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TRANSFORMING THE AMERICAN SOLDIER: EDUCATING THE WARRIOR-DIPLOMAT

by

Jeff D. Hudson
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June 2005

Thesis Advisor: Anna Simons
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In this thesis, we examine the current levels of cultural understanding and irregular warfare being taught in U.S. Army conventional military schools. Given engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is our view that the military needs a deeper understanding of the indigenous people due to the extremely close and on-going interaction between American Soldiers and the local populations. Current analysis of the difficulties being reported suggests U.S. Army Soldiers are having trouble combating irregular warfare due to cultural misunderstandings and a lack of counter-insurgency training, thereby reflecting a likely educational gap in the U.S. Army’s formal military educational training system.

This thesis analyzes the current problems and difficulties Soldiers are reported to be having while attempting to combat irregular forces in non-western environments. We analyze the amount of training U.S. Army Soldiers receive in cultural understanding and irregular warfare in the military schools pipeline and conclude that there is a connection between problems Soldiers currently face and a lack of training for the conduct of operations in foreign countries. We propose a number of solutions to overcome these suspected gaps in education and suggested changes to the Army’s professional education curriculum.
TRANSFORMING THE AMERICAN SOLDIER: EDUCATING THE WARRIOR-DIPLOMAT

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ABSTRACT

In this thesis, we examine the current levels of cultural understanding and irregular warfare being taught in U.S. Army conventional military schools. Given engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is our view that the military needs a deeper understanding of the indigenous people due to the extremely close and on-going interaction between American Soldiers and the local populations. Current analysis of the difficulties being reported suggests U.S. Army Soldiers are having trouble combating irregular warfare due to cultural misunderstandings and a lack of counter-insurgency training, thereby reflecting a likely educational gap in the U.S. Army’s formal military educational training system.

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Table 2.  **OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION CONTINUUM** (From: CJSCI 1800.01B, 2004, p. A-A) ... 53
I. A KNOCK AT THE DOOR

For most...the matter of learning is one of personal preference. But for [military] officers, the obligation to learn, to grow in their profession, is clearly a public duty.

---General Omar N. Bradley

Wham! Wham! Wham! The young teenage Iraqi boy, Haroun Fadhil, instantly thought that thieves were trying to break into his home. Living in a crime-infested neighborhood and wanting to protect his family, Haroun reached for an AK-47 assault rifle—one per family is allowed by U.S. authorities in Iraq. But the intruders were not thieves. Instead they were members of an 82d Airborne Infantry squad who were acting on a “tip” that lead them to Haroun’s door. In textbook fashion, right out of Field Manual 7-8, the squad burst through the door yelling in languages the boy did not understand. Conflicting stories from both sides mask what actually happened next; however, no one can dispute the fact that when the gunfire and explosions ceased: two Iraqi civilians were dead, four U.S. Soldiers were injured, six apartments were shot up, and trust between U.S. Soldiers and the Iraqi civilian population had been further eroded. The Americans called the raid a “by the book” operation that used a “knock and talk” approach with an appropriate degree of force (Peterson, 2003).

Unfortunately, the Americans do not have all the “books” they need to properly deal with an insurgency, and understand and work with the local population. For one, the U.S. force could not communicate with the Iraqis—they had no interpreter or member of the Iraqi police force accompanying them. Furthermore, U.S. Soldiers lacked
adequate educational training regarding Iraqi culture—such training sheds light on why approximately 99% of all “tips” are erroneous (Packer, 2003).

Numerous first-hand accounts, reports, and news articles prove how little Soldiers understand about the cultures of the countries in which they are currently fighting; this lack of understanding, in turn, has compounded mistakes and problems, thereby increasing the difficulty of successfully combating irregular forces. An initial analysis of curricula in the U.S. Army's Officer and Noncommissioned Officer educational system reveals a lack of training in cultural awareness, as well as a lack of instruction in irregular warfare. As a result, a deficit exists in our Army education system, resulting in our modern day Soldier-turned-warrior-diplomat being unable to read a foreign country’s “social landscape”, preventing him from properly combating irregular forces. We define the term “social landscape” as the social structure and culture in a foreign country.

Understanding the “social landscape” will only be able to be achieved through direct interaction with the local population. Additionally, this direct interaction with the local population, if combined with an understanding of the cultural and social aspects of the situation, can increase the trust between the military and the foreign population. One of the most effective ways to increase the effectiveness of the U.S. military’s operations overseas is to be able to increase the trust of the civilian population towards the Army.

To write this thesis, we focused on analyzing the current professional education system to determine how much
time is devoted to the study of irregular warfare and cultural understanding. We traced how U.S. Army officer and enlisted professional education policy is formulated and how schools determine their focus and learning objectives. We also examined various current curricula, reviewing both the conventional Officer and NCO school house training. Additionally, we reviewed the U.S. Army’s current capstone training events, which are conducted at the National Training Center and Joint Readiness Training Center (NTC/JRTC), and are recognized as the premier method of evaluating a unit’s combat readiness.

Next, we compared our findings about the educational curricula to front-line reports and identified the sources of shortcomings in our Army education and training. The gaps we identified can be filled, however, and so we propose a solution for helping to transform the American Soldier to enable him to more effectively negotiate a foreign country’s social landscape and successfully combat irregular forces.

Throughout this thesis, we discuss two identified deficiencies in education and training – cultural awareness and irregular warfare. These two subject areas, although very different on the surface, become very intertwined during combat operations in low to mid-intensity situations, such as the two U.S. Army Soldiers currently find themselves in in Iraq and Afghanistan. We believe that the typical separation between these two subjects and the lack of understanding about how they are interrelated is one of the main causes for the difficulties the U.S. military is currently experiencing during combat operations.
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II. THE FORMULATION OF MILITARY EDUCATION

Knowing others is intelligence; knowing yourself is true wisdom. Mastering others is strength; mastering yourself is true power.

---Lao-Tzu

In a memorandum dated October 8, 2004, entitled “SUBJECT: Defense Capabilities to Transition to and from Hostilities,” Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld appointed the Under Secretary of Policy to be the focal point for implementing the 2004 Defense Science Board’s recommendations. The Under Secretary of Policy was directed to reshape the military’s capabilities to exploit prewar opportunities and address postwar responsibilities to achieve U.S. objectives in the transition to and from hostilities. In turn, the draft DoD Directive 9-17-2004 specifically charges the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to:

5.3.2. Reform curricula at senior service schools, service academies, ROTC programs, advanced officer and enlisted education programs to include foreign language education and regional area of expertise, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

5.3.3. Expand opportunities for officer, enlisted, and civilian personnel to participate in regional and cultural education programs, including resident or on-line studies and exchange programs. Establish programs to maintain proficiency in regional and cultural affairs and language skills (DoD Directive, 2004, pp. 6-7).
The DoD directive further states that foreign language skills and regional and cultural expertise are essential enabling capabilities. Furthermore, U.S. forces must be reshaped to be capable of operating in a range of cultures and languages to respond to an adaptive enemy (DoD Directive, 2004, p. 8).

Within DoD, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as defined by law, is responsible for formulating policies for coordinating military education and training of the armed forces in regard to military education (CJCSI 1800.01B, 2004, p. 2). Each service operates its own officer and noncommissioned officer professional military education (PME) “to develop leaders with expertise and knowledge appropriate to their grade, branch, and specialty” (p. A-1). Although the CJCS Instruction 1800.01B and 1805.01 distinguishes between education and training by stating “at its highest levels and in its purest form, education fosters breadth of view, diverse perspectives and critical analysis, abstract reasoning, comfort with ambiguity and uncertainty and innovative thinking, particularly with respect to complex, non-linear problems. This contrasts with training, which focuses on the instruction of personnel to enhance their capacity to perform specific functions and tasks” (p. A-2), the Instruction also acknowledges the interrelated nature of the two elements. The Instruction continues by stating “training and education are not mutually exclusive. Virtually all military schools and professional development programs include elements of both education and training in their academic programs. Achieving success across the joint learning continuum relies on close coordination of
training and education to develop synergies as personnel develop individually over time” (pg A-2). The CJCS Instruction 1800.01B provides the framework for the officer military education policy. Likewise, CJCS Instruction 1805.01 provides the framework for the enlisted professional military education policy. These documents provide the guidance, establish the learning area framework, and delineate what the schools should include in their curricula. Each Service Chief then decides how best to address these learning areas with regard to his particular service and determines his respective Service’s focus (Roesner, 2005).

Of note, the CJCS Instruction for Enlisted PME states that

Leadership development consists of leadership education and training that develops skilled and knowledgeable leaders capable of meeting the increasingly complex requirements of joint operations. To meet these requirements, personnel must expand their understanding of individual, Service and joint core competencies while broadening their understanding of the uncertain strategic and operational environments (CJCS Instruction 1805.01, 2004, p. A-3).


The CJCSI for enlisted personnel also states that its overarching goal is to educate and train the right person for the right task at the right time. “This is especially true today because we are discovering the War on Terrorism requires noncommissioned officers from all Services to work
in the joint environment more often than they have before” (2004, p. 1).

Unfortunately for both the officer and enlisted PME, the definition of joint is working with another service on a staff, within an organization, during training, and/or in performance of duties (CJCSI 1805.01, 2004, pp. GL-3, GL-4, & CJCSI 1800.01B, 2004, p. GL-5). We would submit that jointness should likewise come to mean working within coalitions, foreign militaries, and by, with, and through indigenous populations.

Attached annexes to this thesis list both the officer and enlisted PME path through junior, mid-, to senior ranks, as well as respective educational opportunities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels for each set of ranks.
III. ROADBLOCKS AND FINDING DETOURS

Neither a wise nor a brave man lies down on the tracks of history to wait for the train of the future to run over him.

---Dwight D. Eisenhower

Unfortunately, the DoD directive to reform service schools has only slowly been implemented. A review of Army enlisted and officer PME school curricula shows very little to almost no inclusion of cultural anthropology/awareness, foreign languages, and/or understanding of insurgencies (Harp, ND). Training and Doctrine Command is proposing to inject cultural training into every education level; however, little to no progress has been made.

First, there are no set definitions or directed learning objectives that the schools must adhere to. For example, many of the schools define “cultural awareness” differently and, although some schools claim that they do already teach cultural awareness, this is non-regulated and for the most part simply a means to check a block. Second, in the near-term, very few if any schools plan to implement any of the mentioned reforms, citing that something else in the school’s program would have to be cut in order to make room for a new course or courses. Change, if any takes place, will definitely need a long-term focus (Protosevich, 2005). In addition, for the enlisted ranks, NCOs might not even receive education in cultural awareness, foreign languages, regional expertise, and/or insurgencies until they attend the Sergeant Major Academy near the end of their careers—if they stay in the force that long and are selected to attend (Carter, 2005).
Yet, in this new era of media saturation and instantaneous communications, the age of globalization and the War on Terror, where everything transpires in front of a CNN camera or is recorded in a reporter’s journal, it is the junior specialist and lieutenant on the ground with a rifle who truly matter. These are the individuals required to rapidly determine friend from foe, make sense out of a complex tribal culture, and make on-the-spot decisions that can have far-flung implications, not just for tactics and operations, but on strategy and policies as well. It only seems prudent that the Army’s PME should be readjusted at the junior levels especially, but across all ranks to reflect these realities.

In the fight to improve the Army’s PME, America must first tear down the cultural walls within her own governmental, civilian, and military bureaucratic organizations. One way to view the attempt to reform the Army’s PME is by looking through the lenses of the rational actor, organizational behavior, and governmental politics models. These models make clear the extent to which individuals and organizations have to be viewed in competition, pulling, and interacting with each other for their own personal benefits (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, pp. 13-389). A school’s product—its graduates—is hard to measure and returns are not immediate, but take years and sometimes decades to tabulate. With little or no means to readily show their near-term worth, sadly, many schools are unwilling to share information and ideas about their curricula. From a rational actor’s perspective, no school wants to disclose its courses and materials for fear that another school will advocate that it can teach the same
material to the same or a higher standard and may be even for less cost. Likewise, schools and department heads also fear that if they cannot continually prove their relevance, their programs may be curtailed or eradicated, funds cut, and jobs lost. Therefore, schools with pertinent curricula that could help to shape a more beneficial Army PME neglect to do so in order to protect themselves and their own organization. Likewise, schools with poor curricula that teach little or nothing about cultural anthropology/awareness, insurgencies, regional expertise, and/or foreign languages also seek not to divulge information in order to protect their organization. These schools do not wish to be found wanting, resulting in program cuts, lost jobs, and maybe even closure. However, what should be understood is that PME is not a zero-sum game. There are work-arounds from which everyone could benefit, most importantly the Soldier on the ground and, hence, the nation.

As just one example of a work-around amongst a myriad of potential educational cooperative opportunities, the Army recently announced full implementation of the Basic Officer Leadership Course in July 2006 for all second lieutenants. According to General Kevin P. Byrnes, TRADOC’s Commanding General,

Leader development—while educating them to think broadly—must prepare them for the complexities on the battlefields they’ll see when they join their first units. We’re fighting a small-unit war. It’s being fought by staff sergeants, sergeants first class, lieutenants, and captains every day. They’re the ones out on patrol; they’re the ones who are in this extremely complex environment where things change from the minute they leave their compound until they return that evening.
We’ve got to make sure our leaders are prepared for those complexities and changes and have a framework to refer to, a handrail to grab on to, and an understanding of foundational concepts (U.S. Army News Release, 2005).

BOLC consists of three phases. Phase I is the pre-commissioning phase where training takes place at the U.S. Military Academy, Reserve Officer Training Corps, and Officer Candidate Schools. Herein lays opportunity. Make it mandatory as part of the commissioning requirement that cadets/officers take a class on cultural anthropology. Require them to study two semesters of a foreign language. Provide incentives for them to gain some regional familiarity. And offer a class on guerrilla warfare if one is not already a part of the curriculum. While it is true that not all universities or OCS posts may have instructors available to meet these goals, such blocks of instruction can be made available in the virtual world through distance learning, on-line courses, or even via contact teams.

During BOLC Phase II, new lieutenants are put through an initial-entry field-leadership phase. Eighty percent of this six-week long course is taught in the field, designed to stress small unit leadership and challenge officers physically and mentally. Here is where another opportunity exists to inject cultural awareness situations into the small unit field training exercises. In addition, the local populace dealt with should not speak English, instead forcing students to deal with them through an interpreter or use a secondary language they had previously studied in BOLC I. The background for several of these exercises could easily draw from actual region-specific settings, not just the Middle East.
Instruction and scenarios should be as realistic as possible and should borrow from Soldiers’ recent experiences, encounters and engagements in scenarios of modern day nation-states and developing third world countries and with non-state actors. Infusing actual information not only reflects real-world teachings, but helps educate Soldiers as well as providing realism to the exercise; no one cares about the fictitious island of Cortina, but everyone will want to learn about the FARC in Colombia or Chechen tactics in Afghanistan. Current intelligence and maps should be used to help build these realistic scenarios. Equally important, students should be encouraged to learn to work by, with, and through the population when confronting insurgents.

BOLC III, the branch technical phase, is where lieutenants learn the specialized skills, doctrine, tactics, and techniques of their assigned branch (U.S. Army News Release, 2005). BOLC Phase III can further capitalize on the same educational and training enhancers described above, but with yet more branch-related specificity.

On a parallel note, while BOLC represents the first building block in the foundation of officer education and training, the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC) is the first level of development in the formation of our Noncommissioned Officers. PLDC is a month-long leadership course for Army Specialists and Corporals designed to teach them the skills necessary to effectively lead small groups of soldiers at the team, squad, and section levels. The first leadership course designed to transform enlisted soldiers into NCOs, PLDC seeks to “instill self discipline, professional ethics, and establish the foundation for
further training and leader development” (EUSA Wightman NCO Academy, 2005). The course’s topics include: leadership, training management, map reading, land navigation and drill and ceremony, and it culminates in a field training exercise (FTX). The purpose of the capstone FTX is to evaluate the student’s performance in a stressful situation and ability to lead a patrol in a combat scenario (Ruiz, 2005).

A review of various PLDC training schedules reveals what amounts to four phases of enhancing Soldiers’ knowledge: 1) leadership to know oneself and how to lead others; 2) to know the importance of physical training and drill and ceremony which are integral to leadership but also represent Army customs; 3) to know and be able to read terrain via map reading and land navigation; and 4) to understand how to put these practices together in the culminating FTX (Hawaii Army National Guard, 2005). However, while we are taking the time to educate and train to see ourselves, see the terrain, and see a conventional foe, we must also be able to effectively understand and operate in a non-western environment, deal with a foreign culture, and appreciate that our actions may either incite or help curb a rise in guerrilla warfare. The leadership phase itself should not only concentrate on leading U.S. Soldiers but also discuss leadership behavior in foreign environments where the indigenous population will scrutinize every move the leader makes. Given today’s information age, our Soldiers have to understand that good or bad impressions can have lasting and far flung results, potentially of strategic impact.
As with BOLC, here is another opportunity to educate and train rising leaders about the need to understand the social landscape by weaving aspects of foreign cultures and irregular warfare into the FTX. Furthermore, such teachings can be introduced without adding any more time to the 30-day course.

The FTX presents an excellent opportunity to immerse junior leaders in a difficult and demanding situation. While basic tactics, techniques, and procedures should still be practiced, we must raise the bar in training to expose our junior leaders to the kinds of worst case scenarios that they may find themselves confronting. For example, the FTX should also include civilians on the battlefield from a non-western environment who don’t speak English, a foe who blends into the local populace as well as into any conventional indigenous forces, and an inquisitive embedded reporter trying to get a story. Scenarios should be derived from real-life experiences learned from Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq to name a few. The Center for Army Lessons Learned, numerous unit After Action Reviews, and combat veterans provide a wealth of information which can be used to design such a challenging and rewarding FTX. Better to stress our leaders to the utmost in training, then leave them to fail in war.

Similarly, all Army schools can revamp their education and training to better peg them to individuals’ particular level of expertise. Bolstering current doctrine and new TTPs would not require new courses. Instead, actual information and intelligence about present-day hot spots could be used to create relevant, modern day scenarios,
especially when so many soldiers and officers find themselves deployed right after PLDC or BOLC II.

In addition to fostering these work-arounds in the school houses, training scenarios at a unit’s capstone training exercise - while at JRTC or NTC - can likewise be made much more worthwhile. For example, a unit rotating to NTC could be learning about the North Korean Peoples’ Army or Chinese Army instead of studying the fictitious OPFOR. Also, not only should the rotation focus on high to mid-intensity conflict for the first week to ten days, but then the rotation should shift to low intensity conflict and post-conflict stability operations. Relevant areas to cover include dealing with irregular warfare and the establishment of security, governance, economic well-being, and justice and reconciliation. Or, being more realistic still, it should be possible to create an even more advanced situation where the unit needs to cope with a mix of all of the above situations simultaneously. This will go far in disabusing notions that these types of conflict arrive in a set sequence or order.

Likewise, JRTC should do away with its make-believe Cortinian scenario and instead shift focus to a likely hot spot in the world. Low-intensity conflict and post-conflict stability operations should also be emphasized. Real world villages often do not have a JRTC-type major or chieftain in charge, and Soldiers must learn how to operate in acephalous societies. Real world scenarios could be changed yearly and could shift between scenarios drawing from a range of locations, such as Bosnia, Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Colombia, etc. We recognize there are political or diplomatic reasons that a
make-believe scenario and enemy is utilized, in order to prevent labeling any specific country as an “enemy,” but we believe there needs to be an understanding of possible real-world threats incorporated into the training, in order to get the most out of it. A unit rotating through these real world situations would gain a far greater training advantage and would not only be able to apply, but would have an understanding of, regional areas, knowledge of cultural aspects, differing languages, and guerrilla warfare TTPs. All of this would render these exercises more realistic.

We are not advocating doing away with conventional teaching and training. On the contrary, we believe in balancing the Army’s PME and training so that the Soldier is still able to soundly defeat conventional armies, in conventional settings. But, his education has to be counter-balanced so that he is adequately prepared to work with indigenous populations and defeat guerrillas and terrorists too, whether in remote areas of a country or within its urban centers. As the CJCSI states, the Army must prepare its Soldiers for warfare across the entire spectrum of conflict (emphasis added). While the Army has mastered the high to mid-intensity conflict spectrum, recent history demonstrates that the Army is still lacking when it comes to dealing with low intensity conflict environments.
IV. REPEATING AND RELEARNING HISTORY

The significant problems we face cannot be solved at the same level of thinking we were at when we created them.

--- Albert Einstein

Coupled with failing to consider regional and historical factors, the U.S. military’s best intended but completely misguided actions in an insurgency can exponentially increase the number of its enemies, quickly alienate and/or diminish its friends and supporters in the population, and destroy a level of trust that is paramount in the real battle for, as we’ve seen in Iraq, the people’s “hearts and minds.”

Christopher Varhola, a U.S. Army Major and cultural anthropologist, recently addressed these cancerous issues plaguing the American military in Iraq in an article for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. In his piece, “American Challenges in Post-Conflict Iraq”, Varhola argues that, at the very least, the Army should incorporate an understanding of guerrilla warfare and cultural awareness into its military education system in order to better prepare Soldiers and leaders—warrior diplomats for reading the “social landscape” in low intensity conflicts in order to save lives and nations.

Chris Varhola’s main points are that the American military’s lack of training and experience in the Middle East leads to U.S. practices that alienate broad elements of the Iraqi population, and we are failing to take into account historical and regional factors. Even after recent
peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, Haiti, and Somalia, Varhola argues that the U.S. military was unprepared for governing an Islamic nation. With its focus on combat operations, the U.S. military excluded an understanding of indigenous power structures and cultural considerations. Furthermore, the military’s lack of training in both the Arabic language and support activities such as local law enforcement, administration, and various reconstruction activities is evident—all of which should be considered paramount in working with a host nation’s population and countering an insurgency.

Hence, as Varhola implies, the military educational system has not prepared Soldiers for the unique requirements of battling an insurgency and dealing with low intensity conflict. Sadly, we neglected to learn the lessons of Vietnam and incorporate them into service schools. Noted author and Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, retired Lieutenant Colonel Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. in his book The Army and Vietnam devotes a whole chapter, “The Revolution That Failed,” to discussing the U.S. Army’s “tying itself to a conventional war in the training of its officers.” The Army’s leadership considered dealing with insurgency to be a “fad”, stone-walled President Kennedy’s efforts to incorporate counter-insurgency training at all educational levels, from West Point all the way through the War College and, instead, continued to focus on big-unit operations (battalion and above) as opposed to small-unit, counterinsurgency operations. (Krepinevich, 1986, pp. 27-55) Ironically, a current review of the Army’s military educational system finds that not much has changed since
the 1960s. In all of the Army’s military educational curricula, the focus remains on large scale conventional war with very little to no attention paid to preparing our Soldiers for dealing with the complexities of an insurgency. This has to be considered a major underlying reason for why we are having so many problems overseas today. (Harp, ND)

In support of Varhola’s view, parallel reasoning is found not only in Krepinevich’s book but also in Backfire, a book authored by Loren Baritz, also about Vietnam. In it, Baritz blames the quagmire in Vietnam on both the myths of American culture and the way we cultivated and educated warriors. As Baritz puts it for Vietnam, the U.S. Army fought a conventional war whose aim was killing, whereas “The key to the problem was the farmer and his family.” (1998, pp. 233&251) For Iraq today Varhola echoes, “targeting insurgents takes precedence over working with the people.” The U.S. military is still not geared toward civil-military operations. For instance, as a U.S. Army Brigade Commander in Iraq told Varhola, his forces were there to “kill the enemy, not win their hearts and minds.”

Lending further support to Varhola’s assertions, a recent unclassified e-mail article written by the First Marine Division Intelligence Officer, Major Ben Connable, astutely cites the various difficulties U.S. Marines are having in understanding the Iraqi people and vice-versa, for “American Marines and Iraqis are hardwired at far ends of a cultural void not by genetics but by social conditioning” and these fundamental differences lead to fundamental misunderstandings. (Connable, May 30, 2004)
Reflecting their education, training, and culture, American Soldiers regularly assert that the only thing Iraqis understand is “force.” But, while it may be true that force is universally understood, force can also foster a reaction that undermines the Coalition’s goals. Varhola cites numerous examples of the U.S. military’s forceful practices that have served to alienate the Iraqi population and undoubtedly turned some “fence sitters” into insurgents. Here are a few examples of what the Army has not considered:

- The long term effects of test firing weapons from moving vehicles in urban areas.
- The ramifications of completely destroying walls that have anti-American graffiti painted on them versus just repainting them.
- Detaining all the males in a given area for weeks or months on end without regard to legitimacy.
- Detaining family members of suspects in the hopes that the suspects will turn themselves in.
- Using dogs, which Iraqis consider unclean animals, to search Iraqi homes, even though this is viewed as a disgrace by Arabs and as an attack upon their honor.
- American male Soldiers searching Iraqi females—a highly disrespectful action that violates a family’s honor and begs vengeance by the male family members.
- Arrests of religious leaders who preach against the Coalition. We should view such public speeches less as a cause and more as an effect/symptom of public discontent to be monitored carefully. Unwarranted arrest of religious leaders for what they say just leads Iraqis to believe Americans really do not believe in freedom of speech.
- Misunderstanding the terms “liberation” and “occupation” and how they have different and
detrimental meanings politically, morally, and legally to the Iraqi people.

- Creating more enemies or at least hardening them when American Soldiers place their boots on the heads of Iraqi captives, for Arabs consider such acts as inhumane and disgraceful. Soldiers must come to understand the values of honor, shame, and dignity in Arab social systems.

- Soldiers misconstruing the nature of how blood feuds intertwine with local customs—one reason why so many baseless erroneous tips are given to U.S. Soldiers.

Given how quickly Soldiers are expected to transition from open combat to peacekeeping/occupation duties, Varhola reiterates the importance of Soldiers’ training taking cultural and socioeconomic factors into consideration.
V. READING THE “SOCIAL LANDSCAPE”

What we actually learn, from any given set of circumstances, determines whether we become increasingly powerless or more powerful.

---Blaine Lee

The current deficit in cultural awareness and understanding insurgency results in the erosion of trust between the American Soldier and indigenous populations. This leads to difficulties while conducting military operations. The U.S. military is currently engaged in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, two environments that do not present conventional battlefields. There is no clearly defined enemy or a “front line” that can be identified, measured, and mapped. The current battlefields are asymmetric and contain multiple areas that require different tactics, techniques, and procedures based on constantly changing situations. American Soldiers are required to conduct numerous types of operations that run the gamut from humanitarian assistance in areas with the full support and cooperation of the local population through combat patrols in a decidedly anti-American hostile environment. Although both of these mission sets at each extreme of the warfare spectrum present their own unique difficulties and challenges, the multiple mission sets that are in the middle are probably the most difficult to accomplish. In these the Soldier is entering into an unknown situation where portions of the population might be willing to support U.S. goals and objectives, while other
segments throw in their lot with the opposition, for individual or ideological reasons.

In these unknown situations, it is extremely important for force protection of the Soldiers, as well as the success of the operations, that Soldiers understand the local situation. Understanding the local situation implies an understanding of the local culture, including the mores and beliefs of the people as well as understanding the social structure of the society, and how individuals interact with each other and with external actors. Currently, U.S. Soldiers are unable to read the “social landscape”.

Understanding the social landscape allows Soldiers to more effectively define their operational environment, thereby allowing for a proper analysis and application of tactics, techniques and procedures. Additionally, understanding the operational environment helps to prevent potential costly mistakes based on improper cultural awareness.

In conventional military battles, we are all taught that to be successful, a military unit needs to fully understand and utilize information about three items. We are taught that the keys to success are to “know yourself, know the enemy, and know the terrain”. The conventional military, fighting a battle against a conventional threat, needs to fully comprehend the capabilities and tactics, techniques, and procedures of both the enemy forces in the battlespace, as well as friendly units that can affect the outcome of any given battle. In addition to the study of the military forces present, the Soldier should be as familiar as possible with all facets of the terrain where
the battle will take place. The U.S. Army Soldier is taught to “read” the terrain and the enemy, and understand how they interrelate, as well as with the Soldier’s unit.

![Diagram of Terrain, Enemy, and U.S. Soldiers interrelating](image)

**Figure 1.** READING the BATTLESPACE.

The problem that arises in an insurgency, or a low-intensity conflict, is that there is another factor involved that also needs to be “known” and understood – the indigenous population. In a battle against non-state forces, or against insurgents, the interrelated and interactive contact between the military forces on the battlefield, both U.S. and enemy, with the indigenous population can not be ignored, and requires a military force that is taught to “read” the “social landscape” and not just the physical terrain, or the actions of the enemy. This understanding of the interaction between the military and the indigenous population is summarized by Cecil B. Curry in the introduction to Landsdale’s book titled *In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia.* Curry states, "Before beginning any course of action, leaders always needed to ask themselves first: "What will the people's reaction [be] to this proposed action?" (Lansdale, 1991, p. xvi).
Major General (Ret) Robert Scales argues that some of the problems the U.S. military is facing in places like Iraq and Afghanistan are the result of an over-reliance on technology, combined with a lack of cultural understanding of the local population. According to Scales, “We need to be able to understand the non-military advantage, to read intentions, to build trust, to convert opinions, to manage perceptions – all tasks that demand an exceptional ability to understand people, their culture and their motivation.” (Hedges, 2004)

The U.S. military usually receives little instruction as to the nuances of the local culture prior to deployment. Although some information is provided, it usually consists of basic statements, in bulletized form, such as “avoid showing the bottom of your foot in mid-eastern countries”, or “don’t stare at women”, and listing hand gestures that are considered taboo. Although these small, succinct warnings are an effective way to get out the basic
information and can be useful for Soldiers that are traveling through a foreign country or region, they only provide superficial sensitivization, and their only real aim is to help soldiers avoid offending the population.

In practice, it is difficult to translate such warnings into effective cross-cultural understanding especially while conducting military operations for an extended period of time in varied combat conditions. An example of the difficulties faced when trying to translate cultural awareness statements into proper application of tactics in an operation is when Soldiers in Iraq were using dogs to help search houses. Although Soldiers might realize that the Iraqis didn’t “like” dogs, what they might not realize is that the vast majority of Iraqis don’t just “not like” dogs, but instead consider them an “unclean” animal and bringing them into houses was considered disgraceful. Another example of tactical difficulties based on a misunderstanding of culture is when American male Soldiers search Iraqi women. Although tactically it might be necessary, it is considered a highly disrespectful action that violates the honor of a family and begs vengeance. These two examples, as previously mentioned, indicate just some of the problems that can lead to further alienation of the population, and an additional erosion of trust. It is very difficult to trust someone, let alone an organization, that violated your family’s honor or disgraced your home. As a result, our actions are eroding the trust of the Iraqi people in the Coalition.

Many issues relating to trust arise when the military interacts with local populations. Members of the local population help determine whether the military is viewed as
a liberating or occupying force. They are directly affected by what the military accomplishes, or fails to accomplish. Additionally, confidence in the military can greatly assist in carrying out orders, and establishing a secure, stable environment.

Piotr Sztompka, in his book *Trust: A Sociological Theory*, indicates that there are three bases for the trustworthiness of an individual or organization: reputation, performance, and appearance (1999). Of these three, two of them – reputation and performance – are most likely to be affected by misunderstanding cultural norms in Iraq and Afghanistan. Appearance is also a factor, but as the majority of our military are in uniform and carry weapons, they are automatically lumped together as belonging to one organization – the American Military. Distinguishing one unit from another is very difficult for military members to do, let alone the local population. Although there are some things military members can do, such as not wear sunglasses when confronting locals in order to display a less threatening posture, force protection issues often dictate our general overall appearance. Additionally, the local population probably does not base its sense of trust or mistrust on appearance, but on past and present actions.

The military’s reputation greatly depends on its past performance. Many of the mistakes that have been made in Iraq, that are the consequence of cross-cultural misunderstanding have decreased trust in the military and have set a precedent for mistrust based on reputation. Robert Galford and Anne Seibold Drapeau discuss some of the problems major organizations have when it comes to the
issue of trust in their *Harvard Business Review* (HBR) article, “The Enemies of Trust”. Galford and Drapeau list seven “enemies of trust”. One of them - “rumors in a vacuum” - can lead to the spread of information loosely based on incidents involving the military’s interaction with locals that is detrimental to the military’s goals and objectives. (Galford & Drapeau, 2003) Sadly, the Infantry squad’s Company Commander whose actions were mentioned at the beginning of this thesis said of the incident involving Haroun, “…they [the Iraqis] don’t have all the facts.” (Peterson, 2003) Without informing the local population as to the “facts”, rumors will start and lead to mistrust throughout the community.

As Sztompka discusses, current performance also affects trust. Recently, some changes in arrest techniques have been implemented by some units with an understanding that insulting or humiliating locals while placing them under arrest might do more harm then good. According to U.S. Army Major General Peter Chiarelli, Commander of the 1st Cavalry Division currently stationed in Baghdad, “The worst thing in the world is to put him on the ground and put your boot on his head. Honor is so critical in this society. You don’t take away a man’s honor.” (Associated Press, September 4, 2004) Although some changes are being undertaken in some units, the argument can be made that too much damage has already been done. As Sztompka notes, “[performance] is of course, a much less reliable clue than reputation, because it does not allow for a judgment as to whether trustworthy performance is continuous, typical, and in character”. (1999, p. 27) Unfortunately, it might take a
longer time for trustworthy current and future behavior to overcome the mistrust that already exists in Iraq.

Where the U.S. military is combating insurgents, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan, which means also dealing directly with a local indigenous population, trust between the locals and the military is paramount while a reputation of untrustworthiness cannot only harm the U.S. forces, but has the potential to help the insurgents. Chiarelli sums it up his way: “You’ve got to see it from a force protection standpoint: you’re making more enemies. When we mistreat one person, I’ve got a net increase of nine enemies.” (Associated Press, 2004) In an article entitled “The Tipping Point: How Military Operations Go Sour”, Neil Swidey writes, “In nearly every occupation, there is a tipping point—a defining incident that crystallizes the popular reception of the occupier. Right now, the views of many Iraqis toward the US occupation force are extremely fluid, changing depending on the circumstances of the day—or hour.” (2003)

Understanding the underlying social conditions, being aware of the cultural situation, having solid information concerning the population’s moods and beliefs, as well as understanding the networks that connect the different parts of a society comprise one way to avoid a “tipping point.” (Swidey, 2003)

Part of successful military operations, especially in an indeterminate environment, consists in “getting the word out.” This entails providing information to the local population in order to affect behavior, as well as to make clear the military’s goals and objectives. Essential to spreading the message is understanding how ideas are
transmitted and appreciating the social factors and internal relationships that exist at the local level. One way to look at and analyze the connections in a given area, such as a village, town, or province, is to attempt to conduct a network analysis of the area. This would consist of mapping the main players or personalities within a town and attempting to pictorially or graphically reproduce the social connections in the area, in order to identify the main “hubs” or “connectors” within various segments of the population. For instance, one could start by concentrating on the family ties between households, and then expand to consider social and financial interactions. By building a complete picture of the relationships and interactions within a community, it should be possible to figure out the key players and personalities who could be targeted either with a message or with requests for information that could lead to a more effective utilization of forces. They might also be very helpful in conveying specific mission objectives and goals back to the community.

The main drawbacks to this procedure are the amount of time, analysis, and information that are required to come up with a realistic and effective schematic of interactions. To do this effectively would take a persistent presence and significant manpower and could prove extremely difficult to maintain, especially given the size of current operational areas within Iraq and Afghanistan. The mapping or understanding of interactions becomes even more important when dealing with an acephalous society, where there are no key leaders, which appears to be the current situation in Afghanistan as well as in Iraq (especially after the Ba’ath Party members’ total removal
from power and the political system). An alternate way to target key personalities within an area is to simply focus on the people who are socially active, or attempt to find those who are most likely to be trusted by other members of the local population.

In The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference, Malcom Gladwell provides a very useful theory on the spread of ideas and selling of products. His three agents of change — the Law of the Few, the Stickiness Factor, and the Power of Context — can carry an idea or a product up to and beyond the “tipping point”, after which its spread grows exponentially (Gladwell, 2000). Two of these — the Stickiness Factor and the Power of Context — can be utilized at higher operational levels, especially in the arenas of selecting and broadcasting the messages that the strategic planners deem most important. Meanwhile, The Law of the Few, can be applied at the tactical level when it comes to identifying who these “few” are, thereby facilitating more effective interaction between the U.S. military and the local population. This increase in effectiveness can assist the military in the dissemination of ideas and information, which is always extremely important when conducting operations in an environment containing insurgents.

When it comes to Gladwell’s agents of change, he identifies three types of personality. With the proper combination of these individuals, he argues an idea can spread like wildfire. These three are: Connectors, Mavens, and Salesmen. The Connectors are people who interact socially with many different people from many different walks of life. These are the people that might be
considered “social butterflies.” They are the people that seem to know everyone in a given society. The Mavens are the collectors of information, but as Gladwell points out, they are not passive collectors. They are socially motivated to spread the information and knowledge they acquire. Salesmen, in contrast, are individuals who are able to pass a message on through eloquence and empathy. In other words, Salesmen can latch onto an idea, and if they agree with it, can convince others of its merit. As Gladwell comments, “In a social epidemic, Mavens are data banks. They provide the message. Connectors are social glue: they spread it. But there is also a select group of people—Salesmen—with the skills to persuade us when we are unconvinced of what we are hearing, and they are as critical to the tipping of word of mouth epidemics as the other two groups.” (Gladwell, 2000, p. 70)

Although discovery of these specific individuals will be difficult, especially in an area that is anti-American, investing in the quest is worth the manpower. In some cases, basic inquiries of the local populace, such as ‘who do you tell if there is a problem in your neighborhood?’ ‘Who do you go to if you need assistance?’ ‘Where do you get your information about local events?’ and, ‘who is the person who knows the most about the history of your neighborhood?’ can lead Soldiers to key personalities. The Army’s ability to identify these individuals and earn their trust could help to “tip” the indigenous population over to the U.S. or, at a minimum, allow us to more effectively focus information operations, whether to push the Coalition’s message or to pull of information from the local populace. Gaining the trust of some key individuals
might help the military to gain the trust throughout an entire area.
VI. IMPROVING THE ARMY’S PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Imagination is more important than knowledge. Knowledge is limited. Imagination encircles the world.

--- Albert Einstein

Trained to breach minefields, combat engineers with little prior experience with sewer systems or water purification improvised as they sat through meetings of Baghdad’s water department; specialists in jumping out of airplanes, America’s paratroopers with little formal knowledge of law enforcement established the Kirkuk police department; and, the mechanized spearhead of the invasion, who fought all the way into Baghdad, handed out textbooks in a Baghdad girls’ school. While simultaneously fighting guerrillas, Army officers do their best to transition from combat leaders to city managers often saying as they do so, “I’m doing the best I can, but I don’t know how to do this, I don’t have a manual. You got a manual?” (Packer, 2003) In the process of transitioning between combat and nation-building, cultural misunderstandings and a lack of understanding about insurgency has added fuel to the fires of the Iraqi insurgency along the way. While the Army has some limited peacekeeping experience (e.g. the Balkans and Kosovo), the Army has formally taught its Soldiers as much about nation-building activities and other cultures as it has about insurgencies: next to nothing.
The solution lies in what President Kennedy urged forty years ago, authors Krepinevich and Baritz wrote about in the 1980s, and scholars such as cultural anthropologist Christopher Varhola call for today: the U.S. Army must teach about irregular warfare and cultural awareness throughout its professional military education system (PME), at its service and branch schools, and to its units. In addition, initial entry recruits at One Station Unit Training and at professional development schools for Noncommissioned Officers should also include receiving education and training on how to combat insurgencies and why understanding cultures matters. At a recent hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, retired Major General Robert Scales argued,

This cultural wall must be torn down. Lives depend on it. Every young Soldier should receive extensive cultural and language instruction... The success of counterinsurgency operations depends much more on the agility of mind than on any other single factor, and it’s the absence of this agility of mind that I suspect constrains us most today in Iraq... (Hedges, 2004)

Irregular warfare needs to be taught throughout the officer and NCO professional military education system. Each level of instruction should be tailored to the level of understanding about insurgencies needed at the Soldier’s specific level of responsibility.

For example, at the officer basic courses and NCO primary and basic leadership development courses, instruction should be integrated that will trace the evolution of American counterinsurgency doctrine in America’s small wars from the 1800’s to present. Valuable
lessons can be re-learned from the American Indian Wars, the Banana Wars, the Rio Coco Patrol, and El Salvador to cite a few examples (Sepp, 2003). At these officer and NCO basic courses, the focus should be on the tactical level, for it is the young lieutenants and junior NCOs who will combat the insurgents face to face in the field. Reading Mao Tse-Tung’s *On Guerrilla Warfare* should be mandatory. In addition, new or recurrent tactics, techniques, and procedures currently used by the insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan should also be taught and discussed in great detail.

At the Captains Career Course (formerly the Officer Advanced Course), the First Sergeant Course, and the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course for company grade leaders at the captain, master sergeant, and sergeant first class levels, a program of instruction covering irregular warfare should examine what such struggles have meant in operational terms for governments and guerrillas. There should be a focus on how armed, intra-state struggles are actually carried out, to include how they begin, evolve, and end, and why they succeed or fail. The case studies of Malaya and Vietnam present excellent examples. The interactive nature of the insurgent and counterinsurgent campaigns should be especially stressed (McCormick, 2004). This level of instruction further builds upon lessons taught in the basic courses. While the basic courses mainly focus on tactical level considerations at the team, squad, and platoon levels, the mid-career courses should build on these previous teachings and incorporate field and combat lessons learned, focusing on the tactical aspects of the platoon and company, as well as battalion operational
considerations, for senior NCO’s and captains will play pivotal roles as platoon and company leaders and as battalion staff officers.

For field grade officers at the Command and General Staff College and War Colleges and for sergeant majors at the Sergeant Majors Academy, material should be assigned that will help them to develop an analytical framework by which to understand the origins and dynamics of organized insurgent conflict. Special attention should be paid to a critical examination of the prevailing theories of social rebellion in order to derive a general theory of internal war that helps account for the social, political, and organizational dimensions of the struggle between political movements, non-state actors, and incumbent regimes. Once again, this instruction would build upon previous courses and should also incorporate current lessons learned at the strategic level (McCormick, 2004).

Additionally, understanding how to identify local social structures would be extremely beneficial to understanding conflict from new and different angles. Anthropology offers a way to study warfare and large-scale ethnic conflict as seen from the perspective of the participants and can help us gain an emic and not just an etic view. Most often American Soldiers do not comprehend why people in foreign countries behave and react the way they do. Similarly, Americans often fail to take into account cultural considerations when planning and executing military operations and, as a result, sometimes make more enemies than friends. Cultural awareness is extremely beneficial in three ways: it fosters better international relations, provides views from different perspectives, and
can greatly assist in knowing one’s enemy. Consequently, understanding other cultures is critical in the development of an adequate irregular warfare war plan - whether at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels.

Lieutenants and sergeants at the platoon level must know how to operate in and respect people from the various cultures that they will encounter on deployments. Often conducting squad and platoon patrols, junior leaders need a baseline of understanding about the people(s) with whom they are interacting. Small mistakes can have major consequences. Hence at the officer basic and NCO primary and basic leadership development courses, an instructional overview should be given on how to understand foreign cultures, with a focus on the cultures of potential “hot” spots. At ground level, if a small unit leader understands the social structure and inner workings of the local society and indigenous population, then he will be more likely to establish relations of trust as well as a better intelligence picture. Furthermore, case studies should be used to demonstrate how various societies perceive different issues.

Further case studies of various cultures should also be addressed at the Captains Career Course, the First Sergeant Course, and the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course. Here, the company leader must realize how his actions as a potential military mayor of an area during peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations can have dramatic effects and / or unintended consequences if he fails to properly read the region’s social landscape.

Likewise, at the Command and General Staff and War Colleges, and at the Sergeant Majors Academy, leaders
should learn to re-evaluate the salience of ethnic, cultural, and civilizational divides. Students should learn how a deeper look into social relations could better illuminate the actions of various ethnic groups. Thus, battalion, brigade, and division leaders could gain an upper hand in understanding why people engage in warfare elsewhere, and the ways current and potential enemies might think and act based on their ethnic, culture, and civilizational environment (Simons, 2004). Such knowledge could prove quite beneficial especially if competing groups can be used against each other.

In addition to officer and NCO education, recently enlisted Soldiers should also receive instruction on understanding other cultures. Examples can be drawn from the various differences within America’s own society as well as lessons learned from American Soldiers overseas. Soldiers could thus be taught that what are completely acceptable norms of behavior back home in Athens, Georgia may cause extreme discord in Mosul, Iraq. In the age of information warfare especially, one private’s actions in front of the camera can now have strategic consequences.

In addition to school house instruction, “contact teams” who have expertise in particular world regions should be formed. These teams would periodically visit units to keep them abreast of and current on overseas affairs and, more importantly, visit units prior to a deployment to conduct cultural awareness training for the specific region of deployment. In addition, the contact team should re-visit the unit prior to the unit’s re-deployment to collect and gather information to strengthen the contact team’s knowledge, pass on that information to
other units (especially the next unit scheduled to rotate in), and share the information with the school houses for possible updates to learning objectives and syllabi. Currently, Professor Barak Salmoni of the Naval Postgraduate School is heading such a program for Marine Corps units rotating to and from Iraq.

The military and its civilian constituents already contain more than enough qualified and suitable instructors within our ranks who can teach the material and lessons learned—many with combat and personal experience in foreign lands—such as anthropologists, interpreters who have dealt extensively in a foreign culture, expatriates, and professors grounded in irregular warfare, such as those teaching at the Naval Postgraduate School and the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School. In addition, many of the Army’s service schools already contain foreign officers. The Army could optimize their attendance by requiring foreign officers to be guest lecturers on their specific regional areas. Given the fact that the U.S. already supplements the income of foreign officers who attend U.S. military schools for a first rate education, the Army should also make it mandatory that upon their graduation the foreign officer must serve a minimum of two years as a liaison officer to a U.S. Army Battalion or Brigade, or as a foreign language instructor at a service school.

Retired General Anthony Zinni, former CENTCOM Commander, recently proposed something similar in his remarks to the Center of Defense Information’s board of directors. Zinni urges seeking the aid of Arab officers who have attended our schools, such as our command and
general staff colleges, and who not only speak English but who also already have a good working relationship with Americans. General Zinni’s argument is:

I’d put them on the planning staffs of these units, as advisors, as planners. If I’m a battalion commander down there in the middle of Fallujah or Najaf, I need more than some kid who happens to be of Arab descent and speaks Arabic that I dragged over there and probably doesn’t speak the dialect. I would like to have five or six of these guys that I went to school with, that I know, that would be there, that would be seconded there for me as planners, advisors, and to help me in these situations (2004).

Furthermore, when it comes to costs, retired Major General Scales argues that the military is spending billions of dollars on weapons, but just a pittance on educating its officers and Soldiers, especially on the foreign cultures and languages they encounter in places like Iraq and Afghanistan (Hedges, 2003). Sadly, the services have managed to spend billions in research for the Navy’s littoral combat ship experiment and $238 million a piece for each new F-22 fighter, yet in transforming the Army, we’ve forgotten to also transform the Soldier.

Even if the Army introduces new doctrinal literature, such as the new Field Manual-I 3-07, which is being derived from the Iraqi insurgency and engagements in the Global War on Terror, the task to educate and train officers and their men now both in the classroom and the field, remains (2004).

Training is an important element of doctrinal development. Hence, as previously discussed, the Army must also revamp its major training centers—the Joint Readiness Training Center and the National Training Center, both of
which are considered capstone events for a unit to be combat ready. NTC and JRTC should balance their focus of combating major conventional forces with combating irregular forces. They should also test Soldiers on their post-conflict stability and reconstruction skills, as well as how to deal with foreign cultures. These should be included as the measures for success.

Strong evidence suggests a need to better understand insurgencies and foreign cultures given the complex situations that have arisen today in both Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2003 at the Naval War College, Dr. Anna Simons chaired a study for the Secretary of Defense composed of fifteen intellectuals, senior service members, and academics to determine what should be the desired characteristics of the officer corps in 2030. The study looked at what should go into an officer’s education, training, and preparation to cultivate the right traits and attitudes needed for the military in 2030. The study also urges that changes need to start taking place now, for 2030 is too late.

Through educational reform, the Army can amend the deficit within its educational system enabling America’s modern day Soldier to become the kind of warrior-diplomat who will be able to successfully thwart an insurgency and read a foreign country’s “social landscape.” If the American Soldier is to be not just a “destroyer” but also a “diplomat”, he must be educated to know the terrain, his enemy, his own capabilities and limitations, and incorporate the indigenous population’s social landscape into his decision cycle.
VII. CONCLUSION

War is not an affair of chance. A great deal of knowledge, study, and meditation is necessary to conduct it well.

--- Frederick the Great, Instructions to His Generals, 1747, tr. Phillips, 1940

The Army will never win the cultural battle overseas, if the government, schools, and other supporting organizations do not first tear down their own cultural walls. At a recent hearing of the House Armed Services Committee, retired Major General Robert Scales made the point that:

This cultural wall must be torn down. Lives depend on it. Every young Soldier should receive extensive cultural and language instruction... The success of counterinsurgency operations depends much more on the agility of mind than on any other single factor, and it’s the absence of this agility of mind that I suspect constrains us most today in Iraq... (Hedges, 2004).

Interestingly, since 1798 the United States has been involved in 235 deployments of U.S. forces overseas, not including peace operations. Of those ventures, 5 were declared wars and 8 can be considered undeclared wars, while the remainder of our conflicts – 222 – were small wars, insurgencies, and counter-insurgencies (Harp, ND, p.7). Yet, given the preponderance and frequency of small wars versus large wars (222 vs. 13), our educational system remains configured to deal with the few and far between conventional wars rather then the much more common people’s war, or the kinds of struggles we are engaged in today in Afghanistan, Iraq, and for the foreseeable future.
Multiple first-hand accounts, like Varhola’s, or those conveyed by any one of a number of other service members, reporters, and eye witnesses provide solid anecdotal evidence suggesting a need for a better understanding of insurgencies and foreign cultures when dealing with the complex situations that have arisen in Afghanistan and Iraq. Soldiers no longer need to be trained just to kill, but rather have to be given some of the tools needed by warrior-diplomats whose individual actions can have far-reaching consequences not only on local and regional outcomes, but also on the world stage.

As America’s military is transformed to meet the threats of the 21st Century, the Army must also transform her Soldiers. Sadly, the Infantry squad’s Company Commander whose actions were mentioned at the beginning of this thesis didn’t have all the facts he needed, nor did the local population. Haroun didn’t understand the Soldiers’ actions nor were they able to explain anything to him. No one had learned the groundwork of fostering cross-cultural understanding and awareness prior to the incident. Yet, surely this could have been done had the Soldiers on our side been better prepared to think like warrior-diplomats, for the Army isn’t solely in the business of door kicking anymore—if it ever was.

A. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

For the purposes of this thesis, our focus has been strictly on the U.S. Army. An area of further research that should be explored is the education of the U.S. Marines, Airmen and Sailors. Although each branch is responsible for training its individual members, we believe that all of the services should be jointly discussing
cultural education. It is entirely possible that a combined effort, by an established Joint Task Force, could reduce research costs, eliminate conflicting information, as well as decrease the amount of time it would take to implement needed reforms.
# Enlisted Professional Military Education Continuum

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<td>PRIMARY</td>
<td>E-4 TO E-6</td>
<td>- PME Academies, Schools and Courses - Basic EJPME</td>
<td>OPERATIONAL</td>
<td>- Expand Tactical Warfighting Skills - Leadership and Management Skills in Service and MOS - Followership and Fundamentals of Leadership</td>
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<td>INTERMEDIATE</td>
<td>E7</td>
<td>- PME Academies, Schools and Courses - SEL JPME Course - Career EJPME</td>
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<td>E8 TO E9</td>
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<td>E9</td>
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<td>- Expand Interagency and Multinational Ops. - Introduction to Strategic Theater Level of Warfighting - Command Senior Enlisted Leadership</td>
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**Table 1.**

**Enlisted Professional Military Education Continuum (From: CJSCI 1805.01, 2004, p. A-A)**

**APPENDIX A.**

**ENLISTED PME**

- **Basic EJPME**
  - National Military Capabilities and Organization
  - Armed Forces Overview
  - Foundations of Joint Operations
  - National Strategic Overview

- **Senior EJPME**
  - National Military Capabilities and Organization
  - Armed Forces Overview
  - Foundations of Joint Operations
  - National Strategic Overview

- **CSEL CAPSTONE Course**
  - National Military Capabilities and Organization
  - Joint Doctrine
  - Svc, Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Capabilities
  - Defense Acquisition and Resourcing

- **Career EJPME**
  - National Military Capabilities and Organization
  - Armed Forces Overview
  - Foundations of Joint Operations
  - National Strategic Overview
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Table 2. OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION CONTINUUM (From: CUSCI 1800.01B, 2004, P. A-A)
LIST OF REFERENCES


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Peterson, Scott. (2003, September 8). “In Iraq, one incident, two stories; the killing of two Iraqi teens last week highlights the parallel realities that often attend US patrols.” *The Christian Science Monitor*.


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