Implementing the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime: Much Reorganization Required

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Abstract

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The United States national security structure and law enforcement communities are poorly organized to counter the expanding threats posed by transnational organized crime. While international awareness of these threats is increasing, demonstrated by the growing volume of discussion on the subject in official documents of the United States\(^1\) and United Nations\(^2\), as well as in academic institutions\(^3\), the plan to address these threats has stalled. In the years since President Obama signed the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, outlining the threats posed by these organizations and making several recommendations for a way ahead\(^4\), not much forward momentum has occurred in the implementation of that strategy. Substantial discussion occurs at think tanks and military universities about the need for new ideas and better organization to address these illicit networks, but more than two years after establishing a strategy there is still no single organization designated as the national-level lead to synchronize the fight or prioritize the use of resources.

This paper will examine the urgent need for a reexamination of our national security structure and will propose organizational changes intended to enable a whole-of-government, even whole-of-society approach, to combat transnational organized crime. An interim organizational solution will be provided due to an acknowledgement of the lengthy process required to establish new federal organizations and redesign or absorb others. Examples of successful organizational networks and counter-network organizations will be provided as possible models for a future National Center to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (NCCTOC).
Ultimately, the reforms required to address the threats posed by transnational organized crime will require an extensive reorganization of the United States law enforcement and national security structures as well as a thorough reexamination of the legislation which divides those functions. Why is such sweeping legislation required at a time when the economic outlook for the United States is still somewhat in doubt? Most of the leading authorities on transnational organized crime believe it is an ominous and growing threat to the United States and ultimately the stability of world order.\(^5\) Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, in testimony to the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, stated, “Transnational Organized Crime is an abiding threat to US economic and national security. Criminals can play a significant role in weakening stability and undermining the rule of law in some emerging democracies and areas of strategic importance to the United States.”\(^6\) Author Douglas Farah has observed that global stability is further undermined by the increasing number of nations that are becoming “criminalized states” with their senior leaders allowing or even encouraging organized illicit activities.\(^7\)

Evidence suggests a forty-year trend toward increasing cooperation between the large, established transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) such as the Chinese Triads, the Italian Mafia, the Russian Mob, Colombian cartels and the Japanese Yakuza.\(^8\) All of these organizations have established some degree of cooperation with other large syndicates operating from countries around the globe, making the task of mapping the network relationships between these criminal enterprises extremely difficult.\(^9\)
In addition to the chaos generated by networks purely motivated by profit through illicit activity, there is mounting evidence that transnational crime poses an even more ominous threat. Capitalizing on the smuggling techniques of some of the most dangerous TCOs, many terrorist groups, insurgents and in some cases, rogue states appear to be employing transnational criminal activity as a new way of war. As an example, Lebanese Hezbollah fight as proxies of Iran against both Israel and the enemies of the Assad regime in Syria while financing many of their operations through illicit trade in cocaine from South America moved through networks in West Africa and the Middle East to new markets in Europe. Criminal activities allow these organizations to conduct their version of unconventional warfare while largely or completely financing their operations through illicit gains. Without the need for funding from a sympathetic national sponsor these malicious networks are extremely low cost and potentially deniable weapons of war. While substantial resources are committed to tracking and in some cases targeting terrorist organizations worldwide, the criminal networks the terrorist groups affiliate with operate with much greater freedom of movement.

Warnings of this evolving way of warfare started with the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1991 Martin van Creveld wrote, “Tomorrow’s warmaking organizations will not recognize the kind of distinctions that, in the past, allowed governments but not individuals to profit from war.” Many authors, journalists and pundits predict an increasing number of armed insurgent and terrorist groups, as well as some nations, are turning to international illicit activity to fund military and intelligence activities. When the Iranian government could no longer fully finance Hezbollah, a terrorist organization
with a thirty year history of violent action against United States military targets, that organization expanded its illicit activities to make up for the lost funding. At least two permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, Russia and China, have very extensive transnational criminal organizations operating from inside their sovereign territory.

This asymmetric, self-financing way of warmaking is expanding. Linkages between groups and nations hostile to the United States are occurring despite no easily explained unity of purpose. Iran's close ties with the Bolivarian Alliance (ALBA) nations of Latin America is evidence of a disturbing trend of anti-US alliances occurring across vast religious, ideological and cultural divides.

Rapid population growth and urbanization will contribute to the threat posed by these organizations. In the span of just one generation the global community is facing a population surge matching the growth of the entire recorded human population up to 1960, and almost all of that will occur in some of the world's poorest cities. Even with significant advances in economic well-being in these cities, they will still be ripe recruiting grounds for criminal organizations.

If the threat posed by TCOs warranted a strategy from the White House to fight it then a plan to implement the strategy must follow at some point. With all the agreement that there must be a new whole-of-government (WOG) approach to address these threats, what are the organizational and legislative changes required to combat these expanding and converging threats?
Challenges to Implementing Effective CTOC Strategy

The boundaries established by the bureaucratic organizations of the US Government hobble timely and effective responses to these transnational threats. The self-imposed bureaucratic fences between each agency, bureau, authority, or geographic boundary prevent the rapid pursuit and arrest of these illicit actors.\(^{21}\) The challenges posed by international laws as well as well-intended but ineffective eradication efforts, trade sanctions, and what Robert Mandel refers to as “conflicted mass public outcry,”\(^{22}\) serve to make implementing an effective CTOC strategy all the more challenging.

The fiscal constraints currently faced by the United States make any discussion of forming any new national level organization a difficult one. These budget limitations may pose the most significant challenge to implementing the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. While TCOs make significant profits from their activities, the organizations tasked to combat them require resources and revenue from the taxpayers who are threatened by those very same organizations.\(^{23}\)

Success Stories

While the United States and other countries struggle to find the right solution to effectively address the threats posed by TCOs, there are some success stories at the
tactical and operational levels. With less than 7,000 personnel covering 227 assignments in the United States and 87 offices abroad, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has the extra-jurisdictional authority to pursue narcotics traffickers anywhere on earth.\textsuperscript{24} As many TCOs and terrorist organizations expand their illicit activities away from the narcotics trade, perhaps the resources of the DEA would be better spent focused on only the most dangerous TCOs, regardless of the illicit activity in which that group is presently engaged.

In efforts to interdict the flow of illicit narcotics into the United States, Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) is widely acknowledged as the U.S. government’s most successful example of effective interagency and cross-functional cooperation.\textsuperscript{25} Located in Key West, Florida and commanded by a Coast Guard admiral, JIATF-South “conducts interagency and international Detection & Monitoring operations, and facilitates the interdiction of illicit trafficking and other narco-terrorist threats in support of national and partner nation security.”\textsuperscript{26} The task force does this with a team consisting of assigned members and available forces from all the armed services, and many of the federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies of the United States as well as several partner nations throughout the Americas along with France, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Spain.\textsuperscript{27} While many observers of JIATF-South believe such an organization would be difficult to duplicate in other environments,\textsuperscript{28} the lessons learned from this organization are certainly worth retaining and emulating where possible.

The DEA and JIATF-South, along with their many partner US agencies as well as the militaries and law enforcement organizations of partner nations, have demonstrated
through interdiction efforts the vulnerability of the TCOs during the transportation phase of their illicit activities. There are significant advantages in also targeting the transportation apparatus of these organizations. Focusing a CTOC campaign on individuals known as "super fixers and shadow facilitators" presents opportunities to remove key individuals with the knowledge and human networks to move illicit items, regardless of what those items are, thus disrupting a TCOs ability to make a profit from those illicit items. Targeting this select group of individuals avoids the pitfalls involved in the costly and often counterproductive eradication campaigns of the past thirty years.

A true success story in the fight against TCOs at the international level is the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental, policy-making body with twenty years of experience in separating criminal organizations from their profits. Established by the 1989 G-7 Conference in Paris, the FATF expanded its member nations from 16 in 1991 to the current membership of 33 nations, Hong Kong, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the European Commission. Using a combination of monitoring, training assistance and financial incentives, the FATF has seen expanding success in enabling countries to disrupt the money-laundering activities of criminal organizations. While this assistance is probably beneficial in each nation's battle against its own domestic criminal organizations, it is proving to be an essential part of the international fight against TCOs.

At the individual country level, Colombia can now be seen as a success story in a struggle against extremely violent TCOs over a period of more than thirty years. That effort took thousands of Colombian lives and billions of US dollars to achieve. Any effective strategy to degrade TCOs must employ all resources available across the
whole-of-government (WOG) and whole-of-society (WOS). Any effort to replicate the plans used in that campaign could not be sustained by the United States or any other nation due to the enormous costs associated with the effort.

TCOs are involved in illicit activities because of the enormous profits they reap from those crimes. Any national level organization responsible for the synchronization of global CTOC strategy must establish and maintain focus on separating the TCO from profit. The successful operations of organizations such as the DEA, FATF and JIATF-South demonstrate the efficiency of maintaining that focus.

An Interim Solution

A lasting solution to CTOC will require extensive thought and discussion, followed by legislative action, both within the United States government as well as enduring diplomatic efforts internationally. Even with great determination, these legislative actions will probably take many years to enact, but as most of the authorities on TCOs agree, there is no time to waste. Understanding that TCOs are all essentially networks, the ideal lead organization for establishing and maintaining a global network to counter these threat networks is the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). In its designated role as the Department of Defense lead agency for tracking global terrorist networks as well as countering threat financing, SOCOM and its affiliated special operations organizations already have years of experience in tracking and targeting dangerous networks and the financial transactions that support them.
As a leading authority on the threat posed by TCOs, Douglas Farah sees region-specific intelligence as key to right-sizing specific campaigns against TCOs. In each Geographic Combatant Command (GCC), the Theater Special Operation Command (TSOC) currently provides the GCC commander with connectivity to regional networks as well as a bridge across interagency lines. The TSOCs also serve as a hub for regional-specific intelligence fusion and an awareness of the realities on the ground in regards to the willingness of regional nations to pursue, prosecute or extradite TCO members and associates. Regionally-tailored responses are largely considered the only way to conduct CTOC effectively. In coordination with a refocused interagency task force at SOCOM, as well as additional interagency personnel at the TSOCs, perhaps the tide of expanding TCO activity can be slowed, disrupted or at a minimum diagrammed and tracked.

Internationally the areas at greatest risk for exploitation by TCOs have been referred to as the “Non-Integrating Gap” or “geopolitical black holes.” These are the areas that need the greatest focus of our whole-of-government approach. Unstable areas offer TCOs and other nefarious actors ripe recruiting grounds, and while the United States cannot and should not police all these areas on its own, the NCCTOC should provide coordination and assistance to those nongovernmental organizations (NGO) that seek to make a difference.

Addressing these threats requires more work than even a whole-of-government approach can deliver. Much time, effort, and funding must focus on energizing a whole-of-society approach. Such a line of operation cannot be a repeat of the failed drug demand reduction programs of the past, where much of the federal, state and local
efforts and funding were spent attempting to reduce the demand for illicit products. These efforts must be continued but only in partnership with community activists, clergy and the media. The role of any national-level organization in this effort should only go as far as sponsoring workshops and seminars where the illicit activities of a TCO are exposed to the scrutiny of society. This is a line of operation where government led programs in the United States and other countries have a long history of failure.

Extensive Governmental Reorganization Required

Ultimately any effective implementation of the CTOC strategy will require an extensive reorganization of the national security and federal law enforcement establishments of the U.S. government. While many interagency task forces have had tremendous success against TCOs, they tend to be short-term, ad hoc organizations with relatively short existences. The adaptive and growing nature of the threat requires a much more permanent and lasting solution. A National Center to Combat Transnational Organized Crime (NCCTOC) will require all the authorities needed to orchestrate campaigns against all activities of highly networked and adaptive TCOs.

The origins, organization and scope of the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) provide the best model for a national level coordination center to orchestrate an effective CTOC strategy. In 2004, Executive Order 13354 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act provided the legal basis for the establishment of the NCTC. The Director of the NCTC has a unique reporting chain, both to the Director of National Intelligence but also directly to the President. While such direct access may
not be required for a future director of the NCCTOC, the two organizations would ideally collaborate on issues of immediate national security threats.

The emphasis placed on establishing NCTC through executive and legislative action resulted from the shock of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While the White House has not implemented any additional guidance since the publication of the CTOC strategy, and Congress has been slow to recognize the gravity of the threat, the manner in which NCTC was established nevertheless provides the best example for the establishment of the NCCTOC. The threat of a terrorist act requires an immediate timely response, while the threat posed by most TCOs requires a deliberate, long-term campaign.

Just as NCTC provides an example of the design required for the proposed NCCTOC, the current business practices of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) may provide an even better model for actually moving forces against a targeted TCO. FEMA’s current business model provides an excellent example of a relatively small agency with tremendous reach during disaster response. When a crisis such as Hurricane Sandy strikes, FEMA quickly transforms from a staff of 7,500 to a highly orchestrated response force of tens of thousands. Coming from the full spectrum of Federal, State, Local and Tribal agencies, law enforcement, emergency medical teams, firefighters, utility companies and military personnel all converge with a great deal of coordination and cooperation. FEMA transforms itself during crises into a virtual organization of both bureaucracies and networks, reaching out across a vast array of authorities and functionalities through a daily rhythm of three to five tightly managed video teleconferences. Many of these teleconferences start with words from the FEMA
administrator, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), or occasionally even the President of the United States. The comments provide focus to the assembled audiences. The comments are brief but instructive and effectively provide unity of effort, if even for a short while.49

As a model of a virtual organization of both bureaucracies and networks, FEMA’s business practices suggest that the NCCTOC does not need a large standing work force. It needs to follow the example of FEMA and require each employee to establish and expand his or her own network across a specific functionality. Because most of the organizations, agencies and networks required for an effective CTTOC strategy fall across a broad array of international law enforcement, military, NGOs, activists and others, a continued reliance on SOCOM and its global SOF network is to be expected. Understanding this, the NCCTOC should be staffed with counter-network professionals from across the IA but specifically SOF intelligence specialists.

If a targeted TCO suddenly ceases its involvement in the movement and sale of illicit narcotics and turns to the trafficking of humans, a designated task force commander must have the authority to continue the campaign against the TCO. Again, the United States government has examples of current legislation providing a commander in field with more than one authority to use force. The United States Coast Guard has a very long and successful history of operating with both the law enforcement authorities of Title 14 and Title 19 United States Code (USC), as well as the ability to transition to Title 10 USC when operating as an arm of the U.S. Navy. This enables the Coast Guard to operate fluidly as either a military organization or a law enforcement agency.50
An effective CTOC strategy needs doctrinal publications to provide all who are participating in the fight against an illicit network with as much information as possible about their day to day role in the campaign. Again an excellent example currently exists in the US government in the form of the National Response Framework (NRF) published by DHS.\textsuperscript{51} When a disaster strikes anywhere in the United States the NRF provides the strategy for the response. In responding to these crises, many of the responding organizations are authorized by law to move immediately without seeking authorization,\textsuperscript{52} but many others outside the affected area simply assemble and wait for orders or directives to move into the impacted area. An effective CTOC doctrine must replicate the cross-functionality, whole-of-government approach found in the NRF in which every individual from the tactical level law enforcement officer or deployed military service member all the way up to the national level coordination center knows their role in the interconnected CTOC fight.

In addition to the NRF, the National Incident Response System (NIMS) provides the doctrine for the operational and tactical level organizational of the actual on-scene response to a disaster. NCCTOC will need a similar doctrine to guide the manner in which each incident of a designated TCO is handled. This will certainly require significant input from the Geographic Combatant Commander and the State Department embassy teams in any affected country or region.

The NCCTOC can use the organizational challenges and lessons learned from both NCTC and DHS (more specifically FEMA) to avoid starting from scratch. While the challenges posed by the laws of the United States, international law and the sovereignty
of nations is daunting, so too are the legal authorities facing the NCTC and FEMA almost every day.

Orchestrating the Whole of Society Response

Education and awareness play a key part in any whole of society approach to CTOC. Unlike the failed drug demand reduction strategies of the “War on Drugs,” mobilizing a true whole-of-society response must involve listening to, and adopting, the strategies of some groups who have often been at odds with the military, law enforcement and oftentimes society itself. A division of the NCCTOC must be established to build and fuel this WOS response, with the authority and funding to reach out to the media, the entertainment industry, and clergy as well as community and environmental activists.53

Rapid decentralization among TCOs54 will require an increasingly decentralized response. Even inside the United States the available intelligence from 750,000 law enforcement officers in 17,500 local and state law enforcement agencies remains largely untapped at the national level.55 Expanding the discussion to all jurisdictions in every participating country illustrates the scale of the networks within networks inside various communities of interest (law enforcement, judiciary, military, activists, media, environmentalists, and clergy). While any designated lead agency should not be harnessed to leading efforts across the entire WOG, that agency should have the resources and personnel to participate in most if not all planning efforts across the spectrum.56
Any attempt to militarize the breadth of the CTOC strategy would be a mistake. Eradications efforts have in many cases resulted in unintended consequences, in some cases worse than not having taken any action at all. Understanding that, the United States military, interagency and coalition partners have demonstrated an appreciation and an application of the lessons learned from a forty-year War on Drugs, and more than a decade of fighting networks connected to the War on Terror. Careful targeting of the TCO weak points is essential. USSOCOM, NCCTOC, or whatever agency is eventually designated to orchestrate the global strategy to combat transnational organized crime must lead the effort to focus on separating the most dangerous TCOs from their ill-gotten gains and the transporters and facilitators who move their products and money.

Endnotes


3 George Mason University established its Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) as “the first center in the United States devoted to understanding the links among terrorism, transnational crime and corruption, and to teach, research, train and help formulate policy on these critical issues. TraCCC is a research center within the School of Public Policy at George Mason University.” Accessed at http://traccc.gmu.edu/about-us/ on 18
January 2014; Harvard, Yale and Georgetown Universities all have courses addressing the threats and challenges posed by transnational organized crime.


9 Ibid, 67.


12 Ibid, 372.


15 Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah, 372.


Naim, Illicit, 248.

Mandel, Dark Logic, 164. Mandel states that while there may be mass public outcry against the criminal acts of a TCO, the same individuals may very well be benefiting from the jobs and other opportunities provided by that same TCO’s activities.


Killebrew, “Crime Wars,” 42.


Ibid, 4.


31 Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, 156.


38 Ibid, 166; Naim, Illicit, 258.


42 Ibid.


44 Naim, Illicit, 261.
Naim, Illicit, 249; Mandel, Dark Logic, 159.

Naim, Illicit, 248.


The use of the term “forces” here covers the array of response needed for CTOC. As an example, one force might be a law enforcement or military unit or a public awareness campaign.

Observations of the author while assigned to National Guard Bureau Current Operations Division (NGB-J33) from January 2012 through July 2013.


Naim, Illicit, 259.

Naim, Illicit, 226; Mandel, Dark Logic, 20.

Christopher Dauer, “Local Law Enforcement Seeks Increased Collaboration in US Anti-Terrorist Events,” February 1, 2012, http://ctocevent.com/media/7200/2368.pdf (accessed January 19, 2014). Dauer quotes Michael P. Downing, Deputy Chief and Commanding Officer of the Counter-Terrorism Special Operations Bureau for the Los Angeles Police Department, as he describes the intelligence collection plan in the greater Los Angeles area (an area encompassing 166 law enforcement agencies), “We’ve identified the threats in the area and prioritized the threat…. [w]e still recognize the FBI is the quarterback in this game.” This is an example of local and regional security forces acknowledging the authority of federal agencies with extra-jurisdictional authority to coordinate the response to transnational actors.

As an example, the agency tasked to coordinate CTOC strategy should be resourced to provide an attendee at meetings of clergy and non-governmental agencies without necessarily providing endorsement to the planned activities of those groups.

Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up, 156.