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THE CYCLE OF RECIPROCITY: A SOCIAL CAPITAL INTERVENTION STRATEGY FOR SSTR OPERATIONS

by

Glenn A. Tolle

June 2007

Thesis Advisor:        Nancy Roberts
Second Reader:         Dorothy Denning

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**13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words):** Is it possible to initiate and sustain a positive cycle of reciprocity between competing actors in a Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) environment? The author postulates that an intervention strategy based on fostering “bridging social capital” between two or more competing parties stands a greater probability of success than an intervention strategy based primarily on an infusion of physical or human capital. The author reviews key literature of social capital and examines two cases involving a harvest initiative in Gnjilane, Kosovo (July-September 1999) and the “Village of Hope” in Mosul, Iraq (January-December, 2004). Examination of these two instances of convincing recalcitrant ethnicities to cooperate for the greater good yields lessons in civil military relations and provides a template for intervention and for generating “bridging” social capital. Current practices in SSTR operations inadvertently establish a competitive dilemma by introducing significant amounts of fiscal and physical capital in a post-conflict environment. Ethnic groups compete with other groups for financial, human and information capital—to the detriment of the collective civil good. Recommendations for civilian and military interventionists include bringing competing ethnicities together in common, low-level microfinancial projects that foster bridging social capital between kinship-based social networks.

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THE CYCLE OF RECIPROCITY: A SOCIAL CAPITAL INTERVENTION STRATEGY FOR SSTR

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Is it possible to initiate and sustain a positive cycle of reciprocity between competing actors in a Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) environment? The author postulates that an intervention strategy based on fostering “bridging social capital” between two or more competing parties stands a greater probability of success than an intervention strategy based primarily on an infusion of physical or human capital. The author reviews key literature of social capital and examines two cases involving a harvest initiative in Gnjilane, Kosovo (July-September 1999) and the “Village of Hope” in Mosul, Iraq (January-December, 2004). Examination of these two instances of convincing recalcitrant ethnicities to cooperate for the greater good yields lessons in civil military relations and provides a template for intervention and for generating “bridging” social capital. Current practices in SSTR operations inadvertently establish a competitive dilemma by introducing significant amounts of fiscal and physical capital in a post-conflict environment. Ethnic groups compete with other groups for financial, human and information capital—to the detriment of the collective civil good. Recommendations for civilian and military interventionists include bringing competing ethnicities together in common, low-level microfinancial projects that foster bridging social capital between kinship-based social networks.
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Finally, I thank Nancy Tolle for her steadfast support and encouragement during a very challenging and rewarding stretch in our military journey.
I. SOCIA L CAPITAL IN SSTR

A. INTRODUCTION

This thesis asks, “How can civilian and military organizations facilitate the development of social capital with and between competitive ethnic networks during Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations?” The question, more simply put, is “how can civilian and military outsiders foster social capital among indigenous populations in a post-war environment?” This question is timely, given current SSTR efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Humanitarian and military efforts frequently focus on human and physical capital intervention without due consideration for social capital. As an example Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz testified in June ’04 before the Senate Armed Services Committee and stressed money and the concern for human capital—the development of individuals:

It's worth pointing out that Iraq has already committed—and this is, I think, a significant figure—$20 billion of its own resources. That's a pretty impressive number—$20 billion of Iraqi resources that have already gone into funding the government and funding reconstruction, including 350,000 teachers, 100,000 doctors, more than 2,000 schools, almost 250 hospitals, over a billion dollars in improving electricity infrastructure.²

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The infusion of funds to develop physical and human capital—essential as they are to nation building—has taken precedence as a contemporary intervention strategy. This thesis examines and proposes a different approach: an intervention strategy that emphasizes a cycle of reciprocity and the development of networks where bridging social capital can develop and grow. The basic premise is that the development of social capital is the key to long-term security and stability.

Social capital (the definition of which will be explained in greater detail in the next chapter) is defined as “features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.”³ Within this definition are two types of social capital: bonding social capital which exists between families, tribes and similar social classes; and bridging social capital which manifests itself between unlike groups.⁴

An examination of the literature on social capital and the experiences of the author in organizing the Harvest Initiative in Gnjilane, Kosovo (July-September 1999) and observing the “Village of Hope” in Mosul, Iraq (January-December 2004) suggest that a network-centric intervention strategy that fosters a positive cycle of reciprocity among in-country groups promotes SSTR goals more so than a strategy that does not.

The organization of the thesis is as follows: the remainder of this chapter proposes a theoretical framework

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⁴ Ibid.
for a social capital intervention strategy; Chapter II reviews the evolving definition of social capital and the literature of the key contributors in the field; Chapter III explains the comparative case study methodology employed and the strengths and limitations of this methodology; Chapter IV presents the events of the two case studies (the author’s personal involvement in the Wheat Harvest in Kosovo in 1999 and the Village of Hope in Mosul, Iraq in 2004); Chapter V analyzes, compares and contrasts the events of the two case studies. The final chapter presents conclusions from the case studies and recommendations for a social capital-based intervention strategy for SSTR.

B. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The conceptual framework of this thesis is built on fostering “bridging” social capital between entities with strong “bonding” social capital (Figure 1). Some take issue with this dichotomy, noting that external ties (bridging social capital) at one level of analysis are actually internal ties (bonding social capital) at higher levels of analysis.5 One must keep such cautions in mind when determining whether bridging social capital has been produced in an ad hoc SSTR network.

Overwhelmingly, the primary lesson of the United States military in Afghanistan and Iraq has been one of seeking to establish the norm of reciprocity: Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom are massive laboratories of human relations based on tit-for-tat gamesmanship in

5 Adler, Social Capital: Prospects, 35.
seemingly zero-sum environments. When the military—as well as civilian governmental and non-governmental relief organizations—bring considerable resources into regions starved for economic and material aid, the race is on for the interventionists to impose order and generate popular support, while the ethnically-divided population races to gain as much assistance as possible. Herein lays the conceptual framework: a cycle of positive reciprocity evolves between the indigenous population (further subdivided along competing ethnic/religious lines) and the providers of aid. A cycle of reciprocity must further develop among the ethnically-divided populations themselves. The initial unit of analysis for the conceptual framework is the relationship between the population and the interventionists. The secondary unit of measure must be the relationships among individuals in the competing ethnic groups. This micro level of analysis within groups enables a macro level of analysis between groups.

C. RECIPROCITY AND COMPETITIVENESS IN THE FRAMEWORK

The conceptual framework is held together by the norm of reciprocity. Positive reciprocity (PR) at its simplest level is a mutually beneficial system of trust. This system of trust contains an element of risk, as indicated in Piotr Sztompka’s definition of trust: “trust is a bet about the future contingent actions of others.” Positive reciprocity, from Sztompka’s perspective, requires that one party places a bet—i.e., demonstrates trust to another party that may either reciprocate that trust (yielding to the sense of

Figure 1. Conceptual Framework for Network-Centric Intervention in SSTR

(SC = Social Capital)
obligation that arises when trust is given) or choose to “opt out” of the cycle. Neutrality in the face of demonstrated trust is rare and appears contrary to human nature. Examples from ancient history support this view, as Cicero stated, “There is no duty more indispensable than that of returning a kindness,” and warned, “all men distrust one forgetful of a benefit.” The propensity for opting out of the cycle of reciprocity has much to do with a society’s circumstances relative to Maslow’s Hierarchy of Human Needs (discussed in Chapter VI). Societies with a high degree of autonomy and self-sufficiency (and less war damage) have more latitude for opting out of a trust arrangement than societies which are scrabbling for the basics of existence.

Competitiveness must be taken into consideration when conceptualizing a humanitarian intervention. Introducing massive aid in an SSTR environment inevitably sets the stage for competitiveness and distrust. Elements of game theory contribute to an understanding of competitiveness and its impact on reciprocity in the conceptual framework.

In humanitarian interventions, the well-heeled civilian and military outsiders possess the “means of production” (to borrow a Marxist take on capital) and therefore have the capacity and the incentive, as well as the mandate, for initiating reciprocity with the population. The population, typically subdivided along competitive ethnic lines, does not possess the means of production and have little incentive to cooperate with their enemies, but they have strong incentive to cooperate

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7 Gouldner, 161.
with the deep-pocketed interventionists. This is why the relationships among the ethnicities prior to the intervention resemble the low “Defect / Defect” payoff in the 2-person Prisoner’s Dilemma (Figure 2). Interventionists apply their time, energy and considerable resources to shift the dynamic of this zero-sum game to “cooperate / cooperate.”

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Figure 2. The 2-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma

Competing ethnicities may establish a mutually beneficial cycle of reciprocity or compete to each other’s detriment. The “Prisoner’s Dilemma” (PD) helps to explain the initial social dynamic between well-heeled interventionists (the “Haves”) and one ethnicity (the “Have Not”). Recipients of aid may either cooperate with the interventionist or defect. SSTR scenarios typically involve more than one ethnicity, so the dynamic assumes the complexity of an “n-player game”.

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9 Ibid.
The explanatory power of this simple model is that it accounts for a 2-player subset of the competitive dynamic in an SSTR environment. This competitive dynamic is an integral component of the conceptual framework of this thesis. Groups will always be in competition with each other in the real world. Interventionists must be prepared to contend with the competitive zero-sum dynamic in place, and engineer cooperation between competing ethnicities.

D. ACKNOWLEDGED WEAKNESSES

As with all models (simplified explanations of real life phenomena), there are downsides. In Figure 2, the potential drawback to cooperation for the “have nots” (e.g., the survivors of an ethnic conflict whose basic service infrastructure—electricity, sanitation, schools, roads and bridges—have been destroyed) is the imposition of political and social imperatives by the “haves.” Given the mandate of such key aid players as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank, such imperatives are an inevitable political price tag of intervention. If the incentive for cooperation does not exceed the incentive for defection, the interventionists (the military in particular) may be called on to coerce the population into cooperation, hazard a cycle of negative reciprocity and creating more defection than cooperation.

Another potential weakness to any conceptual framework or model, even something as basic as the PD, is the set of cultural assumptions underlying the model. If the conditions are right, mutual cooperation between the “haves” and the “have nots” seems a given, since the “have nots” have apparently nothing to lose by cooperating—or do
they? Nonconsensual interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan were predicated on an anticipated cycle of reciprocity with the liberated and overwhelmingly grateful citizens. Unfortunately, this critical strategic assumption proved incorrect. A surprisingly diverse network of "have nots" in both Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated a willingness to forego development and defect. Whether this was a result of the military alienating the population by harsh treatment is not clear. Not all defected, but sufficient numbers turned to make the entire Western interventionist enterprise a gamble.

The inevitable resistance aside, anecdotal evidence suggests the possibility of establishing a positive cycle of reciprocity in a hostile environment (as is the case with negative reciprocity): Iraqi soldiers and police hazarding themselves with their American partners in joint patrols, multiple ethnicities forming joint committees to deal with municipal problems, etc. 10 Apparently, it is possible to generate bridging social capital from existing networks, if the security requirement has been met. 11 Trust is the coin of the realm in SSTR, and cooperation—a key component of social capital—is a manifestation of trust earning dividends. But nothing printed, said, or broadcast will carry any weight unless the message is corroborated by deeds. This is how the cycle of reciprocity is initiated and maintained—by deeds. COL Ralph Baker, a brigade commander during Operation Iraqi Freedom I, noted that

11 "Maslow's Hierarchy of Human Needs" is considered in chapter six as a societal template. Security is a fundamental human and social need.
winning “trust and confidence” was a more achievable strategy than winning “hearts and minds.” 12

As will be seen in the “Village of Hope” case in Chapter IV, use of the generously funded Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) enabled tactical units to initiate a cycle of reciprocity with the population in Mosul, Iraq. 13 Microfinancial CERP initiatives throughout the battlespace served notice to the Iraqi population that their erstwhile invaders intended to improve relations through municipal and humanitarian projects. This is the same approach taken in Afghanistan. The challenge in such projects is to accelerate the cycle of positive reciprocity ahead of the enemy’s cycle of negative reciprocity. It is not the project itself, but the bridging relationships fostered and sustained among the social groups that matters.

The cycle of reciprocity generated by CERP should reach what Malcolm Gladwell calls the “tipping point;” namely, the point where an idea becomes contagious and spreads like the plague. Gladwell’s three “agents of change” are: “The Law of the Few, the Stickiness Factor and the Power of Context.” 14 Gladwell’s idea applies to the conceptual framework of this thesis in that the “few” represent the “true believers” (connectors, mavens and

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13 Author’s experience in Iraq, JAN 2004-JAN 2005 includes spending one million dollars in a six-month cleanup program in Mosul, Iraq. CERP enabled immediate cash financing of everything from trash cleanup to pothole repair.

salesmen) among the military and civilian interventionists; the "stickiness factor" is the irresistibility of the message transmitted by the deeds of the interventionists; the "power of context" is the "golden hour" after a conventional war has been won and where the greatest opportunity to influence a docile population exists. Interventionists striving to achieve a tipping point in a host nation population (and looking for an exit strategy) should do so through an accelerated cycle of reciprocity that incorporates all three of Gladwell’s agents of change.

The norm of reciprocity has a down-side. A competing cycle of negative reciprocity emerges among those opposed to the agenda of the humanitarians. Reciprocity never takes place in a vacuum: a positive outcome between interventionists and indigenous groups can be a negative outcome for "dark networks" operating—and profiting—outside the bounds of local and international law. For the purpose of this thesis, the author will acknowledge the potential of negative reciprocity but will focus on what is required to initiate a positive cycle of reciprocity and generate social capital between interventionists and indigenous groups, and among the indigenous groups themselves.

The following chapter will examine the literature of social capital.

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15 The "Golden Hour" is known in military circles as the hour immediately after a soldier is wounded. If the soldier is given combat lifesaver treatment and medically evacuated within that hour, his or her odds of survival go up dramatically.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. EVOLUTION OF DEFINITIONS

Definitions of social capital and the conceptual framework of this thesis draw on a number of dynamic sociological, economic and military schools of thought. Not all schools of thought are in agreement as to the substance, effects or application of social capital. This chapter will examine the main streams of thought on social capital and conclude with the author’s identification of the major elements that facilitate the development of social capital.

“Social capital” is a cross-disciplinary concept that has received attention from schools of thought running the gamut from sociologists and network theorists to economists. The appeal of social capital is that it puts the emphasis on social relations, a factor that tends to be ignored in SSTR interventions. Social capital goes beyond mere fiscal, physical or human capital—the stuff brought to SSTR in great abundance but with little forethought on their social and relational consequences.

An early pioneer in social capital thought, the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu defined social capital as

...the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition.17

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James Coleman, a catalyst in modern social capital thought, lays the American foundation for the concept with an emphasis on network structure and utility:

Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in common: They all consist of some aspect of social structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure.18

Francis Fukuyama expands on Coleman’s definition to include norms:

I prefer to define the concept more broadly to include any instance in which people cooperate for common ends on the basis of shared informal norms and values.19

Again, in the Third World Quarterly:

…social capital is an instantiated informal norm that promotes co-operation between two or more individuals… …trust, networks, civil society, and the like, which have been associated with social capital, are all epiphenomenal, arising as a result of social capital but not constituting social capital itself.20

A key author disagrees with Fukuyama’s ideas on what constitutes social capital. Building on the idea of norms, Robert Putnam, who gained recognition by examining a perceived decline in social capital in the United States, provides this earlier referenced description of social capital as “features of social organization such as

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networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit."\textsuperscript{21}

The definitions proffered by these four authors indicate the challenge in applying an idea such as social capital to SSTR: nobody agrees on any single definition—social capital is many things to many people. Bourdieu and Coleman emphasize the structure of relationships and the facility derived therein, while Fukuyama and Putnam stress the norms inherent in the structure. While features of all four authors’ views are applicable, Robert Putnam’s SSTR-friendly view of social capital proves the most functional.

For the purpose of this thesis, social capital must be further subdivided between bonding social capital and bridging social capital. Robert Putnam explains this dichotomy:

Bonding social capital brings together people who are like one another in important respects (ethnicity, age, gender, social class, and so on), whereas bridging social capital refers to social networks that bring together people who are unlike one another.\textsuperscript{22}

It must also be noted in these definitions that not all social capital is positive. Bonding social capital may be found in tightly knit organizations with very negative externalities, such as Hezbollah, Al Qaeda or the Mafia. Bonding social capital also tends toward exclusion and in-group/out-group dynamics.

The final definition to be considered is the “cycle of reciprocity.” Reciprocity itself is “a mutually contingent

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exchange of benefits between two or more units." 23 This definition contains an implied warning against what Gouldner calls the "Pollyanna Fallacy," namely, that gratitude always follows the bestowal of a benefit. 24 The norm of reciprocity is a standard feature of any human network and a critical component of social capital. It has both positive aspects (a mutual exchange of benefits, advantages, money, information, generating trust with each successful iteration) and negative aspects (a downward spiral of tit-for-tat, eye-for-an-eye, generating distrust). The challenge of civilian and military interventionists—and a topic of interest in this thesis—is to help competing entities generate trust by initiating and sustaining a positive cycle of reciprocity. If a positive cycle of reciprocity is initiated, sustained and enforced between competing actors in an SSTR environment (Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Post-Tsunami Aceh, etc.), then intuitively one may assume that other such cycles may be initiated at various levels in the population.

What has been written to date on the various forms of capital (social, human, physical, fiscal, political, artistic, etc.) is voluminous and continues to grow. 25 Military SSTR doctrine, while experiencing a prodigious growth rate in recent years, has not kept pace with this growing body of literature. The gap between contemporary

24 Ibid.
thought on social capital and military lessons learned in SSTR presents an opportunity for practical civil-military synthesis and application.

Before proceeding, the line must be drawn between social capital and human capital. Both forms of “capital” are essential elements of stabilization operations, but they are not one and the same. An understanding of both types of “capital” is a starting point for applying these useful metaphors.

A Nobel Prize-winning economist, Gary S. Becker, provides his perspective on human capital:

...economists regard expenditures on education, training, medical care, and so on as investments in human capital. They are called human capital because people cannot be separated from their knowledge, skills, health, or values in the way they can be separated from their financial and physical assets.26

Human capital is the focus of considerable humanitarian energy expended by military civil affairs, governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and their host nation partners. The civil and military lessons learned since the fall of the Soviet Union (and examined in the Kosovo and Mosul cases in Chapters IV and V) suggest that the human capital cart is being put before the social capital horse. Initiatives to build and sustain human capital (or any other form of capital) must be founded on and between existing social capital networks.

Pierre Bourdieu deserves credit for his groundbreaking work on material and non-material forms of capital. Bourdieu was the first to synthesize two schools of capital, bridging the tangible world of economics (the world on which many interventionists—particularly military—focus) with the intangible world of sociology. Bourdieu’s work, in French, did not achieve the widespread popular appeal of other proponents of social capital.

Social capital first became popularized among American sociologists by prominent sociologist James S. Coleman’s influential essay, “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital” (1988). The author used high school dropout statistics to illustrate the impact of social capital (family, friends and community organizations) on successful and unsuccessful human capital initiatives. Dr. Coleman explained his challenge in synthesizing the economic and sociological schools of thought by addressing what he called “two intellectual streams.” Sociologists use such exogenous factors as social networks to explain levels of economic performance, while economists place strong emphasis on the very rational and endogenous constant of “maximizing utility.” Coleman reinforced his synthesis of these two streams of thought with four useful examples of social capital: the wholesale diamond market in New York City, radical student activists in South Korea, parents moving from Detroit to Jerusalem to improve their children’s social network at school, and the highly-

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28 Svendsen, Bourdieueconomics, 616.
networked Kahn el Khalili market in Cairo.\(^{30}\) Interventionists dealing with SSTR challenges can identify with the sociological parallels in these cases. James Coleman’s seminal effort established the conceptual framework within which numerous economists, sociologists and other interested academics have attempted to correlate social networks and levels of economic activity.

Robert Putnam’s frequently-referenced “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital” pays homage to Coleman’s work and then expands upon the idea of social capital being a precursor to regional economic success:

Voter turnout, newspaper readership, membership in choral societies and football clubs—these were the hallmarks of a successful region. In fact, historical analysis suggested that these networks of organized reciprocity and civic solidarity, far from being an epiphenomenon of socioeconomic modernization, were a precondition for it.\(^{31}\)

Dr. Putnam’s study of northern and southern Italy yielded valuable insights into the role of social capital in the economic success of local governments.\(^{32}\) Extrapolating from these results, the author presents a compelling use of the concept of social capital in explaining the decline of civic engagement in America.

Due to Putnam’s ground-breaking work in Italy, both he and Coleman emerge as cornerstone references for contemporary (post-2000) treatments of the concept of social capital. Some have built upon Putnam’s observations


\(^{31}\) R. D. Putnam, Bowling Alone, 65.

after September 11th, comparing the surge in social solidarity with the civic revival that followed World War II.33 Such resurgence is challenging in a peacetime context.

Dr. Francis Fukuyama builds on both Coleman and Putnam as yet another advocate for the study and application of the concept of social capital. He is by no means in agreement with these two authors, presenting counterbalancing definitions and applications of the concept of social capital. Dr. Fukuyama defines social capital as “an instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation between two or more individuals.”34 Positive and negative externalities characterize the various manifestations of social capital. Dr. Fukuyama points to both the Ku Klux Klan and the Mafia as unfortunate examples of groups with highly developed norms but with strong negative externalities.35

Fukuyama’s intuitive “radius of trust” resonates well with the ideas of Putnam, Coleman and Bourdieu. Dr. Fukuyama noted a tendency of groups with particularly strong internal norms, such as the Marine Corps or the Mormon Church, to constrict their radius of trust vis-à-vis outsiders.36

An additional challenge identified by this author is the translation of the idea of social capital into policy. Authors from numerous disciplines are in disagreement as to the very definition of social capital, let alone the

34 Fukuyama, Social Capital, Civil Society and Development, 7.
35 Ibid., 8.
36 Ibid., 15.
application of that concept to sound fiscal policy. Fukuyama notes that microfinancial initiatives by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in developing countries have met with some measure of success in generating social capital at the local level.

Fukuyama’s ideas complement those of Coleman and Putnam by identifying two important catalysts for the generation of social capital: religion and globalization.

Religion as a source and catalyst for social capital finds numerous advocates in the literature. Dr. Andrew Greeley of the University of Chicago is an outspoken critic of the Putnam school, calling the generalized warnings of a decline in social capital “pop sociology” and “fuzzy thinking.” Greeley presented compelling data on the dropout rates between religious and secular schools, linking his findings with Coleman’s original empirical study of high school dropout rates. Students who had “multiplex” relationships (i.e., “closure” or overlapping networks of parents, friends and community organizations—particularly the church) stood a better chance of graduating school than those with “simplex” relationships.

Taking the knowledge management approach, Dr. Mark McElroy (co-authoring with Rene’ J. Jorna and Jo van Engelen) makes the following observation: “Social capital consists of knowledge and organizational resources that

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38 Ibid., 33.
39 Fukuyama, 19.
41 Ibid.
enhance the potential for individual and collective action in human social systems."\textsuperscript{42} McElroy et al consider trust, norms, beliefs, rules and networks to be manifestations of knowledge that complement both Coleman’s and Putnam’s perspectives on social capital. Of these manifestations, networks receive the most attention in the social capital literature. Together, these five analytical elements (trust, norms, beliefs, rules and networks) constitute what McElroy calls “social innovation capital.”\textsuperscript{43} This distinction underscores the importance of knowledge and capacity for innovation as a metric for social capital rather than network linkages alone.

Ronald S. Burt of the Business School at the University of Chicago stresses the network aspects of social capital and underscores the burgeoning literature on the topic.\textsuperscript{44} Taking the business approach to the social capital metaphor, Burt argues that competitive advantage may account for “structural holes” between organizations:

The hole argument begins with a generic research finding in sociology and social psychology: information circulates more within than between groups (e.g., within a work group more than between groups, within a division more than between divisions, within an industry more than between industries).\textsuperscript{45}

Network structures account for why certain individuals and groups perform better than others. Those who position


\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 132.


\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 6.
themselves at the “structural holes” provide connectivity and add value to their network.46 Social capital entrepreneurs who prove adept at brokering information within and between groups not only improve the effectiveness of their organizations but tend to get promoted faster than their less-connected coworkers.47 Burt’s study of structural holes has application in education as well as business and has the explanatory rigor to aid in the understanding of civil networks in stabilization operations.

The literature makes the connection with stabilization operations by discussing microenterprise initiatives in poverty-stricken areas. Michael Woolcock of the World Bank examined social capital as a form of group collateral for recipients of micro loans.48 Diffusion of risk among densely-connected groups proved to be an effective technique for economic stimulus based on his field work in India and Bangladesh.49 Woolcock also drew on the work of Coleman, Putnam, Burt and Fukuyama in his discussion of bonding within groups and bridging between groups.

Ethnic identity is an important subset of the literature. Examination of Jimy Sanders’ “Ethnic Boundaries and Identity in Plural Society” yields further understanding of the concept of “closure” in networks.50

47 Ibid., 73.
49 Ibid.
While Coleman sees “closure” as overlapping networks that reinforce positive social capital, Sanders warns of the “down-side” of closure in that “bounded solidarity” may strengthen bonding social capital to the detriment of bridging social capital.\textsuperscript{51} Identifying ethnic networks as sources of both social and human capital enables consensus engineers such as military civil affairs and non-governmental humanitarian organizations to promote collaboration between organizations and prevent isolation.

Sanders illustrated how the church frequently becomes a “hub of social organization” wherein religious identity can trump ethnic identity.\textsuperscript{52} He is in agreement with Greeley and Coleman regarding the role of religious affiliation in generating volunteerism, collaboration and other forms of social capital. An interesting phenomenon regarding the religious assimilation of immigrants is the growing Protestantism of the Hispanic population in the United States.\textsuperscript{53}

The literature of social capital has demonstrated an enthusiastic growth since Coleman’s popular 1988 article. The ubiquitous metaphor and concept of social capital has found adherents in both sociological and economic circles. Common themes running through the literature include the empirically significant impact of religious affiliations on education; the difference between bonding within groups and bridging between groups (structural holes) and the economic impact of simplex versus multiplex relationships. The

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 344.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
literature also has a significant counterbalance of voices declaring “social capital” to be a convenient and nebulous catch-all for the general decline in civic mindedness in the United States.

The literature represented in this review seems to indicate that the explanatory power of social capital may be applied to the challenges of bridging ethnic division in military stabilization operations. The gap in the literature between the rising interest in social capital and the current Global War on Terrorism (with its economic overtones) is a fertile ground for doctrinal synthesis.

Before addressing the methodology of the thesis in the next chapter, the reader must keep in mind that the determinants of social capital (e.g. common projects, “networks of networks” that emerge from these projects and the norms of reciprocity that the groups use to govern their interactions in networks) are not the same thing as social capital. The reservoir of good will and the willingness to contribute resources in a positive relationship constitute social capital, while the apparatus that generates the capital (networks, projects, etc.) must be examined separately.54 This dichotomy will be demonstrated in the Kosovo and Iraq case studies.

The next chapter will explain the methodology of the thesis.

III. METHODOLOGY

This thesis uses a comparative case study design to examine two cases in which the author was personally involved: the Gnjilane, Kosovo Harvest Initiative, August-September, 1999 and the Mosul, Iraq “Village of Hope” project, February-June, 2004.

Data collection and analysis in this thesis rely on qualitative methods. Quantitative methodology differs from qualitative methodology in that the researcher applies statistical tests to numerically quantified results. Qualitative methodology places emphasis on interpretations of experience. The comparative case study design drives the research narrative and analysis in the following chapters.

The data collection process relies on three sources: interviews, archival research and participant observation. In both case studies, the author worked with and interviewed commanders, operations officers, media representatives and engineers in daily contact with the indigenous populations. These personnel sources were selected based on their availability, credibility and proximity to the cases. The archives on both cases are limited to Department of Defense press releases, newspaper accounts and two separate case studies. The author’s experiences in two countries in two separate military

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56 Lundberg’s “Accidental Statesman” (Mosul, Iraq) and Holohan’s “Networks of Democracy” (Kosovo) are excellent sources of contextual information but neither goes into detail on the two specific cases in this thesis.
operations, coupled with archives and interviews, provides ample primary and secondary sources from which to generate hypotheses on the development of bridging social capital under SSTR conditions.

Participant observation is both a strength and limitation in that it carries the author’s useful but limited frame of reference. Interviews and archival research serve as quality control measures, but inevitably carry an element of bias in the questions asked and sources consulted by the author. All three data sources for this thesis will be integrated as objectively as possible. Perfect objectivity is unrealistic and the potential for bias increases significantly when one has personal experience in a case in question. Acknowledging that one’s limited perspective may be tinged with bias is a necessary step toward credibility.

The very structure of the research design has an impact on the analysis. Both authors and students of comparative case studies understand that historical events are unique products of their sociological, political and economic context. Events that occur at one point in time and space may translate to another location at another time, but never perfectly. The analysis of the Kosovo and Iraq cases will demonstrate congruence and incongruence, convergence and divergence. The two cases enable a fuller examination of intervention strategies and the development of hypotheses.

Although the methodology used in this thesis does not use quantitative statistics, a recommended “way ahead” in Chapter VI includes a follow-up analysis of Gnjilane, Kosovo and Mosul, Iraq and other locations. Such follow-up
will enable us to test the hypotheses of social capital and reciprocity developed in this thesis. This “grounded theory” approach and the resulting hypotheses may be thus tested using other research designs and methods in the future.

For the purpose of this thesis, bridging social capital will be operationalized by three criteria: observable participation, observable cooperation and the formation of inter-group agreements of norms of reciprocity and behavior. With these criteria, the author asks in both cases: Who participated in the projects, why did they participate, and how did they work out cooperation with competing ethnicities? The answers to these questions will help determine if social capital had been generated between competing groups.

The following chapter will discuss what happened in the two cases.
IV. WHAT HAPPENED: TWO SOCIAL CAPITAL CASES

The following case studies encompass the author’s experience and knowledge in two useful examples of initiating a cycle of reciprocity and the development of bonding and bridging social capital. The unique relationships and circumstances discussed here will be analyzed, compared and contrasted in the next chapter.

A. THE HARVEST INITIATIVE, GNJILANE, KOSOVO

In July 1999, the author’s four-man Civil Affairs Team-Alpha (CAT-A) from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion was assigned to 1-26 Infantry in Camp Monteith, Gnjilane, Kosovo. The Gnjilane sector lay within the larger American sector and consisted of sixteen villages and a number of smaller hamlets. These communities were divided among a shifting demographic of (in order of population density) Albanian, Serbian, and Roma (“Gypsy”) ethnicities. The Civil Affairs team spent the first month learning the leadership of the local area and fulfilling its mandate of keeping the civilians out of the way of the military and keeping the military from unduly inconveniencing the host nation population.

It became apparent after talking to leaders of the Serbian and Albanian communities (the Roma had no center of


gravity or representation per se) that the summer wheat harvest was in jeopardy. Approximately 6,000 hectares of wheat, equivalent to nearly 15,000 acres, was in danger of going to waste due to a stand-off between Albanian and Serbian farmers. Neither side trusted the other enough to go into adjacent fields to work. The same month that the Civil Affairs team arrived, a 12-year-old Serbian boy was shot and killed—presumably by Albanians—while riding with his father on a tractor. Distrust was extremely high and ran both ways during this time of reverse ethnic cleansing and retribution. A survey of the Serbian enclaves revealed that they possessed most of the farm equipment. The Albanians claimed that their own farm equipment had been confiscated and given to the Serb villages during the Serbian incursion (winter ’98-spring ‘99).60

The Civil Affairs Team Sergeant and Team Leader conceived of an idea: a joint Serbian and Albanian project to harvest the summer wheat. The Team Sergeant further recommended using military fuel as an incentive for the farmers.61 After proposing the idea to the battalion operations officer, the team traveled to the villages in the Gnjilane region to organize the first meeting. Such a meeting would require a neutral location, so the team organized the meeting at the Gnjilane gymnasium in August, 1999. Approximately twenty representatives agreed to attend the meeting, divided evenly between Serbian and Albanian villages.

60 Wikipedia, Kosovo.
61 Mark Eubanks SGM, US Army Sergeants Major Academy, FT Bliss, TX, telephone interview with author, 9 April 2007.
The Civil Affairs Team Leader and Team Sergeant facilitated the meeting with Serbian and Albanian interpreters present. The 1-26 Infantry battalion operations officer occupied the head table and related comparative anecdotes about farming in Oklahoma. Media representatives at the meeting included a reporter from the LA Times.62

During the course of the meeting, one Albanian representative shouted angrily, “I refuse to talk to these men. They killed my brother.”63 The team had to work through this outburst to present a plan for sharing equipment and getting the wheat harvested. The team identified such raw emotion as a potential risk in an initial meeting and ensured KFOR had the only arms at the meeting. Engineering consensus under such circumstances is difficult but not impossible. Relationships with functional trust and reciprocity, as the team learned, take time and patience in SSTR operations. Turbulence is part of the process. Clearly, the norm of reciprocity between ethnicities would have to be subjugated for the time being to the norm of reciprocity between the interventionists and the mixed Kosovo population, obviously locked in a tit-for-tat Prisoner’s Dilemma (Figure 2, p. 7). The team managed to mediate this icebreaker by allowing the Albanian man a chance to vent his spleen briefly to a docile Serbian audience (wisely so, as the Serbs were outnumbered), then

62 Valerie Reitman, "Kosovo Harvest Yields Bounty of Ethnic Mistrust," Los Angeles Times (1999): 1. It must be noted that the author of the article credited the battalion operations officer with the CAT-A’s work, for which the officer later apologized.

63 The author’s anecdotes are personal observations and one of the three “triangulating” sources for the case study.
tactfully expressing genuine regret for the recent injustices and then getting on with the business of the wheat harvest.

The Harvest Summit lasted approximately two hours due to the Serbian and Albanian interpreter mediation. The United States military used a “quality control” interpreter from New York to ensure indigenous translations were accurate (biased local interpreters plagued the CA Team’s efforts in Kosovo). The substance of the meeting focused on very mundane issues, such as who had what wheat fields, who had what equipment, and who was willing to cooperate. The team and 1–26 Infantry reiterated the offer of free fuel to participants. This was not a trivial offer in a region where the United Nations embargo had driven up the price of a liter of black market fuel.64

Gaining the tentative cooperation of the meeting attendees was the goal. This was by no means certain, as it was the first meeting between Albanians and Serbians in the American sector since the NATO occupation. The team gained the verbal acknowledgement of the attendees and word spread of the initiative. The commander of the American sector, Brigadier General Craddock, held forth the initiative as an example of incentivized cooperation.65

In the weeks that followed, the Civil Affairs team oversaw the distribution of several thousands of gallons of


NATO low-grade diesel fuel. Participants in the Harvest Initiative were entitled to fill their farm equipment and so get on with the business of harvesting the wheat under the watchful eye of platoons from 1-26 Infantry. During the fuel distribution, the Civil Affairs team used the opportunity to check serial numbers on the tractors that lined up for fuel, to compare them with papers of ownership provided by Albanian farmers. In the village of Pasjane, over one hundred and twenty tractors lined up for fuel, most with the serial number plates forcibly removed. The CAT-A managed to return one tractor and wagon to the neighboring Albanian village of Vlastica, where only weeks earlier a forensics team identified the remains of thirteen village males massacred by Serbian militia.66

As a result of the fuel incentive, the Serbians harvested all their wheat, while scattered instances of Serbians harvesting their Albanian neighbors’ wheat was reported. The team observed an interesting dynamic taking place at the Gnjilane silos which indicated that not all relationships within the population had been severed by the war.

The author’s Civil Affairs team accompanied Serbian wheat wagons to the silos in Gnjilane, and witnessed Albanian workers rejecting wet Serbian wheat. The author discovered through his 19-year-old Albanian interpreter that the Serbian farmers knew the Albanian man who operated the silo, and accepted his judgment (with some bickering). Wet wheat would cause rot and mildew in the silo, so the

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team watched as the Albanian silo operator carefully examined every farmer’s wagon, Serbian and Albanian alike. When the Serbians witnessed Albanians getting the same treatment that day, they were mollified.

The author’s Civil Affairs Team departed Kosovo one month after the Harvest Summit in Gnjilane. Before the team’s redeployment to the United States in September, it appeared that most of the wheat had been harvested. Talks were in the works to arrange the planting of the winter wheat (the seed of which would be donated by the interventionists) in accordance with the agricultural cycle of the region.

The Harvest Initiative will be analyzed in the following chapter, using the “bridging social capital” conceptual framework. The companion case, the “Village of Hope” in Mosul, Iraq demonstrates another effort to bring competing ethnicities together for the common good.

B. THE “VILLAGE OF HOPE,” MOSUL, IRAQ.

What became a showcase project in Northern Iraq started out as a training project for Iraqi ex-military in desperate need of marketable civilian skills and employment. The author observed a cycle of reciprocity developing among Iraqi laborers and between the Iraqi laborers and the Americans.

The 926th Engineer Construction Group of Montgomery, Alabama supported the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division’s effort in Mosul, Iraq. The Engineers, under the direction of Design Engineer LTC Richard Ott, started the “House of Hope” project to teach out-of-work military
personnel new marketable construction skills. The project, which took place over a period of approximately eight months (June '03 to February '04), expanded into the “Village of Hope” and resulted in a multi-ethnic cadre of laborers trained in numerous house-building disciplines (carpentry, plumbing, masonry, etc.). The physical results of their labors were eighteen houses built in the Ghazlani area of Mosul, at the destroyed headquarters of Saddam Hussein’s 5th Corps. The social capital results of this project were strengthened relations with the Americans, while inter-ethnic relations appeared to have at least stabilized during the eight-month project. Within the work place, the mixed ethnic work force performed admirably. As a result of the laborer’s cooperation and hard work, eighteen families received houses—a mixture of Muslim, Kurdish, Arab, and Turkomen ethnicities—totaling 135 people and ranging in ages from pre-born to seventy-one.

The commander of the 101st Airborne Division, Major General David Petraeus, hosted a ceremony on February 2nd, 2004 with Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz in attendance. Several months of teaching and building came to fruition as the United States Deputy Secretary of Defense

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68 Inter-ethnic violence increased during these eight months, but not between the Kurdish, Turkomen and Arab members of the Village work force.

69 Ibid. Major General Petraeus’ efforts in Mosul were also captured in Kirsten Lundberg’s Harvard Case Study, which listed the seminal “House of Hope.” The “Village of Hope” also is mentioned in her case study “epilogue.”

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handed certificates of ownership to the eighteen families, stating he hoped the Village of Hope would eventually become the “City of Hope.”

That week, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) was relieved by the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington and “Task Force Olympia” (approximately 80 personnel from I Corps, FT Lewis, Washington) as part of the country-wide Operation Iraqi Freedom II changeover.

The Ghazlani area and the “Village of Hope” became the responsibility of the new unit. With less than half the personnel of the 101st Airborne Division, Task Force Olympia and the 3/2 Stryker Brigade monitored the Ghazlani area and the “Village of Hope.” The operations officer for 1-23 Infantry (eventually becoming the Brigade operations officer), Major Chuck Hodges, discovered that Governor Kashmoula of Nineveh Province had selected families not based on need, but apparently out of political favor. The operations officer evicted the residents and redistributed the houses to homeless in the Ghazlani area.

The work force that had trained and performed so admirably under LTC Ott’s engineers dispersed and presumably sought other means of employment. Efforts by the Stryker Brigade to expand the Village of Hope were frustrated by zoning restrictions dictated from Baghdad, and a very creative and promising test bed of bridging social capital came to a halt.


72 Author’s conversations with the operations officer and evicted residents, April-June, 2004.
V. INTERPRETATION, COMPARISON AND CONTRAST

A. KOSOVO HARVEST INITIATIVE: INTERPRETATION OF EVENTS

The impact of the political-military context of this case cannot be overstated. Actions on both sides of the conflict resonated in the minds of the Kosovars at the time of the Harvest Initiative: the grievous actions of Serbian forces gave the Albanians a vengeful mindset while NATO’s ouster of Slobodan Milosovic’s Serbian forces set KFOR (Kosovo Force) at odds with the Serbian enclaves. Kosovo Serbs initially proved less willing to cooperate with the civilian and military interventionists while the Albanians (and the Kosovo Liberation Army in particular) went through great lengths to align themselves with KFOR. The interventionists—the author included—discovered the framework of intervention to be highly competitive, with the Serbs and Albanians occupying the “distrust-distrust” low-payoff quadrant of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.

The military considered the environment “permissive,” meaning that the operating environment was conducive to reconstruction and humanitarian aid, even though host nation law enforcement was being reconstituted and not in control of the populace.\textsuperscript{73}

Establishing a cycle of reciprocity—even in a permissive environment—required an initial investment of goodwill and trust. Somebody has to take the first step, and it is usually the interventionist. Repeated visits by the author’s Civil Affairs team with both Albanian and

Serbian villages in the Gnjilane sector enabled the team to develop rapport with village leadership. Key leaders in both Albanian and Serbian villages represented the "bonding" social capital within and between the families of the villages, with no apparent "bridging" social capital between villages of different ethnicities. This lack of "bridging" social capital represented an opportunity for creative consensus engineering.

The author’s Civil Affairs team and numerous platoon-sized elements from KFOR (1-26 Infantry Battalion, commanded by LTC Robert E. Scurlock, Jr.) initiated the first attempt at fostering "bridging" social capital between communities since the beginning of the Serb incursion the previous year. Aggressive social networking between villages led to a successful proposal to village representatives, who reluctantly agreed to a "Harvest Summit." The key incentive for Serbian and Albanian participants was the offer of free fuel to participating farmers, courtesy of Brigadier General Craddock at Camp Bondsteel. The offer of fuel was made to village leaders prior to the Summit. The village leaders took the Civil Affairs team at its word, demonstrated good faith and attended the Summit. The Civil Affairs team wasted no time making good on their offer: 1-26 Infantry provided a fuel truck that week and the Americans gained favor and cooperation with the local farmers. This is bridging social capital.

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75 DefenseLink, Craddock.
capital in its purest form: good will deposited in the bank of human relationships held for later withdrawal.

The atmosphere of grievance and distrust made generous incentives imperative. Wielding metric tons of supplies gives interventionists compelling leverage in a post-war environment. The Harvest Summit represented an opportunity to bring together competing ethnicities under the same roof with civilian and military interventionists, who commanded significant leverage in the form of raw financial and material aid. Simply giving the resources to the villages without obligating the villages to a degree of cooperation would have proven wasteful and would have run contrary to the agenda of UNMIK, which was to establish self-sufficiency and set the conditions for democracy.76

The “carrot and stick” approach worked exceptionally well in this constrained environment. The interventionists had abundant supplies which the competing Serbs and Albanians desperately required. Access to these humanitarian supplies (dry goods, UNHCR tents, school materials, donated clothing, etc.) was a compelling incentive to at least reciprocate with the interventionists, if not with the competing ethnicity.77 Both Serbs and Albanians remained entrenched in their villages and needed a common project to bring them into the same room. The Civil Affairs team had access to resources desired by both sides by virtue of the team’s working relationship with numerous humanitarian organizations in


77 The Interventionist / Single Ethnicity “cooperate-cooperate” paradigm
the Gnjilane sector. These humanitarian actors included the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Program, USAID, Doctors Without Borders, and Mother Teresa. (While these organizations were stakeholders in the outcome of the harvest, they did not take part in the meeting or the implementation, but aided those with no crops with direct food assistance). The military also brought considerable security and transportation resources which complemented the non-military resources in sector. Anne Holohan observed the dynamic networking potential of civilian and military interventionists:

In Kosovo, the militaries, the UNCA, NGOs, and democratization organizations such as the OSCE are enmeshed in alliances and linkages that eschew centralized control and correspondingly enhance flexibility and adaptability to local situations.78

Essentially, the interventionists had to first learn how to network with each other before they could network with the population. Reciprocity, trust and good will had to thrive to a degree between the civilian and military interventionists before such civil relations could be encouraged between the Serbians and Albanians. Competitiveness exists among interventionists, who are bound by organizational constraints and motivated by organizational imperatives to get the job done, sometimes at the expense of other organizations.

The relationship established between the Civil Affairs team, the village representatives and the humanitarian actors in the theater became a form of social capital that facilitated the Harvest Initiative. The level of trust

78 Holohan, 175.
developed between the Civil Affairs team and the indigenous leadership was such that the leaders were willing to take a small, tentative step toward compromise. The compromise took the form of (1) sitting in the same building as their enemy and (2) the Serbians pledging harvest support for their less-equipped Albanian neighbors in return for free diesel fuel.

The harvest consisted of hauling the wheat to the silos in downtown Albanian-controlled Gnjilane. The author’s Civil Affairs team accompanied Serbian truckloads of wheat to the silos and observed the Albanian silo manager inspecting the wagons of wheat and rejecting the wet wheat. The Serbians, understandably aggravated at having wheat rejected, accepted the judgment of the silo manager. The farmer community was small, and these gentlemen apparently knew each other before the war. This pre-existing bridging social capital made the team’s task of mediating business agreements much easier. Identifying such relationships during interventions can give civilian and military organizations considerable leverage in brokering inter-group agreements.

B. “VILLAGE OF HOPE,” MOSUL, IRAQ: INTERPRETATION OF EVENTS

The increasingly non-permissive environment of Mosul and the reduction of forces in February ‘04 adversely impacted the well-intentioned “Village of Hope.” LTC Ott’s 926th Engineers originally anticipated building 100 houses rather than eighteen.79 The hazardous environment

notwithstanding, the prior Iraqi military, consisting of mixed ethnicities and trained in new construction skills, demonstrated a work ethic that CW2 Nathan Harvel said rivaled American crews.\footnote{Defenselink, Village.} This is an interesting bridging social capital phenomenon in a population working on a site that only a few months before had been bombed by the United States. The need for meaningful employment overrode the population’s tendency to shun the occupying forces. By answering the engineers’ summons for trainees, the Iraqi ex-military, representing Kurdish, Turkomen and Arab ethnicities, joined the workforce in a first step toward post-war normalcy.

The organization of the project demonstrated great human and financial capital finesse. Not only did the 926th Engineers provide employment for a particularly sensitive segment of the population (out-of-work military personnel), but those personnel were taught critical reconstruction skills, a tangible take-away from their time with United States military personnel. The bridging social capital in this situation could be measured by (1) the number of indigenous personnel working with the Engineers (approximately 20), and (2) the level of reciprocity demonstrated by the workers in the form of honest labor. The author toured the houses with LTC Ott and met the labor force. It was evident from the completed houses and the attitude of the work force that the American engineers were onto something worthwhile. The laborers were turning in an
honest day’s work for an honest day’s wage and actually trusted the American military to fulfill their end of the wage bargain.

After the eighteen families occupied the houses and Task Force Olympia and the 3/2 Stryker Brigade settled into the area, it became evident that the Nineveh Provincial Governor at the time, Dr. Usama Kashmoula, had selected the Village of Hope families based on political favor rather than need. In one instance, the male head of a family drove up to the ceremony in what appeared to be a Mercedes to claim the keys to his free house. Also, the location of the “Village” proved to be problematic for the troops who replaced the 101\textsuperscript{st} Airborne. Hundreds of homeless Iraqis had taken up residence in the bombed out barracks of Saddam’s defunct 5\textsuperscript{th} Corps and witnessed the housing being erected literally within yards of their hovels. The demarcation between the “haves and have nots” had never been so pronounced.

Although the Stryker Brigade attempted to address this gulf with more housing, zoning restrictions dictated from Baghdad prevented an ambitious and well-intentioned expansion of the Village of Hope. MAJ Hodges, who eventually became the operations Officer for the 3/2 Stryker Brigade, could not add to what the 101\textsuperscript{st} had already built, due to those bureaucratic barriers. Iraqi elections in June 2004 prevented military zoning decisions such as those taken by the 101\textsuperscript{st} in the fall of 2003.

\footnote{81 Interview with Stryker commander, 7 August 2006, Fort Ord, CA.}
\footnote{82 Interview with Stryker Operations officer, 3/2 Stryker Brigade, June 2004.}
The judgment call of the leadership on the ground could not be second-guessed: the Village of Hope, initiated with the best of intentions and initially generating observable bridging social capital among multi-ethnic laborers and between Americans and Iraqis, succumbed to political machinations beyond the American’s control. Further manifestations of social capital among the multi-ethnic Iraqi work force could not be verified and is a potential subject for follow-on study.

C. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE TWO CASES.

Three similarities between these cases bear examination: (1) the incentive for reciprocity, (2) relationship building and (3) initiation of the cycle of reciprocity. These three dimensions suggest a way ahead for interventionists that goes beyond mere distribution of humanitarian aid to the engineering of new inter-group networks.

The common denominator of both of these cases involved initiating a cycle of reciprocity. The interventionists had to convince multiple competing ethnicities to cooperate with each other for the greater good. A hefty incentive had to be used in both cases to get the ethnicities to work together. Although the level of investment in Kosovo and Iraq were substantially different (less than 15,000 gallons of low-grade diesel fuel to Serbian and Albanian farmers compared to the human capital training and approximately $10,000 invested in labor and material per house in Mosul, Iraq), both instances of reciprocity began with a material boost of one form or another. The desperate employment and economic situation in both Kosovo and Iraq made competing
ethnicities exceptionally willing to accept the initial “investment in reciprocity” from the interventionists.

The second similarity, relationship building, occurred in both cases first between the interventionists and the indigenous population. After that, tentative relationships became apparent among the rival ethnicities. In Kosovo, both Serbian and Albanian farmers “voted with their feet” and participated in the Harvest Summit in the Gnjilane gymnasium. This was a manifestation of bridging social capital between the Civil Affairs team and the leadership of the villages demonstrating trust in the arbitrating Americans. In Iraq, LTC Rich Ott and his engineers managed to pique the interest of the Iraqi ex-military who also “voted with their feet” and learned reconstruction skills on the site of a US bombing, in spite of the Kurdish / Turkomen / Arab mix of the work force. Relationships developed that lasted the eight month duration of the project and produced eighteen houses. Again, the duration of these relationships beyond the duration of the project is a suggested subject for further study. It may be hypothesized that the working relationship of the laborers may have sufficient momentum to manifest itself elsewhere.

A third similarity between the two cases is the initiation of a cycle of reciprocity. The competing ethnicities in both cases required a common end to which they could strive and focus their attention—a litmus test for trust. For the Kosovars it was the wheat, and for the Iraqis it was a common need for post-war employment skills and houses for the homeless. Both these cases involved pressing needs requiring collective effort. Initiating a cycle of reciprocity through a common project enabled the
interventionists to establish a speedy, profitable relationship with hostile elements. The Serbs witnessed their countrymen driven out of Kosovo with NATO bombs, yet proved receptive to the author’s Civil Affairs team after a few weeks of dialogue and the offer of fuel. LTC Richard Ott’s engineers managed to gain the interest of several out-of-work Iraqi ex-military just a few months after the cessation of combat action. This unique social phenomenon could be labeled as “collaboration” in the pejorative wartime sense of the term, but in both cases cooperation with the interventionists proved worthwhile ventures for both Serbs and Iraqis. Both population groups accepted this reciprocal relationship with military and civilian interventionists and in so doing demonstrated a willingness to reciprocate with other ethnic groups.

D. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO CASES.

Three elements differentiated these two cases: the security environment, the level of distrust and political interference.

The security environment varied considerably between Gnjilane, Kosovo and Mosul, Iraq. From a social capital perspective, generating trust when adequate security is lacking is an exercise in frustration. The permissive environment in Kosovo enabled a two-vehicle Civil Affairs team to move about the Gnjilane sector freely, enabling open lines of communication between villages and humanitarian elements. Not one American was killed in the US sector in Kosovo during the author’s tour (July-September ’99). Developing “bridging” social capital between competitive but relatively non-violent social
networks in Kosovo became a matter of how fast the interventionists could move from town to town rather than if they could move.

In contrast, by November 2003, the 101st and its supporting engineers in Iraq had already begun to experience violent resistance. In the 101st Airborne’s deadliest month, Two 101st soldiers were shot dead and stripped by a mob near the Ministry of Oil, just minutes from the Village of Hope.83 To the everlasting credit of the 101st and its supporting engineers, these military interventionists persevered in the face of stiffening resistance and completed eighteen houses by February 2004. Completion of the project required a preponderance of military presence to protect the workers (proximity played a role here: the Ghazlani area was on the border of the Mosul airfield and within rifle shot of the airfield garrison). Bridging social capital developed in this project in terms of people willing to work and cooperate with their American employers, but only at the cost of heavy military presence. Bridging social capital developed to a small degree between the laborers themselves in that they demonstrated a willingness to work together for the duration of the project. Job security makes for strange bedfellows, overriding the exclusionary social bonds of families and tribes and bridging groups for the duration of the project. In the short term, the bridging social capital generated by the project manifested itself in the laborer’s willingness to continue working with each other. In the

long term, the question for follow-on research is: do such bonds survive the project and give rise to residual cooperation and trust?84

The level of distrust in the Kosovo case was much higher than that in the Mosul case. In the Kosovo case, the Serbians were passively sympathetic to the ethnic cleansing of Milosevic’s forces and passive witnesses—and in some cases, alleged participants in—a horrendous slaughter of Albanians. The village representatives at the Harvest Summit despised each other. In Mosul, the ethnicities involved did not demonstrate the palpable hatred and distrust toward each other that the author witnessed in Kosovo. This was a curious difference that may be accounted for by Saddam’s brutal repression of any manifestation of inter-ethnic conflict. In the early days of the liberation, the Iraqi citizenry had greater reason to distrust the Saddam Fedeyeen and former regime loyalists than the Americans. Liberation from Sunni oppression may have accounted for the level of trust and cooperation demonstrated between LTC Ott’s engineers and the Iraqi ex-military laborers.

The final contrast, political interference, figured prominently in the Mosul case, but was conspicuously absent in the Kosovo case. In Kosovo, the military and civilian interventionists had free reign to take the measures necessary to initiate a cycle of reciprocity between the Serbians and Albanians. In Mosul the Provincial Governor, Dr. Usama Kashmoula, stopped expansion of the Village of

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84 The same question may be asked of the “Arizona Market” in Bosnia: do the market relationships between Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims transcend the marketplace or is cooperation a localized phenomenon?
Hope project, citing zoning restrictions dictated from Baghdad. Gov. Kashmoula also dictated the recipients of the free homes, which proved problematic in the months following the 101st Airborne’s redeployment. Political circumstances in Kosovo facilitated social capital, while the circumstances in Mosul militated against it.

The final chapter will provide conclusions and recommendations for designing an intervention strategy in SSTR that fosters a cycle of reciprocity among competing populations.

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85 Hodges, June 2004. Governor Kashmoula was assassinated on July 14, 2004 in a convoy heading to Baghdad.

86 The original recipients of the houses petitioned the author for a redress of their grievances when they were ousted from their houses to make room for homeless families already living in the bombed buildings next to the “Village.”
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSIONS

The two case studies presented in this thesis indicate a need for an intervention strategy based on a cycle of reciprocity that generates bridging social capital. It is the author’s conclusion that the cycle of reciprocity generated in Gnjilane, Kosovo and Mosul, Iraq caused an observable change in relationships between competing ethnicities. It is the challenge of the interventionists to not only initiate, but sustain the cycle of reciprocity.

The approach to both problems involved an incentive-based cycle of reciprocity initiated by the interventionists with each of the competing ethnicities. The interventionist then initiated a project with cross-ethnic appeal (wheat, housing). The competing ethnicities in turn demonstrated a degree of cooperation with each other during the course of the projects. This two-step approach to reciprocity is an incremental method of building trust between competing groups (Figure 3).

![The Two-Step Cycle of Reciprocity](image-url)

Figure 3. The Two-Step Cycle of Reciprocity
Reciprocity is the first step in the long process of reconciliation.

So there is a pressing need to address that negative relationship. Not to make enemies love each other, by any means, but to engender a minimum basis of trust so that there can be a degree of cooperation and mutual reliance between them. To achieve this, they need to examine and address their previous relationship and their violent past. Reconciliation is the process for doing exactly that.87

The Harvest Summit in Gnjilane, Kosovo and the Village of Hope in Mosul, Iraq did not result in observable, spontaneous external interaction between Serbian and Albanian families. Such results may be quantified in follow-on research. What the projects did result in was initial positive relationships with the interventionists and a working arrangement that placed competing and distrustful ethnicities in working proximity of each other. Competing ethnicities worked together for the common civic good—helping neighbors to harvest the summer wheat and training ex-military to build houses. The interventionists observed by the author deserve the highest praise for their efforts—efforts which provide three key reciprocity and bridging social capital lessons for future SSTR operations. These lessons are

(1) Bridging social capital begins with reciprocity between interventionists and competitive ethnicities;

(2) Reciprocity requires an initial conditional investment;

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(3) Bridging social capital requires continual maintenance or it will depreciate (the “shadow of the future” must not be visible to competitive ethnicities for an interactive Prisoner’s Dilemma to remain cooperative.)

Social capital must be fostered between competing social networks for security, stabilization, transition and reconstruction initiatives to succeed. An initial investment of diesel fuel and personal communications and relationships in Gnjilane, Kosovo and an initial investment of human capital, financial capital and personal relationships in Mosul, Iraq resulted in the formation of hybrid networks—ad hoc test beds of trust and reciprocity that had the potential of becoming more permanent and profitable associations. If civilian and military interventionists carefully engineer the reciprocity between competing groups, new networks may be expected to arise almost out of sheer necessity. The bridging social capital resulting from new networks (e.g., norms of reciprocity and trust between opposing families, tribes, ethnicities) will depreciate if not actively maintained by institutionalizing and rewarding those relationships in the emerging civil society.

With the foregoing conclusions in mind, intervention strategies in SSTR operations require a different approach to Maslow’s Hierarchy (Figure 4).

Modern SSTR efforts assume a “Maslow’s Hierarchy of Human Needs” when applying intervention strategies. Maslow’s Hierarchy is a classic theory of personal motivation that has explanatory power beyond the personal level. Abraham Maslow’s theory is based on a seemingly intuitive prioritization of human needs progressing with
the most fundamental physiological needs (food, water, shelter, security) to social needs (sense of belonging, love, etc.) to more advanced psychological needs of personal attainment. Collective action in a society takes place in the context of personal needs. Human nature dictates, and Abraham Maslow would concur, that people will tend to their (and especially their children’s) more pressing personal needs (food, water, safety) before moving on to higher social needs. Bridging social capital does not even become a factor in Maslow’s hierarchy until the basic needs are at least temporarily satisfied.

The experiences of the author in the two case studies suggest that Maslow’s Hierarchy may be used as a societal template, but the intervention strategy needs to occur at the mid-point of the hierarchy rather than the bottom, with humanitarian aid contingent on participation in reciprocity-generating projects.

In a sense, this thesis argues that applying Maslow’s Hierarchy at the individual level is an ineffective approach to societal intervention. Interventionists assume a Maslow-like approach to intervention and tend to bring prodigious quantities of aid into a stricken region without considering the existing social networks or their inherent dynamics. By tending to the existing sources of bonding social capital (such as that encountered at the grain silo in Gnjilane, Kosovo), interventionists may initiate the cycle of reciprocity more efficiently than simply introducing unconditional aid.
Figure 4. Maslow’s Hierarchy as a Societal Template

Positive and negative reciprocity are indicated on the Maslow template by the two sets of cyclic arrows, traveling in opposite directions (Figure 3). Establishing positive reciprocity with a population to meet their basic needs sets the stage for higher forms of trust and reciprocity. The intervention strategy should be designed to address the basic physical and security needs, but only in the context of existing social groups. To do otherwise is to simply introduce material goods into a needy society without developing the lasting capacity to work together to produce their own goods.

Operationalizing social capital in SSTR requires an understanding of where social networks fit in society’s hierarchy of needs. The following recommendations are a hypothesized “way ahead” for civilian and military interventionists.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following “Network Intervention Design Criteria” should be adapted to SSTR planning cycles:

1. Cross-Group Representation. New networks formed in the early stages of SSTR must have cross-ethnic representation for the development of bridging social capital. Demographic surveys yield possible leads on group representation and reduce grievance with the interventionists.

2. Equitable Distribution of Resources. Impartiality is a prerequisite for both initiating and sustaining the cycle of reciprocity. If cross-ethnic representatives perceive bias in the system, parties will at best withdraw participation from the initiative, and at worst initiate a
negative cycle of reciprocity. A simple metric for this criterion is transparent accounting of where the various forms of aid are going, and informing the parties accordingly. Apportionment of aid can also serve as a disincentive for uncooperative behavior (“carrot and stick”).

3. Value-added Networking. Participants must derive a tangible benefit from the intervention strategy. In the Kosovo case, the tangible benefit was not only the diesel fuel for the tractors, but also the salvage of the 8,000 hectares of wheat. The value-added for the ex-Iraqi military was a civilian skill and a paycheck.

4. Population Ownership. A final criterion for designing an intervention strategy is demonstrable ownership of the project. Ad hoc networks will generate a reservoir of good will if all members of the network have a vested interest in the outcome of the project.

The metrics for these design criteria should go beyond the typical “1,000 schools built, 2,000 tons of humanitarian rations distributed,” etc. The metrics should also include, but not be limited to:

1. Cross-group representation in municipal jobs (medical, law enforcement, education, etc.);
2. External associations that develop as a result of group projects (e.g., civic organizations, neighborhood watch groups), and
3. Leadership nodes with cross-ethnic representation. This final metric is a critical indicator that interventionists have implemented a successful transition and reconstruction strategy. Indigenous leadership that
gains the trust and confidence of a cross-section of the population will enable the interventionists to transition out of the theater.

In summary, the forces that engage in security, stabilization, transition and reconstruction operations must approach such challenges from a social capital perspective. Building capacity in a post-war environment means more than just shipping tons of humanitarian aid into the region. The civilian and military interventionists, once they have a working relationship established among themselves, must seek out the existing sources of social capital in the host nation population and engineer reciprocity between competing groups. Such a cycle, if sustained, can generate “bridging” social capital and create new, more effective relationships within the population.


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