know that Ghadaffi was considered a criminal by the world court. U.S. Army photos

**Captain Geoffrey Childs** served as a scout platoon leader in southeastern Iraq in 2008. He has most recently deployed to Europe in support of Operation Unified Protector as a MISO Detachment Commander. CPT Childs currently serves as Headquarters and Headquarters Company Commander, Special Warfare Education Group (Airborne), U.S. John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.
Col. George Bristol, a U.S. Marine with more than 37 years in the Corps and now the commander of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Trans Sahara, has spent a great deal of his time in the Corps working in special operations, and in particular, working in Africa.

“U.S. special-operations forces are without peer in their ability to look at, and operate in, a complex environment like Africa,” said Bristol, during a recent interview at the TSOC headquarters at Kelley Barracks, Vaihingen, Germany. “Africa is the true next horizon. We are working successfully in an interagency world in a vast, multilingual, multi-cultural area that has an operational area far bigger than the United States.

When people ask me about Africa, my answer is simple. Africa is a very violent place. It is a very poor place. It’s a place where many nations and entities are vying for its vast store of natural resources. It is a vast region of ungoverned space with harsh terrain,” he continued.

Along with its rugged terrain, its people also fiercely hold on to tribal traditions, which put survival via competition — whether it’s for land, water or fuel — as a top priority. In today’s environment, there is a nexus where all things converge: the exchange of goods.

“Smuggling is considered an honest profession and illicit goods, drugs and weapons are coin of the realm,” said Bristol.

As is instability, which is caused by the former, and frequent changes in governance. In West Africa alone, more than 40 coups have occurred in the past 60 years. In April 2012, coups in Guinea-Bissau and Mali made headlines and in late December 2012, the U.S. State Department closed its embassy and evacuated all U.S. dignitaries in the Central African Republic as rebel forces converged on the capital. The CAR has been a significant partner to the United States in its work to bring stability to Central Africa through Operation Observant Compass, which is aimed at defeating the Lord’s Resistance Army.

At the heart of these coups is a lack of stability in the region. Felicity Duncan, writing on Money Web, explains that instability can be contagious and can spread like wildfire through a region pointing to the recent experience in Mali and Guinea Bissau.

It is that kind of instability and regional chaos that U.S. special-operations forces on the continent are trying to end through two key means of operations: building partner-nation capacity and countering violent extremist organizations. It is hoped that by providing

Col. George Bristol
Commander, JSOTF-Trans Sahara
“We do not have a large footprint. It is seamless, small and discreet,” said Dunkle. “The need for this kind of force precludes the use of conventional forces — not because there isn’t work to be done — but because their footprint is too large for a country team to support.”

He noted that the addition of forces in African countries is considered an “emotional event” by the host nation, which has to justify the presence of U.S. forces not only to its citizens but also to its neighbors.

In Northwest Africa there are three significant threats to the stability of the region: al-Qaeda in Libya; al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb operating in Mali; and Boko Haram operating in Niger. These threats have the ability to spread throughout the region, ARSOF working indirectly with host-nation militaries will attempt to stem the tide.

In these areas, the U.S. Special Operations Command-Africa brings all of its resources to bear. Specifically for Army SOF, the three main units of action the Civil Military Support Element, Regional Information Support Team and Special Forces operational detachments. Working under the auspices of the Department of State and the U.S. Embassy Country Teams, the units work closely with partner-nation forces, getting the biggest bang for their buck from Joint Combined Exchange Training and serving as advisers to counterterrorism units.

“We are truly working in the interagency in Africa and the partnerships that are emerging are very exciting,” said Bristol. “The last few months have been a time of great tension. The agility, innovative nature and high standard of excellence, all of which are hallmarks of SOF, have been put to the test — including our situational awareness. We have had to put the full range of SOF skills into play in extreme operating environments in support of the interagency, and we have found that our ability to do these tasks are alive and well.”

A key element of SOF’s presence in Africa is in engagement and shaping of the environment. “We have stayed the course as an organization and that enables the host-nation SOF through training engagement to secure their borders and build their skill sets,” said Sipperly. “It is important to remember that this is not an OEF or OIF environment. It is a very lethal environment and we are here to enable the host nation to support themselves, but in doing so, we are protecting U.S. interests in the region.”

The U.S. mission in Africa is definitely not a lethal one. Rather it is one of long-term relationship building, shoring up capability and helping partner nations solve their own problems.

One of the biggest challenges for SOF operating in Africa is space. Africa is an enormous continent and the tyranny of distance often works against the force. ODA’s that operate far in the hinterlands must be able to sustain their operations over a long period of time. A lack of landing strips and roads makes resupply difficult in the best of conditions. Teams go into forward operating areas knowing they need to be able to take care of their own needs from provisions to medical care. Often they rely on local villagers to help meet needs when it comes to food. Teams purchase game from the villagers, which provides them with food and promotes good will among the people they need to live among.

One member of an ODA from the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) explained that the quality of food they purchase varies. On one occasion, the villagers brought an animal to the team that the team could not identify. They asked the villagers what type of animal it was. Unable to explain, the villager went back to his hut and brought the head of the animal to the team. It was an aardvark. “It didn’t taste like chicken,” quipped a team member.

stability in one country it can influence adjacent countries, just as the activities of the VEOs spill over and cause instability.

“We know that our African partners are looking to counter the VEO threats out there. They don’t want them spilling over from one country to another. We are working in the interagency and with our country teams to ensure that we can help promote stability in the region,” said Col. Ken Sipperly, deputy operations officer, U.S. Special Operations Command-Africa.

“Most of the countries we work with do not have a large annual budget for their military. Unlike the United States, they do not have the assets or equipment they need to protect their borders. What they do have is a strong desire for stability, control and protection. They have a desire to bring their borders closer together to make blockades so that threat groups cannot compromise them,” continued Sipperly. “Most importantly, they have a desire to protect themselves and their families.”

It is that desire, coupled with commitment, that has built and nurtured long-term relationships between U.S. SOF and many partner-nation militaries on the continent. While the U.S. presence in Africa is not huge, it definitely has an impact.

“We have a relatively small force to conduct a mission in an area the size of the continental United States,” said Lt. Col. Keith Dunkle, JSOTF-TS operations officer. “We have a small element operating in an area of significant threats in Northwest Africa. It is really like playing Whack-A-Mole. One threat pops up and we address it and then we move on to the next. We want to apply equal pressure to these threats by providing training to their armed forces.
“It’s also a given that you are going to lose weight and get sick,” said the team medic. “We prepare for that and make the best of the situation. In these areas, we have to be very careful about any injuries we get because they are going to get infected.”

With the sheer size of the continent, the force finds more work than it can handle because of the limited forces available for employment in the region. SOF are called upon to handle spots that are in critical nodes, which stops problems before they spread throughout the region.

Another major challenge is that of competition for natural resources on the continent. While SOF is working to build the capability of the government to sustain itself, some countries are taking advantage of their instability and pour money in to develop the resources rather than the people. It is imperative that a balance in the flow of money is found.

All of these issues add to the complexity of the situation in Africa. These outside elements often dictate how SOF will approach a host-nation and what kind of help it can offer. Part of a traditional foreign internal defense mission is advising the host nation on how to do things. It is imperative that SOF utilize their cultural knowledge of the region when offering suggestions or advice. Nothing can be done in a vacuum. SOF in Africa take a holistic view when addressing the challenges faced by their counterparts. In Africa, one size does not fit all.

One mission that has garnered widespread attention is the participation of U.S. advisers in Observant Compass. The mission of Observant Compass is to remove the threat of the Lord’s Resistance Army from a four-country region. Led by Joseph Kony, the LRA has terrorized the people of South Sudan, Uganda, Central Africa Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Counter-LRA mission includes training, funding, airlift, logistics, communications and intelligence support, which brings intelligence to bear on the conduct of missions.

In late October 2011, President Barak Obama authorized the deployment of 100 Special Forces advisers to the region, not to engage the LRA, but rather to train the military forces in the region. Working hand-in-hand with the Department of State’s representative for LRA issues, the U.S. advisers were welcomed by the military forces in the region.

The DoS representative was operating in the region prior to the deployment of U.S. forces. He noted that the presence of U.S. forces was welcomed by the soldiers and the local citizenry.

He explained that even in the most remote areas of the region the villagers are aware of what is going on around the world, noting that they knew when the U.S. raid resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden. The representative added that while the presence of nongovernmental agencies and other governmental agencies like the Department of State are welcome, it is the American Soldier who draws the most attention.

“There is something about the uniform,” he said. “When they see one American Soldier, they think their prayers are answered and their problems are solved. To them, American Soldiers represent safety and security.”

At times, that can serve as a double-edged sword, as in the mission to find and capture Kony. Local villagers don’t understand why the U.S. doesn’t use its full range of technology to hunt him down.

“Over time, it could become a problem for them,” he noted. “They don’t understand the constraints under which the Soldiers are operating.”

He noted that the relationship between the advisers and the DoS is particularly strong and continues to grow as they engage in missions like Observant Compass. While many will argue that driving Kony out of his normal area of operations equals a success, the actual end state of the mission according to those executing it is the “creation of a fully enabled force that is capable of prosecuting the mission on their own to bring Kony to justice or to marginalize the LRA until it no longer poses a threat to the region.”

One way of doing that is by applying constant pressure on drivers of instability; not only through specific named operations, but also through ongoing training missions and exercises. One of the several USAFRI-COM exercises held annually on the continent is Operation Flintlock slated for the spring and will be held in Mauritania. The exercise involves the militaries of several partner nations as well as members of NATO. During the exercise, forces are taught and tested on medical operations, infantry and peacekeeping skills, airborne operations, humanitarian relief and leadership skills.

Throughout the course of the year, the U.S. helps sponsor five other exercises which are aimed at different problem sets. While Flintlock is very focused on counterterrorism, Exercise Epic Guardian is more scenario driven, integrates host-nation crisis responses with SOF employment. Integration is key because it gives the force the opportunity to conduct operations in different places and to work with their neighboring forces.

Silent/Noble Warrior is focused on the country’s SOF capacity and is regionally focused. This is the exercise where African partner nations take the lead.

In all of its missions, SOF works diligently to plug into episodic engagements that are already occurring. While many see the way forward as “fixing the problem,” forces operating in Africa understand that it is not their job to fix the problem, rather it is their job to help identify the problem, introduce resources and training where necessary and serve as a bridge to allow the host nation to negotiate the terrain to build a more stable country and region. The objective is a self-sustaining Africa that is stable and inhospitable to VEOs and their ideology. Special-operations forces operating under the auspices of SOCAFRICA have embraced an African proverb as their means of operating: If you want to go fast, go alone. If you want to go far, go together. SW

Notes

Janice Burton is the editor of Special Warfare.
The 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) is responsible for Africa. What are some of the kinds of missions your operational detachments alpha are conducting in Africa?

Deedrick: We are widely employed throughout the continent. The majority of the missions assigned to the ODAs are designed to build partner-nation capabilities to counter the specific threats that they face. The continent is very diverse and the challenges that face individual nations and regional organizations are equally diverse. In the Horn of Africa, we man Special Operations Command and Control Element—Horn of Africa. This organization is very focused on assisting in the preparation of African forces that support the African Union Mission in Somalia. This indirect approach allows the United States to make a tangible difference in the battle against al-Shabbab and support the fledgling Government of Somalia. Our ODAs understand that it will be the African forces operating under AMISOM that will be called upon to achieve lasting results in Somalia, and take the challenge of assisting in the preparation of these forces very seriously and with good results.

In the Trans-Sahel region of Africa, we are focused on enduring engagements with specific units throughout the region. Once again, a large part of the mission is to provide partner-nation forces additional capabilities. The threat presented by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and other jihadist groups is complicated and each nation faces its own individual challenges. The recent events in Mali and Libya highlight the volatile nature of the region. We first must be aware of the specific requirements and constraints in each nation. The cultural, tribal and linguistic diversity of the region is tremendous. How the threat presents itself is also unique to specific sub-regions that often do not conform to national boundaries. The tack that we have taken is to work with specific units to build a higher end capability. These are not episodic activities. We are there 365-days-a-year to share the burden, assist in shaping the environment and exploit opportunities.

The Counter-Lord’s Resistance Army mission certainly does receive a lot of attention and scrutiny. The mission may have jumped into international and national prominence with the public media release of Kony 2012, but Uganda and other nations have been dealing with the LRA for more than a decade. While the film certainly raised awareness in some circles, it did not truly depict the gains that Uganda and other partner forces had previously made. There was a time when the LRA was a destabilizing force in the region. The atrocities committed by the LRA coupled with Kony’s messianic cult following bred a deep fear into the population. Now, the LRA has been pushed out of its traditional operating areas and has been reduced to a scattered organization that is subsisting in the jungle with very limited operational capability. As insurgent organizations go, the LRA is well into the downward spiral.

One of the most positive signs in the battle against the LRA is the success of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration process. More and more members of the LRA are coming out of the jungle. The populations in the affected areas are more willing to provide information on LRA movement and activities. One of the real successes of the mission has been the partnership between military and civilian organizations. Both governmental and non-governmental organizations have been very supportive of our efforts and are working together. Radio stations have given air time to advertise DDRR sites and NGOs have worked through their networks to advertise the program. This coupled with more traditional activities such as a leaflet drops have made a very tangible difference.

What does success look like for your force involved in the LRA mission?

Deedrick: There are a couple of components to success in battling any insurgent organization and these are very true with the LRA. The military component is important. The forces involved in fighting the LRA, especially the Ugandan Peoples Defense Force, have a lot of experience and understanding of the terrain. What we do is build upon the competencies that they and other forces have and assist with not only the tactics, but the larger campaign plan. Where do you look, when do you look, how do you incorpo-
rate information and battle track such a huge geographic area? Those are specific military tasks. Equally important is winning in the human terrain. Getting all of the different organizations and nations to work together has been rewarding. We have been a good bridge between civilian organizations and the military and have assisted in formulating systematic processes for sharing information. When the population does not live in fear and is willing to provide information on the LRA and members of the LRA are defec ting, you know you are winning.

**SW:** Mali is in the headlines a lot. The 10th SF Group has a long history in Mali — how did the coup affect your force — many of whom knew the soldiers personally?

**Deedrick:** The United States and our Soldiers do have a long history with Mali. The coup came at a very inopportune time in the history of the nation. We had invested considerable time in the training of a specific unit that remained loyal to President Toure’ and has since been disbanded. Northern Mali has always been a challenge to the government of Bamako, and the insurgent groups in Northern Mali seized upon the opportunity presented by the coup. Mali is an interesting case study on how al-Qaeda and jihadist organizations will seize opportunity. When the coup occurred, the dominant opposition group in Northern Mali was the Mouvement National de Liberation de l’Azawad. The MNLA was largely based around the Touareg tribe that forms the majority of the population in Northern Mali and also has populations in Niger, Libya and other nearby nations. A smaller, but more virulent jihadist organization, was Ansar al-Dine, which espouses adherence to Shariah law and has goals that are aligned with AQIM. AQIM surged to support Ansar al-Dine and carved out a foothold. We now face a large ungoverned space that can act as a training base and safe haven for AQIM.

The situation presents difficulties not only for Mali, but for all the bordering nations. The Economic Community of West African States is offering assistance, but the details of how to best support and intervene in Mali are still under development. While direct support in Mali is problematic, we must support and assist our partners in Niger, Mauritania and elsewhere and look for opportunities as the ECOWAS plan develops.

**SW:** After serving in combat zones like those found in Iraq, how do your Soldiers reorient themselves to the advisory role?

**Deedrick:** By the time we left Iraq, partnered operations were the norm. In many cases our Iraqi partners led the operation. So while there was a direct-combat application, we were still doing advisory missions. In theaters where we are not at war, but have a national-security interest, advisory missions are critical. The mindset change for our force is one of defining and recognizing success. The opportunities to be “on target” will be less, but the obligation to train, rehearse and advise a partnered force is no less critical. We must take great pride in seeing forces that we work with succeed. We must take great pride in providing the absolute, most-professional training and assistance to our partner forces.

There are a lot of methods to deal with a threat. Direct combat is only one method. Special Forces are uniquely designed and enabled to conduct advisory missions in both a foreign internal defense and unconventional-warfare role. If the threat is eliminated or contained, it does not matter if the final force on the target was U.S. or partner-nation led, in the end the threat is eliminated. We must step back and look at a broader context for what we as a nation are trying to achieve. Special Forces are a national force; the force of choice to conduct long-term advisory missions in support of U.S. national interests.

There is a reason we have been directed to help prepare forces for combat in Somalia under AMSIOM and to support, through bilateral engagement, the nations in the Trans-Sahel region of Africa. What we do on a daily basis and the enthusiasm that our ODAs and partners in the Civil Affairs and Military Information Support formations demonstrate is indicative of how rapidly we have been able to reorient the force to theaters where we are not at war.

**SW:** As a commander, when your force is down range they are literally a world away. What kind of challenges does this present?

**Deedrick:** The first thing is to ensure that the force to be employed fully understands the mission that it is being asked to conduct. It really still all comes down to the equation of know yourself, which includes the partner nation, know the threat and know the terrain, which includes the human terrain. When we send forces overseas, we will ask them to operate in distant and austere locations. Nowhere is this truer than in Africa. The challenge at home station is to ensure that the preparation the ODA conducts is focused on the mission at hand and takes into account the nuances of working with different nations in different terrain.

We have a very simple chart that lays out the basic skills of shoot, move, communicate and survive. We couple that with the incorporation of technical enablers. But, underpinning it all is the ability to transfer those skills to a partner force.

For the long term, we are investing a lot of time in getting our language skills back up to par. We must be able to speak the language to maximize our effectiveness. The ingenuity and flexibility of our ODAs never ceases to amaze me. Once on the ground, the Soldiers always rise to the challenge and find ways to make a lasting contribution. **SW**
“...the most disturbing aspect of this humanitarian crisis is the fact that this is a war fought by children on children — minors make up almost 90 percent of the LRA’s soldiers. Some recruits are as young as 8 and are inducted through raids on villages. They are brutalized and forced to commit atrocities on fellow abductees and even siblings. Those who attempt to escape are killed. For those living in a state of constant fear, violence becomes a way of life and the psychological trauma is incalculable.”

By Chief Warrant Officer 3 Terry Shelton

On Oct. 14, 2011, the President of the United States stated that approximately 100 Special Forces advisers were arriving in Uganda, to advise and assist in the removal of Joseph Kony from Central Africa. While Kony’s name is not well known in the United States, the conflict he has furthered and the war crimes he and his Lord’s Resistance Army have committed over the past 25 years have gravely affected life in four central African nations. One recent observer noted:

“The most disturbing aspect of this humanitarian crisis is the fact that this is a war fought by children on children — minors make up almost 90% of the LRA’s soldiers. Some recruits are as young as eight and are inducted through raids on villages. They are brutalized and forced to commit atrocities on fellow abductees and even siblings. Those who attempt to escape are killed. For those living in a state of constant fear, violence becomes a way of life and the psychological trauma is incalculable.”

This would be context in which the U.S. Army Special Forces would work to advise and assist partners in Counter-LRA operations, a task requiring a unique blend of operational art and design.

For decades, the Ugandan, Congolese, Central African Republic and South Sudanese people have all endured conflict with the LRA. As far back as 1987, the Ugandan People’s Defense Force have pursued the LRA as they have abducted, enslaved, tortured, mutilated, raped and killed populations from these four countries. The indigenous populations involved in the conflict have all taken different perspectives, with outsiders to the region routinely attempting to quantify and qualify the need for the capture and prosecution of Kony for his war crimes. Thus the conflict, as it spiraled out of control within a sub-regional scope, was an ideal location for the application of SF skills.

The timing of the President’s statement is noteworthy, given that the advisers were en route to Africa as the press conference was ongoing. While this sequence of events is not unprecedented (President
Ronald Reagan had done much the same thing with his intervention in Lebanon in 1983) the fact that the release of this information occurred just as the SOF advisers were arriving in Africa provided very little warning to the international community. Still it is important to note that while this timing was designed to alert elements of the U.S. government as well as the nations affected by the deployment, it was also used by the Special Forces units assigned as a means of wielding an older weapon in their arsenal: information.

Upon arrival in Uganda, the command and control element of the advanced operations base immediately identified through liaison with the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational partners that all partners had a similar goal in mind, but were not communicating effectively. Upon infiltration, the operational detachments-alpha made contact with locally deployed forces including; UN contingents, Central African Republic Armed Forces, Republic of South Sudan’s Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, Democratic Republic of Congo’s Forces Armes Republic du Congo and the Ugandan UPDF. ODA commanders employed liaisons and developed systems to establish systematic communications procedures. By embedding Special Forces Soldiers within the military and civilian entities in the operational area, SOF was able to identify challenges and create efficiencies.

A key to developing efficiencies was to analyze the systems and processes used by the broad spectrum of entities operating in the environment. Special Forces detachments had to alter the lens from which they perceived the operational environment. Using a somewhat orthogonal approach as a basis to gain a full perspective, the civilian model of project management emerged as a means of adjusting the existing plan for deploying military forces into a mature and complex JIIM environment heavily comprised of civilian entities.

**A mile in their moccasins: The question of project management**

Good management should dictate the time, scope and resources of a project, and these characteristics are precisely what define project management. The outcome of the effective balance of these characteristics is quality. That outcome, if effectively managed, produces results in which all stakeholders, with equities in the project, can accrue some positive percentage of satisfaction, while achieving the end state or goal. The first characteristic is time, which defines the expectation for when the achievement might take place, and also provides context for which to scale the next project-management characteristic, resources. Resources define the capacity for elements to achieve the third characteristic, scope, in the time allotted, balanced logically, and is referred to in project management circles as the ‘Triple Constraint’.

This civilian perspective provided a logical method for gaining a cultural understanding of both allies and adversaries. The inherent capability of Army Special Forces to identify and establish engagement with other cultures, within the partner’s cultural context, was critical to success. Cross describes “culture competence” as:

“... a set of congruent behaviors, attitudes and policies that come together in a system, agency or among professionals that enables effective work in cross-cultural situations. ‘Culture’ refers to integrated patterns of human behavior that include the language, thoughts, communications, actions, customs, beliefs, values and institutions of racial, ethnic, religious or social groups. ‘Competence’ implies having the capacity to function effectively as an individual and an organization within the context of the cultural beliefs,
behaviors and needs presented by consumers and their communities.\textsuperscript{55}

The concept of cultural competence was well suited for understanding the context of the LRA conflict. Cultural competence is a developmental process that occurs along a continuum with six possibilities, starting from a point and building toward another. The Counter-LRA mission achieved a suitable spot on this scale, with the intent of moving to a more advantageous position (see Figure 1).

**Right sizing the fit: Combining civilian and military doctrines**

The protracted conflict with the LRA resulted in a set of loosely knit and informal, communication channels between the affected nations, NGOs and other governmental organizations such as the UN. Special Forces operators had to find a method of achieving cultural proficiency with the majority of the diverse players. The ability to maintain cross-cultural communication, and move toward cultural proficiency afforded the operational elements and liaisons a framework in which to achieve the ultimate goal. For the Counter-LRA effort, the ultimate goal has been the eradication of Kony and his key lieutenants, with the hope that the “cult of personality,” which surrounds the LRA leadership, evaporates and the LRA “boogeyman” disappears so that peace and justice might return to the region.

Aside from the joint intelligence preparation of the environment which SOF advisers conducted, SOF advisers also utilized time wisely when assessing partner capacities. The use of foreign language, predominantly French, as a means of connecting with partners afforded Special Forces soldiers the means of achieving a measure of routine rapport.

**Using doctrine to shoehorn uncomfortable shoes**

There are obvious differences in culture between NGOs and Army Special Forces. For the military, Joint Doctrine points towards “principles guiding employment of US military forces toward a common objective”\textsuperscript{7} (see Figure 2).

Advanced operations base and ODA commanders identified and used the Joint Publication 1 concept of “unified action,” meaning, “The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort”\textsuperscript{7} to establish cultural communication and proficiency.\textsuperscript{9} ODAs worked with IGOs and NGOs using a refined approach that was not focused on deconfliction, but rather the synchronization of each elements actions and core competencies. Using Interorganizational Coordination, defined by the the Department of Defense as, “The interaction that occurs among elements of the Department of Defense; engaged United States Government agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; intergovernmental organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector.”\textsuperscript{10} Special Forces elements enhanced the flow of communications within the JIIM community that fostered an understanding of interdependent equities, while focusing on a tangible end result. AOB and ODA soldiers recognized this collective requirement for achieving a culturally competent outcome in a very physically and culturally dislocated environment. Success was achieved only through strict adherence to Chapter 1, Part 4 section (d) (Gathering the Right Resources) of Joint Publication 3-08 which dictated the actions of the Counter-LRA force to achieve objectives:

A challenge to commanders is to recognize what resources are available and how to work together to effectively apply them. Despite potential philosophical, cultural, and operational differences, efforts should be coordinated to foster an atmosphere of cooperation that ultimately contributes to unity of effort. Pursuit of Interorganizational coordination as a process should be viewed as a means to mission accomplishment.

To make transparent the goals of NGO partners and host nations, Special Forces ODAs created synchronization bodies within their operations areas. Interdependent coordination organizations termed Combined Operations Fusion Centers utilized the civilian “Triple Constraint” model as a means to achieve scaled, flexible and quality Counter-LRA outcomes.

As the four area-focused COFCs emerged with rudimentary facilities, logistical support and basic communications capability, a communication conduit
in the form of newsletters titled COFC Talk became a means of communicating the efforts of the COFC to the public, and potentially to the LRA. Balancing secrecy with efficacy, these newsletters were collaborated on by Special Forces and Military Intelligence personnel as a weekly compilation of area-focused stories on safe routes, danger areas, safe travel tactics, techniques and procedures, as well as dissemination of escapee recovery areas and news stories focused toward creating “tipping points” to encourage the populace to abandon the LRA. The newsletters were printed in English and French and reviewed by local partners.

Demobilization, Disarmament, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration initiatives of the IGOs were expressed in the COFC Talk newsletters. Plans to ensure the functions of the COFC could transfer to the local government or IGO were developed. In this arrangement, the retrograde of U.S. operations in the region would leave an acceptable residual capability through civilianized demobilization actions.

This COFC configuration could be sustained using the same non-standard civilian aircraft (including airdrop in adverse airstrip conditions) or scale down to ground operations, depending on the threat remaining. Balancing the requirements of quality support in this austere environment is crucial to synchronized operations. Furthermore, ensuring that support is maintained during times of transition acts to avoid tensions created in time- and resource-constrained environments.

**Conclusion**

In an operational area that is as large as the state of California, Special Forces Soldiers entered into a context comprising a myriad of unique cultures. One key lesson of this Special Forces intervention is that the judicious use of military doctrine, coupled with creative organizational development, and non-standard resourcing must be used without distorting the relevant populations and partners. By tying systems already in place together using valid doctrine and supportable resources efficiencies are gained in time and scope.

Without some crucial alterations in perspective, and the resultant creativity of specially selected and well-trained professionals, it is unlikely that a force of any size would achieve success alone, much less without the partnership with IGOs and NGOs in the operational environment. The nature of this unique and complex environment requires a focused and resourced force with inherent knowledge, skills, and experience to match or overmatch the adversary. These capacities, coupled with language capabilities, creativity, and professionalism prove that U.S. Army Special Forces and assigned soldiers are still the nation's first choice for the “wicked” problems of the 21st century. SW

**Can ODAs think out of the box if they are confined to it?**

1. ODAs operate in resource-rich ‘operational risk’ bubbles in an area ripe with graft
2. PN and IGO/NGOs operate outside the bubbles but have their own interests
3. The LRA will exploit these interests and gaps
4. Incentives must work for all relevant populations in these gap and seam areas
5. Liberal movement outside the risk bubbles as well as use of appropriately suited incentives will motivate the population toward C-LRA end state

**Chief Warrant Officer 3 Terry Shelton**

served as the Targeting Cell Leader during the initial deployment of Special Forces to Counter-LRA operations. He currently serves as the Company Warrant Officers for Charlie Company, third Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne). CW3 Shelton was among the first U.S. Special Operations Command graduates with a Bachelor of Science in Strategic Studies and Defense Analysis from Norwich University, and is pursuing an M.A. in Diplomacy with Norwich University’s College of Graduate and Continuing Studies.

**End Notes:**

Introduction

The purpose of this article is to share the experiences and lessons gleaned from the first deployment of U.S. Army Special Forces advisers to Central Africa in support of the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009. Having deployed as the initial advisory force in support of a newly established named operation, the advanced operating base and its subordinate Special Forces operational detachment alphas broke new ground and challenged existing doctrine in an austere and complex operating environment.

Of the key challenges that confronted the AOB upon initial entry, logistics posed one of the greatest obstacles in achieving operational success. Faced with this obstacle, Army special-operations forces and Special Forces detachment logisticians demonstrated incredible ingenuity, perseverance and adaptability to overcome the inherent logistical challenges of the region. This article will capture the logistical lessons and pragmatic solutions applied during this deployment to Central Africa. To properly convey the context of the operation, this article will provide a condensed history of Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army conflict, frame the complex operating environment in Central Africa and provide critical recommendations and planning considerations to achieve future SOF logistical success in the region.

Background

Kony and the LRA have terrorized Central Africa through mass murder, mutilations, rape and the kidnapping of thousands of children for more than two decades. Originating as a rebel group in northern Uganda in the 1980s, Kony led the LRA in an intense and bloody insurgency against the Ugandan government until the mid-1990s. By 1994, the LRA had established bases across the northern Ugandan border in Sudan (now the Republic of South Sudan) and continued to launch attacks into Uganda until 2005. In February 2005, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Kony and 11 other senior LRA commanders for war crimes committed during their bloody insurgency against the Ugandan government and its people. By late 2005, the LRA had been forced to relocate to the Democratic Republic of Congo due to military pressure from the Ugandan People’s Defense Force. The military pressure had forced the LRA to disperse into the densely vegetated area of the Garamba National Park in the DRC and the rural terrain of South Sudan. From these safe havens, the LRA launched new attacks in the DRC and South Sudan, killing soldiers, civilians and kidnapping and
forcibly recruiting hundreds of new Soldiers into their ranks. The LRAs brutal attacks on remote villages in the region ultimately increased diplomatic and military involvement by these countries.

On Dec. 14, 2008, the UPDF with the assistance of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan People’s Liberation Army launched an offensive against the LRA in GNP named Operation Lightning Thunder. The operation led to the destruction of numerous LRA camps in GNP, including the main camp believed to have been occupied by Kony. The operation was deemed a success by the three partner nations, but the inability to capture or kill the LRAs illusive and charismatic leader allowed the LRA to regroup. After regrouping, the LRA conducted several reprisal attacks against villages in Northeastern DRC, resulting in an estimated 500 casualties.2 As a result of the combined operation and continuing military pressure, the remnants of the LRA splintered into mobile groups across the vast expanse of the tri-border area of the Central African Republic, Republic of South Sudan and the DRC.

By March 2009, the UPDF had negotiated with the governments of CAR and South Sudan to establish rural base camps within their countries, which would allow them to project and resupply forces conducting operations against the remaining LRA forces in the region. From these rural, isolated base camps, the UPDF continued its efforts to track Kony and the remaining LRA as it attempted to evade UPDF military-tracking efforts by transitorily occupying mobile camp sites in the tri-border area.

On March 24, 2010, U.S. President Barack Obama signed the Lords Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009. The act reaffirmed existing support by the U.S. Government to provide, “…political, economic, military and intelligence support for viable multilateral efforts to protect civilians from the LRA.” On Oct. 14, 2011, President Obama announced the deployment of 100 military advisers to Central Africa to provide assistance to the UPDF and regional forces involved in Counter-LRA operations.4

The stated mission for the deployed military advisers was to advise and assist Counter-LRA regional partners in removing Kony and his top LRA commanders from the battlefield.5 As a matter of public policy and diplomacy, this operation required a force capable of establishing and sustaining a nominal yet scalable footprint, while also accomplishing or supporting a broad spectrum of tactical, operational and strategic objectives. As the mission statement suggests, the force was required to achieve its objectives indirectly through Counter-LRA regional partners. These objectives would also require direct engagement with four separate U.S. country teams and four partner-nation governments and militaries covering an area the size of California. Military advisers were also required to embed with partner-nation forces, and work closely with non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations in a complex, austere and resource constrained environment.

**Framing the complex operating environment**

When U.S. Special Forces advisers arrived in Central Africa in October 2011, the stage had not yet been set for USSF advisers to forward-deploy in an advise-and-assist capacity with Counter-LRA regional forces. Without a robust enabling force in place when advisers arrived, the AOB coordinated with the U.S. Africa Theater Special Operations Command to conduct planning and execution of reception, staging, onward-movement and integration of forces to rural base camps in the CAR and South Sudan. During the initial assessments of air and land lines of communication, the AOB identified significant shortfalls in adequate and dependable field landing strips and road infrastructure to support infiltration and long-term sustainment operations.

Assessments and surveys of the field landing strips concluded that only short take-off and landing aircraft could be used to transport and resupply forces in proximity to Counter-LRA regional forces. Many of the airfields required reconditioning or improvement that limited the type of short take-off and landing aircraft that could be used. Ultimately, the employment of Pilatus PC-12 aircraft were limited to more improved airfields where personnel and supplies could be cross loaded onto Cessna 208 Caravans and transported to the most remote airfields. Additionally, airstrips were not equipped with runway lighting, which limited resupply operations to strictly daylight hours. Since only small STOL aircraft were available for resupply, cargo space was severely limited and required rigid synchronization of daily flights to maintain adequate supplies for forces isolated at forward operating sites. Furthermore, the limited availability of alternative aircraft restricted the AOB’s ability to conduct container-delivery system bundle drops and sling-load operations to augment aerial resupply.

“During the initial assessments of air and land lines of communication, the AOB identified significant shortfalls in adequate and dependable field landing strips and road infrastructure to support infiltration and long-term sustainment operations.”

Assessments of the road infrastructure identified that paved road systems did not exist along the primary and secondary lines of communication and that the available dirt-road systems were often impassable during the rainy season (approximately April-October). Rainy season conditions limited line-haul resupply operations to only four to five months out of the year. These limitations required logistical planners to formulate a line-haul schedule to transport and stockpile adequate supplies during the dry season. As a result of the road conditions, a general planning factor required 7 to 10 days for line-haul supplies to arrive at their final destination. To promote efficiency, line-haul operations were primarily utilized to transport supplies and equipment that could not be transported aboard STOL aircraft due to cargo constraints.

Furthermore, the lack of all-weather day/night field-landing strips and degraded road infrastructure directly impacted the reliability and responsiveness of evacuation assets for the sick and wounded. Of note, the infrastructure and environmental challenges that impede the successful employment of
that is not taught in the conventional Army classroom. The traditional logistics curriculum fails to train students to make use of non-standard assets available in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment. Furthermore, conventional logistics training does little to prepare logisticians for the complexity, scale, tyranny of distance and lack of infrastructure that confronts military operations on the continent of Africa. Despite the lack of training in non-standard logistics on the African continent, the ingenuity, perseverance and adaptability of ARSOF and SFODA logisticians could not have been more impressive during this operation. Drawing from years of experience conducting theater security cooperation events in Africa, the SF ODAs’ experiential knowledge and determination was critical to their success. Although the recommendations and pragmatic solutions generated from this operation are by no means a paradigm shift, they should serve to inform SOF small-unit logistics planning for future deployments to rural Africa. The following are five recommendations and planning considerations for enhancing non-standard logistics in Central Africa:

**Building Social Capital.** No matter where you deploy or what type of operation you conduct, people and social networks matter. Building and leveraging social capital is one of the most important tasks in achieving logistics success on the continent of Africa. As a logistician you must master the human domain and expand your social network so that you are better positioned through formal and informal ties to influence the operational environment.

This process begins immediately when you arrive in country and start to meet drivers, cultural advisers, interpreters, realtors, vendors and embassy finance and contracting officers. Establishing and developing working relationships with embassy personnel and particularly embassy financial-management officers and contracting officers are tremendously valuable. The embassy is capable of facilitating contracts, receiving and exchanging currency and funding (MIPRs), and providing lists of vetted vendors for procurement, life-support services and transportation. Every new tie that is established provides additional information about markets and economic conditions that expand your access to resources. As you extend your social network and information resources, you reduce information asymmetry, increase the chance of finding higher quality goods and decrease the likelihood of price gauging.

**Time is Relative.** Nothing happens quickly in Central Africa. Understanding the relative nature of time is the first step toward cultural competence on the continent. Whatever the underlying cultural implications, it is important to recognize that punctuality in a Western sense is not as strictly adhered to in Africa. Contracts or purchase arrangements that normally take several days to process in the United States may take up to a week in Africa. Don’t be caught off guard by transportation or contracting delays that can adversely impact the unit’s sustainment plan. Identify longer lead times than expected for the transport of goods in order to provide a buffer for critical resupply requirements at forward-operating sites.

**Maximize Resources.** Although maximizing resources tends to be common sense and prudent planning, nowhere else is this principle more relevant than in the resource constrained environment of Central Africa. Considering the impact that the rainy season and degraded infrastructure can have on timely resupply, it is important to maximize the dimensions, weight and cube calculations for supplies and other outsized equipment for both ground and air transport. This logistics process should be rigidly coordinated and synchronized with the transport of personnel so that all available cargo space is optimized. When feasible or necessary, devise creative ways to transport outsized items such as generators or all-terrain vehicles on small contracted airframes like the Cessna 208 aircraft. You will be surprised what the AOB and SFODAs can accomplish with ingenuity and perseverance. With that said, don’t rely exclusively on-air transport, diversify with line-haul and recognize that railways are nearly non-existent in Central Africa.

Additionally, units should maximize each forward-operating site’s capacity for self-sustainability. Although forward-operating sites tended to be heavily reliant on MREs and bottled water, they were able to supplement their Class I supply with local livestock and renewable food sources like chickens and eggs. Additionally, each forward-operating site was able to employ varying versions of MIL300, Portable Water Filtration Systems to supplement their potable water supply. By supplementing their meals and water, the forward-operating sites...
were able to increase variety while also moderately decreasing their reliance on external requirements for Class I resupply.

LOGCAP Support. Although LOGCAP is a proven and reliable logistics platform for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the nine-month bidding and implementation process for LOGCAP contracting proved too arduous and inflexible to rapidly support operations in Central Africa. In the absence of LOGCAP, AOBs and SFODAs are completely capable of establishing their own bare-base support systems in order to achieve initial-and full-operational capability. Additionally, the significant footprint of non-indigenous LOGCAP equipment and the influx of civilian contractors that are predisposed to hire foreign labor instead of local labor in the management of life-support systems are not conducive to building rapport with partner-nation forces and civil leadership. Whenever the operational environment dictates, it is recommended that AOBs and SFODAs maximize their organic sustainment and life-support capabilities utilizing contingency contracting and OPFUND procurement.

Special Operations Resuscitation Team. In the absence of a dedicated MEDEVAC capability in the austere rural environment of Central Africa, the resourcing of a SORT team provides a dedicated capacity of up to 72 hours of resuscitative care during evacuation of the sick and wounded from point-of-injury to more definitive medical care. With the inability to evacuate casualties during hours of limited visibility due to airframe and pilot constraints, the SORT served as a vital asset for forward operating sites that were nearly 500 miles away from the nearest Level III medical facility. Additionally, the SORT aided in augmenting the AOB in its mission to advise and assist Counter-LRA regional force’s medics and physicians and provided the capacity to assist in medical civic-action program activities whenever available. As a health-service support-planning consideration, it is recommended that SORT teams augment operations in the absence of dedicated MEDEVAC capabilities and when there is significant distance between forward operating sites to definitive-care facilities on the African continent.

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Notes
1. ARSOF Logistian with AOC 90A and ASI K9; SFODA logisticians defined as MOS 18C (Special Forces Engineer) or 18D (Special Forces Medic) that traditionally serve as SFODA logisticians.
5. Ibid
6. Joint Publication 1-02 (November 15, 2012) defines Enabling Force as, “Early deploying forces that establish critical capabilities to facilitate deployment and initial employment (including sustainment) of a force.”
8. Joint Publication 1-02 (November 15, 2012) defines Operational Contract Support as the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations along with the associated contractor management functions.”
9. In the World English Dictionary (Nov. 28, 2012) social capital is defined as, “the network of social connections that exist between people, and their shared values and norms of behavior, which enable and encourage mutually advantageous social cooperation.”
10. In Army Magazine (June 2012), MG Bennet S. Sacolick, defines Human Domain as, “The human domain is the totality of the physical, cultural and social environments that influence human behavior to the extent that success of any military operation or campaign depends on the application of unique capabilities that are designed to fight and win population-centric conflicts. It is a critical and complementary concept to the recognized domains of land, air, maritime, space and cyberspace.”
11. investopedia.com defines information asymmetry as, “a situation in which one party in a transaction has more or superior information compared to another. This often happens in transactions where the seller knows more than the buyer, although the reverse can happen as well. Potentially, this could be a harmful situation because one party can take advantage of the other party’s lack of knowledge.” http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/asymmetricinformation.asp#ixzz2EFZasQ1j (accessed November 28, 2012)
WAGING SPECIAL WARFARE IN AFRICA
THE CASE FOR INTEGRATED ENGAGEMENT
BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL GUILLAUME BEAURPERE
Introduction

How do special-operations forces, conducting an array of special-warfare activities in the vast expanses of the African continent, best support U.S. foreign policy objectives and protect U.S. interests where political, economic and security challenges plague so many nations and create environments easily exploitable by violent extremist organizations? Geographically vast, ethnically and culturally diverse, Africa presents unique challenges that are well suited to the agility and adaptability of SOF. Founded upon years of experiences gained in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan, special operators bring tremendous capability to adapt to the complexity of this environment and discreetly achieve U.S. objectives where large-scale military investment is neither feasible nor advisable in the coming decades.

This article draws upon recent U.S. Army Special Forces deployment experience on the continent of Africa — including work with other joint and Army SOF units — in support of the geographic combatant-commander’s objectives. Seeking first to characterize the national-security threat in these regions, this article then examines a framework for training and employing SOF against these threats. The experience that informs this analysis spans a spectrum of activities conducted over the past three to four years including the application of special warfare in support of partner-nation internal defense and development, SOF support to U.S. Africa Command sub-regional campaign plans aimed at disrupting and degrading al-Qaeda and its many affiliates and support to African partners struggling to quell regional, violent insurgent movements. Regional focus is specifically based on activities in the Trans-Sahel region of West Africa, the Horn of Africa in the East, and parts of Central Africa.

Regional insurgencies in Africa

The application of special warfare is defined as “the execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit tactics and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment.” In Africa it depends heavily upon the understanding of the root causes of instability and the various security challenges faced by our partners. The one common denominator in regions where SOF conducts its operations is the vast expanses of ungoverned or under-governed space. To many of our partner nations, these areas are denied space where access and influence present monumental challenges to long-term security and stability. Denial of these spaces, on the one hand, can stem from resistant or semi-autonomous populations who seek to subvert central government authority. On the other hand, denied space also has a direct correlation to the ability of an African nation to project its security apparatus or its control beyond major population centers. Firmly grasping and clearly defining the nuanced challenges of security operations in Africa allows SOF to apply a broader spectrum of special-warfare activities to the problem and provides much greater flexibility in how to conduct its missions.

One of the most interesting discussions, and the greatest challenges to achieving a clearly defined end state for U.S. policy and supporting SOF objectives, is how the problem in Africa is defined. Since September 2001, counterterrorism has been the driving strategy behind U.S. military efforts around the world. With the withdrawal of forces from Iraq at the end of 2011 and the inevitable drawdown from Afghanistan looming in the near future, there is growing concern that African-based al-Qaeda affiliates are now emerging as the next terrorist threat to U.S. national security. Yet the threat in Africa is not easily categorized as a simple terrorism problem nor is it always clearly linked to the al-Qaeda core. This article proposes that terrorism in Africa is only a symptom, or more plainly a tactic, of often loosely affiliated regional and sub-regional insurgencies aimed at overthrowing established governments by occupying under-governed or ungoverned spaces. From the Trans-Sahel, through the Nile and Great Lakes region of Central Africa, to the Horn of East Africa, there are common vulnerabilities that allow insurgencies to take hold and subvert fledging national governments. While a weak and susceptible military apparatus complicates regional security, vulnerable populations and wide expanses of ungoverned space and porous borders allow external support to flourish and sanctuary to take hold.

The most immediately exploitable vulnerability is the poorly trained, equipped and loosely institutionalized African security apparatus. A good chunk of our partners’ challenges are directly related to weak economies that prevent governments from investing in their militaries. This constraint subsequently leads some African nations to depend heavily on foreign-military assistance to develop and sustain its security forces. This national security dependence in Africa creates a dizzying conglomeration of foreign doctrine and military equipment complicating the long-term institutionalization of the military. West-African Francophone countries such as Senegal, Mauritania, Mali and Niger all have long-standing security-cooperation agreements with the French. Any bilateral military activities by the U.S. must account for an enduring French post-colonial influence that is not always very transparent or interested in cooperation. East-African nations tend to be more doctrinally aligned with the British, but also gravitate towards an amalgamation of security cooperation and assistance from the Middle East, India and even China — a long-term partner in Tanzania for example. Inevitably, SOF will continue to encounter partner security forces still struggling to achieve independent identity even some 60 years after post-colonial independence.

Regional alliances are difficult to sustain in Africa where diverse military doctrine combines with language and ethnic differences. Algeria, easily one of the most capable regional military powers in the Maghreb of North Africa, could serve as a core nation for a regional military alliance, but this Arab nation remains relatively closed to sub-Saharan cooperation as it continues to contain its own internal jihadist insurgency. Political and economic interests also compete with regional security interests. The East African Community established in 2001 linked Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania economically — it added Burundi and Rwanda in 2007 but the alignment does not necessarily enable regional military cooperation. Uganda, Kenya and Burundi formally contribute to the African Union Mission in Somalia, but Tanzania and Rwanda do not. Ethiopia, a significant regional diplomatic and military power in East Africa, contains threats on three geographical fronts — al-Shabaab in Somalia to its South, an unstable peace with Eritrea to the North and the containment of a percolating border conflict between the two Sudans to the West — yet Ethiopia does not officially contribute to AMISOM nor does it actively seek secu-
rity rapprochement with other regional powers such as Kenya or Uganda to its South.

To complicate matters, the operational environment is rife with militias loosely affiliated with or sponsored by central governments. Most African political regimes were founded upon a revolutionary ideology in the struggle to achieve independence and the men in power often elevate their resistance backgrounds to provide self-legitimacy. Deeply rooted in anti-colonialism and armed struggles for independence, the African military institution maintains an inherent tendency towards guerilla warfare. As a result, SOF will often contend with independent military elements leveraged to ensure regime survival. Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama‘a, or ASWJ, a Sufi Somali militia trained and supported by the Ethiopian government, conducts operations against al-Shaba in Somalia to indirectly support Ethiopian security interests on its southern border. ASWJ, however, is only loosely affiliated with the Somali government and its security forces, further contributing to diverse clan-based militias vice a centralized national-security apparatus. Just to the West of Ethiopia, the newly independent, and still transitioning from protracted guerilla warfare, nation of South Sudan continues to leverage resistance groups, such as the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement-North, to advance its irredentist claims to oil-rich territory in Sudan. This militia remains generally independent of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, South Sudan’s established national military. More than a year after the overthrow of the Qaddafi regime, militias still operate with general impunity across vast swathes of Libya with no concrete affiliation to the central government. The convergence of weak military institutions with the propensity to extend influence through militias weakens civil authority and creates opportunities for insurgencies to take root.

Ethnically fractured and ideologically vulnerable populations in Africa also enable regional insurgencies to exploit fissures between the people and the state — an especially acute problem when an insurgency elevates religious ideology as the legitimate alternative to secular and often corrupt governments. The human terrain in Africa is a complex blend of tribal, religious and ethnic groups that few Westerners can even begin to appreciate without spending a prolonged period of time in a specific region or country. This human diversity is colored by the endless flow of refugees displaced by ethnic and sectarian violence, drought or simply the search for a better life. Several nations in North Africa have become full-time staging areas for illegal African migrants attempting to enter Europe. Somali refugees in Southern Ethiopia and Eastern Kenya number in the hundreds of thousands with large diasporas present in Europe and the United States. Tuareg groups have begun moving out of the Azawad region of Northern Mali due to the recent violent occupation by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and its affiliates. Large groups of African populations remain pastoral nomads and often resort to violence to resolve access to land for cattle grazing and farming with other tribes regardless of international borders. Other groups simply aspire to greater political representation. In Kenya, the Mombasa Republican Council has the characteristics of a resistance movement aimed at subverting the central government, but its goal is to achieve economic and political rights for the marginalized coastal populations making their living along the Indian Ocean. Effective application of special-warfare activities must account for the human complexity of the region, which can quickly overwhelm the uninitiated. SOF must learn to discern the root causes of violence to avoid confusing disenfranchised populations with militant Islamists or terrorist networks who compete for their influence.
Where marginalized and impressionable population groups meet under-governed or non-governed regions in Africa, militant Islamist insurgencies can find sanctuary. The successful al-Shabaab nationalist campaign against the 2006 Ethiopian invasion created space for insurgencies can find sanctuary. The successful al-Shabaab national—under-governed or non-governed regions in Africa, militant Islamist affiliating to take root. Training camps emerged across southern Somalia where foreign fighters were able to develop terrorist tactics that threatened the wider region and even Europe and the United States. For the Malian government, the Tuareg Agawam region of Northern Mali was always difficult to access and control. Now that it is tacitly controlled by a self-declared independent Islamist insurgency led by AQIM, regional and international affiliates have a vast sanctuary in the heart of the Sahara desert from which to train and operate.

Declaring autonomy in Africa is nothing new as arbitrary colonial borders continuously challenge many governments over the control of diverse population groups. With the newly independent nation of South Sudan joining the continent in July of 2011, several observers worry that this could trigger wider regional initiatives for independence. Somaliland declared independence from the rest of Somalia in 1991. Though it is not internationally recognized as an independent nation, it does tout its own constitution and enjoys relative peace and security compared to the rest of the Horn. The fledgling government in Mogadishu will be hard pressed to bring them back into the fold of a unified Somali nation. Puntland remains semi-autonomous and presents additional challenges to the unification of Somalia. For nine years, Boko Haram, and its Islamist predecessor, has battled the Nigerian central government to form an Islamic nation in northern Nigeria. Since 1982, a resistance movement has battled for the independence of the Calamanco region of southern Senegal, which always risks destabilizing one of the more democratic nations in West Africa. Whether already semi-autonomous or at risk of splintering, a study of these fissures is paramount to appreciate the potential for insurgent sanctuary.

External assistance is a common enabler in many insurgencies. Networking with AQ foreign sources of finance and propaganda apparatus provides African Islamist insurgencies immediate and quantifiable gains. The AQ brand also provides a common framework of ideology for regional interaction and facilitation networks to develop. Once interconnected through ideology and leadership, insurgent threats quickly become regional vice contained internal security problems. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb declared loyalty to Osama bin Laden in 2007 and through a prolonged campaign of kidnappings, suicide bombings, assassinations and loose alliances with National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad and other militant Islamist movements such as Ansar ad-Dine and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, wrested control of northern Mali from the central government in March of 2012. A December 2011 U.S. Congressional Report indicated that Boko Haram may be forging ties with other al-Qaeda affiliates in Africa, most notably AQIM just to the North and al Shabaab in Somalia. During the 2011 civil war in Libya, the uncertain security and political climate allowed violent Salafist groups to exploit ungoverned space and seek to impose their ideological objectives from within the Libyan opposition. The fall of the Qaddafi regime then produced a flow of illicit weapons trafficking and displaced militants that enabled the AQIM and Tuareg uprising of 2012.

The interconnected nature of these regional Islamist groups is an important capability of the threat facing U.S. interests in the region, but there are vulnerabilities that are also worth noting. The adoption of the al-Qaeda name by regional militant Islamist movements can be misleading because it belies local origins and diverse organizational objectives, which are not always neatly in line with global jihadist goals. AQIM is beset by internal strife as former members of its precursor organization, Algeria’s Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, reportedly left the group over internal conflict. The loose alliance formed with other groups such as Ansar ad-Dine and the Movement for Unity and Jihad appears to be splintering. The alliance of convenience with the MNLA has collapsed and Tuareg rebel groups are now in opposition to a Salafist occupation of the Azawad. Similar rifts exist between al-Shabaab and East Africa al-Qaeda affiliates who seek to exploit the insurgency to advance broader regional jihadist objectives. The immediate benefits of the al-Shabaab alignment with al Qaeda — shifts in tactics, access to additional financing and foreign-fighter leadership, robust U.S. increase in information and communication technology to advance its cause — have been placed under significant pressure by the tactical military success of the African
Preparing for special warfare in Africa

Experience has shown that to effectively oppose regional African insurgencies and their underground support networks through special-warfare activities, SOF training and preparation must adopt some broad principles. The first is preparing for operational agility. If there is one lesson to take from posturing SOF on the African continent, it is that nations can transition from peace to violence in a matter of days. Military takeovers threaten government collapse where democracy is still taking hold. Mauritania alone has experienced at least three military coups d’états in the past 10 years. The effects of the Arab Spring, initially contained to North Africa, continue to pose broader threats to regional security. Seemingly innocuous religious statements or contentious media can spark large-scale uprisings giving the impression of popular support for Islamist insurgencies and threatening U.S. diplomatic missions and American citizens on the continent. The Tuareg rebellion led by the MNLA, bolstered by militant Islamists and al-Qaeda affiliates and the subsequent coup in Mali did not necessarily catch SOF off guard but it did require an ability for the teams in the region to respond to the crisis and support the ambassador’s emergency action plan. Every SOF element deploying to the continent must always have the tactical capabilities and the flexibility to react to contingencies.

Another important tenet of special warfare in Africa is to seek unified action and integrate engagements on the continent with U.S. diplomatic mission-strategic plans and with other national assets in the region. This requires a broad understanding of U.S. policy and objectives and knowledge of the various U.S. governmental agencies at play. Unified action also applies to developing common frameworks with traditional allies in the region. France is heavily invested — and influential — in West Africa maintaining post-colonial relationships, presence and cultural ties to a vast Francophone region. In East Africa, the United Kingdom has similar interests, especially in Kenya where it still maintains a very large military presence. Canada, the Netherlands and select other NATO allies have begun to consider security cooperation in Africa and understanding their interests and objectives should factor in preparing for special warfare on the continent. SOF must learn to form the adhesive layers that bond and synchronize these various actors on the continent. This requires a unique approach to training and frequent interoperability with the rest of the interagency community.

Special Forces must train to achieve objectives indirectly in Africa. A direct and overt presence of U.S. forces on the African continent can cause consternation not only within country teams, but often with our own partners who take great pride in their post-colonial experiences of resisting occupation.

Preparing for special warfare in Africa must also strive to train and develop their core mission of unconventional warfare. Although the preponderance of SOF activities on the continent are currently best categorized as foreign internal — and regional — defense or counterinsurgency, training and preparing for UW is certainly relevant. For one, understanding the evolution of insurgencies, how resistance movements are organized and how external or foreign support can help subvert or overthrow a government allows SOF to better analyze the complexity of the regional Islamist insurgencies we face in Africa. Whereas AQIM and al-Shabaab may have organizational structures akin to guerrilla movements whose ranks are infused with foreign jihadists, Boko Haram and other smaller splinter groups remain domestic and generally underground although approaching a guerrilla war of movement.

Secondly, a firm grasp of the evolution of insurgencies through UW training allows special operators to identify when African-based militant Islamist movements may be most vulnerable. When foreign fighters began to assume leadership roles within al-Shabaab in Somalia, the popular perception of the insurgency changed which then presented exploitable rifts between a nationalist stream and a global jihadist ideology. AQIM, bolstered by a vulnerable alliance of other militant Islamist groups, has attempted to govern Northern Mali since March 2012. In a struggle to assimilate the local populace, they have instead alienated the indigenous Tuareg population and incited broad international condemnation. Expertise in UW allows SOF to extrapolate logical conclusions to these insurgencies realizing that in many cases this will take generations to achieve. The key lesson in the study of resistance movements is that all insurgencies, one way or another, will eventually transition to civil authority or demobilize. This
fundamental principle allows SOF to think long-term and advise our partners and the U.S. diplomatic missions overseas, on the probability and conditions for reconciliation and reintegration. The Algerian Peace and Reconciliation Charter of 2006 and the UN's Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement program in Central Africa are two examples of reintegration programs aimed at national or regional reconciliation that provide possible frameworks for the demobilization and reintegration of militant Islamist groups in the future.

UW training philosophy is especially relevant to the African problem because it prepares SOF for the ambiguity and austerity of a guerrilla-warfare environment. Training for UW places emphasis on regional expertise, cultural appreciation and language ability. These skills sets are inherent to penetrating and operating within the complex human domain of African COIN operations. UW requires special operators to train for operations in austere, isolated and denied areas. Africa has no shortage of such environments, and Special Forces can survive and excel in these conditions. When thrust into the forests of Central Africa to assist Ugandan forces in counter-LRA operations, it was their ability to operate in denied and isolated areas that allowed U.S. Army Special Forces to develop infrastructure and relationships required to operate where the U.S. logistics simply could not reach. Training for UW also maintains a unique capability and option for U.S. policy makers that is too often overlooked. Special Forces are trained to make contact with, assess, develop and employ resistance movements to subvert, disrupt and even overthrow occupying powers that may threaten U.S. interests and the stability of an entire region.

**The current operational design**

It is through enduring and integrated engagements that SOF in Africa disrupts and degrades threats to the United States. The enduring and persistent approach allows SOF to better integrate with long-term diplomatic objectives and to persevere in regions suffering from deep historical sources of instability that will take years, if not generations, to resolve. Current special-warfare engagements to counter violent Islamist and extremist insurgencies generally follow three logical lines of effort. These lines focus on mitigating the vulnerabilities in the security sector and the human domain that enable regional insurgencies.

The first line is a partner-unit capacity building effort that demonstrates a commitment to assisting key partner nations in the region who share U.S. democratic and human rights principles. The second line is a shaping effort focused on building enduring relationships and influence, bolstering U.S. public diplomacy overseas through information operations and posturing for contingencies. This line is critically focused on integrating SOF with the interagency, and if appropriate with other allies and supporting organizations in the region. SOF enduring engagements in Mali, for example, ended when a military junta overthrew the democratically elected government in early 2012, but the relationships and positioning SOF developed over the course of several years still remain and can be leveraged to achieve future objectives. The third line focuses on enabling our partners through information sharing and, if necessary, accompanying and augmenting their COIN capacity during operations. Along this line, SOF directly affects the outcome of conflict through presence and advisory assistance.

Whether it is through episodic combined exercises or long-duration presence directly supporting U.S. diplomatic mission integrated country strategies, every SOF engagement on the African continent builds partner-nation capacity. In some cases SOF is tasked to build units from the ground up. In other cases, SOF engages and partners with already established units. From Mali and Mauritania to Uganda and Kenya, SOF has played a crucial role in the development of special-forces units to expand the capability of our partners to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, raids and ambushes against insurgent groups. With the full endorsement of our partner nations, these units must be highly mobile, capable of conducting expeditionary operations and be specially equipped and trained to conduct precise counter-guerrilla operations in austere environments. In Mali, Special Forces trained a company-sized element initially designed to build the foundation for this capability across the Malian military. An internal military assistance and training capability, the company was initially used, before the military coup of March 2012, to train, advise and assist Malian combined-armed groups forward in the Azawad region of the North projecting presence and capability forward in denied areas.

Once a special capability exists, enduring SOF engagements continue to play a crucial role in building the organizational and institutional capacity necessary to maintain an advanced counterinsurgency capability. Through close coordination with the Office of Defense Cooperation and the Senior Defense Official in country, SOF is postured to recommend U.S. train-and-equip programs through Section 1206 or 1207 assistance programs under the National Defense Authorization Act to bolster a fledgling unit. In Kenya, SOF played a crucial role in infrastructure investments for the Kenyan Special Operations Regiment and especially in the establishment of the Kenyan Ranger School that serves as the institutional mechanism to generate future Rangers for the regiment. Similar initiatives are needed in Uganda and Senegal where fledgling special-forces units have no established method to assess, select and train future soldiers which will maintain their ranks and ensure long-term sustainment.

An additional, and more complex, layer of capacity building occurs at the operational level to develop an effective framework and understanding for employing special COIN forces against the threat. Across the ranks of our African partners, there is a shortage of officers qualified to advise higher echelons on the employment of advanced-capability units against regional insurgencies. This problem can sometimes relegate specially trained units to combat support roles, being held in reserve or maintained close to the seat of government to protect the regime in case of attack. In some cases, the Praetorian Guard phenomenon associated with highly skilled units in partner nations can be directly monitored and shaped by SOF engagements to ensure compliance with human rights and application against a common threat vice regime protection. SOF representatives or liaisons engage at the general staff levels to solidify doctrinal basis for special capabilities and advise and mentor senior leaders on the proper application of advanced skills in the wider campaign design.

The shaping line of effort for SOF in Africa takes an inform-and-influence track that is aimed at changing perceptions, eroding support for extremism and building enduring relationships with key individuals and leaders. In Africa, SOF should never underestimate the value of its overt military presence. Military uniforms draw
respects and provide SOF access to segments of the population, and more importantly to key leaders, that may be otherwise inaccessible. Through this access, SOF builds relationships and trust that can directly support the capacity-building efforts described above and shape the environment for the future. The junior leaders who are trained and engaged during combined exercises and SOF training missions will someday move to positions of greater influence and power in their countries. There is an inherent opportunity in every engagement to develop the ethics and leadership philosophy of these individuals. Through engaged dialogue and focused training efforts, SOF can shape the environment for future activities and directly assist the U.S. country team in aligning partner-nation COIN plans and operations with U.S. policy and objectives.

Leveraging Military Information Support teams, SOF can directly assist partners in messaging, thus enabling specially trained units to exploit the fissures between insurgent movements and the populace. Information support can also enable partners to bolster their legitimacy within their own population. Through radio programs such as the Islamic Lecture Series in Somalia—a Somali-led moderate Islamist radio show broadcast once a week through Radio Mogadishu—information can enable discussion within a segment of the population to draw upon social or religious diversity and elevate the voices of the silent majority often oppressed by insurgent movements such as al-Shabaab.

The enabling assistance line of effort builds upon the foundations established through enduring SOF capacity building and persistent shaping activities. These efforts acknowledge that the capacity of our partners in Africa has some shortcomings that directly impact their ability to target, degrade and disrupt insurgent networks. More sensitive and politically charged, SOF-enabled operations require an endorsement from both the host nation and the U.S. Chief of Mission. The bilateral counter-LRA activities conducted by U.S. Special Forces and the Ugandan military were driven by U.S. congressional action and approved by President Museveni, the Ugandan head of state. In some cases, SOF enablers may support regional UN or African Union initiatives. The AU Mission in Somalia receives indirect logistical support and information from the U.S. and other allies facilitating African-led operations against al-Shabaab. Unmanned-aerial systems deployed with SOF can support early warning and detection requirements of our partners, a critical capability when it comes to patrolling vast stretches of the Saharan desert or porous border regions. Through unique funding and equipping programs, information-support equipment can be made available to a partner unit. When combined with the right training, this capability enables a security force to conduct tactical messaging before, during and after a COIN operation.

Enabling assistance also includes the advising of partner forces in forward locations through discrete and small task-organized elements. When deploying to conduct FID in Africa, SOF must be prepared to transition from training to enabling combat operations. A detachment of Special Forces is trained to operationally advise a battalion-sized unit of about 400-500 partner-nation soldiers. Smaller elements can embed at tactical or operational headquarters to facilitate information sharing or enable coalition activities when regional security organizations take form such as AMISOM or if ECOWAS proceed with military action against the occupation of the
Azawad. Forward Special Forces presence in the jungles of Central Africa allowed regional African partners to benefit from deployed systems and expertise to expand their counter-LRA operations. Most significantly, SOF advisory assistance at forward outposts was directly responsible for the establishment of combined operations fusion centers where military commanders, local security officials and a host of international and non-governmental organizations could share information about regional insurgent activity and coordinate military activities with civil authorities.

The way ahead in Africa

When peace and stability falter in Africa, and radical Islamist insurgencies seize opportunities to occupy space and threaten U.S. interests and security in the region, it is SOF presence in the human domain combined with the discrete and enduring application of special-warfare activities that can help achieve U.S. objectives. Acknowledging that success will be measured over the course of years – and perhaps even generations – SOF take a deliberate and calculated approach tempered with patience and perseverance. Accounting for the complexity of the African regional insurgency problem and drawing on the experience and lessons learned from SOF activities across the vast mid-section of Africa, it is possible to extrapolate some broad recommendations for continued evolution of special-warfare activities.

1. Recognize regional threats in Africa as growing, yet fractured and still vulnerable, insurgent movements. The U.S. and its regional allies are facing a conglomeration of Islamist insurgencies that are loosely affiliated and interconnected. Porous borders, under-governed and inaccessible spaces and disenfranchised populations create opportunity and sanctuary for these insurgencies to take root and grow into significant threats. Militant groups, such as AQIM and al-Shabaab, become occupying powers when the security apparatus fails and influence is lost. Terrorist tactics, whether aimed at local governments or exported against Americans and our way of life, are enabled under the banner of extremist ideology. We must concentrate on studying these movements in depth, understanding their critical capabilities and how they draw power and influence, and most importantly, exploiting fissures and vulnerabilities between the various radical Islamic groups in the region.

2. Establish whole-of-government unified action at the country-team level. The various U.S. governmental actors on the African continent do not always communicate and coordinate effectively or efficiently. Special operations alone are not always fully synchronized and various SOF elements operating from a single embassy can confuse the country teams. Establish SOF unity of command in the short term to fuse the various capabilities and ensure that a single commander or SOF representative is available to U.S. ambassadors at the sub-regional level to advise and inform on the full spectrum of special-warfare activities underway in a specific country or area. Where a Special Forces detachment operates in the same country as a civil military support element, there should be one single SOF representative or overall commander identified to the country team to synchronize the full spectrum of special warfare in that partner nation. A deeper objective must include greater interagency coordination and even integration.

3. In key partner nations where special-warfare activities can have the most affect on regional Islamist insurgencies, develop SOF supporting plans that directly support the ambassador’s integrated country strategy. The production of these plans should be nested with the annual review of strategic planning by the country team and demonstrate, in plain terms, how special warfare activities can directly support foreign policy objectives and goals in that country. It is important to note that regional security and partner-force development may not always be an ambassador’s number one priority. If priorities focus on development and diplomacy instead of defense, SOF activities may be more constrained but certainly remain feasible. In these cases, SOF may have a more discrete presence and focus on shaping and influence activities vice broader capacity building or enabling operations.
4. **Always posture SOF for strategic response.** The inherent capability of SOF to provide immediate response in a crisis must be communicated to our embassies overseas early and often. When deployed, SOF teams must be allowed to maintain access to their weapons and tactical equipment to react quickly in an emergency. Working closely with the regional security office to seek exceptions to certain diplomatic policies is paramount during pre-deployment surveys and continuously throughout an operation. Host-nation constraints must also be taken into account as SOF can quickly experience a political backlash if the arrival of military equipment is not properly coordinated in advance. Agreements for storage and the security of weapons should insist on accessibility and functionality. Weapons cannot be stored in one location with bolts and ammunition kept under lock and key miles away.

5. **Consider the full spectrum of special-warfare activities to oppose regional insurgent movements.** U.S. Army Special Forces are specifically trained to assess the resistance potential of certain groups and, when properly guided by U.S. policy, to make recommendations for possible U.S. support to a guerrilla or underground. A wider array of SOF is available to assist in organizing, training, advising and assisting partner-nation forces or a coalition if mobilized to conduct operations against a regional insurgency. SOF teams, when embedded with interagency partners, can assist in forging relations and coordination between African and non-governmental civilian agencies and military authorities. MISO and Civil Affairs teams, with unique influence and shaping capabilities, should augment partner-nation capacity building efforts by Special Forces or other SOF units and exploit informational fissures between insurgencies and the local populace. MISO can also be leveraged to legitimize and enable African security partners. This can take the form of recruiting, building esprit de corps by solidifying unit identity, building ties with local population groups or messaging their unique counterinsurgency capability and adherence to the rule of law.

6. **Develop partner-nation enduring institutions.** Through persistent engagement and committed mentorship, SOF has successfully built a foundation of African partnerships with specially trained units that have the basic capability to conduct advance counterinsurgency operations. What is lacking is the full national capacity to institutionalize and sustain these units for the long term. SOF activities must increasingly shift to a broader application of capacity building that develops the training institutions required to continuously generate more elite forces while simultaneously gaining access to the ministries of defense and higher military echelons to influence the doctrinal development for employment of these units. The Joint Special Operations University has the ability to support some of these initiatives through joint military-education programs that can augment SOF activities. Multi-national training exercises such as the Flintlock program in West Africa provide additional opportunities for engaging higher echelons and discussing options for countering radical Islamic insurgencies. To increase regional-security cooperation and tactical exchange, SOF can facilitate the development of regional coordination centers where multiple partner nations and U.S. governmental agencies can synchronize their various activities.

**Conclusion**

SOF must continue to serve as a national asset to U.S. foreign policy in Africa. The array of SOF Special Warfare capabilities, its access and influence in the human domain, and small discrete military signature make it the force of choice in an operational environment where African partners must take the lead but lack the full capacity to sustain and deploy fledgling security forces and build enduring and effective regional alliances. From the activities of multinational organizations, to a host of bilateral military and economic partnerships and various non-governmental and humanitarian actions there is little international synchronization or unified objective to counter radical Islamic insurgencies. The problem is even more complicated when various U.S. government actors cannot synchronize their own activities. SOF unity of effort and command, clearly delineated in SOF supporting plans to the chief of mission's strategic objectives will go a long way in achieving greater effect against regional insurgencies. When a crisis occurs, SOF enduring engagements and presence provide unique options for an ambassador and the U.S. government. These options will be significantly limited, however, if SOF cannot posture for response prior to the crisis occurring. As African governments develop regional institutions and agreements to counter violent Islamic insurgencies, SOF is the Department of Defense's option of choice to discretely enable and support burgeoning coalitions. Africa faces tremendous challenges as we enter the second decade of the 21st century. Our partners remain vulnerable to complex insurgencies, but with the correct application of special-warfare activities and human relationships their struggle against our common enemy is more likely to succeed.

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**Notes**

5. Joint Publication 3-05 (April 2011) defines Unconventional Warfare as, “Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.”
6. UN Security Council Resolution 1925 calls for the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration, and Resettlement (DDRRR) or foreign armed groups having a destabilizing effect on the Democratic Republic of Congo.
7. Capacity is defined as having a military capability combined with the national will to sustain and utilize it. SOF can affect both of these elements. Capability involves training and equipping a unit for a specific mission, but it is also requires an operational level investment to ensure the capability at the tactical level is properly resourced and employed. National will is only attained once SOF partners understand the unique capability they now possess.
The strategic dilemma of promoting democracy and human rights

Democracy and human rights have long been promoted as the ideals of U.S. foreign policy, with the rule of law being the glue that holds democracy and human rights together. But law can be a means of tyranny in the wrong hands, and democracy can produce a tyranny of the majority, as our founding fathers warned and as we are now witnessing in the Middle East and in North Africa. Human rights are what give legitimacy to democracy and the rule of law. Human rights protect the freedoms of minorities in a democracy, but they are meaningless without the rule of law.

The image of the U.S. as a champion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law was tarnished in the Middle East where, until recently, the U.S. supported authoritarian rulers. With the outbreak of democracy and the overthrow of autocratic rulers, the strategic dilemma of promoting human rights in Islamic cultures became apparent. The fundamental freedoms of religion and expression and the prohibition of discrimination based on sex or religion conflict with Islamic law, or Shariah, as well as with tribal practices that have become customary law.

The strategic dilemma is whether to promote democracy or human rights, since in emerging Islamist democracies the former can preclude the latter, and Islamist policies can also threaten U.S. national-security interests in the region, as seen in Mali. This creates both a strategic issue for U.S. policymakers and a tactical issue for SOF trainers and advisers whose mission success depends upon developing a relationship of trust and confidence with their indigenous counterparts. The requirement to report violations of human rights where they are not protected by local laws can create a mission impossible.

Back to the future in promoting human rights

In the summer of 2001 human-rights compliance was an operational priority for special-operations forces engaged in training and advisory missions. But on 9/11, those priorities changed. With the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the operational priority of human rights was subordinated to the more conventional priorities of combat operations. And even after conventional combat and stability missions were superseded by counterinsurgency operations, SOF remained more focused on direct-action counterterrorism operations than on indirect training and advisory missions.

It was only after U.S. combat forces had been withdrawn from Iraq and were being drawn down in Afghanistan that President Obama signaled a major shift in U.S. operational strategy — from COIN operations conducted by conventional combat forces back to SOF training and advisory missions coupled with CT operations. For SOF it was back to the future and a reorientation to pre-9/11 operational priorities; but experience during the intervening years will make a return to the human-rights priorities of 2001 problematic.
In doctrinal terms, the strategic shift from COIN to foreign internal defense may at first glance seem to be a distinction without a difference. But there is an important difference. While FID has the same political objective as COIN, which is to gain the public support necessary to win the battle for legitimacy against an insurgent threat, COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have been carried out by large deployments of conventional forces whose primary mission is to provide security for the local population, while FID is conducted by a relatively few highly trained SOF operators whose mission is to train and advise indigenous forces to conduct the lethal operations that in COIN have been conducted directly by U.S. and NATO military forces.\footnote{Legitimacy is about public perceptions of what is right and is what gives governments the moral authority to act. Military legitimacy is about \textit{might being right}, and in COIN and FID the battle for legitimacy is won by the side that gains enough public support to govern. That makes legitimacy an operational imperative in COIN and FID.\footnote{Experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has demonstrated that large deployments of conventional U.S. and NATO forces can undermine the public support needed for legitimacy and mission success in COIN. In such hostile cultural environments a relative few SOF are more effective than many more combat forces. In addition to maintaining a low profile, SOF are diplomat-warriors with the leadership, language and cultural skills needed to train and advise indigenous forces to carry out the lethal operations needed to defeat an insurgent threat.\footnote{After more than 10 years of COIN, the increasing hostility of Afghans to the continued presence of U.S. and NATO forces may make it impossible to salvage legitimacy from a legacy of corrupt government and endemic religious hatred. The lesson of legitimacy learned in Iraq and Afghanistan — that fewer U.S. forces are better than more in hostile cultural environments — should be applied in other strategically important regions where Islam predominates but where the potential for public support has not yet been contaminated by large deployments of U.S. combat forces. In African Islamic cultures, SOF training and advisory missions have been successfully conducted without fanfare or negative publicity.\footnote{The Middle East, Africa and Asia are strategically important regions where Islamic standards of legitimacy often prevail and conflict with those of the West. In such hostile cultural environments the quiet professionals of SOF can avoid incidents that undermine the public support needed for legitimacy and mission success. The success of the SOF training and advisory mission depends upon the military and diplomatic skills of SOF personnel and their compliance with local laws, moral standards and values. There is a double standard of legitimacy that complicates mission success: Standards in the U.S. often conflict with those in the operational area, and SOF must maintain public support both at home and in the area of operations. That can be a delicate balancing act; but SOF, like civilian diplomats, understand the importance of avoiding conflict with local legal, religious and cultural standards and they have the language capability to effectively communicate with their indigenous counterparts. Laws are the clearest standards of legitimacy and human rights the most important standards of law, so that compliance with human rights is essential whenever public support is critical to mission success. But values, moral standards, laws and even human rights are pluralistic and vary according to differing cultures. What is considered legitimate conduct in the U.S. often conflicts with standards in the Middle East and Africa, where a combination of tribal traditions and the Islamic religion have shaped standards of legitimacy and law.\footnote{Religion and secular traditions are primary sources of the standards of legitimacy, law and human rights; and because religious rules are considered sacred, they take precedence over secular standards. In Western nations like the U.S., the Judeo-Christian tradition has been shaped by the Enlightenment and capitalism to produce a culture reflecting the libertarian values of legitimacy and democracy that has fostered progress and modernity. In contrast to the libertarian values of legitimacy and law prevalent in the West, Eastern Islamic cultures have had little experience with democracy and capitalism; their values have been shaped more by tribal traditions and religious laws than by individual rights, liberty and capitalism.\footnote{In Islamic cultures of the East, religion and the rule of law are inseparable. Islamic law has produced conflicting standards of legitimacy that help explain the negative public attitudes that have plagued U.S. COIN operations. The lower profile of SOF personnel, with their diplomatic skills and indirect advisory and training mission can minimize that conflict; but that advantage can be lost if direct-action counterterrorism operations produce collateral damage, as they have in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The elite commando-warriors who conduct direct-action CT missions — such as those on Seal Team 6 who killed Osama bin Laden — offer a stark contrast to those diplomat-warriors who must lead from behind in FID. Both are SOF personnel and represent the unique and irregular military capabilities that are critical to protecting U.S. security interests overseas, but their operational methodologies are dramatically different and require contrasting skill sets. The commandos who conduct direct-action CT missions are pure warriors for whom mission success depends on lethal skills in striking clearly defined targets. The mission success of SOF diplomat-warriors who conduct FID depends upon indigenous forces that they train and advise to conduct lethal operations and maintain public support. While CT and FID are both considered special operations within the United States Special Operations Command, their means and methods can be in conflict. Issues of legitimacy that are critical to FID have little relevance to CT operations, but the collateral damage caused by CT operations can undermine the legitimacy required by FID.\footnote{Religion and the rule of law: Where East meets West Many of the problems of legitimacy experienced by U.S. forces can be attributed to the conflict between tribal traditions, the religious standards of Shariah and the secular standards of Western law. Any SOF trainer or adviser serving in an Islamic culture can expect to encounter such conflicts, but in Afghanistan the future of the SOF training mission is in jeopardy. The increasing number of green-on-blue killings of U.S. trainers by Afghans caused SOF commanders to put a hold on the training of more than 20,000 Afghan forces that in order to evaluate security concerns.}}}
In the West, the rule of law is founded on the social contract theory and libertarian principles of the Enlightenment that were enshrined in The Declaration of Independence: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.” The U.S. Constitution provides for a democratic government that protects those fundamental freedoms in the form of civil (human) rights; and U.S. religions have accommodated the libertarian norms of the Enlightenment and capitalism in the concept of free will (religious freedom) and the Puritan work ethic.

All U.S. military personnel take an oath to protect and defend the Constitution against all enemies, and that includes defending the right of civilians to exercise their freedoms of religion and expression, even to the point of burning the American flag or holy books. That is ironic, since the military is an authoritarian regime within a democratic society and requires that its members forfeit some of the very freedoms they risk their lives to defend for civilians.¹¹

There is little democracy or individual freedom in the authoritarian regimes of the Islamic East where the law of Shariah is based on tribal traditions and the dictates of the Quran, the holy book of Islam, and where burning the Quran is a capital crime and can cause widespread rioting, as it did following the intentional burning of a Quran by a pastor in Florida in March 2011 and the accidental burning of Qurans by U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan in February 2012.

Most Muslims consider the Quran to be the immutable word of God, just as fundamentalist Christians and Jews believe their holy books are the inerrant and infallible word of God, and in most Muslim nations Shariah produces a rigid and inflexible code of laws. While some progressive Islamists have embraced libertarian forms of democracy, others have argued that God is the only legislator and have promoted an emasculated form of democracy.¹²

Indonesia and Turkey are notable exceptions as Muslim democracies with secular rules of law. Saudi Arabia and Iran are Islamist nations that have rigid and comprehensive rules of law derived from Shariah that are interpreted and enforced by religious authorities. Indications are that emerging democracies in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt may join Saudi Arabia and Iran and embrace Shariah as a divine standard for their rules of law, as have Pakistan, Iraq and Afghanistan.

Shariah is considered to be God’s immutable law and often functions like a constitution in Western jurisprudence; and like Western constitutions, Shariah comes in different forms. Most of the differences in Shariah are attributed to traditional tribal practices that are not included in the Quran but that over time have been given divine sanction in Shariah. These tribal practices include female circumcision, honor killings and other barbaric practices that brutalize women and discriminate against non-Muslims.

Not only are there different forms of Shariah, but there are differences among Islamic scholars on the nature of Shariah: Whether it is a divine set of principles upon which laws should be based or an immutable code of laws to be enforced. There are also differences among Islamic scholars on how Shariah defines reason, free will, justice, democracy and human rights.¹⁸ But in some Muslim nations such as Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia, blasphemy and apostasy are capital crimes, and Islamic law condones discriminatory practices against women and non-Muslims. Such laws are clearly in conflict with fundamental human rights.¹⁴

Eastern and Western concepts of human rights differ, and when Shariah provides a comprehensive and rigidly authoritarian rule of law it precludes libertarian standards of human rights.¹⁵ This is evident in the Preamble to the 1990 Cairo Declaration of Human Rights that asserts a unique Islamic view of human rights that are “…an integral part of the Islamic religion and that no one shall have the right as a matter of principle to abolish them either in whole or in part or to violate or ignore them as they are divine commands, which are contained in the Revealed Books of Allah…” The freedoms of religion and expression are fundamental human rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966. While

Muslim nations are parties to both the Declaration and Covenant, the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights reveals a different understanding of the freedoms of religion and expression.¹⁷ The legal pluralism resulting from conflicting Eastern and Western concepts of law and human rights makes compliance requirements for SOF trainers and advisers in Islamic cultures problematic. It was difficult enough in 2001 when human rights were an established operational priority and Shariah was not a complicating factor; but today Shariah is a factor, so that human rights compliance is an even more daunting challenge for SOF.

**Human rights as an operational priority for SOF trainers and advisers**

Human rights have long represented the highest standards of legitimacy and law for SOF trainers and advisers.¹⁷ To maintain that priority Congress has placed certain restrictions on foreign-training missions to ensure compliance with human rights,¹⁸ and the Department of Defense has issued policy directives through its chain of command that require any violation of human rights be reported, and also require special training in human rights for U.S. military trainers and advisers both in the schoolhouse and at the operational level whenever military advisers and trainers are deployed.¹⁹

The following background is provided for U.S. Special Operations Command Human Rights Policy:

One goal of U.S. national-security strategy is to champion aspirations for human dignity. Coupled with our effort to promote regional
stability through democratic reform and our belief that all people are born with certain inalienable rights, our nation has focused efforts to protect the rights of all people throughout the world. The Department of State, with support of the Department of Defense, plays a key role in achieving the foreign-policy goal of promoting human rights abroad. DOD accomplishes this goal by shaping the international security environment and influencing those nations and militaries that can affect or assist the U.S. By their nature as warrior-diplomats and global scouts, SOF must incorporate and fully support these regional programs and plans [of the geographic combatant commands].

And the following are USSOCOM Policies and Procedures:

Human-rights awareness, concepts, reporting requirements and themes will be an integral part of SOF training with foreign forces. SOF will be prepared to teach and demonstrate by word and deed that the protection of human rights is imperative for military success in any environment, from garrison operations to conduct of war.

This command policy is a reminder that SOF trainers/advisers must be diplomat-warriors who can bridge the formidable gap between civilian diplomacy and military operations. When it comes to training military forces in emerging democracies overseas, SOF must not only provide effective military training but also promote democracy and human rights and exemplify the role of the military in a democratic society.

It is clear that the promotion of human rights is essential to political and military legitimacy, which has been a long-standing operational imperative for SOF. It is also clear that SOF trainers/advisers have a legal obligation to report any violations of fundamental human rights. What is not clear is a definitive list of those fundamental human rights that must be reported if violated.

The plurality of human-rights standards and the lack of clarity of fundamental human rights complicate issues of legitimacy in peacetime training and advisory missions; further complicating matters are different legal standards for human rights in peacetime and wartime. It has long been assumed that the law of war preempts human-rights law through doctrine, but one senior military lawyer has argued that “...human rights are now the prism through which all military operations are viewed and judged” and “...the continued development of human-rights law has arguably eclipsed that of the law of war.”

It is clear that genocide, murder, extra-judicial executions, torture, mutilation, slavery or the slave trade, including trafficking women or children for prostitution, prolonged arbitrary detention, kidnapping or taking hostages are all violations of fundamental human rights and must be reported. But real questions arise as to what constitutes “outrages upon personal dignity,” “...cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” and “other flagrant denial of...liberty, or the security of a person.” Would condoning honor killings and the abusive treatment of women and non-Muslims and trials and executions for blasphemy and apostasy be considered gross violations of human rights?

Questionable acts must be considered in the context of national policy promoting democracy and human rights and take into account the primacy of legitimacy as well as the practical realities of accomplishing the training and advisory mission. The burden of defining what to report as violations of human rights falls upon SOF commanders, who need specialized staff support in Islamic cultures to provide guidance to their trainers, advisers and operators in order to negotiate hazardous human terrain and comply with human-rights requirements.

**Defining human rights and negotiating the human terrain**

Human-rights compliance is part of operational-law support and normally the exclusive province of military lawyers, but because religion has a dominant role in defining human rights in Islamic
CONCLUSION

Before 9/11, the human-rights policy for SOF and other U.S. military forces was defined without reference to conflicting standards of law and human rights in Islamic cultures. Experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has since provided important lessons in legitimacy. If it’s back to the future for SOF, then training and advisory missions conducted in Islamist cultures must consider the hazards of the human terrain and require an increased emphasis on the intertwined issues of religion, legitimacy and law.

It can be difficult for the SOF trainer/adviser to comply with U.S. laws and human-rights compliance standards while respecting conflicting standards of legitimacy in Islamist cultures, especially if those standards condone honor killings, brutality to women, discriminate against non-Muslims and deny the freedoms of religion and expression. To maintain military legitimacy while promoting democracy and human rights in Islamist cultures, respect for prevalent religions, laws and values must be an operational priority, and USSOCOM should utilize its legal, religious and CA personnel to help SOF trainers and advisers understand and mitigate conflicting standards of legitimacy and law—especially those that relate to human rights.

It is a daunting challenge for SOF trainers and advisers to tolerate conflicting standards of legitimacy in Islamic cultures, and there are limits to that tolerance. Violations of fundamental human rights should never be tolerated in the name of military expediency, but it is not always clear just what those fundamental rights are. For those trainers and advisers who work directly with indigenous counterparts in Islamic cultures there should be clear guidance as to what human rights are fundamental—for instance, whether they include religious freedom and expression and equal treatment of women and non-Muslims under Islamic law.

Otherwise, military legitimacy could become a casualty of military expediency.
Notes

2. General Petraeus was a principle author of the Counterinsurgency Manual, which describes legitimacy as the main objective in COIN in paras 1-113 through 1-136, and there is special emphasis on the rule of law in chapter 7 and Appendix D. Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24 and MCWP 3-33.5, December 2006, Headquarters, Department of the Army. On the distinction between COIN and FID, see note 4, infra.
5. On the importance of legitimacy in COIN, see note 2, supra. The concept of military legitimacy and its relationship to public support is defined and explained in Barnes, “Military Legitimacy: Might and Right in the New Millennium,” Frank Cass, 1996, in chapters 2 and 3 (hereinafter cited as “Military Legitimacy”); see also Barnes, “Military Legitimacy in OOTW: Civilians as Mission Priorities, Special Warfare, Fall 1999.
6. Counterinsurgency (supra at note 2) for reference to diplomat-warriors at para 2-36 (p 2-8), and leadership requirements in chapter 7; see also “Military Legitimacy” (supra at note 5) at pp 105-117; and Barnes, “Civil Affairs: Diplomat-Warriors in Contemporary Conflict,” Special Warfare, Winter 1991, p 4.
7. Violent public demonstrations and the killing of US advisers following the accidental burning of Qurans on February 21, 2012 at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan raised doubts as to whether adequate security could be provided for US advisers and trainers against the increasing hostility of those Afghans being trained.
11. On the oath of office and the paradox of the military as an authoritarian regime in a democratic society, see “Military Legitimacy,” supra note 5 at pp 105-107, 118-126.
16. Articles 18, 19 and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) provide for the freedom of religion and free expression; and Articles 18, 19 and 20 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (a 1966 treaty signed by the US in 1977 and ratified in 1992) make those rights the law of the land. The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam of 1990 has no provisions comparable to Articles 18, 19 and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, but following a Preamble that asserts the primacy of Shariah in defining human rights, the following relate to the freedoms of religion and expression: Article 18 provides in part: Everyone shall have the right to live in security for himself, his religion, his dependents, his honor and his property... Article 22 provides: (a) Everyone shall have the right to express his opinion freely in such manner as would not be contrary to the principles of the Shariah. (b) Everyone shall have the right to advocate what is right, and propagate what is good, and warn against what is wrong and evil according to the norms of Islamic Shariah. (c) Information is a vital necessity to society. It may not be exploited or misused in such a way as may violate sanctities and the dignity of Prophets, undermine moral and ethical values or disintegrate, corrupt or harm society or weaken its faith. (d) It is not permitted to arouse nationalistic or doctrinal hatred or to do anything that may be an incitement to any form of racial discrimination. Article 24 provides specifically what the Preamble implies: All the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to the Islamic Shariah. Article 25 provides: The Islamic Shariah is the only source of reference for the explanation or clarification to any of the articles of this Declaration.
18. Department of Defense Instruction Number 5111.19, July 26, 2011, Enclosure 2, para 1c., which assigns to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities the responsibility to ensure compliance with the current “Leahy” human rights provisions of section 605B of Public Law 112-10, and section 2378d of title 22, United States Code (also known as section 620j of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.
19. Ibid Enclosure 2, at para 8g, which requires Geographic Combatant Commanders to verify that human rights vetting requirements and human rights training requirements have been met.
21. Ibid at Section II, para 4d.
23. If a specific human right falls within the category of customary international law it is a “fundamental” human right binding on U.S. forces during all overseas operations. Unfortunately there is no definite “source list” of those human rights considered by the U.S. to fall within this category of fundamental human rights. The source list for fundamental human rights includes, but is not limited to, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Common Article III of the Geneva Conventions, and the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. and authoritative pronouncements of U.S. policy by ranking government officials. According to the Restatement (Third) the U.S. accepts the position that certain fundamental human rights fall within the category of customary international law and a state violates such law, when, as a matter of policy, it “practices, encourages, or condones” a violation of such rights. Examples of such rights are “...cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and consistent patterns of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.”
27. That common word is the greatest commandment taught by Jesus to love God and neighbor (See Mark 12:28-33; Matthew 22:34-40; and Luke 10:25-37). It is two commandments taken from the Hebrew Bible (See Deuteronomy 6:4, 5, Leviticus 19:18). For more information on a common word see www.acronym.com.
28. Luke’s version of the greatest commandment reports Jesus answering the critical question, “And who is my neighbor?” Jesus responded with the story of the good Samaritan in which he told of a Jew stopping to help and care for a wounded Samaritan. (Luke 10:29-37) Jesus was a Jew, and the story is especially relevant today since in the time of Jesus the Jews thought of Samaritans much as Jews and Christians today think of Muslims. If the story were told to Jews or Christians today it would be the story of the good Muslim, or for Muslims it would be the story of the good Jew (or the good Christian). In short, in the greatest commandment Jesus taught that to love God we must love those of other faiths, even those we despise.
On the morning of Thursday, Oct. 14, 1999, former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere died of leukemia at the age of 77 at St. Thomas Hospital in London. Mwalimu, as he was known, was the founding father of Tanzania and an elder statesman from the 1960s African independence movements. In addition to his contributions to his home country and on the African continent as a whole, Nyerere visited the People's Republic of China “more than 10 times in his life.” Indeed, he was integral in facilitating and supporting China's strategic presence in East Africa and on the African continent. It is no wonder that upon Nyerere's death, China's official state news agency, Xinhua, reported that the Chinese people had “lost an old friend.”

Much has changed in the world since Nyerere's death in 1999. But the close friendship between China and Tanzania has not; nor has China's strategic presence in Tanzania. In the 21st century, Tanzania's prominent position in Greater East Africa, as well as its location astride the Western Indian Ocean region, gives it added geopolitical importance. While Western nations, the United Kingdom and the United States, in particular, cultivated close ties with neighboring Kenya in the last century, China devoted substantial time, energy, patience and resources in creating an ally of its own in the region. What has been the nature of Sino-Tanzanian strategic relations in the 21st century, and why? To what extent has China furthered its already close relationship with Tanzania through political-military interactions? By addressing questions such as these, the United States will be better positioned to craft a prudent and effective Africa policy of its own in the 21st century.

Visits and Influence

In the 21st century, China and Tanzania have exchanged senior-level military delegation visits, on average, every year. In addition, Chinese naval vessels have made port-of-call visits to Dar es Salaam on repeated occasions. The visits themselves were symbolic representations of the bilateral military relations between the two countries. Furthermore, in the context of the dynamic changes in the post-Cold War international political environment, the visits demonstrated the continued political importance each placed in the other.

Exchange visits this century began in late July 2000 with a momentous (though underreported in the West) port visit by two vessels of the People's Liberation Army Navy, the guided missile destroyer Shenzhen (DDG 167) and the large supply ship Nancang (AOG 953). The Chinese delegation was led by Rear Admiral Huang Jiang, chief of staff of the PLAN South Sea Fleet. Welcoming Jiang was General Robert Mboma, chief of the Tanzanian People's Defense Forces. Notably, Mboma said, “Tanzania highly appreciates the assistance provided by China in building the navy which has been playing a very important role in defense of the 1,224-kilometer coast and exclusive economic zone.” Thus, not only were Chinese naval personnel gaining experience along the East African coastline, Tanzania gained much needed support for its own national security needs. In many ways, the July 2000 PLAN port visit signified the mutually beneficial aspects of the bilateral military relationship that has been nurtured over many decades.
Well before China’s presence in Africa gained widespread media, academic and government coverage, China was engaged in adept strategic relationship-building around the continent. The new century resumed China's interactions with key African nations such as Tanzania. To illustrate, the following is a list of high-level Sino-Tanzanian military exchange visits that occurred between 2000 and 2010:

- In November 2001, a senior PLA delegation led by General Fu Quanyou (member of the Central Military Commission and chief of the general staff, PLA) visited Tanzania and met with President Benjamin Mkapa.
- In August 2002, a senior TPDF delegation led by General George Waitara (chief of the TPDF) visited China and met with Minister of Defense Chi Haotian.
- In September 2003, Tanzanian Minister of Defense Philemon Sarungi visited China and met with Vice Premier Huang Ju (member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, Communist Party of China).
- In May 2004, a senior TPDF delegation led by Lieutenant General Iddi Gahhu (chief of staff, TPDF) visited China and met with General Ge Zhenfeng (deputy chief of the general staff, PLA).
- In April 2005, a senior Chinese delegation led by Minister of Defense Cao Gangchuan (state councilor and vice chairman of the CMC) visited Tanzania and met with President Mkapa.
- In September 2005, a senior TPDF delegation led by L. M. Mwamunyange (chief of staff, TPDF) visited China and met with Defense Minister Cao (who stated China was ready to bring relations with Tanzania to “a new high.”)
- In July 2007, a senior TPDF delegation led by L. M. Mwamunyange (chief of staff, TPDF) visited China and met with Zhang Li (deputy chief of the general staff, PLA).
- In September 2008, a senior TPDF delegation led by Lieutenant General Abdulrahman Amir Shimbo (chief of staff, TPDF) visited China and met with Ma Xiaotian (deputy chief of the general staff, PLA).
- In September 2009, Tanzanian Minister of Defense and National Service Hussein Ali Mwinyi visited China and met with Minister of Defense Liang Guanglie and Guo Boxiong (vice chairman, CMC); Guo made special note that “bilateral military ties were an important component of bilateral ties.”

It is apparent that a majority of these exchange visits involved Tanzanian officials visiting China. This should come as no surprise, especially given China’s international political and economic ascent over the past two decades. Nevertheless, the fact that senior political and military officials repeatedly conferred high honors to Tanzanian officials demonstrates the strategic priority Tanzania holds within China’s Africa policy. And this high status of Tanzania in the Chinese strategic perspective was on display again as another decade passed in the 21st century.

Over a decade after China’s first port visit to Tanzania, the PLAN’s first hospital ship, Peace Ark (AHH 866), set on its maiden voyage that included a five-day stop at Dar es Salaam port in 2010. Commander of the 10,000-ton Peace Ark Major General Bao Yuping said “Mission Harmony 2010” was “a trip of service, a trip of harmony and a trip of friendship to reflect the theory of harmonious world and harmonious sea.” Beyond this lofty Chinese talk of grandeur, the PLAN vessel offered real humanitarian medical services to Tanzanian military personnel, local citizens and the Chinese community in Tanzania. It also exposed Tanzanian military doctors to Chinese expertise, which served as a recruiting tool for Tanzanians to study medicine in China. Once again, Chinese personnel gained operational experience, but Tanzanians benefited as well.

The following year, Sino-Tanzania military-to-military relations achieved even greater heights. In March 2011, the PLAN’s seventh escort flotilla made a five-day port visit to Dar es Salaam. Missile frigates Zoushan (FFG 529) and Xuzhou (FFG 530) comprised China’s anti-piracy mission operating in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast. Three months later, General Davis Mwamunyange, chief of the TPDF, visited Beijing. He met both Chen Bingde, chief of the General
Staff, PLA, as well as state councilor and Minister of Defense Liang Guanglie. Notably, Liang “hailed Tanzania’s support to China on Taiwan and Tibet-related issues as well as other major issues concerning China’s core and critical interests.” What these exchange visits demonstrated was China’s long-term commitment to developing strategic relations with Tanzania. The largely balanced, reciprocal nature of the military exchange visits revealed the symbolic and substantive relations between the two countries. Furthermore, the repeated expressions of shared strategic interests and values solidified the relationship in the 21st century.

**Goods and Influence**

In addition to high-level military interactions and PLAN port visits, in the 21st century China has continued to provide significant amounts of tangible military assistance to Africa, from small-arms and officer training to aircraft and infrastructure development. This also is not new to the Sino-Tanzanian relationship. China has provided military assistance to Tanzania since diplomatic relations were formally established in 1964, but the continued assistance is a meaningful reminder of China’s long-term commitment. For example, between 2000 and 2012, China provided approximately $63 million in arms exports to Tanzania. This accounted for nearly three-quarters of all reported foreign-arms exports to the country. During the aforementioned PLAN Rear Admiral Jiang’s visit to Tanzania in 2000, General Mboma revealed that Tanzania expected cooperation to be enhanced in military personnel training and equipment upgrades. So the recurrent Chinese military assistance to Tanzania has not been a real surprise. What is interesting to consider, however, is the long-term cumulative effects of Chinese military assistance to Tanzania.

Though it has long been a provider of military goods abroad, China’s tangible support of Tanzania’s military capabilities sometimes has not been immediately apparent. In 2005, for example, arms manufacturer Mzinga Corporation within Tanzania’s Ministry of Defense and National Service reportedly achieved an annual production capacity of 7 million rounds of 7.62-ammunition for AK-47 rifles. Mzinga, as it turns out, had been using Chinese production equipment supplied in 1971-1972. Subsequent efforts to enhance Mzinga’s production output using Belgian equipment came to naught, as Belgian government officials refused to authorize the license for an equipment transfer. One wonders, to whom will the Mzinga turn to next?

Across the TPDF order of battle, Chinese arms and equipment and, therefore, Chinese training and doctrine are all readily apparent. As with nearly all African militaries, it must be remembered that ground forces comprise the bulk of the armed forces, while air and naval forces may be considered appendages. For example, the TPDF comprises a total strength of approximately 25,500; 21,000 are Army; 3,500, Air Force; and 1,050, Navy. An overwhelming amount of Tanzania Army’s armor and artillery are Chinese-made. More significantly, perhaps, is the Army’s synthesis of British, Chinese and African guerrilla doctrine. While the Army has come under greater Western influence in the post-Cold War environment, legacy doctrine and training continue to inform Tanzania’s Army even as it continues to study Western doctrine.

China and Tanzania reportedly signed a military-cooperation agreement around 2007. Since then, China has continued to be a key partner in the training and equipping of Tanzania’s Air Force, particularly with the Chinese-manufactured K-8 jet trainer. The Air Force is also thought to be organized along Chinese regimental lines and its principal capability is a moderate transport one, again using Chinese-made transport aircraft. On the water, half of Tanzania Navy’s patrol and coastal craft are of Chinese origin. Again, most of the transfers occurred in the 20th century. Nevertheless, continued use of Chinese military goods provides China with a convenient opportunity to continue to develop strategic relations. Indeed, China’s presence in Tanzania — and around Africa — provides it with strategic opportunities, especially given the free or preferential transfer arrangements offered by China. It has been noted, moreover, that China is “particularly well placed to redevelop Africa’s crumbling military infrastructure.”

References:
1. Staff, PLA, as well as state councilor and Minister of Defense Liang Guanglie. Notably, Liang “hailed Tanzania’s support to China on Taiwan and Tibet-related issues as well as other major issues concerning China’s core and critical interests.”
2. What these exchange visits demonstrated was China’s long-term commitment to developing strategic relations with Tanzania.
3. The largely balanced, reciprocal nature of the military exchange visits revealed the symbolic and substantive relations between the two countries.
4. Furthermore, the repeated expressions of shared strategic interests and values solidified the relationship in the 21st century.
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ufactured arms sales to Tanzania — and Chinese military assistance in general — may outweigh the weapons themselves.

A case in point is China’s alleged use of covert forms of military assistance, which allegedly involved shipments through Tanzania to Burundi. According to Human Rights Watch, China in the past delivered covert shipments of weapons labeled as agricultural equipment to Dar es Salaam; in contravention to a number of arms embargoes, arms were destined for warring factions during Burundi’s civil war in 1995-1996. While it is difficult to verify the veracity of this report, which was based on firsthand accounts, what is clear is that this case of purported Chinese covert arms shipments was misreported and misidentified by more recent observers and scholars of China in Africa, all of whom attribute these alleged Chinese activities to the 21st century when, in fact, the allegations occurred in the previous decade. This example serves as a reminder that China’s presence in Africa, while certainly cause for close examination, requires careful strategic assessment, particularly in light of its presence on the continent since the 1950s.

**Assessment and Lessons**

Thus, it may be true that China’s relationship with Tanzania facilitates its “search for secure access to energy and commodities,” as 21st century commentators and analysts are wont to point out. At the same time, as this article has elucidated, Tanzania — indeed, Africa as a whole — is much more than a land of strategic resources for China. Africa, rather, is a land of strategic opportunity for China. This explains China’s commitment to Tanzania. Through careful and deliberate actions, China has forged close, strategic ties with Tanzania into the 21st century. Today, both nations constantly draw on the historical aspects of the relationship as well as the successful examples of mutual benefit and cooperation, both real and perceived. Tanzania has become a key strategic ally of China in East Africa, which was accomplished through long-term planning as well as presence and awareness of the local environment. U.S. Africa policy would do well to learn from these characteristics of China’s Africa policy, particularly if the United States has interests in forming long-term partnerships on the continent.

In order to invest in the long haul, the United States must send personnel to Africa, not necessarily to represent American interests officially, but rather to develop relationships, meaningful and lasting ones. The 21st century Sino-Tanzanian strategic relationship analyzed here is, above all, a shared relationship, with both nation-states and peoples interested in the long-term well-being of the relationship. The American tendency for “political missionary behavior” (that is, brief and sporadic stints of engagement in foreign countries, then rapid withdrawals and forgotten relationships) will no longer suffice, if it ever did, in the 21st century. Americans must demonstrate both symbolic and substantive commitment to nations and peoples in Africa. This is only possible when foreign languages, cultures and histories are appreciated and known; then relationships may be properly nurtured. Advanced information and communications technologies may assist in America’s long-term endeavors, but nothing — nothing — can replace the individual on the ground, on the streets, and, in the case of Africa, in the bush, among the people.

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**Notes**

1. Mwalimu is Swahili for “teacher.”
4. For background on the geopolitical importance of Kenya, see Donovan C. Chau, Global Security Watch: Kenya (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010).
6. The following was compiled from Xinhua and Jiefanjun Bao articles between 2000 and 2012.
13. “Chinese Naval Ships’ Head Meets Tanzanian Army Chief,”
15. Ibid.
19. “Stoking Fires with Arms in Burundi,” Relief and Rehabilitation Network Newsletter, no. 11 (May 1998): 19. This newsletter is produced by the UK Overseas Development Institute. Published in 1998, the Human Rights Watch report was entitled Stoking the Fires: Military Assistance and Arms Trafficking in Burundi.
U.S. Army Civil Affairs units conduct veterinary civic-action projects in order to influence civilians in an area of operations. During a VETCAP, CA units team with military veterinarians to provide or supervise the provision of basic care to herds, farm animals and pets. The Army has incorporated VETCAPS and other civic-action programs, such as medical civic-action and dental civic-action programs into its civil-military relations efforts as far back as the Vietnam conflict. They continue to be a part of military operations in conflict and peacetime.

Conceptually, VETCAPS are simple, but in practice they vary greatly in scale, duration and complexity. For example, in Afghanistan, a CA unit organized VETCAPS in which hundreds of animals were vaccinated and de-wormed in a single day. By contrast, the VETCAPS supported in Karamoja, Uganda in 2009-2010 by Civil Affairs Team–3 under Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa focused on training local community members to provide basic animal healthcare over the course of several weeks. The Karamoja VETCAP earned praise from its chain of command, U.S. government officials and Ugandan partners for focusing on long-term effects rather than on immediate results. This article examines lessons learned from CAT-3’s planning, execution and evaluation of the VETCAP in Karamoja. Since VETCAP doctrine is still being formalized, the experience may provide useful guidelines for units performing similar missions in the future.
Considerations for coordinating a VETCAP

The overarching objective of a VETCAP is never solely to treat animals, but rather to influence the civilian population as part of a broader mission. It is critical to keep this in mind from the outset. For example, the mission in Karamoja was to assist the Ugandan People's Defense Force with improving community relations in order to facilitate a small-arms disarmament campaign in the region. If the team had taken the lead role on the VETCAP, the mission would have failed. Rather, the VETCAP had to feature the UPDF leading a project to benefit local communities. In the planning phase, therefore, the UPDF took the lead at as many meetings and planning sessions as possible. While this approach was sometimes inefficient, seemingly easier ways would not have served mission accomplishment.

Achieving VETCAP objectives can take time; it may take months or years for CA teams to win the trust of the local population or to promote better animal healthcare practices in their area of operations. VETCAPS contribute to long-term goal achievement when their effects are sustainable. For example, a VETCAP may contribute knowledge, training, equipment or some other asset so that the target population will continue to benefit after project completion. In Karamoja, we supplied local civilians with the training and equipment required to establish basic veterinary services in their villages. In addition, the project can help build relationships and develop best practices that will facilitate future CA activities in the area.

Besides thinking long-term, VETCAP planners must also think locally. In Uganda, CA teams in the field and traveling functional specialty teams (consisting of CA and veterinary Soldiers) have executed successful, but markedly different VETCAPS. In 2009, in the volatile Gulu region of northern Uganda, CA Soldiers and Army veterinarians carried out a VETCAP to assist civilians who had been displaced by the conflict with the Lord's Resistance Army. They treated and vaccinated most of the animals in the Internally Displaced Person camps, which gave the VETCAP beneficiaries confidence in their ability to survive with their herds outside of the camps. By early 2010, most people had returned home and the post-war economy was flourishing. Despite the success of this VETCAP, CAT-3 could not replicate this model in Karamoja because conditions were different. A greater number of people raise livestock in Karamoja than in Gulu, so the number of animals was too large for a mass vaccination. Moreover, cattle-raiding is pervasive in Karamoja, so the team had to develop detailed security plans for each treatment site. In short, CAT-3 had to learn what it could from the Gulu VETCAP and make the appropriate changes for the mission in Karamoja.

The only way to learn such variations is to consult with local residents, leaders and relevant organizations and experts. Through consultation, the CA team gathers information that the functional specialty teams will need upon arrival, such as the prevalence of animal diseases, the availability of certain medicines and the preferences and priorities of area residents. By meeting with the district veterinary officer in Moroto, Karamoja, for example, the team learned of a risk that the project could fuel animal theft by creating a pool of animals that had recently received healthcare and were therefore more valuable. As a result, the team developed strategies to mitigate this risk, such as branding animals and treating only animals whose owners kept them in kraals — systems of fences guarded around the clock by the UPDF.

Finally, VETCAP planners must employ effective management practices. This means 1) ensuring an efficient division of labor among all of the military and civilian elements involved, and 2) providing the structure necessary for these elements to communicate and work with one another. When labor is efficiently divided, each task will be executed by the most appropriate person or team, which often requires forward thinking. For example, several days prior to the start of the VETCAP, the veterinary equipment and medicines ordered arrived at the CTA-3 team house. The team did not have sufficient technical knowledge to check and catalogue these supplies, and had it not arranged for a veterinary technician to arrive early to assist with the cataloguing, they would have been unable to accomplish this task.

Planning phase

A CA team preparing for a VETCAP will need to research local conditions, acquire technical information and solicit expert opinions.
During this phase, the team must:

- Discover outcomes of past VETCAPs in the area
- Learn the views and attitudes of local populace
- Record the composition, population and health conditions of domestic, herd or farm animals
- Identify local veterinary resources and experts
- Consult with experts who can advise on ways to link VETCAP objectives with other important outcomes such as economic development and conflict resolution
- Create a budget and plan for allocating U.S. Government funds
- Search for potential partners
- Survey and plan to incorporate local resources

In Karamoja, the team began gathering information by meeting with partners in the local government and the UPDF. Some of these sessions were formalities to gain official approval, but meetings with the DVO proved to be the real start of project planning. The DVO told the team about local animal diseases, gaps in animal healthcare and the non-government organizations and UN agencies working in the area. By starting the consultation process months ahead of time, the team was able to form working relationships with these groups well before the execution stage.

Whenever possible, the UPDF took the lead in meetings. This gave them ownership of the project and experience working with local groups. Potential NGO partners, who sometimes were reluctant to work with military organizations, were on notice from the outset that this was a UPDF project, which helped to establish trust early in the process. It also gave the UPDF a vested interest in providing security guards, organizers and assistants. This visible presence was essential, since the main goal of the VETCAP was to improve civil-military relations by demonstrating UPDF concern for local communities.

CAT-3 also coordinated extensively with the Government of Uganda and the U.S. country team, a process that was complicated by distance — Karamoja is an eight-hour drive from Kampala, the capital city. This differed significantly from Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom where interagency coordination occurred within provincial reconstruction teams, which included the interagency and the respective national governments. In Africa, CA teams typically have to go to the capital city to engage the host-nation government and U.S. agencies.

Integrating the country team’s area-specific knowledge and project-management experience can make the difference between merely executing projects and achieving desired effects. CAT-3 initially decided to hold the VETCAP in the Kotido District of Karamoja, a remote area where it had yet to plan a project. The regional security officer argued in favor of Moroto District, where the road network, facilities and security situation were better. Although the team had already planned a water project in Moroto, the RSO convinced argued that the factors outweighed the team’s preference for distributing projects equally. In retrospect, executing Karamoja’s first VETCAP in Kotido would have been a major challenge. In another situation, a U.S. Agency for International Development representative who specialized in working with the private sector recommended that the team survey the available animal healthcare products and services in Karamoja and incorporate them in project execution in order to build demand for veterinary products and services.

The team also benefited from close coordination with Ugandan agencies and institutions in Kampala. The Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries and Fisheries oversaw the project at the national level and made sure that it conformed to national-training standards and complemented other government programs. MAAIF special-ordered branding irons to be used during the VETCAP so that cows
could be marked as they received treatment. By helping the national government achieve its own goals for animal healthcare and management, the team reinforced U.S. commitment to Uganda in a tangible way. It also leveraged its relationship with Makerere University, which provided four veterinary students to serve as VETCAP trainers and assistants. Since Karamoja is a remote region of the country, the students also enjoyed the opportunity to conduct unique research there.

The team’s lack of veterinary knowledge sometimes limited its ability to ask the right questions or to fully comprehend the answers. For this reason, the team arranged a pre-deployment site survey for the functional specialty teams supporting the VETCAP. The PDSS gave supporting military specialists the opportunity to coordinate and discuss technical issues with veterinary store owners, MAAIF officials, the DVO in Karamoja and NGO partners. The PDSS familiarized the functional specialty teams with the situation on the ground and the goals of the VETCAP.

The pivotal event during the PDSS was a VETCAP stakeholders conference. Jointly organized by the CA team and the UPD, the conference brought the key players together in one forum and proved indispensable in reaching consensus on VETCAP design and execution. Moreover, the transparent and consultative manner in which planning occurred encouraged most of the group present to commit its long-term support to the project. In order to continue this cohesive coordination process, CAT-3 established a working group that met twice a month for the three months prior to the start of the VETCAP. The team continued its coordination with the functional specialty teams following the PDSS through weekly conference calls and the maintenance of a synch matrix, which laid out duties and responsibilities, timelines, budgets and generally tracked progress.

LONG-TERM EFFECTS The VETCAP focused on training local community members to provide basic animal healthcare over the course of several weeks. Photos by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Dawn M. Price

The final piece of the planning process involved coordination with leaders in the villages and communities in the Moroto District. After considering timing, traditions and formalities, the project was introduced to local politicians and tribal elders. This gave leaders ownership of the project and the opportunity to contribute to its success. As a result of these efforts, local leaders ensured people did not leave early in the morning during the VETCAP to graze their animals. They also constructed temporary holding pens, called “cattle crushes,” that facilitated the vaccination of cows. During these engagements, the team addressed lingering concerns just prior to execution and kept expectation management in mind.

These meetings offered an ideal opportunity to collect baseline information about the community’s views, attitudes and living conditions — the things the team hoped to influence through the project. By comparing data from before and after the VETCAP, a CA team can get a sense of whether, and to what degree, the project has accomplished its greater purpose. Ideally, social scientists will be available to help design and implement this kind of survey, but even a rudimentary attempt at measuring the effects (rather than just the outputs) of a project can provide the supported commander with a better idea of what has been accomplished.

Execution phase

For a CA team, the execution phase of a VETCAP involves facilitating, monitoring and publicizing the project. Facilitation means that the CA team responds to changing needs and new challenges in order to keep the project on track and to ensure mission accomplishment. It may require a hands-on approach or behind the scenes work with other partners. The team provided support by keeping training events on time and by assisting with the delivery of food, water and supplies to the training sites. An efficient division of labor is crucial here and all the players need
COLLABORATION Civil Affairs teams provide the resources to facilitate a comprehensive animal health care program in Uganda. Photo by U.S. Air Force Master Sgt. Dawn M. Price

to understand and accept their roles and responsibilities. Thorough and effective planning and coordination empowered individual actors to take the initiative to resolve unanticipated problems (when trainees in the Karamoja requested flashlights and insect repellent to use overnight, the designated pay agent on the functional specialty teams immediately purchased those items without lengthy coordination).

In order to respond effectively to unforeseen challenges, the CA team should proactively monitor the VETCAP, as opposed to waiting for issues to emerge. Nightly meetings were conducted with all the key players, which made it easier to share information, learn and make adjustments. Monitoring the progress of a VETCAP should include such items as keeping track of the number and type of animals receiving treatment. VETCAP objectives should dictate what information to track. The CA team's goal was to highlight the involvement of the UPDF, so it monitored and discussed the publicly visible roles of its military partners.

Publicity can be critical to mission success in a VETCAP. Prior coordination with the host nation, the public affairs officer at the embassy and military PAOs will ensure that a coherent message is communicated through multiple channels. In support of the VETCAP, the PAO at the embassy in Kampala issued a press release to the Ugandan media that provided details on the project. The team also engaged local journalists in Karamoja, providing them with information sheets. Since most people in Uganda get their news from the radio, the team gave interviews on local radio shows during the execution phase that allowed community members to ask questions and voice their opinions.

The team also took photographs and video footage of VETCAP activities, beginning with the stakeholders' conference. These images were helpful for telling the story in U.S. military publications, such as the CJTF-HOA Civil Affairs newsletter and the CJTF-HOA website. In addition, public affairs Soldiers from Djibouti provided professional coverage in military outlets.

Evaluation Phase

The Evaluation Phase of a VETCAP involves reviewing the project and transferring the lessons learned to the next project or to follow-on teams. Conducting an internal review among CA Soldiers, while necessary, is not sufficient to measure the success of a VETCAP. The other partners in the project will also have valuable insights, feedback and suggestions for future improvements. Holding a final stakeholder's conference is a good way to get everyone involved. It signals to part-

ners that the CA team values their opinions and advice, which can strengthen working relationships.

A critical but often overlooked component of the review process is soliciting the opinions of the project beneficiaries. CA teams should, to the extent possible, conduct baseline surveys of public opinion, collect atmospherics and otherwise make note of local conditions and attitudes throughout the project as an evaluative tool for mission effectiveness. Gaining reliable information about public opinion can be a difficult task that requires sophisticated surveying techniques, however. A CA team should seek the assistance of social-science professionals, such as socio-cultural research and support teams or human-terrain teams, in designing and implementing public-opinion surveys. In the absence of such support, the CA team can learn a lot by simply talking with community members several weeks or months after the VETCAP. Asking local residents whether they remember the VETCAP, what they think about it and what they think about the organizations that carried it out will provide insight into VETCAP effects. Comparing the answers to these questions with data recorded during the planning phase will help assess how a project impacted local attitudes.

After conducting a thorough evaluation, the final task is to disseminate what has been learned to other teams and organizations. Compiling a list of lessons learned is one way to capture this knowledge and make it accessible to others. Another way is to develop briefings for the supported commander, the U.S. Embassy, host nation counterparts and other partners. For other CA teams in theater and follow-on teams, it will be important to provide a robust set of details such as the names and contact information of project partners. For the team’s replacements in Karamoja, it prepared a detailed briefing, introduced them to project partners and walked them through the planning and coordination processes and architecture (e.g., stakeholder conferences, synch matrix, etc.). Ultimately, it is the responsibility of each team to ensure its peer teams and replacements can build upon and improve what has been accomplished through a VETCAP.

Conclusion

U.S. Army Civil Affairs Soldiers have been conducting VETCAPS for decades in order to influence civilians in an area of operations. This article has explored some of the lessons learned from CAT-3’s experience in Karamoja, Uganda from 2009-2010 and suggested best practices for future VETCAP planners. Whether conducted as part of combat, stability or humanitarian operations, VETCAPS and other civil military action projects will continue to be a core competency of Civil Affairs Soldiers.

SSG Danielle Bayar is from Delta Company, 411th Civil Affairs Battalion, Danbury, CT.

Notes

3. The UPDF calls its Civil Affairs soldiers “CMCC soldiers” because they staff Civil-Military Coordination Centres. CAT-3 partnered with these soldiers.
4. Bradbury, Mark, and Michael Kleinman. Winning hearts and minds? examining the relationship between aid and security in Kenya. Medford, Mass.: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, 2010. (Discussing the difficulty of understanding how attitudes and opinions change as the result of a project when an initial baseline assessment is not made).
ROYAL NETHERLANDS ARMY SPECIAL FORCES: “NUNC AUT NUNQUAM”

History
The Korps Commandotroepen (Special Forces Regiment) of the Royal Netherlands Army has a proud heritage spanning more than 70 years. It traces its origins to March 22, 1942, when 48 Dutch volunteers started intensive training at the Basic Commando Training Centre at Achnacarry, Scotland. Once finished, these special forces of No. 2 (Dutch) Troop of the No. 10 Inter-Allied Commando, participated in operation Market Garden (Nijmegen, Eindhoven and Arnhem) and operation Infatuate (Vlissingen and Westkapelle) in the European theatre, late in 1944. A limited number of Dutch commandos also gained combat experience during World War II in Southeast Asia as part of the 3rd Special Service Brigade during operations in Arakan (Burma).

Coincidentally in the Far East, a Netherlands Special Organisation (Korps Insulinde) was founded mid 1942. Under the auspices of the British Special Operations Executive, these troops conducted operations against Japanese occupying forces in the Netherlands East Indies. Operations in the East Indies were resumed following the Japanese capitulation with the Dutch government deciding to reassert its authority over the archipelago. After a number of post-war reorganizations, RNLA special forces capability had been consolidated in a Special Troops Regiment by late 1948. This combat unit was used in a series of successful airborne operations against Indonesian nationalist forces at Djokjakarta and in mid-Sumatra.

In 1950, the Special Troops Regiment took up residence in the Engelbrecht van Nassau Barracks in Roosendaal where it is still situated today and was renamed into Korps Commandotroepen, also known as KCT. During the Cold War, the main emphasis for the KCT was providing special reconnaissance for the 1st Netherlands Army Corps, which was responsible for defending the plains of Northern Germany in the event of a Warsaw Pact campaign against NATO forces. Also, in the early years of the Cold War, a number of KCT personnel were attached to the Dutch contingent of the UN Command in Korea (1950-1954).

The regiment underwent a turbulent period following the end of the Cold War. The Dutch Defense forces were transformed from a conscript into a voluntary force as did the KCT. Its active-duty strength has quadrupled since, boasting four operational special-forces companies (103, 104, 105 and 108 SF Companies) in addition to a logistics and support company and a dedicated special-operations training company.

KCT missions
The KCT primary missions are special reconnaissance, direct action and military assistance. Collateral missions include counterterrorist operations, hostage release/ non-combatant evacuation operations and personnel recovery. Specific teams are specialized in conducting riverine operations, operations in mountainous terrain and in HAHO/HALO airborne operations.

Each team is made up of medics, communications specialists, snipers and demolition experts. Additionally, each SF company has embedded fire-support teams, consisting of fully qualified forward air controllers, laser operators, qualified forward observers and unmanned aerial-vehicle operators.

SF training
To become an SF operator, one needs to be tenacious. It takes more than two years of intensive training to achieve full SF qualification. Potential candidates first have to undergo a three-day introduction period in which they will be tested and evaluated — both physically and psychologically. Candidates will then follow the pre-commando training of eight weeks in order to prepare them for the basic commando course. During this period they train patrolling tactics, techniques and procedures, field craft, basic shooting, first aid and land navigation. In addition, they will undergo intense physical training.

During the pre-commando training, candidates are regularly tested and evaluated and only the remaining candidates will take the basic commando course. This course is regarded as the toughest of the RNLA with a dropout rate of up to 80 percent. This eight-week period ends with a grueling 200 plus kilometer march. Those who persevere, will earn their coveted green berets if they are deemed worthy by their instructors. The KCT creed “Nunc aut Nunquam” (“Now or Never”) is shouted on command by the new KCT commandos when donning the beret for the first time. It symbolizes the tenacity shown by those who have succeeded.

After a short rest and recovery, the new commandos begin the 12-month advanced commando course. It is comprised of the individual specialists courses and various themes such as training in military freefall, waterborne, mountainous and SOUT opera- continued on page 63
**CAREER NOTES**

**Soldier to get paid for language proficiency. AR 11-6, change it, what the requirements are for changing a Soldier's CLANG to a mission language and what the requirements are for a**

**CIVIL AFFAIRS**

There is some confusion about a control language. This will clarify what constitutes a control language, who assigns it, who can change it, what are the requirements for changing a Soldier's CLANG to a mission language and what the requirements are for a Soldier to get paid for language proficiency. AR 11-6, Army Foreign Language Program, states “the CLANG identifies the active Army Soldier’s primary foreign language for management and strength accountability purposes.” This is often confused with “primary language” which is used to identify language-coded billets for reserve or National Guard Soldiers.

For Civil Affairs, the CLANG is assigned by the CA Proponent prior to the Soldier beginning the CA Qualification Course. The primary factor for determining the CLANG is the operational needs of the force. The proponent takes into account current and projected force strength, Soldier’s ability measured on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery and the Soldier’s language desire. Chapter 3-9 of AR 11-6 provides additional information on the CLANG. The Soldier’s CLANG can be changed by the Human Resources Command if the Soldier meets a 2/2 standard or higher in a different language. The Soldier must request a change to their CLANG based on completion of the active-duty service obligation for their CLANG. The Foreign Language Proficiency Bonus Program will not exceed $400 per language, and $1,000 for a combination of languages. The Soldier must be proficient in their CLANG prior to receiving pay for additional languages (reference AR 11-6, Chapter 6-4).

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**Third-quarter FY13 Boards**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>BOARD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 Apr</td>
<td>Army Reserve Selective Early Retirement Board/Selective Retention Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Apr</td>
<td>Chief Warrant Officer 3/4/5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 May</td>
<td>Colonel Army Promotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Jun</td>
<td>Army Reserve SGM/AGR CSM/TPU CSM/SMC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Jun</td>
<td>Active Component SGM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Soldiers whose records are pending review by a selection board need to validate their Official Military Personnel File, Enlisted Record Brief or Officer Record Brief to make sure the documentation is current and up-to-date. Also, make sure your Department of the Army photo is not more than two years old.

**Intermediate Level Education**

Army ALARACT 262/2012 published Sept. 24, 2012, implementing a one-look, merit-based selection board process for officers attending ILE. The merit selection for ILE will increase predictability and opportunities for officers to attend ILE prior to serving in a key developmental assignment.

The first ILE selection board will convene immediately following the FY13 Major Promotion selection board to consider Year Group 04 officers for a 10-month resident, 14-week satellite campus or Distributed Learning ILE starting in January 2014. Officers not selected for either resident course will be enrolled in ILE DL by Army Human Resources Command. ILE attendance breakout is 50 percent of a YG attending a 10-month resident ILE, 40 percent will attend one of the satellites at Fort Belvoir, Fort Lee, Fort Gordon or Redstone Arsenal and 10 percent will receive their ILE via DL. Officers will start ILE at YG plus 10 years.

Examples of 10-month resident programs are Fort Leavenworth, Sister Service, Foreign, Interagency and the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation. Officers will be provided the opportunity to submit their ILE preference and location.

Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Special Forces officers still have the opportunity to obtain their ILE through the Naval Postgraduate School. Be on the look-out for the next MILPER message or check the Regiment HRC page for the announcement of the next NPS selection board.

**Force Structure**

The Department of the Army G1 (Classification and Structure Branch) approved the creation of a Personnel Development Skill Identifier, D5R. The D5R will identify officers, warrant officers and enlisted Soldiers in Career Management Field 18 who successfully complete the Advance Training and Language Course conducted under the auspices of the U.S. Army Special Forces Command. Personnel who complete the course will have the PDSI top-loaded in their record.

The Department of the Army G1 (Classification and Structure Branch) approved the creation of Skill Identifier K9 to identify officers in any area of concentration except AOC 18A, 37A, 38A who complete an assignment with a special-operations unit. Qualifications for the SI are:

1. Successfully complete 12 months in an active-duty capacity in any AOC with a special-operations designated unit. USASOC, USASFC, USAJFKSWCS, USASOC, USAMISOC, 95th CA Brigade, 528th Sustainment Brigade.

2. Army Reserve or National Guard officers must meet the same qualifications but require a cumulative 24 months of assignments in a SOF-designated unit or 12-month SOF deployment.

3. Approval and Removal Authority: The first Army SOF O5/lieutenant colonel commander in the chain of command is the authority for awarding or withdrawing the skill identifier.

4. Officers who have previously served in a SOF unit and meet the above qualifications must contact the DCS G1, ATTN: AOPE-MPD, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, 2929 Desert Storm Dr., Fort Bragg, N.C. 28310-9110 for award of the SI. Individuals may also have the SI withdrawn by forwarding a request to their branch manager at Human Resources Command.

The SI will facilitate the movement of these officers between SOF and non-SOF assignments, rapid identification in support of contingency operations and assist in forecasting officer availability to serve additional tours in SOF units. The effective date for SI K9 was Oct. 1, 2012.
**SPECIAL FORCES**

SF Branch Chief

Lt. Col. Dan Greer is the new Special Forces Proponent chief. He can be contacted at james.greer1@soc.mil or 910-432-7576.

**Prior Service Accession**

The Prior Service Accession Program is open to Special Forces Career management Field 18-qualified noncommissioned officers who previously served in the active component, Army National Guard or in the reserve components and want to return to active duty. The PSA Program provides a fast track to refresh technical and tactical skills and ensure our PSA candidates are proficient and prepared to meet the demands faced by today’s regiment. If you have questions relating to the PSA program, contact Master Sgt. Brian Pope at (910) 432-7359 or popeb@soc.mil.

**REGULATIONS**

**DA Pam 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management**

Special Forces Proponency has rewritten its chapter of DA Pam 600-3. The DA Pam is the professional development guide for all Special Forces officers. It describes the full spectrum of developmental opportunities an officer can expect to pursue throughout his career.

In the 2012 rewrite, there were several significant changes for the O-3 through O-6 grades. There is now an emphasis that captains are Ranger qualified; 600-3, paragraph 16-4 bullet 6 states, “It is strongly encouraged that captains attend Ranger School if not already qualified.” Ranger School continues to create an excellent environment for our officers to refine their leadership and tactical skills.

Majors should pay particular attention to earning a master’s degree at the Combined General Staff College or equivalent course as available. Within the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, an emphasis on education within our ranks is becoming more important and SF Proponency is exploring the addition of an education requirement for majors in some key-developmental positions.

The updated chapter identifies successful completion of the Advanced Training Language Course as a requirement prior to serving in the regional support element for all officers and warrant officers.

The Psychological Operations chapter of DA Pam 600-3 was recently updated following a holistic review of the guide by the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School’s PSYOP Directorate. All officers are encouraged to reference the text to view updated branch standards and expectations, officer development and career management notes. Some highlighted changes:

- Updated terminology and doctrinal references
- Updated required officer characteristics in accordance with guidance from the commanding general, USAJFKSWC, and the PO regimental proponent
- Included the PSYOP Assessment & Selection requirement for active-duty officers
- Updated critical officer key-development and broadening assignments for all PO officer ranks
- Updated U.S. Army Reserve PO officer paragraph to include a separate career development model

**AR 614-200, Enlisted Assignments and Utilization Management**

A review and analysis is underway for AR 614-200 revisions, changing the Service Remaining Requirement and obligations from 24 months to 36 months following graduation from the SFQC, GED waivers for select 18X Initial-Entry Soldiers, potential of establishing an age limit for in-service recruits and inclusion of the non-waiverable CG disqualifiers.
PERFORMANCE NUTRITION: How to Optimize Performance

BY CHRISTI M. LOGAN, RD, CSSD, LDN

Special-operations forces Soldiers often seek out their SOF performance dietitians for guidance on how to enhance their performance during training and missions. More often than not, many operators are only using water during physical events lasting more than 60 minutes, and the amounts consumed tend to be inadequate to mitigate performance deficits caused by dehydration. Many operators do not carry adequate carbohydrate, electrolyte or protein sources, if they pack them at all. Studies show that fueling appropriately during physical events lasting more than 60 minutes, will increase endurance potential and time to exhaustion, maintain desired pace longer (especially during events longer than 90 minutes), as well as help maintain a higher intensity for longer durations.

Consuming carbohydrates during events lasting greater than one hour will extend endurance performance, but the physiologic mechanisms for processing carbohydrates will change as the event intensity and duration change. Most forms of carbohydrate can be tolerated up to the two hour mark; after the two-hour mark, focusing on the type of carbohydrates can be important. Utilizing easily digested carbohydrate sources, like glucose, glucose plus fructose, other simple sugars and maltodextrin seem effective. When the event duration is two to three hours, focusing on glucose or maltodextrin that are rapidly digested, optimizes the absorption of dietary carbohydrates. When event duration is expected to extend beyond two and a half hours, consuming carbohydrates in the form of glucose plus fructose versus glucose alone can enhance carbohydrate digestion as well as aid in tolerating the higher ingestion rates of carbohydrates needed for these durations. Subsequently, the glucose plus fructose combination will aid in enhancing fluid absorption, may reduce gastrointestinal stress and can even enhance performance more than when ingesting glucose alone. Mixing and matching carbohydrate sources via bars, gels or fluids can also be done as the carbohydrates contained within these forms are all digested similarly. Be cautious of consuming fructose alone as a carbohydrate source, this may adversely cause diarrhea issues.

Ensuring adequate, but not excessive, hydration and maintaining an appropriate electrolyte balance can further optimize performance. Performance deficits can begin with as little as a 2 to 3 percent loss of body weight due to sweat. On a hot, humid day, an operator might sweat one to two liters per hour with some operators sweating as much as two to three liters per hour. Additionally, the sodium lost through sweat can range from 575-1,725 milligrams per liter. Including a sodium source during events aids in reducing electrolyte imbalances and prevents hyponatremia. Combining sodium appropriately with fluids during events, can also aid in preventing both hypo- and hypernatremia. It may not be practical to test for sodium losses in sweat, therefore operators experiencing muscle cramps, white residue on their clothes, stinging eyes from sweat during training or whose skin is gritty after training most likely are “salty sweaters.” These operators should ensure adequate salt intake throughout the day by consuming high-sodium foods (i.e., pretzels, pickles, luncheon meats, cheeses, soups, etc.) or by lightly salting their foods during meals and snacks. Additionally, “salty sweaters” may want to aim for 800mg sodium-per-liter-of-fluid-per-hour during events lasting greater than 60 minutes. In general, most operators should aim for 400mg sodium-per-liter-of-fluid-per-hour for events lasting one to three hours, increasing to 800mg sodium-per-liter-of-fluid-per-hour when event duration is expected to exceed three hours.

The carrying of kit and/or ruck loads during training and missions makes it essential to consume protein during prolonged events to prevent or minimize lean mass losses. Total event duration is not always known in advance, therefore when it becomes apparent that events will exceed three hours, it is recommended to consume no more than 0.2g protein/Kg/hour, (i.e. ~15-20g protein-per-hour for both males and females, however operators weighing more than 200 lbs may need more). Consuming a protein source that contains 20-25g protein every two to three hours is also sufficient. Finally, within the 60 minutes immediately following training or missions, it is recommended to consume 20-25g protein in a liquid form that is high in leucine (i.e. milk or whey) to optimize muscle synthesis. Coupling post-training/mission protein with 60-90 grams of carbohydrates will also accelerate the replacement of muscle carbohydrate stores and can spare ingested protein for use in muscle recovery, repair and building. Nutrition is a powerful performance enhancer, exploit this performance edge. See the chart on the right for summary of recommendations to optimize performance with nutrition. SW

Christi M. Logan, RD, CSSD, LDN is the THOR3 performance dietician at the USA JFK Special Warfare Center and School.
## PERFORMANCE NUTRITION: FUELING REQUIREMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Timing</th>
<th>Fluid Needs</th>
<th>Electrolyte Needs</th>
<th>Carbohydrate Needs</th>
<th>Protein Needs</th>
<th>Fat Needs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Days Between Training and Missions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everyday preparation &amp; recovery</td>
<td>Drink to prevent dry mouth</td>
<td>Lightly salt foods or consume sodium containing foods throughout the day</td>
<td>Aim for 3-8g/kg daily</td>
<td>1.5-2g/Kg daily</td>
<td>0.7-1g/Kg daily</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-Event</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1-3 days before endurance events lasting &gt;90</td>
<td>Drink to prevent dry mouth</td>
<td>Lightly salt foods or consume sodium containing foods throughout the day</td>
<td>Aim for 10g/Kg/day</td>
<td>1.5-2g/Kg daily</td>
<td>~20-30% of daily energy intake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2+ hours before event</td>
<td>16-24oz fluid</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Consume a meal that provides carbohydrates, proteins and fats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 min before event</td>
<td>5-10oz fluid</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>30g</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>During Event</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>&lt;30 minute events</td>
<td>5-10oz every 15 minutes</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;30-75 minute Events</td>
<td>5-10oz every 15 minutes</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Rinse mouth with sports drink or use a hard candy. Most forms of carbs are tolerated</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 hour events</td>
<td>5-10oz every 15 minutes</td>
<td>400-800mg sodium/liter of fluid/hour</td>
<td>Up to 30g/hour. Most forms of carbs are tolerated</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3 hour events</td>
<td>5-10oz every 15 minutes</td>
<td>400-800mg sodium/liter of fluid/hour</td>
<td>30 to 60g/hour. Focus on rapidly digested carbs (i.e. glucose, maltodextrin, or glucose + fructose). (i.e. glucose + fructose)</td>
<td>20-25g</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3+ hour events</td>
<td>5-10oz every 15 minutes</td>
<td>800mg sodium/Liter of fluid/hour</td>
<td>60-90g/hour. Focus on rapidly transportable carbs (i.e. glucose + fructose)</td>
<td>20-25g every 3 hrs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immediately Post-Event</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Within 60 minutes post event</td>
<td>During the 2-4 hours post-physical activity, replace 24oz fluid for every pound of weight lost during event</td>
<td>Ensure ~400mg sodium/liter of fluids or salt your foods to optimize retention of post-training fluids</td>
<td>Consume 1g/Kg. (i.e. ~60-90g carbs) Especially important when recovery period is &lt;8 hours</td>
<td>20-25g</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“For arms are of little value in the field unless there is wise counsel at home.”
— Cicero

America currently has the most powerful and technologically savvy military in the world yet it seems to struggle with properly applying its capabilities against insurgencies. Will America continue to disregard historical lessons, hastily construct policy and succumb to an “American myopia,” which describes America’s current ignorance of foreign affairs, history and geography?

G.L. Lamborn, a former Soldier and CIA officer, provides first-hand experience and insight into the nature of an insurgency. He explains how America was once the expert at insurgencies, how it dealt with insurgencies and why America is now failing to effectively deal with present insurgencies.

Lamborn posits that understanding the essence of an insurgency is paramount to destroying it. Directly defined, an insurgency is an armed insurrection against an existing government, usually one’s own, by a group not recognized as having the status of a belligerent. An insurgency differs from every type of warfare in the conventional sense. It is an internal war waged when a group of people have become disenfranchised by social or political injustice, either actual or perceived. The insurgency represents armed politics of an irregular force to obtain the political end game. Insurgencies’ primary weapons are intelligence, counterintelligence, subversion, sabotage, propaganda, passive resistance, political warfare and time.

Lamborn describes the balance of power throughout the world and how that balance is in peril due to socioeconomic disparities and population growth rates — primary factors that lead to insurgencies. The Group of 20 countries controls almost all of the wealth in the world, while their populations comprise only a quarter of the world’s population. They use 75 percent of the world’s resources. In contrast, the other three quarters of the world’s population lives off the remaining 25 percent of the world’s resources.

Lamborn explains this resource disparity lays the groundwork for insurgencies to take hold because even if the countries outside the G20 are making social and economic advances, these advances may not be enough to keep pace with population growth. The growth rate in these countries is exploding, further exacerbating socioeconomic problems. If a country is already weak or failing, then it becomes fertile ground for an insurgency to take place. Because population growth in some G20 countries is failing to meet replacement rates, the balance of power and the entire global-security paradigm is in jeopardy.

Lamborn argues that as populations in weak, non-G20 countries continue to grow and the weak states in which they reside continue to fail, these failed states will in turn destroy the global-security paradigm. If global security fails then national security amongst the G20 countries becomes of paramount concern as insurgencies lead to failed states and those failed states become safe havens for terrorism and their geopolitical strategies. The Taliban government of Afghanistan prior to 2001 poses a striking example of a failed states’ inability to defend itself against terrorist factions operating with impunity within its borders.

Utilizing his geopolitical prowess, Lamborn describes the complex intricacies of an insurgency and identifies the factors outside of a typical military operational effect. He shows that the insurgency itself is not just about killing the insurgent. He purports that the revolutionary ideology stems from things such as hunger, education, literacy, poor health and other social-economic inequalities or their perceived disparities. Placing this into a current context we could surmise that the populace-focused strategy of village-stability operations is one way to forge a strategic victory in Afghanistan.

Being historically astute, Lamborn draws immediate attention to the historical perspective of the American way of war.

He reveals why the core idea of America was once an insurgency. He describes how our American Revolution started as an insurgency and then morphed into a revolution of the current system that was in place instead of a simple reform. The British failed to obtain victory because they misunderstood the center of gravity of the insurgency, the populace. Throughout the Revolutionary War, the British continued to alienate local people who were once Tories with endless taxation and sweeping punishments in an attempt to disrupt the rebellion. This approach eventually backfired and the most powerful nation in the world lost to an insurgent force that was comprised of mostly an irregular force. One would be wise to deduce the parallels between 18th century Britain and 21st century America.

Continuing to apply the conventional pillars and strategy of Clausewitz to deal
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with what seems to be a systemic virus in the 21st century is flawed reasoning. If we look at our enemies’ playbook and realize the truth in Mao Zedong’s “numbers themselves confer no particular advantage,” it should have been evident to U.S. leaders that a strategy of a surge would never work. In fact if we look at the various experienced scholars on counterinsurgency such as David Galula, C.E. Calwell, David Kilcullen, Robert Thompson or Martin van Creveld we see they were all stating the same thing: The populace is the answer.

Lamborn makes it clear that without wise counsel at home we are destined to fail and our arms will be of little value. His view of “American myopia” describes how our own way of life is facing irreparable harm because of our lack of forthright education, adherence to standards and apathy. He uses quantitative and qualitative data to paint an ominous picture. Lamborn asserts that American collegiate curriculums are mishandled to the point where the nation’s top 55 colleges will graduate students without a single class in American history. Specifically regarding Asian and African studies, regions of the world of particular interest to the global security paradigm, only 430 bachelor degrees were awarded in 2009 out of a total of 1.6 million degrees. At the lower end of the education spectrum, only 7 out of 10 high school students finish high school, and even fewer attain any higher learning.

These statistics beg an answer to the question: How will America confront these challenges when our own citizens are not educated on the threats? Lamborn proposes that policymakers need to take a detailed look at how the other three quarters of the population live and direct our policy efforts to improve those socioeconomic disparities. We need to offer incentives to aspiring scholars and analysts so they will study these areas of the world and provide an in-depth analysis of these potential threats. America will then be able to anticipate the problems before they occur and react to them accordingly. He states that we should always keep the faith that we can continue to make a difference in the world and continue fighting for the liberty of those oppressed. When speaking of American exceptionalism, Lamborn notes that we are not to be crass or pompous towards the indigenous populace of another country. Instead, we must understand the root of our differences and realize that they do not enjoy the liberties that we seem to take for granted. Americans must work hard to spread liberty and democracy in the hopes that others can share in the American Dream on their own soils. Lamborn argues that we must continue to educate ourselves with relevant tenable education that can help guard against hastily constructed and flawed policies. We must exercise our right to represent the very fiber of American ideology and not let that ideology be crushed by an oppressive insurgency pushing an idea under which none of us could live. The most profound takeaway from Lamborn is that we must understand that ignorance is more expensive than education and that being clever is not the same as being wise. SW

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ations. On completion of the course, the commando is considered to be a basic qualified SF operator, ready to be embedded in one of the four SF companies. Within the SF company, he will refine and upgrade his tactics and techniques, conduct multiple SF team exercises within a special-operations task group and will attend numerous additional courses such as a 17-week contra-terrorist course before becoming fully SF capable.

The training provides the KCT company commanders with the right personnel to take on missions in the full spectrum of special operations whether foreseeable or non-foreseeable. By using a specially designed operational training and preparation rhythm, the KCT always has one fully operational SF company at its disposal, ready to be deployed at any time, at any place.

Operational deployments

Post-Cold War operational commitments led to KCT personnel conducting operations in the Balkans almost continuously from 1993 until 2002. During 2002 and 2003, a KCT platoon provided the commander of the Kabul Multinational Brigade (ISAF) with his own reconnaissance assets. In Iraq, KCT units supported Dutch battle-group operations in the Al Muthanna province from late 2003 until 2005.

Task Group Orange conducted operations in the Kandahar Province as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (2005-2006). ISAF stage III resulted in the deployment of KCT troops to the Uruzgan province. This in turn led to the Special Forces Task Group being engaged in heavy fighting for prolonged periods of time at the outer limits of the area of responsibility of Task Force Uruzgan (2006-2007). From mid 2009 until Aug. 1, 2010, Dutch SF operators of Task Force 55 (TF-55) conducted special operations in ISAF Regional Command-South under COMISAF control.

Awards for bravery

The 108 SF Company was awarded the Bronze Shield, the RNLAs highest unit commendation award, for its achievements in Uruzgan. Around 75 percent of KCT operators earned the Dutch combat Infantry Badge and numerous operators were awarded various medals for bravery (equivalent to the U.S Bronze Star Medal, Silver Star Medal or Distinguished Service Cross) on May 29, 2009, Captain Marco Kroon (108 SF Coy) was awarded the highest Dutch award for bravery, the Military Order of William, equivalent to the U.S. Medal of Honor and the British Victoria Cross. This order was last awarded for operations during the Korean War. SW