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AN ANALYSIS OF MODERN STATE-LEVEL TERRORIST DERADICALIZATION CAMPAIGNS

by

Justin A. Duvall, Lee C. Novy, and Calvin A. Knox

December 2012

Thesis Advisor: Michael Freeman
Second Reader: Doowan Lee

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The purpose of this thesis is to identify the optimal characteristics of a terrorist deradicalization campaign. A deradicalization campaign consists of all efforts a state or organization leverages to prevent the rise of or to disrupt terrorist organizations. A persistent difficulty with evaluating deradicalization "programs" stems from conflating different levels of analysis ranging from individual in-jail programs to broader national campaigns. The primary scope of this research extends to identifying key programs or factors required for state-run deradicalization campaigns to be effective. The initial framework used to evaluate these campaigns is composed of four lines of effort (LOE): individual disengagement, collective disengagement, individual deradicalization, and collective deradicalization. A series of mechanisms operationalize each LOE. This framework will be applied to historical and ongoing deradicalization efforts in Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Indonesia in order to develop relevant, empirically-based conclusions.
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AN ANALYSIS OF MODERN STATE-LEVEL TERRORIST DERADICALIZATION CAMPAIGNS

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to identify the optimal characteristics of a terrorist deradicalization campaign. A deradicalization campaign consists of all efforts a state or organization leverages to prevent the rise of or to disrupt terrorist organizations. A persistent difficulty in evaluating deradicalization “programs” stems from conflating different levels of analysis ranging from individual in-jail programs to broader national campaigns. The primary scope of this research extends to identifying key programs or factors required for state-run deradicalization campaigns to be effective. The initial framework used to evaluate these campaigns is composed of four lines of effort (LOE): individual disengagement, collective disengagement, individual deradicalization, and collective deradicalization. A series of mechanisms operationalize each LOE. This framework will be applied to historical and ongoing deradicalization efforts in Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Indonesia in order to develop relevant, empirically-based conclusions.
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<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Aden-Abyan Army (Yemen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIS</td>
<td>Islamic Salvation Army (Algeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALN</td>
<td>National Liberation Army (Algeria)</td>
</tr>
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<td>ANP</td>
<td>People’s National Army (Algeria)</td>
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<td>AQ</td>
<td>Al-Qa’ida</td>
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<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al-Qa’ida in Islamic Maghreb (Algeria)</td>
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<td>AQY</td>
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<td>AQAP</td>
<td>Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula</td>
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<td>CFD</td>
<td>Committee for Dialogue (Yemen)</td>
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<td>DDII</td>
<td><em>Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia</em> (Indonesia)</td>
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<td>Det 88</td>
<td>Detachment 88 (Indonesia)</td>
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<td>DRS</td>
<td>Department of Intelligence Services (Algeria)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIS</td>
<td>Islamic Salvation Front (Algeria)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLN</td>
<td>National Liberation Front (Algeria)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIA</td>
<td>Armed Islamic Group (Algeria)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPC</td>
<td>General People’s Congress (Yemen)</td>
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<td>GSPC</td>
<td>Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Algeria)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>IJY</td>
<td>Islamic Jihad in Yemen</td>
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<td>JAT</td>
<td><em>Jamaah Ansharud Tauhid</em> (Indonesia)</td>
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<td>JI</td>
<td><em>Jemaah Islamiyah</em> (Indonesia)</td>
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<td>LOE</td>
<td>Line(s) of Effort</td>
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MB  Muslim Brotherhood (Indonesia)

MMI  Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesia)

NGO  Non-Governmental Organization

OIF  Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

PKS  Prosperous Justice Party (Indonesia)

PSO  Political Security Organization (Yemen)

SBY  Soldier’s Brigade in Yemen

U.S.  United States
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The purpose of this thesis is to identify the optimal characteristics of a terrorist deradicalization campaign. A deradicalization campaign consists of all efforts a state can leverage to prevent the rise of or to disrupt terrorist organizations. As discussed in the literature review, a persistent difficulty with evaluating deradicalization “programs” stems from conflating different levels of analysis ranging from individual in-jail programs to broader national campaigns.

The primary scope of this research extends to identifying key programs or factors required for state-run deradicalization campaigns to be effective. The framework used to evaluate these campaigns is composed of four lines of effort (LOE): individual disengagement, collective disengagement, individual deradicalization, and collective deradicalization. A series of mechanisms operationalize each LOE.

B. BACKGROUND

Said Ali al-Shihri spent six years at Guantanamo Bay as a prisoner and was sent back to Saudi Arabia as a repatriated militant in November 2007. After ten weeks he was released from the Prince Mohammed bin Nayef Centre for Care and Counseling. By 2009, he was in Yemen and served as the leader of the Al-Qa’ida cell that claimed responsibility for the attempted airline attack in the United States on Christmas Day (Goldman, 2010). Was al-Shihri an anomaly after going through such elaborate re-education training? Or, does his case represent a more systematic problem with

---

1 The authors define a deradicalization campaign as a broad set of deradicalization efforts. Recent radicalization programs are limited to in-jail and/or detainee-based initiatives. Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, & Boucek (2010) claim that successful deradicalization programs are broad, rigorous, and comprehensive efforts that oppose the “affective, pragmatic, and ideological commitment” (p. xvi) to the group. To be effective, these programs require three components: employed interlocutor(s) that are viewed as credible in the eyes of the rehabilitated individuals; assistance to ex-militants and their families in finding employment, housing, health care, and education; after-care programs that continue monitoring rehabilitated extremists in order to deter recidivism and support social integration. This thesis will attempt to analyze potential instruments of deradicalization within a clearly defined, contextualized social/cultural environment.
deradicalization campaigns that could be addressed to improve their effectiveness? His completion of the Counseling Program and subsequent return to violence demonstrates the utility of exploring the effectiveness of deradicalization campaigns.

Simply put, an effective deradicalization effort is vital to suppressing future terrorist activities. Recognizing the inherent potential for terrorist recidivism, deradicalization campaigns are necessary in order to prevent attacks by a large pool of experienced insurgents and combatants. In other words, states need to consider how to efficiently deter future enrollment in radical groups, continue disrupting existing groups, and enable deradicalization of terrorists who have already disengaged from violent activity.

C. RESEARCH QUESTION

What constitutes an effective deradicalization campaign? In particular, the authors analyze if an optimal combination of individual and collective programs can be determined in order to reduce terrorism. In addition, we intend to examine how the components of effective deradicalization campaigns can be used to understand why and how terrorist groups can be induced to deradicalize by answering the research question.

Within the methodological framework, the authors define four lines of effort (LOE): individual disengagement, collective disengagement, individual deradicalization, and collective deradicalization. Additionally, the following nested questions guide the research:

- Are certain LOEs more or less effective by themselves? Given resource scarcity, which LOEs are essential?
- Are combinations of LOEs optimal? If so, what is the optimal combination?
- To what degree do cultural, environmental, or cultural conditions matter?

D. RADICALIZATION

The literature on radicalization can be broadly categorized into two approaches where one focuses on individual factors and the other on collective factors. Early literature argued that political terrorists were driven to commit acts of violence as a
consequence of psychological forces tied to a unique “psycho-logic” that allowed these individuals to justify perpetrating seemingly random acts of violence (Post, 1998, p. 25). In addition to trying to identify a common psychological profile for terrorists, a large debate existed centering on socio-economic factors that drove individuals towards terrorism. Common conditions were fraternal deprivation, poverty, lack of employment, or lack of education.

A common misconception is that radicalization is an individual phenomenon triggered by a variety of socio-economic conditions. For example, one idea is that poverty leads to terrorism because young men who are poor become angry and easily radicalize to commit acts of terror. However, extensive field research has been conducted to gather empirical data, which has led to socio-economic theories being refuted (Horgan, 2005; Moghaddam, 2004; Post, 2007; Sageman, 2004). These conditions are important factors, but they are not sufficient to cause radicalization.

More importantly, the key ingredient is not even an individual’s material status or hierarchical rank within the organization. Rather, it is the collective identity of the terrorist group. Individuals begin the process, wittingly or not, because of the innate human need for collective identity. An individual may have grievances about his socio-economic position, but grievances will not exclusively lead to radicalization. It is the combination of grievances and a lacking collective identity that lead an individual to accept a group’s radical moral code. It is after this willing acceptance that an individual graduates to adopting a radically deviant belief structure that guides his own thoughts and actions.

While one cannot downplay free will or discount the role of the individual, there is growing emphasis on the enormous role that group dynamics play in the radicalization process. More specifically, the notion of collective identity has emerged as a primary

---

2 Moghaddam (2006) defines fraternal deprivation as relative deprivation that an individual feels because of their group’s position in society (p. 22).
force that pushes individuals to accept violence and to conduct terrorism as a means to fix socio-economic grievances (Horgan, 2009; Moghaddam, 2006; Post, 2007; Taylor & Lewis, 2004).

On the other hand, the second approach puts more emphasis on how collective dynamics are more responsible for radicalization. Collective identity should be viewed as an organizational adhesive that not only establishes and maintains the ideological norms and values for the group, but also serves as a powerful force that compels group members to take action. Collective identity is succinctly described as:

a description of the group to which individuals belong, which serves as the normative backdrop against which they can articulate their unique attributes...collective identity is primary. The collective identity of a terrorist organization describes the group’s beliefs, values, attitudes, and goals. Moreover, it specifies the routes an individual might take to internalize the values and achieve the goals. The individual terrorist now has a template against which to formulate his or her own personal identity. (Taylor & Lewis, 2004, pp. 171–173)

Related to collective identity, the Social Network Theory of radicalization posits that the Global Salafi Jihad is an emergent quality of the informal tie formed by alienated young men who become transformed into fanatics (Sageman, 2004). Within this theory, it is argued that relative deprivation, religious predisposition, and ideological appeal may be necessary, but they are not sufficient conditions for terrorist activity. Social bonds are the critical element to the process (Sageman, 2004).

Conceptually, collective identity and social networks appear to be analogous to push/pull factors. A group’s collective identity—in addition to the strong sense of purpose and meaning accompanying this identity—pushes behavioral norms to individual members and elicits within each member a sense of duty to take action on behalf of the group. Concurrently, strong social bonds and relationships often pull individuals into the group and pave the way for dynamic socialization processes and collective identity to influence and shape the behavior of all members.

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3 In Leaving Terrorism Behind, Tore Bjorgo (2009) first introduces the concept of “push and pull” factors. The authors apply the concept differently when compared to Bjorgo’s application.
E. DERADICALIZATION VS. DISENGAGEMENT

Before one can analyze deradicalization, it is important to understand the difference between deradicalization and disengagement. The distinction is necessary to identify what objectives should be pursued when a campaign tries to reverse radicalization. Disengagement defines the process involving a “change in role or function that is usually associated with a reduction of violent participation” (Horgan, 2009, p. 152). Disengagement aims to separate individuals or groups from violent behavior. Deradicalization is the “social/psychological process whereby an individual’s commitment to, and involvement in, violent radicalization is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement and engagement in violent activity” (Horgan, 2009, p. 153). Deradicalization looks to change the ideology or beliefs that fuel violent behavior. It also refers to initiatives aimed at reducing the risk of terrorist recidivism.

Ashour (2009) identifies three types of deradicalization: comprehensive, substantive, and pragmatic (p. 6). Comprehensive deradicalization refers to a successful deradicalization process at all three levels (ideological, behavioral, and organizational).4 Substantive deradicalization achieves success at the ideological and behavioral levels, but not at the organizational level. This is typically caused by splits, fractionalization, internal organizational conflict and/or marginalization of deradicalized group leaders. The third type, pragmatic deradicalization, refers to success at the behavioral and organizational levels only (Ashour, 2009, p. 6).

While the above definitions and concepts complement each other, they lead to a potentially critical analytical flaw within the literature. Existing works on deradicalization implicitly and explicitly subscribe to multiple levels of evaluation such as individual, collective, and national efforts. This is problematic because without a common unit of analysis it is hard to adequately distill common components for an

---

4 Ashour (2009) defines three fundamental levels of deradicalization. The three levels are ideological, behavioral, and organizational. The ideological level aims to change the attitudes of armed Islamist movements toward violence. The behavioral level occurs when groups abandon the use of violence in pursuit of political goals. Deradicalization at the organizational level results through the “dismantlement of the armed units of the organization, which includes discharging/demobilizing their members without splits, mutiny, or internal violence” (Ashour, 2009, p. 6).
effective campaign. Additionally, many authors interchangeably use disengagement and deradicalization; in doing so, they confuse the reader while increasing the degree of ambiguity. This confusion also obscures how to define prescriptive measures clearly.

Understanding the difference between deradicalization and disengagement illustrates that states have different mechanisms to stop violence on different levels. As part of a campaign to stop terrorist/extremist violence within its borders, states can aim to deradicalize terrorists, disengage terrorists, or both. With this in mind, states have at their disposal a variety of deradicalization and disengagement mechanisms that target individual terrorists and terrorist groups. These mechanisms are ingredients that can be used in varying combinations to create different campaigns.

Groups usually do not deradicalize first and then disengage from violence. Additionally, disengagement has the ability to facilitate deradicalization. Hypothetically, a group may agree to disengage due to terms of a cease-fire. The rank-and-file then return to their normal lives and, assuming all belligerents adhere to the cease-fire, the cease-fire continues indefinitely. It is possible due to the prolonged period of disengagement that members of the group may see the ideological benefits of abstaining from violence, which, in fact, demonstrates deradicalization.

F. DERADICALIZATION

Much like the literature on radicalization, deradicalization and disengagement can be understood at the individual and collective levels. At the individual level, Horgan (2009) provides a comprehensive analysis of individual profiles associated with deradicalization and disengagement. His findings are quite striking, as there are no “cookie-cutter” solutions to the processes of disengagement and/or deradicalization. The success or failure of deradicalization depends on too many variables to prescribe a
standardized solution. Horgan used empirical data from interviews with terrorists in order to develop a Pathway Model. Armed with this model, those seeking to deradicalize individuals can customize the process.

The recent body of literature on deradicalization follows state-level initiatives to ideologically moderate imprisoned radicals. Limited success at the individual level revealed that it might be more effective to target the collective causes of radicalism vice the individual causes. This led to research on targeting the group instead of the individual. Collective deradicalization rarely occurs and is extremely difficult, which is why some experts suggest that government deradicalization policies should focus on the individual terrorist rather than the group (Crenshaw, 2011, p. 109).

Some stark criticisms can be made regarding this body of literature. Unlike the literature on radicalization, which suggests that collective efforts heavily influence the individual, the literature on individual deradicalization states the very opposite—the deradicalized terrorist only affects himself. In sum, the majority of literature on deradicalization fails to properly consider the influence of collective factors on radicalization. Another glaring criticism of the literature is that it fails to emphasize the need to channel individual deradicalization efforts toward terrorist group leaders due to the massive amounts of influence and prestige leaders possess within the group.

On the collective side, early terror-related academic literature almost entirely dismisses the feasibility of collective deradicalization, and instead discusses the need to implement measures that favor counterterrorism and anti-terrorism. Allusions made by

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5 Horgan’s (2009) Pathway Model consists of the dynamic relationship between seven variables: Pre-radicalization, Radicalization, Pre-Involvement Searching, Violent Radicalization, Remaining Involved and Engaged, Disengagement, and Deradicalization (p. 151).

6 Post (1998) almost entirely dismisses the feasibility of effective terrorist deradicalization; he feels “terrorists whose only sense of significance comes from being terrorists cannot be forced to give up terrorism, for to do so would be to lose their very reason for being” (p. 38). Post also mentions that the strong sense of collective identity provided by the group leads to the survival of the group becoming paramount. Ultimately, Post favors counterterrorism through the reduction of external support to terrorist organizations, and anti-terrorism by marginalizing the attraction to terrorist groups by alienated and/or at-risk youth. Moghaddam (2006) provides four potential policy implications that contribute to the discussion about anti-terrorism: (1) Prevention First; (2) Contextualized Democracy; (3) Educate Against Us-Versus-Them; and (4) Dialogue.
Gurr (1998) and Hoffman (2006) slowly begin to bridge the gap toward a more comprehensive understanding of collective deradicalization. Gurr (1998) does not provide a compelling argument for or against collective deradicalization, but does list three processes that may contribute to the group’s internal decision to contemplate and/or initiate steps toward deradicalization: backlash, reform, and deterrence. These processes contribute to the overall discussion about collective deradicalization because they erode the political and social bases of popular support for terrorist organizations. Like Gurr, Hoffman emphasizes the importance of taking a collective approach to combating and/or countering radicalization as he states, “a bridge needs to be found between mainstream society and these militants so that they do not feel threatened and forced to withdraw psychologically into aggressive defensive stances used to justify violence” (p. 128).

Current terrorism research suggests that collective deradicalization, though harder to accomplish, is the most effective method of ending violence and countering Islamist extremism (Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, & Boucek, 2010). Rabasa et al. (2010) argue that state efforts need to focus on collective deradicalization, but must also include individual deradicalization programs. The most widely acclaimed research on collective deradicalization uses case studies to suggest causal relationship between four variables and the success of collective deradicalization (Ashour, 2009). It should be noted, however, that this research is still in its infancy and lacks adequate depth and breadth supported by empirical data.

In summary, the analysis of the literature suggests that experts now agree on the important role that collective identity plays in the radicalization process. Early theorists tended to explain radicalization as an individual process by using various psychological models. As the study of terrorism has matured, experts placed more emphasis on group, organizational, and social psychology to explain the radicalization process (Moghaddam, 2004; Post, 2007).

Following 11 September 2001, an increase in the number of detained/imprisoned radical Islamists prompted certain governments to moderate radicals by implementing numerous programs. Accordingly, scholarly research shifted toward explaining the
individual deradicalization process in order to help optimize states’ efforts. In short order, the leading terrorism experts began studying and writing about the futility of individual deradicalization and suggesting that collective deradicalization was the answer for ending violent extremism. At this point, the momentum toward collective deradicalization solutions seems stymied because of its inherent difficulty to not only conceptualize, but implement it as well.

G. RESEARCH ARGUMENT AND SUPPORTING HYPOTHESIS

In their study of deradicalization, Ashour (2009) and Rabasa et al. (2010) have identified that measures aimed at the collective, or those which have an effect upon the collective, have greater and longer lasting results when it comes to the cessation of violence. This is due to the group and social factors that have bound individuals of terrorist groups together in the first place.

Rabasa et al. (2010) acknowledge that individual deradicalization and individual and collective disengagement are part of the overall solution, however, they place more emphasis on collective deradicalization as it provides more “bang for your buck” in terms of permanently ending violence. History has shown that collective measures are more permanent than individual measures. Libya, Egypt, and Algeria all serve as examples of successful collective deradicalization (Ashour, 2009; Rabasa et al., 2010). In each of these cases, the groups that collectively deradicalized have in fact refrained from violence since their deradicalization.

Collective deradicalization occurs less frequently than collective disengagement because it requires a significant amount of time, patience, and persistence to change the ideology at the individual and group level. In some instances, collective disengagement can occur immediately because of a cease-fire agreement or an overwhelming amount of state repression in which the majority of the group is detained or killed.

The examples of collective deradicalization in Libya, Egypt, and Algeria took years to accomplish (Ashour, 2009; Rabasa et al., 2010). In each of these cases, most of the members of the groups had been captured and imprisoned for long periods of time.
The leadership then chose to deradicalize. This decision was followed by a discussion(s) with their members in order to convince them that deradicalization was the right path. These actions took a great deal of time to complete, indicating that deradicalization is an extremely painstaking, methodical process (Ashour, 2009; Rabasa et al., 2010).

In this thesis, one argument is that efforts aimed at collective deradicalization have the greatest effect based on group/social factors that bind individuals together. In the case study analysis, mechanisms that facilitate collective deradicalization or attempt to influence the group will carry more weight. Countries that use more collective mechanisms will likely rank higher in their overall deradicalization effectiveness (assuming that these particular mechanisms are being used effectively and efficiently).

The thesis argues that collective deradicalization has a greater, more long-term impact and states’ efforts must work toward this. However, it is also recognized that individual deradicalization and individual and collective disengagement play a part. With this recognition, the thesis utilizes mechanisms from all four areas, individual and collective disengagement and individual and collective deradicalization, in order to evaluate a state’s deradicalization campaign.

H. DESIGN FRAMEWORK

The literature review exposes a continued debate on the individual versus collective causes of disengagement and deradicalization. In order to address this debate, the design framework is explicitly predicated upon four components. To better understand the framework set forth, an analogy of a cook and a chef is used. The cook reads a recipe, adds the ingredients, and prepares the food in a standard manner without deviating from the recipe. The chef understands the ingredients to develop a delicious dish. The cook is more focused on the science of cooking, whereas the chef is involved in the art of cooking.

In this analogy, the ingredients are the mechanisms directed at both the individual and collective levels of disengagement and deradicalization. Most states function like the
cook when they need to operate like a chef. As chefs they can develop a creative and effective mix of mechanisms available to them to use against terrorist.

Existing models (Ashour’s included) are insufficient prescriptive tools. These tools arm states as cooks because they merely change the quantity of ingredients without understanding the important characteristic of each ingredient. The essential characteristic of each ingredient is whether it seeks to deradicalize through individual or collective-based means. The framework presented in this thesis can arm states as chefs by helping to educate them about the essential characteristics of various deradicalization programs.

With a better understanding of the essential qualities, states can make contextualized decisions about which ingredients to add or take away. In developing this framework, four lines of effort (LOE) have been identified: individual disengagement, collective disengagement, individual deradicalization, and collective deradicalization. Within these LOEs there are several mechanisms that states use against terrorist organizations. Individual disengagement mechanisms work to change the violent behavior of individual terrorists, while collective disengagement mechanisms aim to stop the violent behavior of the group as a whole. Likewise, individual deradicalization mechanisms aim to change the radical beliefs of the individual, while collective deradicalization focuses on changing the beliefs of the group. Figure 1 illustrates a non-exhaustive list of mechanisms a state can use within each LOE. We acknowledge that some the techniques have a dual role—these techniques broadly apply to counterterrorism, but the authors are primarily interested in those techniques that directly affect deradicalization and disengagement.
From this framework, the authors recognize three considerations. First, certain mechanisms may simultaneously relate to multiple LOEs. One example of such a mechanism is a state’s attempt to leverage existing social networks. Second, a state’s type of governance (democracy, authoritarian, theocracy, etc.) may affect which LOE a state uses and how the mechanisms within the LOE are utilized. Finally, state efforts towards individuals will rarely affect the group; however, state efforts against the collective will primarily have an effect on the collective, but may have a secondary effect on individuals.

To evaluate a campaign’s effectiveness, Ashour’s (2009) types of deradicalization—comprehensive, substantive, and pragmatic—are utilized. According to Ashour, each of these types of deradicalization achieves distinction based upon the inclusion or exclusion of three fundamental levels of deradicalization—ideological, behavioral, and organization. These concepts have already been defined in the literature review.
II. ALGERIA

A. BACKGROUND

This case study will evaluate Algeria’s deradicalization efforts from 1995 to the present. Ashour, the most frequently cited expert on Algerian deradicalization, consistently uses Algeria as an example of successful deradicalization. According to Ashour (2009), the presence of charismatic leadership was the variable that caused the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) to declare a cease-fire in 1997 and the absence of which caused the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) to continue its violent rampage until 2005. This thesis seeks a more nuanced explanation pertaining to the nature of the state’s efforts. To set the stage for a closer look at Algeria’s deradicalization efforts it is beneficial to understand the key points of its recent history in combating militant Islam.

In October 1988, mass protests of youth erupted against the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) and provoked a gruesome response from the Algerian security forces. The protests were not instigated by any particular group; the common grievances were a list of unsatisfactory socio-economic conditions. The government declared a state of siege, security forces intervened, 500 civilians were killed, and another 3,500 were arrested. Mass marches resulted and President Chadli Benjedid responded by ushering in a new constitution, increased freedom of press, and facilitating some level of political inclusion (Cronin, 2009, p. 155).

Benjedid’s changes brought about the establishment of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which beat the FLN in the 1991 elections. Their victory was rewarded with a bloodless coup by the National People’s Army (ANP). The ANP was the direct successor to the National Liberation Army (ALN), the armed wing of the defeated FLN party (Tlemçani, 2008, p. 12). For the next five to eight years the country spiraled deeper and deeper into civil war in which 150,000–200,000 Algerians were massacred or disappeared. The groups involved included the AIS, the armed wing of the FIS; the GIA, a splinter group with less political aspirations and a more violent approach; the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), a GIA splinter that did not want to target
civilians; and most recently Al-Qaida in the Land of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), or the remnants of GSPC under a new name. This is not an exhaustive list of all the groups involved, just the largest and those with the most responsibility for death and destruction.

In 1999, President Bouteflika was elected President on a platform for reconciliation to end the terrible cycle of violence. The security environment in Algeria is far from perfect, but under Bouteflika the country benefited from a remarkable decrease in violence. While the storm of violence has calmed there are still questions as to whether or not the grievances that preceded the violence have been addressed.7

With or without knowing, the majority of Algeria’s deradicalization efforts were focused at the group level. The research yielded very little evidence of individual deradicalization or disengagement mechanisms. That the programs worked supports the authors’ hypothesis and is in keeping with the body of literature on radicalization.

B. LINES OF EFFORT

1. Individual Disengagement

Algerian security forces are somewhat notorious because of the harsh repression alleged to have taken place during the civil war of the 1990s. Of the “soft” approaches to deradicalization, individual disengagement was the least prevalent.

a. Protection from Terrorist Group Reprisal

The government did two things to assist members with personal or family security concerns. Families of GSPC members who refused to surrender were relocated to camps run by the ANP as a means to protect them from retaliation by competing groups (Ait-Hamadouche & Zoubir, 2007, p. 110). With government assistance, a member might no longer need to stay in an armed group just to protect his family. Fear of

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7 As of 2000, 12 million Algerians were living below the poverty line. In 2006, Algeria’s Security Service reported that the wealth gap had increased and less than 20 percent of the population controlled more than 50 percent of the country’s wealth (Layachi, 2011, p. 490). Algeria was also ranked only 100 of 179 countries in a 2008 Human Development Report (United Nations, 2007).
reprisals, from within the group or other militant groups, was another barrier to group exit. In recognition of this, the government provided weapons to key leaders within the AIS in order to buttress deradicalization legislation (Ashour, 2009, p. 126). As will be discussed below, many of the casualties that AIS sustained were from attacks by the GIA. The government-provided weapons were a demonstration of good intentions to encourage the AIS to surrender.

b. Isolation in Prison Facilities

Any prisoners thought to be indoctrinating other prisoners were isolated from general populations (Hearne & Laiq, 2010, p. 3). This is a simple technique, with varying degrees of effectiveness, which aims to counter the radicalization phenomenon that traditionally thrives in prisons. A charismatic individual who proselytizes to the general population can recruit additional members to garner resources for the group. By isolating these types of people the state prevents further recruitment.

c. Provide Job Opportunities

An aspect of President Bouteflika’s campaign was to facilitate employment opportunities in order to provide alternatives for former fighters. Initiatives included giving disengaged militants their previously held jobs, providing compensation, or a retirement pension for those of age (Hearne & Laiq, 2010, p. 3). Returning to work or being provided a means of sustenance was designed to stop feelings of being wronged by the state. Additionally, it is logical that if working and earning a sufficient income, people may be less likely to participate in violent activity as a means to provide resources for themselves or family members.

To conclude, with evidence of only three mechanisms, this was the weakest of the four lines of effort in Algeria’s deradicalization campaign. Individual disengagement is the most basic tactic to reduce a terrorist organization and sometimes produces substantial results. However, governments often realize the futility of targeting individuals, so they cast larger nets to stop groups’ ability to conduct attacks. These efforts, categorized as collective disengagement, will be discussed in the next section.
2. Collective Disengagement

The majority of Algeria’s disengagement efforts were leveled at groups, not individuals. The research identified seven mechanisms with state repression being the most elaborate, consisting of numerous techniques. In 1995, the government adopted a military repression strategy against Islamic militant groups because an Army General, Liamine Zeroual, won the Presidential election (Ashour, 2009, p. 118). Witnessing several failed negotiation attempts between the government and the FIS during the 1990s, Zeroual determined that a change in strategy was appropriate (Tlemçani, 2008; Roberts, 2003).

a. Environmental Manipulation

A common goal for many of the Islamists groups was to overthrow the regime in favor of an Islamic state (Tawil, 2010, p. 68). However, the government intelligence service facilitated the disengagement of the AIS and others by keeping many groups with common goals polarized to each other via covert infiltration (International Crisis Group, 2004, p. 4). “There is no doubt that the Algerian army’s intelligence services, which were able to infiltrate most if not all the various armed organizations, were instrumental in thwarting these attempts” (Roberts, 2008, p. 50). By infiltrating various groups the government made the groups fight each other more than jointly fighting against the state. The full extent to which government forces infiltrated these groups and the details of their actions are still not published in scholarly sources.

The most recent technique of environmental manipulation employed by the state was the repeal of the “state of emergency” in 2011, which had been in place since the beginning of the civil war in 1992 (Arieff, 2011, p. 1). As a continuation of President Bouteflika’s reconciliation approach, the repeal should drastically reduce the amount of animosity toward the government by re-instating constitutional civil liberties.

In addition to countering radicalization it appears that Algeria took steps to prevent it as well. The unemployment rate fell from 31 percent in 2003 to 11.8 percent in 2008 (Layachi, 2011, p. 490). According to the United Nations, Algeria’s Human
Development Index (HDI)\textsuperscript{8} is 0.698, which gives the country a rank of 96 out of 187 countries. The HDI of Arab States as a region increased from 0.444 in 1980 to 0.641 today, placing Algeria above the regional average (UN website, August 28, 2012). This research did not identify specific state efforts that led to these improvements. However, this is evidence that Algerian governance is improving and addressing some of the antecedent conditions to radicalization.

\textbf{b. State Repression}

Estimates vary, but all would agree that between 150,000 and 200,000 Algerians were killed during the 1990s. The vicious cycle of violence was perpetuated by multiple organizations, including the GIA, AIS, GSPC, as well as government forces like the ANP, the paramilitary or gendarmes, and the Department of Intelligence Service (DRS) (Layachi, 2011). While state repression was prevalent, it is often overvalued when explaining the causes of terrorist group deradicalization in Algeria. Nonetheless, in addition to widespread attacks from the GIA, the AIS was also under heavy pressure from the ANP and other state security forces. Medani Mezraq, the former emir of AIS stated, “We declared ceasefire because the jihad was about to be buried by the hands of its own sons” (Ashour, 2009, p. 110).

Algerian Army forces are currently positioned in southern Algeria to block AQIM and other militants from creeping north into the more populated areas of Algeria (Interview, 2012). For the sake of brevity, a detailed list of all security force operations, which might be considered leadership targeting, is not provided. These operations are categorized as collective disengagement because the intent was not to stop the violent actions of one man, it was to disrupt the group and thereby stop the actions of many. In fact, often times the targeted leaders were not suspected of violent crimes themselves, but wanted for ordering others to conduct these activities.

\textsuperscript{8} The \textbf{Human Development Index} (HDI) measures the average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. Data availability determines HDI country coverage. To enable cross-country comparisons, the HDI is, to the extent possible, calculated based on data from leading international data agencies and other credible data sources.
State repression unquestionably had an effect on the AIS cessation, but it would be more accurate to say that violence in general was a primary causal factor. Medani Mezraq wanted Algerian people to know that AIS was not responsible for all of the massacres (Hafez, 2000, p. 590). So, it was not just the pressure from AIS/FIS members dying, it was that Mezraq did not believe in the same degree of violence as the GIA and he did not want to be associated with it either. Outside of state repression, there exists evidence of several other group disengagement mechanisms.

c. **Targeting Key Leaders**

A few examples are provided to demonstrate the state’s willingness to conduct decapitation operations in order to compel or maintain disengagement. Ali Benhadj, a key leader in the FIS was arrested and interrogated by police in September 2003, after he announced a press conference to discuss a potential FIS comeback (Ait-Hamadouche & Zoubir, 2007, p. 124). On 20 June 2004, four GSPC leaders were killed by the army near Bejaia in Kabylia (ICG, 2004, p. 22). More recently, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a founding member of AQIM was killed in fighting in Northern Mali (Suicide Bomber Kills one in Algeria Attack, 2012). The effectiveness of leadership targeting is widely debated in security studies. In some cases, an organization can be made more vulnerable to other state efforts when their leaders are removed. In other cases the organization is strengthened with new motivation or because they re-structure. In Algeria, the kinetic leadership targeting of GSPC and AQIM has helped reduce violence activity because it has kept the group in a constant cycle of re-organization.

d. **Negotiations**

Contact operations were low visibility attempts to negotiate with armed groups. The most noteworthy example was Army General Lamari’s meetings with Medani Mezraq in 1997, which will be discussed later. The government also made negotiation attempts in conjunction with a fierce offensive in Babor Mountains, which

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resulted in approximately 300 GSPC members surrendering (Ait-Hamadouche & Zoubir, 2007, p. 109). This is categorized as collective disengagement because the contacts were made with organizational leaders and resulted in groups of people disengaging.

**e. Social Networks**

According to the U.S. Department of State (2011), the Algerian Ministry of Religious Affairs uses Radio Qu’ran to speak directly to masses of radicalized fighters in the mountains. Former terrorists are used to address active fighters to convince them to lay down their weapons and stop fighting (p. 95). This mechanism falls under disengagement because the former fighters do not address the belief in using violence, just the act itself. It is worth noting here that it is entirely possible for deradicalization to take place prior to disengagement. For a number of reasons, a fighter’s belief in violent means can wither but he may stay engaged.

The previous two sections explored the mechanisms that the Algerian state used in the last 20 years to disengage militants from radicalized organizations. None of these mechanisms aimed directly at changing an individual’s or a group’s belief system. Research shows that the majority of Algeria’s disengagement mechanisms were at the group level. In the next section, the analysis focuses on mechanisms that affect a change in radical belief systems.

3. **Individual Deradicalization**

Effective deradicalization mechanisms can lead to disengagement first in some cases, but the process is not always linear (Horgan, 2009). Internationally, the most common form of individual deradicalization is prison based re-education programs. Algeria does not have a prison-based program. In fact, similar to their disengagement efforts, most of Algeria’s deradicalization efforts are aimed at the group, not the individual. However, evidence exists of two specific programs that fall into individual deradicalization.
a. Removal of Community Leaders

Since gaining independence from France in 1962, Algeria has recognized Islam as the official religion, but maintained a secular democracy. The Ministry of Religious Affairs oversees religious matters, which works as a deradicalization mechanism that seeks to identify and address radicalization problems early. According to Algerian law, imams suspected of delivering inappropriate sermons “can be summoned to a ‘scientific council’ composed of Islamic law scholars” (DOS, 2011, p. 5; Kasim, 2007, p. 3). The imam is not necessarily engaged in violent acts but his sermon may have indicated a belief in the use of violence. By re-educating these imams through counseling the state attempts to adjust their belief system and prevent the spread of radical rhetoric. The penal code states that only government-authorized imams can lead prayer in mosques and establishes strict punishments, including fines of up to 200,000 dinars ($2,782) and prison sentences of one to three years, for anyone other than a government-designated imam who preaches in a mosque (DOS, 2011, p. 6). However, not all radical beliefs stems from religious teachings.

b. Delegitimizing Violence

With so much death and destruction during the civil war some of the radical beliefs were simply revenge based. To counter this, the Ministry of National Solidarity spent approximately $50 million from 2005 to 2007 in death gratuity payments to the families of victims allegedly “disappeared” or killed by government forces (Tlemçani, 2008, p. 8). These payments were an effort to reconcile with the people most likely to embrace violence as a result of the anger generated by their unjust losses. This program was not oriented on any specific group. Any individuals who felt their loved ones were wrongly killed/disappeared by the state could apply for compensation. Arguably, these payments diminished many families’ justification for the use of violence.

President Bouteflika did not focus on dismantling terrorist groups by just changing individual’s beliefs. The low quantity of individual deradicalization programs
suggests that they were only a supporting effort in the deradicalization campaign. The final section of this case study details the regime’s collective deradicalization efforts.

4. Collective Deradicalization

It is well established that the deradicalization process is not always a linear sequence. Nevertheless, group deradicalization is the ultimate goal. Of the four lines of effort analyzed, this LOE is composed of mechanisms that aimed most directly at the problem. During the period studied, Algeria’s efforts were most heavily weighted in this line of effort. Some used multiple techniques, but all with the same goal in mind—stop radical Islamist groups from embracing violence as their voice to call for change.

a. Negotiations

On several occasions throughout the 1990s the government tried, unsuccessfully, to negotiate peace agreements with the FIS (Roberts, 2003). After formal talks failed, less formal dialogues prevailed. In 1997, direct negotiations between the AIS (Mezraq) and the ANP (Gen Lamari) became the basis for the AIS cease-fire and subsequent deradicalization (Ashour, 2009, p. 113). According to an International Crisis Group (2001) report:

The agreement set out a list of terms: ‘general amnesty for all groups joining the truce; concentration of all AIS factions and other armed groups in precise locations under the control of the ANP; integration of ex-servicemen in special ANP units; drafting of a law to provide a legal framework for the truce; release of ex-FIS leaders within 18 months; State compensation for all victims, etc…’, but above all they culminated in a promise to the effect that the ex-FIS would be allowed to return to the political arena (under another name, with a new direction totally unconnected with ‘the past’ and ‘in accordance with the provisions of the 1996 constitution’). (p. 4)

The scope and depth of these negotiations are the reason they are categorized here as deradicalization instead of disengagement. These were not simple negotiations to arrange a temporary cease-fire; they were agreements which have compared to international peace talks, aimed at solving more meaningful problems.
On a smaller scale, an uprising and conflict in the Kabylia region in 2001 prompted the government to initiate a dialogue with local leaders and to grant a major Berber demand: recognition of their language, Tamazight, as a national language (Gera, 2007, p. 86; Arieff, 2011, p. 12). The action was intended to moderate the Berbers and demonstrate that violence was not required. The original demand was for the language to have a more formal status and to have all Gendarmerie removed from Kabylia. This is significant because the Berber areas are in the mountains where there are minimal security forces and, unsurprisingly, a focus area for AQIM.

b. Social Interaction with Moderates

Although not well documented, the Algerian government facilitated interaction between its organic violent Islamist groups and more moderate Muslim scholars from Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Ashour, 2009, p. 133). Highly respected scholars from these bedrock locations helped to moderate the AIS leading up to their deradicalization. More recent interaction with scholars from the same locations has helped to keep splinter organizations disengaged from activity although they maintain their weapons and skepticism about completely deradicalizing (Ashour, 2009, p. 134).

c. Amnesty

The aforementioned negotiations were all informal until legalized in the 1999 Law on Civil Concord (Ait-Hamadouche & Zoubir, 2007, p. 108). The main points of the law were a pardon for all insurgents not guilty of murder or rape and the legalization of the 1997 negotiations (Amnesty International, 2005, p. 3; Gera, 2007, p. 85; Tlemçani, 2008, p. 6). The goal of this legislation was to convince the active members of the group that the new government, under recently elected Bouteflika, was serious about reconciling with the AIS. Passing this law was an important signal from the government that it was committed to honoring the AIS-ANP agreements. The problem with the law is that instead of reduced sentences for certain crimes and deliberate investigations, it resulted in a blanket pardon for nearly anyone who surrendered (Tlemçani, 2008, p. 7). At this point, the GIA and GSPC, were not considered for
amnesty for several reasons including suspected ties to al-Qa’ida (ICG, 2004, p. 15). This represents another example of a mechanism originally categorized as disengagement that falls under deradicalization because of the Algerian context. This law was nested in President Bouteflika’s campaign to reverse the violent trend in Algeria by stopping the belief in violent solutions.

In 2005, President Bouteflika ushered in his second large-scale agreement, the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation (Gera, 2007, p. 93). The main points included amnesty for militants, clemency for security services involved in insurgent repression, and compensation for victim’s families. This legislation is considered deradicalization because it sought to build upon the somewhat successful disengagement that had already taken place. Violence was already on the decline and the president was trying to help the country get past the national tragedy without extending the quarrels.

d. Prisoner Release

Between 1999 and 2005, tens of thousands of political prisoners were released (Ashour, 2009, p. 126). As discussed under state repression, terrorists in prison were disengaged from violent activity. However, releasing prisoners also had a disengagement effect because many on the outside were fighting simply to free their wrongly detained leaders. After being released and supported by the government, groups such as the AIS were compelled to deradicalize because they could see that dialogue produced better results than continued violence.

e. Government Clean-Up

A major grievance that has driven Algerian youth toward the Islamist cause is rampant government corruption (Ait-Hamadouche & Zoubir, 2007). Under Bouteflika, the government removed 1,050 previously elected officials from office and arrested another 500. Additionally, the courts charged 349 mayors (25% of the total) with insider trading. Of those mayors, 12 were judged and given jail terms (Ait-Hamadouche & Zoubir, 2007, p. 108). In 2004, General Mohamed Lamari, a longtime proponent of the
eradication strategy,\textsuperscript{10} retired and was replaced with a general more synchronized with the Bouteflika administration (Layachi, 2011, p. 493). Efforts to remove corrupt officials and improve democratic processes are collective deradicalization because these measures address grievances and entice radicals to reject violence in lieu of political participation.

\subsection*{f. Apology}

Apology is probably the most basic means to moderate anger from any grievance because it tends to acknowledge responsibility for wrongdoing. President Bouteflika apologized to a large group of former AIS in a speech (Ashour, 2009, p. 126). He did this because many of the fighters who had surrendered were still being harassed because of past transgressions. The apology was backed by further government efforts to ensure the social reintegration of those who surrendered. This was a deradicalization mechanism because the system responded, in deeds and words, to the complaints of disengaged Islamists, which demonstrated that violence was not necessary.

\subsection*{g. Re-education}

The state used Radio Qu’ran in two different ways. To complement the disengagement requests by former fighters, the state enlists religious scholars to refute AQIM justification for violence. This is a mechanism more akin to the re-education efforts that have become popular in countries like Saudi Arabia and Yemen in the last 10 years. Islamic re-education is deradicalization in its purest form. In this situation the religious sermons were collective deradicalization because the radio broadcasts were directed at groups of fighters hiding out not individuals in prison-based programs.

The Ministry of Religious Affairs has established policies for hiring teachers at Quranic schools (DOS, 2011, p. 95). The effect of this mechanism is comparable to the control of sermons for Friday prayers. The state wants to moderate radical underpinnings and promote moderation in order to evaporate the pool of recruits for violent groups.

\textsuperscript{10} In “De-radicalization in Algeria” Ashour (2009) explains that the body of different authorities in the 1990s is often divided into two categories: eradicators and dialogists (p. 112).
h. Religious Moderation

The final mechanism that Algeria employs is its embrace of Sufi Islam. According to experts from Algeria, the state “began a policy of endorsing and supporting Sufism as a more moderate alternative to more radical Salafis and more conservative Wahhabis” (Khemissi, Larémont, & Eddine, 2012, p. 550). The states support for Sufism simultaneously provides for the Islamic identity of Algeria while removing violence as an acceptable means for seeking change.

The number of different mechanisms shows that Algeria’s deradicalization efforts were primarily oriented at the group level. Aside from the quantity, the overall majority of effort within Algeria’s deradicalization campaign resided in these mechanisms in accordance with President Bouteflika’s policy beginning in 1999. State and GIA sponsored repression definitely played a role in AIS deradicalization, but the body of literature on radicalization suggests that these programs oriented on groups of people and collective identity were more important.

Figure 2 illustrates the degree to which each LOE contributed to Algeria’s success. A campaign taking this shape can encourage reduced violence overall, but the radical ideology may continue longer with smaller terrorist groups. The collective deradicalization and disengagement efforts were the most effective LOEs. Within these two LOEs, environmental manipulation, negotiations, and amnesty were the most important mechanisms. It was these mechanisms that comprised the majority of the laws passed in 1999 and 2005 under President Bouteflika. Although some organizations criticize the regime for failing to seek adequate justice for those wronged during the 1990s, the regime has consciously chosen to implement policies that help the country move forward as opposed to lingering in the past.
The individual disengagement LOE was the third biggest contributor to Algeria’s effectiveness. Within this LOE the protection from reprisals was most important to facilitating exit from terrorist groups.

Individual deradicalization efforts made the least contribution to Algeria’s success. The delegitimizing of violence mechanism was relatively small in scale when assessed in terms of dollars allocated for the program and the re-education mechanism used is typically by states as part of prevention programs.

C. OUTCOME

Was the Algerian campaign effective at deradicalizing Islamist insurgent groups? The answer is yes, for some, and no, for others. The AIS went through comprehensive deradicalization, which includes the ideological, behavioral, and organizational levels of deradicalization. AIS initially disengaged when Mezraq declared a cease-fire in 1997
(Ashour, 2008). At that time, “an estimated 3000 militants obeyed the order, including many from the GIA…” (Tlemçani, 2008, p. 5). The AIS never returned to using violence and Mezraq continues to voice his ambition to join the political process, pursue his goals peacefully, and has appealed to GSPC/AQIM to cease their violent activity (Saidani, 2007a, 2007b).

The GIA was not offered a truce in 1999 and refused amnesty in 2005, but eventually dissipated. Their demise was caused by a combination of substantive deradicalization, which facilitated security forces killing or capturing the remnants of the hardcore leadership. Although the Bouteflika peace agreements were not aimed at the GIA as a group, they still had a positive effect. First, as previously noted, some factions in the GIA followed Medani Mezraq and laid down their weapons in 1997. Hassan Hattab splintered off with a sizeable group because of opposition to the killing of innocent civilians and renamed itself the GSPC. Both events are prime examples Ashour’s (2009) substantive deradicalization.

D. CONCLUSION

By 2006, armed rebellion had been reduced to remnants of the GSPC (Mortimer, 2007, p. 36). In the same year, GSPC officially franchised with AQ and changed its names to AQIM. This drove another wedge into the group because “much of the organization rejected the merger with al-Qaida, often bitterly. In some instances, GSPC members renounced violence…” (Byman, 2012, p. 39). The name change also helped the Algerian government. First, with an international label the Islamists’ group could no longer cling to the narrative of a repressed opposition to the incumbent government. Second, Algeria received more international support for their security services because their fight was now part of the global struggle against AQ (Ait-Hamadouche & Zoubir, 2007, pp. 114–115).

By 2007, Hassan Hattab, the former GSPC leader, surrendered to an amnesty offer from the government, his replacement was subsequently killed by government forces and they lost popular support due to the reconciliation efforts of the state. The
name change from GSPC to AQIM is perceived as a plea for AQ help because GSPC was losing the battle in Algeria (Anonymous, 2006). At this point, AQIM is no longer conducting a high number of attacks against global targets. They talk a lot about hating America, China, and France, but have not done much about it (Filiu, 2009, p. 9). The empty rhetoric is great for Algeria because AQIM is losing its base of support. Algeria’s Islamic rebellions have typically been nationalistic, which is why AQIM may be having trouble garnering support in Algeria with its supposed global aspirations.

Emergence of peaceful opposition groups like the Front for Socialist Forces and National Coordination for Change and Democracy demonstrates that there is less radical thinking in the country, which suggests that deradicalization and anti-radicalization efforts have been successful (Arieff, 2011, p. 2). Research experts and international security agencies agree that the Islamist problem in Algeria has significantly improved. Tlemçani (2008) states, “Algeria has regained stability, with radical Islamism no longer a fundamental threat to security across the country” (p. 1). In comparison to the rest of the Maghreb region Algeria has experienced the most significant drop in Islamist activity since 1997 (Rogan, 2008).
III. SAUDI ARABIA

A. BACKGROUND

In 2003, Saudi Arabian internal security threats from Muslim radicals led to the development of a strategy to attack extremist ideology. However, this problem in Saudi Arabia predated the year 2003. In 2001, 15 of the 19 hijackers that attacked the United States were from Saudi Arabia (Gendron, 2010, p. 488). This alarming fact initially elicited a rather lethargic response from the Saudi Arabian government. In 2002, extremist attacks within Saudi borders continued. The majority of incidents resulted in the death of foreign nationals (Peterson, 2007; Ezzarqui, 2010).

A car bombing in Riyadh that involved three vehicles in 2003 changed the Saudis’ approach. Although the attack primarily targeted Westerners, its severity—34 dead (Peterson, 2007; Riedel & Saab, 2008; Ezzarqui, 2010)—jolted the government into action announcing a new counterterrorism strategy. Later that same year, 17 Saudis were killed and hundreds injured in a truck bomb attack; this attack prompted the strongest call to action from Saudi citizens. In 2004, following an intense direct action campaign designed to capture or kill extremists, the Ministry of Interior initiated a counseling program to re-educate captured Islamists (Zoepf, 2008). At this point in time the Saudi government began to fight “a war of ideas” (Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, 2011, p. 6) through initiatives aimed at changing the radical and deviant thoughts of those committing acts of violence.

The Saudi Arabian deradicalization campaign is lauded as one of the most effective in the world, specifically the Munasaha, or Advisory Committee, which started in 2004 after the terrorist attacks of 2003 (Cline, 2009). The purpose of the overall campaign is to help people with takfiri beliefs “repent and abandon terrorist ideologies” (Boucek, 2009, p. 213). It is important to note that most soft approaches are typically designed for terrorist supporters, not individuals physically involved in violent terrorist attacks. This is often cited as a criticism of the overall effort, but the criticism does not negate the importance of deradicalizing supporters of radical Islam. In the end, without a
dedicated support network, the hardcore terrorist would be much more challenged to execute an attack. This has in fact been the case within Saudi Arabia as they battled al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

To understand why Saudi Arabia would use these soft approaches, one must first understand that Saudi Arabia has a history of government programs intended to rehabilitate criminal prisoners (Boucek, 2009, p. 213). These programs help families cope with having a spouse or parent who is imprisoned or has recently been released from prison and include activities such as assistance with marriage, small business loans, job placement, direct support in the form of groceries and holiday gifts, and rewards to recognize high achievers. The use of religious leaders is also well documented within Saudi efforts to rehabilitate prisoners (Boucek, 2009, p. 214).

B. LINES OF EFFORT

1. Individual Disengagement

Within individual disengagement, eight mechanisms have been identified: capture or kill, promote marriage, provide job opportunities, provide job training, social networks, detainee release, publication of militants names, and removal of community leaders. All of these mechanisms aim to stop the behavior of individuals in their efforts against the state.

a. Capture or Kill

Following the 13 May bombing, Saudi Arabia undertook significant repressive measures against AQAP. A large component of these measures was to arrest or kill AQAP militants. Raids by Saudi security forces and shootouts between the security forces and AQAP were common and typically resulted in the killing or capturing of individuals (Oxford Analytica, 2003a, 2004a; Hegghammer, 2010a). The Saudi authorities took actual and suspected operatives off the streets on a regular, almost weekly basis (Oxford Analytica, 2004b). The Ministry of Interior has also announced the arrest or death of militants within the kingdom. This has occurred as late as August 2009 where the capture of forty-four militants was announced (Hegghammer, 2010a, pp. 3010–
Finally, Saudi authorities made it a point to publish the names of the most wanted militants operating within the kingdom. Following the publication of the names, security forces went to great lengths to target those individuals and either arrest or kill in security operations—the security forces became very efficient (Reidel & Saab, 2008; Oxford Analytica, 2005b, 2006a; Hegghammer, 2006b).

By capturing or killing the militants who opposed the state, Saudi Arabia was able to physically remove these individuals and prevent them from conducting further attacks against the state. Those incarcerated remain in prison unable to conduct attacks. Additionally, by taking these individuals off the streets, Saudi Arabia removed experienced terrorists from the organization. Over time, this degraded the experience within AQAP and reduced its efficiency and lethality.

**b. Promote Marriage**

The promotion of marriage typically takes place when a captured individual is undergoing the re-education process in Saudi Arabia’s Care and Counseling Program run by the Advisory Committee. This program works “to reintegrate deviants/extremists back into society, change their behavior (disengage them) and change their beliefs (deradicalize them)” (Royal Embassy, 2011, p. 7). As part of the release and after-care component of the program, the counselors promote and encourage marriage for those who are single. The Counseling Program may provide assistance in finding a bride or providing money to help meet the male’s requirement for marriage such as having an apartment (al-Hadlaq, 2011; Boucek, 2007, 2008a, 2009; El-Said, 2012, Seifert, 2010).

Saudi’s promotion of marriage is not just aimed at single males. The Counseling Program takes steps to reinforce the bonds between those who are already married. The program allows and encourages family visits to include private visits with the spouse (Ansary, 2008; Boucek, 2008b). Additionally, the program provides a significant amount of counseling support to the family, specifically the spouse if the detainee is married, in order to facilitate the reintegration process of both the detainee and the spouse (Al-Hadlaq, 2011; Boucek, 2007; El-Said, 2012).
Overall, the intent behind promoting marriage is to provide the individual with additional responsibilities and countervailing pressures that prevent him from engaging in violence against the state. By facilitating a marriage or rebuilding a marriage, Saudi Arabia is able to reestablish the cultural norm of a man’s responsibility to provide for his family. Fulfilling this responsibility provides the individual with something to do other than violence.

c. **Provide Job Opportunities**

As part of the after-care component of the Counseling Program, the Advisory Committee works to assist in finding jobs for soon-to-be-released individuals (Al-Hadlaq, 2011; Boucek, 2007, 2009; El-Said, 2012; Zoepf, 2008). This is part of the support the government provides to individuals through the program. The intent is to physically give the individual something to do. Second, it provides him with an income after becoming economically marginalized for not being employed while in detention. The income allows him to support his family, which may have been facilitated by the state as discussed under marriage.

d. **Provide Job Training**

As with job opportunities discussed above, the Advisory Committee also provides opportunities for detained individuals to receive or take part in job skills training. This may also include finishing basic education (Al-Hadlaq, 2011; Boucek, 2007, 2009; El-Said, 2012; Zoepf, 2008). Here the intent is to provide the detained individual with necessary skills to obtain a job once released from detention whether government provides the job or the individual finds his own job. This mechanism appropriately supports the previous mechanism.

e. **Social Networks**

This mechanism aims to place the individual in a positive social network. Two previous mechanisms facilitate this one: promote marriage and provide job
opportunities. These two mechanisms provide new, non-radical networks for the individual to associate himself with in order to prevent him from turning back to his errant ways.

The second aspect of this mechanism is through the separation of the individual from the radical prison population. Detainees slated for the Counseling Program are placed in separate prisons. These prisons are designed specifically for these detainees and do not contain general or radical prison populations (Boucek, 2008b).

Following a detainee’s release from incarceration after completing the Counseling Program, detainees are allowed and encouraged to maintain contact with the clerics and counselors they worked with during their time in the program. This allows the detainees to maintain the positive networks they built. Additionally, this allows the government to continue to monitor released detainees following their release (Ezzarqui, 2010).

**f. Detainee Release**

There have been between 700 and 1,500 individuals released from incarceration after completing the Counseling Program as well as several former Guantanamo detainees (Ansary, 2008; Oxford Analytica, 2008a; Peterson, 2007; Reidel & Saab, 2008). Release from the Counseling program, which Guantánamo detainees of Saudi origin go through, is conditional upon successful completion of the program and completion of any prison sentence that may remain. Upon release, an individual may find himself with a job, an apartment, a stipend, and even a car (Al-Hadlaq, 2011; Boucek, 2007, 2008a, 2009; El-Said, 2012). The release, along with these incentives, constitutes a contract with the state. The individual agrees to disengage from violence. If the individual violates the contract and returns to violence the state will arrest or kill him. The detainee’s release also demonstrates a level of benevolence by the state.

**g. Publication of Militants’ Names**

On several occasions since May 2003, Saudi Arabia has published the names and pictures of its most wanted militants thought to be operating within the
kingdom at that time (Peterson, 2007; Obaid & Cordesman, 2005; Hegghammer, 2010). Though this tactic is not new among nation-states, it did facilitate disengagement to some degree. The publication made it more difficult for militants to operate within the kingdom now that the general public knew whom they were and what they were trying to do. Additionally, it focused Saudi security forces specifically on those individuals, generating raids that resulted from citizen tips (Hegghammer, 2010b).

**h. Disengagement of Community Leaders**

As part of the strategy to stop the spread of radical ideology, Saudi Arabia has fired thousands of lower level clerics who were deemed to be preaching a version of Islam inconsistent with the state approved version. There has also been the removal of teachers who have incited violence (Ansary, 2008; Oxford Analytica, 2003a, 2003b; Peterson, 2007). To complement the firing, Saudi electronically monitors those who retained their position (Ansary, 2008). This acts as a deterrent to prevent clerics from promoting jihad and inciting violence, especially among youth.

2. **Collective Disengagement**

This research identified five mechanisms under collective disengagement used by Saudi Arabia: state repression, amnesty, target key leaders, environmental manipulation, and surrenders and recants. The last mechanism, surrenders and recants, is specific to Saudi Arabia. As stated earlier, the list of mechanisms is not all-inclusive. These mechanisms aim to prevent the group from using violence.

**a. State Repression**

Following the May 2003 bombing there was a significant crackdown by Saudi security forces on extremists operating within the kingdom resulting in numerous shootouts. This appears to have occurred heavily throughout the summer of 2003 before easing. Despite the “massive crackdown” on militants, all accounts point to Saudi’s restricted or restrained use of force against the militants primarily conducted by internal security forces such as the police. Saudi police targeted key leaders, raided known safe
houses, and primarily arrested known militants in an effort to prevent Saudi citizens from becoming caught up in the violence. The police also made it a point to not torture militants who were captured. The Saudi government aired interviews of captured militants who positively described their conditions while incarcerated (Oxford Analytica, 2004b, 2004d; Hegghammer, 2006a, 2006b, 2010a).

This police crackdown clearly demonstrates the repressive measures used by the state. However, these measures focused specifically on the group. By targeting the leadership, removing safe houses, and arresting fighters Saudi Arabia was able to apply pressure directly on the group without adversely affecting the citizens. The focused pressure applied to the group put all members of the group on the run from the security apparatus. The pressure removed leaders and experienced members early in the fight against AQAP, ultimately making it much more difficult for AQAP to operate (Hegghammer, 2010a).

**b. Amnesty**

King Abdullah provided two general amnesty periods to all militants operating within the kingdom. The first, one month long amnesty was provided on 23 June 2004 and a second, one month long amnesty was provided on 26 June 2006 (Bashir, 2004; Hegghammer, 2010a, 2010b; Peterson, 2007). The conditions of amnesty were simple—turn yourself in and all will be forgiven. There was a third amnesty-type announcement in December 2007. During this announcement, Saudi youth were prohibited from conducting jihad abroad and encouraged to turn themselves in if they were planning on conducting jihad. Those who turned themselves in voluntarily would have their surrender taken into account (Glass & Yehoshua, 2008).

There were six individuals who surrendered after the first amnesty period. These surrenders were highly publicized providing the illusion of desertion among AQAP members (Hegghammer, 2010b). Additionally, the six were later released after a short period of incarceration (Peterson, 2007). Their release adds to the detainee release mechanism described earlier in that it demonstrates benevolence on the part of the state
and demonstrates that the state will remain true to its word. The short time in detention for the six also infers that they were questioned about their knowledge of AQAP leadership, safe house, and future operations. All of which, presumably, facilitated security operations to some degree.

The actual surrender of operatives and supporters, the appearance of a high level of desertion among AQAP members aided by Saudi media efforts, and the focused and repressive effort by security forces arguably forced AQAP to take an introspective look at its members and whom it was recruiting into its ranks. This introspection facilitated the disengagement of the group by changing the priority from planning operations to watching each other.

c. Target Key Leaders

As discussed earlier, Saudi Arabia took significant steps to specifically target the leaders of AQAP. This was part of the broader effort to limit the negative effects on Saudi citizens as a result of the Saudi response on terrorism. Within the first few months of operations against AQAP, Saudi security forces killed the leader, Yusuf al-Ayiri, and other senior commanders within the organization (Oxford Analytica, 2006a; Hegghammer, 2006b). The killing of key operational leaders within the organization continued for the next few years. Approximately one year later, another charismatic leader, Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, was killed when Saudi forces raided the group’s headquarters (Hegghammer, 2006b). Subsequent leaders were less qualified and faced the same fate as the two most important leaders in AQAP’s organization. In 2005, Saudi security forces raided a farmhouse resulting in the death of at least 14 senior leaders (Hegghammer, 2010b).

Saudi security forces did not stop with just killing operational leaders. Saudi Arabia also targeted the clerics and ideologues that directly supported AQAP. Early in the Saudi efforts against AQAP, three prominent clerics who directly supported the group and provided the religious backing to their violent actions were arrested. This eliminated the only credible religious authority the group had at that time (Hegghammer,
To make matters worse, the Saudi government convinced these three clerics to publicly repent and admit the error of their way (Hegghammer, 2010a).

In highlighting the effect of targeting the leaders, Hegghammer (2010b) identified that “the group was so dependent on al-Muqrin’s leadership...that [his] removal made the organization start imploding” (p. 17). This is the desired effect of targeting key leaders. Saudi Arabia effectively did this as it removed every leader of the organization and a majority of the senior leaders, ultimately disrupting the organization’s ability to plan and conduct operations.

d. Environmental Manipulation

Hegghammer (2006b, 2010a) suggests that economic conditions and unemployment play a role in the recruitment and radicalization of terrorists. While this is not the sole contributing factor to violence, Saudi Arabia recognizes the effect. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia has made efforts to initiate economic reforms and reduce unemployment amongst Saudi nationals. Saudi has done this primarily through education and labor reforms. Within education, Saudi Arabia has provided more money to better train Saudis in the technical skills they lack to work in the various industries within the country (Oxford Analytica, 2008a, 2008b). From the labor perspective, Saudi Arabia has worked to increase the number of jobs available to Saudi nationals through a variety of regulations on the private sector (Oxford Analytica, 2004b, 2008a). Specifically, the Saudi government has done this by creating regulations that discourage businesses from hiring foreigners (Oxford Analytica, 2004b).

By increasing the technical abilities of young males and increasing the number of jobs available to young men, Saudi Arabia is able to limit AQAP’s ability to recruit these individuals. Saudi Arabia has enabled a reduction in the recruiting the pool of young men at a time when Saudi security forces are either eliminating or arresting the more experienced members of AQAP. This adversely affects the collective ability of the organization to take violent action against the state.
e. **Surrender and Recant**

Saudi Arabia has been able to affect the surrender of many militants, not just those mentioned earlier under amnesty. These have included AQAP supporters, a local AQAP leader, a high-ranking AQAP operative, a wife of a senior militant, and general-purpose fighters. In addition to surrenders, Saudi Arabia has been able to affect the recanting or repenting of former militants and formerly pro-AQAP clerics (Hegghammer, 2010a; Peterson, 2007). The primary component of this mechanism is the publicity of the surrenders and the recanting (Hegghammer, 2010b). Saudi Arabia has used television extensively in showing militants turn themselves in, denounce violence, and even confess. The best example of this is the show *Jihad Experiences, the Deceit*. This was a five part series that showed confessions of captured terrorists, as well as Saudi scholars and clerics, retracting previous statements supporting violence (Ansary, 2008; Usher, 2005). The public display of surrenders and recants serves to promote more members of the organization disengaging from violence against the state.

3. **Individual Deradicalization**

Individual deradicalization aims to change an individual’s belief in the use of violence. In Saudi Arabia, the focus is on teaching the “‘right jihad’ vs the ‘wrong jihad’” (Cline, 2009, p. 5). The research indicates that Saudi Arabia uses three mechanisms under individual deradicalization. They are family building, community responsibility, and re-education.

a. **Family Building**

Saudi culture has strong cultural norms surrounding familial and tribal relations and the notion of honor. The Counseling Program uses these cultural norms to rebuild the relationship between the detainee and his family (Boucek, 2007, 2008a, 2009; Ezzarqui, 2010). The family, through frequent visits, is used as an anchor point to facilitate pulling the detainee away from his previous beliefs and behavior.

Additionally, the family receives counseling offered by the Advisory Committee. While an individual is still detained, the counseling assists the family in
coping with a detainee’s absence and the shame it can bring upon the family and the tribe (Al-Hadlaq, 2011; Boucek, 2007; El-Said, 2012). A detainee’s family can also receive counseling on reintegration, which improves the process of reintegrating the rehabilitated individual back into the family in order to strengthen the bonds between the family and the individual. The intent is to make the value of the family greater than the belief in violence.

b. Community Responsibility

As with family building, the strong Saudi cultural norms surrounding familial and tribal relations and the notions of honor play a significant part in community responsibility. Saudi Arabia uses these norms to place responsibility for the individual on the family network (Boucek, 2008a, 2009). This is done in two ways. If the detainee is still participating in the Counseling Program and is released to attend a wedding or family event and escapes, the family members who vouched for him have to take his place in prison (Boucek, 2008a). The second method occurs if a detainee reoffends. This involves taking away incentives provided to a detainee’s family while he is in the program and after he is released (Boucek, 2008a, 2009).

The ultimate end is to reinforce the family building mechanism and make the value of family greater than that of violence. In the short-term, this mechanism creates a disengaging effect by leveraging cultural norms to apply pressure upon the individual. There is also the potential to have a more long-term effect. By reinforcing these same family values and norms, ideally, the detainee does not want to bring harm to his family by escaping or committing another offense.

c. Re-education

Saudi Arabia works to re-educate individuals in three ways: the Counseling Program, the Tranquility Campaign, and clerical retraining. All three efforts aim to teach individuals the proper tenets of Islam and ultimately have these individuals renounce their previously held views.
The Advisory Committee was briefly described earlier. Thus far, approximately 3,000 detainees have participated in the Counseling Program. Of those, approximately 1,400 have been released while nearly 1,000 remain in prison. The 1,000 that remain in prison consist of the few that have recidivated in addition to detainees that either failed or refused to participate in the program. Since the start of the program, the Ministry of Interior reported 60 incidents of recidivism, with recidivism being defined as incidents in which a detainee was released and subsequently re-arrested for taking part in terrorist activity. This equates to a two to four percent recidivism rate (Wagner, 2010).

The Tranquility Campaign is similar to the Counseling Program in that it tries, through dialogue, to convince individuals to renounce their radical beliefs. However, this program works through the Internet. This program uses credible religious personnel and academic scholars who volunteer to enter known militant chat rooms. Once inside these chat rooms, they begin discussions about Islam and attempt to illustrate that what the extremists believe to be right is in fact incorrect. Through this “group” dialogue, volunteers will then work to pull individuals out into side chat rooms and continue the discussion (Ansary, 2008; Yehoshua, 2006). As of early 2008, almost 900 individuals have renounced their previously held beliefs (Ansary, 2008).

Finally, the last component of re-education is that of the radical low-level clerics throughout the kingdom. In addition to the firing of thousands discussed earlier, hundreds were sent to re-training or re-education programs (Ansary, 2008; Obaid & Cordesman, 2005; Oxford Analytica, 2005a; Peterson, 2007). Outside of these reports, there is no information on what exactly is involved in this particular component.

4. **Collective Deradicalization**

Saudi Arabia utilizes four mechanisms within collective deradicalization: delegitimize violence, delegitimize religious leaders, environmental manipulation, and
delegitimize the group. With these mechanisms Saudi Arabia aims to delegitimize everything about the group from its use of violence, its reasons for using violence, and those who are in or support the group.

a. **Delegitimize Violence**

From the outset following the May 2003 bombings, the Saudi Council of Senior Ulema and the Grand Mufti have publicly condemned the violence to include the issuance of official *fatwas* condemning violence (Ansary, 2008; Oxford Analytica, 2003b; Peterson, 2007; Reidel & Saab, 2008). The condemnation of violence has not been limited to just the top state sponsored clerics within the kingdom. Most clerics have denounced the violence to include dissident clerics who were opposed to the government (Hegghammer, 2010a; Oxford Analytica, 2005a; Peterson, 2007). Another component is the televised repentant clerics referenced earlier. Part of their repentance was retracting their previous verdicts on the use of violence.

From a religious framework, the condemnation of violence by the top Sunni clerics, the dissident clerics, and those who previously supported violence makes the use of violence illegal. An important component of this mechanism for Saudi Arabia was gaining the support of the dissident clerics who were known to oppose the government. The support of the dissident clerics illustrated that violence within the kingdom was the greatest threat.

b. **Delegitimize Religious Leaders**

Initially, Saudi Arabia delegitimized religious leaders who supported violence in two ways. First, the government gained the support of dissident clerics. The partnership between the dissidents and the state drew a line in the sand. There were those who were against violence and those who supported violence. Violence was deemed as illegal; therefore, those who supported violence were also illegitimate. Members of the government and the Senior Ulema also spoke out against and criticized those who promoted violence (Glass & Yehoshua, 2008).
The second way Saudi Arabia delegitimized religious leaders was through the creation of an official website for the Senior Ulema. This website allowed for the publication of official *fatwas*. It also allowed for the Council of Senior Ulema to be asked a variety of questions by the public (Ansary, 2008). By creating the website, Saudi Arabia has marginalized all unauthorized or unqualified clerics. In reality, these are those clerics who are “not on the list.” Now the government and the Council are able to regulate the interpretations and verdicts issued. Any *fatwa* published on the website, that all Muslims can access, take priority over anything a local cleric may issue. What is on the website is the correct interpretation of Islam.

c. **Environmental Manipulation**

AQAP wanted to “cleanse the Arabian Peninsula of Crusaders and Zionists” (Hegghammer, 2006a, p. 3; Oxford Analytica, 2006a, p. 1–2). This is also a common justification for joining AQAP (Hegghammer, 2006b). This desire to remove the U.S. and others from the Land of the Two Holy Places no doubt began during the First Gulf War. It increased over time especially as the U.S. invaded Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, respectively. As early as 2002, public opinion of the U.S. within Saudi Arabia came to the point where the “royal family [thought] its security [would be] best served by publicly distancing itself from the United States” (Hegghammer, 2010a, pp. 1782–1786). In April 2003, the U.S. announced, with the support and consent of Saudi Arabia, that it would withdraw U.S. forces from within Saudi Arabia (U.S. Pulls Out of Saudi Arabia, 2003; see also Kafala, 2003; Schmitt, 2003).

The withdraw announcement preceded the bombing in May 2003. Thus, the Saudi government had removed AQAP’s ideological justification for the use of violence before the attacks began through the physical manipulation of the environment. AQAP continued to use this justification even after U.S. forces withdrew in the summer of 2003.
**d. Delegitimize the Group**

Within this mechanism, Saudi Arabia utilized a media smear campaign to portray the AQAP organization in a negative light. This portrayal further discredited the group by using the group’s own actions against it. As AQAP’s operations continued and focused on attacking the security forces, the numbers of Saudi’s and Muslims killed or injured dramatically increased. This made it much easier for the Saudi government to depict the group as deviant rebels attempting to start a revolution whose main aim was to kill Muslims (Hegghammer, 2010b; Oxford Analytica, 2006a). Additionally, Saudi Arabia employed misinformation about AQAP stating that the militants had violated both the *Qu’ran* and mosques (Hegghammer, 2010b). Lastly, the government aired a show entitled *Inside the Cell*. This television show presented captured militants exposing how they were tricked into becoming members of AQAP. This further delegitimized the group by painting them as dishonest people whose cause was so illegitimate that they had to deceive their friends and family members into joining the group (Hegghammer, 2010a; Saudi Militants Shown Repenting on State TV, 2004). The picture painted by the government of AQAP flies in the face of Saudi cultural and religious norms, which isolated the group.
Figure 3.  Saudi Arabia’s Effectiveness

Much of Saudi Arabia’s effectiveness is within its efforts at individual deradicalization (see Figure 3). The Advisory Committee is very effective at changing the beliefs of those individuals who come through their program and at using other mechanisms to reinforce this success. However, there are a number of program graduates who have returned to violence elsewhere, but based on reporting that number is very small.

Individual and collective disengagement are the next most effective LOEs within Saudi Arabia as illustrated in Figure 3. Most of the success lies in the more kinetic mechanisms used such as capture or kill, state repression, and target key leaders. More importantly, it was how these mechanisms were used that made these LOEs effective. Here, Saudi Arabia went to great lengths to be selective in the execution of these
mechanisms in order to prevent the effect of these repressive measures producing negative consequences upon its citizenry (Oxford Analytica, 2004c, 2006; Hegghammer, 2006a, p. 5, 2010a, p. 19, 2010b, pp. 2659–2661).

Finally, the least effective LOE for Saudi Arabia was collective deradicalization. Despite the success of Saudi Arabia in implementing the mechanisms within this LOE, it had little effect on deradicalizing AQAP. It did more to turn the population against the idea of using violence and, consequently, made the population unsupportive of violence within the kingdom.

C. OUTCOME

On 7 June 2006, King Abdullah announced that Saudi Arabia had defeated AQAP (Peterson, 2007, p. 40). There have been no major attacks within the kingdom since 2006 (Saudi Arabia, 2011). The Ministry of Interior has continued operations against militants and occasionally announces large arrests (Glass & Yehoshua, 2008; Hegghammer, 2010a; Reidel & Saab, 2008). Despite the continuance of those believe in violence, there remains little support for them within Saudi Arabia.

Irrespective of the moderate effectiveness of Saudi’s overall efforts against AQAP, they did not bring about any substantial type of deradicalization. At most, Saudi Arabia achieved the organizational level of deradicalization—the dismantlement of the organization to carry out violence (Ashour, 2009, p. 6). The breakdown of AQAP was done largely through targeting the leadership and selective state repression against the group. The successive losses of strong leaders coupled with repressive, yet selective crackdowns against the group eliminated the organization’s ability to function or recover forcing those who had not been detained or killed to flee the country.

D. CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding Saudi Arabia’s ability to bring about organizational deradicalization and collective disengagement of AQAP, the success achieved was limited to within the borders of Saudi Arabia. The AQAP members who had not been detained or killed simply fled the country to Yemen. Essentially, Saudi Arabia “kicked
the can down the street,” forcing Yemen to deal with the problem as evidenced in that country’s current fight against the Yemeni version of AQAP.

Understanding the local and purely domestic nature of the Saudi Arabian deradicalization campaign, the Saudi government has achieved varying degrees of success within all four LOEs. Specifically, this campaign has been effective in bringing about collective disengagement within the borders of Saudi Arabia. The government also has used a variety of mechanisms in each of the four LOEs against AQAP. Through the combination of mechanisms implemented across all four LOEs, Saudi Arabia applied pressure on AQAP and, in turn, significantly reduced the ability of the organization to conduct attacks. Admittedly, however, AQAP was still able to conduct various attacks between 2003 and 2007 before the remnants fled to Yemen. In addition to disrupting the group’s ability to conduct attacks, the government largely delegitimized the group, its use of violence, its religious leaders, and removed the justification for the use of violence. Despite Saudi’s apparent success at executing these collective deradicalization mechanisms, they had minimal effect in bringing about any type of ideological change within the group itself. Ultimately, AQAP had limited ability to conduct operations and had no support for their operations inside the kingdom.
IV. YEMEN

A. BACKGROUND

Yemen is no stranger to militants within its borders. The country first saw an influx of mujahedin fighters following the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan (Hull, 2011, p. xxvi; Sharp, 2011, p. 13). Yemen has also seen its land used by terrorists in attacks against the United States (U.S.). Early attacks against the U.S. included: the 1992 al-Qa’ida (AQ) attacks against U.S. soldiers in Aden (Hull, 2011, p. xxviii; Schanzen, 2005, p. 76); the 1998 attacks against U.S. embassies in Africa, Nairobi and Dar es Saleem, where Yemen was used as a jump off point (Hull, 2011, p. xxviii); and the 2000 USS Cole bombing in Aden (Hull, 2011, p. xxviii; Clark, 2010, p. 172). A more recent attack emanating from Yemen is the failed 2009 underwear bombing of Northwest Flight 253 (Ashenfelter, 2012). Aside from attacks targeting U.S. interest, Yemen received its fair share of domestic attacks targeting infrastructure, tourism, and government officials (Hull, 2011; Clark, 2010).

Generally, Yemen has done little except to placate a variety of groups that have operated within its borders. There are two time periods that serve as exceptions. The first was from roughly 2000 to 2003. The second began in 2006 and continues to present day. These periods mark the “two distinct phases of war against al-Qaeda[sic] in Yemen” (Johnsen, 2010a, p. 6). The first phase stemmed from U.S. pressure on Yemen following the Cole bombing and the 9/11 attacks (Johnsen, 2010a, p. 7; Cordesman & al-Rodhan, 2006, p. 23). The second phase, caused by a greater degree of U.S. pressure, has compelled the Yemeni government to actively respond to terrorism against the regime.

Most experts argue that the radical groups operating inside Yemen have lineage to AQ (Johnsen, 2010a, p. 7; Hill & Nonneman, 2011, p. 15). The first of these groups was Islamic Jihad in Yemen (IJY) from 1990–1994 (Koehler-Derrick, 2011, p. 21). Associates of, and Arab-Afghans who fought with, bin Laden in Afghanistan started this group (Hill & Nonneman, 2011, p. 15). When this group was defeated, its remnants then

The more recent al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) officially began in 2009 with the merger of fleeing Saudi AQ militants with Yemeni AQ militants inside Yemen (Swift, 2012, p. 2). However, the group really started in 2006 with the escape of 23 militants from a Sana’a prison (Johnsen, 2010b, p. 1). AQAP underwent a series of name changes between 2006 and 2009; however, most know the group simply as AQAP. In addition to AQAP “proper,” a second, apparently separate, group emerged in the early period following the prison escape: AQAP—Soldiers Brigade of Yemen (SBY), which operated from 2006 to 2008 (Koehler-Derrick, 2011, p. 38).

In dealing with these different groups, Yemen has used a variety of mechanisms. Yemen “successfully” dealt with four groups; however, the most current group, AQAP, remains active. With this, the following case study seeks to determine the effectiveness of Yemeni deradicalization efforts.

B. LINES OF EFFORT

1. Individual Disengagement

Within individual disengagement, the Yemeni government has utilized five mechanisms: capture or kill, promote marriage, provide job opportunities, detainee release, and publication of militants’ names. All of these mechanisms aim to stop the behavior of individuals in their efforts against the state.

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11 The Saudi militants were fleeing Saudi Arabia as a result of that country’s significant efforts to defeat its version (the original version) of AQAP (Horton, 2010, p. 2).

a. Capture or Kill

Prior to the first phase of AQ, there appears to be limited capturing or killing of terrorists inside of Yemen. It was not until the USS *Cole* bombing, the M/V *Limburg* bombing, and 9/11 that Yemen became serious about trying to capture or kill terrorists operating within the borders (Hull, 2011). Initial efforts focused on mass arrests of anyone sympathetic toward or associated with al-Qa’ida (Johnsen, 2007a, 2010a, 2010a; Oxford Analytica, 2004c; Taarnby, 2005b, p. 130). The Yemeni government is not opposed to killing terrorists during its operations either. The killing of terrorists has taken place during numerous operations that persist to the present (Boucek, 2010a; Department of State, 2012, p. 124; Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity, 2010a, 2012; Schanzen, 2005, p. 82).

Furthermore, Yemen has moved beyond just detaining its own citizens. Yemen has sought to detain foreigners inside of the country suspected of ties to or involvement with terrorist organizations. Following their detention, Yemen has deported these individuals to their country of origin (Boucek, 2010a, p. 5; Clark, 2010, p. 192; Johnson, 2009; Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity, 2010b; Schanzen, 2005, p. 82). One prominent example is the arrest of New Jersey resident, Sharif Mobley, who was detained in March 2010 (Koehler-Derrick, 2011, p. 51; Sharp, 2011, p. 18).

Another tactic used by the Yemeni government is the arrest of militants’ family members (Birk, 2009, p. 8; Clark, 2010, p. 230). Yemen uses the family members as “hostages,” holding the family members without trial until the wanted militants turn themselves in (Clark, 2010, p. 230).

By capturing or killing the militants, Yemen is able to physically remove these individuals and prevent them from conducting additional attacks against the state. Those incarcerated remain in prison unable to conduct attacks. Arguably, however, the detention of family members is the least effective. Such arbitrary arrests are a human rights violation (United Nations, 2012). These types of arrests could, quite possibly, serve to radicalize individuals who may have not previously harbored ill will towards the government.
b. Promote Marriage

Graduates of the Committee for Dialogue (CFD),\textsuperscript{13} which operated from 2002 to 2005, were encouraged to marry. If necessary the state financed the marriages (Fink & El-Said, 2011, p. 15). In addition to paying for the wedding, the state provided an assistance package that contained basic cooking commodities to help the new couple get started (Fink & El-Said, 2011, p. 15).

Yemen seeks to provide the individual with something to do—provide for a family—as a socially acceptable alternative to violence. However, in the case of Yemen, the one-time stipend that was provided to released graduates quickly ran out. Without money, marriage became a liability. This prompted many to return to terrorist violence in order to earn money to support their family (Fink & El-Said, 2011, p. 15).

c. Job Opportunities

Early on, the Yemeni government provided a number of jobs to fighters upon their return from fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. These jobs were typically rolled into the country’s security forces (Sharp, 2011, p. 13). The former president, Ali Abdullah Salih, even offered government jobs to IJY members in an effort to persuade those individuals to disengage from violence (Koehler-Derrick, 2011, p. 26). The CFD program assisted released detainees with jobs (Al-Hitar, 2011, p. 120). Attempts were made to return the individual to his previous job, if he had one (Fink & El-Said, 2011, p. 15; Taarnby, 2005a, p. 3). However, difficulties in finding employment existed due to the detainees’ lack of qualifications (Fink & El-Said, 2011, p. 15). Consequently, graduates who took jobs ended up in the government, specifically the military and security services (Johnsen & Boucek, 2010, p. 25; National Security Initiative, 2010, p. 27; Taarnby, 2005a, p. 3; Westervelt, 2005, p. 2).

This provided many militants with an alternate activity besides violence against the state and created a link between the government and the individual that

\textsuperscript{13} The Committee for Dialogue will be discussed in further detail in the Re-education section of this paper.
facilitated disengagement. The government provided a job, a paycheck, and subsequently, an incentive not to commit violence. Unfortunately, there are no indications that the government ever provided any type of job training or religious education. This led the government to put most militants into the military and security services, which created a problem for Yemen. Clark (2010) states, “Yemen’s security services, the Political Security Organization (PSO), was itself a bastion of anti-western, tending towards pro-jihadist feeling, staffed as it was in large part by retired Afghan War veterans” (p. 170). The “pro-jihadist feeling” has led some to believe that the PSO actually facilitated, or turned a blind-eye to, the 2006 prison escape, which took place from a PSO prison in Sana’a (Johnsen, 2010b, p. 1).

d. Detainee Release

Through the CFD, if one renounced violence and signed a pledge, then he would be released from prison (Al-Hitar, 2011, p. 119; Birk, 2009, p. 10; Johnsen & Boucek, 2010, p. 25; Porges, 2010, p. 28; Schanzen, 2005, p. 84). Of those who went through the program between 2002 and 2005, 364 were released (Horgan & Braddock, 2010, p. 276; Johnsen & Boucek, 2010, p. 25; Westervelt, 2005, p. 2). The individual’s release creates a “contract” between the Yemeni government and the released detainee. The individual is supposed to refrain from violence and remain loyal to the government. If the individual violates this contract and returns to violence, the state is authorized to arrest or kill him.

In order for the government to ensure that the contract is upheld, the government must monitor released detainees. Those released from prison following the CFD program were monitored for a period of time following their release (Al-Hitar, 2011, p. 119; Taarnby, 2005a, p. 2; Westervelt, 2005, p. 2). It does not appear that much effort went into monitoring released detainees due to the government’s inability to do so (Schanzen, 2005, p. 84). Additionally, there is the issue of the pro-jihadist leaning PSO as discussed above. One can easily argue that little effort was made by the PSO to monitor these particular detainees. Finally, during the time frame of the program’s existence, Operation IRAQ FREEDOM (OIF) started in 2003. A large number of the released
detainees are suspected of travelling to Iraq and fighting against the coalition (Porges, 2010, p. 28; Porges & Alley, 2010). Reverting to violence technically violates the contract; however, there is no indication that the pledge made any stipulation concerning the use of violence outside of the country (Porges, 2010, p. 28; Porges & Alley, 2010).

e. Publication of Militants’ Names

As early as 2003, Yemen has published the names of some of the wanted militants operating inside of the country (Hull, 2011, p. 84; Johnsen, 2007b; NSI, 2010, p. 30). In addition to publicizing the names of operatives, the Yemeni government has, in at least two cases, offered a reward for information leading to the capture of specific militants (Hull, 2011, p. 84; Johnsen, 2007b, 2007c).

The publication of the names makes it difficult for those militants to operate inside of the country. More time is spent hiding one’s self and activities versus actually conducting violence. Adding the reward makes providing information to the government a greater incentive, especially in Yemen, which is the poorest Arab country and has a 35 percent unemployment rate (Boucek, 2010b, p. 2, 11). This mechanism has worked and encouraged Yemeni citizens to provide information to the government on suspected militants, which facilitated government operations (Hull, 2011, p. 60, 73, 83; Johnsen, 2010a, p. 16).

2. Collective Disengagement

Yemen used six mechanisms under collective disengagement: state repression, targeting key leaders, amnesty, surrenders, political inclusion, and negotiations. These mechanisms aim to prevent the group from using violence.

a. State Repression

In the fight against AQ, Yemen, as seen through the capture or kill discussed earlier, has cracked down on militants operating inside of the country (Analysis-Yemen Crackdown, 2010; Johnsen, 2007c; Schanzen, 2005, p. 81; Westervelt, 2005, p. 2). The government typically uses large-scale operations that can involve police,

State repression demonstrates the state’s ability to apply pressure on a group. The repression forces a group to focus on avoiding the repressive measures vice conducting violence. However, large-scale operations are seen as severe and heavy-handed (Johnson, 2009, p. 14; Koehler-Derrick, 2011, p. 144, 148). The apparent indiscriminate nature of these large-scale operations has caused significant collateral damage, specifically the use of air strikes (Hull, 2011, p. 119; Koehler-Derrick, 2011, p. 5). One reported incident indicated that along with five AQ militants, there were a number of women and children killed (Hull, 2011, p. 119). These types of mistakes have continued to present day. In September 2012, Yemeni military aircraft attacked vehicles thought to be carrying AQAP operatives. However, the vehicles were carrying civilians including women and children (Associated Press, 2012). These types of operations anger local tribes and turn the population against the government (Hull, 2011, p. 42, 119–120).

b. Targeting Key Leaders

Yemen has successfully targeted the leaders of three groups: AAA, AQY, and SBY. The removal of strong and or charismatic leaders disrupts the organization’s ability to plan and conduct operations and removes the agent holding the organization together. Yemen has had limited success against AQAP.

AQY received their defeat in two blows. The first came in November 2002 when a U.S. drone\textsuperscript{14} fired a missile killing the leader of AQY, Abu Ali Al-Harithi (Johnsen, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2010a, p. 9, 2010c, 2010d; NSI, 2010, p. 26; Oxford Analytica, 2007, Sharp, 2011). The second blow came in November 2003 when Yemen security forces managed to arrest al-Harithi’s replacement, Muhammad al-Ahdal (Johnsen, 2007a, 2007b, 2010a, p. 9, 2010b, 2010c; Oxford Analytica, 2006b; Schanzen, 2005, p. 86). The successive blows against AQY leadership combined with the state repression and capture or kill mechanisms brought this group to an end. Most of its rank-and-file members were either in jail or dead. Following the removal of AQY’s primary leaders, there was no one to plan or coordinate operations; nor was there anyone to help hold the organization together.

SBY’s short-lived existence ceased with the elimination of their leader, Hamza Salim ‘Umar al-Qu’ayti, in 2008. Yemeni security forces conducting a raid killed al-Qu’ayti along with four others (Koehler-Derrick, 2011, p. 5, 38–39). Following his death, no one in the group stepped up to take charge.

AQAP’s leadership appears to have proven a more difficult target for both Yemen and the U.S. There have been a number of successful strikes against high-level AQAP leaders and operatives; however, the group continues to function with relative ease. Two familiar examples of successful strikes are those against Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan (DOS, 2012, p. 5, 124, 256; Johnsen, 2012; Traub, 2012a). Despite achieving success on a number of ranking militants, to include the recent elimination of AQAP’s second-in-command, Saeed al-Shihri, on 10 September 2012 (Al-Haj & Baldor, 2010), the state has been unable to remove the head of AQAP, Nasir al-Wahayshi (Johnsen, 2008). This provides the remainder of the organization with a core cadre that can still provide direction and motivation.

\textsuperscript{14} The strike by an unmanned aerial vehicle or drone was authorized by the Yemeni government in 2002 (Clark, 2010, p. 194; Hill & Nonneman, 2011, p. 16; Johnsen, 2010c; Oxford Analytica, 2006b; Sharp, 2011, pp. 15-16). This marks the beginning of “offensive” cooperation between the two governments. This cooperation, specifically the drone strikes, but also includes other forms of assistance, continues to the present day even under the new Yemeni President, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi (Traub, 2012a). With this in mind, the authors consider U.S. drone strikes inside Yemen a component of the Targeting Leadership mechanism as their use has been authorized.
c. **Negotiation**

The Yemeni government, under former President Salih, has used negotiation extensively. This took the form of three components: non-aggression pacts, amnesty, and surrender.

(1) **Non-Aggression Pacts.** Initially, this took the form of a non-aggression pact with the mujahedin that flowed into Yemen in the early 1990s. This negotiation, and subsequent agreement, amounted to the mujahedin’s assistance in fighting Yemen’s internal conflicts and not conducting attacks inside or against the country in return for safe haven inside of Yemen (NSI, 2010, p. 26).

Another component of this form of negotiation came about after the start of OIF. Here, the Yemeni government negotiated to allow the movement of Yemeni jihadists to Iraq as long as there were no attacks against Yemen’s interests (Clark, 2010, p. 227). Also included in the negotiation was the stipulation that Yemen would not target jihadists, nor would the government extradite jihadists to the U.S. (Clark, 2010, p. 282).

The government also used negotiations with specific terrorist groups operating within the country in order to cease their operations. However, the government’s attempts to negotiate with specific groups did not produce the desired effects. Yemen has attempted to negotiate with IJY, AAA, and even called for dialogue with AQAP (Peterson, 2010, p. 2). Both negotiations with IJY\(^\text{15}\) and AAA failed (Koehler-Derrick, 2011, p. 25, 27–28). AQAP has flatly rejected any attempts to negotiate by the government and has even warned older jihadists about the consequences of being caught negotiating with the government (Johnsen, 2007c, 2008, 2010a, p. 13).

(2) **Amnesty.** An aspect of negotiations used by the Yemeni government is that of amnesty. In conducting negotiations with individuals or groups, the government has typically offered some form of amnesty (Horton, 2010, p. 3). In return

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\(^{15}\) Negotiations with IJY initially failed; however, Yemen did have success negotiating, specifically with the leadership on an individual level, which did have collective effects. These effects will be discussed in Political Inclusion in this section and Influencing and Co-opting the Leader under Collective Deradicalization.
for the amnesty, groups or individuals are expected to refrain from violence against the state. This reportedly worked with a portion of AAA following an offer of amnesty to the group resulting in more 50 members of the group surrendering (Schanzen, 2005, p. 84).

If the offer of amnesty is successful, it can significantly disrupt the group’s operational capacity. Not only does it take away fighters from the group, it creates an operational security risk for the organization. The group now has to focus on determining what information about the group is being divulged; changing group habits and tactics, techniques, and procedures; and trying to determine future group defectors. Emphasis on conducting operations is significantly reduced while the organization takes an introspective look at its members.

(3) Surrenders. A number of individual militants have surrendered to include some of the 23 escapees who absconded in February 2006 (Johnsen, 2007d). Surrenders have typically been a part of a negotiation process between the government and an individual. This process involves an exchange of money and the mediator placing his reputation on the line (Johnsen, 2007d). Then as part of the arrangement, the detained militant is released on house arrest where he will remain as long as he does not commit any crimes (Johnsen, 2007d).

This works at an individual level, however it does have a collective effect. The effect of surrenders is similar to the amnesty mechanism. Initially, it takes fighters away from the group. The surrenders then force the group to look inward and focus on the potential operational security risks that have developed.

d. Political Inclusion

There has been only one instance of political inclusion by the Yemeni government, which was with IJY. As part of negotiation efforts with the IJY leadership, Tariq al-Fadhli and Jamal al-Nahdi were placed in positions with the government—along with other incentives—as long as they denounced violence and broke up IJY (Koehler-Derrick, 2011, pp. 24–25). Al-Fadhli, specifically, was provided with membership in the ruling party, the General People’s Congress (GPC), and a seat in Parliament’s upper
house (Clark, 2010, pp. 164–165). Former President Salih offered government positions to other members of the group, however, many turned down the offer (Koehler-Derrick, 2011, p. 26).

Through the inclusion of the IJY leaders into the political system, the Yemeni government has disengaged the two individuals who controlled IJY. Ideally, one cannot conduct violence against the state when one is part of the state. The disengagement of the leaders also has a disengaging effect upon the group in three ways. First, the former leadership, as part of the deal, has to break up the group and facilitate collective disengagement (Koehler-Derrick, 2011, pp. 24–25). Second, members now have to stop and re-evaluate their use of violence as they watch their former leaders become part of the state in which they were fighting. This period of re-evaluation is where the group is disengaged. Finally, the IJY had grievances with the state that were not being addressed. By having their leadership inside the political system, the IJY, in essence, now has a voice within that same system allowing them to effectively communicate their issues to the state.

3. Individual Deradicalization

Individual deradicalization aims to change an individual’s belief in the use of violence. Yemen uses two mechanisms under individual deradicalization: re-education and community responsibility.

a. Re-education

The Committee for Dialogue program ran from 2002 to 2005 under the direction of Judge Hamoud al-Hitar; this program started as a result of the mass arrests conducted by Yemeni security forces (al-Hitar, 2011). Prisons had become crowded and Yemen was searching for a way to ease the pressure within the prisons (Johnson, 2009, pp. 13–14; Taarnby, 2005a). At the direction of former President Salih, al-Hitar started the program using dialogue with suspected militants to challenge and debate their radical ideology. During the dialogue, groups of militants would go through a series of sessions with al-Hitar and his committee. While in these sessions, each side would justify their
position on a number of issues using only the *Qu’ran* and *hadiths*. Following the successful completion of the program, detainees were released if they had not committed any violent crimes. Following their release, the state provided surveillance of the released detainees as well as a one-time stipend, assistance in getting a job, and help with marriage (al-Hitar, 2011; Horgan & Braddock, 2010, p. 275; Porges, 2010; Taarnby, 2005).

Despite the apparent success of the program touted by al-Hitar (2011), much remains to be seen as Yemen has yet to publish any reports or statistics on the program (Johnson, 2009, p. 17; Porges, 2010, p. 28). One of the issues with the CFD is that, upfront, it presented detainees with the knowledge that if they went through the program, renounced violence, and pledged obedience to the state and/or Salih they would be released (Birk, 2009, p. 4, 10; Johnsen & Boucek, 2010; Porges & Alley, 2010). Immediately, detainees knew they just needed to bide their time, say the right words, and they would be released. Second, those who went through the program were reportedly sympathizers versus hard-core militants (Birk 2009, p. 8; Eaves, 2004). More importantly, these sympathizers were not separated from the general prison population of radical militants. During the day, they received their re-education, while at night they received a course in militancy. This negated any progress that may have been made by the Committee. Finally, of the 364 released through the program, a number of the reformed individuals travelled to Iraq and were found fighting the coalition; these actions dispute the effectiveness of the program (Johnson, 2009, p. 17; Porges, 2010; Porges & Alley, 2010, Taarnby, 2005b).

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16 The topics discussed during the dialogue sessions were:

- The concept of the state, government, Islamic succession and rights of others.
- Jihad in Islam: what (its rules), when, how, where, and who (has the right to announce it)
- Commitment to the constitution and the laws that are in effect
- Muslim’s relationship with others
- The rights of non-Muslims in Muslim countries
- Actions and implication that disrupt the security and stability of the country
- Ostracizing violence, extremism, and terrorism
- Unbelief and migration (Al-Hitar, 2011, p. 117)
b. Community Responsibility

Yemen has strong cultural norms about familial and tribal relations and the notion of honor. Yemen attempts to capitalize on this by making the family or tribe responsible for a detainee once he is released. This is done by having the family use their home or business as collateral in order to sign for the detainee upon his release (Schanzen, 2005, p. 84; Westervelt, 2005).

The idea behind the concept is that if the detainee re-offends he will bring shame upon his family and tribe because they have given their word that the detainee will not commit crimes. Not only would the family or tribe member’s honor come into question, but they could also lose their home or business if the detainee re-offended. Initially, this works as a disengagement mechanism, however the effect of placing the family or tribe’s honor on the line is to make those tribal norms more valued than the use of violence. Committing violence is no longer worth harming the family or tribe.

Unfortunately, it does not appear that this has worked with much success considering that a number of the released detainees from the CFD were found fighting in Iraq. However, because Iraq was seen as a justified front, Yemen may still mark this as a successful mechanism because the use of violence was not against the state.

4. Collective Deradicalization

Yemen utilizes two mechanisms within collective deradicalization: influence or co-opt the leaders and delegitimize violence. With these mechanisms Yemen aims to delegitimize the group and its use of violence.

a. Influence or Co-opt the Leaders

As discussed earlier, the Yemeni government did conduct negotiations with IJY. Negotiations with the group by and large did not work very well; however, Yemeni efforts to co-opt the leaders, Tariq al-Fadhli and Jamal al-Nahdi, did work. Both leaders were offered government jobs (Clark, 2010, pp. 164–165; Koehler-Derrick, 2011, pp. 24–25). Al-Fadhli also received membership in the GPC and a seat in Parliament
(Clark, 2010, pp. 164–165), which facilitates the political inclusion mechanism discussed earlier. Additionally, Al-Fadhli received a paycheck, a vehicle, military rank as the commander of the Second Army Brigade, and the return of his family lands (Clark, 2010, pp. 164–165).

In exchange for the incentives, al-Fadhli and al-Nahdi disbanded and renounced IJY (Koehler-Derrick, 2011, pp. 25–26). By renouncing the group, the leaders delegitimized the group. This forces the group, specifically the rank-and-file membership, to re-evaluate their belief system and their justification for the use of violence. The leaders were the ones who created the belief system and promoted the use of violence against the state. Now, those same leaders have deemed that the previously held beliefs were incorrect. Initially, this creates a collective disengagement effect as the members take an introspective look; however, as they accept the leaders’ new views it can become collective deradicalization.

b. Delegitimize Violence

Following the attacks by AQ affiliated groups within Yemen during the first phase; the Yemeni government was able to successfully use the media to sway popular opinion against the terrorist group (Hull, 2011, p. 59, 78). Specifically, the terrorist attack on the M/V Limburg turned most Yemenis against the groups. The oil tanker had no military value and was not directly tied to the government. Yemen’s oil exports constitute approximately 75 percent of the country’s revenue (Boucek, 2010b, p. 4). The Limburg provided an economic line facilitating domestic revenue. Attacking this ship eliminated a portion of the funds coming into the country. Additionally, it polluted the harbor and disrupted local fishing by depriving fisherman their main source of income (Hull, 2011, p. 57, 59, 78).

During the first phase, former President Salih publicly spoke out against terrorism in a meeting he hosted for prominent political and tribal figures (Hull, 2011, p. 29). Salih also commissioned his Ministry of Interior to produce and publish a work highlighting the negative effects of past terrorist incidents in the country. The end result
was the work titled, *Terror in Yemen* (Hull, 2011, p. 68). Additionally, opposition forces, namely Salafists, spoke out against the use of violence whether against the state or against the coalition in Iraq (Bonnefoy, 2010, p. 16).

The Yemeni government and political opposition forces continue to speak out against the use of violence (DOS, 2012, p. 127). However, this does not appear to have the same effect it did from 2000–2003. More than likely, this is due to the type of targets that were attacked. During that time period, many selected targets were not government related targets and they adversely affected the population. This drove the government and the population together in the struggle against violence resulting in citizens reporting on suspicious activity or persons (Hull, 2011, p. 60, 68, 73, 83, 90; Johnsen, 2010a, p. 16).

Figure 4. Yemen’s Effectiveness
Overall, much of Yemen’s effectiveness rests in its ability to disengage both individuals and groups. More specifically, much of the country’s success lies in its ability to disengage groups from violent behavior as illustrated in Figure 4 within the collective disengagement quadrant. Yemen’s success within this LOE has been shown through their defeat of AAA, AQY, and SBY primarily through targeting key leaders and state repression mechanisms. Yemen was somewhat successful under individual disengagement as shown in Figure 4. Yemen’s effectiveness here is within the capture or kill mechanism. However, their method for utilizing this mechanism, specifically the mass arrests, is what ultimately diminishes the effectiveness for this LOE. As described earlier, Yemen utilized wide sweeping mass arrests, which included family members of wanted militants. This initially disengaged those who were arrested, but ultimately pushed individuals who may have been neutral to the side of the militants.

Under deradicalization, Yemen scored more effective under collective deradicalization for their efforts against IJY as pictured in Figure 4. Yemen did achieve some level of success in deradicalizing this particular group, which was primarily accomplished through efforts to influence or co-opt the leadership. However, this is where Yemen’s success stops. Yemen has had little success since IJY to influence or co-opt the leadership of any other group. Of all the LOEs, individual deradicalization is the least effective within the context of Yemen as shown in Figure 4. Despite their efforts to stand-up an actual program to work on changing the beliefs of individuals, little evidence exists to support any real success. There has, however, been a fair amount of evidence to suggest that a number of the graduates were fighting in Iraq during OIF highlighting the fact that those individuals still held their beliefs in the use of violence.

C. OUTCOME

In Yemen, IJY reached the pragmatic type of deradicalization, composed of both behavioral and organizational levels of deradicalization (Ashour, 2009, p. 6). By negotiating, including the leaders in the political system, and co-opting the leaders of IJY, the Yemeni government was able to bring about behavioral deradicalization, which is the abandonment of violence in pursuit of political goals (Ashour, 209, p. 6). Yemen did
achieve organizational deradicalization, which is the dismantlement of the organization to carry out violence without splits and factions (Ashour, 2009, p. 6). Using the aforementioned mechanisms that focused on the leadership coupled with state repression, capture or kill, amnesty, and job opportunities facilitated this. However, Yemen only achieved limited success under organizational deradicalization due to IJY members who were in hiding from state repression that did not follow the IJY leadership and coalesced to form AAA (Koehler-Derrick, 2011, p. 21). Despite attaining pragmatic deradicalization, there is no evidence to support any efforts to delegitimize the use of violence, ideologically, by the IJY leaders following their renunciation of violence.

Yemen only realized organizational deradicalization with AAA, AQY, and SBY. All three of these groups came to an end following Yemen’s successful effort to target the leadership in which the leadership was either captured or killed. The removal of the leadership coupled with ongoing state repression to capture/kill the remainder of the group facilitated organizational dissolution within all three groups.

D. CONCLUSION

Over the years, Yemen has had mixed results in dealing with terrorist organizations. To some degree, Yemen deradicalized IJY, while only disengaging AAA, SBY, and AQY through defeat. Yemen’s efforts against AQAP continue today with very limited progress.

Overall, efforts focused on the leaders appear to have had greater effects against radical groups operating inside of Yemen. In the case of AAA, AQY, and SBY, Yemen managed to defeat these groups, or collectively disengage them, through targeting the key leaders. The removal of leadership from each of these groups brought about their end. IJY, on the other hand, was collectively disengaged through the use of political inclusion of the IJY leadership and, subsequently, deradicalized through the influence and co-option of the IJY leadership.

However, mechanisms aimed at leadership must be used in conjunction with some level of state repression or capture/kill and other mechanisms that create incentives, such
as amnesty. Without the repressive measures, no push factor would exist to facilitate the pull factor of incentives such as political inclusion and co-option of the leadership as seen with IJY. Additionally, in the case of Yemen, efforts that allowed the leadership to remain, allowing the leaders to exert some level of control over members, had greater deradicalization effects versus simply capturing or killing the leaders. The latter, specifically killing, removes the ability of the leader to influence deradicalization efforts based upon the assumption that success can be achieved at an individual level with the leader(s).
V. INDONESIA

A. BACKGROUND

In Indonesia, terrorism perpetrated by radical Islamist groups represents a serious threat to local and regional stability. This terror landscape contains the following groups: Mujahidin KOMPAK, KOMPAK, Front Pembala Islam, Committee for the Enforcement of Islamic Law, Laskar Jundullah, Hizb ut-Tahrir, AMIN, Ring Banten, and Jemaah Islamiyah (Oak, 2010, pp. 1017–1018). While most of these groups maintain a rather narrow strategy and focus on agendas framed around domestic matters, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has emerged as the most formidable and dangerous organization by extending its strategic focus and operational reach to not only Indonesia, but throughout all of Southeast Asia as well. Because of its propensity for catastrophic violence and aspiration for regional relevance and expansion, the remainder of this chapter will primarily focus on JI.

JI has conducted large-scale violence across Southeast Asia, since 2000. The origins of JI can be traced back to the early 1960s when its two co-founders and spiritual leaders, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar, met. Ba’asyir and Sungkar formally organized JI in Malaysia the early 1990s with the strategic goal of establishing an Islamic Caliphate first in Indonesia, and eventually throughout Southeast Asia. JI moved to Indonesia after the fall of the Soeharto regime in 1998 (Barton, 2004, pp. 13–15) and orchestrated twenty catastrophic terrorist attacks that resulted in 310 civilian deaths and 1,157 wounded casualties from 2000 to 2009, JI (Oak, 2010, p. 997).

In response to the JI bomb attacks in Bali on 12 October 2002—a series of near-simultaneous blasts that killed 202 people—the Indonesia security apparatus realized the need to implement deradicalization programs. Detachment 88 (Det 88), Indonesia’s premier domestic counterterrorism force, unilaterally seized the initiative and began to develop and implement an assortment of hard and soft approaches aimed at disengagement and deradicalization (Rabasa et al., 2010, p. 106). While some of Det 88’s
activities target the collective level of JI and associated groups, the majority of them seek to influence the behavior and ideology of the individual terrorist.

The primary goal of the Det 88 program is to facilitate the disengagement of individual jihadists so as to prevent further terrorist attacks from occurring. A November 2007 International Crisis Group assessment supports this assertion by stating that selective incentives in the form of economic aid is “ultimately more important” (International Crisis Group, 2007, Executive Summary) than religious arguments in efforts change the attitudes of Indonesian jihadists (ICG, 2007, Executive Summary). Thus, Detachment 88 primarily uses material resources to change jihadist behavior rather than engaging in religious/ideological dialogue.

A summary of the Det 88 strategic intentions for the Indonesian deradicalization program is contained in the following quote:

Success is primarily based on actual organizational capacity in terms of forming horizontal and vertical networks of moderate forces. This is also combined with the ability to find new and innovative ways of communicating the ‘countermessage.’ A combination of a credible and effective message on the one hand and the ‘right’ messenger on the other makes this happen. (Ranstorp, 2009, p. 8)

Thus, Ranstorp (2009) alludes to a few essential components of the Det 88 deradicalization program—delivering the JI counter-message through innovative means and utilizing credible, respected interlocutors as the mouthpiece for the program. These two components represent the heart of the Det 88 deradicalization program and the foundation from which the program’s successes and failures can be identified from the analysis of the four LOEs that follow.

B. LINES OF EFFORT

1. Individual Disengagement

Regarding the individual disengagement LOE, the Det 88 deradicalization program largely focuses on the implementation of selective incentives (job opportunities, job training, various forms of financial compensation) and the manipulation of exclusive
jihadist social networks. By enlisting the help of Nasir Abas, a former mantiqi commander, and Ali Imron, a key JI member involved in 2002 Bali bombings, Det 88 attempts to gain access into some of JI’s inner circles in order to set the conditions for individual JI members to disengage and refrain from further acts of violence. Selective incentives and social networks serve as the two key tenets of the Indonesian program, for only radicals can directly influence jihadi prisoners because they possess the requisite credibility (through social networks); the state must re-establish trust and legitimacy (through selective incentives) in order to establish an environment conducive to cooperation by individual terrorists (Speckhard, 2011, p. 11–6).

a. Selective Incentives

Conceptually, selective incentives can be viewed as the job opportunities and job training mechanisms combined with various forms of financial compensation to individual terrorists and their families. The Indonesian police, specifically Det 88, financially assist the families of jihadists actively participating in the deradicalization program by paying school fees, providing money for food and clothing, providing start-up money upon release from prison, buying plane tickets for family members to see detained program candidates, granting visitation for family members, and facilitating marriage and medical care for prisoners (Schulze, 2008; Istiqomah, 2011, p. 30). Det 88 creates job opportunities by giving microloans/start-up funds for businesses with the intention of providing former terrorists with a “meaningful occupation” (Ranstorp, 2009, p. 8). Det 88 also facilitates job training through the work of Nasir Abas. He endeavors to build the vocational skills of jihadi prisoners which, in turn, allow them to more fully integrate back into their community upon their release from prison (Istiqomah, 2011, p. 30).

Experts recognize that Det 88 provides these various forms of selective incentives as little more than financial pacification done to moderate individual behavior (Ranstorp, 2009, p. 19). These socio-economic approaches often work, but must be tailor-made to link individual needs to personal, time-consuming bonds made between prisoners and police officers (ICG, 2007, p. 13). As a means of achieving temporary
disengagement through instant gratification, Det 88’s use of selective incentives achieves its desired effects. The fact that, since 2007, JI has only launched two notable terrorist attacks suggests that the utilization of selective incentives by Det 88 has clearly been effective.

**b. Social Network**

This mechanism can best be identified through the work of Nasir Abas and Ali Imron. Abas’s message is more about means than ends. He does not attempt to change JI’s strategic vision of an Islamic state, but uses the life and sayings of Muhammad to tell JI members that the creation of an Islamic state should not be their priority (Rabasa et al., 2010, p. 113). Although they relate to individual ideological re-education, Ali Imron’s arguments should instead be viewed as individual disengagement because they aim to change jihadist behavior. The reasons are simple—Ali Imron’s version of re-education does not admonish or refute jihad, but rather modifies it. For Ali Imron, JI’s views regarding jihad are correct; the modification of these views pertains to the timing of offensive jihad, as well as an improved way to calculate the associated costs and benefits of terrorist attacks (ICG, 2007, pp. 12–13). What is significant about the approaches of Abas and Imron is the fact that they seek to modify jihadist beliefs just enough to allow the individual to temporary disengage from terrorist violence. Their style can be interpreted as pragmatic and realistic in pursuit of achieving the immediate effect of individual disengagement.

The Indonesian contextualized environment presents unique challenges because “in the mind of the radicals, all *ulama* have already failed because they failed to establish an Islamic state…their credibility is nothing with the militants” (Schulze, 2008). Recognizing this, Indonesian deradicalization practitioners believe that reformed terrorists may make significant strides toward deradicalization because they share a common identity with jihadi militants, and thus command a tremendous amount of respect. By using jihadist-based social networks as a powerfully influential disengagement tool, Det 88 is able to speak to radical jihadist through ways in which they could understand and relate. What these ex-militants lack in religious knowledge they
made up for in terms of credibility and charisma, as they directly relate to other prisoners of whom they had personally recruited or trained (Neumann, 2010, p. 52).

c. **Arrest**

Since the first Bali bombing in 2002, Indonesian security forces have arrested more than 400 JI terrorists and active supporters. Despite a poor rule of law across the country, these arrests have been backed by a high terrorist conviction rate. These convictions have led to JI being “fundamentally compromised and disrupted,” (Sheridan, 2008) as evidenced by the last major JI attack being the second Bali bombing in 2005. The arrest mechanism works because it physically prevents terrorists from participating in future acts of violence while maintaining pressure on active terror cells within the group. Sixty-two jihadi prisoners were released from Indonesian prisons between 2006–2007, of which thirty-one were JI members (ICG, 2007, pp. 24–25). This action resembles a “revolving door” for jailed jihadists operating in Indonesia—proving that although Det 88 arrests terrorists, these same individuals may inevitably receive a more lenient punishment through early release from prison. This interesting dynamic suggests that large scale detainee release could be counterproductive to, if not completely undermine, the arrest mechanism.

2. **Collective Disengagement**

Regarding the collective disengagement LOE, two mechanisms embody the Det 88 program—social networks and environmental manipulation. Adding to what was described in the previous LOE, the credibility and perceived legitimacy felt within jihadi social networks provide effects that are conducive to terrorist disengagement at the group-level. The potential for environmental manipulation can be observed within the Indonesian prison system as well. Recent historical events and ongoing policies place Indonesian prisons in an advantageous position to enhance collective disengagement within Indonesia. Two other mechanisms, state repression and political inclusion, also
relate to this LOE. This case study shows that massive amounts of state repression may very well lead to political inclusion, which, in turn, relates to the decision by the group to disengage from terrorism.

a. **Social Network**

Pragmatically speaking, the social network tied to the Det 88 program has been successful in eliciting information that has led to the disruption of the JI terrorist network in Indonesia. To this day, a number of individuals continue to privately cooperate with the police to disengage pockets of militants from the network (Rabasa et al., 2010, p. 109). This statement assumes that the impetus behind the Det 88 is first and foremost disengagement, with deradicalization serving as an enhancing, but not an essential, component.

The Indonesian government enabled the JI organization to collectively disengage itself. Det 88 identified that JI had developed a strong internal social network. Recognizing this, Det 88 applied the state repression mechanism against the group. As a result, in August 2009, Ba’asyir announced that armed struggle against the U.S. is a religious obligation for the international Muslim community, but Indonesia’s brand of jihad should consist of proselytization until further notice (Woodward et al., 2010, p. 9). In effect, he called for JI to suspend terrorist activities within Indonesia indefinitely; this announcement should be considered as the single-most important element of collective disengagement thus far in Indonesia. Also, a lack of factionalization within the JI organization following Ba’asyir’s announcement demonstrates not only group solidarity, but also signifies the strength of the JI internal social network.

b. **Environmental Manipulation**

This mechanism indirectly occurs throughout the Indonesian law enforcement and prison systems. It primarily results from prisoner interaction rather than direct government action or involvement. At this point, the government essentially turns a “blind eye” to prison activities, but resides in a unique position to influence, shape, or control the overall prison environment. Both Detachment 88 and the Jakarta Center for
Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) have “major initiatives” (Ranstorp, 2009, p. 19) aimed at fortifying security at prisons to prevent terror cells from originating and the radicalization of other inmates. Although these major initiatives are descriptively vague with limited public disclosure, they have the potential to contribute to collective disengagement. In addition, recent empirical data states that criminal gangs like Gang Arek and Gang Korea have physically confronted the jihadi-based Ustadz Gang over prestige and “turf” (ICG, 2007, p. 5).

c. State Repression

The operational capacity of JI has been “severely crippled” (Oak, 2010, p. 1000) as a result of copious amounts of state repression, punctuated by 466 arrested JI members (roughly 23 percent of its organizational composition) and numerous raids and weapons cache confiscations since 2002 (Oak, 2010, p. 1000). One should remain skeptical of these actions, as state repression is very much a double-edged sword—while the immediate effects of eroding the target group are viewed as beneficial, the second and third-order effects are unknown and may very well lead to strategic problems that rival, if not surpass, the issues posed originally by the target group.

d. Political Inclusion

The unique political and social environment of Indonesia, facilitated by the government, may have created a window of opportunity for JI to take advantage of the political inclusion mechanism. Since its inception in 2000, Ba’asyir’s Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) political strategy has sought to unite jihadi and non-jihadi radical Islamists and lobby for political change in accordance with Sharia (Barton, 2008, p. 131). MMI serves as the forerunner to Jamaah Ansharud Tauhid (JAT), another political group founded by Ba’asyir in September 2008. These two organizations have influenced JI’s degree of militancy and violence. Arguably, MMI and JAT have led to JI’s transformation into a predominantly political movement with a limited threshold for violence. In short, JI’s political focus stymied its capacity to conduct significant acts of
terror and denigrated its activities to ideological proselytization and recruitment, which, in turn, greatly contributes to the ongoing collective disengagement of JI.

3. Individual Deradicalization

Indonesia’s success has been in part due to its emphasis on individual-level approaches. Recognizing that deradicalization is a “labor-intensive business,” (Sheridan, 2008) it seeks to exploit information from a balanced mix of hard and soft power. The individual deradicalization LOE, as it applies to the Det 88 program, can best be expressed through the application of the re-education mechanism and two family-based mechanisms—family building and family responsibility.

a. Re-education

Without question, this mechanism has been the most visible component of individual deradicalization in Indonesia. JI sees the Indonesian government as “kafir…they are the enemy and all products from the government are haram” (Schulze, 2008). Because of this, Det 88 has turned to former JI extremists like Nasir Abas and Ali Imron who have ideologically moderated. This technique is inherently powerful because these ex-militants have the requisite credibility needed to garner the trust and legitimacy from among the pool of potential deradicalization candidates (Sheridan, 2008). Because they share a common identity and worldview, the ability of ex-militants to moderate active jihadists cannot be underestimated; Det 88 and other Indonesian agencies recognize the importance of this mechanism and will leverage it to the fullest possible extent.

Theological dialogue is absent from the Det 88 deradicalization methodology; rather, the Indonesian police rely on “cultural interrogation,” (Rabasa et al., 2010, p. 107) an approach that requires the interrogator to be immersed in the culture of the detainee, understand his emotional state of mind, and share a common language (Rabasa et al., 2010, p. 107).

Nasir Abas’s approach retains two key elements of re-education: the killing of civilians and the need for an Islamic state. Abas asserts that JI’s struggles have
been corrupted by bombings against civilians. He attempts to show candidates that true *ulama* do not want an Islamic state within Indonesia (Schulze, 2008). Abas uses three arguments to convince militant jihadis to abandon their allegiance to the movement: (1) that militant jihad and attacking civilians is not in accordance with Islam, (2) that all Westerners are not bad, and (3) that militant Islam has done a great disservice to Islam by giving it a bad image in the eye of international public perception (Speckhard, 2011, p. 11–6). The Abas version of re-education has led to the successful deradicalization of twenty jihadi prisoners. While some experts and analysts consider this figure to be low and insignificant, one cannot deny that deradicalization via re-education has achieved some success in Indonesia.

Former radical Islamist Noor Huda Ismail serves as another proponent of the re-education mechanism. His brand of re-education emphasizes the reintroduction of “normal” lifestyles and behavior. Indeed, Ismail’s mission in establishing and managing the Institute of International Peace Building seeks to give ex-militants a normal life, and in doing so, provides them with an opportunity to live peacefully and productively within mainstream society (Sabarini, 2010a).

**b. Family Building / Family Responsibility**

Family building can best be expressed through the ways in which Det 88 assist the families of prisoners participating in the deradicalization program. This includes services such as paying school fees, providing money for food and clothing, providing start-up money upon release from prison, buying plane tickets for family members to see detained program candidates, granting visitation for family members, facilitating marriage and medical care for prisoners (Schulze, 2008; Istiqomah, 2011, p. 30). Det 88 also understands that JI operatives practice *hijra*, leaving their families and property to fight in the *jihad* (Rabasa et al., 2010, p. 108). Recognizing this, Det 88 tries to place a greater emphasis on not only family building, but family responsibility as well, by flipping the *hijra* process around on jihadi prisoners and detainees, and leverage the cultural emphasis placed on family and the immediate, local community by reuniting
them with their families to facilitate deradicalization. It should be noted, however, that the immediate effect of these actions may result in disengagement.

4. Collective Deradicalization

Three mechanisms—social interaction with moderates, delegitimizing the group/violence, and political inclusion—comprise nearly all of the collective deradicalization LOE in Indonesia. What is fascinating about these mechanisms is the fact that none of them correspond to the deliberate activities of Det 88 or to actions conducted by the Indonesian government. Rather, they are the result of actions taken by social groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and formal political movements. While the government has no direct involvement in ongoing collective deradicalization activities, it remains indirectly linked to the effects of these mechanisms and the activities being performed by these third-party groups.

a. Social Interaction with Moderates

The Wahid and Maarif Institutes both attempt to openly challenge radical ideology in a public forum. The Wahid Institute actively and critically examines radical messages and uses information campaigns to encourage debate on strategically relevant issues. The Maarif Institute works to consolidate democracy in Indonesia by organizing open debates and discussions as a means of encouraging citizen involvement in the political process (Ranstorp, 2009, p. 7). In addition to these two organizations, the Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (‘Oneness in Diversity’) movement was created in May 2009 by key political and social leaders that aimed to organize members of the Indonesian elite to “actively prevent the spread of radical Islam on all levels and with all available means” (Ranstorp, 2009, p. 17). While its intentions are pure and wholesome, the movement can also be criticized as generating a polarizing effect of “us versus them” across Indonesian society. It is also difficult to measure the aggregate effect generated by these moderate groups because its levels of effectiveness among the Indonesian population is nearly impossible to capture.
b. Delegitimizing the Group / Delegitimizing Violence

There exist several ways in which groups have attempted to delegitimize JI as a terrorist group, as well as delegitimize its violent methods. Interfaith dialogue serves as a tool to increase international collaboration and respect between cultural and religious groups. The dialogue helps to counteract terrorism and radicalization from a long-term perspective and strategically employs dominant and widely-accepted religious views such as acceptance, tolerance, and moderation (Ranstorp, 2009, p. 9). The overall utility of this dialogue remains undetermined and may in fact lead to more conflict as opposed to less of it. JI can also be delegitimized through the promotion and expansion of democracy. Two recent examples highlighting the ideological expansion of democracy include Muhammadiyah’s decision to ban external activities/influence that were “against the spirit of democracy,” (Ranstorp, 2009, p. 16) and Nahdlatul Ulama’s official decree stating that Muslims are not “theologically required to establish a khalifa or oppose democracy” (Ranstorp, 2009, p. 16). Lastly, a repentant Ali Imron continues to preach a nonviolent interpretation of jihad as a spiritual struggle in God’s name and in doing so, delegitimizes the use of violence as well as those who espouse it (Rabasa et al., 2010, p. 114).

c. Political Inclusion

This mechanism could have a transformative effect on the organization that ultimately leads to collective deradicalization. Research indicates that JI has contacted political and socially accepted organizations like the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) (Oak, 2010, p. 999). To date there are no indications that the government has impeded JI’s attempt to become politically active through its interaction with these two organizations. These groups may guide JI’s organizational evolution by creating greater appeal for a peaceful transformation to a legitimate political entity (Oak, 2010, p. 999).

Given these recent events, it is entirely conceivable that JI transitions to a legitimate political and social organization within Indonesia in similar fashion to the
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB). While JI’s operational strength has diminished, its extensive social networks remain intact. Such a transformation would have a tremendous impact on the Indonesian radical Islamic community in a positive manner by demonstrating that political struggle serves as a viable alternative to violence. This option should be viewed as extremely viable since many components of the MB model have been reflected in JI strategies and missions (Oak, 2010, p. 1005).

Figure 5. Indonesia’s Effectiveness

Figure 5 aptly depicts the overall shape of the Det 88 deradicalization program and highlights three distinct characteristics, the first of which being a large amount of emphasis placed on disengagement at the individual and collective levels. Figure 5 clearly shows that, with regard to the overall effectiveness of the program, Det 88 has made the most progress at disengagement; this is due in large part to the manner in which
Det 88 implemented two critical mechanisms: selective incentives and social networks. The various forms of material compensation provided by Det 88 facilitated the individual disengagement of numerous JI members. The ways in which Det 88 leverages its organic social network and influences JI’s internal social networks also achieves a desired net effect of disengagement at both the individual and collective levels.

The second distinctive feature shown by Figure 5 is its abundance of effectiveness within the individual deradicalization and individual disengagement LOEs. Like the disengagement portion of Figure 5, its entire left side displays the large amount of programmatic effectiveness at the individual level of analysis. The previous paragraph discusses the relevance of selective incentives and social networks within the individual disengagement LOE. Within the individual deradicalization LOE, the re-education mechanism has clearly played the greatest role. The work of ex-militants Nasir Abas and Ali Imron have directly contributed to the successful deradicalization of individual JI terrorists.

Figure 5’s third major characteristic is the relative absence of effectiveness within the collective deradicalization LOE. To date, Det 88 has yet to implement any programs designated for the collective deradicalization of terrorist organizations such as JI. Within Indonesia, all attempts to collectively deradicalize JI have been undertaken by third-party political and/or social groups which are not formally aligned with the Indonesian government. The reasons for Det 88’s lack of effort within this LOE are unclear, but may relate to a general recognition that collective deradicalization, at this point, is simply unattainable for Det 88 given its finite organizational resources and operational capacity.

C. OUTCOME

The various mechanisms implemented by the Det 88 program have led to the pragmatic disengagement of JI. Ashour’s definition of pragmatic deradicalization, when applied to the concept of disengagement, suggests that pragmatic disengagement results from the successful behavioral and organizational disengagement process of the group, but without the much-needed ideological component that delegitimizes violence (Ashour,
The most telling and easily identified empirical data supporting this assertion is Ba’asyir’s 2009 proclamation for JI to temporarily suspend terrorist violence indefinitely and instead focus on organizational recruitment and religious proselytization. Another significant piece of empirical data that supports the pragmatic disengagement categorization of JI is the addition and inclusion of JAT and MMI as the recognized political wings of JI. As JI engages with well-established political and social groups like PKS and DDII, it may seek to formally align itself with these groups. Such an alignment will likely have a more profound, lasting effect on the pragmatic disengagement process of JI, and further enhance JI’s potential for collective deradicalization.

D. CONCLUSION

The Indonesian deradicalization program has relied mostly on individual initiative of Detachment 88, an organization with constrained capability and a finite amount of resources (Neumann, 2010, p. 50). Given the analysis contained in the four LOEs, two dominant, recurring themes present themselves. First, the empirical data clearly signifies that the Det 88 program should be categorized as a disengagement campaign rather than a deradicalization campaign. While the data implies that a small number of jihadists were deradicalized by ex-militants like Nasir Abas and Ali Imron, the deradicalization process should be treated more like an accidental by-product of the Det 88 strategic vision—fluence jihadist behavior so as to prevent future terror attacks. The other dominant theme, as shown in the aforementioned analysis, is the individual level of analysis emphasized by the Det 88 program. Arguably, the most meaningful results of the Det 88 program can be observed by looking at two LOEs—individual disengagement and individual deradicalization. One cannot deny that efforts toward collective disengagement and deradicalization have taken place in Indonesia, but these efforts have mostly been undertaken by JI itself or by external, third-party social organizations and NGOs rather than by Det 88 and the government of Indonesia.

How should a befitting deradicalization campaign be crafted in Indonesia? Few experts have attempted to establish a comprehensive strategy or campaign that seeks to moderate the virulent ideology of radical jihadist groups in Indonesia. Some experts and
research think tanks assert that deradicalization and rehabilitation programs should primarily focus on reforming individual terrorists rather than terrorist groups (International Crisis Group, 2007, p. 16). As such, it is imperative that individual-level efforts are not cookie-cutter, but rather nuanced and crafted to address the needs of the individual terrorist. A recently published International Crisis Group report (2012) provides a list of recommendations to the Indonesian government on how to prevent the spread of radical ideology (counter-radicalization). Interestingly enough, none of these recommendations attempt to prescribe effective options for dealing with jihadists currently being detained in the Indonesian prison system or those jihadists that continue to operate and freely move about Indonesian society.

It is important to realize that all hope for terrorist deradicalization is not lost in Indonesia, as two relatively new government initiatives seek to build off of the few successes experienced by the Detachment 88 program. Indonesia’s fledgling National Counterterrorism Agency stood up in 2010 and is charged with “implementing the government’s counter-radicalization and disengagement programs” (U.S. Department of State, 2012, p. 42). In May 2012, the Indonesian Defense Ministry stated its intent to work with local religious leaders and education experts “to develop a curriculum for its deradicalization center for convicted terrorists in Bogor, West Java” (Govt center aims to rehabilitate terrorists in Bogor, 2012). The goal of the center is to rehabilitate convicted terrorists through training and education that prepares them for release back into mainstream society (Govt center, 2012). Initial observations indicate that this is certainly a step in the right direction for the Indonesian government. Finally, it appears as if the Indonesian brand of terrorist deradicalization will now be coordinated, resourced, and sponsored by the national government. Only time and local circumstances will determine the effectiveness of this rejuvenated deradicalization effort in Indonesia.
VI. CONCLUSION

As illustrated in the previous case studies, states employ a variety of mechanisms within the four primary LOEs. The strategic vision and desired end-state for a deradicalization campaign ultimately determines the amount of effort and emphasis placed on any given mechanism and LOE. For a complete breakdown of individual mechanisms, by case, refer to Appendix B (States’ Efforts by Mechanism).

A. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTIVENESS

![Figure 6. Comparative Overlay](image)

Three distinct observations can be made from Figure 6. First, the most effective LOE varied in each case. This may be attributable to the application of resources into a specific LOE or to the fact that mechanisms may be more or less effective in different contextual environments. Second, collective disengagement was almost equally effective in each case. Appendix B, Table 2 suggests that this may be due to the amount of effort
shown by each state within the specific LOE mechanisms; this may stem from the ease of execution for these types of mechanisms. Third, the individual disengagement LOE was relatively equal in three of the four countries, the exception being Indonesia. This equality may relate to the fact that individual disengagement mechanisms are comparatively less resource intensive and produce more short term tangible results.

1. **Collective Efforts are More Effective**

As previously discussed, current radicalization literature emphasizes the importance of collective identity. The case study analyses show that collective efforts have the greatest effect. Mechanisms that facilitate collective deradicalization carry more weight because they target group/social factors that bind individuals together. Algeria and Yemen used more collective mechanisms than Saudi or Indonesia and each had higher ranking deradicalization effectiveness. Indonesia had the least evidence of collective mechanisms and its primary terrorist organization internally disengaged in order to reconstitute its ability to fight again in the future, a clear indication that radical thinking remains. Conversely, Algeria had the most evidence of collective mechanisms and its primary terrorist organizations have converted to the political process to seek desired changes, which suggests they no longer embrace violence as legitimate means.

2. **Individual Efforts Trump Collective**

The individual level generally trumps the collective level with regard to the amount of effort put forth by the state within a given deradicalization campaign. In terms of the individual disengagement LOE, Appendix B shows that the capture or kill mechanism was the most heavily emphasized activity implemented in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Indonesia. Four other mechanisms—job opportunities, job training, social networks, and detainee release—were used to a lesser degree in at least two of the four cases. What is interesting about these mechanisms is the fact they all seek to moderate violent behavior of the individual terrorist through immediate gratification and material compensation. These mechanisms, in effect, allow the state to tangibly influence individuals to stray from violent terrorist activities. Also, these mechanisms logically
support the notion that an attrition strategy undertaken by the state can slowly degrade the operational capability within a targeted terrorist group.

Appendix B also shows that the individual deradicalization LOE is more vigorously used by a greater number of states than the collective deradicalization LOE. Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Indonesia all incorporated the re-education, family building, and family/community responsibility mechanisms within the individual deradicalization LOE. The only collective deradicalization mechanism common to all three countries was delegitimize violence. While it remains difficult to ascertain the efficacy of these mechanisms, the analysis shown throughout this research suggests that states are more likely to focus on individual deradicalization action vice collective deradicalization action. In similar fashion to comments made in the preceding paragraph, states recognize that individual deradicalization efforts are more responsive, more immediately observed, and arguably less resource intensive than collective deradicalization efforts. Simply put, states have a greater ability to control the desired outcome(s) of the two individual LOEs than the two collective LOEs.

3. **Disengagement Supersedes Deradicalization**

The third significant observation shown by Figure 6 suggests that disengagement efforts generally supersede deradicalization efforts within a state-run terrorist deradicalization campaign. Appendix B shows that, at the individual and collective levels, the disengagement and deradicalization LOEs each contain twenty mechanisms. Further investigation shows that, of the four studies used in this research, thirteen disengagement mechanisms were used in two or more cases while only six deradicalization mechanisms were used in the same number of cases. Thus, almost two thirds of the disengagement mechanisms were implemented by two or more states, while only one third of the deradicalization mechanisms were used by two or more cases. These observations suggest, from a strategic viewpoint, an agenda predicated upon disengagement carries more utility than an agenda built around deradicalization efforts. These observations also match conventional wisdom in that disengagement is a more pragmatic and feasible endeavor than deradicalization.
4. Collective Deradicalization is Generally Avoided

Collective deradicalization is generally avoided when implementing a state-run campaign. This is a surprising dynamic considering the amount of literature that highlights the importance of collective identity. The difficulty with mechanisms in this category is that they do not yield the immediate results that states desire. With the exception of the Algerian case, collective deradicalization was the least used LOE. Mechanisms such as state repression yield more tangible results such as dead or imprisoned terrorists. Tangible results provide governments something to show their constituencies. It is almost trite to point out that human thought and beliefs are significantly more complex than human behavior. As long as that dynamic prevails then changing human thoughts will be a more difficult task than changing behavior. Consequently, governments in need of more immediate results will most likely favor disengagement LOEs.

B. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

1. Deradicalization in Name Only

As shown in the four aforementioned cases, the four associated campaigns should be categorized as “deradicalization” in name only. These campaigns are labeled deradicalization because this word captures the essence of utilizing soft approaches within the context of a broader counterterrorism strategy. The reality is that in many situations states do not have the time or patience to implement true deradicalization mechanisms and wait for the results, which are time consuming, hard to accurately measure, and difficult to observe. The soft approaches that comprise a deradicalization campaign often serve as a more socially acceptable compliment to hard counterterrorism approaches synonymous with state repression. States can justify the further use of hard approaches and potentially increase their effectiveness by including a contextualized blend of mechanisms contained within the four LOEs.

Additionally, the manner in which a state implements a mechanism may reveal its true deradicalization intentions. A good example of this can be determined from
leadership targeting. If a state primarily focuses on targeting the leaders, specifically killing, this may indicate that a state may only be concerned with the cessation of violence or disengagement. Whereas a state who refrains from targeting the leaders and utilizes non-kinetic methods to engage with leaders, this may indicate a higher degree of interest in actually wanting deradicalization. In Saudi Arabia, the government kinetically targeted the leaders of AQAP as did Yemen with AAA, SBY, AQY, and still does with AQAP. In these examples collective disengagement was the result. However, in Algeria with AIS and in Yemen with IJY, non-kinetic methods were used to engage the leaders, which resulted in varying degrees of deradicalization.

2. Importance of Leadership

The four case studies have highlighted and reinforced the claim that radical groups’ leaders are a key component in a state’s deradicalization campaign. Ashour (2009) and Johnston (2012) both agree on the importance of leaders and the need for states to engage leaders in some fashion. They disagree, however, on the method of engagement. Ashour suggests that leaders who are charismatic need to be present in order to facilitate states’ efforts at deradicalization (Ashour, 2009, p. 15). Johnston, on the other hand, advances the idea that leaders need to be removed from the group in order to bring about their defeat (Johnston, 2012, p. 77). Despite the difference, all three points have been identified within the case studies: the importance of leaders, the presence of leaders is needed for deradicalization, and the removal of leaders is needed for collective disengagement.

In Saudi Arabia, one of the key ingredients in bringing about the defeat of AQAP was the targeting of its leaders. Targeting the leadership, specifically killing, resulted in the successive elimination of strong charismatic leaders within the group. Without real leadership the group was off-balance and disrupted in its ability to conduct attacks. Though not the sole factor for bringing about the defeat of AQAP, targeting AQAP leaders did play a dominant role.
In Yemen, targeting of leaders carried a much more direct effect. With AAA, AQY, and SBY the removal or elimination of the leaders effectively brought about the end of these groups within Yemen. Following the execution of al-Midhar in October 1999, AAA essentially fell apart. AQY ended with Yemeni security forces killing al-Harithi in November 2002 and capturing al-Ahdal in November 2003. Finally, SBY ceased when government forces in Yemen killed al-Qu’ayti in 2008.

In Algeria, an Army General went and negotiated with the leader of AIS. The General worked through Medani Mezraq instead of attempting to remove him. By working through the leader, who was well respected, the General was able to facilitate the deradicalization of AIS and several subordinate groups of other terrorist organizations. In other cases, such as GIA and GSPC, the government kinetically targeted the leaders in order to decapitate the organizations. The efforts were partially effective but the groups eventually spawned into AQIM, the Muslim insurgency that currently plagues all of North Africa.

In the case of IJY, former President Salih co-opted the leaders, al-Fadhli and al-Nahdi, to bring an end to IJY. By influencing and co-opting these leaders with plenty of selective incentives, Yemen facilitated a degree of deradicalization with the IJY. Without the presence of the leaders, Yemen would not have been able to facilitate deradicalization.

3. **Context Matters**

Our case study analyses indicate that there is no magic combination that can be internationally applied. The optimal combination depends heavily on the local factors. The optimal combination of hard and soft approaches varies from country to country based on the situation and the unique internal environment. Within the field of soft approaches, “Deradicalization pathways [are] likely to be affected by the political-economic and sociocultural context in which the individual and group are nested” (Davis & Craigan, 2010, p. 367). In Yemen and Algeria the timing of the soft approaches was important in achieving their desired effects. In both cases, mechanisms such as
negotiations were used after hard approaches had led terrorist groups to a strategic crisis.\textsuperscript{17} The atrocities in Algeria were so severe that some groups were simply exhausted. In Yemen, the state used political inclusion with IJY in conjunction with kinetic targeting.

4. **Collective Identity Matters**

The Radicalization section of Chapter I provides a succinct discussion on the conceptual relevance of collective identity and the critical role it has on the process of terrorist radicalization at the individual and collective level. Regarding the notion of deradicalization, collective identity can be influenced by two primary components—family ties and social networks. The cases of Saudi Arabia and Indonesia suggest that, when states attempt to identify, influence, leverage, and/or control existing terrorist social networks via deradicalization mechanisms, the ensuing effects tend to favorably benefit the state. Conversely, states that either ignore or discount the importance of leveraging social networks within a given campaign are disadvantaged and lack a major weapon used in the struggle against terrorism and radical ideology. Arguably, such is the case in Yemen. The extent to which collective identity factors into a state-run deradicalization campaign remains purely contextual. One thing, however, appears certain—the idea of collective identity should be directly linked to an organized terrorist deradicalization program or campaign.

C. **FUTURE OF DERADICALIZATION**

1. **Existing Proposal**

Recently, deradicalization experts have suggested some rather abstract ideas surrounding of concept of a “global regime” (Gunaratna, 2009, p. 159) aimed at terrorist rehabilitation and deradicalization. Gunaratna (2009) argues for the formation of an international terrorist rehabilitation governing body predicated upon the following six common programs: (1) a common database or repository of information; (2) exchange of

\textsuperscript{17} According to Rebasa et al. (2010) the definition of a strategic crisis is “a re-examination of a group’s methods due to state repression.” (p. 161)
technical/professional personnel so as to improve information collaboration and capacity building; (3) joint research, publication, education, and training tied to terrorist rehabilitation; (4) transfer of expertise and resources to create resource parity within the international community; (5) sharing of experience and disseminating lessons learned from previous and current programs; and (6) establishing an international advisory council consisting of practitioners and scholars (pp. 160–161).

While Gunaratna’s suggested programs appear to be logical and theoretically sound, they have little practical applicability for several key reasons. First, international organizations tend to be wholly ineffective and bureaucratically inefficient. Common sense suggests that large international organizations face significant challenges when determining how to properly act upon policy. Secondly, terrorist deradicalization thus far has proven to be an entirely local/domestic phenomenon. As such, states tend to exclusively use domestic forms of governance and power to deal with terrorism. Lastly, terrorist deradicalization and rehabilitation programs are relatively new, having provided extremely limited amounts of data and research. Realistically, it will take many more years to produce and analyze the amount of data required to adequately assemble a global advisory council.

2. Our Recommendations

Ashour (2009) and Rabasa et al. (2010) identified that deradicalization efforts must have both hard and soft approaches. Our research generally concurs with the assessments contained in these two references. State repression alone, for example, is not enough. Additionally, incentives without some level of repression will not work either. States must find a balance between the hard and soft approaches that fit the specific context of their particular country.

States must ensure that their deradicalization campaign efforts include mechanisms that engage the leaders of the groups. More importantly, if states truly aim to deradicalize a radical group the state must work to prevent the killing of the groups’
leaders. The states need to find ways to influence or co-opt him while he actively controls the group or once he is captured, but still has influence. Without the leader available (dead), deradicalization will not occur.

3. Future Research

The authors recognize several limitations of this research. First, only four case studies were conducted and each was deliberately selected from a pool of Muslim majority countries dealing with religiously affiliated terrorist organizations. The conclusions presented could be further bolstered or disproved if tested against states efforts against organizations within other terrorism typologies (such as anarchists, separatists, or leftist). Second, the list of mechanisms found in Appendix A is not exhaustive. Future research could further refine the mechanisms used and possibly identify more mechanisms. Our framework categorized certain mechanisms into LOEs, but the mode of implication should be the ultimate factor that determines which LOE the mechanism falls under. Finally, several of these cases represent ongoing problems. Deradicalization is a long process that may only reveal results decades after a campaign has begun.
APPENDIX A. LOE MECHANISMS DEFINED

INDIVIDUAL DISENGAGEMENT

- Arrest—incarcerate an individual, physically preventing him from committing acts of violence against the state.
- Kill—the individual is deceased and physically unable to commit acts of violence against the state.
- Marriage—a union between a man and a woman where the union places increased responsibilities and duties upon the man (militant) in order to preclude him from engaging in violent acts.
- Job opportunities—a state providing employment to a militant in order to place increased responsibility upon him and preclude him from engaging in violent acts.
- Job training—the state providing skills training in order to further prepare the individual for a potential job opportunity.
- Protection from terrorist group reprisal—a state’s efforts to provide security to those individuals who leave extremist organization and or speak out against the group
- Detainee release—a state’s release of individuals from incarceration under the agreement that the individuals will not commit acts of violence. If the individuals do commit acts of violence against the state they will be re-arrested.
- Social network—state’s effort to change whom the individual “hangs out” with in an attempt to surround the individual with non-radical people.
COLLECTIVE DISENGAGEMENT

- Political inclusion—allow the group to become full and legitimate members involved in the formal political process and institutions of the state.

- Establishing autonomous zone—partitioning a semi and or fully autonomous area in which the group governs the territory and its inhabitants. Here the group is focused on governing its territory vice attacks against the state.

- High-profile detainee release—the release from incarceration of high-ranking members of the opposition organization in order to effect disengagement of the group. The state’s action is directed at the newly released individual, but the desired effect is aimed at the group.

- Target key leaders—direct action (capture/kill) operations against the group leader(ship) with a goal of having a coercive effect aimed at group disengagement. This includes operational leaders as well as key religious figures of the group.

- State repression—any active, offensive military, and or police action against the group, or supporters of the group

- Environmental manipulation—an act taken by the state to specifically control a clearly defined element within the local environment.

INDIVIDUAL DERADICALIZATION

- Marriage—a union between a man and a woman where the union places increased responsibilities and duties upon the man (militant) in order to preclude him from engaging in violent acts. In this instance, deradicalization comes from long-term disengagement where the individual values his family over the belief in violence.
• Family building—a state’s efforts to strengthen an individual’s ties to his family in order to promote the family’s increased interest in preventing the individual from committing further acts of violence.

• Family/tribal/community responsibility—the state specifically placing responsibility for the formerly violent individual on the family, tribe, and or community for integration. The goal of the state is to affect the individual, not the group

• Re-education—a state’s efforts to re-teach the correct or socially accepted religious beliefs within the state to the individual

COLLECTIVE DERADICALIZATION:

• Social interaction with moderates—a state’s efforts to use legitimate, well respected, and moderate clerics to interact and influence the thought of the group itself.

• Influence or co-opt the leader(s)—a state’s efforts to change the group’s leader’s belief in the use of violence, ideally leading to the leader renouncing violence and facilitating the deradicalization of the group.

• Delegitimize the leader—state’s effort to reduce the credibility of the leadership in order to change the beliefs of the group members and cause a reduction in membership. An example of leader de-legitimation is an effective, specific state-run media smear campaign.

• Establishing autonomous zone—partitioning a semi and or fully autonomous area in which the group governs the territory and its inhabitants.

• Political inclusion—allow the group to become full and legitimate members involved in the formal political process and institutions of the state.
APPENDIX B. STATES’ EFFORTS BY MECHANISM

The following tables show each state’s efforts within the four LOEs, which is further broken down by mechanism. This allows for a comparison between states of the effort used by mechanism across LOEs. The scale used is from zero (0) to three (3). Zero (0) is no effort or the mechanism not used. This category is color coded in white. One (1) is minimal effort and color coded in light gray. Two (2) refers to moderate effort. Two is coded in dark gray. Finally, three (3) shows significant effort and is color coded in black.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
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<th>Yemen</th>
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Table 1. States’ Efforts in Individual Disengagement by Mechanism
### Table 2. States’ Efforts in Collective Disengagement by Mechanism

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### Table 3. States’ Efforts in Individual Deradicalization by Mechanism

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Table 4. States’ Efforts in Collective Deradicalization by Mechanism
LIST OF REFERENCES


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