Using Foreign Internal Defense and Unconventional Warfare to Conduct Global Counterinsurgency

A Monograph

by

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This monograph examines the use of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Unconventional Warfare (UW) as the primary means of preventing global insurgency. The paper is broken into four sections. The History section gives a basic background of Special Operations Forces, with emphasis on historical examples relevant to this topic. The historical overview shows that insurgency is an old form of warfare and is traditionally difficult to fight. The history of special operations shows a divergence over the past fifty years that has caused a decreasing capability in executing and coordinating FID and UW operations. Following the history, are three recommendations, each with internal supporting exposition. 

Recommendation 1 is to incorporate a FID mindset into military training and education. A FID mindset embraces the concept that in virtually all U.S. operations conducted on foreign soil, the ultimate goal is to transition authority to a sovereign Host Nation (HN) that is acceptable to U.S. government policy. By embracing this mindset, planners will better be able to shape operations during the high intensity conflict phase in order to better prepare the force for the following stabilizing phases and transfer to civil authority. 

Recommendation 2 is to remove U.S. Army Special Forces Groups (SFG) from Iraq and Afghanistan in order to use them in a global FID and UW campaigns. The SFGs are the nation’s premiere force in conducting FID and UW operations and often do so in direct support of strategic aims and goals. Unfortunately, most of our SFGs are, currently, completely dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan conducting tactical level missions. This focus on just two countries seriously degrades Special Force’s ability to conduct global shaping missions and, therefore, decreases the global security posture of the U.S. Pulling the SFGs out of Iraq and Afghanistan will allow them to increase their presence globally, which leads to better security for the U.S. 

Recommendation 3 is to form a new unit at the national level that has the primary responsibility of planning, executing, coordination and synchronizing global FID and UW. The U.S. currently has a superb structure for fighting terrorists. The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is well structures to combat terrorists in an extremely efficient manner. There is no mechanism currently in the U.S. military to fight terrorism globally. The U.S. currently has a superb structure for fighting terrorists. The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is well structured to combat terrorists in an extremely efficient manner. There is no mechanism currently in the U.S. military to fight terrorism globally. 

In conclusion, The U.S. military faces the unenviable position of having to fight a multi-front, asymmetric, well networked enemy that is enmeshed throughout the world. In the six years of fighting the Global War on Terror, the U.S. has done little to stem the tide of the global insurgency. Indeed, there is ample evidence that, globally, the terrorist networks are stronger today than in 2001. The recommendations in this paper are designed to contribute to the effort.
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Abstract


This monograph examines the use of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Unconventional Warfare (UW) as the primary means of preventing global insurgency. The paper is broken into four sections. The History section gives a basic background of Special Operations Forces, with emphasis on historical examples relevant to this topic. The historical overview shows that insurgency is an old form of warfare and is traditionally difficult to fight. The history of special operations shows a divergence over the past fifty years that has caused a decreasing capability in executing and coordinating FID and UW operations. Following the history, are three recommendations, each with internal supporting exposition.

Recommendation 1 is to incorporate a FID mindset into military training and education. A FID mindset embraces the concept that in virtually all U.S. operations conducted on foreign soil, the ultimate goal is to transition authority to a sovereign Host Nation (HN) that is acceptable to U.S. government policy. By embracing this mindset, planners will better be able to shape operations during the high intensity conflict phase in order to better prepare the force for the following stabilizing phases and transfer to civil authority.

Recommendation 2 is to remove U.S. Army Special Forces Groups (SFG) from Iraq and Afghanistan in order to use them in a global FID and UW campaigns. The SFGs are the nation’s premiere force in conducting FID and UW operations and often do so in direct support of strategic aims and goals. Unfortunately, most of our SFGs are, currently, completely dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan conducting tactical level missions. This focus on just two countries seriously degrades Special Force’s ability to conduct global shaping missions and, therefore, decreases the global security posture of the U.S. Pulling the SFGs out of Iraq and Afghanistan will allow them to increase their presence globally, which leads to better security for the U.S.

Recommendation 3 is to form a new unit at the national level that has the primary responsibility of planning, executing, coordination and synchronizing global FID and UW. The U.S. currently has a superb structure for fighting terrorists. The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is well structures to combat terrorists in an extremely efficient manner. There is no mechanism currently in the U.S. military to fight global terrorism. The distinction between fighting terrorists and fighting terrorism is subtle, yet profound. This new unit would exist at exactly the same level as JSOC and have similar authorities and resourcing, but it would focus all its efforts on long term solutions dedicated to preventing terrorism globally.

In conclusion, The U.S. military faces the unenviable position of having to fight a multi-front, asymmetric, well networked enemy that is enmeshed throughout the world. In the six years of fighting the Global War on Terror, the U.S. has done little to stem the tide of the global insurgency. Indeed, there is ample evidence that, globally, the terrorist networks are stronger today than in 2001. The recommendations suggested in this monograph will help the U.S. find long term solutions to the threats it will face in the 21st Century.
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Some extremists’ goals, objectives, and methodologies take on the characteristics of insurgencies. At the furthest end of the spectrum, some extremists espouse a global insurgency aimed at subverting the existing political and social order of both the world of Islam and the broader world. They aim to undermine Western influence, redefine the global balance of power, and establish a global pan-Islamist caliphate. Rather than simply seeking to overthrow a particular government in the traditional sense of the term insurgency, these extremists aim to fundamentally change the nature of the world order.¹

National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, February 1, 2006

Introduction

This paper is about the United States’ (U.S.) conduct of global counterinsurgency (COIN) at the operational and strategic level. The U.S. currently faces a global terrorist threat that is inherently tied to the concept of global insurgency, as noted in the quote from the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT). These terrorists are sophisticated, networked, and employ a wide variety of techniques and technology to foment global instability. They use their formidable influence to create pockets of insurgency and instability that contribute to their global effort. Only through conducting coordinated, global operational campaigns synchronized within the framework of U.S. strategy can the U.S. hope to create a world-wide environment inhospitable to these terrorists and implant the seeds of peaceful democracy in our allied nations.²

There has been a great deal of work done in studying the tactics, techniques and procedures required to fight a COIN mission at the tactical level, but there seems to be a dearth of material on how the U.S. should conduct strategic and operational COIN. The Army’s Counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-24, December 2006, for example, does a good job of describing how to conduct COIN at the tactical level, but barely touches on operational and strategic levels.

strategic concepts. This paper will concentrate on how to best use Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Unconventional Warfare (UW) as the mechanism to conduct COIN, but also how FID/UW can be used to prevent an insurgency from happening in the first place.

This paper does not offer a solution to the current problems in Afghanistan and Iraq. The aim of this paper is neither to point blame for the current failures, but to suggest alternative methods that may be used in future planning to avoid the same problems.

At the strategic and operational level, the U.S. should avoid conducting unilateral COIN. Most often, COIN should be conducted by, with and through host nation partners. At the tactical level the United States military often must fight counterinsurgency unilaterally. This often happens during high intensity conflict as conventional forces occupy an area. For instance, often when a conventional force invades an area, local insurgencies will form from indigenous personnel that are not happy with the U.S. presence. Until local and national governments can be reestablished, the U.S. force must deal with these fledgling insurgencies.

At the strategic level the United States currently faces a global insurgency effort. This effort by Muslim extremists crosses geographical and theater boundaries. While it is best to enable Host Nation (HN) partners to fight the terrorists that are causing this insurgency, the United States will encounter strategic targets that must be dealt with in a rapid and violent manner and they can only be accomplished using unilateral force. The operational goals, however, should be completely directed at enabling HN governments to handle insurgencies without U.S. involvement.

This paper will establish a quick history on the concepts of COIN and FID/UW. There are many other works that outline the history of COIN and the methods used by other civilizations and nations to deal with insurgencies. It is not the intent of this paper to be a history paper about COIN or FID/UW, it will merely be necessary to give the reader a frame

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2 Ibid.
of reference and context. Further, historical examples will be used to emphasize certain points. Historical examples show that conducting COIN is difficult and expensive. It is rarely profitable in the long run to conduct an aggressive, military COIN fight. In fact, the most important historical lesson to learn may be that it is virtually always better to prevent an insurgency than it is to fight one. The importance of describing FID/UW in a historical context is that most people have a poor concept of what FID/UW really are. They are often thought of as Special Operations Force (SOF) only missions and, even in the SOF community, FID is most often associated with the overt, Joint Combined Exercises for Training (JCETs) that have a reputation for being SOF boondoggles. In actuality, FID is much more than that and encompasses a great deal of the operations the military conducts. UW is also misunderstood, especially in the Joint SOF community. Both FID and UW suffer from discrepancies in their definitions between Joint Publications (JPs) and Army Publications.

In JP 1-02, FID is defined as “Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.” The Army’s new Unconventional Warfare manual defines FID as those operations taken by the military, usually overt in nature, to aid a HN in free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. A distinct difference is that in the Joint definition

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6 The Army does not currently have a FID manual. The JFK Special Warfare Center and School is working on a new FID manual, as of May 2007. The Unconventional Warfare manual is a classified document, but the definitions of FID and UW are unclassified.
encompasses all actions taken by civilian and military agencies, while the Army definition limits itself to military actions. Importantly, though, fighting insurgencies is a subset of FID in both definitions.

The joint definition for UW is “A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery.” The definition in the Army UW manual is subtly different in that it specifies that the surrogate forces must be irregular forces in order for it to qualify as unconventional warfare. As Derek Jones notes in an article in Special Warfare magazine, the definition is further clouded by a large number of SOF in the joint community that believe, incorrectly, that UW is a catch-all phrase that encompasses any special operation undertaken by designated SOF units.

The concept that COIN is a subset of FID is critical to the understanding of how FID/UW should be used to conduct global COIN operations and, ultimately, prevent insurgencies from growing. As stated earlier, one of the conclusions of this paper is that COIN should mostly be conducted by, with and through host nation partners. With that in mind, it will be clear that COIN is most often a subset of FID through the use of HN forces and organizations to secure their own borders.

This paper posits three recommendations: 1. Incorporate a FID mindset into military professional education and training. 2. U.S. Army Special Forces Groups (SFGs) should be removed from Iraq and Afghanistan and utilized for global UW/FID. 3. Form a strategic

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UW/FID unit as a national asset that is responsible for planning, coordinating, synchronizing and executing world-wide FID/UW operations.

History

As noted in the Army’s new COIN manual (FM 3-24), “Insurgencies and its tactics are as old as warfare itself”. 10 FM 3-24 defines insurgency as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.” 11 It defines counterinsurgency as the “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.” Using the definition of FID discussed earlier, one can see that the U.S. contribution to a HN counterinsurgency is FID. The converse of this help is when the U.S. decides to overthrow or disrupt a standing government or power and that contribution by the U.S. is UW.

Dealing with insurgency is nothing new. As stated in FM 3-24, it is as old as warfare itself. Even biblical accounts recall such famous insurgencies as the Hebrews rebelling against the Egyptians in the time of Moses. Rebellion against imperial occupation is common throughout history. For the vast majority of recorded history, there has been some kind of empire ruling major parts of civilization. For example, just in the past 2000 years, the succession of major empires in the European and West Asian area started with the Romans, transitioned to the Byzantines, was taken over by the Ottoman Empire and was eventually parceled by the British Empire (predominantly) in the early 20th Century.12 This is only a miniscule list of empires in a relative small region of the world. At the same time, hundreds of other empires coexisted in other parts of the world. At some points, there have been multiple empires

11 Ibid.
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battling for supremacy, but these conditions have been historically rare. In most cases, the empires used a massed “conventional” force to defeat, subdue, and annex lands, peoples and cultures. From the Babylonians to the Persians to the Romans to the Ottomans to the Americans, and the hundreds of empires in between, both large and small, the greatest threat was almost always from within. While history may show empires being defeated by larger forces, insurgency and rebellion often weakened empires to the point that they were susceptible to defeat.

Why, then, does the United States seem to constantly treat insurgency like it is new and unknown? Why does COIN doctrine eventually fall out of use and then have to be re-written from the ground up each time? It is common for people to answer this question with the cliché “those who don’t know history are doomed to repeat it”. The reality is probably much more complex. One aspect may be the ever increasing reliance on technology as a solution. Humans have developed a staggering amount of technology devoted to the art of killing each other. From devastating weapons to incredibly sophisticated communication systems to Meals-Ready-To-Eat, the business of fighting is high tech. Unfortunately, this reliance on technology often leads to a dangerous kind of complacency – it leads to the idea that the “old rules” no longer apply. That, through some technological marvel, the military can rid itself from all the unforeseen problems that plagued earlier armies. Another type of complacency comes from the idea that preparing for High Intensity Conflict will inherently prepare a military for fighting COIN.

The reality is that, fundamentally, conflict is the same as it has always been. In most conflicts, there is at least one group of people who perceive themselves to be oppressed,

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disenfranchised, segregated, unrepresented, etc. In many empires, this type of grassroots insurgency was almost always rampant and had to be dealt with. Some emperors dealt with it well, some dealt with it poorly, but the better they were at dealing with insurgency, the longer the empire flourished. A recurring theme, though, was that trying to fight insurgents militarily was a method doomed to failure.

The length of the Roman Empire’s reign is subject to debate, depending on how you define its start and end points, but its effectiveness as a state is hardly questionable. For well over 400 years, the Roman Empire controlled much of Europe, West Asia and North Africa. While it is difficult to say that the Romans had one way of dealing with insurgency, since each emperor had his own way of dealing with problems, the Roman system was adept at aiding even the worst emperors in dealing with these localized problems.

To ensure security across the empire, the Roman Legions were well dispersed with the mission to not only secure the borders, but also to maintain law and order. Perhaps more effective, though, was the tradition of granting rather generous autonomy to the local leaders within the Empire. At its peak, in the 2nd Century AD, the Roman Empire had about 2.2 million square miles of land under its control,15 which roughly equates to most of Europe or about two-thirds of the size of the U.S.16 For the most part, this relative large area was made up of defeated lands that had been annexed into the Empire. Instead of ruling these areas solely with Romans, the local leaders were most often left to govern their particular areas. In fact, life in many of these areas was not very different than it was before the Romans took over, except that now there were taxes to be paid and service to be rendered to Rome. By allowing local rule and by keeping the areas within the empire relatively separate, the

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14 Ibid.
Emperor could more easily deal with small insurgencies before they had the opportunity to flourish. Generally, local governors were reluctant to join an adjacent rebelling province for fear of jeopardizing their own relatively peaceful coexistence with the Empire.

One good example of this was the Roman’s ability to crush the Jewish rebellion in Judea in the first century. The Romans had occupied Judea in 63 BC17 and, by 60 AD, the Jews had developed a Messianic theory that a savior would come to liberate them.18 At first, the Romans tried to allow the local governor in Syria to quell the Jewish insurrection,19 but the local governor failed to defeat the Jews, so the Romans sent General Vespasian to regain control of the area and defeat the insurgents.20 When he arrived, he defeated the Jewish forces at Galilee and drive the insurgents into Jerusalem. Instead of directly laying siege to the city, though, Vespasian realized that the Jews were in turmoil due to a vast amount of infighting. There was also a power struggle taking place in Rome, so “Vespasian now had more important issues to attend to than the Jewish revolt. He calculated that for the time being, the insurgent groups were inflicting more damage to themselves by their infighting than the Roman Army could inflict.”21

This turned out to be a wise decision. Not only did Vespasian return to Rome and become Emperor, but the Jews in Judea fought amongst themselves so bitterly, they never achieved unity against Rome.22 Vespasian waited 3 more years and, in 70 AD, put Titus in charge of an Army to quell the rebellion once and for all. Weakened by the internal fighting, Titus quickly invaded Jerusalem and was able to secure a total victory. Once the insurrection was

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17 Sorrells, William T, Insurgency in Ancient Times: The Jewish Revolts Against the Seleucid and Roman Empires, 166 BC-73 AD (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2006), 31.
18 Ibid, 34.
19 Ibid, 37.
20 Ibid, 40.
21 Ibid.
defeated, the Romans put it back under local rule and did not have a problem in that area for the remainder of the Empire’s rule.23

In many ways, the Roman approach was very similar to FID/UW. Although the provinces were technically part of the Empire, they acted and were often structured like mini nations within the whole. By using the Roman Legions to provide external security and local militias to do the day-to-day law and order security necessary within the provinces, the Empire was able to empower the provincial governments to suppress insurgencies before they were able to really gain a foothold. When necessary, the Roman Army would step in and fight larger insurgencies, and then turn the area back over to local rule.

The U.S. historical view of FID/UW is similar. When Aaron Bank formed the first Army Special Forces (SF) Group (SFG) in 1952, he originally envisioned the unit’s primary mission as Unconventional Warfare (UW)24. While the official definition of UW has been fought over ever since, it is generally accepted that UW operations are those undertaken by, with and through irregular forces with the aim of displacing or disrupting an occupying power or government. In the early 1960’s, President Kennedy quickly recognized the converse of this mission was equally, if not more, valuable and made FID SF’s other core mission.25 The definition of FID has also been a source of argument, but it has generally described all the military and civilian operations conducted by, with and through a host nation government to suppress lawlessness and disorder in that nation in order to increase security in the area and further U.S. interests.

Since FID/UW were made core SF missions, SF have conducted FID/UW operations in every theater on earth. The SF missions in South Vietnam were FID missions while the

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22 Ibid, 41.
23 Ibid, 43-45.
24 Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets (Novato, Presidio, 1986).
missions carried out over the border in North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were UW missions. SF continued this tradition and conducted more combat FID missions in Latin America in the 1980’s and 1990’s, in Haiti, the Horn of Africa, the Persian Gulf and the Balkans in the 1990’s, and, more recently, throughout the Middle East. In the midst of these combat FID roles, SF spent a large amount of the peace-time effort conducting FID in many forms from the 1960’s to the present. These took many forms, including Mobile Training Teams (MTT), Joint Combined Exercises for Training (JCET), Military Liaison Teams, and many other missions and operations. Unfortunately, these types of FID missions tended to give people the impression that FID was just something we do in peace-time and that it has no “combat” function. Even the latest SF UW manual states that FID is normally conducted as an overt mission.

This is not a useful interpretation of FID, since the definition of FID encompasses all the actions taken by civilian agencies and the military to assist a host nation, which are all combat and non-combat capabilities, including overt, covert and clandestine missions and operations. Many of the most vital functions that SOF soldiers conducted in the name of FID were low-profile, “presence” type missions designed to bolster the confidence of our host nation partners and allies. For example, the U.S. sent a number of U.S. SOF personnel to Greece to help them prepare their security for the 2004 Olympic Games. Greece could have gotten that training from virtually any Western nation, but the U.S. was showing Greece, the other nations participating in the Games, and anyone who thought the Games might make an easy target that the full weight and influence of the American military and law enforcement community was ready to ensure that the Games would be a safe venture. In all, the U.S. sent less than fifty soldiers to help train the Grecian forces, but this relatively small effort on the

part of American SOF was a huge boon to Greece and strengthened the ties between our governments. It also gave Greece new capabilities to combat future lawlessness in that area, which indirectly allows the U.S. to divert attention and resources to other pressing issues.  

Recommendation 1: Incorporate training and education with a FID mindset into military professional education

The U.S. military, like all modern major powers, is trained, structured, and equipped for World War II type clashes—massive tank battles advancing across the countryside, accompanied by devastating doses of artillery and air power. This is called conventional warfare…

The U.S. military education and training system has been refined to point that it produces a force incredibly well suited for warfighting. From Initial Entry Training, to military combat training centers, to the service component War Colleges, the military produces a force that is, arguably, the finest in history. In the early part of the 21st Century, it is difficult to imagine many militaries that would be able to stand against the full power of the U.S. for very long.

History has show the U.S. prowess at waging large wars. In conflicts where our enemy has decided to fight conventionally (Civil War, WWI, WWII, Desert Storm, etc.), the U.S. has prevailed easily. Yet, the U.S. still has a large problem with smaller unconventional wars:

Western militaries too often neglect the study of insurgency. They falsely believe that armies trained to win large conventional wars are automatically prepared to win small, unconventional ones. In fact, some capabilities required for

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27 The author did not participate in the effort to help Greece prepare for the 2004 Olympic games, but it was his unit that conducted the mission. The author interviewed some of the soldiers who did participate in the mission.
conventional success—for example, the ability to execute operational maneuver and employ massive firepower—may be of limited utility or even counterproductive in COIN operations. Nonetheless, conventional forces beginning COIN operations often try to use these capabilities to defeat insurgents; they almost always fail.29

In order to fight these types of conflict or, better yet, prevent them from happening in the first place, the education and training of our forces must change. By incorporating a “FID mindset” into the U.S. military education and training, our future forces will be better prepared to deal with the unpredictable and asymmetric nature of 21st Century conflict.

const as a subset of FID

As shown in the Joint definition, COIN is primarily a subset of FID. More broadly, FID should be the ultimate goal of most U.S. operations undertaken on foreign soil. Regardless of how a conflict starts, it should end in a FID. In other words, the conflict is finally over once the U.S. has turned over autonomy and authority to the HN government. The only exception to this is when we decide to annex a territory and make it part of the U.S.. While this has not happened in quite some time, it is not inconceivable that the U.S. will add territories in the future. For the purposes of this paper, though, it is assumed that the goal of the U.S. is not to invade and annex territory.

The goal of enabling HN governments to rule autonomously is clearly outlined in all our national strategy documents. Iraq is a perfect case-in-point. The U.S. invaded Iraq with the

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express intent of “liberating” the country rather than “occupying” it.\textsuperscript{30} This leads to the conclusion that, at some point, every conflict we plan to wage should have a transition to a host nation government that will eventually assume autonomy. This transition is, by definition, where the operation converts to a FID.\textsuperscript{31} At that point, the goal is to aid the fledgling host nation to be strong enough to secure its own borders and subvert lawlessness and disorder without outside help.

This leads to another conclusion – FID is not a SOF only mission. Due to the fact that it is a core mission of SOF, many have come to believe that only SOF conduct FID missions. In reality, by the strict definition of FID, virtually all U.S. military operations are, ultimately, a FID. Once it is understood that the goal of the U.S. is not to occupy other nations indefinitely, then it is clear that the goal of the military is to devise a plan, in coordination with other governmental and non-governmental agencies, to conduct true Foreign Internal Defense. The entire U.S. main effort should be designed to achieve this goal.


\textsuperscript{31} Since the definition of FID states that it is the efforts taken to aid a HN in securing its own borders, the transition from U.S. control to HN control is where our forces must now support the sovereign HN. When Iraq elected its new government, for example, the U.S. transitioned, theoretically, to operational and strategic FID.
Joint doctrine outlines six phases of conflict, starting and ending with stability. Conventional wisdom has held that during major combat operations the goal has been to defeat the enemy militarily. In other words, inflict as much destruction upon the enemy in order to force him to capitulate or be completely destroyed. The U.S. has a long history of accepting nothing less than unconditional surrender as acceptable terms to cease fighting. The U.S. has not always achieved this goal, but that way of thinking has influenced major combat war planning for the entire history of U.S. involvement in warfare. Looking at the Joint

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notional phases, however, it is clear that defeating the enemy militarily (Phase III – Dominate) leave a force only half-way towards its goal (Phase 0).

The mentality of a complete destruction of the enemy served well in past conflicts with nations and states. The U.S. Civil War, World War I, World War II, Korea, the Cold War, Desert Storm and other smaller conflicts were easy to frame in terms of defeating the enemy in order to secure victory. During the U.S. Civil War, for example, it was necessary to exact an unconditional surrender in order to convey many messages – the most importance of which was to make anyone understand that cessation from the Union was unacceptable. Anything less than an unconditional surrender from the South would have given future insurgents hope that such an action had an opportunity to succeed. During the Cold War, the idea that warfare was an all-or-nothing ordeal led the U.S. to build the largest and most expensive military industrial complex the world has ever known.

While this attitude helped in the U.S. effort to force the Soviet Union to collapse, thereby “winning” the Cold War, it set up the country to be ill prepared for the post Soviet era. The very concept of “winning” has to change to embrace a new way of looking at conflict. In this new world, the U.S. is the sole superpower and has the capability to truly be the world’s police force. Under the Cold War mentality, this was entirely appropriate. It had taken almost 40 years, but the combined will and strength of the American world wide unilateral effort had caused the Soviet system to crumble. Unfortunately, the new world order was not amenable to these old, unilateral techniques. For instance, “winning” in the Balkans was not tied to defeating and enemy. Likewise, in Iraq, it is difficult to imagine an enemy that the U.S. can just defeat and solve the problems. Instead, “winning” will not likely be tied to any military effort, but to an effort that emphasizes the stability of the Iraqi government.

Since the end of the Cold War, this, however, the U.S. military and political planners seem to have continued to model the military after the successful Cold War giant and never
realized that unilaterally stepping in to solve problems in the world might do more harm than good. Thus, the military never adopted a FID mindset – it continued to train under the assumption that its primary mission would remain “High Intensity Conflict”. A perfect example of this was the U.S. Combat Training Center OPFOR which remained modeled after the Soviet Army a full 12 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

How is a FID mindset different? Adopting a FID mindset assumes that the goal of any operation is not necessarily the unconditional surrender of the enemy, but rather the eventual stabilizing of a government that is acceptable to the U.S. and that is capable of securing its own country. While that goal may seem obvious in hindsight, it is rarely the primary concern of military planners when they are preparing to conduct major combat operations. In the case of Iraq in 2003, there is ample evidence that senior military planners actively discouraged the operational plan from looking past Phase III.33 It is possible, however, to plan an operation from the very beginning to support the inevitable FID that must take place in the post combat phases. A plan that emphasizes FID from Phase 0 would be oriented on preventing major combat operations in the first place. Planning with a FID mindset could lead to a plan that first uses UW as the method to conduct Phase I and II operations.

For example, when the U.S. is faced with a hostile government in control of an area that is determined to be strategically critical, the U.S. is faced with a number of options. One option is to invade the country unilaterally; however the current mindset of most people in Western civilization is that this is usually not a desirable course of action. The second option is to handle the issue diplomatically, although this often is easier said than done. If unilateral diplomacy fails, it may be possible to utilize coalition partners in order to add diplomatic

pressure on the rogue nation and force them into compliance. This is most often done through the United Nations (UN), although the U.S. has proven that getting UN approval is not a necessity.34 Another option is to use UW to incite an insurgency within the rogue nation in order to depose or disrupt the undesirable government and, possibly, put in its place a government more acceptable to the U.S.

This UW led option has many desirable traits from a FID perspective. First, the insurgents would have a bond with America and U.S. forces, so they are more likely to accept a peaceful arrangement with the U.S. once they have been put in power. Second, this type of operation puts a much smaller U.S. fingerprint on the situation and puts the legitimacy of the new government back into the hands of the indigenous people. Likewise, the absence of large amounts of U.S. armor and infantry divisions makes the local populace less apprehensive about American involvement. Although the operation starts with a UW campaign, the ultimate goal is to use FID to legitimize the new government and ensure they are strong enough to rule.

It is important to note that FID operations include much more than just military interactions. As defined in Joint doctrine, FID also includes civilian actions taken to aid the host nation. This includes other governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In peacetime engagement, this is why FID is primarily a SOF mission: SOF are “a unique politico-military instrument capable of operating in the vague gray area between political conflict and open war.” 35 Especially Army SF are designed to facilitate operations not only by, with and through other forces and nations, but also with politically sensitive agencies and organizations.36

35 Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2006), pg 20
36 Ibid.
The conventional military is best suited to conduct the kind of FID required in war and SOF are best suited to conduct FID during peacetime with other nations in order to prevent war. SOF are already selected, trained and equipped to do this mission, but the conventional forces are, traditionally, not prepared to plan and/or conduct wartime FID. Yet, this is exactly what they must do to prevail in the conflicts the U.S. is currently engaged in and will be engaged in for the foreseeable future. It will require nothing less than the re-education and re-organization of our force in order to accomplish this feat. As the planning for Iraq shows, thus far, it appears that the senior leadership, both in the government and in the Pentagon, does not embrace this way of thinking.

**Incorporating a FID Mindset**

The nature of UW demands that it be conducted by specially trained and resourced units. FID, however, is much more than just the operations conducted by SOF. Although GPF forces have been conducting true FID missions for quite some time now (i.e. Military Transition Teams (MiTT) in Iraq)\(^\text{37}\), a “FID mindset”, however, goes beyond individual missions and approaches a philosophical approach to war.

Traditionally, military training and education has primarily focused on successfully defeating an enemy in major combat operations. Outside of unique educational opportunities such as the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), it is difficult to incorporate education and training that can go beyond obtaining tactical objectives. The War Colleges do

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go beyond tactical doctrine, but the Army War College focuses primarily (and appropriately) on National Strategy.38 In the War College curriculum, there is only one course dedicated to the concept of conflict avoidance and termination.39 Unfortunately, current U.S. strategy emphasized combat capability more than the military’s ability to conduct post combat operations. The National Military Strategy (NMS) states: “The goal [of Joint Future Warfighting] is Full Spectrum Dominance – the ability to control any situation or defeat any adversary across the range of military operations.”40 This is hardly the language of a strategy that embraces enabling HN allies.

A FID mindset, though, is a way of looking at a problem and realizing that ultimate goals and solutions are going to require a broader view than just the accomplishment of military objectives. A FID mindset in planning makes it imperative to start planning with the idea that a HN nation government will eventually take control and the U.S. will ultimately leave. This inherently goes beyond “planning” and enters the realm of “understanding” what needs to be done in a particular situation.

When faced with the task of military planning, the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) provides a tried and true method of translating a concept or an idea into a concrete plan. Using the MDMP, planners usually develop a plan that will meet the military objectives quite well. Unfortunately, this process often eschews deeper thought into the broader consequences of immediate military actions. The MDMP is almost completely focused on accomplishing an immediate objective. It is left to the individual to think about the “bigger picture”. While the current military education and training system is very adept at ensuring

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our personnel are good at military planning, it is quite deficient in giving them the tools to put that planning into a larger perspective.

A FID mindset primarily embraces the concept that all actions should ultimately lead to the host nation becoming autonomous and capable of providing its own security. While it is possible the U.S. may engage in a war of conquest sometime in the future, the nature of global politics and international relations make this a rather unlikely event. It is therefore safe to assume that the U.S. enters, and will enter, into any conflict with an ultimate goal of eventually removing all U.S. military from the area and leaving a government in place that, at the least, is amenable to U.S. interests. The combat operations phase of these campaigns will not be the decisive effort. Instead, it will be the FID operations conducted after the major combat operations are over that will ultimately allow the host nation government to succeed. Therefore, it behooves military planners to develop a good plan for this post-combat phase before they even start thinking about planning combat operations. Only by understanding the conditions required for a successful FID can a planner understand the end-state necessary for combat operations.

This should drive a large number of decisions during the planning of combat operations. For example, a thorough FID plan may show that an insurgency is likely if certain conditions are met. It would therefore be imperative to ensure that the environment created during major combat operations do not enable these conditions. Another example can be taken from the Iraq campaign. A thorough understanding of the most likely requirements in Phase IV may have led planners to realize that securing the borders with Syria and Iran were of utmost importance. This may have led to a plan that used the standing Iraqi Army to secure the borders at the end of combat operations. Instead, the Iraqi Army was completely disbanded which not only created a monumental task of rebuilding the IAF from scratch, but it created a
large number of disgruntled, unemployed, disgruntled males who were ripe for recruitment into an insurgency.

Incorporating this type of FID mindset into the military training and education system would be extremely helpful in growing a future generation of military leaders that embrace long term, encompassing solutions rather than leaders focused on obtaining short term victories.

**Recommendation 2: U.S. Army Special Forces Groups should be taken out of Iraq and Afghanistan and utilized for global UW/FID.**

The U.S. Army Special Forces are an incredibly adaptable and useful force. They can be tailored to do an amazing variety of missions and operations, which are often sensitive and have strategic importance. In his book, *Afghanistan & The Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare*, Dr. Hy Rothstein notes that SF are a strategic tool designed to implement policy, not fight tactical battles.41

![Figure 2 - Presence Leads to Security](image)


42 Hy S. Rothstein, lecture March 13, 2007 at SAMs
A large part of this ability, though, relies on SF’s ability to maintain a “global presence”. Dr. Rothstein ties our national security directly to our ability to have SF operate in as much of the world as possible. Figure 2 represents a model presented by Dr. Hy Rothstein to explain how increased presence leads to better security. He posits that if SF are allowed to go out and conduct global presence missions, this would increase the trust that the host nations (HN) would have in the U.S. resolve in assisting them. He believes that this will then allow the U.S. to have an increased influence in the area and, at the same time, take advantage of better intelligence from our allied partners. Ultimately, the U.S. influence and better intelligence will help increase our global security posture. He provides evidence that this type of global presence was the norm prior to the start of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), but, especially since the invasion of Iraq, has not been the focus of our SF units. In the 1990’s, he points out, over the course of any given year we had SF soldiers in over 100 countries doing all manner of missions. Many of these missions were just one or two soldiers stationed at an embassy providing influence and guidance for both our own State Department personnel, but also to the HN government.

Our National Security Strategy, however, is very clear that global presence is not the current “way-ahead” in succeeding in the GWOT. It specifically states: “Afghanistan and Iraq: The Front Lines in the War on Terror. Winning the War on Terror requires winning the battles in Afghanistan and Iraq.” This does not leave much room for enabling military planners to conduct global presence operations that could enhance the security of our HN partners, which could lead to better U.S. security.

43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
Recommendation 1 espouses incorporating a FID mindset into military training and education and it showed that GPF forces must be prepared to plan and conduct FID as a part of war. Although the combat role of FID is important, the non-combat FID missions play an even bigger role in shaping the globe. Conducting JCETs in relatively weaker countries, for example, is an excellent way to bolster ties with countries that may exist in contentious areas. Although the stated mission of JCETs is to provide U.S. personnel with an opportunity to further their training by being exposed to other nation’s military expertise, JCETs also provide a valuable message to the countries we send them to. They indirectly tell that country that the U.S. has taken an interest in their security and that the U.S. will help them, should they need that help.

Certain military exercises also have the same effect. From 1967-1993, the military ran an annual exercise called Return Forces to Germany (REFORGER) which was “in the final analysis, one of the cornerstones of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s philosophy of flexible deterrence.” and “create[d] an operational nightmare for the Soviet/Warsaw Pact planner”.46 Today, the military still runs a massive annual exercise in Southeast Asia a called Cobra Gold. According to the Department of Defense (DoD) website DefenseLink, “Cobra Gold is an annual, joint, and combined training exercise aimed at developing interoperability, strengthening relationships, and developing cross-cultural understanding among participating nations.” These types of exercises are expressly designed to give the U.S. a global presence, which is all part of FID.

By continuing to improve the security of friendly and allied nations around the world, the U.S. inherently increases domestic security. When a host nation is empowered to fight and capture terrorists before they can reach the U.S., that is one less country the U.S. has to worry

46 Dick Larsen, “Reforger: More than Just an Airlift” Air University Review, (September-October 1975)
about monitoring and actively targeting. Eventually, our coalition and allied partners will become self sufficient and the drain on the U.S. military will be significantly reduced. A tangential effect will be the increase in economic, political and social welfare in the other countries that comes with a secure environment. In addition, these countries will be in a better position to contribute to the world-wide pool of intelligence, thereby further increasing U.S. security.

**Retask SFGs**

Since the U.S. invaded Iraq in March 2003, the Special Forces Groups (SFGs) have been on a fairly regular deployment cycle. U.S. Army Special Forces Command (USASFC) has maintained a cycle of dedicating two groups (5th SFG & 10th SFG) to Iraq and two groups (3rd SFG & 7th SFG) to Afghanistan, with some support from 1st SFG. 1st Group has also had the onus of supporting OEF-Philippines, normally with a battalion sized element. While the actual deployment dates for the groups are classified, the general cycle has been 5-7 month deployments with approximately 2 weeks of overlap on either end of a deployment in order to affect transition. Also note that the forward deployed battalions (1st BN, 10th SFG and 1st BN, 1st SFG) have primarily not been deployed to OIF or OEF, since the Combatant Commanders in their theaters have determined them to be too valuable to deploy. Thus, out of the 5 current active duty SFGs, 2 of them are always deployed, 2 are in recovery/pre-mission training (PMT) mode, and 1 has 60% of its battalions in the same situation. When looked at from a battalion perspective, the numbers are even more telling. There are currently 15 active Special Forces battalions. The 2 forward deployed battalions have traditionally not been eligible for world-wide, long term deployment. Of the remaining 13 battalions, six are deployed at any given time with another 6 in recovery/PMT (and thus unavailable for
missions in other areas of the world). This leaves 1 battalion in the active duty force to do other long term missions world-wide. The forward deployed battalions do a lot of UW & FID type missions, in addition to their SR/DA focused METL, but these missions tend to be of short duration since these units are primarily reactionary.

The current mission set of the SFGs in Iraq is such that other units could do the job, if the SFGs were not there.\textsuperscript{47} In fact, the FID role of Foreign Military Training (FMT) and the role of advising foreign units has already been taken from SF and given to the conventional forces.\textsuperscript{48} While some SF teams are conducting limited FID and UW missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, most of the SF missions are unilateral in nature and utilize the reconnaissance expertise inherent in the SF mission set. While these missions are undoubtedly valuable, they are generally tactical in nature and could be done by a number of other units. Special Forces are meant to be a strategic tool and using them in such a limited, tactical mission in a relatively small theater of operations is a waste of resources.\textsuperscript{49}

If pulled from Iraq and Afghanistan, Special Forces units would be free to conduct a massive, world-wide global FID and UW campaign that would truly target terrorism at a strategic level. Fighting terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan is visceral and concrete, but it is hardly going to solve the problems the U.S. faces across the globe. There is much evidence that the terrorists have moved a large part of the their support and training out of the middle east and into many other areas of the world. It would be incredibly beneficial to have small groups of SF advisors working with many countries to help combat terrorism in the HN. For example, virtually all the nations in the Horn of Africa (HOA) have massive “ungoverned

\textsuperscript{47} Hy S. Rothstein, \textit{Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare} (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2006).


\textsuperscript{49} Hy S. Rothstein, \textit{Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare} (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2006)
spaces” that the host nations cannot control. From a strategic perspective, it makes perfect sense to devise and execute operations which shift a large part of our SF effort to the HN’s in this area. The SF units could help those governments bring stability and control to the ungoverned areas and teach them how to police their own borders. SF units could be the conduits for not only training, but also equipment and resources necessary to ensure the HN has the ability to govern itself and secure the land within their borders. Perhaps most importantly, dedicating SF support to these nations will also show the HNs that the U.S. is serious about helping them and it will give them confidence that the U.S. will stand behind them.

By freeing the SFGs from the yoke of Iraq and Afghanistan, they could also conduct world wide UW missions to help defeat unfriendly governments without the expense (and possible embarrassment) that deploying a large conventional force would incur. For example, Iran is rapidly becoming a major threat in the world wide arena. Arguably, it is absolutely vital to curb this threat before they have the capability to inflict mass damage on Western nations. It is also arguable that invading Iran with a large conventional force would be a monumental disaster that would make the U.S.’ current problems look small by comparison. Rather than risk a conventional military invasion of Iran, a true unconventional warfare operation conducted with a covert force consisting of Special Forces units and other governmental agencies could be utilized to bring about a change in Iran. While it may be too difficult (and possibly undesirable) to actually topple the Iranian government, it may be possible to wage a UW campaign that creates enough internal strife that it becomes impossible for Iran to effectively wage a surrogate war against the West. In addition, it may be much more effective to use indigenous forces controlled through our UW units to deter, disrupt or destroy Iran’s nuclear capability.
The Iranian example is important because the effect the U.S. would like to achieve (Iran is incapable of sponsoring a world-wide terror campaign against the West) can be brought about in a myriad of ways. We could just invade them with a conventional force, or we could use a clandestine direct action operational campaign to selectively target their nuclear facilities and, perhaps, their leadership. Both of these military options not only have financial risk; they incur huge political risk that could be even more devastating. Additionally, these options have varying levels of expected success. A conventional invasion would, undoubtedly, be a military success, although the loss to our force would be much more considerable than our losses during the Iraq invasion. The issue is not about the U.S.’ ability to win a conventional war, it is a question of the level of global political fallout from such an action.

A selective direct action campaign may be less politically sensitive, but it is doubtful that it would have the desired effect. In order to truly disrupt or destroy Iran’s capability or will to fight, the amount of direct action necessary would be considerable. This concept is similar to the one adopted by the U.S. in the 1990’s that it isn’t necessary to put troops on the ground to win a war. To wage a campaign like this against Iran, it would require massive overt and clandestine targeting inside their borders in order to achieve any meaningful result. Ultimately, a targeting campaign would very likely end with a conventional war anyway.

While the UW campaign option is not without risk (certainly any soldiers involved with “behind the lines” operations would be at incredible personal risk), the risk to mission and strategy would be much, much lower. A force made up of indigenous guerrillas that is trained, equipped and advised by Special Forces would look, for all the world, like a standard rebellion or insurgency. The use of a covert UW force would give the U.S. a measure of plausible deniability and allow us to build alliances within Iran for future use and exploitation.
A more concrete, real-world example of what SF can achieve with a global presence is the successful campaign waged in the Philippines during Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines. While the Abu Sayaf terrorist movement in the Philippines has existed since the early 1990’s, it was only after 9/11 that the group became a primary U.S. target. This was due to Abu Sayaf’s ties to international terrorism and, specifically, its links to Al Qaeda. The U.S. quickly realized that the links of the terrorist network spanned out much farther than the Philippines. “Because the enemy consists of small cells operating independently all over the globe, success depends on local intelligence and American assistance subtle enough to avoid charges of imperialism or meddling, charges that often provoke a backlash and the feed the movement.”

The U.S. utilized FID concepts in order to play a “crucial, but almost invisible role” in support of the Philippine government and forces. Before the U.S. got involved, Abu Sayaf was “tying the Philippine armed forces in knots.” The U.S. sent SF soldiers to train the Philippine armed forces in COIN techniques while the U.S. intelligence agencies provided resources for the Philippine forces to do their job better. Importantly, these U.S. forces worked behind the scenes and put a Philippine “face” on all actions. This cooperation led to a successful campaign against Abu Sayaf across the entire region. While Abu Sayaf still exists as an organization, the Philippine and U.S. effort “significantly downgraded the leadership and strength of the group.”

51 Ibid, 6.
52 Ibid, 4.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid, 11.
56 Ibid, 18. Quote was made by COL Juancho Sabban, the deputy commander of southern operations for the Philippine marine corps.
Ultimately, “the invisibility of the United States’ role reduced the effort to a local police action.”57 This operation was a perfect example of how U.S. SOF, working with other government agencies, can use low-profile, clandestine, covert and overt actions to provide essential aid to the security of an allied HN. By taking a global Al Qaeda partner out of the terrorist network, the U.S. also improved its own security. For at least the near future, it will be much more difficult for Al Qaeda to operate, get intelligence from, and move or obtain resources from the Philippine area.

These types of FID and UW operations could be planned and executed regularly, if our strategic UW/FID assets were available. The U.S. has a number of special mission units and conventional forces that can conduct the full gamut of direct action, special reconnaissance, counter-terrorism and HUMINT missions, but only the SFGs have the specialized selection, training and resources to conduct strategic FID and UW. Unless they are pulled out of Iraq and Afghanistan, though, they cannot expend the time and energy to be the strategic tool they were designed for.

57 Ibid.
Recommendation 3: Form a strategic UW/FID unit as a national asset.

At the end of combat a North Vietnamese colonel was told by an American that his armies had never defeated American combat forces on the battlefield. His answer: “That may be so, but it is also irrelevant”58

UW and FID are characterized as being of long duration and requiring considerable expertise, training, equipping and resourcing in order to be successful. Our SF units have excelled at perfecting the tactics, techniques and procedures required to conduct UW/FID missions. What is lacking is an organization that has the training, resources, and, most importantly, authority to plan, coordinate and execute world wide UW/FID missions.

Targeting Mentality

As Dr. Rothstein notes, the Bush administration has spent a large amount of time talking about how they have re-organized the military and about how the military has undergone a transformation to embrace an unconventional mindset. Rothstein goes on to show that this is not true. This administration has approached virtually every problem since 9/11 with the same kinetic mindset that has preceded us since the American Revolution.59 We bombed Afghanistan into submission, but were unable to capitalize on the conventional victory.60 We devastated Saddam Hussein and his Army in a record time, but are nearly helpless in the

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58 Seymor Hersch & Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2006), pg xi
59 Hy S. Rothstein, lecture March 13, 2007 at SAMs
60 Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2006), xiv
ensuing insurgency and growing civil war. There are no longer good options for resolving the entangled web we have woven ourselves into.

Early in the war, Secretary Rumsfeld understood that the problems he faced in trying to fight a Global War on Terror were “unconventional”.61 He also understood that the conventional military was unprepared to tackle such an asymmetric task. He thus turned to the one command under his control that should, theoretically, be ever prepared to understand and fight such a war. He gave the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) the responsibility of figuring out the best way to defeat this amorphous, global enemy.62 What he did not fully grasp was the extent to which the SOF community had been divided and where the control and resources lay within that community.

Over the course of U.S. SOF history, two distinct mindsets have emerged. Dr. Rothstein does an excellent job describing them by citing the difference in definition of Special Operations used by SOCOM and the definition used by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). The SOCOM definition describes SOF as being special because of their unique equipment and because their tasks are beyond normal conventional capabilities. USASOC defines special operations in terms of conducting missions on “political, economic or informational objectives” while employing “unconventional means”.63 In other words, SOCOM views special operations as something that is defined by the unit and USASOC sees special operations as something that is defined by the mission.

This tension between the definitions is a consistent theme running through the history of special operations forces at least since World War II. It is

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61 Ibid, 3.
63 Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2006), pg 18
not mere semantics, but reflects a real divergence of opinion among military leaders, planners, and ordinary soldiers about the nature, purpose, functions, and methods of special operations forces.64

With this in mind, the unit focused mindset SOCOM has bred a mentality that “targeting” is the main special operations function. This idea has bled over into the conventional Army force and has become pervasive in much of the Army’s current doctrine and strategy. Now, when most planners and operators describe a situation, they often frame it in the language of targeting. A search through the most current U.S. National Military Strategy finds 11 references to targeting the enemy.65 In fact, targeting has become so ingrained in the military idea of waging war, it precisely the lack of targets in Afghanistan that hampered initial planning against Al Qaeda immediately after 9/11. “To a large extent, U.S. military capabilities were neutralized by the absence of lucrative targets to engage.”66

The phrase “find, fix and finish” has also become a common phrase in the Army and is most often used to describe the targeting process.67 In this process, a problem is identified and then targets are “found” that are determined to be at the root of the problem. Once the targets are found, the force then “fixes” the target by either preventing the target from operating or by merely monitoring the target through Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance (ISR) mechanisms. During this time, a determination is made on how best to “finish” the target, which can be through lethal (kill the enemy) and non-lethal (information operations, decrease will to fight, etc.) means.

64 Ibid.
66 Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2006), pg 6
This targeting process is now being used in the field to plan and conduct everything from raids and ambushes to psychological warfare operations (PSYOP). This process is working very well at the tactical level to solve many of the issues our units are facing on the modern battlefield. For example, if a brigade S3 and S2 believe the local population in their area is harboring foreign fighters and that this is occurring against the will of the population, the brigade commander may decide it would be best to solve this problem with an indirect approach. The Brigade Information Operations (IO) officer researches the problem, gathers information and available intelligence and determines that his target for this IO effort is the relatively poor and uneducated sector of the population because they are being paid to harbor the terrorists. In order to “fix” the target, the IO officer consults with the PSYOP officer and they construct a campaign to reward the locals monetarily if they turn in the terrorists to friendly forces. Then, in order to “finish” the enemy, the brigade operations officer develops kinetic and non-kinetic solutions. The brigade commander may order the subordinate battalions to help the local police force and the regional Iraqi military units to provide better local security while the brigade Civil Affairs officer works with local businesses to figure out how the U.S. can aid them in increasing jobs and revenue in the area to ensure the poor are less likely to be enticed to harbor terrorists for money.

While targeting makes sense at the tactical level, using a targeting mindset can be detrimental at the operational and strategic level. The problem is that targeting is inherently reactionary. It is designed to solve problems, not prevent them. If targeting becomes the main effort at the operational and strategic levels, it will always be a game of “catch-up”. By the time the enemy is within the operational targeting cycle, the damage has already been done. This is very evident in our operational and strategic methods applied to fighting Al Qaeda. After almost six years of aggressively targeting Al Qaeda on a global basis, it is evident they are far from being beaten. On the contrary, the evidence seems to show that there are more
terrorists in the world now that identify themselves as being affiliated with Al Qaeda than there were prior to September 11, 2001.68

This is not to say that targeting does not have a place in our military or that it isn’t exactly the right methodology to employ in some cases. The units in the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) are excellent cases-in-point. Most units within JSOC are reactionary units by design. They exist to rapidly and efficiently react to immediate threats and opportunities in the global arena. They are arguably the finest units the world has ever produced to do this mission. They have the absolute best assets to “find, fix and finish” targets with a myriad of options to accomplish these difficult and time-sensitive missions.

The problem arises when these types of reactionary units become the main effort operationally and strategically. While the missions of these highly specialized units are often “strategic” in guidance, they are predominantly “tactical” in execution. A hypothetical targeting scenario may play-out in the following manner. JSOC has complete authority within an area of operations (such as Iraq) to find, fix and finish targets. Often, the opportunity to complete this mission is so time sensitive that they must have the authority to rapidly execute their plan without getting bogged down in a bureaucratic approval processes. Therefore, authority is delegated to the Task Force (TF) commander to execute time sensitive missions with little to no higher approval and with little to no coordination with conventional units that are operating in the area of the target. While this setup is very efficient and effective at being able to execute missions on High Value Targets (HVT), it has the potential to be disruptive to the overall strategic and operational aims and goals.

For example, if intelligence shows that there is overwhelming evidence that a particular HVT is currently in a known location that is advantageous for a quick strike, the TF

commander may decide to immediately deploy a force to kill that individual. In this hypothetical scenario, the forces are precise and inflict little collateral damage, but during the strike, a beloved local leader is killed and a nearby school is damaged. The HVT is successfully killed and the immediate assessment is that this is a direct blow to Al Qaeda leadership in the area. On the surface, this has been nothing short of a success. However, in the following weeks, local animosity towards the U.S. conventional brigade in the area grows because the locals blame the brigade for killing the town leader and for damaging the school. The brigade does its best to appease the town and tries all manner of conciliatory actions to regain positive rapport, but now the insurgents have moved in to nurture the seeds of discontent. The insurgents run an effective campaign through the internet; Arabic television and local word-of-mouth to blame the Americans and the flames of insurgency grow in the entire sector. Six months later, no one in the area even remembers the Al Qaeda HVT that was killed, but the local leader has been martyred and remains an inspiration and a rallying point around which anti-American forces have grown.

Clearly, this was not the intent of the original HVT targeting mission, but it is a possible scenario that could arise when the operational main effort is targeting and there is no coordination of this main effort with the overall strategic aims.

Technically, SOCOM could be the overarching entity that eschews this targeting mentality and espouses a more overarching approach, but, ever since SOCOM was formed in 1987, it has been predominantly led by former members and commanders of JSOC. Of the seven commanders of SOCOM since its inception, five of the generals have commanded JSOC69 and the Admiral Olsen, the recently announced successor to the command position, was the JSOC Deputy Commanding General. It is clear that SOCOM leadership is a very

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69 Generals Steiner, Downing, Schoomaker, Holland, and Brown
“target” minded group. In fact, the numbers show that a SOF officer only has a 25% chance of commanding SOCOM if he has not served in JSOC.

**FID/UW Unit Required**

In the U.S. military structure, the JSOC has the authority and resources to plan, coordinate and execute all manner of direct action and special reconnaissance missions in order to implement national strategic aims and goals. The unit was specifically setup to be able to work outside the normal military chain of command in order to provide the government with a time sensitive capability that could handle operations of the utmost importance and secrecy. The JSOC is incredibly adept at coordinating world wide kinetic missions across Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) boundaries and ensuring that not only the resources are available for the operations, but that the actions taken and intelligence garnered are tied into an interagency effort to thwart terrorism.

Unfortunately, the JSOC is quite incapable of handling long term UW/FID missions. This is not due to their lack of competence, but rather a consequence of their mission set. What is required is a unit with similar authority and resources to JSOC, but that is designed from the ground up to handle the unique characteristics of UW/FID operations.

The units under this new command would be the current SFGs and all necessary units designated to conducting this type of mission, such as the Air Forces Special Operations Command (AFSOC)’s 6th Special Operations Squadron, the Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) FID battalion, and various other operational and support units. While the unit would be responsible for resourcing training and coordination of the subordinate units, its largest contribution would come in the form of coordinating world wide operations.
Currently, the military is quite good at conducting individual UW/FID missions. We have well trained and experienced personnel who can plan and execute these types of missions in virtually any environment. What the new UW/FID unit would add is an operational and strategic level to these operations. For example, right now, it would be close to impossible to run a true UW campaign that spanned across multiple GCC boundaries. Yet, the threat we face in 21st Century purposely operates across those boundaries. In order to truly defeat a world wide networked threat, it is necessary to have unit that has execution authority across all boundaries. SOCOM does not fill this role since they are technically only a force provider and not an operational headquarters. It would be extremely beneficial to have a unit that could formulate a comprehensive intelligence picture focused on UW/FID operations, plan and coordinate synchronized UW/FID operations in any part of the world, and focus on long term solutions.

Long term solutions are the key to the success of our country. Politically, long term solutions are often uneasy to stomach. Our politicians often look for short term solutions in order to ensure they keep their job through the next election. This new unit would provide an opportunity for the government to conduct overt, covert, and clandestine operations with a view towards changing the environment over decades. This would not preclude or take the place of short term operations and goals, but it would allow the government to set in place mechanisms that would help ensure U.S. interests long after their term in office is over.

Some examples may be helpful. Ungoverned Space has become one of the hottest buzzwords in politics and in the military. In the past, these areas were of little concern because they were usually in remote areas, were austere, and appeared to be unappealing to anyone, including our enemies. A consequence of our actions since 9/11 is that the terrorists have realized that these ungoverned spaces provide an excellent sanctuary. These areas may not be very hospitable, but they are relatively safe. Often, the “host nation” is more than
willing to turn a blind eye towards terrorists in the ungoverned spaces within their borders. First, the terrorists often pay the HN, so not ignoring the issue actually brings in money. Second, many of these countries already have a general populace that is relatively unfriendly towards the U.S., so this provides the host nation a way to show its own people that it too is anti-U.S. without openly defying the U.S. Finally, the HN has plausible deniability since they can argue that they have no control over what happens in those areas. An excellent example of this situation is in Northwestern Pakistan. U.S. intelligence shows that Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters are seeking refuge in the hills in Pakistan near Quetta, Miram Shah and Peshewar. President Musharraf finds himself in the unenviable position of standing at the nexus of the U.S., the Al Qaeda/Taliban terrorists, and an increasingly anti-U.S. Pakistani populace. It is no wonder his attempts at rooting out the terrorists from these areas have been half-hearted, at best.

It would be in America’s best interest to conduct UW and FID campaigns in these countries that will create an environment unfavorable to the terrorists. The best way to do this, is to ensure the host nation is strong enough to govern its entire country and to give the host nation government confidence that the U.S. will support them. Importantly, though, it also requires that the UW and FID campaign span across international borders. For instance, if the U.S. supports the Philippine government in trying to rid their nation of Islamic Extremists, then the campaign must take into account that the terrorists in the Philippines are actually part of networks spanning throughout much of Southeast Asia. This entails strategic level planning to coordinate multiple related operations across continental borders. Without that level of planning detail and coordination, the individual missions conducted in the Philippines could actually be detrimental to the overall global extremist problem. Unfortunately, at the moment, we do not have an organization that could begin to meld together the massive Joint, inter-agency, inter-national and inter-governmental effort required
to conduct such dispersed operations. It is only when the links are established between the global threats and our actions to defeat them can the U.S. begin to find ways to systemically decrease the threat we face.

**Figure 3 - Developing Complementary HQ Structures**

During the course of the Academic Year 2006-2007, the SAMs students enrolled in the SOF/W Elective had the opportunity to work on two projects for SOCOM. The goal of the first project was to give recommendations on possible changes to CONPLAN 7500, the plan for the GWOT, and the goal of the second project was to give recommendations on how to conduct global UW. One of the recommendations this group made was to create a new headquarters with the mission to “facilitate persistent engagement with our allies and partners the Department of Defense (DoD), in coordination with other governmental agencies

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71 The author was the project leader for the CONPLAN 7500 recommendations.
Figure 3 illustrates this new command’s responsibilities. The left side, labeled JTF, represents the capabilities in JSOC, which center around Direct Action type missions designed to Fight Terrorists. The right side, labeled JWC, represents the new unit which would be responsible for conducting global FID/UW missions in order to Fight Terrorism.

The distinction between fighting terrorists and fighting terrorism is subtle, but profound. Fighting terrorists entails targeting known terrorists and using the “find, fix, and finish” methodology to prevent them from causing harm. Fighting terrorism, on the other hand, is not necessarily centered on targeting individuals, but is the concept that shaping the environment to prevent the terrorists from existing in the first place is a better long term solution. Both functions are vital to national security, it is just that fighting terrorists is a short term solution designed to protect against immediate threats, while fighting terrorism is a long term solution designed to protect against emerging threats.

Another important aspect of this unit would be to incorporate general purpose forces (GPF) in the global UW/FID effort. While the GPF contribution may be limited in the UW role, the use of GPF in FID is instrumental to its success. In the Iraq, for instance, the need to conduct widespread Foreign Military Training (a subset of FID) in order to organize, train, equip and advise the new Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) quickly outstripped the capabilities of SOF. At the very beginning of Phase 4 operations, SF units were responsible for training all the new IAF units, but it became physically impossible for SF to sustain this mission once the coalition began standing up multiple Iraqi combined arms divisions. Skill-wise, the SF units were probably the best choice to conduct this mission, but there are so few available SF units in the world that there was no way they could efficiently do the mission. It therefore fell upon the GPF to figure out how to take on this massive responsibility. Indeed, there are now

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thousands of U.S. GPF servicemen deployed into Iraq that are, in some way, responsible for training, organizing and or advising IAF. The GPF forces have proven to be quite good at these missions and the U.S. government has pinned a great deal of hope that they are the long term answer to success in Iraq. The proposed UW/FID unit would be able to take the lessons learned from using GPF in a FID role in Iraq and formulate operations using GPF in FID missions world wide.

**Conclusion**

The U.S. military faces the unenviable position of having to fight a multi-front, asymmetric, well networked enemy that is enmeshed throughout the world. In the six years of fighting the Global War on Terror, the U.S. has done little to stem the tide of the global insurgency. Indeed, there is ample evidence that, globally, the terrorist networks are stronger today than in 2001.

The Army’s new counterinsurgency doctrine is a good first step at educating our soldiers on how to face such a threat, but it fails in a key aspect. It includes tried and true, Galula style COIN principles, it tries to incorporate 21st threat ideas and it provides a handbook on how to deal with these threats in a variety of situations and environments. What it never achieves, though, is a higher level discussion about insurgencies working together. The doctrine almost solely deals with insurgency as though they happen in a vacuum.

While this may have been true of insurgencies in the past, today terrorist networks are inter-woven in a true system-of-systems. By utilizing our SF Groups to conduct world wide, overt, covert and clandestine FID/UW operations, the U.S. can get away from a targeting mentality and begin to increase interdependent security among allied nations. Further, creating a new unit with national asset level authorization and resources to oversee and
conduct these global FID/UW missions will give the U.S. the mechanism to coordinate the actions necessary to achieve this goal.

Finally, transforming the military education and training system to incorporate a FID mindset will produce a new generation of soldiers and leaders that embrace the idea that it not always necessary to completely defeat an enemy to win a war. This way of thinking will hopefully help our planners and decision makers look for adaptive and fluid solutions that allow the U.S. military to implement strategy with the ultimate goal of bolstering our allied partners and allowing them to secure their homeland.
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