Interagency Integration in Phase “Z”

A Monograph

by

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The United States emphasizes a whole-of-government approach to protect its national security interests. Given that the United States is most often in Phase Zero, or involved in a unified effort short of war, the United States must closely examine the effectiveness of the current interagency system during this phase. Not only is interagency integration in Phase Zero worth examining because the United States is most often in Phase Zero abroad, but there are certain conditions within Phase Zero that inherently lead to more friction in the interagency process. The conditions in the Horn of Africa (HOA) in 2006 was one particular instance that caused friction between the commander of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) – HOA and the Chief of Mission (COM)-Nairobi. This case study highlights conditions in Phase Zero that inherently lead to interagency friction due to an insufficient national security structure. The recommendations to improve interagency action divide into levels of political feasibility. Some solutions are difficult to implement because they require modifications to the national security system. A politically feasible solution is one that does not require any national security reform and is a concept that is already in practice within the interagency realm.

### Subject Terms
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Abstract

The United States emphasizes a whole-of-government approach to protect its national security interests. The whole-of-government approach requires that multiple US government agencies work together to ensure their individual actions link to a unified effort to achieve common objectives. This unified effort often occurs in places where the United States is not at war because most places in the world are typically in their steady state. When international tensions rise and threaten US national security, then the United States might choose to use military force or threaten to use military force in hopes of lowering that tension. As long as conflicts abroad remain below the threshold of committing conventional US military forces to a region—as one finds in phases one through five of the US joint operations model—then the US military remains in Phase Zero in that region of the world. Given that the United States is most often in Phase Zero, or involved in a unified effort short of war, the United States must closely examine the effectiveness of the current interagency system during this phase. Not only is interagency integration in Phase Zero worth examining because the United States is most often in Phase Zero abroad, but there are certain conditions within Phase Zero that inherently lead to more friction in the interagency process. The conditions in the Horn of Africa (HOA) in 2006 was one particular instance that caused friction between the commander of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) – HOA and the Chief of Mission (COM)-Nairobi. This case study highlights conditions in Phase Zero that inherently lead to interagency friction due to an insufficient national security structure. The recommendations to improve interagency action divide into levels of political feasibility. Some solutions are difficult to implement because they require modifications to the national security system. A politically feasible solution is one that does not require any national security reform and is a concept that is already in practice within the interagency realm.
## Contents

Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... v

Acronyms .................................................................................................................................. vi-vii

Figures ......................................................................................................................................... viii

Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1

Part 1. Literature Review ................................................................................................................. 7

Part 2. Background ......................................................................................................................... 12

Part 3. Case Study ......................................................................................................................... 30

Part 4. Recommendations ............................................................................................................. 41

Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 48

Appendix 1 ..................................................................................................................................... 51

Bibliography .................................................................................................................................. 52
Acknowledgements

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The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) contributed greatly to the interagency topic and ideas on national security reform. James R. Locher III, and all of those involved with PNSR, especially professionals like Dr. Christopher Lamb and Ambassador Edward Marks, shed much light on this work. Dr. Lamb gave me his best insights on interagency integration, but more importantly was his encouragement that the process was more important than the product; this encouraged me to be a lifelong student. Ambassador Marks provided valuable insight on the differences between the Department of State and the Department of Defense. I will take his comments with me as I pursue my profession in the US military.

To US Marine Major General (Retired) Timothy Ghormley and Ambassador William M. Bellamy, thank you for taking time to explain the incident that occurred in the Horn of Africa in 2006. This case study was unknown to most interagency personnel. My hope is that this case study not only shows flaws in the current national security structure, but it also highlights the efforts of public servants whose stories will never be known to US citizens. Thank you for your service.

Lastly, I want to thank my lovely wife, Shelly, who endured and enabled me to pursue this topic. She spent hours reading my paper while caring for our newborn daughter, Zoe Grace. Thank you, Shelly, for your prayers and for your sacrifices—you are truly one of a kind.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronyms</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<td>CAT</td>
<td>Civil Affairs Team</td>
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<td>CCDR</td>
<td>Combatant Commander</td>
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<td>CCMD</td>
<td>Combatant Command (headquarters)</td>
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<td>CDCS</td>
<td>Country Development Cooperation Strategy</td>
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<td>CENTCOM</td>
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<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Combatant Command (type of authority)</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>COM</td>
<td>Chief of Mission</td>
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<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CJOA</td>
<td>Combined Joint Operations Area</td>
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<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>European Command (US)</td>
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<td>FCC</td>
<td>Functional Combatant Commander</td>
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<td>GEF</td>
<td>Guidance for Employment of the Force</td>
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<td>GFMIG</td>
<td>Global Force Management Implementation Guide</td>
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<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
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<td>HOA</td>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
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<td>ICS</td>
<td>Integrated Country Strategy</td>
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<td>JIACG</td>
<td>Joint Interagency Coordination Group</td>
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<td>Joint Publication</td>
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<td>JRS</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
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<td>Joint Strategic Planning System</td>
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<td>MEDCAP</td>
<td>Medical Civic Action Program</td>
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<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Defense Strategy</td>
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<td>National Military Strategy</td>
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<td>OCO</td>
<td>Overseas Contingency Operations</td>
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<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
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<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>PACOM</td>
<td>Pacific Command (US)</td>
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<td>PC</td>
<td>Promote Cooperation</td>
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<td>PNSR</td>
<td>Project on National Security Reform</td>
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<td>POLAD</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Advisor</td>
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<td>Unified Campaign Plan</td>
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<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
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<td>VETCAP</td>
<td>Veterinarian Civic Action Program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figures

1  Phase Zero .................................................................................................................................................. 13
2  National Strategic Guidance and Joint Strategic Planning System......................................................... 22
3  Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa Operational Area............................................................... 31
Introduction

Recalling the Goldwater-Nichols legislation of 1986, Secretary Rumsfeld reminded us that to achieve better joint capability, each of the armed services had to “give up some of their turf and authorities and prerogatives.” Today, he said, the executive branch is “stove-piped much like the four services were nearly 20 years ago.” He wondered if it might be appropriate to ask agencies to “give up some of their existing turf and authority in exchange for a stronger, faster, more efficient government wide joint effort.” Privately, other key officials have made the same point to us.

—9/11 Commission Report, 2004

Nations fluctuate along the peace-war spectrum and rarely do they declare war against each other. The last time the United States declared war was World War II, but since then, it has used its military on numerous occasions in support of its national interests. Some of those occasions were major conflicts such as the Korean War, Vietnam War, and the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars.¹ The degree of Department of Defense (DOD) resources used in those conflicts varied. However, there is a clear distinction between those conflicts, which required a large commitment of personnel, equipment, and time, and military operations in areas such as Bosnia in the mid-1990s and security cooperation activities conducted by portions of the First Infantry Division in Africa (2013-present).²

The DOD is not the only US agency that operates within the peace-war spectrum. The Department of State (DOS) and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) are a few other agencies whose efforts contribute to bringing stability to regions abroad. In the most recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, elements of all these agencies participated in the stability efforts.

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When the United States is not involved in conflict, it still uses various instruments of national power to influence the international community. Since the end of the Cold War, US leadership has emphasized the importance of international engagement. Even prior to the end of the Cold War, the first National Security Strategy (NSS – 1987), as required by the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, listed five major objectives in support of US interests. Those five objectives all related to US involvement with the international community, mainly building favorable relationships with those who share a common concern.\(^3\) Twenty-seven years later, the 2010 NSS speaks in similar language.

The 2010 NSS acknowledges the interaction between domestic and international affairs. A main component of the NSS strategic approach is the “engagement,” “the active participation of the United States in relationships beyond our borders.”\(^4\) The NSS states, “America has never succeeded through isolationism . . . we must reengage the world on a comprehensive and sustained basis.”\(^5\) The NSS emphasizes that “engagement” involves all elements of American power—diplomatic, development, economic, and military.\(^6\) The US military “will continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments.”\(^7\)

Interagency action is a specified task for US government agencies. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines interagency as “[o]f or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the

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\(^5\) Ibid.

\(^6\) Ibid.

\(^7\) Ibid.
Department of Defense." However, this definition does not explain the underlying theme of the term “interagency,” which the author believes is the collaboration between the different agencies to achieve common objectives.

This work does not analyze the effectiveness of the United States’ current national strategy; it looks at the strategy and examines how the US government agencies execute to meet the objectives. This study seeks to answer the research question: How can US military joint operations in Phase Zero (Phase “Z”) integrate with other US government agencies to create a unified effort enhancing US national security?

Phase “Z” is a term the DOD uses to describe a steady state environment. The DOD uses this term to coincide with the traditional method of using phases for military operations. Because the US military is a means to realize US grand strategy, which in large part takes place during times of peace, US military operations must integrate with other government agencies along the peace-war spectrum. Interagency integration in Phase “Z” does not imply the DOD is the lead agency and the other agencies need to integrate themselves into the military’s peacetime plans. Phase “Z” is simply the environment short of major conflict.

To meet US strategic objectives, the interagency will execute actions in different environments covering the spectrum of peace and war. The DOS is the lead agency on foreign affairs due to its diplomatic mission; therefore, one might conclude the DOD is in support of the DOS mission when conducting any military actions abroad. Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, stated, “war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument . . . .” This popular phrase does not mean that DOD should be subordinate to DOS; however, it does mean that military actions should tie to a political objective. A nation should use its military to achieve

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political ends. An interesting reality, however, is that the DOS does not have authority over the DOD. The Chief of Mission (COM), who is the President’s representative in a specific country, does not have authority over the combatant commander or his subordinates. The combatant commander is the senior military commander within a given area of responsibility (AOR) who receives direction only from the President and Secretary of Defense through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The DOD and the DOS have their own chains of command and the only person with the statutory authority to resolve interagency conflict is the President.

The focus of this work is on a steady state environment. Given that “engagement” is a main component of American strategy, this work highlights interagency integration as an essential element of that strategy. Integration is a higher form of cross-organization effort than coordination, cooperation, and collaboration; it is “executive authority to direct unified effort in pursuit of national objectives.” Personnel experienced on the interagency topic, like US Army Colonel Michael Pasquarett and Professor James Kievit, argue interagency integration is simply a grander scale of combined arms integration, where the US Army integrates its different arms to “achieve an effect greater than if each arm was used separately or sequentially.” The US Army’s Training and Doctrine command “exists primarily to ensure that no other land forces in the world will be more proficient at combined arms . . . .” As the US military recognized the

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10 Christopher Lamb and Edward Marks, Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Reform (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, December 2010), 5.


importance of combined arms, “[b]y the second half of the 20th century, it was clear that integrated joint operations were an imperative for operational success.” These same experts cite the performance of the US Army in the Persian Gulf War of 1991 as proof of an effective, integrative joint force. These authors are correct in that just as combined arms and joint operations proved to be imperative for military success in the 20th century, fully integrated interagency action will be required to meet the challenges of the 21st century operational environment.

The current national security system is more than sixty years old. Since the enactment of the 1947 National Security Act, the national security system has not undergone a major change; as a result, it is not well-suited to meet the demands of the 21st century environment. An argument can be made that the 1947 system is flexible enough and able to meet the demands of the 21st century since every President since Harry S. Truman has made slight modifications to the system to adapt to the changing environment. After all, this same system won the Cold War. However, the 1947 system was based upon an “unambiguous threat” and today the US faces multiple ambiguous threats within a more complex world. Non-state actors play an increasing role in the world and have become a viable threat to US national security. The rapid flow of information and the rate of a changing society are indicators of an increasingly complex world.

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14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.


17 Ibid., i.

18 Ibid., ii.

Slight modifications to a national security structure designed to deal with a state-centric military threat is not the solution the US needs, especially as the “gap between the challenges the US faces and its capacity to deal with them,” continues to widen.\textsuperscript{20}

The current national security system has proved inadequate. It was unable to integrate adequately all instruments of national power in a comprehensive strategy in both Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom as well as Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).\textsuperscript{21} Leadership is an important element for interagency unity of effort, however, no matter how capable a leader is, the weakness of the current system cannot fail to hamper talented managers.\textsuperscript{22} There is a clear need for national security reform. This reform will not be the key to securing US national interests; however, reform will allow the US to respond better to the challenges of the 21st century.

Although the ideas represented in this paper focus on Phase “Z,” many of the lessons could also apply to the other phases of joint operations. The reason for focusing on interagency integration in Phase “Z” is because the world is most often in its steady state. In general, once there is a mobilization of conventional US military forces to “deter” (Phase I) an enemy or possible enemy from disrupting US national interests, then the US is no longer in a steady state in that particular area.

The methodology used in this study is first, an explanation of Phase “Z”—why it is important, the military commander’s goals during the phase, and the identification of other interagency actors involved in a Phase “Z” environment. Next, this study examines how those actors plan for Phase “Z.” This examination reveals some of the problems involving interagency action in Phase “Z.” Next, a case study revealing one of these problems occurs in the Horn of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20} Locher III et al., \textit{Forging a New Shield}, ii.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Ibid., iii.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
Africa between a COM and a military commander. The case study was based largely on information gathered through a series of oral history interviews with US Marine Major General (MajGen) (Retired) Timothy F. Ghormley who served as the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) commander at the time of the incident. The focus of the oral history interviews was to gather the facts of the event and to receive Ghormley’s perspective as to how the incident occurred. Lastly, this study lists recommendations to improve interagency unity of effort in Phase “Z.”

**Literature Review**

The US Army’s recent addition of the seventh warfighting function (the engagement) addresses the human domain, which “encompasses the moral, physical, and cognitive components of soldier, leader, and organizational development and performance essential to raise, prepare, and employ the Army in full spectrum operations.”

The Army also sees ‘the engagement’ as a way to contribute to joint operations in Phase “Z.” JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning describes activities in Phase “Z” as “dissuading or deterring potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies.” If Phase “Z” succeeds there would not be a need for the mobilization of conventional US military forces and no need for Phases I through V of the joint phasing model.

One of the approaches the Army developed to contribute in Phase “Z” is the Regionally Aligned Force (RAF) concept. According to US Forces Command (FORSCOM) Commander,

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General Daniel B. Allyn, the primary goal of the RAF is to prevent war by partnering with other nations.\footnote{David Vergun, “Regionally Aligned Forces Continue to Organize Despite Budget Uncertainties,” \textit{US Army Homepage}, last modified October 23, 2013, accessed May 26, 2014, \url{http://www.army.mil/article/113660/Regionally_aligned_forces_continue_to_organize_despite_budget_uncertainties/}.} Partnering can include military-to-military training, providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, and sharing intelligence and interoperability.\footnote{Ibid.} Although other US government agencies do not use the term \textit{Phase “Z,”} they conduct a variety of activities during the same timeframe. USAID currently has 283 projects abroad and the majority of these occur during \textit{Phase “Z.”}\footnote{“Where We Work,” United States Agency for International Development, last modified May 29, 2012, accessed May 26, 2014, \url{http://www.usaid.gov/where-we-work}.} The DOS Foreign Assistance budget for 2013 was seventeen billion dollars dedicated to more than 180 countries.\footnote{US Department of State, \textit{United States Department of State: Fiscal Year 2013 Agency Financial Report} (Washington, DC, 2013), 8, 46.} As the interagency conducts a variety of activities, there is a need for integration to ensure the US addresses foreign policy from a whole-of-government approach.\footnote{The definition of whole-of-government approach used in this paper is: United States government agencies working together to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government response to particular issues.}

Writing about \textit{Phase “Z”} is not new and neither is writing about the integration of interagency efforts. Combining the two concepts is unique only in the usage of the terms. In 1997, the Center for Strategic Leadership at the US Army War College published an article titled, “A Blueprint for a Bold Restructuring of the Organization for National Security.” Colonel Pasquarett and Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Kievet wrote this article because they believed the regional national security organizations were inadequate to meet the needs of a transforming
world environment. They highlighted the origination of the combatant commands (CCMD) was a post-World War II idea and with the end of the Cold War, the United States needed to relook the national security organizations to ensure they met the demands of a changing environment.

The restructuring the authors proposed centered on the aligning of DOD and DOS regional areas. The authors claimed that making these changes would help with interagency integration. They believed that interagency integration would be instrumental for meeting the demands of the 21st century.

Other authors have written on Phase “Z” operations in an interagency context. In 2007, a student attending the US Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) wrote a monograph assessing the capabilities of the DOD to integrate the interagency in their Phase “Z” plans. Major Elizabeth A. Medina wrote her monograph following the introduction of the formalized six-phase military operational plan, where the initial phase was Phase “Z” – Shaping. Since Phase “Z” attracted much attention within the DOD, the author wanted to assess whether the DOD had adequate methods of integrating all elements of national power in Phase “Z” planning. The monograph concluded that despite the changes that each agency had undergone, the DOD still did not have an effective method of integrating all elements of national power when planning for Phase “Z.”

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31 Ibid., xi.

32 Ibid., xii–xiii.

33 Ibid., viii.

34 Ibid., vii.


36 Ibid., 55.
In 2010, Christopher J. Lamb, who led the 2008 Project for National Security Reform (PNSR) study, and Ambassador (retired) Edward Marks wrote “Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Integration.” In addition to being the lead for the PNSR study, Dr. Lamb served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Resources and Plans where he had oversight of war plans, requirements, acquisition, and resource allocation matters for the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy).\(^{37}\) Ambassador Marks is a retired Senior Foreign Service Officer with a 40-year career involving service in nine countries, the United Nations (UN), and Washington, DC.\(^{38}\) He also served as the DOS representative in US Pacific Command’s (PACOM) Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) on Counterterrorism (CT) and was actively involved in the 2008 PNSR.\(^{39}\)

Lamb and Marks addressed the difficulties of interagency integration within the current interagency system and offered the COM authority as the best interagency integration model within the US government.\(^{40}\) They claimed that the best solution to inadequate interagency integration, caused by an outdated national security structure, lay within COM authorities where, by statute, the COM is the overall integrator.\(^{41}\) The authors recommended using a “Mission Manager,” someone who could lead an interagency national security issue from start to completion and would have statutory authority similar to the COM.\(^{42}\) Although the authors never

\(^{37}\) Lamb and Marks, *Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Reform*, 39.

\(^{38}\) Ibid.

\(^{39}\) Ibid.

\(^{40}\) Ibid., 15.

\(^{41}\) Ibid., 3.

\(^{42}\) Ibid., 18.
mentioned Phase “Z,” a term that only the DOD uses, they used the term “steady state operation” to describe an environment with characteristics equivalent to Phase “Z.”

In May 2011, the Bipartisan Policy Center, co-chaired by Ambassador Paula Dobriansky and Admiral (Ret.) Gregory Johnson, published a report titled, “A Stitch in Time: Stabilizing Fragile States.” The purpose of this report was to make policy recommendations on how the United States could help stabilize fragile states. The report had a number of recommendations, one of them being the alignment of DOD, DOS, and USAID regions. Two months following this article, authors from the US Global Leadership Coalition published a follow-up article also supporting the alignment of DOD and DOS regions. The authors of the Bipartisan Policy Center article claimed that though the National Security Council bears the responsibility of integrating the different government agencies, the different interagency issues are too numerous, and when taken individually, are too minor to warrant the NSC’s attention.

These articles all address the issue of creating unity within the interagency realm. The articles that discussed regional alignment between the different agencies (DOD, DOS, USAID) highlighted that the interagency lacks unity because of the different boundary discrepancies. The SAMS monograph assessed whether the DOD had the capability to integrate all elements of national power within their Phase “Z” planning. The Lamb-Marks article claimed the reason there is not an integrated interagency process is because there is a lack of statutory authority to whoever is in charge of a specific topic or region.


44 Ibid., 7.


If the US government’s emphasis is going to be on shaping the environment, then examining the national security structure to see how it suits this desire is worth the effort. The US national security structure has improved slightly since the 1947 National Security Act. For example, the creation of the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) has fostered an environment where different government agencies can share information and coordinate actions in a unified effort. JIATF-South has proved to be remarkably successful against illicit smuggling in the US Southern Command’s area of responsibility. The US government considers JIATF-South the “‘gold standard’” for interagency success.47 However, one of the reasons JIATF-South has been so successful is because it has been around since 1989 and the different government agencies involved have had time to develop positive working relationships and standard operating procedures.48 The other reason is that the problem set is quite small in comparison to nation building (e.g., Iraq and Afghanistan). Although the interagency system has improved through organizations such as the JIATF, the interagency system as a whole still lacks the structure for integrating interagency efforts.

Background

An understanding of the terms Phase “Z,” Phase 0, and Shape is relevant before discussing how each agency receives guidance and creates plans for conducting activities during times other than war. US Army Colonel Brian Petit wrote one of the more complete definitions of Phase “Z” in his book, Going Big by Getting Small: The Application of Operational Art by


Special Operations in Phase Zero. COL Petit differentiated between Phase 0, as defined in joint doctrine, and Phase “Z.” He defined Phase “Z” as being “both the actions taken and the environment involved in maintaining US access and influence through foreign engagements with means and methods below the threshold of war.” JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning does not specifically address the difference between the two. JP 5-0 describes Phase 0 as “[j]oint and multinational—inclusive of normal and routine military activities—and various interagency activities” whose “activities are performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies.” Petit distinguished between the two because in his view, Phase “Z” “connotes a stand-alone description of activities that occur in a peacetime environment and not solely as a ‘preparation’ phase for joint operations.” In other words, Phase “Z” encompasses actions and describes an environment short of war. Other US government agencies may refer to this definition of Phase “Z” as equivalent to steady state operations. Phase “Z” encompasses activities in Phase 0, described later in detail.

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50 Ibid., 53.


52 Petit, Going Big by Getting Small, 53.
Phase “Z” has a military connotation because it uses the term “phase,” but Phase “Z” describes an environment where all US government agencies participate. Giving it another name would probably be beneficial within the interagency community because the DOD is the only one that views the spectrum of peace and war in terms of phases. Similar and related terms such as security cooperation, security assistance, and engagement, as defined in JP 1-02 *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, do not encompass all of the characteristics of Phase “Z.” JP 1-02’s definitions limit security cooperation to the DOD, describe security assistance as a subset of security cooperation dealing with defense-related services, and refer engagement to combat-related contact between opposing forces.\(^5^3\) Future studies regarding this

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\(^{53}\) JP 1-02, 98, 255. The Joint Force does use “engagement” to mean more than combat-related operations as revealed in the US Army’s seventh warfighting function (engagement). The next version of JP 1-02 might define “engagement” as more than kinetic operations.
topic might reveal a better term to describe actions by all US government agencies in a steady state environment. More important than the term however, is its description.

The term Phase “Z” came from Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s request to the CJCS, US Air Force General Richard B. Meyers, to develop war phases that included a Phase 0. Secretary Rumsfeld received numerous briefings on CCDRs’ plans whose phases did not match and the lack of standardization led to confusion. When Secretary Rumsfeld wrote this memo, he was asking for a Phase 0 (shaping activities within a contingency plan), not a Phase Zero (a campaign of shaping and deterrence activities). The 2004 version of JP 3-0 Joint Operations did not contain a Phase 0, but instead had generic names of phases: deter/engage, seize initiative, decisive operations, and transition. When the DOD published a new version of JP 3-0 in 2006, it established a six-phase operational plan model. The six phases were: shape (Phase 0), deter (Phase I), seize initiative (Phase II), dominate (Phase III), stabilize (Phase IV), and enable civil authority (Phase V). JP 5-0 uses the term Phase 0 and Shape almost synonymously; however, it does distinguish between Phase 0 activities that support a contingency plan and Shape activities that may be in support of a contingency plan and in support of the Theater Campaign Plan (TCP). Phase 0 activities are Shape activities; however, not all Shape activities are Phase 0 activities.

A TCP’s focus is on the CCMD’s steady state activities, which include ongoing operations, military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence, and other shaping or preventive activities. A TCP is a CCMD’s Shape phase or Phase “Z,” but not its Phase 0. JP 5-

54 J. M. Lynes, “Standardizing Campaign Phases and Terminology” (briefing, Washington, DC, January 3, 2005). Colonel (Retired) Lynes served on the Joint Staff (J-7) when Secretary Rumsfeld made the request. The author of this paper received the Powerpoint slides that Lynes used when he gave the briefing.


0 seems to equate Phase 0 to Shape when it mentions “the [S]hape phase” implying Phase 0.\textsuperscript{58} Phase 0 activities are in support of a contingency plan, which most likely consists of follow-on phases. Whereas, Shaping activities are both in Phase 0 plans and in the TCP. Phase 0 activities do not necessarily mean that war is inevitable and that follow-on phases will occur; US military commanders hope they will never have to move to Phases I through V. Formalizing the term, Phase 0, forced joint headquarters, CCMDs in particular, to acknowledge officially the importance of Shaping operations as a phase of its own. Doctrine formalized the term, but CCMDs were planning steady state operations before.

CCMDs have been planning steady state operations since 1948 under the direction of the Unified Command Plan (UCP).\textsuperscript{59} In 1995, the NSS highlighted the importance of military involvement overseas during peacetime. It stated:

> Our leadership must stress preventive diplomacy — through such means as support for democracy, economic assistance, overseas military presence, military-to-military contacts and involvement in multilateral negotiations in the Middle East and elsewhere — in order to help resolve problems, reduce tensions and defuse conflicts before they become crises. These measures are a wise investment in our national security because they offer the prospect of resolving problems with the least human and material cost.

This quotation demonstrated that the US placed a high value on using its military in foreign matters in support of US national interests. The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reinforced the DOD’s need to plan for Shaping operations. This first QDR stated, “the Department of Defense has an essential role to play in shaping the international security environment in ways that promote and protect US national interests.”\textsuperscript{60} Strategic guidance

\textsuperscript{58} JP 5-0 (2011), III–41.


continues to emphasize DOD’s role in national security. The latest NSS (2010) states, “Our military will continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments.”61 Since 1948, CCMDs have evolved in their planning development for theater campaign planning. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) has helped provide the link between CCMD campaign plans and national strategic objectives.

The term “phase” gives Phase “Z” a military feel; however, the Joint Force uses phases within their planning for certain reasons. Phasing helps the commander organize “the assignment of tasks to subordinate commanders” and helps “integrate and synchronize subordinate operations in time, space, and purpose.”62 In addition, the focus of one phase is usually different in another phase and changes in command or support relationships usually accompany a shifting of phases.63 An example of where a shift in focus may occur is when sustained combat operations in the dominate phase moves toward stability operations in the stabilize and enable civil authority phases.64 The Joint Staff designed the phasing model to aid, not hinder, the commander. The commander determines “the number and actual phases used during a campaign or operation” and the six-phase model is “not intended to be a universally prescriptive template for all conceivable joint operations.”65

US European Command (EUCOM) deputy commander, General Charles F. Wald, wrote an article in 2006, describing a Phase “Z” that EUCOM was conducting because of the terrorist

63 Ibid., xxiii.
64 Ibid., III–40.
65 Ibid., xxiii.
threat in the region. General Wald wrote this article before the publication of JP 5-0 (2006) that included Phase 0 into its phasing model. He explained that EUCOM began a Phase “Z” campaign because the dangers they were facing required “understanding the differences between theater security cooperation (TSC) and traditional warfighting.” Just as the title of the article implied, EUCOM considered this Phase “Z” a campaign in and of itself. General Wald seemed to make a distinction between Phase 0 that supports follow-on phases of a campaign, and Phase “Z,” where it is the campaign. JP 5-0 does not necessarily make this direct distinction, but it does state that “activities in the Shape phase normally are outlined in TCPs and those in the remaining phases are outlined in JSCP-directed contingency plans.” It continues, “[w]hile most shaping activities are contained in the TCP, contingency plans may include shaping activities that must be accomplished to support an operation.” In other words, only some military operations in a steady state environment are in support of contingency operations. General Wald and EUCOM saw a threat to their mission, and in the midst of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), they decided to have a Phase “Z” campaign whose “ultimate goal [was] to promote stability and peace by building capacity in partner nations that enables them to be cooperative, trained, and prepared to help prevent or limit conflicts.” EUCOM’s idea of Phase “Z” being a stand-alone campaign shed new light on how CCMDs approached shaping operations.


67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid.


71 Ibid., III–42.

The current version of JP 3-0 states, “*Shape* phase missions, task, and actions are those that are designed to dissuade or deter adversaries and assure friends, as well as set conditions for the contingency plan . . . .”\(^73\) It further states:

*Shape* activities are executed continuously with the intent to enhance international legitimacy and gain multinational cooperation by shaping perceptions and influencing behavior; developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; improving information exchange and intelligence sharing; providing US Forces with peacetime and contingency access; and mitigating conditions that could lead to a crisis.\(^74\)

This quotation demonstrates that *shaping* activities do not necessarily have to be in support of a contingency plan’s *Phase 0*; they may seek to prevent conflict. JP 5-0 *Joint Operational Planning* states that a CCDR’s TCP normally outlines the *Shape* phase actions, but sometimes they are in a CCDR’s contingency plan.\(^75\) *Shape* activities support national strategic and strategic military objectives and “they must adapt to a particular theater environment and may be executed in one theater to create effects and/or achieve objectives in another.”\(^76\)

The DOD uses *Phase “Z.”* However, other US government agencies have their own perspective of this term. Other government agencies do not have a phased planning model because they likely have a difficult time placing “hard-lines” on the peace-war scale. Most government agencies other than the DOD see the security environment more like a barometer, where a lack of tension results in low-pressure readings while an increase in tensions cause pressure to rise. If tensions continue to rise, eventually the barometer will receive so much pressure the barometer will explode (war). Since the DOD and other government agencies each see *Phase “Z”* differently, does their planning align to support a whole-of-government approach?


\(^{74}\) Ibid.

\(^{75}\) JP 5-0 (2011), III–41–III–42.

\(^{76}\) Ibid., III–42.
While many US government agencies have a role in a *Phase ‘Z’* environment, the ones most pertinent to the pillars of national security are DOS (diplomatic), USAID (development), and DOD (defense); therefore, this paper will focus primarily on the efforts of these three.\(^77\)

**Phase ‘Z’ Planning**

The DOS’s highest-level strategic framework is the “State-USAID Joint Strategic Plan.”\(^78\) Because of the close relationship between the DOS and USAID, the two agencies develop a combined plan at the strategic level. Both agencies wrote their most recent strategic plan, “US Department of State and USAID: Strategic Plan FY 2014-2017,” with the guidance of the President’s NSS and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). This strategic plan guides priority setting and resource allocation. With this strategic document, the DOS regional departments, with the help of USAID bureaus, develop the Joint Regional Strategy (JRS).\(^79\) The JRS “identifies priorities, goals, and areas of strategic focus” and “sets the general parameters that guide subsequent planning at the country level.”\(^80\) The key components of a JRS are: regional context, regional goals, management and operational considerations, resources, references, and evaluations.\(^81\) With the JRS established, each COM develops his Integrated Country Strategy (ICS). The ICS is a multi-year, overarching strategy that encompasses US government policy priorities and objectives, and the means to achieve them.\(^82\) The key


\(^78\) Ibid., 13.

\(^79\) Ibid., 16.

\(^80\) Ibid., 14.

\(^81\) Ibid., 14–15.

The components of the ICS are: COM priorities, country context, mission goals, mission objectives, enabling objectives, and management platform considerations.83

USAID refers to its planning system as the USAID Program Cycle. USAID’s strategic-level plan meshes with the DOS’s strategic plan mentioned above and the USAID Policy Framework “operationalizes” the policy guidance in the QDDR.84 With this information, the USAID Field Mission, in coordination with the COM and other agencies, develops a Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS), which compliments the ICS. This is USAID’s primary country-level plan consisting of the following key components: development context, challenges and opportunities; development objectives; results framework; presidential initiatives; monitoring and evaluation; and resources and priorities.85 With input from the CDCS, USAID and State Operating Units produce Operational Plans (Joint State-USAID). These Operational Plans explain how USAID and DOS will use foreign assistance resources.86

The DOD’s CCMDs have TCPs consisting of Phase “Z” activities. The explanation below divides CCMD inputs into two major categories: guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense and guidance through the JSPS. Guidance from the President includes his NSS. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) produces the National Defense Strategy (NDS), which “addresses how the Armed Forces of the United States will fight and win America’s wars and describes how DOD will support the objectives outlined in the NSS.”87 The QDR flows from the NDS and defines “force structure, modernization plans, and a budget plan

84 Ibid., 21.
85 Ibid., 23–25.
86 Ibid., 27.
allowing the military to successfully execute the full range of missions” explained in the NDS.88

The OSD then produces the Unified Command Plan (UCP), which the President approves and
signs. The UCP “sets forth basic guidance to all combatant commanders (CCDR)” and
“establishes CCMD missions and responsibilities; addresses assignment of forces, delineates
ageographic AORs for CCMDs; and specifies responsibilities for functional combatant
commanders (FCCs).”89 Within this first category, the OSD also produces the Guidance for
Employment of the Force (GEF), which “provides two-year direction to CCMDs for operational
planning, force management, security operations, and posture planning.”90

The next category is the JSPS. The JSPS is the primary system by which the joint force
conducts planning to allow the CJCS to provide military advice to the President and Secretary of
Defense.91 In this planning system, the CJCS produces the National Military Strategy (NMS)
from the NSS and NDS.92 The NMS “focuses the efforts of the Armed Forces of the United
States while conveying the CJCS’s advice with regard to the security environment and the
necessary military actions to protect vital US interests.”93 Also within the JSPS is the Joint
Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The JSCP “provides military strategic and operational
guidance to CCDRs, Service Chiefs, CSAs, and applicable defense agencies for preparation of
campaign plans and contingency plans.”94 The JSCP is a key document for CCMD TCP

89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid., II–4.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid., II–4–II–5.
94 Ibid., II–6.
development because it provides guidance for steady state activities.\textsuperscript{95} The final document in the JSPS is the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG). The GFMIG is important to a CCMD’s TCP because it provides direction to CDRs on the assignment of forces and “includes apportionment tables . . . for sourcing plans requiring designation of forces.”\textsuperscript{96} Many inputs contribute to the development of a TCP. Both categories listed above are the main documents that allow CCMDs to develop a TCP in support of national security objectives.

![Figure 2. National Strategic Guidance and JSPS](source: Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operational Planning (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), II-5.)

Since this paper focuses on interagency integration in Phase “Z,” it is relevant to examine where the different agencies’ plans merge to ensure the US has a whole-of-government approach. Starting at the strategic level the DOS and USAID together developed a Joint Strategic Plan. There is no formalized system in place to ensure the DOS and USAID collaborate with the DOD when developing their strategic-level document. However, personnel exchanges between

\textsuperscript{95} JP 5-0 (2011), II–6.

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid.
the departments are a method that allows for DOD input. In January 2012, the DOS and DOD signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which essentially doubled the number of exchange personnel between both departments. The DOD now sends 100 personnel to DOS while DOS sends approximately 95 Foreign Policy Advisors (POLAD) to DOD. DOS also sends an additional 30 personnel to serve as faculty advisors at senior service colleges. These faculty advisors may not directly affect DOD plans, but the interaction between DOS personnel and DOD field grade officers at senior service colleges increases DOS-DOD interoperability through education. For enhanced political-military coordination at the strategic level, the new MOU established the first-ever POLAD to the CJCS. In addition, DOS’s Political-Military Bureau now has a two-star officer from the DOD to serve as the Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Political-Military Bureau. This flag officer position within the DOS had been vacant since the 1980s.

Despite the absence of a formalized planning process from the DOS to gather DOD input at the strategic level, the January 2012 MOU between the DOD and DOS, which increased personnel exchanges between the two departments, allows for informal DOD input. The same holds true for the DOD. Although the DOS has increased its involvement in providing input into

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98 Ibid. POLADs are Foreign Service Officers from the DOS who serve as foreign policy advisors and act as a link between military commands and the State Department.

99 Ibid.

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid. The mission of DOS’s Political-Military Bureau is to integrate diplomacy and defense. POLADs serve with service chiefs at the Pentagon as well as with principal US military commanders in the United States and overseas.

102 Ibid.
DOD’s strategic level documents (e.g., NDS, QDR, NMS), there is no formalized structure to gather input from the DOS.

At the regional level, the DOS and USAID regional bureaus produce the JRS, but according to the “3D Planning Guide,” there does not seem to be any formal system to gain input from the DOD. The DOD’s regional plan, however, is the TCP, and this plan does receive input from the different agencies through the Promote Cooperation series of conferences and discussions.103 Promote Cooperation is an OSD and Joint Staff approved program where CCDRs can directly engage with the different US government agencies allowing for better informed COCOM plans.104 Promote Cooperation encompasses a series of in-progress-reviews (IPRs) where the different agencies may provide advice.105

At the country-level, the COM is responsible for the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS), a three-year strategy developed by a Country Team. The ICS provides the US government’s priority goals and objectives within a particular country and is a document that helps coordinate interagency activities throughout the Mission.106 USAID’s country-level document is the CDCS, which the USAID Mission produces in consultation with the COM. Lastly, the DOD’s country-level document is the Country Plan. Although the Country Plan belongs to the CCDR it is often produced by the CCMD’s in-country representative—usually the Office of Defense

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106 Ibid., 17.
Cooperation—in conjunction with the country desk officer at the CCMD headquarters. The different agencies’ country-level plans have varying degrees of interagency coordination. One of the primary reasons for the varying degrees of interagency coordination at the country-level is due to the differences of personalities within an embassy. Because there is no prescriptive solution for interagency coordination, collaboration and synchronization vary based upon the individual personalities. Not all COMs lead embassies the same way and some are better at fostering interagency coordination than others.

The DOS, USAID, and DOD all produce their plans from the nation’s highest strategic document—the NSS. Because these agencies have distinct missions, roles, legal authorities, and congressional interests, they each have distinct frameworks, process, and planning cultures. The US government chartered the 3D Planning Group to help bridge the gap between these three agencies’ planning communities. The 3D Planning Group produced the “3D Planning Guide,” which is a reference tool for the different agencies. The purpose of the “3D Planning Guide” is to help the different agencies understand the others’ planning processes, but more importantly, it helps identify opportunities for coordination between each other.

From strategic to country-level plans, US government agencies have points of intersection where they synchronize their plans for better unity of effort; however, most of the agencies synchronize informally. The US government has improved concerning interagency planning, as evidenced in agreements such as the MOU between the DOD and DOS as well as DOD’s Promote Cooperation program. Where interagency integration becomes an issue may not

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108 Ibid., 4.

109 Ibid.
necessarily be in the planning for Phase “Z,” although there is much room for improvement, but more in the actions that take place in Phase “Z.”

Chief of Mission and the Area Military Commander

The US embassy is one of the most integrated interagency organizations. The COM has the overall responsibility of coordinating interagency efforts within a country because he has the authority. In 1949, President Truman asked former President Herbert C. Hoover to chair what became the Commission on Reorganization for the Executive Branch of Government. The report concluded that ambassadors should have “the ultimate authority overseas with respect to the foreign affairs aspects of program operations.” President Truman requested this report because after World War II the United States expanded military and economic assistance overseas through programs and policies like the Marshall Plan, which resulted in US government agencies pursuing their own agendas. In addition, “numerous semi-autonomous special missions” only exacerbated a seemingly disjointed effort. “No clear and enforceable guidance existed to coordinate local US policy in countries such as Greece, where three independent US missions—Diplomatic, Military, and Economic Aid—pursued their own agendas.” Shortly thereafter, on February 12, 1951, the DOS, DOD, and Economic Cooperation Administration

110 US Department of State, Letter from the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (Crockett) to the Ambassador to Germany (McGhee), accessed August 9, 2014, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v33/d28. The commission consisted of two former Assistant Secretaries of State, Harvey H. Bundy and James Grafton Rogers, with the advice of former Secretary of State and War Henry L. Stimson.


113 Lamb and Marks, Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Reform, 12; Simmons, “Executing US Foreign Policy Through the Country Team Concept,” 125.
(predecessor to USAID), produced the Clay Paper to express their position and understanding of the ambassador concept in much the same way.\textsuperscript{114} Two months later, President Truman wrote to Secretary of State Dean Acheson stating that all US representatives within a country must work in unity and that the ambassador is responsible for making sure that this happened.\textsuperscript{115}

President Eisenhower was the first President to send letters to ambassadors charging them as Chiefs of Mission and giving them responsibility for the direction and coordination of US government representatives within their assigned country.\textsuperscript{116} This included US military personnel assigned to the US embassy mission (e.g., US Marines securing the embassy, and the US Defense attaché), but not to CCDRs or their employees. United States Code (USC), Title 22, Section 4802 states the Secretary of State has the responsibility to protect “all United States Government personnel on official duty abroad (other than Voice of America correspondents on official assignment and those personnel under the command of a United States area military commander) . . . .”\textsuperscript{117} President Eisenhower also followed up with letters to the other US agencies reinforcing his charge to the Chiefs of Mission.\textsuperscript{118}

The Foreign Service Act of 1980 placed the COM authority in law and stated that the Chief of Mission:

(1) shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all government executive branch employees in that country (except for employees under the command of a United States area military commander); (2) shall keep fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations of the Government within that country, and shall insure that all Government executive branch employees in that country (except for employees

\textsuperscript{114} Lamb and Marks, \textit{Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Reform}, 12.

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{117} Responsibility of Secretary of State, \textit{US Code} 22 (2014), Section 4802.

\textsuperscript{118} Lamb and Marks, \textit{Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Reform}, 13.
In general, this statement outlines the COM’s interagency responsibility and his role in foreign relations. The President appoints the COM position; however, an ambassador typically communicates with the President through the Secretary of State. In addition, an ambassador is typically a Foreign Service officer from the DOS. There are also political appointees who, although might lack the experience and knowledge to perform ambassadorial duties, do not have the stigma associated with them as favoring the DOS over the other agencies. Where the line seems to become blurry for interagency coordination in Phase “Z” is where the COM does not have full responsibility over US area military commanders. There is a “gray” area during Phase “Z” where there is no clear distinction as to who is in charge of US government efforts abroad—the two significant colliding authorities are those of the COM and the area military commander.

The militarization of foreign policy is a controversial topic in national security discussions. Retired US Army general and former ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl W. Eikenberry, wrote an article discussing the excessive militarization of American foreign policy over the past few decades. Eikenberry believes that one of the reasons the US military has become so diplomatically influential is because of the robustness of military assets. One of Eikenberry’s examples is a manpower comparison. Eikenberry quotes former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates who stated that the US military had more musicians in its marching bands than the DOS had diplomats—defined as members of the Foreign Service Officers. To

119 Lamb and Marks, Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Reform, 13.


121 Ibid., 1.

122 Ibid., 2.
highlight a military commander’s influence within a region, Eikenberry quoted another COM who stated, “[i]f I want a meeting with the head of state of the country to which I am assigned, I give the regional US combatant commander a call.” Eikenberry believes the DOD often overrides the DOS in diplomacy matters and believes this trend will have unwanted consequences. One of those consequences is the overuse of the military in matters that may be better suited for other US government agencies. The military clearly has diplomatic influence, but clearly defined authorities will assist in a whole-of-government approach.

The DOD terms *Phase “Z,” Phase 0,* and *Shaping* operations, although interlinked, have their distinctions, as discussed in detail above. The DOS, USAID, and DOD each have their own planning systems in support of steady state activities. The country level plans appear to be the base-level plans when planning for a *Phase “Z”* environment, and the COM’s responsibility is to ensure that all *Phase “Z”* activities integrate to achieve unity of effort. The COM authority is statutory, however, the vagueness of his authority over DOD personnel under a US area military commander causes confusion in the *Phase “Z”* environment. The next section is a case study highlighting the friction between a COM and an area military commander. The event took place in the Horn of Africa (HOA) in 2006.

**Case Study**

This case study examines the relationship between a subordinate command [Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)] of a combatant command [US Central Command (CENTCOM)] and a COM within the subordinate command’s AOR. This case study highlights the friction of interagency integration and the imperfection of the current national security structure. The main actors within this case study are MajGen Ghormley (CJTF-HOA

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124 Ibid., 7.
commander), Ambassador William M. Bellamy (Chief of Mission – Nairobi), Theresa Whelan (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense – African Affairs), and General (GEN) Abizaid (CENTCOM commander).

In October 2002, the United States established CJTF-HOA in support of counter-terrorism efforts targeting al Qaeda affiliates located in East Africa. Its commander from May 2005-April 2006 was MajGen Ghormley.125 In 2006, CJTF-HOA was a subordinate command of CENTCOM, whose commander was GEN Abizaid.126 The combined joint operations area (CJOA) for CJTF-HOA in 2006 included Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Seychelles. Simultaneously, the US maintained embassies in Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Sudan; it had no permanent diplomatic presence in Somali or the Seychelles.


A fundamental disagreement occurred in 2006 when Ghormley and Bellamy had different strategies for the region. Ghormley’s military strategy within his CJOA was counterinsurgency (COIN) focused. On the other hand, Bellamy’s approach within Kenya and neighboring Somalia was counterterrorism (CT).\textsuperscript{127} The United States had no ambassador to Somalia, but Bellamy did have diplomatic oversight of the country and had a watch office within the Nairobi embassy to monitor the political situation. The basis of COIN is to “defeat and contain [an] insurgency and address its root causes.”\textsuperscript{128} COIN is “primarily a political struggle”

\textsuperscript{127} Timothy F. Ghormley, interview by author in a telephone conversation, June 28, 2014. MajGen (Ret) Ghormley’s approach to countering terrorist efforts was a result of his experiences in the Vietnam War. He valued a population-centric approach.

and population-centric. The interagency may conduct the two strategies separately or in conjunction with each other. This work does not argue that one strategy was better than the other, or that one was right and the other wrong, or that the combination of the two would have been a better approach. It argues that the differing strategies by the CJTF-HOA commander and the COM-Nairobi in 2006 prevented a whole-of-government approach. The two strategies did not create the desired unity of effort and nobody in the region had the authority to decide which approach the United States was going to use.

With CENTCOM establishing a JTF, there may be debate on whether CJTF-HOA in 2006 was in Phase “Z.” One way to determine this is to know if CJTF-HOA was in CENTCOM’s TCP. Another way is to know whether the US considered CJTF-HOA’s CJOA a combat zone. A combat zone designation could be a good indicator of whether an environment is in a steady state. Another method is to examine the description of joint operation phases to see whether CJTF-HOA in 2006 was in a Phase “Z” environment. The last method is to ask the CJTF-HOA commander in 2006 whether he believed he was in Phase “Z.”

As discussed previously, a TCP is a COCOM’s theater strategy and designed to coordinate steady state activities within the AOR. A TCP is a COCOM’s Phase “Z” plan. CENTCOM did not officially have a TCP in 2006; from 2001 through 2005, CENTCOM’s planning mainly focused on OIF and OEF-Afghanistan contingencies. Therefore, the method of using a TCP to determine whether CJTF-HOA was in a Phase “Z” environment in 2006 is not

129 JP 3-24, ix–x.


possible. Next, CJTF-HOA was not a combat zone. The US only acknowledged three areas as combat zones—the Arabian Peninsula areas, Kosovo areas, and Afghanistan. The DOD certified Djibouti for combat zone tax benefits on July 1, 2002 due to their direct support of military operations in support of OEF. CJTF-HOA has never been an actual combat zone.

Concerning the joint phases, Phases I through V of joint operations are not a good description of CJTF-HOA’s operational environment in 2006. CENTCOM did not design CJTF-HOA to be a Phases I through V campaign typically designed for a conventional battle. The purpose of Phase I is to deter an adversary by demonstrating the capabilities and resolve of the joint force; this phase sets conditions for the deployment of forces if deterrence fails. CJTF-HOA’s mission in 2006 was not to deter and prepare for the deployment of forces. Phases II (seize the initiative) and III (dominate) do not describe the CJTF-HOA operational environment in 2006 either. Ghormley was not executing offensive operations “forcing the adversary to offensive culmination.” Neither was Ghormley in the dominant phase by “breaking the enemy’s will for organized resistance” in preparation for the stabilize phase. In the absence of Phases I through III, Phases IV (transition) and V (enable civil authority) do not accurately describe CJTF-HOA’s operational environment either.

Lastly, asking the CJTF-HOA commander in 2006 what phase he was in could explain whether CJTF-HOA was in a Phase “Z” environment in 2006. According to Ghormley, he

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132 The Arabian Peninsula Areas are the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Gulf of Oman, the part of the Arabian Sea north of 10° North latitude and west of 68° East longitude, the Gulf of Aden, and the countries of Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The Kosovo areas are Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Albania, the Adriatic Sea and the Ionian Sea north of the 39th Parallel.


believed he was in a steady state environment. He stated he did not have a campaign plan consisting of Phases I through V and CJTF-HOA was not in any particular phase in 2006. Despite the debate over whether CJTF-HOA was in Phase “Z,” the more important matter is to know if CJTF-HOA conditions in 2006 were similar to those found in Phase “Z.” If CJTF-HOA conditions in 2006 were similar to those within Phase “Z,” then one can compare interagency integration for CJTF-HOA in light of those conditions where diplomacy remains the primary tool to secure national interests.

CJTF-HOA’s original mission was to conduct CT operations in support of the GWOT, and more specifically in support of OEF. On September 12, 2005, the CJTF-HOA mission was to conduct “operations and training within the Combined Joint Operations Area (CJOA) to assist Host Nations to combat terrorism in order to establish a secure environment and enable regional stability.” Although “combat terrorism” was part of the CJTF-HOA mission, Ghormley communicated clearly that CJTF-HOA was not a “direct action” force and that it did not “seek to engage enemy forces in combat.” Ghormley believed CJTF-HOA was going to accomplish its mission by “seeking out those in need” and by helping the population with doctors, veterinarians, civil engineers, and well drillers. His approach was to “improve the underlying conditions of the population,” which in turn would prevent terrorist exploitation. He also believed military-to-military training to improve host nation counter-terrorism and border security capabilities was

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135 Ghormley, interview by author in a telephone conversation, June 28, 2014.

136 Ibid.

137 Timothy F. Ghormley, email message to author, July 3, 2014.


139 Ibid.

140 Ibid.
the best way to combat terrorism. The ‘holy trinity’ of Ghormley’s strategy for the HOA was access, presence, and engagement.

From 2002 to September 2005, CJTF-HOA conducted multiple “capacity building” operations involving fifty-two schools and twenty-one hospitals. It also conducted seven medical civic action programs (MEDCAPs), five veterinarian civic action programs (VETCAPs), twenty-three well projects, and eleven other humanitarian assistance projects within Yemen, Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya. One of the primary means available to Ghormley to accomplish his mission was employment of his Civil Affairs Teams (CAT). CATs are the basic Civil Affairs tactical support elements provided to a supported commander; their primary role is to conduct civil-military operations in support of a joint force commander. CJTF-HOA had four CATs, two in southern Ethiopia and two in Nairobi, Kenya. All four teams were working in the CJOA with the respective COMs’ permission under Title 10 authority.

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142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid.
145 Field Manual (FM) 3-57: Civil Affairs Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), iv, 2–2. Civil-military operations (CMO) are the activities of a commander performed by designated civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation (HN). Joint Publication (JP) 3-57: Civil-Military Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), ix.
During a visit to Ethiopia, Ghormley had a meeting with the president of Somaliland. He had a meeting with the president of Somaliland. During that meeting, the president of Somaliland requested that CJTF-HOA expand its operations to include operations into Somaliland. He believed that the American presence within his country would demonstrate to his people that the West was not at war with Islam, but with terrorists. The president of Somaliland ended the meeting with his assurance that the people of Somaliland would welcome and protect the CATs. Ghormley returned to Djibouti and began planning to send a CAT into Somaliland.

With planning complete, Ghormley flew to Nairobi to brief Bellamy on CJTF-HOA’s plan for the introduction of a CAT into Somaliland, not to garner the ambassador’s approval. Ghormley believed that he had the same type of authority as General Karl W. Eikenberry in Afghanistan and General George W. Casey in Iraq; he believed that he had the authority to move subordinate units around his CJOA freely. Neither Eikenberry nor Casey had to get permission from their respective COMs to move units around the area of operation and Ghormley was not aware of any policy preventing him from moving his teams around the CJOA. When Ghormley landed in Nairobi and informed Bellamy of his intentions, Bellamy disagreed with the move.

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147 Ghormley, interview by author in a telephone conversation, June 28, 2014. Somaliland was a part of Somalia and not a state with diplomatic relations with the US. The US supported the African Union, which did not recognize Somaliland as state.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
150 Ghormley, email message to author, July 3, 2014.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
155 Ghormley, interview by author in a telephone conversation, June 28, 2014.
The meeting did not end well. Ghormley departed the meeting and flew back to his headquarters in Djibouti with the intention of carrying out the move despite Bellamy’s disagreement.\textsuperscript{156} If not for Abizaid, who called Ghormley at his headquarters location to stop the move from occurring, Ghormley would have moved his CAT to his desired location regardless of Bellamy’s perspective.\textsuperscript{157}

Ghormley believes that Bellamy went through DOS channels to reach the DOD or the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), which in-turn contacted Abizaid.\textsuperscript{158} Ghormley believes that because Abizaid was involved in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, this HOA incident was not worth the trouble and stopping the move was an easy way to calm interagency waters. The move by Ghormley without COM approval would surely have caused increased tension between DOD and DOS were not for Abizaid’s call to Ghormley.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense – African Affairs, Theresa Whelan, flew to Nairobi to hear the story first-hand.\textsuperscript{159} Whelan knew that she did not have any authority to choose one strategy over another. She was only a person to hear both sides of the story and try to resolve the issue to the best of her ability. Ultimately, the only person who could have resolved that issue of strategy was President George W. Bush and because the issue was below the threshold for presidential notification, nobody notified him and the differing strategy issue was never resolved. One might argue there is an authority below the President who can resolve interagency conflicts because the Secretariat-level in the Ghormley-Bellamy case study did so. The Secretariat-level did resolve a portion of this interagency issue by not allowing Ghormley to move the CAT, but the overall strategy issue was not resolved. Ghormley and Bellamy continued to have a difference

\textsuperscript{156} Ghormley, interview by author in a telephone conversation, June 28, 2014.

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{158} Ghormley, email message to author, July 3, 2014.

\textsuperscript{159} Ghormley, interview by author in a telephone conversation, June 28, 2014.
of strategies, preventing an optimal whole-of-government approach in the HOA region. In addition, nobody at the Secretariat-level had the authority to resolve the incident, but through cooperation and negotiation, the State and Defense departments came to a decision. If a matter of much greater importance developed, and the Secretariat-level could not come to an agreement, then the President is the only person who has the statutory authority to resolve the issue. Of course, the President would heavily rely upon his subject matter experts, but he would ultimately have to make the decision.

The national security structure involving COM authority and a US area military commander, which has not changed since then, enabled friction to occur between Ghormley and Bellamy. One of the reasons for this friction is the vagueness of the COM authority. Title 22 (Foreign Relations and Intercourse) of the USC, Section 3927 states the COM:

\[
\text{. . . shall have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch employees in that country (except for Voice of America correspondents on official assignment and employees under the command of a United States area military commander).}^{160}
\]

Most organizations and professionals assign the term United States area military commander specifically to a unified combatant commander with geographic area responsibility—geographic combatant commander—CENTCOM in this particular case.\(^{161}\) However, nothing indicates that an area military commander cannot be any military commander responsible for a geographic area. In either case, because the exception applies to “employees under the command of a United States area military commander,” CJTF-HOA is both an employee under the command of a CCDR and a military commander of a geographic area. USC Title 10, Section 162 states, “except as otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, all forces operating within the geographic area assigned to a unified combatant command shall be assigned to, and under the command of, the


commander of that command.”162 Because the COM does not have “full responsibility for the
direction, coordination, and supervision” of a US area military commander, this commander is
free to operate under his own authorities.

In Title 10 of the USC, Chapter 6, Section 164, combatant commanders are responsible to
the President and the Secretary of Defense “for the performance of missions assigned to that
command” and “perform their duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary
of Defense.”163 CCDRs have the command authority, unless otherwise directed by the President
or Secretary of Defense, to give “authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces
necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including direction over all aspects of
military operations, joint training, and logistics . . . .”164 CCDRs also have authority over
subordinate commanders.

Commanders of commands and forces assigned to a combatant command are
under the authority, direction, and control of, and responsible to, the commander
of the combatant command on all matters for which the commander of the
combatant command has been assigned authority . . . .165

Therefore, Ghormley was under the authority of Abizaid. In light of Title 10 authorities, Abizaid,
received his guidance and direction from the President or Secretary of Defense. Ghormley
received his guidance and direction from Abizaid. The COM was nowhere in Ghormley’s chain
of command and vice versa. According to Title 22, section 3927, government agencies are
responsible for keeping the COM fully informed of all activities they plan to conduct in the
COM’s assigned country. Paragraph (b) states, “Any executive branch agency having employees

Section 162.

163 Commanders of Combatant Commands: Assignment; Powers and Duties, US Code 10
(2014), Section 164.

164 Ibid.

165 Ibid.
in a foreign country shall keep the chief of mission to that country fully and currently informed
with respect to all activities and operations of its employees in that country . . . .”166 When
Ghormley flew to Nairobi to keep Bellamy informed of his plan to move a CAT into Somaliland,
Ghormley was simply doing his part in keeping the COM informed. Although this clause helps
with interagency cooperation, it does not ultimately solve the problem in authorities between a
COM and a military commander.

When a President assigns a COM to a country, the President issues a letter titled,
“Presidential Letter to Chiefs of Mission.” Within this letter, a section provides guidelines to the
COM when he and an area military commander disagree and cannot resolve the issue at their
level. This section reads, “You and such commanders must keep each other currently informed
and cooperate on all matters of mutual interest. Any differences that cannot be resolved in the
field should be reported by you to the Secretary of State; unified commanders should report to the
Secretary of Defense.”167

Titles 10 and 22 authorize COMs and combatant commanders distinct authorities and
they each have separate lines of communication back to the President. In the HOA, those distinct
authorities led to a situation where neither could resolve the issue at their level. Even though the
national security system worked according to its design a localized issue such as this should not
have needed Secretary level involvement. The 2006 Africa incident should have been resolved at
the regional level, but because of a lack of authorities, the issue made its way to Washington, DC.

Recommendations

The 2006 incident between MajGen Ghormley and Ambassador Bellamy is not well
known. However, in its most basic form, the situation consisted of a COM and an area military


commander (subordinates included), their authorities, and differences of opinion and strategy. Authors and experts, such as Dr. Lamb and Ambassador Marks, have written on interagency integration and have proposed a variety of methods to help resolve interagency unity of effort. A common answer relies upon informal relationships between the key actors within each agency. Although relationships is definitely a key element and will always matter, having proper structure in place provides a framework for interagency integration and prevents leaders of organizations from having to battle interagency conflict without the authority to resolve the issues.

This work proposes three possibilities. The first two would be a challenge to implement because they involve legislative action and require agencies to “give up” some of their authority. Due to lack of will among the interagency, the national senior leadership’s inability to see the need for national security reform, and the unwillingness to take on such a demanding task, implementing these solutions will be difficult at best. The third possibility is more politically feasible because it does not require any legislative action, structural changes, or mandates for agencies to give up authority.

Relationships will always be an important element when conducting interagency action, but structure should augment this principle. In an interagency setting, there is better unity of effort when the different entities have positive and effective working relationships. However, due to a variety of reasons (e.g., differing aims, culture), agencies sometimes cannot agree on a particular matter and without proper structure, issues have the potential of remaining unresolved. The interagency system in 2006 relied upon relationships and cooperation as a primary means for interagency action. Relationships and cooperation worked to an extent and may work a majority of the time; however, defined authorities will help resolve those situations in those other times.

Authority within the interagency community cannot reside solely with the President because he has an abundance of matters to which he must attend. In some circumstances, the President might need to be the approving authority, but in circumstances such as the one in 2006, an authority below the President and Secretariat-level should be able to resolve interagency
disagreements. This paper urges that the combination of authority and relationships will be key to effective interagency integration during Phase “Z.”

Possibility One

This first possibility suggests that the proposed solutions found in the PNSR’s Forging a New Shield are some of the best solutions for national security reform and ones that would significantly enhance interagency integration. The PNSR “was established in 2006 to assist the United States in an urgently needed transformation of the national security system” and “was a single focus think tank dedicated to modernizing the currently antiquated national security system for 21st century challenges.”\(^{168}\) Forging a New Shield was the result of Section 1049 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), which “required a study of the national security interagency system by an independent, non-profit, non-partisan organization.”\(^{169}\) Both PNSR and the Center for the Study of the Presidency contributed to this in-depth study.\(^{170}\)

This 830-page document “provides compelling evidence” that “the national security of the United States of America is fundamentally at risk” and “proposes an integrated set of reforms for the Executive Branch and Congress.”\(^{171}\) The first option proposed was a White-House Command, where authorities reside below the President through a super-Cabinet figure. The second option was an Integrated Regional Center, which is a more decentralized option where authorities reside at the regional level. The last option was a hierarchy of decentralized teams,


\(^{169}\) Locher III et al., Forging a New Shield.

\(^{170}\) Ibid.

\(^{171}\) Ibid.
which is the most decentralized option consisting of “trusted leaders closest to the issues”
managing activity on a day to day basis. Although each of these options was an excellent
solution, there was never enough political will to implement them. The options required major
changes to the national security structure. On December 31, 2011, the PNSR ceased operations.

Possibility Two

This second possibility also requires a change to the national security structure, although
to a lesser degree. Dr. Lamb and Ambassador Marks’s paper titled, “Chief of Mission Authority
as a Model for National Security Integration,” proposed creation of a position called the “Mission
Manager.” The authors stated COM authority is “[p]erhaps the best known model of Presidential
delegated authority for integration of diverse department and agency activities . . .” One of the
main reasons the authors argued the COM model is so effective is because “Congress codified
Chiefs of Mission authority in the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-465, October 17,
1980) during the Carter administration.” COM authority has served as a model “over multiple
decades in hundreds of US embassies and foreign missions mak[ing] it the best established and
understood model of interagency decision making.”

172 Locher III et al., Forging a New Shield, 483, 492, 507.
173 James R. Locher III, “PNSR Bids Farewell As It Ends Operations,” Project on
rg/?p=1271.
174 Lamb and Marks, Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security
Reform, 18. This publication does not necessarily focus on Phase Zero, but its application can
extend across all phases of Joint Operations.
175 Ibid., 12.
176 Ibid., 13.
177 Ibid., 15.
Because of its longstanding model, Lamb and Marks suggested that when the President, with the assistance of the National Security Advisor, determines “that a particularly important issue is an intrinsically interagency problem that requires evoking the congressionally sanctioned and expanded COM authority,” he would assign a Mission Manager to the issue. An example might be the following:

The President may designate individuals, subject to Senate confirmation, to lead interagency teams to manage clearly defined missions with responsibility for and presumptive authority to direct and coordinate the activities and operations of all of US Government organizations in so far as their support is required to ensure the successful implementation of a Presidentially approved strategy for accomplishing the mission. The designated individual’s presumptive authority will not extend beyond the requirements for successful strategy implementation, and department and agency heads may appeal any of the designated individual’s decisions to the President if they believe there is a compelling case that executing the decision would do grave harm to other missions of national importance.178

The Mission Manager would have enough authority to lead an interagency mission while not interrupting the different agencies involved. Once the Senate approves, then the Mission Manager would assemble a team of experts from across the interagency and begin operations. The initial step of beginning operations will be for the Mission Manager and his team to develop a strategy on how to deal with the issue. Through this analysis, the Mission Manager will be able to recommend funding and assets needed for mission accomplishment. Congress will be the approving authority for the resources, and when approved, the Mission Manager will begin execution of the presidential-approved strategy.179

The idea of a Mission Manager would have allowed for a mutually understood strategy for the HOA in 2006. The decision maker for the particular strategy would have been the Mission Manager. Implementing this idea of a Mission Manager would still be difficult, but because it is

178 Lamb and Marks, Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Reform, 18.

179 Ibid.
modeled after a current statutory authority (the COM), Lamb and Marks argue that it would be easier to implement and easier for the different agencies to understand.

Possibility Three

This third possibility is more politically feasible because it does not require any changes to the national security structure and does not need any statutory authority. The concept is basic and relies upon a shared understanding and mutual agreements. The crux of this possibility is the memorandum of understanding (MOU), which can take place at any interagency level. MOUs are memoranda that outline or explain the agreed upon terms between two or more parties. MOUs are not new to any particular agency. Therefore, the concept would not be difficult to explain. MOUs are also not new to the joint-interagency sphere. The United States Joint Forces Command dedicated an entire appendix to the MOU between military and civilian agencies.\footnote{US Joint Forces Command, \textit{Handbook for Military Participation in the Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization}, C–1.}

Prior to the 2006 incident, Ambassador Marks and MajGen Ghormley could have come together to discuss each of their ideas and through a MOU could have outlined, to an acceptable degree, their mutually agreed upon ideas. These memoranda will not prevent disagreements or violations of the MOU from occurring, but in the absence of authority, it is a simple idea that creates a shared understanding. The process of creating a MOU will likely ease some of the tension in the unknown. The classic statement by President Dwight D. Eisenhower applies, “Plans are worthless, but planning is everything.”\footnote{Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Remarks at the National Defense Executive Reserve Conference,” \textit{The American Presidency Project}, last modified November 14, 1957, accessed July 13, 2014, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10951.}

Agencies have used MOUs on a number of occasions where authorities were not absolute. For example, on December 5, 2012, the Departments of Defense, Interior, Agriculture,
and Energy, entered into a MOU for the protection of Indian Sacred Sites. Executive Order 13007 (Indian Sacred Sites) states:

> In managing Federal lands, each executive branch agency with statutory or administrative responsibility for the management of Federal lands shall, to the extent practicable, permitted by law, and not clearly inconsistent with essential agency functions (1) accommodate access to and ceremonial use of Indian sacred sites by Indian religious practitioners and (2) avoid adversely affecting the physical integrity of such sacred sites. Where appropriate, agencies shall maintain the confidentiality of sacred sites.

This statement was guidance to the interagency to cooperate to implement the executive order. The agencies involved each had authorities that affected Indian Sacred Sites. Therefore, to create a unified effort, the agencies participated in a MOU. This allowed for a shared understanding of the situation and facilitated cooperation between the involved parties.

In December 2008, the DOD and the Department of Homeland Security signed an MOU to “formalize the relationship . . . in areas of cooperation in [Chemical-Biological] CB Defense.” Both agencies believed that “[i]nformation sharing, interagency agreements, collaboration in science and technology, portioning of the workload, and complementing policies w[ould] improve the preparedness of the United States and its Armed forces to detect, deter, protect against, respond to, and recover from a potential CBRN attack.” The MOU clearly states that both agencies have certain statutory authorities and that the MOU was not supposed to

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183 Ibid.


185 Ibid.
inhibit any of those authorities.\textsuperscript{186} The MOU clarifies the agencies’ “missions, authorities, responsibilities, and operating principles for oversight of cooperative efforts . . . in CB Defense.”\textsuperscript{187}

Solutions for interagency integration in \textit{Phase “Z”} vary. Some solutions require significant changes in the national security system, as well as in statute, while others are simpler to implement. The PNSR proposed three options in \textit{Forging a New Shield}, but each of the options required agencies to “give up” some of their authority. President and Chief Executive Officer of the PNSR, James Locher III, claims that lack of will or the ability to see the need for national security reform prevented the implementation of any solutions that would meet the challenges of the 21st century.\textsuperscript{188} The PNSR contributed greatly to the interagency topic and its publications will continue to loom in the shadows until the US government decides to take a hard look at national security reform. In the meantime, the interagency can use the MOU concept as a method for creating a shared understanding of the situation as well as creating a unified effort.

\textbf{Conclusion}

One reason why interagency integration receives more attention during \textit{Phase “Z”} than in other phases is because the United States is typically in \textit{Phase “Z”} in most places of the world. The other reason is that \textit{Phase “Z”} possesses unique characteristics, as compared to the other phases of joint operations, where diplomacy is the primary tool for securing US interests. The United States also emphasizes a whole-of-government approach when addressing national

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{187} Ibid., 1.
\item \textsuperscript{188} James Locher III, “PNSR Bids Farewell As It Ends Operations.” James Locher III contributed greatly to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, 1986, and believed that the United States needed another reform for interagency action.
\end{itemize}
security and strategic issues. In a whole-of-government approach, interagency integration is a key component.

This work examined interagency integration in *Phase “Z”* by first defining *Phase “Z”* and then by examining how each of the most relevant agencies plan for this phase. This examination revealed that the different US government agencies plan from the strategic to the tactical levels without a formalized system to link them together. However, to create unity of effort in the absence of a formalized interagency planning methodology, the different agencies developed methods and programs (e.g., DOD’s Promote Cooperation series of conferences and the DOD-DOS personnel exchange program) to maintain unity of effort. The main issue for interagency integration did not seem to lie in a faulty interagency planning system, although there is plenty of room for improvement. The main interagency integration issues in *Phase “Z”* seem to occur in the execution of those plans because of insufficient authorities.

The 2006 Africa case study displayed how interagency integration during *Phase “Z”* was less than optimal because of an insufficient national security structure. Ambassador Bellamy and MajGen Ghormley could not agree upon which strategy to pursue in the region and because each had their own authority and chains of command, both took their organizations in different directions preventing unity of effort in the HOA region. Although positive working *relationships* will always be a key element in interagency integration, proper authority provides a framework upon which those *relationships* can interact. The system in the HOA region relied upon *relationships* and coordination, but the case study revealed the importance of having proper authorities in place.

The current national security structure is not adequate to meet the demands of the 21st century. National security experts, like those who contributed to PNSR, conducted extensive analysis on the current system and published *Forging a New Shield*, which is one of the most detailed and investigative reports outlining fixes to the national security structure. The proposals, however, seem to be out of the realm of possibility due to the amount of change that the proposals
require. The Mission Manager concept by Dr. Lamb and Ambassador Marks does not require a significant change in the security structure, but it still requires legislative action, and for agencies to “give up” some of their authority. Until there is a change to the national security structure, the MOU is a reliable resource to achieve interagency unity of effort.
Appendix 1

CONSENT AND USE AGREEMENT FOR ORAL HISTORY MATERIALS

You have the right to choose whether or not you will participate in this oral history interview, and once you begin you may cease participating at any time without penalty. The anticipated risk to you in participating is negligible and no direct personal benefit has been offered for your participation. If you have questions about this research study, please contact the student at: ______________________ or Dr. Robert F. Baumann, Director of Graduate Degree Programs, at (913) 684-2742.

To: Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Room 3517, Lewis & Clark Center
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

1. I, _______________________, participated in an oral history interview conducted by _______________________, a graduate student in the Master of Military Art and Science Degree Program, on the following date [s]: _________________________________ concerning the following topic: ________________________________________________________.

2. I understand that the recording [s] and any transcript resulting from this oral history will belong to the U.S. Government to be used in any manner deemed in the best interests of the Command and General Staff College or the U.S. Army, in accordance with guidelines posted by the Director, Graduate Degree Programs and the Center for Military History. I also understand that subject to security classification restrictions I will be provided with a copy of the recording for my professional records. In addition, prior to the publication of any complete edited transcript of this oral history, I will be afforded an opportunity to verify its accuracy.

3. I hereby expressly and voluntarily relinquish all rights and interests in the recording [s] with the following caveat:

   _____ None _____ Other: ____________________________________________________

I understand that my participation in this oral history interview is voluntary and I may stop participating at any time without explanation or penalty. I understand that the tapes and transcripts resulting from this oral history may be subject to the Freedom of Information Act, and therefore, may be releasable to the public contrary to my wishes. I further understand that, within the limits of the law, the U.S. Army will attempt to honor the restrictions I have requested to be placed on these materials.

___________________________________________________________________________
Name of Interviewee                           Signature                                               Date

___________________________________________________________________________
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Bibliography


