COMBINING CONFLICT RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE:
MORE THAN A STABILITY CONCERN

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fulfillment of the requirements for the
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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Conflict, Security, and Development

by

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Combating Conflict Related Sexual Violence: More than a Stability Concern

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The common argument for military actors to protect civilians from conflict related sexual violence has been firmly situated in human rights, gender issues, and a responsibility to provide safety and security to civilians for stability. But what military utility does conflict related sexual violence (CRSV) give to an opponent enabling them to wage conflict and achieve military aims? This study examines the existing U.S. military framework on CRSV and analyzes policy and military doctrine associated with conflict related sexual violence. I apply abductive reasoning to the best explanation for CRSV, and military planning methodologies to identify the military utility CRSV provides to an adversary. I propose that commanders and staff approach combating CRSV as a way to weaken or defeat an adversary who uses CRSV as part of their strategy. By incorporating work that has already been done by other concerned international actors in developing training and strategy, I recommend tactics, training, doctrine and strategies should be developed for the U.S. military.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


The common argument for military actors to protect civilians from conflict related sexual violence has been firmly situated in human rights, gender issues, and a responsibility to provide safety and security to civilians for stability. But what military utility does conflict related sexual violence (CRSV) give to an opponent enabling them to wage conflict and achieve military aims? This study examines the existing U.S. military framework on CRSV and analyzes policy and military doctrine associated with conflict related sexual violence. I apply abductive reasoning to the best explanation for CRSV, and military planning methodologies to identify the military utility CRSV provides to an adversary. I propose that commanders and staff approach combating CRSV as a way to weaken or defeat an adversary who uses CRSV as part of their strategy. By incorporating work that has already been done by other concerned international actors in developing training and strategy, I recommend tactics, training, doctrine and strategies should be developed for the U.S. military.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis is dedicated to everyone who has believed something was self evident but realized their belief was only shared in certain circles and wanted their understanding to spread to other circles in order to make a difference in the world around them. I’m grateful to my instructors and classmates who gave me the freedom to explore the ideas that I take for granted and helped me figure out how to communicate them among contrary and competing norms. I thank the U.S. Army Reserves for allowing me to attend CGSC. Thank you to the American people, government, and senior military leaders for valuing the military continuing education and quest for understanding the complexity of the world of conflict around us, in hopes of achieving greater peace and defense of our nation.

From a personal perspective, my gut feeling is that 9 out of 10 service members would not include sexual violence as a security issue or plan for it in their area of responsibility. It surprises me that I feel this way, since there is overwhelming documentation demonstrating the presence of sexual violence used in conflict throughout history. Likely my limited experience within the Department of Defense has shaped that perception and I strongly hope that my perception is incorrect.
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<td>Army Doctrine Publication</td>
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<td>Army Doctrine and Training Publications</td>
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<td>Bi-SCD</td>
<td>Bi Strategic Command Directive</td>
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<td>CRSV</td>
<td>Conflict Related Sexual Violence</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
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<td>S-GBV</td>
<td>Sexual and Gender Based Violence</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>Joint Publication</td>
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<td>MARO</td>
<td>Mass Atrocity Response Operations</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation Europe</td>
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<td>SCR</td>
<td>Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
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<td>SV</td>
<td>Sexual Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIP</td>
<td>Trafficking in Persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNSRSG</td>
<td>United Nations Special Representative to the Secretary General</td>
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### ILLUSTRATIONS

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Girl you should go and get married. . . . I will sell them in the market. . . . I will sell women. I sell women.
— Abubakar Shekau, (leader of Boko Haram), USA Today, 2014

In no other area is our collective failure to ensure effective protection for civilians more apparent . . . than in terms of the masses of women and girls, but also boys and men, whose lives are destroyed each year by sexual violence perpetrated in conflict.
— United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, United Nations, 2007

Indeed, sexual violence challenges conventional notions of what constitutes a security threat. It is often invisible. Cheaper than bullets, it requires no weapons system other than physical intimidation, making it low cost, yet high impact. (United Nations 2012)

Within the repertoire of violence available to armed groups, sexual violence is often a chosen method for its effectiveness in terrorizing, controlling, punishing, and subjugating opponents and civilians (Kuehnast et al. 2011a, 58). Within the last decade a heightened amount of recognition has been given to sexual violence in conflict. The collective and individual voices of victims of conflict related sexual violence (CRSV) past and present and across the globe have been given a platform for the rest of the world to bear witness to the atrocities they bore in silence (Anderson 2010a, 12). Their testimonies demand that action be taken to prevent CRSV from being ignored in future conflicts. The increased international recognition of CRSV and the improvements in monitoring and reporting sexual violence in conflict (UN 2010; Department of State 2014) has required the development of strategies to deter, prevent, and respond to CRSV.
Thesis

The U.S. military, if and when addressing conflict related sexual violence, primarily views combating CRSV as a stability operation, a way to provide safety and security to civilian populations. From a military vantage point combating CRSV is more than just a stability operation. CRSV may be a tactic or strategy; it has military utility and as a result creates vulnerabilities that can be exploited. When CRSV is used as coercive violence an adversary can achieve military aims, generate critical requirements, and combat power. Thus, combating CRSV is a way to weaken and defeat an adversary. Figure 1 below demonstrates a progression of understanding CRSV and where the topic of this thesis aims to add to that understanding.

![Progression of Understanding CRSV](image)

**Figure 1. Progression of Understanding CRSV**

*Source: Created by author.*

Why CRSV is Relevant to the U.S. Military and Why it is Not Going Away

Historical accounts of the utilization of CRSV alone should make this issue relevant to military commanders and planners. But there are also indicators that commitments made to this issue by international and regional actors are not going away.
It appears that momentum is gaining to hold actors accountable to those commitments made in the last decade to end CRSV and a component of those commitments include preparing militaries to address the issue (Department of State 2014; Government of UK 2014; UN 2014, 3).

**Historical Evidence of the Use of Conflict Related Sexual Violence**

Those who have studied CRSV in depth conclude that sexual violence is never absent from war (Kuehnast et al. 2011b, 37; Slim 2007, 60; Anderson 2010a, 15). Sexual violence as a readily accessible, inexpensive, and effective tool to wage conflict is not difficult to identify if one is only willing to recognize its ubiquitous presence in conflict and its utility throughout history. A brief history of sexual violence in conflict is provided below. Later, chapter 4 contains a possible explanation for CRSV’s military utility.

In ancient history Saint Augustine’s *City of God* describes the rape of civilians as an “ancient and customary evil” part of war when he discusses the 410 AD sack of Rome (Slim 2008, 60). The Japanese rape of the Nanking city in 1937 clearly demonstrated a policy of systematic rape as a tool of war and the sexual violence that continued with the use of between 20,000 and 40,000 comfort women from Korea (Soh 2008, 23) and approximately 200,000 from all of East and Southeast Asia (Kalyvas, Shapiro, and Masoud 2008, 326). The Russian’s also used sexual violence as part of their strategy in Berlin, Hungary, Poland, Romania, East Prussia, and Bulgaria and Germany used sexual violence throughout Eastern Europe during World War II victimizing hundreds of thousands of civilians (Wood 2006, 310).
In the last 50 years the conflicts that have received significant coverage in media, literature, and international attention for the use of CRSV include wars in Bangladesh, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In Bangladesh’s 1971 fight for independence an estimated 250,000 and 400,000 women were raped (Millard and Isikozlu 2010, 16). The systematic and mandated procedure of sexual violence during the Bosnian war touched the lives of between 20,000 and 50,000 women who were viciously raped (Stiglmayer et al. 1994, 55). During the Rwandan 1994 genocide 15,700 to 500,000 civilians experienced sexual violence (Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007, 55). No accurate estimate exists because of the numbers of civilians who were murdered after the acts of sexual violence. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone in Africa and El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Peru and Columbia in South America (to name a few countries) all have documented cases of the use of sexual violence in conflicts after 1987 (Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007; Wood 2006; Slim 2007).

Even more recently, in March of 2014, the UN released a report naming state and nonstate actors in 21 countries the UN had credible reports on that CRSV was and is being used (UN 2013). The U.S. has operations in several of the countries listed in the report ranging from direct combat operations to providing military support to partner nations. Examples include, combat operations in countries such as Afghanistan (DeYoung 2014), or providing military support to Jordan for the Syrian conflict (Halaby 2013), and operations providing annual training and military engagement activities to Colombia (Wimbish 2014).
International Commitment on the Issue of CRSV

Although, sexual violence in conflict has been used throughout history it was not until the mid 1970s when scholars started studying its prevalence in war. Later governments started paying attention to CRSV beginning in the nineties (Millard and Isikozlu 2010, 6). In the last 25 years national action plans, security council resolutions, declarations, and laws were introduced by international actors and national governments to address CRSV (UN 2000). These commitments contain and mention a military component to preventing and responding to CRSV.

A major indicator of change in the international perception on sexual violence started with the 2000 landmark United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS), which was unanimously adopted by the security council (UN 2000). Since 2000 the UN has introduced new resolutions, such as SCR 1960, strengthening the responsibility of nations, armed groups, and peacekeeping forces to combat sexual violence and introduced language recognizing sexual violence as a weapon of war, used to attack not only women and girls but men and boys as well (UN 2010).

Sexual violence in conflict has captured the attention of world leaders. 37 countries have developed national action plans to implement SCR 1325 and eight UN peacekeeping missions have been given a mandate which includes the protection of civilians. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), and African Union (AU) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation Europe (OSCE) are a few of the organizations which have developed policies regarding CRSV for their
organizations and taken action to end the use of sexual violence in conflict (European Union 2014; Kersten 2014; OSCE 2011).

Gender Advisor to Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Allied Command Operations (ACO), underlined that, in countries where NATO conducts ongoing missions, it ensures that conflict related sexual violence is always on the security agenda. (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 2014)

CRSV has also gained momentum in other forums. At the 2013 G8 Summit, a declaration was adopted on the prevention of sexual violence in conflict (G8 2013). It was followed up by a UN General Assembly declaration of commitment to end sexual violence in conflict signed by 140 countries (Department of State 2014). In June of 2014 the government of the United Kingdom will host the Global Summit to end conflict related sexual violence. This will be the largest global meeting of government, military, legal and judicial, multilateral, non-governmental organizations, and civil society on CRSV (Government of UK 2014). CRSV has been used in warfare throughout history and international attention to the issue indicates that CRSV will remain relevant in the future and in turn relevant for the military.

A Different Military Perspective on CRSV

Strategic messages from world leaders describing sexual violence as a weapon, a strategy, and a tactic of war have been common within the last two decades. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, called it as destructive as any bomb or bullet (Dickinson 2014). The European Union calls it a common tactic of war against civilian targets (European Union 2014). Some scholars and practitioners have even called rape, and forced pregnancy, which are only two forms of sexual violence, a biological weapon (Anderson 2010a, 15; Allen 1996, 124). However, other than using descriptors such as
weapon, tactic, or strategy when talking about CRSV, not much has been done to present a case to combat CRSV from a military viewpoint except when addressing security and instability. Today the international community views prevention of CRSV as a matter of security and a threat to post-conflict peace (Cohen 2011, 461; UN 2011; UN 2009; UN 2008); however, the role of the military in preventing and responding to CRSV is neglected.

What is Covered and What is Missing

Many of the perspectives and motivations for addressing CRSV are from an individual and human rights perspective of the victims and the causes or motivations of perpetrators to use sexual violence. Human rights and gender advocates scrutinize rule of law systems and institutions that fail to deter CRSV and stop impunity. They also examine the care of victims and the impact on survivors in the short and long term. Other researchers examine psychological, structural, institutional, and ideational causes for CRSV and offer explanations for why perpetrators use CRSV (Cohen 2011, 462; Slim 2007, 61). Others study in depth variations of CRSV and offer theories on patterns of where and how it is exhibited in conflict (Baaz and Stern 2009; Kuehnast et al. 2011a; Cohen 2011).

The foregoing literature contributes valid perspectives and adds to the complexity of CRSV. The literature contributes to establishing the foundation for future solutions to mitigate CRSV and its effects before, during, and after it occurs. What is missing is a military perspective that analyzes CRSV’s military utility, and thereby, exposes military vulnerabilities of those armed groups that employ sexual violence.
UN Peacekeeping forces, North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO), African Union (AU) and European Union (EU) forces have to a degree developed and used strategies in their missions to prevent and respond to CRSV but they have not addressed the advantages it provides to their opponents. The U.S. military has not yet undergone the same evolution as their international partners incorporating ways to deal with CRSV in strategic, operational or tactical planning. There are indirect references to CRSV in U.S. military doctrine but nothing directly placing sexual violence in conflict on a military commander’s purview. This may be because the attention on sexual violence has been primarily situated only within the context of human rights, the protection of civilians, and peacekeeping.

The protection of human rights, the responsibility to protect civilians in conflict, and the need to take actions that allow for greater stability in the long run will always be expected of military forces. Yet, if a military seeks to cripple their adversaries’ ability to win and to continue fighting, it is in the military’s interest to prevent and combat CRSV from occurring. To relegate CRSV to a non-military issue is to dismiss the overwhelming examples of its utility and render any military strategy incomplete. Simply calling sexual violence a weapon of war and recognizing it as a security issue does not provide reasoning for combating CRSV to weaken or defeat an adversary. Analysis from this perspective is what is missing.

Framework

I define what CRSV is and what it is not and I describe the military advantages sexual violence can provide adversaries to wage conflict other than working to destabilize an area. Literature of three major categories are reviewed, scholarly work, U.S. and
international policy on CRSV, and the joint and Army doctrine associated with CRSV concepts. Research and theories done on the explanation of CRSV will be used to build a framework of military relevant CRSV systems and dynamics. Review of U.S. and international policy and joint and Army doctrine will serve two purposes. The first is to establish the military framework and guidance that addresses CRSV. The second purpose is to establish that it is primarily situated in stability operations focused on the protection, security, and safety of civilians.

Three military doctrinal concepts are used drawing from joint and Army doctrine to enable the identification of the military utility CRSV provides an adversary and the vulnerabilities that are inherent to its use. Doctrinal concepts used are (1) military aims defined by the purpose of defensive and offensive task in what the Army calls decisive action, (2) critical requirements, and (3) the elements of combat power. All three are further defined in chapter 4. Abductive reasoning is applied to scholarly work on CRSV and military doctrinal concepts to reveal the military utility and vulnerabilities that goes along with an adversary’s reliance on CRSV. There are several implications for the U.S. military based off the analysis in chapter 4.

The intent of the paper is to shed light on some important questions from a military perspective. Why should military professionals plan against and be prepared for the effects of sexual violence when used by an opponent? How could having a strategy to combat CRSV weaken or potentially defeat an adversary? When military is present, is it compelling to expect diplomatic efforts and humanitarian actors to be the best defense against attacks of CRSV? When concerned stakeholders are working together to prevent
CRSV from happening, how can a military’s capabilities contribute to preventing attacks of CRSV?

**Conflict Related Sexual Violence Defined**

The foundation for the definition of CRSV comes from the 1988 Rome Statute and the UN’s definition of conflict related sexual violence. For the purpose of this paper the term CRSV is intended to mean the following: CRSV is incidents or patterns of violent acts of a sexual nature, including rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, mutilation, indecent assault, sex trafficking, indecent medical exams and strip searches (Raymond, Flavin, and Prandtner 2013, 12; International Criminal Court 1998; Anderson 2010a), or any other form of sexual violence against men, women, boys, and girls by a party to a conflict. “Such incidents or patterns occur in conflict or post-conflict settings or other situations of concern (e.g., political strife)” (Anderson 2010a, 3).

CRSV is conflict related when it used in armed conflict.

Armed conflict is based on factual conditions relating to an armed confrontation between two or more identifiable parties over a sustained period of time at a level of intensity that exceeds ordinary law and order operations (i.e., the use of military force, rather than police forces). Parties to armed conflict are organized armed forces under a command structure, with the capacity to sustain military operations. This includes both State and non-State actors. The difference is between sexual violence committed by organized armed groups (parties), as opposed to isolated violations committed by civilians as a form of criminal activity. (Anderson 2010a, 2)

Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) can be considered CRSV, but not all SGBV is CRSV. For example criminals who traffic sex slaves solely for the purpose of profit would be guilty of SGBV but not necessarily CRSV unless the criminal activity was a function of the armed group to finance its operations. SGBV can also be committed
by a noncombatant to another noncombatant for purposes not related to the conflict. It also includes violence against other genders that is not sexual in nature which is not the focus of this paper.

Sexual exploitation and abuse is when those who are in a position to offer assistance or who are there to intervene sexually exploit and abuse the beneficiaries of their assistance or intervention. Although conflict situations put together these two types of actors, providers and beneficiaries, this is not the CRSV covered in this paper. This can be confusing when state militaries use sexual violence because they can be viewed as a provider of security to the benefit of their people but also a party to the conflict. When a state military is a party to the conflict and is using sexual violence as a tactic or a strategy it is CRSV. If military actors are using sexual violence to exploit or abuse civilians because of their position it is SEA. Incidents of SEA by humanitarian actors, UN, NATO, the U.S. military and other interveners have occurred in several conflicts but that is not the subject of this paper.

**Delimitations**

International, regional, and local efforts to combat CRSV cover a wide range of actions to deter CRSV from starting to the care and recovery of victims after CRSV occurs. Because CRSV covers such a broad spectrum many aspects of CRSV with relation to the military are outside of the scope of this paper. First, this thesis is not designed to convince the reader that CRSV is an issue in conflict rather it is the point of departure for analysis. Secondly, because CRSV is contextual, research already exists that unpacks CRSV by type of conflict and type of sexual violence. Understanding the use of CRSV in civil wars, interstate wars, ethnic and non-ethnic conflict and secessionist
conflicts (Wood, 2011) and what types of sexual violence is being used is relevant to military practitioners. However, this level of granularity is not the focus of this paper rather it is to establish the military utility of CRSV regardless of the context or type of sexual violence used.

Thirdly, the resolve of international and national governing bodies to follow through on commitments made to preventing CRSV or the effectiveness of their efforts is not addressed. Fourthly, this paper is not written from a gender based violence perspective. Although, women and girls are disproportionately victims of sexual violence, sexual violence can and has been inflicted on every age, every gender and the disabled. Any approach to addressing CRSV should be disaggregated by who is experiencing it but for the purpose of discussion and analysis research done on CRSV was aggregated. Gender mainstreaming is also an important part of the plan to implement UN SCR 1325 and the U.S.’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security (President of the United States 2011b). Women’s participation in peace building, ending conflict and gender balancing civilian and military positions is part of the solution to combating CRSV, but addressing those elements are outside of the scope of this paper (President of the United States 2011a; UN 2000).

Lastly, the element of impunity is foundational to the discussion of CRSV given that there is a vast body of international and national laws, declarations, and statutes prohibiting sexual violence. Legal frameworks and judicial processes addressing CRSV related to security sector reform are extensively covered in other literature. However, the role of the military in security sector reform is outside the scope of this paper.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter explores the existing literature on CRSV in three parts. The first part explores the scholarly literature exposing an absence of research from the perspective of an intervening military. The second part is a brief review of the U.S. and international policy and documents on CRSV and how it relates to the military. Thirdly, this chapter will review the U.S. military joint and Army doctrine and other military sources on the subject which constitutes the military framework for CRSV. The review of U.S. joint and Army doctrine will demonstrate that when and where CRSV has been addressed it has been primarily in military stability operations.

Multiple sources exist on the topic of conflict related sexual violence but not from a military vantage point. As the literature review will show, it is primarily from a human rights, gender inequality, and individual experience perspective in which academia, policy makers, and practitioners approach the subject of CRSV. Under human rights the literature attempts to demonstrate the gravity, severity, and proliferation of conflict related violence throughout space and time. Under gender inequality the literature focuses on the characteristics of relationships between men and women that allows for and promotes CRSV using institutional and ideational arguments. Under individual experience it focuses on the treatment, care, and health of the individual who experiences CRSV and on the cultural dynamics that shape how the individual and the community react to the experience.

Most CRSV literature uses rape as the primary type of sexual violence studied and incorporates other forms of sexual violence secondarily (Millard and Isikozlu 2010;
Cohen 2011; Stiglmayer et al. 1994; Card 1996; Kuehnast et al. 2011a). The likely reason for this is information about rape is easier to collect than information about other forms of sexual violence (Kuehnast et al. 2011a). As stated earlier other forms of CRSV include sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, mutilation, indecent assault, trafficking, indecent medical exams and strip exams. All of which are complicated events in their own right to study and document. This does not mean to imply that information about rape is easy to acquire; it is actually very difficult to get accurate information on rape. But compared to other forms of sexual violence rape, to some degree, has been historically referenced and within the last 50 years systems have been developed to record and report incidents of rape (UN 2010).

There are many reasons why rape or the occurrence of other forms of sexual violence are difficult to study. Often there is a lack of institutional structures for victims to report. Victims often do not have access to agencies to report, are prevented from reporting, or chose not to report (Millard and Isikozlu 2010, 16). Sexual violence is very personal and overtime leaves a less public sign of occurrence because the physical damage is done to the soft tissue of the body (Kalyvas, Shapiro, and Masoud 2008, 335). Many will chose not to report sexual violence because of how they perceive their community will respond to them and what they perceive as potential negative outcomes if others know about it (Enloe 2000, 111). If they fear they will be shamed, ostracized, or have a reduced chance for marriage or other life opportunities, or if they feel personal shame or embarrassment they may chose not to report (Kalyvas, Shapiro, and Masoud 2008, 335; Millard and Isikozlu 2010, 44; Nikolić-Ristanović 2000, 41). Other reasons making the study of sexual violence challenging is because often victims commit suicide,
die from injuries, or become a casualty during the conflict (Millard and Isikozlu 2010, 17).

Because of the difficulty in identifying and recording rape and other forms of sexual violence in conflict, I took liberty in using the words interchangeably where appropriate. If the concept the author presents on rape would apply to other forms of sexual violence I used the term CRSV in its place. For example if sexual mutilation by an object could cause a degree of humiliation and fear similar to that of rape I would conclude that the term sexual violence would be appropriate. This is not to imply that when studying or working in a conflict area that CRSV should be treated as one entity; the exact opposite is true. But, the purpose of this paper is not to demonstrate the utility of each type of CRSV in each environment but to demonstrate its potential utility despite its various forms in any environment.

Scholarly Literature on Conflict Related Sexual Violence

There are four major themes of scholarly literature on conflict related sexual violence. They are (1) historical accounts of its occurrence, (2) explanations for the existence of CRSV, (3) the impact on individuals and society, and (4) and variations of CRSV.

Historical accounts of sexual violence in conflict serve several purposes. One purpose is to raise awareness of what had been previously overlooked in historical and military accounts of war and conflict. Sexual violence was previously considered inevitable in conflict (Anderson 2010b, 244), as a byproduct (Stiglmayer et al. 1994, 67; Nikolić-Ristanović 2000, 41; Cohen 2011, 2), or a consequence of war but not a part of war itself. Historical accounts challenged that belief and made it more difficult to dispute
its occurrence as a byproduct (Lilly 2007; Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007; Soh 2008; Nikolić-Ristanović 2000). Another purpose historical accounts serve is to quantify the magnitude, gravity, and severity of the occurrence and the violation of human rights. It also establishes perpetrators, victims, times and locations (I. Chang 1998; Lilly 2007). In some cases the historical accounts serve the purpose of giving a voice to those who have suffered and survived the atrocity of sexual violence and to recognize and honor their experiences (Stiglmayer et al. 1994, 82-169).

A large body of literature exists addressing the explanations for conflict related sexual violence. One of the major explanations started with the feminist writings of Sue Brownmiller on rape. The theory is that rape is a conscious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state of fear (Brownmiller 1986, 16). In other words sexual violence is a socially and culturally ingrained hatred for women that can easily exhibit itself during conflict (Millard and Isikozlu 2010, 18). In patriarchal societies in which view women are viewed as property sexual violence used in conflict can serve to reinforce dominance of one group over another (Nikolić-Ristanović 2000, 47). It has the opposite effect to the side who experiences sexual violence in that CRSV reinforces that they have failed to protect their property. This is especially true when men see themselves as the protector of women, and where women are valued as the child bearers and seen as the holders of the honor, and traditions within the family and the community (Kuehnast et al. 2011b, 48).

Other research on sexual violence from the feminist approach has expanded on understanding its occurrence from the experiences of women who are subjugated to the expression of manhood through an act of aggression, dominance, and superiority.
(Nikolić-Ristanović 2000). This basic explanation has been disputed. As the study of CRSV has grown, incidences of sexual violence of male on male, and by women or facilitated by women on other women or men, has allowed for inclusions of other explanations. Over time the explanation of sexual violence has expanded to be understood as a gendered concept of power and dominance over another (Millard and Isikozlu 2010, 18) not only enacted by men on women. Even though some scholars continue to maintain that the male soldier’s construction of their masculinity and militarization are a primary influence of their use of sexual violence to satisfy their needs (Baaz and Stern 2009, 505).

Another explanation is that sexual violence is a function or a part of war. Sexual violence has been considered part of the spoils of war or as a reward of being victorious in conflict (Lilly 2007, 27; Millard and Isikozlu 2010, 19; Baaz and Stern 2009, 498). This could mean raping the defeated opponent’s women or taking them as sex slaves or wives. Another explanation for sexual violence as a function or part of war is not only do victors have a right to the spoils of war but due to their separation from the normal societal structures which would ordinarily meet their sexual needs, sexual violence is a way to satisfy those needs (Baaz and Stern 2009). This is not a complete explanation because it does not explain why sexual acts are committed with the elderly, with a high level of brutality, in public, or done with objects. In the case of military or governmental leadership establishing sex slaves used by combatants, it was believed to raise troops’ moral. In other words, leaders believed they were offering a recreational reward for the hardships troops were enduring in combat (Enloe 2000, 111) which they believed would keep them from raping.
Another explanation for sexual violence in conflict is the perceived opportunity to commit sexual violence with impunity because of the breakdown of institutions that would normally restrain the behavior (Kalyvas, Shapiro, and Masoud 2008, 337; Cohen 2011, 6; Slim 2007, 62). The theory is the state’s ability to enforce the rule of law is degraded and societal norms and capacity to condemn such behavior are altered during conflict.

When warring parties and the community view sexual violence as part of war and suspend norms about sexual violence they normally hold in times of peace, it can give rise to opportunity and impunity. It is as if the violence seems to “create its own momentum and construct its own moral economy” (Baaz and Stern 2009, 510). The disruption that conflict causes on the conflict areas’ social structure and on traditional authorities and command (Baaz and Stern 2009, 503) can further the inability of a community to enforce social norms.

In cases where the pre-conflict judicial system is weak to begin with an armed group’s perception of impunity can lead them to commit acts of sexual violence (Dobbins 2013, 191). Much of the literature on impunity as an explanation for CRSV focuses on the lack of rule of law institutions and government policies which contribute to impunity (Stiglmayer et al. 1994, 183, 197) where CRSV is used.

The armed group itself can be its own source of generating a perception of impunity.

Demands for group conformity, hierarchical structures, and the dictates of loyalty, which are integral to the ethos of the military as a globalized institution, further facilitate collective action for which individuals are seemingly not accountable. (Enloe 2000, 108-52)
In other words, armed with weapons and engaged in combatant activities, armed groups have opportunity to commit sexual violence and the nature and dynamics of the armed groups can provide them with a sense of impunity.

Another explanation for CRSV is for communication between combatants and other armed groups and civilians. It is a way to humiliate and demoralize other groups, leaders of households, and communities for their inability to protect their families. In ethnic conflict or genocidal wars CRSV communicates who is to be excluded and continues to humiliate those who were powerless to protect those in their group from it happening (Slim 2008, 67). In instances of sexual violence where females are impregnated in ethnic wars it communicates the destruction of the group to which the victim belongs. This is especially found in patriarchal societies where women symbolize family and family is seen as the basis of society and passing traditions and culture (Nikolić-Ristanović 2000, 69). The act of sexual violence not only communicates defeat and shame directly to the victim but to their husbands, wives, children, and community. The dishonor, humiliation, terror, and show of absolute power are clearly communicated when an armed group is able to invade the most intimate of spaces and commit acts of sexual violence (Slim 2008, 63).

CRSV also serves as communication between combatants. It communicates commitment, a sense of masculinity, and mutual esteem between combatants (Baaz and Stern 2009, 505; Cohen 2011, 10; Stiglmayer et al. 1994, 59). Combatant socialization can serve to create cohesion between combatants and build an effective armed group (Kuehnast et al. 2011b, 50; Cohen 2011, 12; Stiglmayer et al. 1994, 61).
Another scholarly body of literature on CRSV focuses on the consequences and impact of sexual violence on a society and on individuals. Much of this literature is focused on medical, physical, and psychological impacts to the individuals, their families, and children resulting from sexual violence (Stiglmayer et al. 1994, 174; K. Johnson 2010) which can have long term devastating effects. The other focus of the consequences and impact of CRSV is what happens in the society after the individual and the community experiences CRSV. It looks at what cultural dynamics lead communities to accept and reject victims or resulting children and what conditions or factors allow for recovery or hinder recovery (Nikolić-Ristanović 2000; Csete 2002, 64). This literature also explores how individuals interpret the sexual violence they endured later in their lives (Hicks 1997; Soh 2008).

The last major body of scholarly literature on CRSV focuses on trying to first identify the variations in sexual violence and identify patterns that emerge. Scholars who study the variations would caution against treating all sexual violence with homogeneity because there is not one type or one reason for how CRSV is used or why it is used (Millard and Isikozlu 2010). Particularly important is the type of conflict it is used in: interstate, intra-state such as civil war, ethnic conflict, genocide, secessionists, the number of groups involved, and when one group uses CRSV violence and the other does not (Kuehnast et al. 2011b, 43; Millard and Isikozlu 2010). Scholars have also started studying the variation of the types of sexual violence being used and by which actors for example, gang rape (Cohen 2011) versus sexual enslavement, public versus private acts, when men and boys are victims versus girls and women, and exceedingly brutal acts and so forth. By studying the variations they are able to identify where sexual violence has
been relatively absent and where more or less brutal forms of sexual violence are used and potential causes for the variations (Kuehnast et al. 2011a). The purpose for this type of study is to help build better strategies for deterrence.

The major bodies of scholarly literature on CRSV do not directly address the military utility and advantages it can provide to an adversary. They do not demonstrate what military aims are achieved, what critical requirements CRSV generates or how CRSV can help build combat power.

**U.S. and International Policy on Conflict Related Sexual Violence and the Military**

The language and actions addressing CRSV in the security council resolutions have become stronger since the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court listed sexual violence as a war crime and crime against humanity (International Criminal Court 1998, 3-9). The UN Security Council started with recognizing the impact of sexual violence in 2000 with SCR1325 (UN 2000), to mandating UN peacekeeping missions to protect civilians from sexual violence in 2009 with SCR 1888 (UN 2009). In 2010 the Security Council made monitoring, analyzing, and reporting of conflict related sexual violence a requirement with SCR 1960 (UN 2010), and again pushed countries to address gaps in implementing previous SCRs on sexual violence, by adopting SCR 2122 in 2013 (UN 2013).

CRSV has been recognized as an issue to be addressed in over 13 security council resolutions since 2000. This does not include any resolutions specifically condemning rape in conflicts prior to 2000 nor does it include any of the resolutions specifically calling out countries using sexual violence in their conflicts post 2000. Not one of the
resolutions addressing sexual violence has been vetoed by a voting permanent or non
permanent member in 15 years and each one references actions for militaries to take in
order to support prevention and response to CRSV. The UN, NATO, African Union and
the European Union (UN SRSG 2014; NATO 2012; EIGE 2014) have formalized policy
and procedures for their military action on CRSV.

Few other issues have maintained the level of attention from the Security Council
and General Assembly that CRSV has. Other types of issues that have received attention
are nuclear, chemical, biological weapons, acts of terrorism, armament, hostage taking,
mining and marking explosives, and proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Of
this short list, CRSV ranks among the top three for number of resolutions passed related
to the one issue. CRSV is established as an issue and it is gaining more attention the more
it is studied.

The U.S. has made initiatives to support the UN resolutions on CRSV starting
with support to SCR1325. The president drafted two executive orders on the issue calling
for the executive departments and agencies to create a national action plan. The first was
Instituting a National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security, Executive Order
13595 (President of the United States 2011a) and the second was Preventing and
Responding to Violence Against Women and Girls Globally, Executive Order 13623
(President of the United States 2012). Both orders direct the department of defense to
have a role in implementation.

The first executive order established recognition of the use of sexual violence as a
tactic of war.
The U.S. recognizes the responsibility of all nations to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, including when implemented by means of sexual violence. The United States further recognizes that sexual violence, when used or commissioned as a tactic of war or as a part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilians, can exacerbate and prolong armed conflict and impede the restoration of peace and security. (President of the United States 2011a)

The order called for interagency coordination, training, education, evaluation, integration and an institutionalized approach to responding to sexual violence.

The second executive order established the development of a multi-year strategy that will more effectively prevent and respond to gender-based violence globally. It called for increased coordination between interagency (including DoD) and other stakeholders like NGOs, international organizations and civil society. It also called for improved collection, analysis, and use of data research, enhanced integration in existing government work, and expanding programming that addresses gender based violence (President of the United States 2012). The executive order established that sexual violence is a national focus which is also reflected in the National Security Strategy.

The 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) referenced the disproportionate burden placed on women and girls in crises and conflict, and stated that the U.S. is working with regional and international organizations with the aim of preventing violence against women and girls in conflict zones (President of the United States 2010, 38). It also established the U.S.’s responsibility to use the military in certain situations of genocide and mass atrocities and that the U.S. is engaged in a strategic effort to prevent mass atrocities (President of the United States 2010, 48).

The definition of mass atrocities is important to understand because within this term the concept of sexual violence is included. The Rome Statute addressing genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity is used to define what can constitute a mass
atrocit

(Joint Chiefs of Staff 2012a, B-2). Sexual violence is included under genocide, Article 6, (b) because sexual violence can cause serious bodily harm or mental harm to members of the group (International Criminal Court 2002, 3; Ellis 2007). Under crimes against humanity, Article 7, (g), and war crimes, Article 8, (b), xxii, acts of sexual violence are specifically listed (International Criminal Court 2002, 3, 7). In other words wherever the word mass atrocity is used in U.S. policy or military doctrine it denotes the inclusion of sexual violence. Also, wherever war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity are mentioned it denotes the inclusion of sexual violence by their definition.

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2010 does not address sexual violence directly, but it does address mass atrocities. In the 2010 QDR it lists preventing human suffering due to mass atrocities as a challenge DoD is required to deal with and to be prepared to support a response (U.S. Secretary of Defense 2010, vi, 15). The 2012 strategic guidance stated the DoD will continue to develop joint doctrine and military response options to prevent and, if necessary, respond to mass atrocities (Secretary of Defense 2012, 6).

As a result of the president’s executive order 13595, the U.S. National Action Plan (NAP) on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS), and the Department of Defense’s Implementation Guide for the U.S. National Action Plan on WPS were developed. The NAP states:

Sexual violence in conflict is a security issue that must receive the same level of attention as other threats to individuals in conflict situations. The safety of women and their families must be a top priority for security efforts around the world. (President of the United States 2011a, 7)
The NAP listed five outcomes the DoD is responsible for implementing with other agencies. All five outcomes are then listed as DoD outcomes in the DoD implementation guide. Even though sexual violence is an overarching concern in the president’s executive directives and NAP, the documents also address other issues such as women’s participation in the peace process and gender mainstreaming. Because not all outcomes are directly related to CRSV it is important to point out the three DoD outcomes which are directly related. They are (1) early warning response systems responsive to sexual gender based violence (SGBV) in conflict and crises areas, (2) risks of SGBV decreased through increased capacity of actors that deal with SGBV, (3) improved interventions to prevent trafficking in persons and protect survivors. Although the trafficking in persons outcome does not reference sexual violence, sex trafficking is a form of CRSV and has been used by armed groups.

The president’s executive orders, the NAP, the military guidance through the QDR, NSS, and the DoD implementation guide establish the foundations for a military framework that recognizes CRSV. The executive directives and NAP are related to human rights and the QDR and NSS are related to the responsibility to protect through preventing and responding to mass atrocities.

Next is a review of joint and Army doctrine and publications that directly or indirectly (like mass atrocities) contain concepts related to CRSV. Because the president’s directive called for interagency coordination on this issue, including the DoD, all branches of services would in theory be part of the DoD plan. Review of all services is outside the scope of this paper but joint doctrine could be a good indicator of what guides and may be included in other services doctrine.
Military Framework on CRSV

Army Publications

Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and the Coast Guard have supporting or direct ground operations putting them in contact with adversaries that may use CRSV. The Army is primarily a ground force with enduring relationships within peaceful and conflict areas and can be called upon to conduct military operations to deter or respond to conflicts where CRSV is used. Because the Army is primarily a ground force their doctrine in addition to joint doctrine was chosen for review.

Army Doctrine Reference Publications, ADRPs, provide the foundation for the Army’s operational concepts, training, and education. The majority of references to protection of civilians or sexual violence is contained in doctrine on stability. The first time the term sexual violence appears in Army doctrine is in the publication on stability under protection of civilians. Under unique considerations in ADRP 3-07 Stability doctrine, it states the protection of civilians is an important consideration that must be included in planning and execution by military commanders (Department of the Army 2013, 3-19). The primary stability tasks of establishing civil security and control are directly related to protection of civilians and are an underlying objective of supporting tasks to protect civilians from threats (Department of the Army 2013, 3-20). Relevant threats included mass atrocities, war crimes, crimes against humanity and terrorism. As stated before CRSV is considered part of those threats. The first and only time sexual violence is referenced in Army doctrine is found in the same section listed as another type of threat that could potentially include SGBV. Lastly, it states that units may be required to respond to mass atrocities including crimes against humanity and war crimes
There is no other mention of mass atrocities, genocide or war crimes in the ADRPs.

The statements made in the stability doctrine are concerned with security of civilians and a unit’s responsibility to protect civilians from threats when circumstances require it. The main focus of stability operations is establishing or maintaining a safe and secure environment which can be done as a mission, task, or activity (Department of the Army 2012a, 2-5). It does not reference the purpose and reason for protection of civilians as a way of defeating or weakening the enemy. But, it does recognize that in stability operations unique considerations like protection of civilians is a balance between offensive, defensive, and stability operations (Department of the Army 2013, 3-1). Since the protection of civilians includes protection from sexual and gender based violence, this could imply that protection from CRSV includes operations other than stability.

Previous U.S. military theses and monographs coming from military professional education institutions have referenced CRSV when reviewing conflicts that included mass atrocities or discuss the after effects from the perspective of the survivor of sexual violence. However, there are no works on demonstrating the military utility CRSV provides.

Joint Doctrine

Joint publications that reference protection of civilians (POC), mass atrocities, genocide, crimes against humanity, or sexual and gender-based violence are in Stability Operation, Peace Operations and Foreign Humanitarian Assistance joint doctrine. JP 3-07 Stability Operations includes mass atrocities and genocide as a threat and a vulnerability. It states that DoS takes the lead in detection and prevention but that joint
forces must be prepared to deter or halt ongoing activities. It also states that HN security institutions should be developed to prevent and counter mass atrocities and genocide with training and assistance. It also states that the joint force commander should provide rules of engagement guidance to units that may encounter mass atrocities or human rights violations (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011d, III-14, 15). Lastly, under military contributions to public law and order JP 3-07 lists the protection of civilians.

The joint force may be called upon to provide protection for civilians if the HN is unable or unwilling to provide such protection. The protection of civilians from physical violence, including genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, is vital. (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011d, III-11)

There are two other supplemental joint publications with indirect associations with conflict related sexual violence. JP 3-07.3, *Peace Operations*, discusses the POC mandates to UN peacekeepers (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2012a, III-1). (As stated earlier POC mandates for the UN means the inclusion of prevention and protection against CRSV.) JP 3-07.3 also describes mass atrocities as part of the joint operating environment, lists mass atrocities as a contingency plan to peace operations, and provides an appendix for mass atrocity response operations planning (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2012a, I-10, III-11, B-1).

JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, states that commanders should be prepared to monitor, prevent, and, if necessary, respond to mass atrocity situations (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014a, I-10).

Because stability operations is the primary location for concepts associated with CRSV it is important to further describe stability operations. JP 3-07 describes the military’s primary contribution to stabilization as protecting and defending the population, facilitating the personal security of the people, thus, creating a platform for political, economic, and human security (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011d, I-2). DoS is
charged with leading the whole of government approach to stabilization and the primary responsibility for stabilization is development and foreign service personnel. If CRSV related concepts are primarily found in stability doctrine, and stabilization is primarily focused on protecting and defending the population, combating CRSV might not be seen as a way to weaken or defeat an adversary.

There is one offensive action mentioned in JP 3-31 Command and Control for Joint Land Operations. When describing the commander’s responsibility for protection of joint forces it says that a commander may conduct site exploitation where war crimes are believed to have occurred (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014b, IV-21). It does not specify if the site exploitation is to investigate military forces’ violation of war crimes or if it the investigation of war crimes committed by adversarial groups. Where publications address laws of war there usually is mention of war crimes and sometimes the term will be used when talking about security sector reform.

The term rape is used twice, sexual violence is used once, and sexual exploitation is used three times in joint publication found in stability operations and foreign humanitarian assistance. There is no use of the term gender-based violence. Both places where the term rape and sexual violence is used is to describe the UN Children’s Fund’s capability to provide post-rape-care kits (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014a, D-4; Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011a, B-C-3), and their promotion of activities to prevent and respond to sexual violence (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011a, B-C-4). Sexual exploitation is used to help define a type of trafficked victim under trafficking in persons (TIP) (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014a, IV-21; Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011d, xx, III-23). Sex trafficking is included in CRSV and sexual and gender based violence so wherever trafficking in persons is referenced it
would include CRSV of sex trafficked persons. The role to military commanders in TIP is to support host nation’s efforts in combating TIP, incorporate anti TIP measures into their post conflict or humanitarian emergency assistant programs, and to periodically meet with NGOs to review TIP initiatives (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2014a, IV-21).

There are two publications relevant to the literature review of joint publications on conflict related sexual violence, the Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) hand book and the Protection of Civilians Military Reference Guide. Neither are official military publications but were produced and published in partnership with the Army’s Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute and are available to military planners from any service. MARO was designed to provide a guide on how military options could be done and provide a common military approach to mass atrocities and genocide (Sewall, Dwight, and Chin 2010, 11). Although it does not mention conflict related sexual violence, by definition mass atrocities includes sexual violence thus making it a relevant document, training tool and guide to military commanders on CRSV. The MARO handbook is the most progressive document in describing military actions in response to mass atrocities in offensive and defensive terms (Sewall, Dwight, and Chin 2010, 17, 23, 56, 61) which is in line with the efforts of this thesis.

The Protection of Civilians Military Reference Guide firmly includes the concept of CRSV. The guide was written for military commanders and staffs who must consider the POC in peace operations and military operation during armed conflict and is a reference for training, planning, and operations (Raymond, Flavin, and Prandtner 2013, vii). It is the first and only place where CRSV is mentioned in a military publication and
it even defines the elimination of CRSV as a task that helps create an environment conducive to the POC (Raymond, Flavin, and Prandtner 2013, 149).

It states the military force, in conjunction with other actors, must ensure that sexual violence is addressed as a major area of focus and is routinely incorporated into its PoC efforts (Raymond, Flavin, and Prandtner 2013, 162). It also states that the military force should view CRSV elimination as an important and distinct task, and that it must be mainstreamed in most of the other PoC tasks (Raymond, Flavin, and Prandtner 2013, 163). The guide also uses terminology and addresses mass atrocities, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. This is an important first document that places CRSV as having specific relevance to military commanders but it does not show how POC from CRSV can also help to defeat an adversary.

A key distinction between protection of civilians and mass atrocities is that POC could happen at any time during an operation but responding to a mass atrocity is more deliberate and is also considered a form of protection to civilians. In military terms POC and mass atrocities are the closest concepts that address sexual violence. Their use provides a basic framework for joint forces role in regards to CRSV even though none of the joint publications use sexual violence terminology. Lastly, the terms mass atrocity and protection of civilians are primarily used in foreign humanitarian assistance, stability, and peace operation publications. They are not located in publications related to the operations of counter insurgency, intelligence or information, counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, civil military operations or any other publication to include the intelligence or planning series of joint publications.
Doctrine and military publications fail to address the relevance of combating CRSV from a military perspective other than the military's responsibility to protect and provide security. The doctrine and military publications do not discuss from a military perspective how CRSV can be used to achieve military aims, generate critical requirements, or combat power. From this perspective chapter 4 discusses the military utility of CRSV weaponry.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Starting with the understanding that CRSV has been used throughout history, is used in conflicts today and is considered a weapon, a tactic, and a strategy, I apply abductive reasoning (Perez 2013) to scholarly theory on CRSV and military doctrinal concepts to propose a military perspective on CRSV. “Abduction or ‘inference to the best explanation’—reasoning on the basis of mature theories from observed effects to unobserved causes” (Shapiro 2005, 39) is the premise for the analysis. By analyzing causal theories of CRSV, accepting that CRSV is used as a weapon to achieve military aims, generate combat power, and critical requirements (military doctrinal concepts), I develop a theory on the military utility of CRSV and the vulnerabilities it creates that can be exploited. Because abduction from the unobservable is a way of “generating knowledge in which theory plays a vital role” (Shapiro 2005, 39) this method of analysis was chosen to develop a new theory.

Figure 2. Abduction Methodology

Source: Created by author.
I first deduced from Stathis Kalyvas’ description of coercive violence that conflict related sexual violence is a type of coercive violence. Stathis Kalyvas’ found that “a central phenomenon of coercive violence is to generate compliance,” in other words, violence used to control (Kalyvas 2006, 28). He also states that “when violence is primarily used to control a population it becomes a resource rather than a final product” (Kalyvas 2006, 26). Lastly, “coercive violence can be tactical when it eliminates a particular risk but when it is used to shape the behavior of others it is strategic” (Kalyvas 2006, 27). Conflict related sexual violence is a form of coercive violence and shares these characteristics: it is used to control, is a resource to an adversary, and can be tactical or strategic. This premise about CRSV was used for the analysis in chapter 4.

I chose three military doctrinal concepts for analysis. These three concepts, or models, offer a basic foundation for demonstrating the military utility of CRSV from the perspective of an adversary. The three concepts include: the purposes of decisive action (which is called military aims in the thesis), combat power, and critical factor analysis. The first doctrinal concept is decisive action. “Decisive action is the continuous, simultaneous, combination of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks” (Department of the Army 2012a, 2-2). Decisive action consisting of offensive, defensive and stability tasks is a foundation to what the Army calls unified land operations which is part of their operational concept to support joint and interagency strategies. The purpose of offensive and defensive tasks are used for analysis and stability tasks are not because CRSV is already considered a stability concern.

The second concept used was an analysis of the Elements of Combat Power. “Combat power is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information
capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time” (Department of the Army 2012a, 3-1). Leaders and units generate and manage elements of their combat power for their operations. Analysis on how CRSV is used to generate combat power is done to demonstrate another aspect of CRSV’s military utility.

The third military doctrinal concept used was critical factor analysis which is the process of analyzing, in this case, an adversary’s capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities to assist in designing an operation to defeat them (Kem 2012). This process is used by joint and Army planners. Only a few critical requirements are used for analysis to further demonstrate this common military doctrinal concept of critical factor analysis and the military utility of CRSV. A definition of vulnerabilities is also provided because inherent to an opponent’s effort to achieve military aims, generate combat power, and critical requirements are vulnerabilities that can be exploited by an intervening force.

For each military doctrinal concept or model, not all elements were analyzed. Instead grounded theory (Andrews and Scott 2013) was used to focus the study of CRSV and analysis of its military utility on core categories. The three doctrinal concepts, as well as the theories on CRSV, compose what experts of grounded theory refer to as “the substantive areas” (or areas of interest) for this analysis (Andrews and Scott 2013). All elements of the doctrinal concepts were considered for providing military utility at the beginning of the research. However, after reviewing the theories and past research on CRSV, core categories of CRSV’s military utility within each doctrinal concept became apparent. Once the core categories or main concern within each doctrinal concept were determined further review of the existing theories on CRSV was done along the core
categories. The core categories for each doctrinal concept are listed below along with a more detailed description of the three doctrinal concepts used.

**Military Aims**

From Army doctrine, the military purposes for offensive and defensive tasks in decisive action were used as the basis for describing military aims. These are considered tactical tasks and they are a part of unified land operations which is the Army’s operating concept to support and overall joint strategy (Department of the Army 2012a, 1-1). This is the first military doctrinal concept for analysis. Abductions were made about the use of CRSV in six core categories (1) dislocate, isolate, disrupt, and destroy enemy forces, (2) seize key terrain, (3) deprive the enemy of resources, and (4) develop intelligence from the purposes of offensive tasks and (5) retain key terrain (6) deter or defeat enemy offense from the purposes of defensive tasks.
Table 1. Tasks of Decisive Action

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<td>Deceive and divert the enemy</td>
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<td>Protect the populace, critical assets, and infrastructure</td>
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<td>Provide support for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents</td>
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<td>Meet the critical needs of the populace</td>
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<td>Gain support for host-nation government</td>
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<td>Shape the environment for interagency and host-nation success</td>
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I diverge from the doctrine in two areas for the analysis. The first is the use of the word enemy. The purpose could be directed at another armed group, state or non-state actor (enemy) but it could also be directed at civilians to achieve military aims. Unlike U.S. forces an adversary is not required to direct combat actions only at their enemy. The second is that although the doctrine considers the tasks tactical, analysis was done on how the purpose of those tasks also contributes to operational and strategic aims. Thus, for each purpose listed an analysis of existing theories on CRSV was conducted to abduct what military utility CRSV provides an adversary at all three levels (tactical, operational, and strategic).
Elements of Combat Power

There are eight elements to combat power intelligence, fires, sustainment, protection, movement and maneuver, leadership, and information which contribute to accomplishing military missions (Department of the Army 2012a, 3-1). During the research four elements of combat power emerged as the core categories that CRSV, when used, was able to generate. Abductions were made about four elements of combat power in intelligence, movement and maneuver, leadership, and sustainment. Protection, may seem like an obvious element of combat power for analysis but during the research CRSV did not emerge from the theories or from the military doctrine as a way of providing protection to an adversary (Department of the Army 2012b; Joint Chiefs of Staff 2010).

Figure 3. ADRP 3-0 The Elements of Combat Power

Army elements of combat power were juxtaposed with Joint Operations doctrine on the use of combat power to seize the initiative. Abductions were made on how an adversary could use CRSV to achieve a decisive advantage through the use of all available elements of combat power to maintain the initiative, deny their opponent the opportunity to achieve its objectives, and generate in their opponent a sense of inevitable failure and defeat (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011b, xx).

Critical Factors

The third military doctrinal concept used was critical factor analysis which is currently a tool used by the joint services. Critical factor analysis is the process of analyzing the three following factors.

Critical capabilities are those that are considered crucial enablers for a center of gravity to function as such, and are essential to the accomplishment of the adversary’s assumed objective(s).

Critical requirements are the conditions, resources, and means that enable a critical capability to become fully operational.

Critical vulnerabilities are those aspects or components of critical requirements that are deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack in a manner achieving decisive or significant results. (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2012b, III-24)

I considered CRSV a critical capability to enable an adversary to function and to accomplish its military aims, generate critical requirements, and combat power.

Using grounded theory logistical support, unit dynamics, and legitimacy were chosen as critical requirements for the adversary and previous theories on CRSV were used to abduct what military utility CRSV provided to generate those requirements. Legitimacy is not referencing a legal acceptance or legal use of CRSV because there are no laws sanctioning sexual violence for armed groups. Rather, legitimacy used for
analysis is referencing an adversary’s ability to be viewed by the people and governing authorities as a party to a conflict capable of conducting operations despite any attempts or deterrence by a governing authority, validating an opponent’s ability to enforce their authority over what they control.

Generating combat power and achieving military aims can also be critical requirements depending on the context of the conflict. For example, the purpose of the offensive task to develop intelligence is a military aim but at the same time the intelligence collected can be a critical requirement. Another example would be an armed group’s use of CRSV to seize resource rich terrain (military aim) denying access to their opponent which may be a critical requirement for an aspect of their operations. Instead of listing every critical requirement possible, only three critical requirements were chosen to demonstrate the critical factor analysis doctrinal concept showing the potential military utility of CRSV.

Critical Vulnerabilities

The military utility CRSV provides to an adversary to achieve military aims, generate combat power and critical requirements possesses inherent vulnerabilities. Dr. Jack Kem’s detailed analysis of critical factors reveals the following about critical vulnerabilities:

1. Critical vulnerabilities consist of those components of critical requirements that are deficient, are targetable, and thereby vulnerable to neutralization or defeat in a way that will contribute to an adversary’s failing to achieve its critical capability (Kem 2012, 190).
2. From a systems standpoint, you are not attacking the entire system, you are attacking a critical component of the system that is vulnerable to attack in order to “de-link” the system from fully functioning (Kem 2012, 191).

3. Part of the critical factor analysis process is to
   (a) Identify “critical requirements” or components thereof which are deficient, or vulnerable (or potentially so) to friendly neutralization, interdiction, or attack. These are the enemy’s “critical vulnerabilities.”
   (b) Devise a strategy, campaign plan, or plan of attack which takes a maximum advantage of one or more enemy “critical vulnerability” (Kem 2012, 180).

Using the military doctrinal concept of critical vulnerabilities informed the analysis of military aims, generating combat power, and critical requirements. The reason identifying vulnerabilities is important is because they can be exploited to weaken or defeat an adversary. Because of the military utility CRSV enables an adversary to achieve military aims, generate combat power, and meet critical requirements, employing a strategy that denies an adversary access to the population to conduct CRSV is an attack on their vulnerabilities. In chapter 4 this approach to analysis serves the purpose of showing an adversary’s collective military utility of CRSV and thus the inherent vulnerabilities.

**Scholarly Abduction**

Using these three military doctrinal concepts, military aims (purposes of defensive and offensive tasks), critical requirements, and elements of combat power, I then looked at scholarship done on the study of CRSV to identify if there was military utility in the use of CRSV. I reviewed scholarly literature on CRSV, theories on general
violence in conflict with chapters specifically on CRSV (or rape), and reports and documents explaining the causes of conflict related sexual violence. The benefit to using the previous theories developed by scholars was that most scholars had studied conflict related sexual violence over decades and over many types of conflicts. This worked to simplify drawing out if CRSV had served a military utility in achieving military aims, generating critical requirements, or generating combat power during my analysis.

The importance of the analysis was not which conflict or context scholars had studied, certain actions or behaviors by adversaries associated with CRSV; rather that military utility was observed when it was used. As stated in the introduction the purpose of using abduction to build a military theory on the military utility of CRSV is not to claim that all adversaries will use CRSV or use it the same way. The theory will attempt to show that when it is used by an adversary CRSV has the potential to achieve military aims, generate critical requirements, and combat power.

A model operational approach is provided in chapter 4 that captures the abductions made to military doctrinal concepts and theories on CRSV. An operational approach is a military doctrinal concept that describes the broad actions that a force takes to reach its overall desired military end state (Kem 2012, 53; Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011c, III-1). The operational approach model in chapter is just one example of how an adversary can use CRSV in their operations and as part of their overall strategy to reach a desired end state. Inherent to their actions and objectives in an opponent’s operational approach are vulnerabilities (denial of an adversary to access and ability to conduct CRSV on a population) that an intervening force can exploit.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

CRSV is comparable in its intent, extent and impact to any classical method of warfare (Anderson 2010a, 10). When CRSV is used as coercive violence an adversary can achieve military aims, meet critical requirements, and generate combat power.

Military Aims

Abducting from decades of conflicts studied by scholars and examining the military utility of CRSV there appear to be linkages to six military purposes. Given that there is military utility in using CRSV to destabilize, which is not the subject of this paper, covered below are six purposes for offensive and defensive military tasks. They are (1) dislocate, isolate, disrupt, and destroy enemy forces, (2) seize key terrain, (3) deprive enemy of resources, (4) develop intelligence, (5) deter, defeat, enemy offense and (6) retain key terrain (Department of the Army 2012a, 2-5).

Dislocate, isolate, disrupt and destroy enemy forces

Probably one of the most obvious military aims that CRSV can achieve is dislocating entire populations from their homes. Throughout history CRSV has been an instrument of expulsion (Nikolić-Ristanović 2000, 65). Just the threat of sexual violence can be used as an instrument to force populations into exile, making them want to leave their homes and never come back. This worked particularly well in the Serbian-Croatian conflict and in several countries in Africa. The UN expert report found that sexual violence was intentionally used in the Balkans on groups of people to move them from particular areas into other areas (Nikolić-Ristanović 2000, 66). In the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) where sexual violence was used by all groups involved, there were cases where nearly half the town fled the area (Csete 2002, 38) or entire towns uprooted and vanished becoming ghost towns (UN 2010a, 14). CRSV has the power to do this in two ways: either by direct threat, forcing civilians who experience sexual violence to flee after a CRSV attack or by rumors of armed groups using these tactics causing civilians to preemptively move out of their way (Nikolić-Ristanović 2000, 66).

This method of using CRSV can be tactical, operational, and strategic. To a unit that wants access to a specific town and uses CRSV to force dislocation (UN 2014), that isolated event is tactical. If the town is of significant importance to their operations, such as dislocating civilians near their bases it is operational (Csete 2002, 61). Whether by force or by choice every kind of dislocation or disruption of space occupied by civilians in conflict is highly strategic and warring parties typically wanting to control the space (Slim 2008, 85) can do so through the military use of CRSV. CRSV was a tool heavily used by both parties in the Darfur genocide where 2.6 million people were forcibly displaced as one strategic example (Anderson 2010a, 14).

CRSV can also work to isolate civilians or specific areas. As civilians try to avoid armed groups who would use CRSV against them, they can be restricted to certain geographical areas, or tactically isolated within their own community. Through the threat of CRSV civilians can be confined or restricted to their homes. One example of this is in Afghanistan where CRSV was used to oppress communities and restrict the movements of women participating in politics (Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007, 89). Also, in Africa and the Balkans civilians were restricted to their homes or cut off from their livelihoods to avoid sexual violence from a warring party. CRSV then can disrupt economic trade
activities (Anderson 2010a, 14; Millard and Isikozlu 2010). For example, if women or men fear they will be subjected to sexual violence or abduction into sexual slavery or trafficking they may choose to stop their involvement in normal economic activities in order to protect themselves.

There are additional benefits to an armed group using CRSV to dislocate, isolate, or disrupt civilians. Not only does clearing a territory for military purpose benefit an adversary but it also sends large flows of people into the areas occupied by opponents which can confuse or divert their opponent’s own efforts (Slim 2008, 75). Also by clearing an area an armed group can expose their opponent making them easier to find, and also take away their opponent’s base of support. Lastly, it can also serve to destroy their opponent’s linkage to land or resources that may be contested over (Slim 2008, 75).

The shame and humiliation inflicted on armed groups and community members for their failure to protect those on whom sexual violence was inflicted can destroy their ability and will to fight and drive them to flee. CRSV also serves within each battle to communicate defeat and destruction to the opponent, like the rape of German women by Russian soldiers at the end of WWII (Nikolić-Ristanović 2000, 49). But the opposite is also true of CRSV; it can increase one’s will to fight. CRSV can mobilize a community to join a side in the conflict and increase recruitment to seek out vengeance and to avenge those who suffered CRSV at the hands of their opponent (Slim 2007, 63; Nikolić-Ristanović 2000, 44; Csete 2002, 24).

Seize key terrain

As in the case of Nanking sexual violence was used as a tool to seize the entire city and render opposition ineffective. An entire population was subjugated to Japanese
rule and were provided with horrific visual, physical, and emotional reminders of the futility of any resistance to Japanese soldiers through the use of CRSV (I. Chang 1998, 52, 161). This not only served the military’s intent to seize and control Nanking but the atrocities they inflicted could strike terror in all Chinese people (Lary and MacKinnon 2001, 79) no matter in what city the military would need to seize next.

The use of sexual violence as a tool to seize and control terrain is common to countries whose warring parties seek to control natural resources or land used for production of economic generating activities (like drugs) to finance their operations or to gain political power (Slim 2008, 72; Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007; Millard and Isikozlu 2010, 16). In Angola’s 1975-2002 civil war, CRSV was used as a tool to control mineral rich terrain (Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007, 31). Probably one of the most familiar uses of sexual violence to control resource rich areas needed for supporting armed groups was and is in the DRC. As part of a military strategy used by all sides to the conflict, CRSV is a chosen method to displace civilians and other armed groups off of the resource rich areas (Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007, 41; Csete 2002, 18). Another example is in Columbia. CRSV has been used by government and paramilitary forces in rebel-controlled territory to keep civilians from supporting the rebels (Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007, 73).

In other cases sexual violence can be inflicted on entire cities or villages as an armed group passes through because the city or village contains something they seek to extract. The terror which is inflicted through CRSV can allow an armed group to freely operate to extract needed supplies or human resources for the duration of the raid (Nikolić-Ristanović 2000, 49; Anderson 2010a, 28; Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007).
This method of extraction will be discussed in generating combat power and critical requirements. But, the point is that CRSV can be used to control terrain that contains supplies needed by an armed group for a short period of time or seize and control terrain for long periods of time in support of their military aims.

Deprive the enemy of resources

Depriving the enemy of resources is twofold. The first is that the use of CRSV can provide resources to the armed group. The second is that the use of CRSV deprives the population of the resources they need. The resources that the CRSV can generate for an armed group will be covered in critical requirements and elements of combat power. Briefly covered here is what resources the civilian population can be deprived of through the use of CRSV.

The fear and terror generated by CRSV can deprive civilians of access to water, health and medical care, education, markets, shopping centers, or fields (Slim 2008, 92, 94; UN 2010a, 24; Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007, 155; Csete 2002, 38). Rather than risk the chance of a sexually violent encounter the population stops accessing resources their community provides or they generate for themselves. One scholar proposes that the loss of access to food, medical services, and stress of being forced to flee can kill twenty times as many human beings as are killed by conventional weapons in Africa (Slim 2008, 91). At first denying the population access to resources through the use of CRSV may seem like a stability concern, but by denying civilians access to resources, the armed group can strengthen their position by weakening the community’s. The more the populations is denied access to resources through the threat or actual use of CRSV the
more likely they are to leave and the less resilient they are to resist an armed group’s advances.

Develop Intelligence

CRSV allows an adversary to collect information and reduce information shared with the other side which is needed to make tactical or operational decisions. At a tactical level it can be used to extract information from an individual about a specific person in another armed group or used to deter others from sharing information as a strategy.

A simple but effective comparison of how CRSV can control the sharing of information is that of a night letter and a rape. Some night letters were used to intimidate Afghans in Afghanistan from cooperating and sharing information with U.S. forces (T. H. Johnson 2007, 4). Whenever a night letter was posted in an area under U.S. control it generated attention from the area commander to stop insurgents from intimidating civilians in their area. Compare that with a father or village forced to watch a young girl gang raped as a collective punishment to intimidate the community from cooperating or sharing information with the opposition (Csete 2002, 27). The point is not which is more effective, the night letter or the rape, but that CRSV can be used to develop intelligence or it can be used to deny intelligence to the opposition.

The use of CRSV to obtain information or confessions has been documented in several conflicts. CRSV has been used on men and boys during interrogation either at a detainment facility or in their own homes or publicly (UN 2010a, 15) to gain information about opponents. CRSV has also been used on women during interrogations, inspections or raids on homes to extract information about spouses suspected activities and allegiances or the woman’s own political involvement (Karatzogianni 2012, 262;
Nikolić-Ristanović 2000, 57); even though the interrogation or inspection often times was just a farce used to terrorize the women or their families.

Deter, defeat enemy offense

As stated in the literature review CRSV is used as a way of communicating defeat to an opponent. CRSV is a tactical way of dominating another group (Anderson 2010a, 5). It can be used to destroy the dignity of the individuals who are victims of the sexual violence and to their family, community and armed group who were supposed to protect them (Baaz and Stern 2009, 500, 511). It works to destroy community networks needed to survive during conflict (Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007, 63) through humiliation, domination, terror, and dishonor crushing their resistance (Slim 2008, 63). The Yugoslav National Army, psychological department, believed that CRSV could more easily crush an opponent’s will to fight especially when used on minors and children (Kuehnast et al. 2011a, 68). CRSV also has the power to destroy in the most tactical sense by creating immediate causalities resulting from the injuries of sexual violence or the causalities caused by the inability to get medical treatment for injuries caused by sexual violence.

It also has the power to destroy families, communities, and overall cultural cohesion (Millard and Isikozlu 2010, 18), destroying the fabric of society. CRSV may not have the power to destroy conventional forces in a literal sense but it has the power to destroy, degrade, and deter resistance from opposing forces and noncombatants in psychological ways.
Retain key terrain

Once an adversary has used CRSV as part of their strategy to displace civilians from terrain needed for their operations or resource rich land they can retain them through the threat of continued use of CRSV. Civilians displaced after CRSV may be unlikely to return if they will continue to face acts of sexual violence, thus allowing an adversary to retain key terrain (Cohen 2011, 7; Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007, 31; Anderson 2010a, 17).

Generating Critical Requirements

CRSV can enable adversaries to generate logistical support, legitimacy, and create unit dynamics required to sustain an adversary’s ability to fight.

Logistical support

The use of CRSV creates and provides resources needed for military operations. Transportation, lodging, food and water, and services can all be generated through CRSV, which are needed to sustain an adversary’s ability to continue to wage conflict. By actually committing acts of sexual violence or under the threat of the use of CRSV adversaries abduct, confiscate, extort and coerce civilians into providing them needed supplies and services (Anderson 2010a).

In rural environments men, women, boys and girls treated as sex slaves or coerced under sexual violence can be forced into transporting supplies needed by the armed group (Cohen 2011, 4). In urban and rural areas they can be forced to provide services such as cooking, cleaning, washing, and farming. Consider the billions of dollars spent on contractors to cook, clean, wash, transport and provide maintenance services to U.S.
forces in Afghanistan or Iraq. An adversary who uses CRSV to procure supplies and services, pays nothing and is provided with services they would otherwise have to do themselves freeing them to spend more time on military activities.

Those who are captured and subjected to CRSV can be specifically used to transport supplies for an adversary (Slim 2007, 68). After events of CRSV civilians would be forced to carry the baggage of their captors (Csete 2002, 48), to include the transportation of ammunition (Csete 2002, 28). Another example is when civilians are on their way to market buying or selling goods and an adversary would rape them and force them to transport the goods intended for market to their camps (Csete 2002, 50). In a third situation, adversaries would use CRSV to force civilians to go and collect supplies like water or firewood and transport them to their bases (Csete 2002, 61). Using CRSV to force civilians to transport goods is a common practice in African and Asian conflicts (Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007). In countries that do not use transportation by foot as a primary means of transport an adversary can also use CRSV to terrorize civilians and confiscate vehicles to transport supplies stolen from the community.

CRSV is used in two ways to acquire supplies. The first is through confiscating civilians’ belongings while terrorizing them with CRSV or while under the threat of CRSV force civilians to procure supplies on behalf of the adversary. Adversaries will steal everything a civilian owns, taking every last possession and piece of property through the brutal use of CRSV (Slim 2008, 72; Nikolić-Ristanović 2000, 49; Csete 2002, 61; Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007). Supplies confiscated from civilians under the threat of CRSV can be to sustain their forces like food, water, clothing, fuel, charcoal,
firewood, vehicles, animals, and weapons. This also includes lodging for armed groups who would seize homes for billeting (Slim 2007, 95) after attacks of CRSV.

The second way adversaries use the threat of CRSV to supply and resupply themselves is by terrorizing civilians into acquiring the supplies on behalf of the armed group and then providing it to them. This could be through forcing civilians to harvest food, water, and firewood. This also includes billeting by forcing those controlled by CRSV to prepare beds for troops to rest at their bases (Csete 2002, 31).

During raids and attacks of CRSV, men, women, boys and girls are captured and forced to work for their captors. The use of CRSV continues while they provide services to their captors, controlling them and keeping them in a state of fear. Sometimes women abducted under CRSV are reallocated to different members of the group who need labor support activities such as cooking, cleaning, and laundry (Csete 2002, 25). Civilians subjugated under CRSV were forced to work given domestic chores or hard labor, assigned duties, and were responsible for meeting the needs of their captors (Doubt 2006, 37; Nikolić-Ristanović 2000, 56; Slim 2007, 67; Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007). Sometimes civilians with specialized skills like nurses and doctors were forced to supply services through coercion under CRSV (Nikolić-Ristanović 2000, 53; Csete 2002, 62).

Extortion or coercion for services through CRSV could apply to any service like mechanical maintenance for vehicles or generators. The services that could be controlled under CRSV are unlimited. If the threat of sexual violence is not considered enough to force compliance to provide goods and services, some captors will force captives to watch brutal sexual violence inflicted on others (Csete 2002, 57) to reinforce their subjugation. Because the threat of CRSV is all it takes to ensure compliance there is
always a regular supply of civilians to turn over for labor if the old ones become undesirable or are no longer able to perform the work (Csete 2002, 62).

Legitimacy

Armed groups can use their ability to conduct CRSV as a way to establish legitimacy as an actor committed to their cause or as a way to undermine the legitimacy of those who oppose them.

In some cases, rebel commanders or “spoilers” who seek to disrupt implementation of a mission mandate, use exactions against civilians to earn them attention as a force to be reckoned with. The more shocking the violence, the more effective it is. (UN 2010a, 16)

The opposite is true for the intervener in a conflict. The credibility of interveners to a conflict is at stake if they are unable to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, including sexual violence (UN 2010a, 12). In simple terms, if a military force is able to stop improvised explosive devices from detonating or protect populations from being fired at by tanks but fails to stop civilians suffering from CRSV the population comparably is not better off. In other words, CRSV provides an adversary with legitimacy by the ability to commit acts of sexual violence and by the interveners inability to prevent them.

Unit dynamics

By using sexual violence in conflict units can generate compensation for pay, build cohesion, and in some cases it is believed to raise combatant’s morale. Having unpaid soldiers in units that lack cohesion with low morale does not help an adversary be an effective force. Through the use of CRSV they have a tool they can use to affect those three elements that can impact their troop’s performance.
In cases where the state or non state leadership cannot pay their combatants’ salaries they can supplement their pay by allowing their troops to loot and rape or use sexual violence to extract resources from civilians for their own personal use (Slim 2007, 62; Anderson 2010a, 35; Baaz and Stern 2009, 519). In contexts where economic opportunities are dire this form of payment can be an attractive recruitment tool (Slim 2010, 62; UN 2010a, 28). Consider the amount of funding and resources spent on trying to create economic opportunities to persuade military aged males from earning money by supporting insurgent activity in Iraq or Afghanistan. Just by allowing troops to participate in CRSV an adversary is able to create an economic opportunity. Also through the use of CRSV, a troop is put in a position to dominate and control others with the additional prospect of extracting items they need in lieu of pay or to supplement their pay (Baaz and Stern 2009, 507; Anderson 2010a, 28; Slim 2007, 89).

CRSV can also create unit cohesion required for armed groups to conduct operations. Adversaries can force recruits to use sexual violence to break their ties with the community (Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007, 83). After recruits are forced to commit atrocious acts of sexual violence against their own family or community members it may serve to sever their ties with them both physically and psychologically (Slim 2008, 89). Physically their family or their community may no longer be willing to accept them after they were forced to sexually harm members of their community. Psychologically the guilt and humiliation from their actions can keep them from returning to their community. Left with few options they chose or are forced to stay with the armed group (Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007).
Sexual violence can also yield improved moral and unit cohesion. Gang rape has been able to provide psychological benefits to perpetrators by improving group morale by inducing feeling of power and victory (Cohen 2011, 4). For armed groups who force recruitment (abduct their troops) gang rape is an inexpensive and effective way to create a coherent force out of recruits who are frightened, around strangers, and have no loyalty to the group (Cohen 2011, 5). Acts of CRSV outside of gang rape can also serve as a bonding method between males, as a highly gendered activity, that leaders can persuade soldiers to participate in as part of being a real man or a real soldier (Kuehnast et al. 2011b, 45). Or as in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, sexual violence was constructed as actions of a successful soldier (Anderson 2010a, 13). Sexual violence used by the armed group can reinforce feelings of masculinity, and signal to fellow soldiers that they are loyal to the group willing, to take risks and participate in the same activities (Baaz and Stern 2009; Cohen 2011, 6).

In other cases CRSV may help unit dynamics by raising morale through enforcing sexual slavery for the purpose of troops’ enjoyment (Hicks 1997, 46; Slim 2007, 67). This was one of the explanations used for the Japanese use of comfort women throughout the Second World War. When facilities are not set up to run the sexual exploitation of women for the purpose of troops’ use, the practice can still be carried out through ad hoc implementation. Troops can be allowed to engage in sexual violence as reward for their performance or enduring the hardships of conflict to raise their morale (Baaz and Stern 2009, 506; Slim 2007, 62; Kuehnast et al. 2011b, 46).
Elements of Combat Power

Intelligence and Information

As discussed under developing intelligence in military aims an adversary can use CRSV to gain information and prevent the sharing of information with their opponents. But, an adversary can also use CRSV to manipulate the information environment against their opponent. An example of this is Boko Haram’s leader, Abubakar Shekau choosing to use media to specifically address the forced marriage and selling of almost 300 girls he has abducted. There is no way to say with certainty why he referenced his use of CRSV, but the choice to include information about its use to the media has effects different than the abduction itself. The effect of using the information about his intent to use sexual violence through forced marriage and selling the girls could create more legitimacy for his group. More legitimacy could be created from the group’s ability to not only abduct but to traffic the girls out of the area. Or it may legitimize the group’s commitment to their purported non-secular religious ideology through marrying the girls off. It could also further demoralize or incite the families whose girls were abducted because of the association with CRSV. It can also raise international pressure because of the local, regional and international organizations that are concerned with CRSV. The point is that he can use CRSV related information to achieve different effects depending on what the group’s strategy is.

In the Serbian-Croatian conflict buses of women in their higher months of pregnancy who had been raped were sent across enemy lines. Messages were written on the sides of the buses about the children who would be born, to demoralize the men (Nikolić-Ristanović 2000, 48). In another situation in the Balkans a Serbian women’s
detailed repeated sexual abuses while detained were broadcast over the radio. This was to
deter other men from leaving their women at home and joining the fighting and to wear
down the moral of the other side (Nikolić-Ristanović 2000, 62). In another instance
General Quiepo’s de Llano in Spain used radio broadcasts to taunt his opponents with the
sexual power of his Moroccan and African troops over the women of Madrid (Slim 2007,
62). By using CRSV an adversary can generate combat power by using this information
to influence his opponent in different ways.

Movement and Maneuver

By using CRSV armed groups are able to have freedom of movement in areas
they seize and occupy either by using CRSV to control the population or by causing them
to dislocate from the areas needed by the adversary (Nikolić-Ristanović 2000, 49; Slim
2007, 84). In some cases communities will vacate their town and villages simply under
the rumor of armed group moving towards their town. The armed group is then able to
move freely through the area and pillage what is left behind or use the vacated villages as
staging bases for military operations. After CRSV attacks, communities may be displaced
and choose to migrate to a different location out of the armed group’s area, tactically
clearing civilians out.

CRSV can also be used to control movement and maneuver at a tactical level. As
an adversary advances or retreats through an area the threat of CRSV can cause civilians
in their path to get out of the way to avoid contact (Slim 2007, 72). To demonstrate
control over roads an adversary can conduct ambushes using CRSV (Csete 2002, 46).
CRSV can also be used CRSV at checkpoints, roadblocks, and customs-offices to force
an opponent and civilians to move and maneuver in other locations to avoid them or to
demonstrate military control and subjugation of those who continue to use the roads (Nikolić-Ristanović 2000, 76; Slim 2007, 82; Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007; Anderson 2010a, 22). In a global review of 51 countries experiencing conflict and CRSV between 1987-2007, thirteen countries were found to use CRSV as part of their checkpoints and roadblocks (Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007). This was by state and non-state actors and included countries like Russia, Israel, Palestine, and several countries in Africa, South America, and Asia.

Sustainment

As stated earlier under logistical support as critical requirements, an adversary can use CRSV to generate the support it needs for sustainment. Unlike a conventional weapon that requires ammunition, CRSV costs nothing and supplies are unlimited. By using CRSV to control and terrorize civilians into enslavement adversaries can force civilians to provide transportation, maintenance, medical care, food, lodging, cooking and cleaning. Almost anything an adversary needs to sustain themselves and their operations can be extracted from the civilian population using CRSV.

This method of building logistical support makes it a versatile sustainment plan. Running out of funds to pay for services and supplies, incorrectly positioning materials to sustain the troops, or getting cut off from supply routes does not have to be as devastating under this type of operational sustainment. By using CRSV an adversary can coerce and extort what they need for sustainment regardless of location by enacting sexual violence on civilians.
Leadership

According to one scholar leadership is key to determining whether a small unit in an armed group or a state military decides to use CRSV as a strategy (Kuehnast et al. 2011b). Military leaders determine the location, the types of targets (discriminate or indiscriminate), the timing of the CRSV attacks, the types of sexual violence they will allow, and the perception of their forces by local and international leaders that they are willing to accept for using CRSV (Kuehnast et al. 2011a, 49). Leaders can choose to use CRSV because of the perceived military aims it will achieve for them tactically, operationally, or strategically and to maintain or build their combat power. When CRSV is used to sustain a force through augmenting soldiers’ pay or when it is used to provide logistical support, leaders are making decisions on how they are going to resource their units and their operations. Given the varying options a leader can choose to influence a population or to resource their operations, it takes leadership to make the decision to engage in CRSV versus another way to maintain combat power. A leader’s decision to use CRSV may be through explicit orders or actions or by simply not prohibiting or correcting troops who conduct CRSV (Kuehnast et al. 2011a, 50).

In each area, military aims, critical requirements, and combat power, CRSV has the potential to be used to the military advantage of an armed group as described. Denying the adversary’s use of CRSV and thus their reliance on CRSV is an attack on their vulnerabilities. Depicted in Figure 3, CRSV operational approach, is a summation of the ways CRSV provides military utility to an adversary’s overall strategy.
This is one model depiction of how an adversary could use CRSV in their overall strategy. As stated earlier, an operational approach describes the broad actions a force must take to achieve its desired military end state. From the perspective of an adversary and for this model the desired state used was to continue to wage conflict and to control the environment. Three lines of effort and two lines of operations were chosen to reach the desired state.
Lines of operation connect a series of actions that lead to control of a geographical or force-oriented effort in time and space (Kem 2012, 155). Lines of effort are more conceptual in nature and link “tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts towards establishing operational and strategic conditions” (Kem 2012, 157). By using CRSV, as described in the analysis, an adversary can create the conditions needed for achieving their desired state. As the model shows CRSV can be used to establish regional control and their base of operations, build effective units, control the information environment, and force the population and the government to consider them a legitimate force. (As stated earlier legitimacy does not denote a legal authority but rather a force that must be reckoned with by the government and the people because of their ability to conduct operations using CRSV.) By using CRSV to create these conditions CRSV provides military utility for an adversary to reach their desired state to continue to wage conflict and control the environment. This is just one example of how CRSV could be used as part of an operational approach. Depending on what the adversary’s desired state is there could be multiple ways of combining effects of CRSV to create conditions favorable to their chosen desired state.

In each context CRSV will be used differently and have different military effects but it does have a military effect that should be recognized by military commanders and staff. What an adversary is using CRSV for exposes vulnerabilities in an adversary’s plans. These vulnerabilities can be exploited by their opponent but the adversary’s opponent must recognize the military utility that CRSV is providing them before they can exploit them.
Stabilization

Although the intent of this paper was not to address the effects CRSV has on the short term and long term security and peace in conflict areas or the role of the military in stability operations, it is important to briefly address its impact. The overall affront to stability from CRSV is the degradation to the social, economic and political life slowing recovery from conflict (Slim 2007, 92) and reducing the likelihood of achieving conflict resolution and reconciliation (Anderson 2010a, 18). Many scholars propose that the use of CRSV contributes to a cycle of violence and actions of revenge (Nikolić-Ristanović 2000, 49; Kuehnast et al. 2011a, 45; Anderson 2010a, 15).

CRSV can also damage existing economies in the short term (Anderson 2010a, 14; Millard and Isikozlu 2010, 48) and slow the economic recovery of a country or an area after a conflict (Kuehnast et al. 2011a, 95). And, as stated in the literature review, CRSV can have devastating effects on the society’s cultural and social norms contributing to a loss of stability and loss of opportunities for recovery.

Politically, the ability of a non-state adversary to conduct CRSV without government forces to prevent them can make them a viable political actor in the eyes of their government and the people. The longer they believe they can act and influence the political environment the less likely they may be to resolve ongoing conflicts. They also can use CRSV to affect political outcomes by using it to stop civilians from voting or other forms of political participation or forcing them to vote a certain way (Nikolić-Ristanović 2000, 53; Karatzogianni 2012, 261; Bastick, Grimm, and Kunz 2007, 89).

The strategic power that CRSV provides to an adversary to destabilize the social, economic, and political structures must be considered to design a military strategy for the
long term safety and security to an area under conflict. This is why attention to CRSV in stability operations is so important. Prevention of CRSV has implications for the short-term and long-term security and stability of nations, regions, and communities.

Stability operations designed to provide safety and security to men, women, boys and girls from CRSV are important in the short term for protecting civilians and also in the long term to create conditions favorable for conflict resolution and recovery from conflict. It is not just the instability that CRSV causes that should be relevant to the military. If my theory is correct, regardless of what causes an armed group to chose CRSV in conflict, CRSV can have a tactical, operational, and strategic military utility. Thus, it is a way to defeat an adversary by exploiting vulnerabilities associated with reliance on CRSV to conduct military operations. Combating CRSV can deny an adversary the ability to generate critical requirements, prevent them from accomplishing offensive and defensive tasks and reduce their ability to generate combat power. Operations designed to combat CRSV can deny an adversary the opportunity to achieve their objectives and could bring them to defeat and failure.

Any military approach to combating CRSV must include other actors from prevention of CRSV, before it is even used, to the reporting and care of those who have suffered from CRSV. Interagency, nongovernmental organizations, regional and international organizations, civil society and local actors are the foundation to any strategy to combat CRSV if it is to be successful. By attempting to show the potential military utility CRSV has to an opponent, I hope to have illuminated to non-military actors dealing with the spectrum of CRSV and to military actors the potential of a military role not only to provide security but to weaken and defeat an adversary. But, it is
important to recognize that the military, unilaterally, is not an appropriate actor for dealing with the spectrum of CRSV. Many of the existing tools, training, tactics, and strategies used by other actors to deal with CRSV have been developed with this in mind.

**Existing Tools, Tactics, Training and Strategy**

In 1999 UN assistance mission to Sierra Leone was the first mission to be given a mandate with the protection of civilians. Since then nine UN missions have been given the same mandate (UN 2010b). Over time actors from peacekeeping missions, humanitarian organizations, local actors and other stakeholders have developed tools, tactics, training and strategies for peacekeepers to deal with CRSV. (Even though peacekeeping operations might imply post-conflict or maintaining peace, mandates to protect have been given in places like the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Central African Republic which continue to experience ongoing conflict).

Exploring some of the resources already developed by other actors to deal with CRSV illustrates two points. First, resources already exist to support military practitioners and planners with addressing CRSV; no military professional has to start with nothing to guide them in building an approach to combat CRSV. Secondly, the existing resources are designed with the aim of protecting civilians, not for the purpose of defeating an adversary.

The UN with other actors developed training on the protection of civilians, which includes training on CRSV for tactical level and operational level units. For brigade and higher an entire module of training on CRSV was dedicated to help commanders and peacekeepers understand the dynamics of CRSV including measures that could be taken to prevent CRSV (Department of Peacekeeping Operations-Department of Field Services
The UN also developed predeployment training for tactical level units, battalion and below, which includes training specifically on CRSV and associated prevention tactics (Department of Peacekeeping Operations-Department of Field Services 2013, Module 1).

A valuable tool that has been developed is the early warning indicator CRSV matrix (Appendix A). This tool provides practitioners with military, security, social, humanitarian, political, governance and legal indicators for potential, impending, or ongoing CRSV (UN Women 2012). It also provides practitioners with possible prevention and response actions they can take when indicators have been identified.

One particular tool that addresses military integration with humanitarian actors, civil society, locals, and international actors is the inventory of tasks and tactics and emerging elements of an effective response addressing conflict related sexual violence (UN 2010a). It provides an inventory of practices that have been done and have worked in certain contexts to inform doctrine and mission wide strategies (UN 2010a, 21). It covers sixteen tasks that a military force can do to prevent and respond to CRSV from specific types of patrolling to detainee and camp operations. It also provides the how; in other words, information about not just doing the task but how the tasks can be done and integrated with other actors for a more effective response (UN 2010a, 39).

Another important action taken by UN and NATO has been implementing organizational changes. Positions have been developed within their forces called gender advisors at the strategic, operational, and tactical level (Supreme Allied 2012, A-1; S. C. UN 2010, 4; United Nations Peacekeeping 2014). Training has been developed and is taught to personnel in these positions. Although all forces require an understanding of
CRSV and should be trained in possible prevention and response methods, personnel who hold these positions receive additional training on CRSV to support their units (SWEDINT 2014).

There are several other tools and documents covering tactics, techniques, training and strategy dealing with CRSV to support any military in planning for or acting in a CRSV environment. Because the U.S. military has unique capabilities and missions, from training other partner forces to actually conducting direct operations, not all the tools developed will inform U.S. military actions on CRSV. From the perspective of the U.S. military's unique capabilities, range of operations in different contexts, and from combating CRSV as way to weaken or defeat an adversary, different resources may be required.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

CRSV has been used throughout history. Today its ongoing use in conflict is documented in at least 21 countries. The international community and the U.S. have built a framework and shown commitment to deter, prevent, and respond to the issue. The U.S. military possesses unique capabilities that can be applied to the problem of CRSV that other actors do not. And, unlike other actors, when asked the military has the mission and capability to defeat an adversary. The role of the U.S. military in stability operations and in creating the conditions for favorable resolution of conflict will remain important in environments where CRSV is being used. However, because of the military utility CRSV provides an adversary, combating CRSV should also be considered a way to defeat or weaken an adversary, not only a way of providing safety and security to the population exposed to CRSV.

This implies the U.S. military may have another role to play in combating CRSV. The first step is for all military professionals to recognize CRSV as a security issue. The second step is to recognize CRSV as a tool of the adversary in achieving military aims, generating critical requirements, and combat power. The third step is to recognize that sexual violence as a tool of any opponent is not confined to tactical action but that it has strategic and operational military utility.

CRSV provides the adversary a tool with which to wage conflict. It allows the adversary access to information needed to build its intelligence or deny interveners access to information by silencing civilians through the use or threat of CRSV. It allows an
adversary freedom of movement through areas they feel are necessary for their strategy by displacing civilians. It allows them to seize very specific terrain or an objective by using CRSV to remove all civilians from the site or control them on the terrain. It enables them to resource their operations by confiscating supplies from civilians and forcing them to provide services needed to maintain operations simply through the threat of CRSV. It provides them transportation by using CRSV to force civilians to move their armed group’s logistical support from one location to the next for conducting operations. It provides them with a means to recruit, pay, and strengthen leadership and unit cohesion. Attack to any one of these requirements would weaken the adversaries ability to wage conflict.

Boko Haram’s abduction of nearly 300 girls in mid April 2014 failed to provoke international attention until the leader boasted he would marry off and sell the girls (O’Hara 2014). It was not a biological attack, a mass atrocity event, or a massive death toll. It was a large number of girls exposed to CRSV that elicited an international response. This is not the first time Boko Haram has used CRSV as part of their strategy. Along with lethal attacks on civilians the group has been kidnapping, raping, marrying, impregnating, and selling girls into sexual slavery (as young as 9 years old) as part of their strategy long before 2014 (C. Chang 2014; The New York Times 2014). This was to fund their operations and was also in line with their ideational beliefs (Brown 2014; The New York Times 2014).

Boko Haram could not have guaranteed an international political or military response but whatever political, military, or ideational aims they hoped to achieve, the U.S. military is now involved. Public announcements were made that additional counter-
terror and intelligence forces from U.S. Africa Command would be sent as an advisory group to assist Nigerian forces to search for the girls (O’Hara 2014). And, another eighty U.S. troops were sent to assist with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft (Al Jazeera 2014).

Many of the military tasks that the U.S. troops perform in Nigeria will not be specific to CRSV but, combating CRSV is not the same as combating an adversary who does not use it. There is no reference to CRSV in any military counter-terrorism or intelligence manual. Networking to disperse girls geographically to be sold into sexual slavery is not the same as one militant group networking to share different designs for improvised explosive devices with another. And, as stated earlier, this is not the only adversary that is using CRSV where U.S. troops have direct or support missions, like Columbia, Syria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, South Sudan, and the Philippines.

The U.S. military has to know what CRSV is and they have to know what military utility it provides to an adversary. The military must address the lethal tactics of an adversary but if they fail to address the employment of CRSV they are doomed to develop an incomplete strategy to defeat the adversary.

When called upon to respond to a conflict where the adversary is using sexual violence the military has a role in combating CRSV. The U.S. military is not alone in solving the problem but their role should not only be defined by stability operations but also engaging in defensive and offensive tasks against CRSV. Military interaction and integration with the efforts of governmental and non governmental agencies, multinational forces, and other international organizational partners is crucial in
combating CRSV because of the spectrum of the CRSV problem before and after military forces are involved. The inclusion and integration of scholarship on the study of CRSV and how it relates to violence is equally important in identifying specific patterns of usage and variations of CRSV which could lead to better prevention and responses by practitioners. More importantly interagency, international partners, and scholars possess a great deal of experience and knowledge on the issue and have already started developing strategies and tools which the U.S. military can build upon.

Because the military has the ability to take offensive and defensive action they should develop their own integrated strategies and tools that capitalize on their unique capabilities that other actors do not possess. The knowledge of other partners who are already working on CRSV will be indispensable in building a military strategy to address CRSV, not only within the military institutions but also on the ground wherever the U.S. military is operating.

Recommendations

Implications for the U.S. Military

The three main recommendations I propose are (1) the U.S. government and the Department of Defense should verify that the U.S. military has an understanding of what CRSV is and what their role is in relationship to CRSV, (2) institutionalize education on CRSV and incorporate combating CRSV into training, and (3) lastly develop new training, doctrine and strategies to combat CRSV.

As the deputy director of operations for International Committee of the Red Cross has stated, start with the assumption that wherever there is armed conflict, sexual violence is happening (Nelson 2014). The U.S. military’s understanding of what CRSV is
and the military’s role in combating CRSV should be verified by The U.S. government and the Department of Defense. Evaluation of existing military training, doctrine, and education provided to service members under the overarching concepts of mass atrocities and protection of civilians should be evaluated to see if it captures and understanding of CRSV and how adversaries use CRSV.

Research should be done with commanders and service members to determine if they know how to detect, deter, prevent and respond to attacks of sexual violence by an opponent. An evaluation should also be conducted to determine if military units know how to integrate their efforts on CRSV with other partners or how to create space for other actors to support survivors after an attack. If commanders and service members do not have a clear understanding of the opponent’s military utility of CRSV and how to combat CRSV then they are subject to developing incomplete strategies and plans. Results from the evaluation would establish where more training and education is needed leading to the second recommendation.

Education and training on CRSV should be institutionalized within the U.S. military. What CRSV is, strategies to combat it, and what military utility it provides to an adversary should be part of the core curriculum in the U.S. armed forces’ professional military education. Currently, there are electives military students can take on genocide, mass atrocity response operations, protection of civilians, and refugee and displaced civilian operations that may indirectly address CRSV at the Army War College, Command and General Staff College, and National Defense University. However, referring back to the first recommendation, it has not been validated if this type of training is enough to ensure the U.S. military understands CRSV.
Education should also be included as part of the core curriculum at pre command courses for commanders. Awareness and education of conflict related sexual violence should not be ad hoc or limited to command initiated efforts but mandated to military professionals. This is not to overburden the commands with the latest political attention grabber but rather to enable their success in areas where CRSV is an active tool used by an opponent.

Training on CRSV and scenarios of CRSV should be incorporated into training exercises for the military. Some training locations where it could be incorporated, using the Army as an example, would be the Mission Command Training Program, the National Training Center, and the Joint Readiness Training Center. The sister services, Air Force, Marines, Navy, and Coast Guard should include training on CRSV and incorporate scenarios into training exercises at their training locations. It also should be included in predeployment training for units, and be country, area, and mission specific.

If the U.S. military considers creating organizational positions for military personnel that could focus on issues like CRSV then training those personal would also be highly recommended. This is in reference to the organizational positions that NATO and the UN have created, like the gender field advisors, who receive additional training on CRSV. The training for military personnel in these positions can help a commander and staff identify when CRSV might occur or is occurring. They can also assist in integrating the military with other CRSV efforts done by interagency and other partners and aide in the development of plans and strategies with the staff for the commander.

The third and final recommendation is, after military professionals have an understanding of CRSV, new training and strategies to combat CRSV should be
developed. They should include three main things, (1) incorporate existing training and strategies developed by interagencies and other international organizations and humanitarian actors, (2) be specific to and incorporate the U.S. military unique capabilities and range of missions the U.S. is involved in, and (3) approach the development of new training, doctrine and strategies from the viewpoint that combating CRSV is not only part of stabilizing an area but that it is also a way to weaken and defeat an adversary. New training and doctrine should also address the types of forces or composition of forces needed for environments where an adversary uses CRSV.

It might not be possible to predict the future conflicts of the next 20 to 100 years but historical and present day conflicts are a good indicator that CRSV will plague nonmilitary and military actors in conflicts to come. When called upon to respond globally concerned stakeholders have an obligation to recognize that CRSV may very well intrude upon their plans to end conflict and keep the peace. With greater recognition and understanding of CRSV interventions which include plans that combat CRSV can facilitate greater success when responding to future conflicts all over the world.
GLOSSARY

Conflict related sexual violence. Refers to rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men or children with a direct or indirect (temporal, geographical or causal) link to a conflict (UN definition).

Sexual and gender-based violence. Refers to the gender-based violence that is directed against a person on the basis of gender or sex. It includes acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty. While women, men, boys and girls can be victims/survivors of gender-based violence, women and girls are the main victims/survivors.

Sexual exploitation and abuse. Refers to the Sexual exploitation and abuse is a phrase most often used to refer to abuses committed by humanitarian actors against beneficiary populations. Protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA) is another common term that speaks to humanitarian actors’ responsibilities to adopt codes of conduct and other measures to limit the extent of SEA in humanitarian operations.
## APPENDIX A

### MATRIX: EARLY-WARNING INDICATORS OF CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of Conflict-Related SV</th>
<th>Possible Preventive/Responsive Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Potential Risk</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Parties wrap groups relying on conception, abduction or other forms of forced recruitment, which increases likelihood of using sexual violence, particularly gang rape, as a mechanism to enhance group bonding and cohesion.</td>
<td>Initiate protection dialogue with chain of command of party or armed group.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armed groups reward or otherwise indoctrinate aggressive, hyper-masculine behavior and/or expose a military code or ideology that supports violence against women of opposing communities to alter ethnic identity, neutrate, undermine enemy morale, fragment or eliminate future generations of the target group (e.g., belief that forced impregnation can alter ethnic balance).</td>
<td>Encourage adoption of a code of conduct to deter acts of sexual and other violence against civilians and to improve discipline within armed and security forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combatants operating under the influence of alcohol and drugs.</td>
<td>Include in STREPS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flare-up of rumenation disputes and other frustrations in army, when typically vented through drug and alcohol abuse and reactions against civilians.</td>
<td>Undertake 'hotspot mapping' in consultation with women who are often the first to be aware of incidents or threats of sexual violence, increase deployment to identified 'hotspots'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms bears undertake house raids and searches, particularly where women are alone in the home.</td>
<td>Establish safe spaces in camps for reporting and service delivery, ensuring they are inconspicuous in order to safeguard confidentiality; give women rights forms like flashlights and whistles; consult women in the design of camp layout and include them in daily management.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Placement of military bases in close proximity to schools, waterpoints, markets, camps and other civilian centers frequented by women and girls.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exposure of forces to pornography in military spaces like barracks or vehicles.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impending Risk</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Armed forces/groups engage in widespread looting due to lack of supplies or other grievances.</td>
<td>Elevate to mission leadership (SRSG/Force Commander).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ex-soldiers, particularly from groups with a history of sexual violence, recently-integrated into armed forces.</td>
<td>Alert military observers (UNMOs) and/or ceasefire monitors.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ongoing SV</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abandon/desert with their arms.</td>
<td>Physical evacuate endangered civilians from 'danger zone'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdrawal/dilution of army, police or peacekeeping presence from an area, leading a security vacuum.</td>
<td>Send deterrent deployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infiltration of refugees, displaced and transit camps by armed bears.</td>
<td>Increase presence of uniformed peacekeepers in area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heightened perception of physical insecurity among women and girls following the resettlement of ex-combatants into communities without decent or follow-up as part of DDR, or due to incomplete disarmament/demobilization.</td>
<td>Establish Community Alert Network (CAN) using mobile phones, sms, HF radio or satellite phones, as appropriate to local circumstances.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rest periods/interludes in hostilities during which armed actors enter population centers.</td>
<td>Liaise with local authorities to advocate for protection and deterrence.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military acts of revenge/victory during the closing stages of a conflict.</td>
<td>Offer advice to detaining authorities on ways to bring prison facilities into alignment with international law/mirimum standards (e.g., Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soldiers not paid, provisioned and/or cantoned in barracks, increasing the likelihood of preying upon civilians.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Equipping of forces to perpetrate sexual violence.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women in detention held under the immediate supervision of male, rather than female, guards and mixed with male inmates.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ongoing SV</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Observed signs of rampage burned homes, destroyed crops, looted villages, torn clothing, torn mattresses, displaced women and children.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armed elements engage in violent reprisals against civilians, e.g., in the wake of joint UN-Govt military operations.</td>
<td>Apply political pressure on abusive groups.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police reports of increased sexual violence noting that increased reporting may signal increased confidence in the authorities/improved safety conditions.</td>
<td>Send JPTI patrol to area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help to build local and national response capacity (e.g., establish mechanisms for reporting) and to empower community-based capacity (e.g., engage with youth/women's groups, engage men as whistle-blowers, etc).</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocate for a stronger presence by the national police where police are not themselves involved in sexual or other</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Military defeat and retreat through an area, increasing likelihood of rape and pillage as a form of 'retributive ethnic policy'.

Reports of sexual violence continue emerging from detention settings/POW camps, often as part of interrogation or punishment.

Women/girls recruited and retained within the armed group by coercion.

Women/girls used as sex slaves to serve as status symbols or possible 'concubines/servants' of the victors.

**CONTEXTUAL FACTORS**

These signs are most likely to be seen in contexts where a culture of ill-discipline (i.e., contempt and coerced), self-entitlement and dehumanization against women prevail. This is often characterized by a lack of training and professionalism, as well as the construction of identity in terms of violent, militant masculinity. Another relevant background factor may be the rapid integration of former rebel fighters into the armed forces without setting up systematic training, and where there is an absence of local authorities able to respond, or where the authorities are themselves involved in abuses.

Greater urgency should be accorded to these indicators where they occur against the backdrop of patterns of sexual abuse. If reports of sexual violence exhibit common features in terms of the profile of the perpetrator, the profile of the victim, the geographical and chronological distribution of cases and/or the modus operandi in the commission of crimes, this may evidence a consistent pattern of violations, e.g., an armed group may engage in patterns of looting, rape and destruction as part of a systematic campaign. In some contexts, women anticipate predatory attacks when they have been a delay in soldiers returning to their native villages.

While there will likely be internal records authorizing rape, there may be official evidence in the case of systematical rape or sexual enslavement, as well as statements made by perpetrators that suggest the crimes are targeted, e.g., inflicted on victims of a certain ethnic background or in areas where the prevalence of a particular group is high.

The use of weaponry and tactics can give an indication of command and control or the level of organization behind the attack. For instance, if the group was heavily armed and/or there appeared to be orders among the assailants or a superior officer who was issuing orders to the others, that would tend to reflect a premeditated and targeted campaign. Sexual violence does not always coincide with mass killings or other acts of violence, and in the case of the Khmer Rouge rape, in which almost all Cambodian women were raped during a 4-day period, not all rape victims were confirmed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOCIAL/HUMANITARIAN</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INDICATORS OF CONFLICT-RELATED SV</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POTENTIAL RISK</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic shifts, such as an increase in female-headed households, due to the absence of men from communities, or to an increase in the number of women rejected by husbands and communities; increase in war widows; sex-specific displacement/refugee outflows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pronounced group division and segregation along ethnolinguistic lines; targeting women of reproductive age to devalue/group ethnic identity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic burden on society as it prepares for war; often manifest in rising levels of domestic and sexual violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploitation of displaced persons and the collapse of law and order caused by natural disasters in a conflict-affected setting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruction of homes/shelters leading to a lack of privacy, including in terms of latrine/shower facilities, caused by military operations or by natural disasters in a conflict-affected setting.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IMPENDING RISK**

Mass displacement due to insecurity or emergency, particularly where displaced women are compelled to pass ad hoc checkpoints controlled by armed or paramilitary forces.

Women forced to forage outside camp for firewood to sell as fuel, and other daily needs such as water, without protection from roaming bands and militia.

Tailor patrols to women's mobility patterns (market routes, firewood collection, etc.).

Include women Community Liaison Assistant(s) (CLAs) on patrols.

Initiate Community Alert Networks (CANS) or equivalent.

Support mobilize local early-warning networks to alert threatened population.
Other relevant social factors that tend to indicate that women may be at heightened risk of sexual violence are the enforcement of these codes for women/vaginas; a context of structural gender-based inequality, strict regulation of women's social and public life, and a sexual shaming of women (manifest in widespread female gender roles, economic dependency, polygamy, and marriage, a record of gender-based discrimination and tolerance of rights violations committed against women, etc.). These may be particularly acute in contexts where ethnic and other social divisions are manipulated by those in power, or in conflicts with a culture that tolerates or even condones sexual violence.

Unfair gender hierarchies, social inequalities, and oppression are often characteristics of societies that are prone to incidences of sexual violence. Historic changes in gender roles and relations in society owing to war, may signal a trend towards increased violence against women and conflict-related sexual violence.

### Political/Governance/Legal

#### Indicators of Conflict-Related SV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Risk</th>
<th>Possible Preventive/Responsive Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violent, unconstitutional change of power (coup during constitutional crises, etc.)</td>
<td>- Public information campaigns to promote women's rights and help to strengthen the capacity of the State and civil society in the area of promoting gender equality and women's rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declaration of emergency laws or other basis for suspending and derogating from women's/human rights</td>
<td>- Appoint female election monitors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of provisions on women's rights from cease-fire/peace agreements, resistance to women's participation in peace processes, lack of references to punishment for sexual violence, or issuing of amnesties for sexual violence (may predict continued violations of women's rights post-conflict).</td>
<td>- Support women's participation in peace negotiations and ensure use of UN Guidance for Mediators on Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in Peace Agreements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political events like elections or referenda in societies where traditional beliefs imply that rape can impugn political power</td>
<td>- Deployment of political interlocutors or Special Envoy to engage with relevant authorities/leaders (using the good offices of the Secretary-General).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of new borders/declarations of independence encouraging mass population movements</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Impending Risk

- Commanders giving forces carte blanche through their own example and tolerance of abuses, a tone of impunity conveyed by political leaders dismissing or condoning claims of sexual violence in public/media statements.
- Expulsions or attacks on organizations working on sexual violence, severe interference with their data.

- Remind political/military leadership of their obligations under IHL/HRI's and the adverse effects of losing the support of the civilian population and international community, and of disorder and sexually transmitted diseases among their force, as well as the detrimental effect of impunity on efforts to extend State authority and strengthen the rule of law.
- Initiate dial-in radio programmes for women to report threats and to ensure the community is informed.
- Initiate protection dialogue with relevant armed forces/groups (leverage threat of listing and sanctions under SCR 1820).
- Include in STREPs.
- Provide direct support for NGOs/organizations working on GSR women's rights and related issues.

#### Ongoing SV

- Women political candidates or participants in an electoral process targeted for intimidation and violence, including threatening text messages and other forms of sexual harassment.
- Manifest intent to discourage or punish women's political participation, including through arrests of women active in protests or control or through targeted violence against women involved in political protest.
- Threats to reinstate against victims, witnesses and court staff involved in prosecuting sexual violence offenders, including obstruction of evidence/hospital records, which indicates not only the obstruction of justice but that similar atrocities may go unreported.

- Establish rapid response mechanism for gender-based electoral violence.
- Deploy a security/protection presence around sexual violence trials.
## - CONTEXTUAL FACTORS -

These indicators often occur against the backdrop of contorted political space for women, patterns of gender-based electoral violence and intimidation, the existence of deep-seated legal inequalities pertaining to the status and rights of women, and discrepancies between law and practice in terms of women’s security. This often involves the systematic exclusion of women from positions of power.

The risk of conflict-related sexual violence will be particularly acute in a context of collapsed rule of law, where there is a history of widespread impunity for sexual violence and where the structures that exist to protect the population and deter sexual violence are not in place. The absence of women from governance and judicial institutions may also facilitate the perpetration of sexual violence with impunity. This is particularly true where women’s rights are accorded low priority by political authorities, as indicated by the proportion of budgetary spending on these issues and the lack of measures to protect the rights of women and girls in national security policy frameworks.

### ECONOMIC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDICATORS OF CONFLICT-RELATED SV</th>
<th>POSSIBLE PREVENTIVE/ RESPONSIVE ACTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>POTENTIAL RISK</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drop in the price of arms/ increased supply of small arms and light weapons, which increases capacity to commit sexual violence.</td>
<td>Support disarmament efforts to remove weapons from communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation and food insecurity preying unrest and increasing economic burdens on women.</td>
<td>Monitor for cross-border human or arms trafficking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased reports of women’s involvement in the shadow war economy (trafficking, prostitution).</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| **IMPELLING RISK** | |
| Economic and power struggles within and between armed groups, including economic motivations for forcibly displacing civilian communities through campaigns of fear and intimidation. disputes over natural resources and environments for testing of civilians, land disputes linked with displacement and flight. | Provide security for disabled doing conduct spot checks of mining area and other due diligence activities. |
| Movement of military forces towards a mineral-rich area/mining community. | |

| **ONGOING SV** | |
| Expulsions/detention of economic migrants (including women) in border areas as a punitive action against those engaged in illegal mining activities and their families, to deter others and instill fear. | Agree a platform of commitments/ make commitments with the relevant national/regional authorities. |
| | Leverage threat of economic and military sanctions. |
| | Install border monitors to observe and report on abuses to relevant authorities, the UN country presence or protection and assistance NGOs, as appropriate. |

## - CONTEXTUAL FACTORS -

Several aspects of the political economy of violence, such as changes in the supply and demand of weapons and the emergence of informal economies, e.g. illicit mining activities or the financing of armed groups through commodity, are often linked with sexual violence, trafficking, and sexual slavery.

Structural gender-based economic exclusion, discrimination and inequitable resource distribution may increase women’s vulnerability to sexual exploitation, prostitution, trafficking and forced labor.

### MEDIA-RELATED

<table>
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<tr>
<td><strong>POTENTIAL RISK</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of independent media and restrictions on freedom of expression, including through the expulsion of international reporters, or journalists being prevented from interviewing women.</td>
<td>Close media monitoring for reports of sexual violence/crimes, local and international news stories.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caricatures of women of a targeted ethnic, religious or political group/gender-based propaganda.</td>
<td>Work with States to ensure respect for human rights obligations, including freedom of expression with the exception of hate speech/propaganda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media-driven campaigns of hate speech that incite, incite violence towards women of a particular ethnic, racial, religious, national or political group.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public incitement to sexual violence, including by reference to past violations against a</td>
<td>Initiate targeted public information campaigns to counter propaganda and incitement to violence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Ongoing SV

- Breaking news coverage of sexual violence in specifically designated locations or reports that otherwise suggest sexual violence is widespread or systematic.
- Reports of torn clothing and mattresses strewn along roads where armed groups have passed.
- Threats or harassment of a sexual nature directed at local or international reporters covering the conflict or political unrest or of reporters covering issues related to rape.

### Contextual Factors

In a context where women are publicly portrayed as repositories of group honor and symbols of collective identity, targeting them can serve to attack and humiliate a group as a whole. Sexual violence may thus be used to target groups as a form of propaganda by deed. The media can play a critical role as a conduit for national propaganda, in funding public anger and triggering violent action. The portrayal of women in the media can be both a form of instrument to sexual violence and an indication that sexual violence is part of the war effort. Local journalists, including citizen journalists operating social media sites, can be important sources of early warning of human rights abuses, including rape. These reports should be triangulated with other information sources to establish their reliability (so to ensure that stories of rape are not being used as propaganda for political gain). It should be noted that due to stigma, shame, fear of reprisals, and a sense of duty given the perceived impunity of perpetrators, very few victims report sexual violence or speak publicly about their assaults, particularly in contexts of active conflict. Therefore, the absence of reporting does not necessarily signify the absence of rape.

### Health

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of Conflict-Related SV</th>
<th>Possible Preventive/ Responsive Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase in requests to consult with women health-care providers.</td>
<td>Reinforce presence of female health workers in hospitals/health clinics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in requests for HIV/STI testing.</td>
<td>Ensure periodic inventory of PEP kits in all ‘danger zones’ for delivery within 72 hours.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in HIV/STI testing in conflict-affected areas.</td>
<td>Dialogue and communication efforts to help debunk myths surrounding sexual violence and HIV.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Belief on the part of an armed group that rape (particularly of a young child or elderly woman) can cure or protect against HIV.

- Increase in women/girls presenting at hospitals/health clinics.
- Increase in women seeking clandestine abortions, spikes in sale of abortion drugs.
- Increase in female prison population and of reports of women and girls subjected to torture and other forms of ill-treatment.
- Statements from doctors, war surgeons, gynecologists, and medical NGOs that they are increasingly seeing rape-related injuries and/or being asked to perform traumatic fistula surgery or “vyanem repair”. Mental health indicators (trauma) may also point to conflict-related sexual violence.
- Medical or victim testimony of compulsory birth-control voluntary sterilization practices directed against targeted groups.
- Requests for HIV/STI testing of men.
abducted by armed groups (e.g., for forced labor) upon their release.

--- CONTEXTUAL FACTORS ---

An analysis of hospital records or equivalent can help monitors to assess whether these indicators exceed normal levels of reproductive health complications/STIs in the particular context. For example, the data provided by different hospitals in Kenya were used by the inquiry into post-election violence (including sexual violence) in 2008. Similarly, an analysis of prison records regarding STIs, HIV, pregnancy and other health complications among inmates can inform assessments of the prevalence of sexual violence in detention settings.

It should be noted that only a small proportion of sexual violence victims – those with the most severe injuries or with greatest access to facilities – will seek clinical care in conflict-affected settings (e.g., only 6% of rape victims during the Rwandan genocide sought medical treatment and just 7% of women subjected to sexual violence during conflict in East Timor reported it). Moreover, there may be a significant delay in women coming forward or out of hiding to report (e.g., a delay of 23 days on average for rape cases reported to MINUSCA between June and September 2010).

Men are particularly unlikely to report sexual violence, especially in contexts of heightened homophobia and militarized masculinity linked with conflict, as well as due to social taboos, a lack of support networks, and the fact that male victims may fear stigmatization or death if they report.
REFERENCE LIST


Kem, Jack D. 2012. Planning for action: Campaign concepts and tools. Fort Leavenworth, KS.


