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ISLAMIC INSURGENCY AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM IN THAILAND: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDED SOLUTION STRATEGY

by

Jeremiah C. Lumbaca

June 2005

Thesis Advisor: George Lober
Second Reader: Frank Giordano

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The Kingdom of Thailand currently faces internal and transnational Islamic insurgent threats that have the potential to disrupt Southeast Asian regional stability. As a Major Non-NATO Ally and the signatory of several bilateral and multilateral security arrangements with the US, Thailand has solidified itself as a security alliance partner whose stability and influence in Southeast Asia has become increasingly more important to the US and its War on Terror.

The purpose of this thesis is to provide a history and analysis of the Islamic insurgency and transnational terrorist operations that exist in Thailand today. Secondly, this thesis will highlight current Thai, US, and regional security initiatives and underscore policy deficiencies. Finally, this thesis will recommend a solution strategy necessary for the purge of radical Islamic insurgency and transnational terrorism in Thailand. By accepting current policy deficiencies and implementing the courses of action recommended in this thesis, the US and Thailand will both contribute to a greater Southeast Asian security.
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ISLAMIC INSURGENCY AND TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM IN THAILAND: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDED SOLUTION STRATEGY

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

The Kingdom of Thailand currently faces internal and transnational Islamic insurgent threats that have the potential to disrupt Southeast Asian regional stability. As a Major Non-NATO Ally and the signatory of several bilateral and multilateral security arrangements with the US, Thailand has solidified itself as a security alliance partner whose stability and influence in Southeast Asia has become increasingly more important to the US and its War on Terror.

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J.C. Lumbaca
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Kingdom of Thailand currently faces the threat of terrorism from two fronts: an internal Islamic insurgency in the southern provinces and increasing activity by transnational terrorists who use the Kingdom as a networking base for operations.

As a Major Non-NATO Ally and the signatory of several bilateral and multilateral security arrangements with the US, Thailand has solidified itself as a security alliance partner whose stability and influence in Southeast Asia has become increasingly important to the US and its War on Terror.

The purpose of this thesis is to provide a history and analysis of the Islamic insurgency and transnational terrorist operations that exist in Thailand today. Secondly, this thesis will highlight current Thai, US, and regional security initiatives and underscore policy deficiencies. Finally, this thesis will recommend a solution strategy necessary for the purging of both the radical Islamic insurgency and transnational terrorism in Thailand.

As with any effective counterinsurgency and anti-terrorism strategy, success lies in gaining the support of the most important mobilizable resource: the people. The insurgency that exists in Thailand is unique. Unlike the country’s Buddhist majority in a country of some 63 million people, the Muslim population in the provinces of the far south is closely tied to its Malaysian Islamic heritage. Underdevelopment, poverty, drug use, corrupt government officials, unemployment, violence, and lack of attention from the Buddhist national leadership in Bangkok have plagued this part of Thailand for decades and assist in fueling the insurgency there today.

Simultaneously, since the 1990s’ birth of al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian arm, Jemaah Islamiah (JI), transnational terrorists have found the Kingdom an attractive and convenient networking hub for weapons trading, financial transactions, front companies and charities, the recruitment of militant Islamic elements, and a planning base for terrorist operations.
Although there has been no direct connection made to date between the militant Islamic insurgency in the south of Thailand and JI, there have been numerous arrests, intelligence findings, and financial discoveries that indicate that such a relationship either exists or has the potential to develop.

The Thai government, in coordination with other countries in the region and the US, has made significant progress in the fight against terrorism since September 11, 2001. Yet, there are still obstacles to overcome. The government must more effectively address the legitimate Muslim grievances in the south, as well as the militant Islamic insurgency that exists there. The government must simultaneously address the fields of interest that continue to make Thailand an attractive safe-haven and planning base for transnational terrorists. Like many Southeast Asian nations, however, Thailand is not fully capable of better addressing these problems without international assistance.

This thesis will examine several areas of Thai and US policy that, if more fully developed, will effectively counter the threats that exist in the Kingdom and Southeast Asia. Several areas requiring improvement include counter-terrorism legislation, intelligence gathering and sharing, cultural awareness, immigration reforms, anti-corruption policies, police and military operations, and better security and stability activities in coordination with other Southeast Asian nations. In Thailand, the most critical areas requiring improvement are policies and actions aimed at gaining the support and trust of the local Islamic population.

With much of the world’s attention devoted to the wars in the Iraq and Afghanistan, a considerable security vacuum has been created in Southeast Asia. The creation of this vacuum has presented many new opportunities for terrorists and insurgents to plan, coordinate, and act more freely.

By accepting current policy deficiencies and implementing the courses of action recommended in this thesis, the US and Thailand will both contribute to a greater Southeast Asian security.
I. INTRODUCTION

...the American response to the war on terror may not be at all adequate in neutralizing the terror threat within Southeast Asia; in fact, it may even backfire. The embers of radical Islamist terrorism can only be doused by the adoption of a comprehensive approach that addresses a host of real or perceived social, economic, political and ultimately, ideological challenges.

-See Seng Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna (2004), Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Singapore

Relations between the U.S. and Thailand are strong and multi-faceted. Thailand is one of five U.S. Treaty Allies in Asia, and we have a close and active security relationship with the Thai. Thai troops fought alongside Americans in Korea and Vietnam. More recently, Thailand has provided critical support...for Operation Enduring Freedom [and Operation Iraqi Freedom].

...Thailand is our seventeenth-largest trading partner with two-way trade of about $20 billion. The U.S. is the second largest foreign investor in Thailand.

...Thailand has actively cooperated with us on all aspects of the war on terror.

-Matthew Daley (2003), Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

As demonstrated by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Daley’s testimony before the House International Relations Committee in 2003, the US has a significant national interest in the stability of Thailand. Americans and Thais have fostered an intimate relationship that encompasses all aspects of international policy from economics to politics to the spilling of blood alongside one another in war.
Since the 1960s, Thailand has experienced and effectively dealt with secessionist movements in its predominately Muslim southern provinces. By the late 1980s, the problem seemed to be eliminated for the most part. However, following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US, militant Muslim movements around the world have gained new momentum. Such is the case in Thailand as well. The reinvigorated insurgency that exists in Thailand today is once again threatening stability throughout the country and the region. Between January 2004 and early 2005, more than 600 people were killed in incidents throughout Thailand’s southernmost provinces. Unlike Thailand’s Buddhist majority, the Muslim culture in the provinces of the far south is closely tied to its Malaysian Islamic heritage. Underdevelopment, poverty, drug use, corrupt government officials, violence, and lack of attention from the country’s Buddhist government leaders in Bangkok have plagued this part of Thailand for decades. The result of these suppressed regional troubles, in concert with the new global emergence of Islamic militancy, has given a renewed intensity to an insurgency that was believed to be eliminated less than a decade ago.

Along with increased Islamic fundamentalism inside the borders of nations around the world, there has also emerged a new era of transnational terrorist networking. This terrorist networking, fuelled by a globalization that has reached all corners of the planet, transcends the borders of sovereign nations and links many organizations that were previously isolated from one another. Following a global awareness of Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda (AQ) (“the base”) network as the primary terrorist threat today, evidence of other AQ-linked networks has emerged in various regions of the world. The transnational terrorist organization known as Jemaah Islamiah (JI) (“Islamic Community”) has emerged as the premier AQ-linked network in Southeast Asia. In 2002 the large-scale terrorist attacks of JI began with the bombing of the Bali nightclub that left 202 dead, followed by the 2003 bombing of the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta that left 11 dead and 150 injured. Unfortunately Thailand has found itself victim of the existence of such terrorist organizations with the discovery of financial networks,
front companies, arms smugglers, and terrorist operatives inside the borders of the Kingdom. In August 2003, the terrorist leader Hambali (Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin), JI’s operations chief and main link to al Qaeda, was captured in Ayuthya, Thailand. According to CIA reports after the capture, JI had plans to attack US-managed hotels in Bangkok as well as commercial airliners by way of Bangkok’s vulnerable international airport (Simon, 2003a).

As a result of the unique situation that exists today, the Kingdom of Thailand currently faces the threat of terrorism from two fronts, an internal Islamic insurgency in the southern provinces, as well as a network of transnational terrorists who use the Kingdom as a networking base for operations.

Thailand has the difficult task of countering both the internal and transnational threats that exists within its borders. Thailand can not, however, counter these threats by itself. Granted, the US and other allies already devote a considerable amount of money, people, intelligence, training, and other resources to assist Thailand in its fight to establish and maintain security and stability. The environment that exists today, however, demands that Thailand reexamine its approach to dealing with the threats that exist there, while the US, likewise, reevaluates its methods and means of supporting the Kingdom.

A. PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to provide a history and analysis of the Islamic insurgency and transnational terrorist operations that exist in Thailand today. Secondly, this thesis will highlight current Thai, US, and regional security initiatives and underscore policy deficiencies. Finally, this thesis will recommend a solution strategy necessary for the purge of radical Islamic insurgency and transnational terrorism in Thailand.

Chapter II of this thesis provides a background history of Thailand’s Malay Muslims as well as the militant Islamic organizations that exist in the Kingdom. Chapter III analyzes Southeast Asia’s transnational terrorist organizations and their operations in Thailand. Chapter IV explores the implications of a link
between Southeast Asia’s primary transnational threat – Jemaah Islamiah – and Thailand’s southern insurgency. It should be noted that the purpose of this chapter is not to prove that there is a direct link between the two threats, but rather to explore the likelihood of such a relationship developing. Chapter V analyzes current Thai and US anti-terrorism policies and denotes policy deficiencies. Chapter VI provides solution strategy options for the problems associated with both transnational terrorism and southern insurgency. And chapter seven provides a summary conclusion to the thesis.

B. RELEVANCY

...designation of Thailand as an MNNA [Major Non-NATO Ally] represents an affirmation of the importance the US places on the US-Thai alliance relationship in the 21st century. Thailand has been a treaty ally of the United States for nearly 50 years, since the 1954 Manila Pact. The alliance partnership has continued to expand over the years. (“Major Non-NATO Ally status for Thailand,” 2003) (See also Appendix E)

Since 1945, Thailand has been a close U.S. ally. The two nations have entered into several bilateral and multilateral arrangements including the 1954 Manila Pact and the 1962 Rusk-Thanat agreement, both of which solidified a long-term bilateral security alliance. The U.S-Thai alliance granted the United States use of Thai military facilities during the Vietnam War. Additionally, Thailand’s anti-communist stance and geographic proximity to Vietnam were vital to the United States during the Cold War, and its current support in the “War on Terror” has once again united the two nations. (Garcia, 2004)

As an MNNA, Treaty Ally, a supporter of the US War on Terror, and the partner in a $20+ billion/year two-way trade relationship with the US, Thailand is a nation that holds significant US economic, political, social, and security interests. Thailand also plays as a key role in the regional stability of all of Southeast Asia, an area in which the United States has significant interests. While there are several countries in Southeast Asia that invite only limited US involvement into their national affairs, there also exist strong US allies, such as Thailand and the Philippines, which allow and request cooperation from the US.
Given the opportunities that these allies present in allowing US assistance into their countries, it is in the best interest of the US to engage these friendly nations with all elements of statecraft. Just as in the Philippines, Thailand requires an improved US engagement strategy at all levels of government to not only promote the political, economic, and security interests of the US in the region, but to also allow for increased worldwide effectiveness in the US’s fight against global terrorism.

With much of the world’s attention devoted to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, a considerable security vacuum has been created in Southeast Asia. The creation of this vacuum has presented many new opportunities for terrorists and insurgents to plan, coordinate, and act much more freely than before. It is critical to regional and global security that the proper US attention and resources be committed with equal and appropriate proportionality around the world. Such a commitment will assist in protecting US interests abroad, protecting our ally nations such as Thailand, and mitigating Southeast Asian regional threats in the US War on Terror (WOT).

There is already a considerable amount of literature written about the more well-known terrorist organizations that exist throughout Southeast Asia. These groups include Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiah, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Abu Sayaaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines, Malaysia’s Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM), the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Indonesia, and others. This thesis provides specific insight into the internal and transnational insurgent organizations and their operations in Thailand. The effects of these organizations and operations in the Kingdom have already proven capable of affecting Southeast Asian regional stability in many ways, as will be described throughout this paper.

C. RESOURCES AND DEFINITIONS

The information used to support this thesis was derived from multiple research sources. In addition to open source documents, a great deal of
information came directly from academic and official government documents provided by both Thai and US agencies. The most accurate and up-to-date information, however, came from interviews and meetings conducted in Thailand with academic professionals from Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, Royal Thai military officers, media representatives, and US government officials from various agencies.

Because the issues of terrorism and insurgency in Thailand have worsened exponentially since the beginning of 2004, a comprehensive, English-language publication focused solely on Thailand’s most recent problems does not exist. As a result, a great deal of information about the problems in the Kingdom, especially in the southern provinces, comes from ongoing media coverage of the situation. Because they are media sources, all attempts have been made to cite only facts since there is admittedly a great deal of journalistic sensationalism present in the writing.

This thesis is an unclassified document. While there is a certain amount of classified information related to the insurgency in Thailand, most of that information is secured simply because it is politically sensitive or controversial. With regard to the substance and details of the insurgency itself, however, this thesis is representative of all research conducted by the author.

A note about definitions and names used in this thesis is also necessary. While western writing formally addresses individuals by their surnames, the same is not always true in Thai and Asian culture. For example, Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra is often referred to by his given name, Thaksin. Depending on the context used in various parts of this thesis, some Thai people are therefore referred to by their given names and not their surnames. This is in complete agreement with acceptable Thai culture and does not imply any disrespect whatsoever.

The use of the terms “insurgent” and “terrorist” in this thesis must be clarified at this point. The “War on Terror” is unfortunately an ambiguous concept. The situation in the world today is, perhaps, better understood as a
global insurgency. The enemy is the insurgent. Very often, the insurgent uses terrorism as one tactic among several to achieve broader strategic goals. It should therefore be understood that we, the free world, are fighting a global counterinsurgency, primarily against Islamic fundamentalists, who wish to establish alternative governments (governed by Sharia law) in a given region (such as an established Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia or a re-established Islamic caliphate in the Middle East) or country.

The CIA’s *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency* supports this logic with the following definition of insurgency:

> Insurgency is a protracted political-military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. Insurgent activity—including guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and political mobilization (such as propaganda, recruitment, front and covert party organization, and international activity) is designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy. The common denominator of most insurgent groups is their desire to control a particular area. This objective differentiates insurgent groups from purely terrorist organizations, whose objectives do not include the creation of an alternative government capable of controlling a given area or country (Central Intelligence Agency, n.d., p.2).

There are, therefore, very few organizations that fit the description of a terrorist organization. The simplest example of this concept is Al Qaeda (AQ). This organization does not kill solely for the purpose of killing. Instead, AQ and Osama Bin Laden himself have announced religious, political, and geographic goals that the network hopes to achieve. Terrorism is just one tactic used by AQ to achieve such goals, and as a result the organization should more appropriately be labeled as an insurgent one.

This thesis will make it clear that an insurgency is taking place in southern Thailand today. The majority of Southern Thailand’s Muslims, including Islamic leaders in the region, do not support the violence or secession. Those individuals and organizations that do support the militant activities, however,
embody the definition of insurgency by taking part in activities “designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy.”

The term transnational “terrorist” is used in this thesis to refer to radical Islamic individuals and/or organizations that support or participate in regional or global insurgent activities that transcend national boundaries. While the term transnational “terrorist” would more appropriately be labeled transnational “insurgent” as per the definition above (since they use terrorism as one tactic among many), the term “terrorist” is nevertheless used in this thesis to maintain consistency with the majority of the policies and publications cited throughout this paper.
II. OVERVIEW OF THAILAND’S INTERNAL ISLAMIC INSURGENCY

A. THAILAND’S MUSLIMS

Ninety percent of the Kingdom of Thailand’s 63 million people are Buddhist. Muslim communities in Thailand are mostly located in the south, along the border with Malaysia. 3.2 million Muslims constitute less than five percent of Thailand’s total population. Muslims, however, are the majority in the three southern provinces of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat. Muslims account for 1.3 million of the 1.7 million people in the southern region. Compared to the majority of Buddhist Thais, southern Malay Muslims in Thailand differ greatly in their language, religion, and culture. Most Muslims are Sunnis. In the southern provinces, 10% of the total Muslim population is Wahabi, a very strict brand of fundamental Islam – the same brand followed by Osama bin Laden.

For centuries, the southern part of what is now Thailand was a part of the former Kingdom of Pattani, which identified three main pillars of the Muslim community that still exist today. The first pillar is the belief in traditional virtues and the greatness of the Kingdom of Pattani (Pattani Darussalam). Second is the identification with the Malay race, a characteristic still evident today in the frequent cross-border contact with ethnic kin in Malaysia’s Kelantan province. Third is a religious orientation based on Islam (Chalk, 2001, p.243).

Technically, Thailand is the only Southeast Asian country never to have been colonized (although many countries have occupied or used part of Thailand at various times over history – such as Japan during WWII). Siam (the former name of the general Thailand region), brought the northern reaches of the Kingdom of Pattani under its rule in the late 1700s. Eventually, Thailand began to exert strong influence over the entire Malay Peninsula, and had it not been for British colonialism in Malaysia, Thailand would have likely continued to dominate much of the population on the peninsula. In 1902 Thailand turned over all the Malay states to British control. However, the current Thai-Malaysian border,
which was drawn along with the signing of an Anglo-Thai treaty in 1909, left three provinces within Thailand that had a majority Muslim/Malay population: Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat Provinces. Other southern provinces, such as Songkhla and Satun, have large Muslim populations as well (See Figure 1).

![Figure 1. The Southern Provinces of Thailand](image-url)

Since the early 1900s, there have been several insurgencies in Thailand – most related to political movements lead by the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). Other insurgencies have been motivated by Islamic secessionism in the south. Over the course of several decades, the Thai military gained valuable experience in the conduct of counter-insurgency as a result of being surrounded by countries experiencing civil wars, such as Myanmar (Burma), Cambodia,
Laos, and Malaysia. Thailand also fought its own successful counter-insurgency against 12,000 CPT rebels in the 1960s and 1970s.

Today, insurgency in the south has again resurfaced with far more violence than seen before. The cause of today’s Islamic militancy in the south is a complex one. As Doctor Panitan Wattanayagorn from Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok has said, “In order to understand the problems in Thailand’s south today, we must look to the past” (2004). For 150 years leading up to 1932, Bangkok was ruled under an absolute monarchy. On June 24, 1932, a coup d’etat was led by a group of military officers known as the “Promoters”. The Promoters gained control of Bangkok and called upon the king to agree to the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, which he agreed to. The result of the 1932 constitution was that from its inception until the late 1980s, there was both internal and external pressure to unite the provinces of Thailand into one nation. Correspondingly, government policy changed from one of relative accommodation to one aimed at strong national unity.

In 1938, under Prime Minister Luang Phibunsongkhram, the Thai government began its most aggressive nationalist programs to date. Under Phibun in 1939, the most visible aspect of nationalism was a change of the name from Siam to Thailand in order to show a distancing from China (the name Siam first appears historically as the name other countries, including China and Cambodia, gave to the Thai-speaking peoples of the Chaophraya valley).

This was a period of mass nationalism, not just elite nationalism, a social and political phenomenon that was more nearly egalitarian in its implications than it could have been earlier under a monarchist psychology. In decades to come, when Thai were to speak of this first Phibun era and use the pronoun we, they were to signify a degree of common participation in their nation’s life that was sharply distinguished from their experience of earlier decades (Wyatt, 2003, p.241).

Phibun, like many of his successors, was a military officer-turned Prime Minister. For several decades to follow, military leaders held the reigns of control over Thailand since no civilian group, in fact, had the cohesion and ability to
govern as effectively as the military. Also peculiar to this era was that from 1932-57, Thai royalty was physically absent for various reasons, including falling-outs with the military. As author and Cornell University professor David Wyatt writes, this was “a most unusual period, dominated not by a king but rather a handful of the Promoters [a group of military officers] of the 1932 coup. It was they who had to face and surmount the grave dangers of a world of warfare and great power-politics…” (2003, p.234).

Thailand’s history since 1932 has included 16 constitutions (the most recent in 1997) and 17 military coups (Macan-Markar, 2004). Since the Kingdom became a constitutional monarchy, the military has played a prominent role in government control and politics. Under Phibun and other military officers-turned-Prime Minister following him, the country became modernized and united in order to confront external threats. But at the same time, the nation was weakened internally. Individual cultures within the country lost their identity and by the 1950s and 1960s Thailand saw a strong emergence of communists and separatist groups. In response, military action was used with great aggressiveness and all uprisings against the government were suppressed.

According to Panitan, by the 1980s the government in Bangkok once again changed its strategy, this time to a more flexible, three-pronged approach: military operations were shifted to political priorities; economic flexibility allowed for self-sufficient economic associations; and government policies acknowledged and observed political rivalries among the security forces in the south. By 1988 the government felt that the Thai south had essentially returned to normalcy. The combined military command that had effectively dealt with southern unrest was disbanded. The aftermath of the military being in the south too long had, however, taken its toll. When the army withdrew, Members of Parliament (MP) took control of the southern region. Thai students who were studying in areas overseas, including the Middle East, returned to the region. The same happened in other countries around Southeast Asia as a new openness and political freedom was experienced. Along with this new openness came more open
borders. At the time of this new freedom of movement, there was also more regional travel between Thailand, Burma, China, Indonesia, and Malaysia than in the past. Radical leaders and their organizations entered the south freely, and over time the key leaders of militant organizations became well known figures in the southern provinces. As Panitan describes, the new leaders in the south were now those who had previous military training and/or were respected former members of separatist organizations. These men took up important positions in education and other agencies. In some cases, they were elected into government office. The national leadership in Bangkok felt that a positive transition was taking place: They believed that that the former “trouble makers” were now mainstream and pacified. The reality, as Panitan recalls, was that many of the former separatists were not, in fact, converts to mainstream political ideas. As the 1980s drew to a close and the 1990s progressed, the country saw economic development on a level never before seen. Money from the government flowed to all reaches of the country, including the south (to a lesser extent).

More money from the government was given to local schools at this time as well. The problem, however, was that the government did not concern itself with regulation of the southern Islamic schools. The result was that separatist leaders, who could influence daily life and education in the south among the Muslim communities, used the opportunity at hand to plant the seeds of radical fundamentalism (Wattanayagorn, 2004). Following the global expansion of radical Islamic militancy that occurred after September 11, 2001, fundamentalists around the world, including Thailand, took advantage of the opportunity to act. Since that time, the south has been witness to a new stream of bombings, assassinations, arson attacks, and shootings.

B. MUSLIM GRIEVANCES AND THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE

There are several reasons why the Islamic secessionist campaigns waged since the 1970s in Thailand resulted in very little success. In addition to effective
Thai/Malaysian police efforts against militants along the joint border, there was
never, in fact, a comprehensive, large-scale repression of Muslims in the
Kingdom. Additionally, Thailand’s rapid economic development increased the
standard of living for everyone, including the Muslims in the south, to a limited
degree. Finally, since Thailand’s new constitution was enacted in 1997,
government decentralization has allowed greater local autonomy, including more
administrative freedom granted to Muslim leaders in the southern provinces
(Abuza, 2003b, pp.78-79)

Thai Muslims, however, do in fact have many legitimate grievances that
the Thai government is currently attempting to address. The government’s
ineffective response to such grievances has only inflamed the situation. To
complicate matters, economic development in the south is markedly less
progressed than in the rest of the country. According to the government’s
National Economic and Social Development Board, Muslim communities
dominate two of the four poorest provinces in the country (Abuza, 2003 b, p.79).
A January 2005 US Report For Congress indicated that the southern region “has
lagged behind the rest of Thailand in economic development and contributes only
1.4 percent of the country’s GDP” (Chanlett-Avery, 2005, p.3).

As Tan and Ramakrishna from the Institute of Defense and Strategic
Studies in Singapore have pointed out,

The lack of central governmental coverage over its remote southern
part suggests that Thailand may in some respects demonstrate
elements of state weakness as well. Moreover, any attempt on the
part of Bangkok to highlight the terrorist problem in the south could
inadvertently restrict the flow of foreign investment [and tourism]
into the country. Stated differently, the common dilemma
confronting these weak Southeast Asian states [such as Thailand]
is essentially a matter of poor governance (2004, p.97).

There are several basic grievances that southern Malay Muslims have.
The primary one is the fact that despite the technical claim that Thailand is a
secular state, it in reality is not. Every aspect of Thai government is permeated
with Buddhism. This fact can easily be seen by observing any government
function or speech or by entering any government building – all three will contain some homage paid to Buddha. The fact that Buddhism is officially embraced is in itself a problem since other cultures, such as the Malay Muslims in the south, feel somewhat alienated. Mr. Don Pathan is an American citizen with a Thai Muslim family lineage. He currently serves as a Regional Desk Editor for *The Nation*, one of Bangkok’s English-speaking newspapers. Pathan’s unique cultural background has granted him access to Malay Muslim people and organizations in southern Thailand that are otherwise unapproachable by others, especially government officials. According to him, southern Malay Muslims want nothing more than recognition of their culture and heritage. Most Muslims today do not want secession leading to a free state. Most, according to Pathan, also do not have a problem with Buddhism or the Bangkok government; they only have a problem with the government’s suppression of the Muslim culture (2004b). In addition to the dominance of Buddhism throughout the Thai government, there is also a basic lack of knowledge of Muslim culture on the part of the Thai government. This was evidenced routinely throughout 2004 when security forces would use male soldiers search women, walk into Mosques with their shoes on, or use dogs to search the houses of Thai Muslims. In each case, the security forces were violating basic principles of Muslim culture and religion. While it is not realistic to expect the Thai government to diminish in any way its sponsorship of Buddhism and Buddhist culture, a greater acceptance and acknowledgement of other religions and cultures by the government in Bangkok is necessary.

According to Doctor Surachart Bamrungsuk from Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, officials truly need better cultural understanding. Surachart acknowledges, however, that the Thai government is slowly making changes to realize these cultural differences. He describes how in 1923, Thai King Rama VI issued a Muslim cultural manual to the Thai civil servants serving in Southern Thailand (Bamrungsuk, 2004). The Thai government today is slowly creating and making use of similar manuals. Compounding the problem in the south,
however, is that provincial and local civil administration and security forces, including police, are staffed through national recruitment policies. More to the point, local citizens are not hired for police, military, and civil administration positions throughout the south. The result is that not only are these officials often uneducated on the Muslim culture they encounter on a daily basis, but they are more importantly unfamiliar with the local populace that is the critical component to solving the problems of the south.

In November 2004, the Thai government announced that it would hire 3,000 local villagers to augment the police forces in the south. Staffing of police had become increasingly more difficult in the troubled region because many officers transferred out of the south because of the continued violence. The new initiative to use locals included budgetary allocation as well as planning for additional police stations. Officers who performed well and did not create problems were to be considered for “promotion” to the regular police force (“Thailand to launch,” 2004). While a program that includes local people in security operations is absolutely necessary in the south, it still remains to be seen whether or not the Thai government is truly committed to making such a program work. A long-term program that addresses training, funding, legal authority, and recruitment to sustain the force will all require approval and implementation by the government for such an initiative to be effective over time.

An additional problem with the current organizational structure is that the local governors in the southern provinces do not have control over the security forces being employed in their provinces. According to Dr. Surachart, this disconnect has created a situation where the activities of the civil administration and the security forces are generally uncoordinated (Bamrungsuk, 2004).

Another highly-criticized decision by Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was his call for the 2002 disbandment of the Civil Police Military (CPM) 43 organization in the south. CPM43 was a joint task force that served as the focal point for intelligence and information gathering. It also served as a point of contact through which locals in the south could contact the government and
make the population’s issues known. Since the abolishment of the CPM, southerners report that they are confused by the current array of police, military, and Para-military forces in the south. Locals do not know who to contact in order to not only make grievances heard, but to report suspected or known insurgent activity as well. When overall control of southern Thailand operations was taken out of the hands of the Royal Thai Army (RTA), many administrative and intelligence mechanisms simply ceased to exist. Informants were exposed after the shift in power, and as a result many were killed (Pathan, D., 2004b). This shift also contributed to a break in trust between the people and the security forces. Since the police took control of the south’s security, they have had, unfortunately, to start at the beginning of the trust and network-building process.

Southern Islamic leaders have also shared their resentment toward the government for not involving them in helping to solve the problems of the south. Despite issues of mistrust that may exist, it would seem appropriate that the government be more creative and use the influential Muslim institutions in place to help solve the problems that are embedded with the Muslim people. Instead, many suspected Islamic institutions are targeted for government disbandment. One example of this includes the website for PULO, one of the southern insurgent organizations. While the government continuously tries to shut down the website, it usually reappears in a different location on the internet (Pathan, D., 2004b). Some Muslims argue that the government might have better results if it instead tried to support the site and regulate its content. The same goes for the southern Islamic schools, or *Pondoks*. The Thai government claims that many of the insurgents in the south are teachers and students from these schools. While that claim has proven to be true with the arrests of several insurgents in the south, over-regulation or simply shutting down the schools is likely to further complicate problems.

The Thai government is slowly acknowledging and addressing many of the issues described here. This is a time of transition for both the government and southern Muslims. As Doctor Panitan states, there is always a
slowness/weakness in transitional periods. What makes this transitional period most dangerous, however, is the fact that the timing of the current situation is highly conducive to the intervention of international terrorists (Wattanayagorn, 2004). Up until now, it appears that transnational terrorists, such as the Al-Qaeda affiliated Jemaah Islamiah (JI) in Southeast Asia, have been relatively unsuccessful in establishing a foothold among the Muslims that exist in southern Thailand. This is partly due to the fact that the Malay Muslims in the Thai south have their own unique culture and history. They do not necessarily want to become subordinate to an alien organization like JI. But with rapid globalization, there is no doubt that southern Muslims are fully aware of the activities of JI and AQ. Out of the large population that is aware of the global Islamic insurgency that is happening around the world, it would not be unrealistic to expect a certain percentage of the southern population to be receptive to JI.

Pathan agrees that this is a very sensitive time regarding Muslim influences from outside of Thailand. He cautions that the government must devote serious time and resources to development and reform in the south. “While most Muslims in the south don’t have an ‘us and them,’ ‘Muslims and Buddhists,’ attitude”, Pathan says, “Things appear to slowly be changing.” Monks, civilians, and tourists in the south are being targeted and killed – all of which is a first for Thailand. The situation is now becoming “ripe” for the introduction of a more extreme, fundamentalist influence (Pathan, D., 2004b).

As Doctor Surachart concludes, “the people in the south only want three things: good work, good payment, and a good life” (Bamrungsuk, 2004). Without addressing such basic needs and grievances as these, the Thai government is likely to see things become worse before they get better.

C. THAILAND’S MILITANT ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS

Despite the fact that the majority of Malay Muslims do not support the violence and insurgency in the south of Thailand today, the fact remains that there are numerous militant Islamic organizations that are behind the almost-
daily killings, bombings, and arson attacks there. These organizations operate with varying degrees of success. The exact motivations for violence among the groups vary as well. The Thai government has often speculated in the past and present that the militants in the south are nothing more than criminals, some seeking political influence, much like a mafia. Secession has always been a popular theme in the south, and another possibility is that the southern population does not necessarily want to secede but is instead resorting to violence in order to force the government in Bangkok to devote adequate resources and time needed to develop the south. And yet another explanation for the violence is that the population is being manipulated by the global Islamic insurgency that calls for a separate, pan-Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia. This later speculation implies that there may be some dimension of transnational terrorist presence influencing the militant activities in the south, a topic that is addressed in detail in Chapter IV.

Regardless of the motivations for violence, the simple fact remains that the organizations in the south today have systematically designed several major attacks against the government in 2004 alone that have left several hundred people dead. In January 2004, an Insurgent raid against a southern Army depot left several soldiers dead, some with their throats slit, and over 300 weapons stolen. In April of 2004, a coordinated insurgent attack on security force outposts throughout the southern provinces resulted in the death of over 100 insurgents and several security force personnel. February 2005 saw Thailand’s first car bomb explosion. In addition to these major attacks, there have been killings on almost a daily basis since January 2004. While targets were initially security force personnel and government officials, the focus has since shifted to include tourists, Buddhist monks, and businessmen. The nature of the insurgency in the south is changing.

According to Dr. Zachary Abuza, a well-respected expert on Southeast Asian terrorism, some of the older separatist organizations with a history of violence are no longer active in the Thai south and have already “died out.”
Abuza claims that, contrary to what the Thai government asserts, old organizations like PULO and BRN (both described later in this chapter) do not pose a threat today. In contrast, he claims that newer organizations, such as the Gerakan Mujahideen Pattani (GMIP) (described later in this chapter) and other radical manifestations are truly the groups instrumental in Thailand’s current insurgency. Abuza also believes that it is these new groups that do in fact have links to the Jemaah Islamiah transnational terrorist network (described in Chapter III) (“Terror warning: Gov’t blind to JI link,” 2005). Listed below are several organizations that have established themselves over the years as contributors to violence in the south. They are categorized according to what Abuza might call “The Old” and “The New.” Because the current activities of each of these groups are difficult to discern, all organizations are listed here, regardless of history or the possibility of being obsolete.

1. “The Old”

Two well known radical groups in Thailand are the PULO and New PULO (Pattani United Liberation Organization). PULO has been conducting secessionist activities since the 1960s. Peter Chalk from the RAND Corporation has provided the following description of the group:

PULO’s ideology is based on the UBANGTAPKEKEMA, an acronym derived from 
_Ugama, Bangsa, Tanach, Air, and Perikemanusiaan_ (Religion, Race/Nationalism, Homeland, and Humanitarianism). Integral to this concept is recognition of the need for a long-term strategy to prepare for the goals of secession. To this end, PULO has placed priority on improving the standard of education among the southern Malay population as well as fostering local political consciousness and national sentiment.

The group sanctions violence as part of its secessionist struggle and recognizes the need to intensify international publicity on the plight of Pattani’s Malay–Muslims. Militant insurgent actions are carried out by a separate armed wing known as the Pattani United Liberation Army (PULA), which has claimed responsibility for several bomb and arson attacks against government establishments in the south (Chalk, 2001, p.243).
In 1995 the New PULO emerged as a break-off faction that has more consistently conducted operations in pursuit of Pattani self-autonomy with much less physical violence inflicted on the Thai population. By limiting the scale of violence aimed at human beings, the New PULO, perhaps, is attempting to establish a greater image of legitimacy.

The New PULO has also demonstrated a greater awareness to conserve limited resources. The group relies on young drug addicts to conduct more rudimentary operations on a consistent basis, as compared to PULO which conducts rather large, dramatic attacks quite infrequently. In the event that a New PULO member is captured by authorities, there is also a much smaller chance of the group’s security being compromised by young, uninformed drug addicts. Thai authorities estimate that the NEW PULO pays its operators approximately 500baht (US$12.50) “to carry out basic sabotage attacks such as torching bus depots or bombing bridges” (Chalk, 2001, p.243).

PULO and NEW PULO have been unwilling, for the most part, to coordinate their activities because of their differences in operational outlooks.

Nonetheless, the organizations did agree to form a tactical alliance in mid-1997 in an attempt to refocus national and regional attention on the “southern question.” Operating under the name of “Bersatu” (Solidarity), the two Pattani groups carried out a series of coordinated attacks (codenamed “Falling Leaves”) aimed at killing off state workers, law enforcement personnel, local government officials, school teachers, and other perceived symbols of Thai Buddhist repression. Between August 1997 and January 1998, no less than 33 separate attacks were carried out as part of this effort, resulting in nine deaths, several dozen injuries, and considerable economic damage” (Chalk, 2001, p.243).

In early 1998, many PULO/NEW PULO leaders were arrested during Thai/Malaysian police raids. The key leaders captured were: Abdul Rohman Bazo, the chairman of New PULO’s political kasdan wing; Haji Maer Yala, senior assistant to Bazo; Haji Da-oh Thanam, the Supreme Commander of New PULO’s Operational Wing; and Hayi Sama Ae Thanam, PULO’s military leader.
Some Thai government officials claim that PULO and NEW PULO are not as active as before since the arrests of the key leaders in 1998.

In May 2003, however, PULO openly boasted that Thai security forces were “falling like leaves” as Muslims fought to free the south from Bangkok’s rule. Lukman B. Lima, PULO Deputy President, charged that Bangkok illegally incorporated the southern provinces into Thailand 100 years ago and now ruled it with colonial repression and crimes against humanity in the area (“Thailand Islamic insurgency,” 2004).

In addition to PULO and New PULO, there are several other organizations that support insurgent activity throughout Thailand’s southern provinces. GlobalSecurity.org, which references the USCINCPAC Virtual Information Center, has analyzed the predominant radical Islamic organizations in southern Thailand. Unless other specific references are cited, the following details of these Islamic organizations are credited to GlobalSecurity.org’s research titled “Thailand Islamic Insurgency” (2004).

**Barisan National Pember-Basan Pattani (BNPP, sometimes referred to as BIPP).** This separatist organization was formed in 1959 and had actually ceased activities until early 2002, when it was believed to be involved in the resurgence of violence in the south. The group is actually headquartered in northern Malaysia and actively participates in Malaysian politics.

**Barasi Revolusi Nasional (BRN).** Since its formation in March 1960, the group has since split into three separate factions as a result of internal ideological differences. The first faction, the BRN Coordinate, has recently been inactive in Thailand but is reportedly carrying out political activity in Malaysia. The second faction, the BRN Congress chaired by Rosa Burako, has mainly focused on military-type attacks in the south. The third faction, the BRN Uram, previously headed by the late Hajji Abdul Karim, has emphasized political and religious progress. Among the three factions, the BRN Congress is considered the most
operational and militarily active. Headquartered in Malaysia, the BRN Congress has consistently carried out political and military activities in the southern border provinces.

2. “The New”

*Mujahideen Pattani Movement* [BNP]. The goal of the Muhahideen Pattani is to consolidate many of the smaller insurgent organizations existing throughout the southern provinces. Since its establishment in 1985 in Northern Malaysia, the group has focused on personal education and political reform work. Some of the BNPs leadership consists of elements that split from the BIPP.

*Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP).* The GMIP, also known as the Pattani Islamic Mujahideen Movement, or the Pattani Islamic Holy Warriors Movement, is considered by some to be the only significant armed insurgency currently operating in the south today. Its leaders were influenced by the Afghanistan war [against the Soviets] and the international jihadi movement that sprang from it in the 1990s. GMIP leader Nasori Saesaeng, also know as Ae Wae Keleh after his home village of Keleh in Bajoh District of Narathiwat Province, fought in Afghanistan in the early 1990s. According to Royal Thai Police intelligence sources, Nasori met and operated with Nik Adli Nik Aziz, the leader of Malaysia’s Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM), in Afghanistan (“Thailand faces up to southern extremist threat,” 2003).

The link between Nasori (the leader of Thailand’s GMIP) and Aziz (the leader of Malaysia’s KMM) is significant.

Thai military intelligence sources suspect that, in the attempts to annex southern Thailand, Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM), based in Trengganu, helped to revive the local separatist groups GMIP and Barisan Revelusi Nasional (BRN). With support from the Malaysian militants, GMIP and BRN have been transformed into insurgency groups with a regional agenda departing from their past goal of carving out a Pattani state (“Thailand Islamic insurgency,” 2004).
In 1999 Aziz purchased a large cache of weapons in Thailand, including 24 pounds of explosives. He was “committed to waging a violent jihad against the Malaysian state, which he considered to be secular and oppressive” (Abuza, 2003b, p.125). Aziz was detained in Malaysia in August 2001 under the Malaysia Internal Security Act.

It was the Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) that Thai Prime Minister (PM) Thaksin Shinawatra named as the insurgent group responsible for the January 2004 raid on the southern Thai army camp that left four soldiers dead and over 300 weapons stolen (Simon, 2003a).

*United Front for the Independence of Pattani [Bersatu- Malay for “United”].* Today many people consider Bersatu the leading organization of Thailand’s Islamic insurgency. This group was formed with the intent of finally unifying the various splinter groups. The goal was to conserve resources to decrease and eventually eliminate the need for foreign sources of support. On August 31, 1989, core leaders of all terrorist movement groups, namely the New PULO, the original PULO, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Pattani (BRN), the Barisan National Pember-Basan Pattani (BNPP) and the Mujahideen Pattani met. The leadership held a joint session called "the gathering of the fighters for Pattani." The results of the meeting included an agreement to establish a cohesive group, then called the “Payong Organization,” and eliminate the need for external support. In 1991, the name of the organization was changed to The United Front for the Independence of Pattani, or Bersatu, as it is now often called. The group is constantly on the move, carrying out guerrilla activities and avoiding direct clashes with the Thai military and police. Instead, their method of operation is more conducive to sabotage against public facilities. Bersatu has claimed that 60-80 of their fighters have trained in SW Asia.

Bersatu insurgents have likewise attempted to carry out political propaganda campaigns to rally Thai Muslims against the Buddhist government of Thailand. The organization has deliberately tried to destabilize the southern regions by:
... attacking schools, harming and threatening the life and property of school teachers, coercing parents to stop sending their children to Thai schools, terrorizing and harming those who cooperate with the government authorities, creating achievements and influence by harming state authorities, planting bombs at public premises, and committing arson against public buildings (“Thailand Islamic insurgency,” 2004)

In Malaysia, the terrorist organization Al-Ma’unah is the leading national force attempting to establish a pan-Islamic state. In Indonesia, Laskar Jihad and the Islamic Defenders Front fight to establish an Islamic caliphate. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) want to form an independent Muslim state including their portion of the southern Philippines. In Thailand it is the organizations previously discussed that also want to establish a pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia.

The result of such groups actually attaining their goals, as analyzed by Andrew Tan from the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies in Singapore, could likely be a situation similar to that in the former Yugoslavia where a resulting number of squabbling mini-states, some with fundamentalist Islamic orientation, have been characterized by even greater conflict. Such a scenario has the potential to realistically disrupt Southeast Asian security (Tan, 2000, p.267).

D. RADICAL TERRORISM: BEYOND SEPARATISM

The rise in Islamic consciousness has raised fears in the [Southeast Asian] region that extreme forms of Islam may develop, if the experience of the Middle Eastern countries is any guide. In this context, Islam is a potent mobilising [sic] symbol in harnessing political opposition to nationalistic government…Economic distress and inequalities could lead many to seek solace in more extreme forms of Islam.

Increased globalisation [sic] and the growing ease of communication have made possible cross-border linkages and networks. These have facilitated the spread of pan-Islamic militant
ideology throughout Southeast Asia and the subsequent emergence of the new terrorism in the region (Tan, 2004, p.224, 227).

Some analysts, such as Dr. Andrew Tan from the Institute of Defence [sic] and Strategic Studies in Singapore, cited above, believe that the new terrorism emerging in Southeast Asia is much more than a movement to promote separatism. Globalization has helped to foster a new breed of radical Islamists that are willing to use ultra-violent terrorism as the vehicle for change. This new threat has the potential to impose greater violence in the future than has been seen at any time so far in Thailand.

1. The Seven Step Strategy Toward Islamic Revolution in Southern Thailand

In late 2004, Lieutenant Colonel Thammanoon Maisonti from the Royal Thai Army translated into English a Thai Interior Ministry book written as the result of analyzing captured insurgent documents. While the translated title of the Interior Ministry document is *Inside the Muslim Separatist Problem in the South*, the document describes a violent Islamic insurgency that goes beyond mere separatism. A more appropriately-named section of the document is titled “The Seven Step Strategy of Islamic Revolution in Southern Thailand,” which is depicted graphically in Figure 2 (Maisonti, 2004, p.26).
As Thammanoon writes, each of the seven steps has a specific purpose that collectively creates a militant population capable of waging jihad. The first step toward revolution involves militant Muslim propaganda aimed at persuading the Muslim community to take action against the Thai government. Thammanoon explains that, “This propaganda is primarily aimed at young Muslims and is reinforced with claims of mistreatment and injustice on the part of Thai government officials.” The second step of the process involves fundamentalist infiltration into mass organizations, “such as Muslim religious associations and Islamic schools, in order to establish a presence and eventually a constituency base, thus leading to a ‘United Front,’ the goal of step three.”
four involves the recruitment of more Muslims by using infiltrated organizations to communicate to others. The ultimate goal, partially achieved at this time according to the Interior Ministry document, is to have “a total of 30,000 religious members, 3,000 members for ‘normal’ missions, and 300 members who conduct the most extreme, violent commando-type actions that promise the reward of martyrdom”. In the fifth step, influential militant leaders indoctrinate the recruited population with Islamic fundamentalism and tactical training that includes guerrilla and terrorist operations. In this fifth step, “members are given the ultimate test by being required to conduct an actual operation in support of the organization’s goals.” Following this initiation, members are deployed for harassment operations against government officials and symbols of the government. “Terror tactics are used to discredit the Thai government in the eyes of impressionable Muslims in the south, as well as to gain support and resources from members of the international community who have similar fundamentalist ideologies.” Finally during the seventh step of the process, Muslims are sent forward to wage the holy war, the jihad, in order to establish a pure Islamic state free of infidels (Maisonti, 2004, p.27).

2. Training Insurgents

According to the Interior Ministry book that also details the operational methods of the insurgents, there is a training cell for terrorists in all three southern Thai provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala. When Muslims are selected for training throughout the provinces, they are instructed to meet with a guide who thereafter takes them to a training site. Training then typically occurs between 8:00pm and 5:00am the next morning. Instructors are disguised from the students as well as from the other instructors in order to maintain anonymity. Training is divided into three levels: physical fitness to prepare for tactical training; guerrilla tactics and weapons training that often occurs on rubber plantations throughout the south; and then deployment on a real-world commando operation as the final stage of training. All levels of training include a
critical element of indoctrination of radical fundamentalism. The duration of training is unspecified and continues until the leaders of the insurgent organization feel that the recruits are capable of conducting successful operations (as cited in Maisonti, 2004, p.28).

3. Operations

Once training is complete, insurgents proceed in an operational capacity to inflict violence throughout the region. When leaders feel that it is necessary for an operation to go forward, the insurgents are directed to meet at specific rally points throughout the south. At the rally points the militants are issued weapons. From there they proceed to carry out the operation, return their weapons, and disperse back into their villages. Until the time that insurgents meet at the specified rally points, they often are unaware of who else belongs to the militant organization. “Sometimes, militants do not even know that members of their own hometowns are part of the extremist organization…” (Maisonti, 2004, p.28).

An interview with Mr. Don Pathan from The Nation newspaper in Bangkok reinforces the details of insurgent operations found in the government document translated by Thammanoon. Pathan describes the operations of one insurgent leader in the south named Ismael Rayalong, also known as Ustad Soh (Ustad or Ustaz, meaning Islamic spiritual leader or teacher). Soh, according to Pathan, is one of the individuals that the Thai 4th Army (responsible for the southern provinces) has suspected as one of the leaders behind the violence today. For four or five years Soh has organized cells, made up of 4-5 men, all recruited from different regions to maintain operational security, to conduct acts of violence (Pathan, D., 2004b).

One insurgent, a 31-year-old Islamic teacher named Abdullah Akoh, operated under the guidance of Soh. Abdullah’s operational cell included four other men, all from different villages. In September 2004, Pathan interviewed Abdullah, handcuffed to his hospital bed after being shot by a security force
officer. Pathan’s report provides details of the April 28, 2004 raid as well as the assassination of a security force officer.

[Abdullah’s] team kept to themselves [sic] and were not permitted to know who was in the other cells. During military training, which included low crawls and simulated assaults using branches in place of guns and knives, Ustad Soh would make sure that each participating cell came from villages that were as far apart as possible in order to avoid further contact.

April 28, 2004, was just around the corner. The date was to mark Hikmahtullah’s [Talekat Hikmahtullah Abandan: a terrorist organization in the south whose translated name means Direction from God Towards Invincibility] first strike against the state that its members so despised. But for Abdullah, the price of this assault was too high. He said he was not willing to walk into certain death no matter how committed he was to the group’s cause.

“I asked Ustad Soh for guns, but he said we would only use knives,” Abdullah said...“He said that what he had been teaching us would be enough to keep us out of harm’s way and that we would be able to take a knife wound or a gunshot [without being hurt],” he added.

By the end of the day, 106 Muslim insurgents lay dead. Most, if not all, had been armed with nothing more than a knife when they attacked 11 police outposts across the region....Abdullah said he was shocked and saddened by the deaths of his comrades and blamed Ustad Soh for their deaths...[But] In spite of his falling out with his mentor, Abdullah said he was still committed to the idea of seeing Pattani liberated.

Three weeks after the bloody incident, Ustad Soh came around again, claiming to have a new set of instructions from his higher ups. This time guns and bombs could be used, Abdullah said. In July, Ustad Soh showed up with a 9mm handgun...“Something has to be done in this area. There has to be an incident, make some noise,” Abdullah quoted Ustad Soh as saying.

The nature of the attack would be similar to many previous hits – a security officer was to be shot with a handgun at close range by a gunman riding on the back of a motorbike. Abdullah said he spent a week monitoring a soldier at a nearby outpost, observing how the soldiers moved to and from the nearby markets.
On July 22, Abdullah was prepared to take a life. The target would be a young Thai soldier. To him [Abdullah] it was just a target he had been observing for the past week or so. The act was for a noble cause, the liberation of Pattani from the infidels, Abdullah told himself. Abdullah said he drove up to the young soldier that he had been monitoring and pumped three or four shots into him – he doesn't remember the exact number – at point blank range. But he wasn't about to get away with this attack so easily. A soldier in the vicinity grabbed his rifle and shot Abdullah as he was speeding away on the back of his motorbike...“I don't know how many rounds hit me but I was in tremendous pain,” Abdullah said.

The two sides entered into a fierce gunfight that lasted several minutes. Abdullah was able to catch a quick breath of air when the soldier had emptied his magazine. It was also at this moment that his driver decided to flee, leaving him lying on the roadside in a pool of blood, where he was taken into the custody of security forces (Pathan, D., 2004a).

Reports such as Pathan’s provide a useful insight into not only the operations but the mindset and ideology that motivates insurgents in the south to kill people. For emerging organizations in the south like Hikmahtullah, Sai Buri, and Agot (Ustad Help Ustad), the goal of the violence is not simply to kill Thais or Buddhists or moderate Muslims in order to force a political or social agenda. It also appears that insurgents in the south today do not limit their goals to irredentist action for the purpose of recreating a Pattani free from Siam. Instead the basis for the violence is deeply rooted in fundamentalist Islam: the insurgents are liberating true Muslims from infidels. The target of such a struggle is the state and symbols of the state: all representatives of the infidel. The catalyst for this terrorism, as Tan and others have pointed out, is the global jihad that insurgents witness happening around the world. There is a new sense of militant Islamic freedom and a new call to take action. The result, as seen in the Thai south, is radical terrorism.

E. CONCLUSION

It appears that there has been a shift in focus from separatism (creation of a pan-Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia) to a more global ideology that
embraces fundamentalist Islam. As a result, the organizations described here, some old and some new, appear to have adapted their ideology to fit into the new world order accordingly. The Interior Ministry document, along with reports such as Pathan’s, provides insight into the changing world mindset that motivates radical actors to kill others in the name of Islam. Regardless of the evolving situation, the Thai government will find that the equation for a solution centers on the local Malay Muslims in the Thai south who either support or reject the actions of the terrorist organizations described in this chapter.
III. SOUTHEAST ASIA’S TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISTS AND THEIR OPERATIONS IN THAILAND

While the threat of internal militant Islamic organizations in Thailand is the focus of much of violence in the south today, there exists evidence of transnational terrorism in the Kingdom as well. This latter analysis that considers the involvement of an external threat is one that the Thai government, generally speaking, would rather not pursue. While the problem in the south is a very serious one that has claimed several hundred lives, it is at the same time relatively localized. The Thai government prefers that it stay that way.

Before the arrest of Jemaah Islamiah operatives in Thailand in 2003, including the monumental arrest of Hambali - the JI operations chief captured in Ayuthya, Thailand in August 2003 – PM Thaksin adamantly denied the existence of JI cells operating inside the Kingdom. Despite known JI cells that currently exist and are being monitored by Thai authorities today, the government would very much like to believe that such cells are not significant to a regional transnational threat (interview with anonymous US government agency officials in Bangkok, Thailand, September 12-17, 2004). For a country that gains considerable national revenue from tourism and foreign industry, the threat of terrorism is simply not conducive to economic prosperity. Since there have been no activities directly linked to transnational terrorism in Thailand since the August 2003 arrest of Hambali, the issue of externally supported terrorism is one that the Thai government does not aggressively pursue. The potential for such a non-engagement strategy to backfire is real, however. As Don Pathan from The Nation newspaper noted, Singapore in 2002 was confronted with a similar situation when it discovered major JI operations being planned there. The Singaporean government had to make the decision to either make the public aware of the situation or keep it a secret and deal with it internally. The government chose to make the problem known to its citizens and the result was a strong rallying of Singaporean citizens to do whatever was necessary to unify
efforts against terrorism. Up until 2003, Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra chose to do the opposite: he ignored, or at least did not pursue further indications that JI was operating in Thailand. Then in 2003, with the arrest of JI operatives in Bangkok and Hambali in Ayuthya, the threat was out in the open. As Pathan recalls, Thaksin and his administration lost credibility with the people, especially when the individuals who had previously tried to warn the government came forward to tell their stories (Pathan, D., 2004b). CNN’s Maria Ressa, author of *Seeds of Terror. An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda’s Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia*, said in a July 2004 phone interview that Thaksin and the Thai government must simply “end their denial of the situation involving transnational terrorists in Thailand” (personal communication, July 20, 2004).

Regardless of how the Thai government confronts the issue of transnational terrorism, the reality is that militant Islamic terrorists from abroad are something that all nations must deal with today – Thailand not excluded.

A. JEMMAH ISLAMIAH (JI)

Zachary Abuza, author of *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror* (2003), has written that al-Qaeda (AQ) set out to establish a foothold in Southeast Asia with three main goals in mind. They would first graft onto existing radical movements and organizations in the region. The second goal was to link these groups into a transnational network. The third and most important goal was to establish a financially independent and technically proficient terrorist arm of AQ in Southeast Asia. That organization is Jemaah Islamiah (or Jemaah Islamiyah)(JI).

Southeast Asia was appealing to the Al-Qaida leadership in the first place because of the network of Islamic charities, the spread of poorly regulated Islamic banks, business-friendly environments, and economies that already had records of extensive money laundering (Abuza, 2003b, p.121).

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) provides the following information about JI’s history and operations. Jemaah Islamiah is a terrorist
network with links to al-Qaida. Through the late 1990s the network plotted in secrecy, following the stated goal of creating an idealized Islamic state comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the southern Philippines, and southern Thailand. December 2001 investigations by authorities in Singapore uncovered a JI plot to attack the US and Israeli Embassies and British and Australian diplomatic buildings in Singapore. After foiling the terrorist attempts in Singapore, "Plan B" was carried out with the October 12, 2002 Bali bombing which killed nearly 200 and wounded 300 others. The Bali attack was the final outcome of meetings in early 2002 in Thailand, where attacks against soft targets such as tourist spots in the region were considered. Recent investigations have linked the JI to several December 2000 killings where dozens of bombs were detonated in Indonesia and the Philippines. The exact strength of the organization is currently unknown. Southeast Asian authorities continue to uncover and arrest JI elements on a routine basis. Following the regional crackdown against JI in 2001, it is unclear how the network has responded. JI is believed to have cells spanning Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand. With regard to financing, “Investigations indicate that, in addition to raising its own funds, JI receives money and logistic assistance from Middle Eastern and South Asian contacts, nongovernmental organizations, and other groups—including al-Qaida” (Aftergood, 2004).

According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), JI operates through cells, but in a very ad hoc and loosely organized structure. The top lieutenants appear to be protégés of cofounders Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, of Pondok Ngruki (a pesantren, or religious boarding school, in Central Java known for producing some of the most fanatical Islamic militant leaders in Southeast Asia). Other key strategic planners include Indonesian nationals living in Malaysia and veterans of the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The second tier members in the cell structure are assigned as field coordinators, responsible for delivering money and explosives and for choosing a local subordinate who can effectively act as team leader of the foot soldiers. The
bottom rung of the cell infrastructure, “the people who drive the cars, survey targets, deliver the bombs, and most often risk arrest, physical injury, or death, are selected shortly before an attack is scheduled” (“Indonesia backgrounder,” 2002, p.i).

All of JI’s senior leaders trained in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and early 1990s before JI formally existed. “It was in the camps of the Saudi-financed Afghan mujahideen leader Abdul Rasul Sayyyaf that they developed jihadist fervour [sic], international contacts, and deadly skills” (“Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia,” 2003, p. i). The 2003 ICG report also notes that, about the internal structure, the JI network is held together by not just ideology, but also by “an intricate network of marriages that at times makes it seem like a giant extended family. Insufficient attention has been paid to the role the women of JI play in cementing the network. In many cases, senior JI leaders arranged the marriages of their subordinates to their own sisters or sisters-in-law to keep the network secure” (ICG, 2003, pi).

According to Maria Ressa, CNN Jakarta Bureau Chief and author of Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda’s Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia (2003), by the mid 1990s JI’s structure was beginning to coalesce. The headquarters for JI was in Malaysia, the leader (or amir) was Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, and Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin, aka Hambali, was his deputy (Ba’aysir and Hambali have both since been captured, and the JI headquarters has moved to several countries throughout Southeast Asia depending on operational goals, law enforcement climate, and political influences). By 1996, JI had divided up Southeast Asia into regional “commands”, called Mantiqis, similar to AQ’s organizational structure. Southern Thailand is a part of Mantiqi 1, which also includes Malaysia and Singapore. The other Mantiqis can be seen in Figure 3. In addition to the regional leadership of each Mantiqi, which composes the policymaking body (called the regional shura, similar to that in AQ), there exist five divisional deputies, chosen by Ba’aysir
years ago and instrumental in the initial organization of the JI network (Ressa, 2003, p.75). This cell structure is depicted in Figure 3.

![Figure 3. Jemaah Islamiah Cell Structure (Adapted from the writings of Ressa, 2003, p.75)]

Although founded in 1993-1994, JI did not conduct its first terrorist act until 2000 when it bombed a train station and hotel in Yala, Thailand. In the first six or seven years, the group patiently built up its network by recruiting, training, and strengthening its technical proficiency (Abuza, 2003b, p.129).

Beginning in 2002 there were numerous bombings and killings throughout Southeast Asia. At the time none were linked together by authorities until later when intelligence agencies began putting the pieces together and discovered similar patterns and names. In addition to the Thailand bombing in 2000 that
premiered Jemaah Islamiah’s acts of terrorism, the year saw the JI’s bombing of a Jakarta mall, the targeted bombing of a Philippine ambassador, thirty eight bombs exploded across Indonesia on Christmas Eve, and the bombing of the light rail in Manila. In 2002 the large scale terrorist killings of JI began with the bombing of the Bali nightclub that left 202 dead, followed by the 2003 bombing of the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta that left 11 dead and 150 injured. In August 2003, the notorious terrorist Hambali (Nurjaman Riduam Isamuddin), JI’s operations chief and main link to al Qaeda, was captured in Ayuthya, Thailand. According to CIA reports after the capture, JI had plans to attack US-managed hotels in Bangkok as well as commercial airliners by way of Bangkok’s vulnerable international airport (Simon, 2003a).

On October 23, 2002, under Executive Order 13224, the US placed Jemaah Islamiah on the global terrorist organization list, and encouraged all nations around the world to do likewise. Since its inception, JI has morphed into a complex organization made up of many networks and cells throughout Southeast Asia. In Thailand, there are numerous radical Muslim groups and movements that are suspected of being involved with the complex, underground, JI terrorist network (interview with anonymous US government agency officials in Bangkok, Thailand, September 12-17, 2004).

Zachary Abuza, author of Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, provides the following additional information about JI structure:

JI, like al-Qaeda, is not event driven. Terrorism is asymmetric warfare and terrorists strike when they have a high probability of success; they cannot afford failure. Both [JI and AQ] place a premium on training and meticulous planning; neither lash [sic] out with ill-timed and ill-conceived attacks to take pressure off themselves. Both place a premium on maintaining the organisation’s [sic] integrity. When leaders are arrested, they are quickly replaced.

The conditions that drove these people to terrorism have not diminished. Mass unemployment is very destabilizing. Diminished expectations and frustration-aggression among educated youth is high. This jihad is as much about anti-Westernism as it is about Islam. For Muslims of the world, there is only one lesson to be
learnt from the Iraq war: no state can confront the US. The only way the West can be made to pay and "taste" the humiliation Muslims feel every day is through terrorism.

The financial war on terrorism has failed in South-East Asia and not one terrorist dollar has been frozen although the region has become more financially vital to al-Qaeda. Much of the fundraising is impossible to stop: hawala [a form of underground banking], cash being brought in on person, and petty crime. But the states have not even curtailed funds they should be able to, such as that of corporations and charities.

Between 1999 and 2000 JI held three meetings that included members of other small and radical Muslim groups from around the region, including Thai and Bangladeshi organizations [sic]. There is evidence that JI cadres are using south-eastern Bangladesh to regroup. The May-June arrests in Thailand and Cambodia further highlight the penetration of societies that were thought to be fairly immune to Islamic radicalism (Abuza, 2003c).

An equally significant point of concern is the self-sufficiency that networks such as JI have. This quality is much to the credit of Osama Bin Laden and the blueprint with which he created AQ. Because of the front companies, charities, non-governmental organizations, and other financial enterprises that JI possesses throughout Southeast Asia, the network has the ability to act independently, regardless of what happens in places like Afghanistan and Iraq.

It is because of these details of cell structure, organizational design, and monetary self-sufficiency that the arrests of Ba’aysir in Indonesia and Hambali in Thailand should not be interpreted by any means as an end to Jemaah Islamiah’s ability to continue its operations.

B. THAI MUSLIM LINKS TO TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

It is clear that Thailand has been an AQ networking hub in Southeast Asia since the mid-1990s. Omar al Faruq, one of the senior-most AQ leaders in SEA, admitted that JI attempted to establish links with Muslim militants in Thailand. The secretary general of the Thai National Security Council, General Vinai
Pattiyakul, “acknowledged that some southern Muslim radicals had been trained in Afghanistan and Libya” (Abuza, 2003b, p.171).

There exists much speculation about PULO/NEW PULO links to external terrorist organizations. Some Thai officials believe that the 1995 bomb blast in Hat Yai, Thailand was actually a premature explosion of a device that was to be used on a “joint, externally-backed PULO-Shi’ite sabotage mission (Chalk, 2001, p.245).

Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, the Free Aceh Movement), an Indonesian secessionist movement formed in 1975 for establishing the independence of the province on the northern tip of Sumatra island, has also found Thailand a convenient hub for networking. Although GAM has never officially been linked to JI or AQ, the US suspects that ties do exist. In late 1999 the Rabitatul Mujahidin (RM) organization was established by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (JI’s amir) as a focal point for coordinating activities between al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiah, MMI [Mujahidin Council of Indonesia], and AQ cells in Myanmar, Aceh, and Thailand (Abuza, 2003b, p.176).

Despite a lack of hard evidence that southern Muslims are connected in some way to international terrorism, there exists proof of JI leaders making attempts to establish such ties. Hambali, the JI operations chief captured in Thailand in August 2003, claimed to have tried, but with no success, in dealing with southern Thai Muslims. The JI leader told US interrogators after his arrest that, “Thai militants refused to help him blow up tourist spots in the country” because they did not agree with the targets (Perrin, 2004). Hambali’s statement should be taken as a warning to Thailand. Because Hambali said he was not able to establish links at the time does not mean that coordination hasn’t since been established. The JI leader could also just as easily have been lying about his lack of success in establishing a network.

Prior to 2003, PM Thaksin continued to deny that any militant activities within Thailand’s borders were the acts of criminals or the dregs of previous separatist movements involved in drug trafficking, banditry, and black market
sales. After the 2002 Bali bombing, Thailand remained in denial that JI and AQ were planning similar attacks in Phuket and Pattaya. Thai information ministry personnel rejected regional information reports that Hambali was planning future operations inside the country. Although Thai officials admitted that Hambali and other JI operatives had transited the Kingdom, they denied that any meetings had taken place to plan the Bali attack. The senior Thai counterterrorism official at the time, Major General Tritot Ronnaritivichai, claimed that “the only plans they [Hambali and his leadership] were making in Thailand were where to run next” (Abuza, 2003 b, p.223).

On May 16, 2003, based on information from Singaporean authorities, Thailand arrested Singaporean Arifin bin Ali, alias John Wong Ah Hung, and three Thais. All three men were known members of JI, planning to bomb the 2003 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Bangkok, which was to be attended by US President George W. Bush. Arifin said that he had been hiding in Thailand since 2002, and that he was “involved with a group of like-minded individuals in planning terrorist attack against certain targets in Thailand” (Ressa, 2003, p.217). Between Singapore and Thailand authorities, the two determined that JI was also planning attacks against five embassies in Bangkok as well as two beach resorts in Pattaya and Phuket, Thailand (Ressa, 2003, p.217).

Following the 2003 arrests in Bangkok and the soon-after capture of Hambali himself in Ayuthya, Thailand, PM Thaksin could no longer deny that Jemaah Islamiah was actually planning and conducting operations in Thailand.

January 2004 saw the beginning of a new emergence of southern violence. An insurgent raid on a southern army depot left four soldiers dead and over 300 weapons stolen. Although no hard evidence was found, the Thai military at the time announced that the recent violence in the south was most likely linked to Jemaah Islamiah: Thai national security advisor, General Kitti Rattanachaya, said Thai Islamic separatists have wide ranging contacts with regional terrorist groups including JI, and that attacks to seize weapons and
explosives were in preparation for larger attacks ("Thailand says Jemaah Islamiah behind attacks in the south," 2004).

February 17, 2005 witnessed an unprecedented event - Thailand’s first car bomb. The explosion left six people dead and over 40 injured. Narathiwat’s Provincial Governor Pracha Terat indicated he believed the main ingredient in the bomb was about 100 kilograms of ammonium nitrate. While the amount of explosive was debatable, Pracha stated that with regard to who was behind the bombing, “If they were Thais, they would not have planted such a powerful bomb, [one] comparable to those in Iraq” (“Car bomb aftermath: no foreign involvement: PM,” 2005). Dr. Panitan Wattanayagorn, a security expert from Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, reinforced the position that it was not possible for the violence to escalate as it has without foreign assistance. Following such speculation, PM Thaksin once again rejected the claim and said that the bombers were most likely family members of local Thai suspects being pursued by security forces in the south.

Jane’s Intelligence Review has likewise detailed a shift in the Islamic threats in Southeast Asia from internal domestic issues to a transnational concern. As Pattani nationalism has faded, Islamic consciousness has emerged as the force behind the violence and insurgency in the south. “JI operatives from outside Thailand have looked to the Wahabi centers [such as Wahabi communities in the Thai southern provinces] as the most likely sources of ideological and operational support (“Thailand faces up to southern extremist threat,” 2003).

C. WHY TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISTS USE THAILAND AS A NETWORKING HUB

In Southeast Asia, porous borders, passport fraud, and lax immigration procedures are contributing significantly to the region’s enabling environment that is fostering the growth of terrorism and other forms of transnational violence (Smith, 2004, p.214).
Thailand is used as a safe haven and networking hub for transnational terrorists, to include AQ and JI for the same reasons that the Philippines is a common terrorist operating ground: Thailand is a convenient country in which to conduct “business.”

Weapons are easily bought in Thailand. “Tamil Tigers fighting for a homeland in Sri Lanka have shopped for weapons for years in Thailand” (Abuza, 2003 b, p.172). Kumar Ramakrishna from the Institute of Defence [sic] and Strategic Studies in Singapore states that, “Serious regulatory weaknesses also help explain the relative accessibility of weapons and explosives. The extremely lucrative arms trade in Southeast Asia has its locus in Thailand and Cambodia” (Ramakrishna, 2004, p.148). The Thai military has similarly been involved in illegal black market weapons sales for many years. Ramakrishna references an estimate by Dr. Panitan Wattanayagorn that one third of the illegal weapons in Southeast Asia “come from illegal arms sales by rogue Thai military elements. Some of these weapons have found their way to radical Islamist groups in the region. Certainly, firearms from Thailand have reached JI militants in Indonesia” (Ramakrishna, 2004, p.148).

Money flow through Thailand is also quite easy to manipulate. Thai regulatory systems are weak while corruption inhibits the government and police forces. Because Thailand is so heavily involved in the worldwide drug trade, money laundering is quite common.

Transportation through Thailand, with its lax immigration requirements, is another attribute that makes the country attractive to terrorists needing a transit and planning hub. In addition to lenient immigration laws at airports, Thailand has a very porous border with Malaysia, allowing for easy travel between the two countries. As Paul J. Smith from the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii writes,

The border between Thailand and Malaysia has been described as a ‘meandering ribbon of dun-colored water’ where ‘border guards are few’ that, among other things, facilitated the clandestine passage of Hambali [the Jemaah Islamiah operations chief] from Malaysia into Thailand in January 2002 (Smith, 2004, p.216).
Passport forgery is another major enterprise that thrives in both the Kingdom and throughout Southeast Asia. Smith writes that “Thailand is considered one of the key locations where passports are forged or fabricated. Law enforcement officials regularly describe Thailand as one of the global centers for passport forgery” (Smith, 2004, p.215).

The funding of terrorist activities is one area that remains very much uninterrupted by the efforts of the War on Terror. In the early 1980s when Osama Bin Laden set out to establish his networks in the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan, he did so with a clear plan in mind. Bin-Laden wanted to create a network that had ties to the main AQ core, but ones that could also operate independently with their own established financial infrastructures. Within that infrastructure, AQ networks would be partially reliant on the Muslim community for funding and partially self-sustaining through the use of front organizations, charities, and businesses. AQ and JI financial success is structured around intricate layers of charities, financial institutions, mosques, front companies, fundraisers, and websites.

In Bangkok, for example, there exist up to six general trading companies that have been linked to firms on the UN’s list of terrorist-supporting organizations. Some of the companies in Bangkok include three Middle Eastern companies that have had offices there since 1997, including Al Jallil Trading Co. Ltd, Al Amanah Enterprise Co. Ltd, and Sidco Co. Ltd. All three firms were raided by intelligence officials following US and Israeli intelligence investigations (Abuza, 2003a, p182).

The great amount of corruption and money laundering within the Thai financial sector can not be ignored as convenient facilitators for terrorist funding activities. Dr. Zachary Abuza, associate professor of international politics at Simmons University, states that according to the Thai government, an estimated US$2.2 billion in drug money is laundered annually. It is also estimated that some 40 percent of Thailand’s GDP is underground, unregulated, and untaxed. Abuza also explains that,
Thailand is a centre of much JI/Al Qaeda financial operations. In December 2001, Thai police with the assistance of the CIA broke up two counterfeiting rings run by Dawood [Dawood Ibrahim, alias Sheikh Dawood Hassan] in Bangkok. In March 2002, Thai authorities arrested 25 Middle Eastern men suspected of laundering Al Qaeda funds in the Kingdom. In addition, several of the suspects were charged with forging travel documents, passports and visas, for Al Qaeda members. (Abuza, 2003a, p188).

Illegal money making operations are rampant in the southern provinces. Some insurgent organizations and criminal gangs are thought to earn roughly US$225,000 a year in contract killings. These groups are also involved in illegal gun-running markets along the Thai-Cambodian and Thai-Burmese borders. The weapons are then brought south where they are purchased by Acehnese GAM rebels, MILF officials, and other criminal gangs (Abuza, 2003a, p189).

In 1999, Thailand enacted new anti-money laundering laws and offices to offset the regulation problems it was experiencing. The systems were created to deal with internal financial corruption, but enforcement and regulation remained minimal. Such regulatory laws and tools could, in fact, prove very useful against transnational terrorist financing if implemented properly. Considering the amount of money circulated illegally in Thailand in support of illegal arms and drug smuggling, there is no reason to not accept that terrorist-backing funds are laundered through the Kingdom as well.

D. CONCLUSION

Because of the many attributes that make the Kingdom of Thailand a desirable haven in which to plan, operate, and coordinate resources, it is not surprising that a transnational terrorist organization such as JI uses the country as a networking hub. Because JI has proven its ability to operate in and around Thailand, the possibility of a future relationship between JI and southern Thai insurgents is an issue that deserves considerable attention.
IV. JI AND THAILAND’S SOUTHERN INSURGENCY

Further investigations of the JI and Al Qaeda networks in Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia since September 11 and Bali attacks revealed that key JI members including Hambali, Mohammed Mansour Japarah and Yazid Sufaat had visited Thailand on various occasions. They found the country and its southern part easy to access (Chongkittavorn, 2003, p.186).

With the current US War on Terror focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, there exists a considerable lack of international attention given to the threats in Southeast Asia. For transnational terrorists in the region, such as those belonging to JI, this vacuum has created great opportunities in which to operate and grow relatively unhindered. This has occurred while influential world powers focus their instruments of statecraft on the Middle East and South Asia. Thailand, like many other Southeast Asian nations, has therefore become even more of an attractive location for terrorists to escape from the reaches of the War on Terror.

Terrorist organizations such as JI have demonstrated their continuous ability to recruit, mobilize, and motivate both actual and would-be fighters, supporters, and sympathizers (Hoffman, 2004). What is especially concerning for Thailand with regard to JI’s ability to recruit is that this organization has shown its ability to accept, train, and organize recruits regardless of background, nationality, and race. This is evidenced by the fact that Hambali, JI’s former operations chief and main link to AQ, was a non-Arab sitting on AQ’s leadership council.

There are essentially two threats that must be addressed in combating terrorism in Thailand: the domestic threat and the transnational threat. Many experts and writers on the situation in Thailand have attempted to prove that a direct link between the two threats exists. While there is a large amount of circumstantial evidence, much of which has already been discussed in previous chapters of this thesis, which would seem to indicate a link, the simple reality is
that no factual evidence exists to prove that Jemaah Islamiah has established a relationship with the insurgents in southern Thailand. While no link currently exists, exploring the implications of such a relationship is useful in illuminating the potential dangers and, therefore, reinforcing the need to implement the policy changes recommended by this thesis.

A. THE DANGER OF A POTENTIAL LINK BETWEEN THE DOMESTIC AND TRANSNATIONAL THREATS

The Islamic insurgency in Thailand, if not eliminated in a constructive and timely manner, has the very real potential of falling under the influence of transnational terrorist networks like JI. This warning assumes that such a marriage of threats has not already occurred. The current ineffectiveness in combating the internal instability and insurgency in the south presents a very attractive opportunity for more influential and powerful external threats to enter the region. The southern region is already saturated with numerous small, militant Islamic organizations that are ideal targets for recruitment under the umbrella of JI. The first generations of Southeast Asian militant Islamic insurgents, to include Thai Muslims, got their taste of jihad when many traveled to Afghanistan in the 1980s to help the Mujahideen fight the Soviets (Ressa, 2003, p.12). In order for organizations such as Jemaah Islamiah to continue to exist and grow, there is a need for the terrorist generations of the future to be motivated by their own jihads. The spilling of non-Muslim blood in Afghanistan is what gave the originators of today's terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia, who have schooled and trained and fought in the Middle East alongside the mujahideen, a fanaticism that has never been witnessed before. As Abuza notes, "Up to a thousand Southeast Asian Muslims fought with the mujahidin in the 1980s, and there is an Afghan connection to most of the radical Islamic groups [in Southeast Asia]" (Abuza, 2003b, p. 10). Small-scale terrorism in Thailand, which has grown exponentially since early January 2004, should at least be considered as more than random acts of banditry by local criminals. It is exactly the current type of hostile, unstable violence that attracts JI to step in,
organize, and take in to the “family” the smaller groups of insurgents who before were operating without coordinated direction.

It is not unreasonable to envision a recruiting effort by JI that highlights to the southern Muslim population the Thai government’s inability to take care of its own Muslim citizens. More disturbing is to consider that perhaps JI has already infiltrated the region. A scenario that must be considered is that JI has been manipulating the south’s instability to make the proposition of a unified Southeast Asian Islamic insurgency all the more attractive to the disenfranchised south.

As Doctor Panitan Wattanayagorn from Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok has said, the insurgency in the south has evolved (Wattanayagorn, 2004). By recalling events in 2003 and 2004, he demonstrates the progression of violence from random acts of violence to coordinated insurgency. According to Panitan, there is now a more systematic, organized method that has taken over insurgent operations in the south. This organized military approach indicates that there is possibly support from external sources. As Panitan points out, the people in the south no longer provide information to the security forces. On January 4, 2004, the first raid occurred on the southern Army depot where weapons were stolen and soldiers were killed. The insurgents were testing the military and overestimated the strength of the Army – they easily overran the camp. Then things were quiet again until April 28, 2004. A systematic insurgent raid on multiple security outposts in the south occurred. More than a hundred insurgents were killed. This time the insurgents had underestimated the security forces. But the attack was even more systematic and coordinated than in January. The insurgency is not diminishing and the increased coordination and strategizing indicates that a more sophisticated, external element is helping to orchestrate the violence (Wattanayagorn, 2004).

Asia Times reporter Julian Gearing has written that, “Disaffected youth [in the southern provinces], many of whom speak little or no Thai, are easy prey to the growing influence of a purist form of Islam and what they may view as the heroic struggle of jihadists such as Osama bin Laden” (2004).
On March 31, 2004, armed insurgents raided a mining quarry in Yala Province. After tying up two security guards, ten masked men armed with assault rifles stole 1.4 tons of ammonium nitrate (commonly used as fertilizer but also easily used as an explosive), 58 sticks of dynamite, and 180 detonators. Considering the amount of explosives stolen, it seemed evident that the responsible insurgents were larger attacks. As the deputy chief of Thailand’s Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC – a southern command established for conducting stability and security operations in the troubled provinces), General Pallop Pinmanee stated that, “With this amount of fertilizer, you could blow up a whole town” (“Explosives stolen in Thai raid,” 2004). In a *Bangkok Post* report that appeared two days after the quarry raid, the attackers were identified as a PULO bomb expert, other locals from Narathiwat Province, and two Indonesian nationals. More importantly, one of the Indonesians, only known by the name Muka, “was said to be a relative of Hambali, the Indonesian operations chief of the Jemaah Islamiah terrorist group who was arrested in Thailand last year” (Pathan, M.A., 2004a).

Deputy Chief of ISOC, General Pallop Pinmanee, announced in late March 2004 that the number of active insurgents in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat provinces was around 500 with a goal of expanding to 3,000 insurgents. In March 2004 there were as many as 70,000 insurgent sympathizers in the deep south, meaning 3-5% of the three southern province’s 1.6 million population were separatist sympathizers. A further indicator of increased organizational design was that the insurgency was structurally organized into “core members, armed trainees and sympathizers or ‘united front’ members” (“Pallop says rebels have huge support,” 2004).

Although the Thai government acknowledged in 2003 that transnational terrorists were using Thailand as a networking hub, the Thai government claims that the violence specific to the southern provinces is not a result of international terrorist influence. Brief statements from government officials, such as Defense Minister General Chetta Thanacharo’s comments that participation of foreign
terror groups in southern violence can not be ruled out, are usually as far as the Thai government goes in addressing the possibility of a viable international terrorist capability in Thailand (“Pallop says rebels have huge support,” 2004).

James T. Kirkhope, a research director from the Terrorism and Research Center in Arlington, Virginia has said,

A review of historical Thai-Muslim antagonisms and recalling the arrest of Hambali, an Indonesian leader of both al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya, provides fuel to the belief that a burgeoning separatist insurgent terrorist campaign with some limited external support may not be far fetched (Gearing, 2004).

Supat Boontanom, editor of Chao Tai (Southern People) newspaper in Yala, describes the influx of foreign nationals in the south. As Boontanom reported in April of 2004, “There have been a lot of Indonesians coming to southern Thailand, as they can enter easily because of our weak laws. They have tried to be congenial with local people in the deep south” (Gearing, 2004). With reference to an increased Indonesian presence in southern Thailand, it should also be noted that Jemaah Islamiah, Pondok Ngruki (the Islamic boarding school in Central Java that schooled many of the men who have been linked to AQ), Hambali (the JI operations chief), and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (the Amir of Jemaah Islamiah), all have originated in Indonesia.

According to the US Department of State’s “Patterns of Global Terrorism – 2003” report, “Extremists [in Southeast Asia] have been able to win supporters by financially supporting schools and mosques that espouse their brand of Islam and exploiting religious sympathies or discontent among Muslim populations. Muslim populations in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and Cambodia are vulnerable to such radical influences.”

B. CONCLUSION

Dr. Zachary Abuza has described the insurgency in Thailand by simply stating that militants “are no longer fighting for Pattani liberation against the imperialist Siamese. They are fighting for Islamic Jihad” (Gearing, 2004).
Accepting the fact that today’s global Islamic insurgency directly impacts every country in the Southeast Asian region, including Thailand, is a crucial first step toward achieving stability in the Kingdom. On November 16, 2004, PM Thaksin made his most bold statement to date by announcing that foreign Islamic extremists were supporting the violence in the south. He said that the assistance came from individual relationships developed while Thais studied abroad in the Middle East and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. The Prime Minister denied, however, that any international terrorist organizations were sponsoring the conflict – asserting only that individual assistance was occurring. Thaksin said that hundreds of Thai Muslims had traveled to Middle Eastern countries and that Thai security agencies believed that some had received terrorist and militia training while abroad (Wannabovorn, 2004).

The insurgent movement in the south, which was never able to achieve anything more than agitation of the Thai government for decades, has now begun to exhibit more organized, systematic operations. If transnational terrorists have not yet established a base of influence among the southern radical constituency that is engaged in the south’s insurgency, it must at least be acknowledged that the situation is “ripe” for such an introduction to occur.
V. CURRENT THAI AND US ANTI-TERRORISM POLICIES

Although US power is still predominant in Southeast Asia, it will erode steadily if US policy does not take fundamental concerns in the region into account. In this instance, a separation between security policy and economic and social policy is a false dichotomy, one that could damage US relations with Southeast Asia in the long run (“US security relations with Southeast Asia: a dual challenge,” 2004, p.4).

A. THAILAND’S POLICIES AND ROLE IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

Thailand’s initial response to the WOT was not very supportive of US efforts. The Thai response was not one of full commitment for several reasons. There was a concern for a possible flare-up of the southern Muslims in Thailand against US-led operations in the Middle East. Specifically, there was a concern among Thai army officials that there could be a rebound of the southern Islamic insurgency which had been effectively quelled.

Thailand initially did little, in fact, in response to the attacks of September 11th. Border security in the Kingdom was not increased, no immigration policies were changed, and law enforcement did little to crack down on what the US believed to be important AQ operatives in Thailand. The US was critical of the Thai government for not arresting many AQ suspects that the US listed as being in Thailand. The Thai government claimed that the evidence presented by the US was not sufficient enough to stand up in court. There was also little done to stop the illegal money trafficking that was processed through the Kingdom.

Ramakrishna explains that there were initially two key reasons for limited Thai and Southeast Asian commitment to the US War on Terror.

First, several Southeast Asian states have significant Muslim communities whose concerns about the perceived US bias against Islam needed to be accommodated in order to forestall the possibility of a domestic backlash. Second, the region has yet to fully recover from the devastating effects of the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, and thus, governments, eager to attract foreign investors and tourists, are naturally loathe to buttress the
impression often created by Western media that their territories are radical Islamist terrorist hotbeds (Ramakrishna, 2004, p.148).

It has also been speculated that there exists a lingering resentment by Thais against the US for its weak response in coming to the aid of Thailand during the Asian economic crisis in 1997/98. In 2002 and 2003, however, Thailand became more involved in the War on Terror. Thai troops were sent to Iraq and Afghanistan in non-combat roles in support of US operations. In 2003 Thailand was elevated to Major Non-NATO Ally status. Because of these affiliations with the US, Thailand has found itself more prone to threats of terrorism. Regardless of these threats, the Kingdom has since maintained its support of the War on Terror.

B. CURRENT THAI / US / REGIONAL POLICIES AND RECOMMENDED IMPROVEMENTS

In order to achieve success in effectively combating the threats present in Thailand, the attention, resources, and long-term commitment of Thai, US, and other Southeast Asian nations must be thoroughly focused and coordinated. Several critical focal points in the fight against terrorism in Thailand are worth examining. Some initiatives have been relatively successful while others require greater attention in order to be effective. The most important factor in analyzing these various focal points is the realization that there is no one key point to target in eliminating the threats of terrorism and insurgency. For example, an infusion of money into the south will not alone solve the problems there. A comprehensive strategy utilizing multiple national resources and assets must be implemented. The points below contain information on what is being done in specific areas of Thai, US, and regional policy. Many of the focus areas described here are being addressed by some combination of Thai and/or US and/or Southeast Asian initiatives. In defining what areas need improvement, it must be realized that although the Thai government is making efforts to confront deficiencies in practice and policy, several of these deficiencies can not be unilaterally addressed in any effective way. It is in the interest of the US to
pursue foreign policies that better support Thai national strategy goals in order to promote Southeast Asian regional stability. At the same time, however, it is critical that the US respect the limitations of the Thai government as well as cultural differences that exist between the East and West.

1. Law Enforcement

“In Asia, police forces have detained far more terrorists than military forces have detained, but most US security aid is given in the form of military assistance” (Dillon, 2004). As reported by Dana Dillon from the Heritage Foundation, a US-based policy research and analysis group, the disparity between military and law enforcement support exists as a direct result of Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which was amended in 1973 to prohibit the use of foreign assistance funds to train police. While various agencies do train police, such training requires a congressional exception. The current laws were amended in the 1960s and 1970s when the US was spending millions of dollars a year but became concerned with a lack of policy guidance and the possibility that repressive regimes were being supported. While today there are many safeguards throughout the vetting process created to monitor and avoid inappropriate support of foreign governments, the US laws remain the same.

Considering that terrorism has changed the face of the world since Section 660 became law, a revision of US policy toward foreign law enforcement is appropriate in helping to combat terrorist networks that exist throughout Southeast Asia. Police in more than 100 countries have arrested more than 3,000 suspects linked to AQ, while the military has captured some 650 enemy combatants (Dillon, 2003; Slevin, 2003). To assist Thailand in the location and prosecution of terrorist operatives, the US must re-engage support for not only police, but also the “entire judicial system from police to judges to prisons” (Dillon, 2004).
In Southeast Asia, with the exception of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, JI operates underground in urban areas. The majority of all JI/AQ operatives that have been captured in Thailand have been detained by various law enforcement agencies, often with the assistance of the US.

To assist in countering terrorism abroad, the US and Thailand would benefit from developing a better-coordinated, foreign law enforcement assistance strategy. In southern Thailand, law enforcement is plagued by low income, corruption, and sometimes-inadequate training. Because of the southern region’s poorly-resourced government and social infrastructure, police and government programs do not receive the attention and funding necessary to deal with insurgency. Corrupt officials have pilfered funds earmarked for development. Misadministration by some government representatives, along with the heavy-handed security forces in the area, has further aggravated the already-alienated Muslim population. According to a report by the South Asia Analysis Group, “Daily life in the urban areas [is] affected by common banditry and lawlessness making it difficult for the authorities to differentiate these activities from that of the separatists or militants” (Kuppuswamy, 2004).

To make the situation of law enforcement in the south worse, there is an ever present divide between the police and the military in the region. Constant disputes over which authority is ultimately responsible and in charge of security and stability continue to exist in the south today. As Jane’s Intelligence Review reports, inter-agency rivalries have “created a serious divide between the Royal Thai Police (RTP) of (Southern) Region 9 and the 4th (Southern Region) Army of the Royal Thai Army (RTA)” (“Thailand faces up to southern extremist threat,” 2003).

In the first half of 2004, the Thai government made sweeping personnel changes in the senior leadership of the police and the military. Both the 4th Region’s Army Commander as well as Thailand’s national police chief were fired for failing to control the growing unrest in the Muslim-dominated south. These actions demonstrated at least an acceptance from the government that the
problems of terrorism and insurgency were not being addressed with the appropriate levels of commitment. Whether these reforms will actually aid in stability and decrease corruption is yet to be seen.

It is for these reasons that both Thailand, with the continued assistance from the US and other nations, must devote greater attention, training, and resources to law enforcement reform and training.

2. Intelligence Operations

...Southeast Asians have also demonstrated difficulties working multilaterally. For example, many ASEAN governments are reluctant to share intelligence on a multilateral basis, and are more comfortable cooperating on sensitive issues through proven bilateral channels ("US security relations with Southeast Asia: a dual challenge," 2004, p.1).

In a September 2004 interview in Bangkok, an anonymous US intelligence agency official remarked that Thais simply do not work coordinate and share intelligence well. The official stated that when the US sponsored or coordinated the joining together of Thai-Thai or Thai-other intelligence agencies, sharing of information occurred rather efficiently. Immediately after withdraw of US sponsorship or coordination for a specific operation or event, the Thai agencies withdrew back to into isolation and compartmentalization. This isolation not only occurred when bi- or multi-lateral agencies were involved, but the official made clear that even within one Thai government agency, such as the Army, for example, compartmentalization among specific units was prevalent and stove-piping straight to Bangkok was very common (interview with anonymous US government agency officials in Bangkok, Thailand, September 12-17, 2004).

Thailand’s intelligence operations, specifically in the areas of gathering and sharing information, require improvement. In January 2000, three suspected terrorists, Khallad bin Attash, Khalid al-Mihdhar, and Nawaf al-Hazmi entered Thailand. Malaysian and US intelligence agencies tracking these men through communications intercepts alerted Thai authorities of their travel to the Kingdom. Thai intelligence received the information on a weekend, and by the time the
information was processed and the seriousness of the situation realized, the men had disappeared into Bangkok. Thai authorities put the men’s names on the travel watch list, but all three left the country unnoticed. It was not until weeks after the men’s departures, sometime in February 2000, that Thai intelligence notified anyone of the departures, and at the time they only notified the Malaysians and not the US. It was later discovered that the only reason the Thais mentioned the departures to the Malaysian authorities was because Malaysia had asked Thailand for several weeks for the whereabouts of the missing terrorists.

It was later discovered that Khallad had proceeded on to Karachi on January 20. He would later go on to mastermind the USS Cole attack in Yemen that killed 17 US servicemen. Nawaf and Khalid left Bangkok on January 15, on a United Airlines Flight to Los Angeles. Once in the US, Nawaf and Khalid traveled across the country and met with members of another AQ cell, identified as the “Hamburg” cell, which was later found to be instrumental in the 9/11 attacks on the US (John, 2004).

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the US, more commonly referred to as the 9/11 Investigation Committee, was careful in making accusations about the intelligence failure that occurred in this case. Although the intelligence coordination was obviously unsatisfactory, the commission said that in the context of hindsight no one could have predicted the failure would contribute to the devastating 9/11 attacks (John, 2004). It must be said, however, that had the FBI received information about Nawaf and Khalid and been able to track them in the US, it is possible that US law enforcement agencies could have broken up any number of the four cells that would later participate in the 9/11 attacks.

It is also significant that Thailand’s intelligence resources have traditionally been focused on targets other than terrorists. One of the primary focus points of Thai assets has been Burma (Myanmar), which has infuriated the Thai government for decades with rampant drug trafficking into the Kingdom as well
as continued border disputes. Indochina is another target that has received considerable intelligence attention by the Thais.

Compartmentalization among intelligence agencies has no doubt hindered the progress of tracking and locating terrorists. Since 9/11 considerable efforts have been made by the US, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines to avoid failures such as the Malaysia-Thailand one described above.

In early 2001, prior to 9/11, a classified, joint US-Thai counter-terrorism operations organization was created called the Counter Terrorism Intelligence Center (CTIC). The CTIC combines, in close coordination, the CIA with key personnel from Thailand’s three main security agencies: The National Intelligence Agency, the Thai police, and the armed forces. The CTIC relies heavily on the CIA for its structure, guidance, and funding. The two agencies share facilities, equipment, and information on a daily basis. The continuing work of this agency enforces the efforts of the Thais and the US to locate and eliminate the threat of JI and other insurgent organizations operating in the Kingdom ("CIA, Thai agencies unite to root out Al Qaeda", 2003, p.3).

By December 2002, however, the Thai Information Ministry and the Prime Minister himself refused to accept or admit that terrorist operations were being conducted in Thailand. CNN’s Maria Ressa recalls attempting to explicitly make clear to the Thais that transnational terrorists were operating in the Kingdom. According to Ressa, the Thai government countered the claims, saying that they believed that Thailand’s intelligence counterparts from other countries would surely have shared such information if it were true. Ressa re-affirmed to the Thai government that her information came from reliable sources, including the FBI, and that the documents were available for the Thais to see (Ressa, 2003, p.216). This interaction was a demonstration of denial on the part of the Thai government as well as the intelligence “stove piping” that often exists between even friendly nations.

The situation in Thailand changed abruptly in 2003. On May 16th, a Singaporean and three Thais, all suspected members of JI, were arrested while
developing a plan to bomb the 2003 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit (Ressa, 2003, p.217). Between Singaporean and Thai authorities, the two determined that JI was planning other attacks throughout Thailand. Following the arrests, PM Thaksin could no longer deny transnational terrorist operations existed inside the Kingdom. Thaksin admitted that JI had a cell in his country “with ambitious plans” (Ressa, 2003, p.217).

The most significant intelligence operation success to date occurred on August 11, 2003, when Hambali (Nurjaman Riduam Isamuddin), Jemaah Islamiah’s operations chief and main link to al Qaeda, was captured in Ayuthya, Thailand. Considered the most wanted man in Southeast Asia at the time, Hambali was the only non-Arab (he is Indonesian) sitting on AQ’s leadership council and thus existed as a critical link between JI and AQ. His capture required the collaboration of Cambodian, Thai, Indonesian, Malaysian, and US authorities. Phnom Penh, Jakarta, and Kuala Lumpur all provided tracking of Hambali while the Thai Special Branch and US officials conducted the actual raid and arrest. After the interrogation of Mohamad Farik bin Amin (Zubair) and other AQ and JI operatives, it was learned that Hambali’s forged Spanish passport was about to expire. Authorities then tracked down a prominent passport forger in Chiang Mai, Thailand, analyzed photographs in his possession, and were then able to make a connection with Hambali. After interrogating two of Hambali’s agents who arrived to pick up the new forged passport, Hambali’s whereabouts was determined and he was apprehended (Smith, 2004, p.212). Under interrogation, Hambali described plans to bomb the US, British, Australian, Israeli, and Singapore embassies in Bangkok (Simon, 2003a). Based on interrogations of Hambali, authorities also learned that terrorist attacks were planned across Southeast Asia, despite the disruption of JI leadership from previous arrests. According to CIA reports, JI had plans to attack two US-managed hotels in Bangkok as well as commercial airliners by way of Bangkok’s vulnerable Don Muang International Airport (Simon, 2003a).
In 2002 there was criticism of Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s decision to disband the southern administrative structures known as the Civilian-Police-Military Task Force 43 and the Southern Border Administrative Command (Funston, 2004). Not only did these organizations provide a critical communications link between the southern Muslims and the Thai government, but the two served as intelligence gathering sources as well. Criticism re-emerged in March 2004 after Bersatu insurgents planted two bombs, one of which was detected before detonation and another that exploded only meters away from the Thai interior and defense ministers who were visiting the southern province of Narathiwat. A March 2004 *Bangkok Post* article titled “Loss of Intelligence Makes Life Less Secure” sharply criticized the move to disband the two government organizations as a “grave policy error on the part of the Thaksin administration” based on “a police recommendation that the violence was now under control and most outlaw elements were neutralized.” The report further stated that important undercover informers were cut off from the government’s payroll after the disbandment, thus “shutting off the flow of intelligence on the activities of insurgents.” In reference to the bombings of the ministerial visit, the report stated that the fact that the bombs were planted close to where the two ministers were meeting pointed “conclusively to a serious security lapse. It suggests terrible intelligence on the part of security officials, who appear to have no idea as to the activities of movements of the bombers, possibly insurgents” (“Loss of Intelligence Makes Life Less Secure,” 2004). According to a Thai military intelligence source commenting on the bombing of the ministerial visit, 12 insurgents, one of them a woman, arrived from Malaysia on March 22, split into two groups of six, and emplaced the two bombs (Boonyakaj, 2004). None had been detected by intelligence sources prior to the bombing.

*Jane’s Intelligence Review* reports that inadequate intelligence is prohibiting an effective government response to the insurgency in the southern provinces.

It [poor intelligence] is the result of poor training and often minimal understanding of Islam and Malay culture and language on the part
of Thai Buddhist officials from other parts of the country - a shortcoming compounded by the closed nature of local Muslim society. Familiarization courses for police officers posted to the south undoubtedly go some way to improve matters at the basic civic relations level, but are hardly sufficient for the more sensitive tasks of intelligence gathering. Tellingly, neither of the two [Buddhist] Border Patrol Police intelligence officers lynched in April [2003] were able to speak the local Malay dialect (“Thailand faces up to southern extremist threat,” 2003).

Thai officials in March 2004 announced that methods of monitoring JI operatives traveling between Cambodia and Thailand were being developed. A Thai military officer said “cooperation on fighting terrorism, especially in intelligence gathering, would be discussed alongside drugs, crime, car theft, arms smuggling and border demarcation” (Nanuam, 2004b). Proposals have been made to create a regional databank, but the levels of distrust that currently exist between US and Southeast Asian nations have historically prevented such a sharing network from becoming a reality (Ressa, 2003, p.220).

In late October/early November 2004, the CIA offered anti-terror training to Thailand. On November 3, 2004, the Borneo Bulletin quoted Deputy Prime Minister in charge of internal security Chavalit Yonchaiyudy as saying, “We don’t want any country, ally or not, to interfere with our internal affairs” (“Bangkok turns down CIA anti-terror training,” 2004). However, according to an interview with a Thai government official who wished to remain anonymous, the Thai government, in fact, did want the specialized instruction, but with a considerable level of discretion. For obvious reasons, there exists much suspicion in the Thai south of any Thai-US cooperation that might imply that the War on Terror will be brought to bear against Thai Muslims. According to the anonymous official, a senior Thai security official leaked to the press that the CIA training was to occur and as a result the Thai government had no choice but to publicly refuse the training to avoid domestic opposition.

Intelligence operations in Thailand have demonstrated improvement in efficiency since 9/11. However, there still exists a need for better intelligence gathering, processing, and sharing among Thai, US, and other Southeast Asian
intelligence agencies. All of the instruments of national power are necessary to combat the threats of internal Islamic insurgency and transnational terrorism in the Kingdom. Improved intelligence operations, with specific attention provided to the flawed areas discussed above, are critical to identifying where, when, and how these instruments of national power are applied.

3. Immigration, Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Corruption

Thai officials acknowledge that Thailand has become a safe haven for transnational terrorists involved in forged documents, narcotics, and weapons trafficking, as well as being a transit point and planning venue for regional terrorists.

The Thai government’s level of cooperation with the US includes both the identification of terrorist financial assets and continuous reinforcement of anti-money laundering legislation. An October 2002 Congressional Report titled Foreign Support of the US War on Terrorism noted Thailand’s involvement in multilateral cooperation efforts on anti-money laundering. The Kingdom is also a member of the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering (Congressional Research Service, 2002, p.45). In 2003 Thailand’s new anti-terrorism laws gave the Kingdom’s Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO), an agency established in 2000 to initially stop the laundering of drug money, wider powers to track illegal funds linked with suspected terrorist organizations. Under the new laws, AMLO has three investigative units, one to track large transactions, one to track corrupt government officials, and one to search for funds associated with terrorist organizations (Corben, 2003).

After the capture of Hambali in 2003, Prime Minister Thaksin issued two controversial executive decrees amending the Criminal Procedure Code and Anti-Money Laundering Act, delivering harsh punishment to perpetrators of terrorist offenses. Thaksin’s new laws enacted provisions that allowed for detention without trial, similar to terrorism-related laws in the US, Singapore, and Malaysia (Simon, 2003a). Between October 2003 when Thaksin’s decrees were
issued, and March 2004, approximately 500 suspects had been arrested on international terrorism and money-laundering charges.

The Thai government must, however, remain cognizant of the protection of human rights for its citizens when creating such laws, especially when it comes to enforcement, namely in the south. When the anti-terrorism laws were generated in Thailand, fears were expressed that the new freedom given to authorities would be used against Muslim leaders who were making legitimate attempts to improve the situation in the south. Some senior Thai officials complained that “the US was pushing them to arrest and interrogate terror suspects in ways that violated civil liberties under Thai law, including military-style abduction, detention without trial, and unrestricted wire tapping” (Simon, 2003a). Such statements are flawed for obvious reasons. Although the US has admittedly pressured countries such as Thailand to do more in the fight against terrorism, violating civil liberties is unfortunately a well-known internal reality among corrupt military, police, and civil authorities in the Kingdom.

Thailand has traditionally been a meeting place for transnational terrorists and an easy place to obtain false documents. The US, Australia, and several other countries have placed law enforcement agents at Bangkok’s Don Muang International Airport looking for people traveling with false documents. On average, over 200 false passports are seized each week (Simon, 2003a). In March 2004, the Thai government signed a Memorandum of Intent (MOI) with the US to install biometric scanners in international airports as part of the War on Terror. The terrorist interdiction system, named PISCES (Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System), matches facial images, fingerprints and biographical information via a high speed data bank in the US. Thailand is in fact the first country in Southeast Asia to share online traveler information with the US (Ashayagachat, 2004a).

Corruption is another well-known aspect of national concern that pervades not only in the military and police fields, but in government as well. Prime Minister Thaksin has openly admitted that this is a real problem. On February
20, 2004, following increased violence in the south that erupted the month before, the Prime Minister said that rogue officials could have played a part in the recent violence in the southern provinces. “There must have been government officials involved in this, but how many, or what level of these people [sic], we are probing” (“Thailand: Officials implicated in southern unrest,” 2004). Police Major General Thanee Thawichsri speculated the day before Thaksin’s announcement that the recent attacks could have been prompted by local elections, and politicians might have seized the opportunity to kill opponents and blame Muslim separatists (“Thailand: Officials implicated in southern unrest,” 2004).

An April 2005 extortion racket in Bangkok’s Bo Bae garment market exposed mafia activities that allegedly included Thai political and military members. Bo Bae revealed that mafia had been demanding money from street vendors in return for being left alone and safe from harm. Soon after the incident came to a head, PM Thaksin announced that the government would take strong measures to eliminate the “parasitic burden” on traders. Regarding military participation in the extortion, Thai Privy Council Chairman General Prem Tinsulanononda announced to defense leaders that military mafias must be eliminated in order for the armed forces to maintain their dignity and respect (Nanuam, 2005c). It is evident that despite recent anti-corruption policies implemented by the Thai government, some officials are still involved in illegal activity for personal gain.

Immigration reform initiatives, counter-corruption policies, and new anti-terrorism laws demonstrate a genuine effort to reform the Thai government’s national policies which have been admittedly insufficient in the past. There still exists much room for improvement in these areas. Because the US has a genuine interest in regional stability as well as locating personnel and terrorist assets in Southeast Asia, greater devotion of resources in assisting the planning and implementation of Thai reforms is necessary.
4. Human Rights and Martial Law

The majority of southern Muslims in Thailand do not support the current violence or the secession of a separate Islamic state. Inadequate government policies toward reform and stability in the region, however, can only be interpreted as contributors toward the violence in which many southern Muslims would otherwise not participate. While conducting anti-terrorist operations by law enforcement and military personnel in the south, the Thai government must be more cognizant of the potential for negative repercussions when a heavy handed approach is used against legitimate Muslim leaders attempting to improve democracy in the region. Unfortunately, a heavy handed approach has been a recurring tactic in the government’s response to southern unrest and insurgency.

In 2003 PM Thaksin launched a war on drugs throughout Thailand. The action, later criticized by the US and human rights advocates around the world, resulted in the killing of more than 2,500 suspects and hundreds of arbitrary arrests. In late April 2004, over 100 southern Muslim insurgents were killed after they simultaneously attacked more than 10 government outposts in Yala, Songkhla, and Pattani Provinces. During this incident, soldiers moved in to several locations and after seven hours of shooting, 5 police officers were dead, 17 insurgents were captured, and 100 were killed, including 32 who were firing from Krue Se Mosque, a historic symbol of the (Muslim) Kingdom of Pattani. In the aftermath of the April battle, General Panlop Pinmanee, deputy director of the southern Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) was ordered to leave the southern region immediately for disobeying orders to negotiate, not battle, with the 32 insurgents fighting from the mosque (“Panlop moved for disobeying orders,” 2004). Despite the highest insurgent casualty numbers in recent history, it must be emphasized in defense of the military and police that the insurgents themselves initiated the April 28, 2004 battle.

Under the provisions of the Leahy Amendment which prohibits the US from training any foreign forces associated with human rights violations, Thailand risks being distanced from certain types of US support if questionable actions
continue to manifest within the Kingdom. A February 2004 US State Department report highlighted Thailand’s worsening human rights situation, with specific attention paid to PM Thaksin’s 2003 anti-drug campaign in which 2,500 alleged drug dealers were killed. April 2005 marked the beginning of PM Thaksin’s third war on drugs campaign in which he announced his intentions to rid Thailand of all illegal drugs by the end of the year. Policies that include human-rights violations, as seen in Indonesia in the 1990s, led to a complete break-off of US support and training of Indonesian military, police, and security forces. While it seems unlikely that the US would take such drastic measures as it did with Indonesia, Thaksin must recognize the potential some type of US policy change towards the Kingdom if human rights violations continue to make headlines. The need for change in specific Thai human rights policies is not only critical to maintaining valuable support from the US, but an awareness of human rights issues is also fundamentally critical to maintaining long term stability inside Thailand’s borders.

Following the January 4, 2004 insurgent raid on a southern army camp that left four soldiers dead and over 300 weapons stolen, martial law was established in the three southern provinces of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat. Thousands of Thai troops have since been dispatched to the region to tackle the problems associated with the reemerging insurgency. The April 28, 2004 insurgent attacks on several security force outposts in the three southern provinces left more than 100 insurgents dead. On October 25, 2004, after protesting the detainment of Muslims suspected of giving weapons to insurgents, 78 people were suffocated or crushed to death after being detained by police and packed into trucks for transportation to jail. According to Major General Sinchai Nutsatit, the detainees were stripped semi-naked after their arrest and taken on a five-hour drive to barracks in Pattani province. An Islamic teacher from Prince of Songkhla University in Pattani, commenting on the Tak Bai incident as it is now
known, said that, “We have never seen this sort of torture in Thai history before…It’s a deliberate massacre” (“Thailand says 78 Muslims Died in Army Custody,” 2004).

A significant problem with the Thai government response is that officials continue to react to violence in the region with force but do not attempt to understand the reason why the southern insurgents are creating the violence in the first place. While the direct approach is often necessary, other options are rarely considered. Following the suffocation of the 78 Muslims, PM Thaksin commented that “The protestors had several motives, but the main reason was separatism…I cannot allow the separatists to exist on our land.” He added that “We can not allow these people to harass innocent people and authorities any longer…We have no choice but to use force to suppress them” (“78 killed in police action in Thailand,” 2004). Two days after the suffocation incident, PULO announced on its website that attacks in Bangkok would come in retaliation for the deaths of the protestors (“How long can Bangkok dodge the militant bullet?” 2004). To further exacerbate the situation in the south and suspicion of the government following Tak Bai, PM Thaksin announced on November 19, 2004 that he rejected a UN probe into the incident because a Thai government investigation was already taking place.

According to an April 2004 Bangkok University survey of over 1,000 Muslims aged 18 and older, the primary reason given for violence in the south is conflicts among soldiers, police and other officials (24.4%), followed by poverty and unemployment (22.5%), religious conflicts (20.1%), cultural conflicts (16.8%), and the activities of local southern influential figures (16.2%) (“City Muslims don’t see eye to eye with ‘eye for an eye’ policy,” 2004).

Nik Abdul Ragib, a Thai-Malaysian relations expert in Narathiwat explained that the majority of southern Muslims do not support the militant insurgent violence. The locals, Ragib explained, only fear for their safety, which in turn leads to less cooperation with the authorities because of potential
reprisals from the insurgents. “By putting martial law into force the government will only widen the gap between the people and the authorities” (Kuppuswamy, 2004).

One ongoing case that has held the interest of human rights advocates is the March 12, 2004 disappearance of Somchai Neelapaijit, chairman of Thailand's Muslim Lawyers Association. Somchai went missing after leaving his home in the south for a meeting in Bangkok. At the time of the disappearance, the lawyer was representing two Thai terror suspects, with suspected links to JI, who were on trial for allegedly plotting bomb attacks in the Kingdom. In April 2004, four police officials surrendered to authorities after arrest warrants were issued against them for involvement in the lawyer’s abduction. The police officers have continued to maintain their claims of innocence (Crispin, 2004b). In March of 2005, with Somchai suspected dead and no progress made after government investigations, human rights groups in Thailand and elsewhere throughout Southeast Asia announced that they will submit the case of the disappearance of to the UN Human Rights Commission conference. Sunai Phasuk, advisor to the Senate committee on foreign affairs, criticized the Thai government for failing to answer questions about the case (Charoenpo, 2005).

In the south, Muslim community leaders and businessmen warned that heavy handed government action could drive away tourists and foreign investors as well as disrupt people’s day to day lives. A statement released by the Islamic Committee of the southern province of Pattani in 2004 said, “Government operations have destroyed the credibility of the religious leaders and institutions. The Muslim community will not provide further cooperation unless the government stops such thug-like measures” (Kuppuswamy, 2004). According to Surin Pitsuwan, a former Thai foreign minister, “A tactic of an eye for an eye has been adopted to suppress the violence. Yet without sensitivity to Muslim culture, heavy handed activity may lead to further tension and more serious conflicts” (Kuppuswamy, 2004).
In March 2004, the Thai Army Commander, General Chaisit Shinawatra announced that the army had assigned informants to talk with key leaders of separatist groups about security in the region in an attempt to ease the tension between the government and the separatist insurgents. Insurgent organizations to be negotiated with included PULO, BRN, and Bersatu (“Asia-Pacific daily news summary,” 2004b). In contrast to offensive police and military operations waged against suspected insurgents in the region, this was a clear change of methodology on the part of the Thai government. The success of this new strategy depends on the actors’ abilities to approach each other peacefully and try to understand the problem. The idea of opening the lines of communication between the government and the insurgents, if given time to develop can only be seen as a step towards regional stability.

In an April 2004 Wall Street Journal report titled “US Ally in Asia may have crossed line in terror fight”, it was reported that since the January 2004 insurgent raid on the southern army camp, “more than 100 Thai Muslims have disappeared in the southern part of the country, many of them taken in commando-style raids by unidentified assailants” (Crispin, 2004b). “The government admits some misdeeds have been committed,” said Thai government spokesman Jakraphop Penkair. He continued to admit that, “some officials saw it as necessary to carry out acts like abduction of people and beating some into confessions. The government does not officially or unofficially endorse these policies” (Crispin, 2004b). An August 2004 report released by Thailand’s Human Rights Commission accused southern security forces of torture, kidnappings, and extrajudicial killings in their crackdown on Muslim insurgents. The commission’s report included documented cases of suspects being “blindfolded, beaten, strangled, electrocuted, humiliated and urinated on by official interrogators” (Corben, 2004).

The international situation and Thailand’s support for the US War on Terror has no doubt affected Muslim sentiments in the south as well. The war is generally interpreted by some Muslims around the world as a War on Islam.
Since Thailand was announced as a Major Non-NATO Ally by the US in late 2003, Muslims have felt even further alienated from their government in Bangkok.

Not all government responses to the southern insurgency have included the use of force. The Thai government has made legitimate attempts, the results of which are still yet to be seen, to improve the situation for Thai Muslims. In January 2004 PM Thaksin declared that it will take three years to stabilize the south. He announced that the government would spend approximately US$500 million to help the southern region. It is unclear, however, what portion of the money will be spent on economic growth versus tightening security in the area (Crispin, 2004a). It should be noted that shortly after the announcement of the spending plan, however, the infusion of the funding into the south was ironically put on hold for an indefinite period of time as a result of increased violence in the south. As of early 2005, Thaksin had continued to withhold funding because of the continuing insurgency which he feared would only prosper following an infusion of money to the region. In another step towards better integration of southern Muslim culture into Thai society, Education Minister Adisai Bodharamik announced in 2004 that Islamic schools in the south would be registered as private educational institutions, thus entitling them to government development assistance (“Islamic schools to receive state development assistance,” 2004).

In response to an April 2004 Senate Military Affairs report urging PM Thaksin to replace 75% of state officials in the south with local Muslims to off-set separatist ideology in the region, former 4th army commander General Harn Leenanond, chairman of a panel studying the report, told the Bangkok Post he agreed the policy would provide long-term solutions to many problems in the South. "Under this policy, Muslim students and youths in southern border areas must receive assistance and a chance to further their studies in all fields, so they can graduate with degrees and help develop their communities," said Harn, who headed the army's southern forces command in the early 1980s. " [The] policy will allow local Muslims to follow careers in the public sector, which in the long
run will dispel mistrust and suspicion," he said. "Within 15 years of the policy being implemented, we will see our Muslim brothers working as government officials at all levels" ("Call for more Muslim officials," 2004).

On November 3, 2004, one week after Tak Bai and one day after being spoken to by His Majesty the King about the violence in the south, PM Thaksin held a reception for about 400 Muslim leaders and representatives of Islamic organizations as well as 17 foreign ambassadors, eight senators, and 10 members of Parliament. Without hesitation, the Prime Minister asked key Muslim leaders to “forget the past, start anew,” and together with their communities discuss what they want the government to do to end the violence in the deep south (Santimatanedol, 2004). Unfortunately, just as in the past, the Thaksin administration discussed an accommodating strategy that may have been productive but then in practice continued on with ineffective counterinsurgency activities.

Controversy erupted in February 2005 when PM Thaksin announced his plan to divide the deep south into red, yellow, and green zones according to the level of violence that villages experience. Red zones villages were those deemed sympathetic to the insurgency and, as a result, they would not receive any development funds unless they improved their status to yellow or green through self-policing. There would have been approximately 350 villages out of 1,500 in the south that were to be designated “red zones.” While the plan was to isolate some insurgents, innocent people would no doubt have simultaneously been punished. A critical measure of success in counterinsurgency is whether or not more or less insurgents are being produced as a result of government activities. In the case of denying certain areas development funds, the government may have forced some people who were heretofore impartial to the insurgency to either support the violence or at least reject any inclination to help the government fight the insurgency. Immediately following Thaksin’s announcement of the zoning plan, harsh opposition to the idea was unleashed by religious leaders, civil administrators, academics, anonymous Thai military
leaders, and the like. Within one week of constant pressure from critics to abandon the idea of mass punishment for the south, government spokesman Jakrapob Penkair publicly announced that the zoning was merely an idea, not government policy, and that as of February 2005 it was “not being implemented or prepared at all” (“Thailand steps back,” 2005). What was most disturbing about the plan, regardless of whether or not it was implemented, was the fact that the Thaksin administration believed it was a viable tactic to help solve the problems of the south. Had it not been for critics voicing strong opposition, the plan would most likely have been implemented rather quickly.

There are numerous problems with zoning measures, one being the possibility that insurgents would simply relocate to green zones where they could operate more freely, thus leaving the innocent people in red zones as the only ones punished. Such a situation would then make it very easy for insurgent leaders to reinforce to the local population that the Thai government is in fact not concerned for the wellbeing of southern Muslims. Historically speaking, the Malayan Emergency of the 1950s showed that zoning was effective for population control measures but cutting off aid to Malaya’s “black zones” – the equivalent of southern Thailand’s “red zones” – was counter-productive to the counterinsurgency fight. According to a Rand Corporation study of the Malayan Emergency, a 1952 law that allowed the levying of “collective punishment against people of an uncooperative village or town…was repealed in 1953 as unfair to innocent members of the population” (Komer, 1972, p. 36). Rohan Gunaratna, author of Inside al Qaeda, has said with regard to the Thai zoning that since only a small number of Thai Muslims currently support the insurgency, "It's highly counterproductive to cut off aid to any village where there are insurgents because it will only radicalize entire villages" (“The Thai terror front,” 2005).

Unfortunately, the positive measures taken by the Thai government to support and work with southern Muslims have been outweighed by questionable human rights practices and martial law abuses. A genuine effort on the part of the Thai government to understand the Muslim grievances in the region, open
lines of communications with the insurgents, eliminate government sponsored violence against Muslims, and devote resources to develop the southern region are all necessary steps for stability in the south.

5. Southeast Asian Regional Forums

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed on August 8, 1967 with the objective of unifying Southeast Asian governments for the purposes of accelerating the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region; promoting political and economic stability in the region; and resolving various issues in the region. The original members of ASEAN are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. New members that have joined since 1967 are Brunei Darussalam (January 8, 1984), Vietnam (July 28, 1995), Laos and Myanmar (July 23, 1997), and Cambodia (April 30, 1999). Combined, all of these nations are referred to as “The ASEAN Ten.”

In 1994 it was determined that ASEAN required a sub-organization specifically focused on peace and stability in the region. The ASEAN nations recognized that rapid regional and global development had serious impacts on their security and strategic concerns. It was also acknowledged that because of the great diversity of the cultures in Southeast Asia, there were significant challenges to peace and prosperity in the region.

As a result, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was formed to deal with these security and stability concerns. Today, the ARF includes the ASEAN 10 as well as 13 additional countries from around the world, including the US, charged with promoting peace and security operations.

Up until 9/11, however, neither ASEAN nor the ARF actually accomplished a great deal in the arena of regional stability. It was generally recognized when the ARF was formed that it would have to establish itself as a meaningful forum to enhance the peace and prosperity of the region. The ARF did provide a much
needed system for senior governmental representatives to meet regularly and interact in order to address regional concerns.

Following 9/11, ASEAN made progress once the serious threat of terrorism became a harsh reality. The US also became increasingly more involved in the operations, activities, and financial support of ASEAN. New agreements were made among the ASEAN 10 and the US to expand intelligence sharing, gain better accountability of the enormous number of weapons that transit Southeast Asia, locate and capture known terrorists, and better coordinate the tracking and seizure of suspected terrorist financial networks.

ASEAN’s recent history and actual results in countering terrorism and instability in the region have proven mediocre. During the October 2003 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Bangkok, US President George W. Bush took advantage of the opportunity to use the summit as a conduit to reengage the issue of terrorism in Southeast Asia. Several nations, such as Malaysia, were infuriated that Bush had turned an economic forum into a facilitator of the US War on Terror. It seemed, however, that the US and its considerable influence perhaps now saw APEC as the vehicle to coordinate Southeast Asian anti-terrorism support more so than the ARF. Economic fallout from the 2002 and 2003 Bali and Jakarta bombings reinforced the concept that “stopping terrorism goes hand in hand with APEC’s goal of promoting economic prosperity” (Simon, 2003b).

Among some of the specific actions recommended by the 2003 APEC summit were controls on trade of shoulder-fired missiles (MANPADs), improved security of shipping in ports and on the high seas, and better monitoring of cross-border financing and movements by terrorists.

The US Bio-Terrorism Act, in force since December 2003, makes it harder for countries to ship containers to the US if the exporter does not use electronically sealed containers. Thailand, along with Singapore, committed to the program in early 2004.
While attending the 2003 summit, President Bush also made the announcement that Thailand would now be promoted to the status of “Major Non-NATO ally,” thus resulting in more favorable arms procurement and military assistance and modernization from the US (Simon, 2003b). It is possible that such an action may, in fact, make Thailand, now more closely aligned with the US and its War on Terror, a more attractive target for terrorism.

In an effort to establish better coordination with Malaysia to the south, Thailand in March 2004 announced new initiatives to coordinate police and security matters with its neighbor. It was reported following a March 27, 2004 bombing in a southern border town that left 28 people injured, including eight Malaysians, that the attackers had retreated across the border to Malaysia denied that the attackers crossed into their country. However, because of administrative “red tape” that does, in fact, hinder pursuit by law enforcement personnel on both sides of the border, Malaysia and Thailand agreed to better coordinate security policies for cross-border law enforcement.

On March 30, 2004, Thailand joined the 22 other ARF countries in Manila to discuss measures on countering terrorism in transport. This Second Inter-sessional Meeting of the ARF focused its discussion on exchanged experiences in ensuring transport security as well as technical measures to enhance bilateral and multilateral coordination to counter terrorism in the region (“Asia-Pacific daily news summary,” 2004b).

See Seng Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna from the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies in Singapore have presented several valuable, alternative considerations in dealing with Southeast Asia’s terrorist threats with regard to regional initiatives (2004). The two analysts first defend what many, including the US to a degree, describe as an over-cautious and inadequate anti-terrorist response among the ASEAN nations. Tan and Ramakrishna counter pessimist criticism by stating that the reason ASEAN governments may not be “doing enough” is because of “certain domestic structural-institutional constraints that conceivably hinder regional cooperation” (p.92). This point carries much weight
considering that most of the countries in the region simply do not have the intelligence funding, resources, agents, and infrastructure that we find among US agencies. In addition, the two researchers point out that “the American [military] response to the war on terror may not be at all adequate in neutralizing the terror threat within Southeast Asia; in fact, it may even backfire. The embers of radical Islamist terrorism can only be doused by the adoption of a comprehensive approach that addresses a host of real or perceived social, economic, political and ultimately, ideological challenges” (p.92).

The 2004 APEC summit in Chile vanquished any question of whether or not APEC had become a vehicle for security, anti-terrorism, and counter-proliferation-related issues. The final communiqué signed by President Bush and the other leaders called for an “unmistakable resolve to collectively confront the threat of terrorism and its disastrous effects” (Goodenough, 2004). The leaders approved many counter-terrorism measures including commercial flight safety agreements and shipping initiatives.

The ASEAN nations have the ability to do more to fight a coordinated effort against terrorism, but politics and cultural biases remain an obstacle. The Indonesian government, for example, did not announce until March 2005 that it intended to formally outlaw JI (Brummitt, 2005). Some Indonesian officials still refuse to acknowledge that JI exists, even after years of horrific terrorists attacks such as those at the JW Marriott and in Bali. The governments of Islamic majority nations, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, have shown their awareness to tread carefully in condemnation of Islamic militancy. Instability and violence, which is already a very volatile matter in these countries, can be easily ignited if the fight against terrorism is conceived as a fight against Islam. On the other end of the spectrum, Thailand, after a weak committal to the War on Terror initially, has since aligned itself rather strongly with the US. In addition to the monumental designation as a Major Non-NATO US ally, Thailand has also since deployed units in non-combat roles to support Operation Iraqi Freedom. This
commitment in itself puts Thailand in harms way, as demonstrated by terrorist threats against the Kingdom delivered to Thailand’s embassy in Sweden in April 2004.

In addition, Thailand must take advantage of the situations involving Muslim extremism in Malaysia and Indonesia to learn about confronting radical Islam. Both countries have offered to provide limited assistance but such offers have been rejected by the Thai government. On November 4, 2004, the ARF met in Beijing. The ARF members requested that Thailand provide the forum with an update on the situation in the Thai south since the matter continues to draw increased international attention. Unfortunately, Thailand’s response was that the issue remains an internal matter. Some believe that Thaksin continues to keep the situation internal rather than regional for political reasons. Regardless of the motivation, the result of rejecting offers of good will from neighboring Muslim states is an obstruction of progress and cooperation among the ASEAN members (“Why Thailand needs outside help to end conflict,” 2004).

In later November 2004, PM Thaksin threatened to walk out of the annual ASEAN summit held in Laos if the insurgency in Thailand was brought up during the meetings. Again, Thaksin’s argument was that the issues in the south were of a domestic nature and not the concern of the other member nations.

The cooperative measures achieved by ASEAN, ARF, and APEC demonstrate a genuine concern for stability throughout Southeast Asia. Cooperation among the regional nations has led to the arrests of hundreds of suspected JI and AQ operatives and leaders. Through these cooperative forums the leaders of all concerned nations have committed themselves to countering terrorism, but with varying degrees. Yet, it is because of these varying degrees of commitment and cooperation in the fight against terror that ASEAN, ARF, APEC, and other forums designed to promote regional stability have achieved a moderate level of success. Because most of the nations in Southeast Asia, including Thailand, have limited resources, it is, therefore, in the US’ interest to increase its support of the regional forums. However, the ultimate success or
failure of these various forums in the fight against regional terrorist organizations such as JI can only be realized by the cumulative successes that occur within the individual nations that make up the forums, with or without external support.

6. Information Operations

In addition to Thailand’s own internal efforts to implement Information Operations (IO) to help combat terrorism, ASEAN and APEC routinely include the topic of IO during regional summits as well.

Regarding cyber-specific security measures, regional workshops held in Thailand and supported by the US Department of Justice have, for example, implemented plans for developing requisite legal frameworks for preventing cyber crime; improving law enforcement investigative units with training and equipment to investigate and deter computer crime; and increasing cooperation between industry and law enforcement agencies to reduce the opportunities for abuse of ICTs [Information and Communication Technology] (“Supporting regional collaboration on cyber-security,” 2003).

In the area of computer technology, Thailand has unilaterally made efforts to confront the problem within its own borders as well.

The Thai National Intelligence Agency (NIA) has also established a Cybersecurity Division, which will be responsible for the NIA’s investigations related to computer and Internet technology. The establishment of this Division was reportedly in reaction to world terrorist events such as the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States and local cyber-crimes... (“PHR2004 – The Kingdom of Thailand,” 2004).

But IO should not be limited to the dealings of computer and internet activities. Comprehensive IO must be understood as information management in both the virtual and physical worlds. It encompasses a broad spectrum of activities through which terrorist funds can be tracked, financial and social networks can be revealed, public diplomacy can be exercised, psychological operations (discussed in Chapter 6) can be used to influence both friendly and
hostile entities, offensive operations in the cyber-realm can disrupt insurgent information channels, and the networking of US, Thai, and regional intelligence and military assets through varied communications channels can be achieved.

Despite the poverty and underdevelopment in the south today, globalization has created an interconnectivity that unites even the most remote parts of the world. Thailand’s first car-bomb explosion in February 2005, along with the increase in the number of cell phone-detonated bombs, reveals similarities among terrorist tactics used in Thailand and elsewhere around the world. The value of developing a comprehensive IO campaign would be worth the cost for Thailand. The United States, with an extensive range of IO assets and capabilities can help Thailand in this area of emphasis while at the same time developing a more expansive IO network of its own throughout Southeast Asia.

7. Maritime Interdiction and Security

...many emerging threats in the [Southeast Asian] region lie in the realm of maritime security. Weak and underpaid Southeast Asian navies and lax port facilities are causing many in the US and regional defense sectors to worry that terrorists may begin targeting the Straits of Malacca [linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans] and generally turn to piracy. US security cooperation with Southeast Asia has traditionally focused on armies, which have been far more important politically in the region than navies ("US security relations with Southeast Asia: a dual challenge," 2004, p.1).

In July 2004, Thailand, the US, and several other Southeast Asian nations met in the Republic of the Philippines for a Maritime Threats Workshop. The purpose of this and other similar initiatives was to address the increases in maritime transnational threats throughout Southeast Asia. A US Army War College issue paper described the areas of concern addressed during the workshop:

Delegates recommended inserting additional Maritime Security Operations/Maritime Interdiction Operations (MSO/MIO) objectives into existing bilateral and multilateral exercises in the region including [the annual military] CARAT exercise (Malaysia, Thailand,
Singapore, Indonesia, and U.S.). Offshore facility protection objectives could also be added. Regular Civil Military Operations should be conducted along the patrol routes to establish government presence along the less developed areas of each country. An expanded Multilateral Maritime Defense Cooperation will be required, especially for those countries that share common sea borders, in order to be able to counter the transnational crime, alien smuggling, drugs, and terrorism.

...[the workshop] described five Southeast Asia maritime security challenges: piracy, maritime terrorism, transnational criminal trafficking operations, refugees and illegal migration, and protecting energy routes...The globalized, hi-technology world order not only poses new security challenges, but also spawns a host of global transnational threats, which are increasingly maritime in nature (Wohlschlegel, Turner, & Butts, 2004, p.1).

Littoral support for insurgent activity in Thailand is a threat which requires coordination with the Kingdom’s neighboring countries throughout Southeast Asia to eliminate. The proximity of Malaysia and Indonesia, which have expansive waterway connections as well as a well-known history of connections to transnational terrorism, demands that these nations, along with allies like the US, develop a stronger cooperation for maritime security. In 2004 Thailand, along with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore agreed to joint patrols along the Malacca Straits following intelligence “suggesting JI intended on either hijacking a vessel and blowing it up in the Straits or steering the vessel into [a] port itself” (“Anti-terrorism advisory council newsletter,” 2004, p.4). To date, however, the patrols continue to be primarily conducted by Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. Proposals from US officials to establish an American naval presence in the region, however, have so far received a cool reception from the nations in the region that wish to address the problem locally.

The threat goes beyond immediate neighbors as well. In June 2000, Thai officials discovered a partially completed submersible at a shipyard in Phuket. The submersible was owned by a known sympathizer to the Sri Lankan insurgent group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Illegal arms trafficking through Thailand, in support of illicit drug trading throughout the region, provides
one additional support mechanism for insurgents and transnational terrorists to acquire the equipment and personnel that they require for sustained operations.

Thailand has worked to implement recommendations by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to strengthen maritime security. This has included the installation of Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) on newly built ships and other tracking measures. At APEC and ASEAN summits in 2003 and 2004, Southeast Asian leaders, along with the US, have recommended and approved multilateral security measures for sea ports as well as several other counter-terrorism maritime shipping initiatives. The US and Thailand also exercise maritime interdiction activities during the annual Cobra Gold training exercises.

Throughout all of Southeast Asia, Singapore and Malaysia are the only two nations that have coast guards. Considering the fact that Thailand has over 1,999 miles of coastline and a known history of illegal transnational maritime operations, development of a Thai Coast Guard to protect and monitor the littoral activities in and out of the Kingdom seems both practical and necessary.

The issue of maritime security remains one in which the Kingdom must build a greater internal capacity for government and international cooperation to suppress transnational terrorist activities through and along the Kingdoms extensive coastlines. For its part, the US must continue to promote multilateral cooperation for security with Thailand and its regional neighbors.

8. Military Options

Among Thai military and police forces, assignments to the southern provinces have historically been given to underachieving or less politically-connected officers who are not deemed worthy of assignments in other more prestigious, important parts of the country. This is a double edged sword for the Thai government: Although substandard officers assigned to the south intentionally do not receive the recognition that other officers get in more prominent locations, these less competent officials further exacerbate the problems associated with the Islamic insurgency there. It would seem
appropriate that, given the seriousness of the insurgency in the south, the most capable and talented security officials in the country should be employed in the south.

According to a March 2004 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment article titled “Executive Summary: Thailand,” the rivalry between the police and Royal Thai Army (RTA) over which authority should oversee the south’s security operations has actually resulted in offshoot parts of the RTA supporting violence in the region. “Rogue RTA elements, angered by the loss of budget and perks implicit in the dissolution of CPM-43 (a civilian-police-military security command controlled by the RTA’s 4th [Southern] Army Region), were accused of reactivating and paying surrendered ex-separatists to undertake hits” (“Executive Summary: Thailand,” 2004).

In March 2004, Thailand’s national police chief and the southern regional army commander were fired for failing to control the growing unrest in the Muslim-dominated south. The Thai government was again reacting to increased domestic pressure to address the problem of Muslim unrest within the country’s borders. In early March 2005, A Tak Bai investigation panel announced that three senior army commanders in the south would be removed from their positions as punishment for the incident which resulted in 78 deaths in October 2004. The practice of hiring and firing police and military officials is a routine affair that usually occurs after a major violent incident in the south. It is often done to give the Thai people the impression that somehow a new officer in charge will solve the problems of insurgency in the south. While ineffective attempts to put more competent individuals in charge occur often, the violence continues unabated.

In an April 2004 Bangkok University poll of over 1,000 Muslims, the Thai military ranked first as the state agency causing the most problems for the southern people, followed by the police, local administrative organizations, and finally village headmen (“City Muslims don't see eye to eye with 'eye for an eye' policy”, 2004).
Today, Thailand is fully engaged in military-to-military cooperation with the US. The Thais and the US “have a vigorous joint military exercise program, averaging some 40 joint exercises per year” (Arkin, 2005, p.219). It is in the area of developing a more effective and professional counterinsurgency capability, however, that Thailand could benefit most from a re-evaluation of training and assistance programs provided by the US military. Today, US Army Special Forces (SF), or Green Berets, rotate regularly through Thailand in order to train, advise, and assist the Thai military and Border Patrol Police during Cobra Gold exercises, Joint and Combined Exchange Training (JCET), Counter-Drug training, Counter-Terrorism training, Joint-Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and other small-unit exercises in support of US-Thai security interests.

The location of US military and Other Government Agency (OGA) personnel and training, with regard to the southern insurgency, however, is a topic of debate. There have been conflicting views among US agencies as to whether or not US personnel - CIA, Special Forces, and others – should be directly used in the south to assist the counterinsurgency. While there are many benefits that can be gained by conducting operations and training security forces in the actual region where the insurgency exists, such activities have the potential to inflame the situation as well. The reason some argue for a cautioned engagement strategy is that, as analyzed by US and Thai academic, military, and government officials, there is a growing conspiracy theory in the south that US agencies – the CIA and Special Forces, among others – are somehow inciting the violence in order to justify bringing the War on Terror to southern Thailand (Pathan, D., 2004; interview with anonymous US government agency officials in Bangkok, Thailand, September 12-17, 2004; and Wattanayagorn, 2004). When analyzed, the concept behind such a conspiracy theory is quite effective for the insurgents: If US agencies are overtly introduced to the south, such action reinforces the conspiracy theory. In the mean time, fear of confirming the conspiracy theory (along with other reasons, such as risk aversion) prevents US intervention.
In November 2004, a former commander of the Thai military contingent in Iraq returned to Thailand and was sent to the southern provinces to explain to Muslim leaders why Thai troops deployed to Iraq. Colonel Montree Umaree said that he would create an understanding of the troops’ mission there and explain that the humanitarian goals of the contingent were not to “help the US Army” (Nanuam, 2004k). The Colonel noted that many Muslims in the South did not understand why the government decided to send troops to Iraq.

The Thai government, with the cooperation of the US, has to this point rejected the option of sending any direct US military or other-agency personnel to the southern provinces. US Army Colonel Barry Shapiro, former Transnational Studies Department Chairman at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii describes reason behind the Thai government’s decision:

Thailand has long hosted Cobra Gold (and other exercises) and requested U.S. military support to counter-drug efforts because all were seen as necessary to Thai national security, and raised little domestic opposition. But an effort [such as introduction of US Army Special Forces] in the Southern three provinces is more likely to achieve the opposite effect of what [the US] hope[s] for. The complex problems that combine to create the conditions in Southern Thailand have been around a long time. What is new is the dimension of globalization: the connections between a militant Muslim extremist in Pattani and Riyadh may be debatable, but that their actions and concerns are seen and felt by Muslims across the world in real-time is undeniable. Direct involvement of U.S. forces would only enhance the dangerously popular perception of a U.S.-led war on Islam, a perception we urgently need to turn around. Thai leaders and policy makers have been worthy allies both before and after 9-11. They have contributed in many ways to the Global War on Terrorism despite public reservation and protests from Muslim southerners. "Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends. Work with others to Defuse Regional Conflicts." These words come straight out of our National Security Strategy document. I spent a year in Afghanistan where the direct approach was and remains necessary, but the situation in Southern Thailand is far removed from that set of circumstances. Thailand knows well that counterinsurgency is only successful when the host nation
takes full ownership of the effort. [The US] must not make it difficult for our friends and allies to do so (personal communication, August 24, 2004).

While there is a definite need for close military-to-military and other-agency training operations, including Special Forces, it would appear that for now, such missions are better suited to occur in regions of Thailand other than the south.

It may be possible, however, to locate such personnel and activities in the southern provinces at a later time. Because of their specialized cultural, regional, and language skills, Special Forces have the ability to work among indigenous populations in the most challenging political and physical environments. Because of the benefits that these forces can bring to a region, such as creating a more responsible security force and a more stable environment to live in, Special Forces have demonstrated in the past – in the Philippines and Afghanistan, for example – that they are capable of overcoming the cultural mistrust that may initially exist between indigenous Muslim populations and SF. The move to employ Army Special Forces to the south should, at a minimum, be planned for and kept as one option for Thailand and the US to act upon in the future.

Aside from a direct engagement strategy in southern Thailand at the present time, a more permanent SF presence elsewhere in the country would be effective in assisting the Kingdom to train police and military personnel in counterinsurgency operations aimed at gaining trust, support, and most importantly - intelligence - from the local population. Dependent, of course, upon Thai cooperation for such action, a more permanent SF presence in Thailand could involve forward basing of SF units in country - very similar to the permanent basing of Green Berets in the Kingdom during the Vietnam era. SF units would be permanently assigned to advisory roles among Thai military forces throughout the country. Additionally, at a strategic level, assigning Special Forces liaison personnel among key government agencies and military organizations in Bangkok
and other key cities would facilitate increased coordination and action channels between Thai, US, and other Southeast Asian national agencies.

By basing US Special Forces in Thailand, with the Thai government’s support, the US would also improve its ability to respond to other War on Terror contingencies throughout Southeast Asia.

C. CONCLUSION

The areas of emphasis discussed in this chapter outline some of the major initiatives that are currently being focused on by Thailand, the US, and other Southeast Asian nations. What becomes evident by examining current Thai, US, and regional policies and initiatives listed in this chapter is the importance of a multifaceted counterinsurgency strategy. Unfortunately, the majority of Thailand’s emphasis today is on security force operations alone. Instead of such a narrowly focused strategy, the next chapter in this thesis will recommend a more expansive solution strategy encompassing several instruments of national and transnational power.
VI. RECOMMENDED SOLUTION STRATEGY

Any successful counterinsurgency depends on timely and accurate intelligence. Without intelligence, all other tools and power that a nation or coalition might have can not be focused and implemented in an effective manner. While it should be understood that timely and accurate intelligence is the primary requirement to implementing strategy, it is equally significant to accept that in an insurgency, the population of a state or region is the conduit through which such intelligence is gathered.

A great deal of this thesis is admittedly focused on the internal insurgency in the south of Thailand. Detailed throughout this thesis, however, is the realization that the transnational and internal threats in Thailand are related in many ways. This chapter provides recommendations for a solution strategy that at some points is directed toward only one threat or the other, but in most cases directly affects both.

A. UNDERSTANDING THE POPULATION

...authorities say they still have no clear picture of who is instigating the violence...Security officers and Muslim community leaders say they are baffled and are finding it almost impossible to fight, let alone negotiate, with the phantom enemy (Barton, 2004).

As evidenced throughout this thesis, an important problem with implementing an effective counterinsurgency strategy in Thailand is a fundamental misunderstanding of the people involved with both transnational terrorism and insurgency there. After decades of militant separatism and more than three years since a global Islamic insurgency swept the world following September 11th, the Thai government to this day does not understand the basic social dynamics behind the threats in the Kingdom. Since the outbreak of violence in January 2004, Bangkok has blamed the violence on drug addicts, radical Islamic school teachers, gun smugglers, corrupt politicians and security forces, separatists, bandits, and criminal gangs. Fundamental questions still
exist about who is in charge, how many insurgents are there, what is the role of external support to the insurgency, do members of one particular insurgent group overlap into other groups, and what are the critical personal ties and relationships that allow for the insurgency to continue uninhibited? Sirichai Thanyasari, a senior Royal Thai Army officer stated in November 2004, “I admit I don’t know who the enemy is but I will try my best to get him” (McGirk, 2004).

In order to conduct an effective counterinsurgency that embraces the population that chooses to either support or reject the violence in the south, the government must understand that population. A basic government analysis of the social networks that exist among the radical Islamic organizations in the south is equally important. It seems that when targeting militants, the Thai government sees all militants as the same. Analysis of the personalities and relationships within insurgent groups can help reveal who are the leaders, operators, and supporters of the insurgency. Social analysis also reveals where the critical communications bridges and gaps exist that can be taken advantage of by government agencies. Understanding the social networks that fuel an insurgency can be very useful in developing a proper counterinsurgency strategy.

While leaders of fundamentalist organizations may be motivated by ideological principles which are difficult to change, operators and supporters of the insurgency may have less founded motivations that can be manipulated with creative incentives. Such manipulation and pseudo-cooperation with supporters and operators can often lead to the gathering of valuable information and intelligence needed for effective counterinsurgency operations.

Simultaneously, the government has not realized the importance of mapping out the interpersonal dynamics that allow transnational terrorist organizations such as JI to enter the Kingdom and establish legal and illegal associations with Thai nationals who potentially support terrorist activities.

Network analysis can help the Thai government better understand the personal dimensions involved with domestic threats, transnational threats, and any possible links between the two. Social network analysis is also a useful tool
for understanding the friendly population that does not support radical Islam but may be influenced by it in the future. Mapping out and analyzing the social networks that have been developed over space and time among suspected individuals inside and outside the Kingdom may allow the Thai government to gain valuable information that can be translated into a national solution strategy that prescribes practical measures, instead of abstract ideas, to achieve success in combating both the insurgency and transnational terrorism. By understanding the concerned populations and communities involved, the government can then commit the appropriate time and resources aimed the population, the support mechanisms that connect the population to insurgents/terrorists, or the insurgents/terrorists themselves.

While the nature of the violence in the Thai south may have shifted from separatism to a form of Islamic revolution, analysis of old ties and relationships can still provide useful information relevant to today’s radical Islamic activities in the country. Social ties created over several decades of Islamic secessionist movements in the south, to include networking that has occurred between insurgents in Thailand and international support elements over the years, can be useful in determining possible links to the new transnational threats that operate in the Kingdom.

B. FOCUSING EFFORTS ON THE POPULATION

In “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches,” Martha Crenshaw (1988) says that, “with regard to creating opportunities for exit [from terrorist organizations], governments would be advised to consider the wisdom of severe legal penalties for membership in certain underground organizations” (p.25). The Thai government, in fact, has attempted on several occasions a more lenient policy toward suspected insurgents who turn themselves in to authorities. In July of 2004, the government did just that. July 11, 2004 was the deadline set by the government for suspects to report to authorities under a new amnesty program. Those who surrendered would be
admitted to regional army camps for re-education and behavioral reform before being released. Those suspected insurgents who did not surrender would be pursued, interrogated, and detained for seven days under martial law. They would then be handed over to police and tried in civilian criminal courts. Between 100 and 150 suspects surrendered to police prior to the deadline.

While the July 2004 policy seemed like a productive tool to help end the violence in the south, government policies and tactics over the years have traditionally been less accommodating. As a result of the harsh tactics more commonly used by southern security forces, the price of exit from insurgent organizations in southern Thailand is potentially greater than the price of staying. As Crenshaw (1988) has said, “Increasing the costs of joining a terrorist organization may restrain some prospective entrants, but establishing high entrance fees also inhibits exit. Offers of amnesty can further motivate exit as well as create suspicion and distrust within the organization” (p.25). In addition to no longer fearing security force pursuit, offers of monetary reward for turning in other insurgents is an additional incentive to those considering surrender.

The problem with amnesty programs is the motivation for the violence in the first place. Understanding the insurgent mechanism in southern Thailand reveals that the motivation for some is an ideological one. And unlike separatists of the past, the Thai Muslims of today are not necessarily in pursuit of a separate state that can be achieved by redrawing boundaries. Many Malay Muslims in the south, influenced by the relative success of today’s global insurgency, have concluded that violence is a tool that can help achieve a desire for recognition of their Muslim identity in a country dominated by Thai Buddhism. A situation such as this is one in which Crenshaw admits that an amnesty policy that offers rewards for surrender may be less effective. As Crenshaw (1988) notes, “the government may find it difficult to find satisfactory substitutes [such as monetary reward or other incentives] unless non-violent organizations with identical purposes exist” (p.25). In the case of Thailand, no such substitutes exist, and in that regard, the creation of a government-sponsored substitute organization that
peacefully promotes Malay Muslim identity is something that should not be dismissed. In the interim, Crenshaw (1988) suggests targeting the terrorist/insurgent organizational system:

It would probably be easier to affect recruitment (remembering that not all organizations are equally dependant on steady supplies of new members) and support functions by influencing the attitudes of sympathizers than by directly undermining the loyalty of indoctrinated activists. The incentive structures for sympathizers are probably weaker than for active members (p.26).

Regardless of the flaws in amnesty programs when ideological values such as religious identity and culture are involved, the Thai government should not abandon attempts at using such tactics. While a percentage of the militant population is undoubtedly incapable of persuasion by material rewards, a certain percentage can most likely be “bought”. Considering the well-known levels of unemployment, economic underdevelopment, and hardship that many in the south experience, monetary incentives for surrender to authorities is likely to produce some useful results. Even in situations where the individual who surrenders may not be of much importance, he may have information on others who are more influential in insurgent organizations.

For those who can not be influenced by monetary or other incentives, as is usually the case with key leaders in terrorist and insurgent organizations, the government must find alternative approaches to dismantling the militant infrastructure. Donatella Della Porta (1995), author of *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany*, examined the “downward spiral” that underground organizations can experience and governments can exploit. In general, Della Porta explains that as organizations become more clandestine as a result of increased government pressure, the group inherently becomes more cut off from the people it requires for recruiting and resources. Because of the increased need for secrecy, the underground organizations, such as those in southern Thailand, can not afford to trust everyone for fear of becoming exposed to government security forces. Over time, the underground organization, according to Dell Porta, becomes less
concerned with propaganda aimed at the people (external focus) and more concerned with simple survival of the organization (internal focus) because resources are scarcer. A component of this internal focus is on maintenance of the organization: dealing with dissent and fissures among the members. As time continues, the group adjusts its limited assets from changing government policies to attacking the government directly. This often takes the form of robbing banks, killing government employees, killing “non-combatants” such as tourists and business people, etc. If one looks at the situation in the Thai south today, this “downward spiral” that Dell Porta describes seems like a very appropriate description of events. In the end, Della Porta explains that members of the underground organizations look more like criminals and less like political activists. They become stigmatized, isolated, paranoid, and put up more barriers between them and the people that they originally intended to influence. This process is the “downward spiral” that Dell Porta describes (pp.113-135).

In the Thai south, it would seem that many of the insurgent organizations have gone the way of isolation and inward focus since many southern Muslims witness violence but with no legitimate purpose. Unfortunately, the Thai government has not taken advantage of this situation. While the insurgents continue to embrace reckless violence, the administration must implement an effective civil affairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOP) campaign that establishes the government’s role in protecting and supporting the people while simultaneously highlighting the insurgents’ use of indiscriminate terrorism aimed at innocent people. The government, however, has instead continued along with an unrelenting use of military force with little or no effective CA/PYSOP. The result of this ineffective strategy has been further alienation of the Malay Muslim population along with a complete misunderstanding of the insurgent mechanism in the south.

Usually after months and/or years of violence and insurgency in a region, the government can identify some semblance of insurgent organization and infrastructure information. Since January 2004, when the most significant
violence in the south started, the Thai government has remained incapable of understanding the insurgent organizations that cause violence on a daily basis. Since early 2004, there have been widely varying claims by government officials about the sources of leadership, funding, resourcing, recruiting, and ideology behind the violence in the south. The organizations appear to be very much isolated. If Della Porta’s model is correct, this insurgent organization isolation would indicate that the local population is just as isolated from the militants as the government is.

As a result of Della Porta’s analysis, it then seems reasonable that the Thai government must continue to exert pressure from the security forces onto the population in the south in order to keep the militants underground and struggling. A critical caveat to such a claim is that the government must achieve a level of Muslim cultural awareness, and adherence to accepted human rights standards, while attempting to drive the insurgents underground. If cultural awareness is not achieved, the government can not identify with the local population that potentially supports the insurgency. Occasional amnesty programs, like those described by Crenshaw, also have their place. A combination of strategies that involve granting leniency and driving the south’s militant organizations further underground will help to keep insurgents relatively ineffective. While violence in the south has claimed more than 600 lives since January 2004, it has at least remained isolated to the southern provinces for the time being.

And so an interim conclusion that can be drawn is that the Thai government is doing what it should be to prevent the growth of militant Islamic organizations by continuing to drive them underground with security force operations. The lingering problem, however, is how to actually eliminate the existence of the organizations so that stability can be restored, all while respecting the culture and rights of the local communities?

As is the case with any successful counterinsurgency effort, the answer to this question is found among the people. Dr. David Tucker of the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, has deconstructed Crenshaw’s “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches” into a simple equation that proves useful here. The equation is simply Entrepreneurs (terrorist leaders) plus mobilizable resources (people, money, weapons, etc.) plus legitimate ideas equal a terrorist organization (Tucker, 2004). It is often difficult for any government to obtain intelligence that is accurate and timely enough to target actual insurgent leaders. What is more productive and cost beneficial is to focus government efforts on the people, or “mobilizable resources” that are critical to both the insurgents and the counter-insurgents. Without such mobilizable resources, the terrorist organization becomes increasingly isolated, ineffective, and eventually disintegrates. If the organization does not disintegrate but falls below the threshold of effectiveness, then the government has more than likely achieved all it needs to eliminate real problems. At no time will a government be able to completely eliminate dissent among its population. However, once the insurgent organization is forced below its threshold of effectiveness, the government must continue to monitor and enforce policies that will maintain or continue to weaken the insurgents’ position.

Dr. Gordon McCormick of the Naval Postgraduate School has developed a counterinsurgency model that depicts the correlation between the key actors in an insurgency (Figure 4.). The model, dubbed the “Mystic Diamond,” includes the population of a state (the Malay Muslims of southern Thailand), the state (the Thai government, or the counterinsurgents), the counter-state (the Thai insurgents), and the international community.
Insurgent Strategy

1. Target Population
2. Target state conversion mechanisms with population
3. Target state directly

State Strategy

A. Target Population
B. Target insurgency conversion mechanisms with population
C. Target insurgents directly

Figure 4. The “Mystic Diamond” Counterinsurgency Model by Dr. Gordon McCormick (2004).

From the model it is understood that the most effective strategy for the insurgents is to first focus effort on the population to gather support, then target the connections or conversion mechanisms that link the population to the government, and finally the government itself. This strategy, in this order respectively, is depicted as actions 1, 2, and 3 in Figure 4. Similarly, the most effective strategy for the state is to first focus effort on the population in order to gain support, then target the links that allow the population to support the insurgents, and finally to target the individual insurgents themselves. This strategy is depicted as actions A, B, and C in Figure 4.
As is often the case in insurgency, both sides do not apply their optimal strategy. Instead of a “1,2,3” strategy, insurgents often apply a “3,2,1” strategy by focusing their attacks directly on the government and symbols of the government. As Della Porta explained, such a strategy does not fare well with the population as the insurgent organization begins to look more like a criminal gang and less like a political activist group.

Likewise, the government in an insurgency often incorrectly focuses its efforts directly on the insurgents and not on the population that provides the critical support necessary for the insurgency to exist. Without accurate intelligence gained from a well-informed local population, the government often attacks suspected insurgents. The result is that innocent or less important people within the insurgent organization get hurt or killed. The outcome of such a defective strategy is reinforcement of the insurgent organization and its propaganda.

In southern Thailand today, these ineffective, reverse strategies (“3,2,1” instead of “1,2,3” by the insurgency, and “C,B,A” instead of “A,B,C” by the government) on the part of both the government and the insurgents are evidenced on nearly a daily basis. Insurgents are continuously blowing up government-related facilities and people, and the security forces are constantly detaining or killing suspected insurgents. Neither side is effectively focusing their efforts on the population. The result for the insurgents is a lack of growth, support, and effectiveness. The result for the government is continued violence and reinforcement of a defective counterinsurgency effort that costs the government scarce resources.

A strategy that incorporates well-planned security operations and amnesty programs is effective. The most important component for the Thai government strategy, as seen in McCormick’s model, is a deliberate focus on the Malay Muslim population and not on individual insurgents. Incidentally, this focus does not revolve around the injection of money into the region or allowing Muslims to speak their own language or pray in public. While such accommodations help
the situation, they are generally regarded by the population as the types of things a government is supposed to do anyway. More to the point, the Thai government must rise above its own self interest and make a genuine shift from a national unity that fundamentally accepts only the Buddhist culture to one that acknowledges and allows for the embracing of Malay Muslim culture as well. Only then will the government truly identify with and win the support of the “mobilizable resources” that Della Porta describes. Without the support of the people, the insurgency can no longer function. Such efforts on the part of the government take time but must nevertheless be pursued indefinitely in order to achieve success in the south.

C. THREAT GROWTH AND REDUCTION FACTORS: ELIMINATING THE THREATS

As demonstrated in this thesis, there is not a distinct line between the domestic and the transnational threats present today. Some specific policies, however, are necessarily directed more toward targeting one or the other of the two threats. This thesis has shown that there is a need for reform of both Thai and US policies dealing with intelligence operations, illegal document production, weapons and drug smuggling, immigration procedures, police and military strategies, anti-corruption, and money laundering. Recommended Thai and US solution strategies have so far been identified that, if implemented, will reduce the threats of insurgency and transnational terrorism in Thailand. Other government activities and policy deficiencies identified in this thesis have the potential to stimulate further insurgency and terrorism if not addressed properly. This growth and reduction of threats occurs within the unique context of Southeast Asian regional influences, Thai-Muslim cultural idiosyncrasies, Thai-Buddhist cultural idiosyncrasies, and western influences. Put into practical terms, if the growth of internal Islamic insurgency in southern Thailand continues to flourish, such growth makes the opportunities for transnational intervention greater by way of an increased support base among the disenfranchised Muslim population. More specifically, if the actual number of southern insurgents grows
from a jihadi motivation or continued dissatisfaction with the Thai government, the transnational target recruiting population that already has a militant, impressionable outlook increases as well. A summary model of the effects of these threat “growth” and “reduction” factors, which have been described in detail throughout this thesis, is graphically depicted in Figure 5.

![Figure 5. Threat Growth and Reduction Factors](image)

Only after significant government reform and implementation of the threat reduction factors described in Figure 5 will Thailand a) no longer exist as a safe haven for transnational terrorists and their infrastructure and b) eliminate the internal insurgency that exists in the southern provinces.
D. A NEED FOR STRATEGY CHANGE

In order to apply the initiatives discussed in this chapter, there must be an acceptance by Thailand, the US, ASEAN, and all other interested parties that current anti-terrorism/counterinsurgency policies in the Kingdom need reevaluation. It is unfortunately very difficult for any organization to accept the need for strategic innovation. In her work *Innovation: Decision Points in the Trajectory of Terrorism*, Martha Crenshaw (2001) states, “…strategic innovation requires both a new goal and a new way of relating operations to that goal. Thus, it is logical to expect that strategic innovation is the exception; it will occur rarely.”

To date, the Thai approach to dealing with the southern insurgency in the south has remained focused on direct action aimed at killing or capturing insurgents. Nowhere in the execution of security and stability operations has consideration been given to destroying the insurgent/terrorist support base with anything other than military and law enforcement measures. Reinforcing failure, or at least a lack of success, is obviously counter-productive, yet it is still occurring in the Kingdom today. The ineffective solution strategy implemented by the Thai government includes the continuous cycle of hiring and firing of military commanders and establishing countless government committees and forming new military task forces. While Crenshaw (2001) focuses her analysis of innovation on terrorist strategy, the same measures of analysis can be applied to Thailand and its allies’ strategic innovation, or lack thereof. It is arguable that Thailand may not have an actual national strategic goal for dealing with terrorists and insurgents. However, observation of government activities throughout 2004 shows that the implicit strategic goal of the Thai government is to kill or capture militants in order to create a stable and secure environment. Despite occasional accommodation and amnesty programs, it is also generally accepted through observation of government operations that the goal of the Thai security forces is not to understand the motivation of, or to reform, those who incite violence.

In accordance with Crenshaw’s (2001) writing, the three areas of concern in a situation such as this are strategy, operations used to accomplish that
strategy, and the measurements of effectiveness (MOE) used to determine whether or not the strategic goal is being accomplished. Applying the model to the problems in Thailand, it is clear that the government’s strategic goal today is the same today as it was when separatists were active in the 1980s and 1990s. It is also the same as it has been since the violence erupted in the south in early 2004: to kill and capture the individuals who are causing the violence. The MOE used to determine whether or not the strategy has been successful is the number of insurgents/terrorists that have been killed/captured. The operation used to accomplish the strategic goal has been conventional military action. Since insurgents remain at large and still able to instigate violence, Thailand reinforces the conventional effort (the operations) in order to raise the number of insurgents killed/captured (the MOE) so that the strategic goal of eliminating terrorists/insurgents can be met. As Crenshaw (2001) says, if the strategic goal is not met, the tendency is to increase the number or intensity of the same type of operations, measured by the same MOE, without reevaluating the appropriateness of the strategic goal.

Applied to the Thai model, once the Thai government (implicitly) decided on its strategy to eliminate insurgents/terrorists, the operations and MOE to accomplish that strategy were created. The message that Crenshaw (2001) conveys is that regardless of whether or not the strategy used is the optimal one, changes are more often only made to operations and MOE while strategic innovation is not considered. Simply stated, the Thai government should re-evaluate its strategic goal of eliminating insurgents/terrorists. While this strategy is not stated anywhere as an official one, it is in fact the one routinely demonstrated through new legislation and security force operations. Operations have, therefore, become those that target insurgents/terrorists, with an MOE that is the number of insurgents/terrorists eliminated. This MOE and operations to support it are likewise not stated in any official government policy but implicitly expressed by security force action that either detains or eliminates those people who are associated with violence in the Kingdom. Unfortunately in Thailand and
other places associated with the US Global War on Terror (GWOT), the strategy, operations, and MOE are all associated with numbers killed/captured and not with whether or not the insurgency is growing or diminishing. Since Thailand is in fact dealing with both transnational insurgents, such as Hambali, and “domestic” insurgents in the south, a more appropriate strategy would be one that targets the growth of insurgency rather than individual insurgents. The killing of some 80 protestors during the 2004 Tak Bai incident, for example, more than likely motivated a portion of Thai Muslims to either support the insurgency or at least reject supporting the government.

By adapting the general theme of Martha Crenshaw’s work, the Thai government should at least consider a new strategic goal since violence and the potential for transnational influence in Thailand are problems that remain unsolved. Instead of the current strategy that focuses on insurgents/ militants/ terrorists being killed or captured, the Thai (and GWOT) should more fittingly be focused on whether the insurgency increases or decreases as a result of government action and policy.

E. PRACTICAL MEASURES TO BE TAKEN NOW

The theories and models discussed to this point are critical to the development of an overall, comprehensive, national solution strategy. Such a strategy, which does not exist solely on the foundation of direct action used by security forces focused on killing/capturing insurgents, does not exist at this time in Thailand. Despite rhetoric there is presently no published, agreed-upon, overarching counterinsurgency/counter-terrorism strategy in the Kingdom of Thailand. For a country that is currently engaged in a full-blown – albeit localized – insurgency that has taken more than 600 lives in less that a year and a half, it seems reasonable that a national strategy is necessary. The drafting and development of such a strategy that all government agencies agree upon would,
at a minimum, force a cooperation of government agencies that to this point are not coordinated. The models presented so far in this chapter can assist in developing such a strategy.

Some of the obstacles to be overcome so that a comprehensive national counter-terrorism/counterinsurgency strategy in Thailand can be successful will no doubt take time. A strategy that intends to eliminate money-laundering and corruption among government officials, for example, may take decades to realize success (if it is possible at all). There are, however, some objectives, such as gathering better intelligence and improving immigration policies, which can be implemented expeditiously with relatively practical measures. Some of the actions recommended below speak directly to several of the “Threat Growth and Reduction Factors” highlighted in Figure 5. Recommended actions include:

1. **Internal Insurgency**
   - Recruit military, paramilitary, police, and government officials specifically from the local Malay Muslim population in the south (This will admittedly require a change in government recruitment policy).
   - Improve government-sponsored employment training and education to enable Malay Muslims to be competitive with Thai Buddhists in Thai society.
   - Use local Islamic leaders to develop and support government-sponsored regulation of Islamic schools (*Pondoks*).
   - Give local Muslim leaders in the south more authority in determining where development funding can best be used.
   - Include Malay Muslim history in all school history curriculums throughout Thailand.
   - Emphasize a Thai nationalism that embraces all religions and cultures of all Thai citizens.
• Give greater emphasis to southern Muslim human intelligence sources.

• Develop more efficient joint cross-border security practices with Malaysia. This implies improving the currently strained diplomatic relations between Thailand and Malaysia.

• Release the development funding for the south that has been withheld.

• Aggressively pursue the elimination of government and military corruption.

2. **Transnational Terrorism**

• Reduce US, Thai, and ASEAN restrictions on intelligence sharing. This must include information regarding the activities, finances, travel, and networks of known and suspected terrorists.

• Conduct a multi-lateral Information Operations campaign that is both offensive and defensive in nature. The goal should be to protect and develop friendly information management while monitoring and, when necessary, taking aggressive action against terrorist information activities.

• Emphasize greater cooperation and inter-agency work with Islamic Southeast Asian nations such as Malaysia and Indonesia. These countries have a great deal of experience with Islamic fundamentalism that can benefit Thailand.

• Create forward staging of US Special Operations Forces to better develop Thai and Southeast Asian counterinsurgency capabilities and interagency cooperation.

• Re-evaluate immigration laws, and airport enforcement of such laws, which currently allow easy transit through, and stopping in, Thailand.
• Develop more effective multi-lateral maritime security initiatives locally as well as among Southeast Asian and other ally nations.

F. CONCLUSION

This solution strategy chapter inherently demonstrates the importance of using all instruments of national power and statecraft to reduce the effects of insurgency and terrorism. The practical measures listed here can and should be taken to address the immediate problems in Thailand today. At the same time, a well thought-out, long-range national strategy, coordinated with regional and other ally nations such as the US, must be developed for lasting security to be possible. For the US, the priority must be to use all elements of national power to develop more effective multi-lateral security initiatives throughout Southeast Asia. Individual countries in the region, such as Thailand, simply do not have the influence or resources to unilaterally promote such cooperation.
VII. CONCLUSION

Islamic fundamentalist activities in Thailand today involve both internal and transnational insurgents who are willing to use terrorism among other tactics to achieve greater ideological aspirations. The Thai government remains in denial and has chosen to not acknowledge that the problems in the Kingdom are related to a global Islamic insurgency that involves much more than the relatively simple remnants of a secessionist movement from the past. The combination of Thai Buddhist nationalism and a lack of a comprehensive national counter-insurgency strategy have contributed to inadequate, poorly thought-out, short term fixes that do not address the dynamic requirements necessary for eliminating internal and transnational Islamic extremism. Similarly, a force-on-force approach used by military, police, and paramilitary organizations, especially in the Muslim-dominated south, does not address numerous demands that a successful counter-insurgency requires. Direct action on the part of security forces is unquestionably necessary at times, but it should not be the standard. While the Thai government occasionally turns to initiatives other than those focused on security force operations, direct action targeting militants remains the Thai government’s primary device for confronting instability in the Kingdom.

Also demonstrated in this thesis is the reality that the United States has a long-standing, established interest in supporting Thailand’s security and prosperity. This interest spans the entire spectrum of foreign relations, including diplomatic cooperation, intelligence sharing, economic partnerships, and military engagement strategies. It is because of these commitments that the US should re-evaluate policy deficiencies and do all that it can to strengthen this very important and influential ally in Southeast Asia.

Regional cooperative efforts such as those outlined by ASEAN and APEC are necessary tools to stop the threat of insurgency and terrorism in Southeast Asia. Building trust, which has been a missing ingredient among neighbors in Asia for centuries, is required for the effective communication and use of
intelligence activities. Before any cooperative efforts can be successful, however, the individual nations that comprise these forums must first address the internal obstacles to progress. Thailand for example, like many developing nations, must accept and do everything it can to eliminate the realities of corruption, inter-agency rivalries, and other illicit activities that take place within and among its government entities.

See Seng Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna from the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies in Singapore have pointed out that a US-like solution that focuses on military power is not the correct method to resolve problems involving militant Islamic activity, especially in Southeast Asia:

[By] adopting a ‘top-down’, macro-analytical approach to the regional war on terror, some of these [US] efforts apply a universal, ‘one size fits all’ paradigm across geographical and cultural domains. Second, they tend to gloss over or ignore the complex multi-layered contexts within which Southeast Asian governments have had to combat terrorism. Third, and as a direct consequence of the foregoing, these studies funnel analysis toward the alleged deficiencies of regional and national state responses in Southeast Asia at the expense of other equally important dimensions (p.92).

Along the lines of Tan and Ramakrishna’s vision of a broad, bottom-up strategy, this thesis recommends emphasis on many different aspects of social, economic, military, and political policies to confront the problems in Thailand. As demonstrated throughout this paper, there is a need for a Thai strategy change in confronting both the insurgency and transnational terrorism. This change must be initiated unilaterally by the Thais and supported by the international community. Unfortunately, making a change in national strategy is easier said than done. Nevertheless, when continued violence is the result of government counterinsurgency and counter-terrorist policies, it becomes evident that policy failure is being reinforced. To compound matters worse, the rapid growth of Islamic terrorism around the world since 9/11, coupled with increased international attention given to Thailand’s southern insurgency, makes the situation in the Kingdom ripe for the introduction of more aggressive transnational terrorist operations.
By accepting current policy deficiencies and implementing the courses of action recommended in this thesis, the US and Thailand will both contribute to a greater Southeast Asian security. If action such as that described in this paper is not taken, continued or increased Thai and regional instability can be expected.
APPENDIX A. NASH ARBITRATION (GAME THEORY) APPLIED TO THAILAND’S SOUTHERN INSURGENCY

(Model created by J.C. Lumbaca)

There are three basic strategies available to the Thai government: continue to use heavy-handed military force that targets insurgents in the south, attempt to implement southern development and reforms to eliminate the legitimate Muslim grievances of the disenfranchised population, or use some combination of the two.

Currently martial law is in place in the southern three provinces of Thailand. The military and police have often been criticized by the local population for the use of excessive force against innocent civilians. Whether this allegation is true or not, the perception that it is true exists in the south. Consequently, the unrest and violence continues. More in line with effective counterinsurgency operations (such as in the Malaya emergency), a more beneficial strategy would seem to focus government efforts on the population, thus gathering intelligence and making it easier to target legitimate insurgent personnel. Often a country will instead focus efforts on targeting the insurgents themselves without proper intelligence, thus targeting the wrong people, and perpetuating the violence.

The insurgents on the other hand have the option to either continue the insurgency/violence or cooperate with the government. Between January 2004 and early 2005, more than 600 people were killed in incidents throughout Thailand’s Deep South. If the insurgents end the violence before government reform actually happens, the insurgents run the risk of having the government continue to neglect the south’s underdevelopment.

This model does not attempt to predict exactly what will happen if the government or the insurgents choose a certain course of action. Instead, the model provides a mathematical model of outcomes that would likely happen if the government and insurgents behave as rational actors.
THE MODEL

Both the government and the insurgents want to maximize their gains in the south of Thailand. Ordinal numbers from one to four have been assigned to the options available to each side. The numbers indicate one being the worst option, four being the best option. The numbers one through four are not weighted, meaning that a four is not necessarily two times better than a two. Decisions made by each side are made over time, with the ability to observe and interpret what the other side is doing.

Assumptions:
1. Both sides are rational actors
2. Both sides want to end the violence (The caveat is that the insurgents want to end the violence as long as the south receives the development and attention that it deserves)
Assigning Values To Each Course Of Action (COA)

The first number in each cell of the table represents the value for the
government COA, and the second number represents the value for the insurgent
COA. Example, the upper left box, which contains the numbers “2,1” represents
a “2” for the government and a “1” for the insurgents. The ultimate goal of each
side, including the insurgents, it to somehow end the violence AND "get" what
each side wants.

4,4 (P,C): The government commits to population support/southern
development and the insurgents coordinate with the government for reform.
Violence ends and reform takes place. This is the best case for both sides.

2,1 (T,C): The government continues to use military only tactics to target
the insurgents, and the insurgents cooperate with the government. This is the
worst case for the insurgents because they continue to be targeted while
attempting to cooperate with the government. The government maintains the
image of a heavy handed force, no southern development occurs, and insurgents
will most likely return to violence after they see that the government is not
responding.

1,2 (T,V): This is the worst case for the government. Violence continues
on both sides and no southern development occurs. The insurgents do not
receive any southern development and reform from the government, but they are
at least not getting completely overrun because they are maintaining defensive
and offensive operations.

3,3 (P,V): Although the government is confronting a continued insurgency
waged by the insurgents, the government is also making legitimate moves to
support the population/develop the south. As the southern development
continues, the population will likely experience improvements in security and
living standards, and the insurgency will most likely loose any support
mechanisms it has. The insurgents maintain a militant posture (at least initially)
to protect themselves and ensure that the government continues with its
development, but over time the insurgents potentially realize that development
and recognition is actually happening (which is what they really want), and so
they may end the violence.
CONCLUSIONS:

1. Dominant strategies: 

Dominant strategy for the Government is Population Support/Development of the south (P). The insurgents do not have a dominant strategy

2. The Nash equilibrium point is 4,4 (P,C). This outcome is likely.
The security level discussed here is a hypothetical approach to the problem assuming that each side will try to minimize the other side. In reality the two sides are not trying to minimize the other but rather maximize themselves. If the insurgents try to minimize the government outcome, the worst that the government can do is a “3”, and the insurgents remain at a “3” as well. So the government has a definite advantage, because even if the insurgents try to minimize the government, the worst that the government can do is a 3.
If the government focuses on minimizing the insurgency (minimax strategy in table above), then the insurgency can be reduced to a “2”. Such a strategy will definitely hurt the insurgency, but it would be at great cost to the government, bringing the government to a “1” in the process. The conclusion is obviously that the best strategy for the government is to not focus on targeting the insurgents by military-only means (Strategy T). Instead, the government should adhere to its dominant strategy (Strategy P) which will at worst achieve a 3, and at best achieve a 4 for the government. Unfortunately at this time, and since 9/11, the government has not chosen its dominant strategy (P) but instead has chosen its most self-defeating strategy: strategy (T).
Threats and Promises: The government has a dominant strategy. The insurgency does not have a dominant strategy. If the insurgents play strategy C, they risk the chance of being reduced to a level 1.

The government has a good first move: strategy P. Then, if the insurgents act rationally, 4,4 is achieved. C is the rational insurgent choice to the government’s P strategy.

The subsequent analysis looks at the applicability of a threat or a promise from either side, if the other side moves first.

Dominant Strategy:
Gov’t: P
Insurgents: None
NE: 4,4 / P,C - this is the likely outcome.

First Moves:
Gov’t: If P (pop. support), then C (insurgent cooperation)(4,4)
If T (target insurgents), then V (insurgent violence)(1,2)

1 is worst
4 is best
Numbers are ordinal
Insurgents: If C (insurgent cooperate with gov’t), then P (pop. support) (4,4)
If V (insurgent violence), then P (pop. support) (3,3)

Analysis from Government Point of View:

Government wants to move first: chooses P, then insurgents choose C (4,4)
If insurgents move first, then government wants insurgents to choose C first.
Threat:
If V, then T (1,2). Contingent on V, Hurts insurgents, hurts government, YES: qualifies as a valid threat, eliminates (3,3). This is actually what is happening in reality at this time. While it does hurt the insurgency, it really hurts the government. The result is a very bad situation for both sides, and continued violence. Rather than playing its dominant strategy (P), the government is continuing with (T).
Promise
If C, then T (2,1). Hurts gov’t, hurts insurgents, NO: does not qualify as a valid promise

Analysis from the Insurgents Point of View:

Ideally, the insurgents want to move first, choose C, then government P (4,4). The problem is that if the insurgents do not trust the government, the insurgents risk being reduced to a 1 if they choose C and the government then chooses T. Choosing C as a first move is a rational choice for the insurgents only if they believe that the government will play its dominant strategy.

If government moves first, insurgents want the government to choose P, thus resulting in (4,4).

Threat
If T, then C (2,1). Contingent on T, hurts insurgents, helps government, NO: does not qualify as a valid threat

Promise
If P, then V (3,3). Hurts insurgents, hurts government, NO: does not qualify as a valid promise.

Geometric Model

There is only one point at which both sides would end up at if negotiations began with a start point of each side’s security level. That ending point would be the pareto optimal point, which is at 4,4.
**OVERALL MODEL CONCLUSION:**

The government has a dominant strategy: to develop the south and focus on the population rather than a strategy that solely targets insurgents. The insurgents do not have a dominant strategy. In reality today, the Thai government is, unfortunately, not optimizing its possible outcome and it is not playing its dominant strategy. Instead, the government is, like the US in Vietnam, focusing only on the insurgents and not on the population. While it may seem intuitive for the government to follow a strategy of targeting insurgents, this model shows that the cost to the government in doing so far outweighs the possible benefits.

There could be many reasons for the government not playing its optimal strategy, one being that the government simply does not know what its optimal strategy is. This model has provided a mathematical representation of a strategy that could benefit both the government and the population.
APPENDIX B. CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1971
• “Abu Bakar Ba’aysir, later dubbed the Asian Osama bin Laden, and his partner Abdullah Sungkar, open the Pondok Ngruki Islamic boarding school in Solo, Indonesia, which later becomes Jemaah Islamiah’s first source of recruits. Although the clandestine organization doesn’t use the name Jemaah Islamiah for more than a decade, at some point in the 1970s its leaders begin creating their first network of cells and study groups” (Ressa, 2003, p.xiii).

1985
• “Abu Bakar Ba’aysir and Abdullah Sungkar flee Indonesia during a crackdown by Suharto, and settle in Malaysia, bringing the leadership of Jemaah Islamiah with them. Sungkar begins sending Indonesian Muslims to fight the continuing war in Afghanistan, and he travels there himself to meet Osama bin Laden. Jemaah Islamiyah is co-opted by al-Qaeda, which begins training and funding Jemaah Islamiyah’s key operatives” (Ressa, 2003, p.xiv).

1989
• The call to Jihad, the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan is highly appealing to Muslims from SEA. Thousands of Muslims from the Philippines and hundreds more from Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore go to fight. “When they return home, they bring back radical ideas – and terrorist techniques – they learned from the camps of Afghanistan” (Ressa, 2003, p.12)

1994
• March 11. Osama Bin Laden operatives plan to blow up the Israeli embassy in Bangkok. The plan goes awry and is not executed (Abuza, 2003 b, p.171). The driver of the truck gets into an accident en route to the attack. Three
Iranians are arrested in connection with the incident ("How long can Bangkok dodge the militant bullet?" 2004).

- December 10. Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, builds and explodes a bomb on Philippine Airlines flight 434 traveling from Cebu, Philippines to Tokyo. This bombing is a practice run for Yousef’s larger plan, codenamed Operation Bojinka, to bomb 11 US airliners as well as assassinate the pope. Yousef returns to Cebu to build the required bombs for Bojinka, but during the process of assembling the explosives, a fire erupts in his apartment (Ressa, 2003, p.xv). Yousef immediately flees the country to Thailand. (He later proceeds on to Pakistan, where he is captured and extradited to the US (Abuza, 2003b, p.106).

1996

- JI divides up SEA into regional "commands", called Mantiqis. Mantiqi 1 includes Malaysia, Singapore, and southern Thailand (Ressa, 2003, p.75).

1998

- Thai and Malaysian authorities conduct a massive crackdown on militants. Thai authorities net several key PULO and new PULO leaders. After the operation, more than 900 Thai insurgents are given amnesty and put into government rehabilitation programs, all in return for the insurgents' promises to support peaceful national development (Crispin, 2004a).

1999

- Nik Adli Nik Aziz, leader of the KMM (Kampulan Mujahideen Malaysia – a homegrown extremist organization operating under AQ’s umbrella in Malaysia) purchases a large cache of weapons in Thailand, including 24 pounds of explosives. Aziz is “committed to waging a violent jihad against the Malaysian state, which he consider[s] to be secular and oppressive" (Abuza, 2003b, p.125).
• October 1. Burmese dissidents seize the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok taking 89 persons hostage, including one U.S. citizen.

2000
• February. Security forces deal a sever blow to the New PULO when they kill its leader, Saarli Taloh-Mayaw. Authorities claim that the leader was responsible for 90 percent of the terrorist activities in Narathiwat Province (“Patterns of global terrorism report - 2000,” 2001).
• April. Police in Pattani arrest the deputy leader of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) insurgent organization.
• June. A Thai criminal court orders Yoshimi Tanaka, detained in Thailand and a member of the radical Japanese Red Army Faction, to be extradited to Japan for the 1970 hijacking of a Japan Airlines flight.
• June. Thai officials discover a partially completed submersible at a shipyard in Phuket. The submersible is owned by a known sympathizer to the Sri Lankan insurgent group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
• December. Thai officials discover an unclassified paper by Canadian intelligence published in December that outlines the LTTE’s use of front companies to procure weapons through Thailand. The Thai government publicly pledges to halt the use of Thailand as a logistics base by the LTTE (“Patterns of global terrorism report - 2000,” 2001).

2001
• June 19. Thai authorities avert an attempted bombing at the Vietnamese Embassy in Bangkok when they find and disarm two explosive devices that failed to detonate. Three Vietnamese males are taken into custody: one is charged with illegal possession of explosives and conspiracy to cause an explosion in connection with the incident, the others are released after it is determined there is insufficient evidence to link them to the crime.

• April 7. The Hat Yai, Thailand train station is bombed resulting in the death of one boy, injuries to several passengers, and severe property damage.

• Post September 11. Thai financial authorities began investigating financial transactions covered under UN resolutions to freeze AQ and Taliban assets.

• November. An unexploded truck bomb is found next to a hotel in southern Thailand ("Patterns of global terrorism report - 2001," 2002).

• December. A rocket-propelled grenade is fired at a multistory building housing a Bangkok ticketing office of the Israeli El Al airline.

• December. In an effort to prevent terrorism and crime, immigration officials announce initiatives to expand the list of countries whose citizens are required to obtain visas before they arrive in Thailand ("Patterns of global terrorism report - 2001," 2002).

• Mid-December. AQ’s military chief, Mohammed Atef, is killed by the US air strikes in Afghanistan (Ressa, 2003, p. 181). Also at this time, Faiz bin Abu Bakar Bafana, one of JI’s leaders, is arrested (Abuza, 2003b, p. 155). While these incidents occur, JI is planning major suicide truck bombings against hard targets in Singapore. The explosives for the bombings are to come from the Philippines, through Indonesia, and into Singapore. However, a botched robbery in Malaysia tips off authorities to terrorist cells planning the Singapore attacks. The crackdown by Singaporean authorities on JI has begun and so Hambali immediately takes action. “The word among the operatives in the area [is] to get to Thailand as quickly as possible” (Ressa, 2003, p.181).

• Late December 2001, early January 2002. Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, a Canadian-Kuwaiti AQ recruit trained by Hambali and used in the planning and
coordination for the planned Singapore bombings, gets an emergency message from Hambali. Upon getting the e-mail from Hambali titled “problem,” along with the order to flee to Thailand, Jabarah departs for Bangkok. Jabarah gets to the Kingdom and meets with Hambali at the Chaleena Hotel in Bangkok. Hambali tells Jabarah to get out of Southeast Asia before the authorities capture him (Ressa, 2003, p.182).

- December. Mas Slamet bin Kastari, alias Edi Haryanto, militarily-trained in Afghanistan and head of the Singapore arm of JI, travels to Bangkok for meetings with Hambali to discuss airplane hijackings. Edi is then sent off to recruit and select personnel in Bangkok and Pattaya, Thailand, for the hijacking missions (“Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: damaged but still dangerous,” 2003, p.42).

2002

- With the crackdown on JI in Singapore, the bombings planned for the city-state are abandoned. JI will settle for hitting soft targets in other countries for the time being. Hambali holds meetings in Thailand in mid-January with several operatives. The leader discusses carrying out attacks against bars, cafes, and nightclubs frequented by western tourists in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the PI, and Indonesia (Ressa, 2003, p.182). It is in southern Thailand that Hambali calls together a meeting that plots the genesis of the Bali Bombings (Ressa, 2003, p.216).

- April. After AQ leader Abu Zubaydah is captured in Pakistan, the CIA ships him to Thailand to be interrogated at a secret facility (Arkin, 2005, p. 218).

- May 1. Administrative structures known as Civilian-Police-Military Task Force 43 and the Southern Provincial Border Administrative Command, a military-led security agency, are dissolved by PM Thaksin (Funston, 2004). The PM announces that stability had been restored. “Some Muslim Thai leaders say that the policy shift closed down an important channel of communication with Thai officialdom” (Crispin, 2004a). According to Makata Ma, president of the Islamic
Association of Narathiwat, the Muslims in the south used to have a venue to present their problems and find joint solutions. Now, Ma says, “we’re under martial law. Now we’re scared to speak” (Crispin, 2004a). According to a Thai Army source speaking with the Bangkok Post in February 2004, the end of the command has “given insurgents more freedom to stage clandestine movements in the remote south.” Insurgents are able to strengthen their operations while providing arms training to more than 3,000 local youth (Nanuam, 2004a).

• June. Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) raiders attack the offices of a national park in Yala Province’s Than To District making away with 17 HK-33 assault rifles, 16 shotguns, and 1,400 rounds of ammunition. It is not clear if the weapons are going to be sold on the black market, moved across the borer to support Malaysian insurgents, or kept to build up the GMIP stockpile (“Thailand faces up to southern extremist threat,” 2003).

• August 1. The Governments of Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Republic of Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the US sign the Joint Declaration on Combating Terrorism. The agreement affirms all participating nations’ increased determination to coordinate and counter terrorism using all elements of national power.

• August. Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) operations chief Manase Jeh-da (aka Nasae Saning) is arrested in Trengganu state, northeast Malaysia. He is handed over to Thai authorities. Jeh-da has been on Thai wanted lists for years and carried a bounty of US$4,900 (“Thailand faces up to southern extremist threat,” 2003).

• August 28. Based on information from the captured GMIP operations chief Jeh-da earlier in the month, police raid a house in Pattani in search of weapons. The house is owned by the head teacher of a private Islamic school. In the house police find Mahama Mae-roh, another GMIP group leader. Mae-roh, who had
served four years in the army and had specialized training as a marksman, shoots dead a police sergeant and then kills two senior officers, including Pattani police chief Colonel Manit Rattanawin. Mae-roh is then killed by police reinforcements. Later the same day, Jeh-da is killed by police in another district of Pattani (“Thailand faces up to southern extremist threat,” 2003).

- October 12. JI executes its first major terrorist attack when it explodes three bombs in Bali that kill over 200 people. Coordination for the bombings were made earlier by Hambali and his operatives during meetings in Thailand in January.
- December. Following media reports that there are terrorist operatives in Thailand, the Thai information ministry disputes the claims. Reports of terrorists in Thailand are made by CNN Jakarta’s bureau chief, Maria Ressa. The Thai government believes that Thailand’s intelligence counterparts in other countries would surely have shared such information if it were true. Ressa reaffirms to the Thai government that her information came from reliable sources, including the FBI (Ressa, 2003, p.216). PM Thaksin adamantly denies the claims of terrorists operating in Thailand and claims that the western countries making such accusations are reckless in creating such misinformed, negative statements.

2003

- March 11. Wan Min bin Mat, a JI member is arrested and interrogated in Malaysia. During his interrogation, bin Mat maps out JI’s overarching goals, proclaiming that once a pure Islamic state in Indonesia is achieved, members will proceed toward a larger Muslim domination of the region encompassing Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and the Phillipines to establish the Islamic caliphate (Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: damaged but still dangerous, 2003, p.1).
- April. Two plainclothes police officers are beaten to death in Narathiwat Province by an angry mob (“Coherent policy needed for the south,” 2004).
• April. Attacks on a Thai Marine civil-development unit in Narathiwat Province result in five Marines killed and over 30 M-16 rifles seized by attackers (“Coherent policy needed for the south,” 2004).

• May 16. Based on information from Singaporean authorities, Thailand arrests Singaporean Arifin bin Ali, alias John Wong Ah Hung, and three Thais, all alleged members of JI. The arrestees were allegedly planning to bomb the 2003 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit which is to be attended by US President George W. Bush. Arifin says that he has been hiding in Thailand since 2002, and that he is “involved with a group of like-minded individuals in planning terrorist attack against certain targets in Thailand” (Ressa, 2003, p.217). Between Singaporean and Thai authorities, the two determine that JI is planning attacks against five embassies in Bangkok as well as two beach resorts in Pattaya and Phuket, Thailand.

• May 30. Cambodian authorities arrest two Thais and one Egyptian on suspicion of having links to JI. Cambodian authorities also order the expulsion of 28 teachers, some of them Thai, for suspected links to JI (Raman, 2004).

• June. Following the May 16 arrests of JI operatives in Thailand, PM Thaksin reverses his earlier statements and finally admits JI has “a cell in his country with ambitious plans” (Ressa, 2003, p.217).

• July 3. Five policemen and one civilian are killed in simultaneous raids by armed insurgents in three districts of Pattani Province. The attackers withdraw with captured weapons and body armor (“Thailand faces up to southern extremist threat,” 2003).

• June 13. Thai national Narong Penanam is arrested in Bangkok after trying to sell what he believed to be uranium to undercover Thai and US agents. The material seized is cesium-137, a radioactive by-product of nuclear power plants. The material is believed to be from Russian stockpiles, taken into Thailand by way of Laos (Ressa, 2003, p.218).
• July 28. A Mujahideen Islam Pattani leader, Mahamae Maeroh, kills a Muang Pattani police chief and four other local officers (Ngamkham and Harai, 2004).

• August 5. JI conducts its second largest attack since Bali when it bombs the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta. 12 people are killed and hundreds wounded.

• August 11. Hambali (Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin), JI’s operations chief and main link to AQ, is captured in Ayuthya, Thailand. Considered the most wanted man in Southeast Asia at the time of his capture, Hambali is the only non-Arab (he is Indonesian) sitting on AQ’s leadership council.

• August 28. Three policemen in Pattani Province, including two senior officers, are shot dead during a raid on a house in search of weapons (“Thailand faces up to southern extremist threat,” 2003).

2004

The January 4, 2004 raid on a southern Army depot is generally cited as the starting point for a great upsurge in violence in the south. Between January 2004 and early 2005, more than 600 people were killed in incidents throughout Thailand’s Deep South. The attacks included bombings, arson attacks, kidnappings, and assassinations aimed at civil administrators, security force personnel, tourists, and Buddhist religious leaders. Not all of these killings, bombings, and arson attacks are listed here because of the sheer number involved. While most of the killings are insurgent related, many are not. The nature of Thai society, with its pockets of corruption, mafia, black-market trading, drug smuggling, and other illegal activities lends itself to occasional murders throughout the country that are not in any way related to insurgency. Because of the insurgency and continued violence in the south however, the media readily sensationalizes almost every killing in the southern provinces as insurgents/terrorists/separatists attacking the government and symbols of the government. Such claims may or may not be true in each case.
January 4. The largest attack on Thai soil in years occurs. In the southern province of Yala, over 100 southern insurgents attack the Thai 4th Army Engineer Depot. After separating Muslim soldiers from Thai soldiers, the insurgents kill four Buddhist soldiers. Two of the soldiers have their throats slit. Weapons are also stolen and more than 21 schools are torched. PM Thaksin accuses the insurgent organization Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) of responsibility. Deputy Prime Minister Chavilat Yongchaiyudh believes that the attackers were possibly aided by someone inside the military's armory. The weapons stolen include some 300 assault rifles, 40 pistols, and two machine guns (Crispin, 2004a).

January 4. PM Thaksin announces that he intends to build a security wall along the Thai/Malaysian border to hinder “terrorists” from attacking targets in Thailand and then retreating across the border to the Malaysian jungles (Crispin, 2004a).

January 5. PM Thaksin announces martial law in the southern Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani Provinces. 3000 troops are dispatched to the region. The martial law gives freedom for the military to search homes and detain suspects without any charge. According to the article titled “Thailand Islamic Insurgency” (2004), key leaders of the Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP), the Barison Revolusi Nasional (BRN), and both the old and new PULO are now being closely followed in connection to the January 4th attack.

January. The Thai government launches investigations into the operation of independent Muslim schools (called “ponoh” or “pondok”) in the south. As a result of Saudi funding, many of the ponohs now teach the extremist Wahabi brand of Islam. Like their Pakistani ponoh counterparts, the schools in Thailand are now suspected of serving as Muslim recruitment centers. According to the Bangkok Post, as many as “700 Thai youths have trained in secret military camps on southern Thailand; others have visited Taliban camps in Afghanistan” (Brown, 2004). The Thai government additionally asks authorities in Jakarta to monitor Thai Muslim students in Indonesia to detect any links with terrorists.
• January. PM Thaksin declares that it will take three years to stabilize the south. The Thai government announces that it will spend approximately US$300 million to help the southern region. It is unclear, however, what portion of the money will be spent on economic growth versus tightening security in the area (Crispin, 2004a).

• January 13. Thailand and Malaysia start joint border patrols to locate and deter insurgents from crossing the border after conducting attacks.

• Select January incidents: Three Buddhist monks are killed, two others are brutally injured. This is the first time that monks have been targeted in the region’s history.

• February. Terrorist suspect Usman Pohmareeso is arrested in Rangae district, Narathiwat Province. Acting on intelligence from Malaysian authorities, about 30 policemen moved in on Pohmareeso at the Thai-Malaysian border checkpoint in Sungai Kolok district. Usman is suspected of shooting dead a village head in Rangae on May 1, 2003. Authorities continue hunting another Rangae native, identified only as Pohsoo, believed to have joined Usman in the murder (Ngamkham and Harai, 2004).

• Select February incidents: An armed group shoots and kills Police Sergeant Major Sayan Khongthon in the Raman district of Yala Province. Some witnesses report seeing women among the insurgents involved in the killing; A border patrol officer is shot and wounded in Yala’s provincial capital. The officer says his assailant is a woman.

• March 3. Subay Useng, member of the Mujahideen Islam Pattani, is arrested in Yala Province for his connection to bomb blasts in the south. He is held on initial charges of treason, illegal possession of weapons and bombing a railway track in Yala’s Raman district in August 2002. The Bangkok Post reports that Useng is a “bomb expert who probably trained overseas” (Ngamkham and Harai, 2004).

• March 12. Somchai Neelapajitt, chairman of Thailand's Muslim Lawyers Association, goes missing after leaving his home for a meeting in Bangkok. The
Thai government investigates the disappearance of the top Muslim lawyer who is representing JI terror suspects on trial for allegedly plotting bomb attacks in the Kingdom. (To date, Neelapaijit has not been found. In April 2004 four high ranking police officials surrendered to authorities after arrest warrants were issued against them for involvement in the lawyer’s abduction. The police officers maintain their claims of innocence) (Crispin, 2004b).

- March. Thailand’s national police chief and the southern province regional army commander are fired for failing to control the growing unrest in the Muslim-dominated south. The announcements are made after unidentified arsonists set fire to 40 sites in two provinces and another village headman is fatally shot.

- March 23. Bersatu insurgents explode a bomb near a meeting between Interior Minister Broken Bhalakula, Defense Minister Gen. Chetta Thanajaro, and security officials in Narathiwat province. After the attack, Thanajaro reports that the government needs to regain the confidence of the people in the South, where he says Jemaah Islamiyah could be involved. "We consider the blast to be a direct challenge to state authority. The government wants to denounce the perpetrators of the bomb attack who are trying to worsen the situation," says government spokesman Jakrapob Penkair (“Thai army eases southern presence,” 2004).

According to a Thai military intelligence source, the Bersatu insurgent movement is responsible for the bombing. The source claims 12 Bersatu insurgents, one of them a woman, arrived in Pattani province from Malaysia on March 22, split into two groups of six, and emplaced the two bombs. The first bomb exploded injuring one person, the second was located and diffused (Boonyakaj, 2004).

- March 26. Security in the south is tightened after the Thaksin Task Force, attached to the 4th Army, announces that international and local terrorist groups are planning attacks on state property in Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala. According to the announcement, the potential targets include government buildings, public parks, bridges, railway stations, schools, telecoms relay stations and highways.

- March 27. A bomb attached to a motorcycle explodes outside a bar in Sungai Kolok, a border town in Narathiwat Province. Twenty Thais and, for the
first time, eight Malaysian tourists are injured. Thai law enforcement officials report that the bomb was made of Power Gel, a commercial plastic explosive commonly found at mining and construction sites and used in other bombings in the region.

- March 29. Udom Charoen, director of the National Buddhism Bureau, reports that more than 20 Buddhist temples in Pattani and Narathiwat provinces are without monks. After temple buildings were set ablaze and monks injured by unknown assailants, many monks have deserted their temples in the southern provinces (“Monks abandon temples in Pattani and Narathiwat,” 2004).
- March 29. A bomb is located at a southern border gate office located 2 kilometers from Sungai Golok, the town where two days earlier a bomb exploded injuring 28 people including tourists (“Asia-Pacific daily news summary,” 2004b).
- March 31. After tying up two security guards, ten masked men armed with assault rifles steal 1.4 tons of ammonium nitrate (commonly used as fertilizer but also easily used as an explosive), 58 sticks of dynamite, and 180 detonators from a mining quarry in Yala Province (“Explosives stolen in Thai raid,” 2004). Authorities later report that the attackers included Thais as well as Indonesians. One of the Indonesians is identified as being a relative of JI operations chief Hambali (Pathan, M.A., 2004a).
- Select March incidents: A Thai police officer is shot in the southern province of Songkhla; armed attackers storm a local rubber wood processing plant
in Bannangsata District, killing a 50-year-old male worker and wounding a police officer who arrives on the scene (“Asia-Pacific daily news summary,” 2004a); police Sergeant Major Surapol Prabpairee from Yala Province dies from wounds suffered when a teenager shoots him while directing traffic on March 22 (“Asia-Pacific daily news summary,” 2004b).

- April 5. A bomb explodes in Yala Province outside the residence of the Bannang Sata district chief (Pathan, M.A., 2004b).
- April 7. Thailand’s embassy in Sweden receives a letter threatening the Kingdom with attacks, similar to those in Spain, in retaliation for Thailand sending troops to support US efforts in Iraq (Ashayagachat, 2004b).
- April 9. The US, Australia, and Britain warn their citizens to stay away from the southern Thai provinces during the mid-April water festival Songkran. According to an article in The Nation titled “Thaksin plays down West travel warnings,” the US State Department warns, “The far south of Thailand has experienced incidents of criminally and politically motivated violence, including incidents attributed to armed local separatist or extremist groups”. Shortly after the US issues its warning, Britain’s foreign office warns that its citizens “should be especially vigilant in public places, particularly tourist sites, large resorts and hotels favoured [sic] by Westerners, and in airports, on public transport and in nightclubs, bars, restaurants, shopping centres [sic] and places of worship.” In response, PM Thaksin, concerned with the impact on the tourist industry says, “The warnings are understandable and common. The warnings would more or less affect the country’s image and tourism. We have to admit that the southern violence has affected tourism because the problems are still going on.”
- April 9. Hours after the US, Britain, and Australia issue travel warnings to their citizens in Thailand, two bombs explode in the south. One bomb explodes opposite a police station in Narathiwat Province and one explodes at the gate of an apartment complex housing police and customs officials.
• April 19. Train service between Hat Yai and the southern Thai-Malaysian border town of Sungai Kolok is suspended indefinitely after the third attack on railway employees leaves several dead.

• April. South Korean and Pakistani embassies in Bangkok, along with six other missions, receive threats for supporting US operations in Iraq (Ashayagachat, 2004c).

• April 26. Leaflets urging Islamic leaders to stop cooperating with police are found in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat Provinces. The leaflets, depicting a Muslim religious leader handing an envelope to a uniformed policeman, carry a message in Thai calling on Islamic leaders to stop giving information about the southern unrest to police authorities (“Leaflets urge Muslims not to cooperate,” 2004).

• April 27. The Interior Ministry announces that teachers and village heads in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat Provinces are now permitted to carry guns for self-protection. Government officials will be given guns on loan while teachers will have to arm themselves (“Teachers told they can now carry guns,” 2004).

• April 27. The Pattani Liberation Front sends letters that threaten to kill the Thai ambassadors in Malaysia and Singapore and attack the Thai missions in both countries (Ashayagachat, 2004c).

• April 28. Over 100 southern Muslim insurgents are killed after they simultaneously attacked more than 10 government outposts in Yala, Sonkhla, and Pattani Provinces. After seven hours of shooting, 5 police officers are dead, 17 insurgents are captured, and 100 are killed, including 32 who were firing from a mosque.

• May 1. An additional 1,800 police are deployed to the south following the April 28 clash between security forces and militants.

• May 1. The Fourth Army Region Chief announces that reporters from foreign news agencies are barred from entering the military precincts in the south. The southern army asks Thai media as well, particularly iTV (Independent Television), to avoid showing sympathy for the militants killed during the violence in the south (Nanuam, 2004c).
• Select May incidents: Unknown assailants decapitate a Buddhist villager in Narathiwat Province and threaten more killings if Muslims continue to be arrested in the south.

• Select June incidents: Gunmen armed with M-16 rifles kill a policeman in Pattani province; four gunmen kill a Buddhist villager and then ambush an Army patrol sent to investigate the attack, wounding three soldiers; military and police conduct a pre-dawn raid that results in the arrest of five suspected Muslim insurgents. Authorities claim the raid foiled a bomb plot to kill several public officials.

• July 10. Defense Minister Chetta Thanajaro announces that foreign sources have transferred over 100 million Thai baht [about US $4 billion] to leading separatists to fund violence in the south. Thanajaro announces that the Thai government will cut off the foreign support and arrest the suspected insurgents (Nanuam, 2004d).

• July 11. The deadline announced by PM Thaksin for all southern insurgents to surrender themselves to police arrives. Those who surrender are admitted to regional army camps for re-education and behavioral reform before being released. Those suspected insurgents who do not surrender will be pursued, interrogated, and detained for seven days under martial law. They will then be handed over to police and tried in civilian criminal courts. Between 100 and 150 suspects surrender to police prior to the deadline.

• July 12. Police and soldiers launch raids throughout the south to detain suspected insurgents who do not surrender by the July 11 deadline.

• July 12. Three soldiers are injured by suspected insurgents in an ambush in Narathiwat Province.

• July 14. An Army dog sniffs out and finds the first weapon to be recovered from the January 4, 2004 insurgent Army camp raid where over 300 weapons were stolen. An M-16 assault rifle is found buried in a durian orchard owned by a Muslim religious teacher in Narathiwat Province. The rifle is found along with rounds of ammunition, maps of police and military

- July 15. The army reports that they are keeping tabs on students from Yala Province’s Rajaghat University. According to officials, the students at the Islamic university have suspected links to the southern insurgency, including helping to transport weapons used in separatist hit-and-run attacks. Of the hundreds of suspected insurgents who turned themselves in by the July 11, 2004 deadline, five are students from Rahaghat University (Nanuam, 2004e).

- July 17. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra announces that a War on Corruption will launch on October 3, 2004. With elections just around the corner from the October 3 date, critics charge that Thaksin promised an end to graft three years ago when he was elected, and that this announcement is aimed only at assisting his re-election (Tunyasiri and Suksamran, 2004).

- July 19. Thailand signs a multi-million dollar deal with a French space company to build the THEOS (Thailand Earth Observation System) satellite. This is the Kingdom’s first satellite, scheduled for launch in mid-2007. Although the images will not be as magnified as the ones Thailand currently purchases from US commercial satellite companies, the photos from THEOS will be viewed much faster and at less cost than the ones bought from the US. In addition to providing information on surveys, agriculture, and natural resources, "It will be used for monitoring the country for defensive purposes and also for intelligence,” said General Vichit Satharanond, the head of the Royal Thai Army Military Technology Centre. “If we let the people in the south know we have this, they will start to worry” said Satharanond (“Thailand signs deal with French company for spy satellite,” 2004).

- July 19. Defense Minister General Chetta Thanajaro dispatches aides to Malaysia to coordinate the tracking down of insurgents between Thailand and
Malaysia. The team is also scheduled to meet with leaders of PULO and Bersatu while in Kuala Lumpur (Nanuam, 2004f).

- July 20. A Thai intelligence source says that 20 Muslim religious teachers are behind the almost daily shootings of security officials in the southern provinces. According to the Bangkok Post, the official claims that the teachers carry out the attacks themselves, hoping to win back the support of local Muslims after many youths who previously received armed training from the teachers defected to the state authorities (Benyakaj, 2004).

- July 25. The Central Islamic Committee of Thailand announces that it will issue a document to southern Muslims in August 2004 that will correct distortions taken from the Koran. The distortions were found in a book found on a dead insurgent in the south. The committee alleges that the book, called Ber Jihad Di Pattani (The Holy Struggle for Pattani), "distorts" more than 60 points from the Koran to mislead militants into making sacrifices for the separatist cause (Nanuam, 2004g).

- July 31. Army Chief General Chaisit Shinawatra says that his secret operation unit, the Army Action Team (ACT), has recovered eight more weapons from the January raid on the southern Army camp. According to the General, the ACT spent three to four months mingling with their “sources” in the deep south to locate the weapons (Nanuam, 2004f).

- Select July incidents: A village chief is shot dead and two policemen are seriously wounded in separate attacks; a former border patrol policeman is shot dead in Yala Province; a hospital worker on his way to work at Pattani Province’s Mayo Hospital is shot dead by motorcycle gunmen; a gunman on a motorcycle kills a policeman in Narathiwat Province. In two separate incidents, two counter-insurgency security officials are shot by gunmen on motorcycles in Narathiwat Province; four people are shot dead in two separate attacks in Yala and Pattani Provinces; one civilian is shot by two men on a motorcycle; three policemen are shot dead while guarding Mai Kai railway station; a man earning extra money driving Muslims students home after school is shot three times and killed by two
men on a motorcycle in Pattani Province; five people are injured in Narathiwat Province when a remote-controlled improvised bomb is detonated ("Suspect in southern attacks arrested," 2004); and two men on a motorcycle shoot a 39-year old woman four times in the chest and kill her.

- August 4. The Thai cabinet approves an independent panel’s conclusion that government forces overreacted and used excessive force in suppressing militants holding out inside Krue Se Mosque on April 28, 2004. The cabinet agrees to pay compensation to the families of both militants and security troops killed (Phanayanggoor, 2004).
- August 4. Three soldiers assigned to protect teachers in Yala province are injured by a roadside bomb. The soldiers were tasked with picking up and transporting the teachers to school (Nanuam, 2004h).
- August 4. The Thai government and Army will announce that they will provide assistance to southern Muslims making the Haj pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia ("Assistance for Haj pilgrims," 2004).
- August 15. Two Chinese nationals selling carpets and blankets in Narathiwat are shot by a gunman riding pillion on a motorcycle. The victims are recovering from their wounds.
- August 17. The Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command (SBPPBC) is assigned the task of mapping out an action plan to “ensure unity among local people and state officials.” Deputy Prime Minister Chaturon Chaisaeng says the action plan is aimed at bringing unity of politics, unity of thinking, unity of beliefs and unity of command” ("Action plan to unify local and state goals," 2004).
- August 19. Thailand’s Human Rights Commission accuses southern security forces of torture, kidnappings, and extrajudicial killings in their crackdown on Muslim insurgents. The commission’s reports includes documented cases of suspects being “blindfolded, beaten, strangled, electrocuted, humiliated and urinated on by official interrogators” (Corben, 2004).
August 19. Thai intelligence agencies search for the Thai wife of an al-Qaeda suspect who, along with seven others, is charged in a British court for conspiring to “commit murder and use radioactive materials, toxic gasses, chemicals or explosives to cause fear or injury.” Dhiren Barot, a British national of Indian origin, moved to Thailand in 1998 where he lived and married a Thai woman. He is the author of documents “describing surveillance of US financial buildings during 2000 and 2001.” The documents Barot authored were found on computers and e-mails during July 2004 raids in Pakistan (“Hunt on for Thai wife of al-Qaeda suspect,” 2004).

August 19. Pohsu Isma-al, the author of the book Ber Johad Di Pattani (Fighting for Pattani State), is detained by Malaysian authorities at Bangkok’s request. He is accused of helping to train southern militants and spreading separatist ideology. Thailand does not pressure extradition and Malaysia is reluctant to hand over Pohsu because he holds dual Thai-Malaysian nationality (Nanuam, 2004i).

August 20. Two Thai nationals along with two Egyptians remain in Cambodian custody for alleged links to JI. The original trial date, set for February 2004, was suspended when prosecutors changed the charges against the men from kidnap to attempted murder (“Cambodian judge questions two alleged JI members,” 2004). (See May 16, 2004 chronology information above for original arrest information).

August 20. Mark Roland Lemetti, a British national is found dead in a rubber plantation in the south. He is found near Sungai Kolok, a Thai-Malaysian border town. Police believe he was mugged and killed somewhere else, then dumped in the rubber plantation. His face is smashed and no documents are found on his body. He is later identified by a passport found in his hotel nearby. Lemetti is believed to be the first westerner to be killed in the region since the unrest began (“Briton found dead in Thailand,” 2004).

August 21. A 10kg bomb is located and destroyed minutes before it is set to explode outside a Thai Military Bank in Narathiwat Province, near the Malaysian
border. The bomb was made of ammonium nitrate, nails and two types of explosives – C4 and Power Gel (“Powerful bomb detonated,” 2004).

- **August 22.** Three bomb blasts injure 11 people when bombs explode at a bar and two hotels in Yala Province. The bombs explode while Yala is hosting festivals attended by tourists from Malaysia and Singapore.
- **August 26.** One bomb explodes at a petrol station and two more are diffused in Narathiwat Province.
- **September 17.** Judge Rapin Ruangkaew is shot seven times in the head and torso. He is the most senior official to die in the south since the 2004 violence started in January.
- **September 30.** Her Majesty the Queen pleas to security forces to cooperate and unite in doing their duties for the security and safety of their country.
- **October 14.** Gunman attack a royal palace vehicle in Narathiwat. Twenty rounds are fired at the Landrover killing the two occupants.
- **October 21.** The most recent Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) released ranks Thailand 64th least corrupt out of 146 countries listed. The Kingdom receives 3.6 points on a scale of 0-10, an increase of 0.3 from last year. This is an overall improvement from last year’s rating of 70th out of 133. Thailand ranks as the 7th least corrupt nation in Asia; Singapore is first.
- **October 22.** Her Majesty the Queen bemoans the government’s failure to end the violence in the south. She notes that improvements in the southern quality of life that were created by the three decades that she and the King had devoted to developing the south are now replaced by people’s fear of being attacked on a daily basis (Nanuam and Tunyasiri, 2004).
- **October 24.** Security forces warn Buddhist monks in the south against walking to collect their morning alms for fear of attack (“Army asks monks in the South to suspend morning alms collection,” 2004).
- **October 24.** According to Thai military intelligence reports, militants have put a 30,000 baht (US$750) price tag on the head of any government security
force person killed (“Army asks monks in the South to suspend morning alms collection,” 2004).

- October 25. Six people are killed by security forces while protesting the detention of Muslims suspected of giving weapons to insurgents. After more than 1,500 Muslim protestors are arrested outside the Tak Bai police station, at least 78 people are suffocated or crushed to death after being detained by police and packed into trucks for transportation to an army barracks five hours away.

- October 31. In an attempt to relieve southern tension, the government revokes the curfew in the south and frees hundreds of detained Tak Bai protestors.

- Select October incidents: A 22 pound bomb is defused in Narathiwat before exploding; Malaysians outside the Thai embassy in Kuala Lumpur demonstrate against Thai government action in the Thai south;

- November 2. Following the October 25 Tak Bai incident, PM Thaksin meets with His Majesty the King. The King tells the PM that the government must handle the southern problems “with care” and give the local people a say in settling the problems in the south.

- November 4. Army chief General Prawit Wongsuwan reactivates 3,000 Army officers who were left dormant after being put in inactive posts. This occurs amidst a five-year military downsizing that started in 2002 (“Army gives ‘dormant’ officers a wake-up call,” 2004).

- November 4. Army spokesman Colonel Acra Thiproy announces that the 4th Army (responsible for the southern provinces) will train its soldiers in riot control, transportation of detained rioters, and unconventional and urban warfare. The decision for the training comes as a result of the October 25, 2004 Tak Bai incident where almost 80 Muslims were suffocated to death. Colonel Acra said that “Tak Bai is an important lesson for us. We have now learned that we have to use a gentle approach and cause the least possible loss [of life]” (Nanuam, 2004j).
• November 2. Most schools in the south’s three southernmost provinces close as a result of security force warnings that Buddhist teachers and students may be abducted.
• November 3. Thailand turns down an offer by the CIA to provide anti-terror training. Deputy Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudy says that “We don’t want any country, ally or not, to interfere with our internal affairs” (“Bangkok turns down CIA anti-terror training,” 2004). This is the first time that the Thai government has admitted that the CIA has offered Thailand anti-terror training.
• November 6. Buddhist residents in the south request the reinstatement of Lt. General Pisarn Wattanawongkeeree as Fourth Army chief. Pisarm asked to be transferred to Army headquarters following Tak Bai.
• November 6. Following research conducted at 88 police stations in Bangkok, the National Economic and Social Development Advisory Council and Dhurakijbundit University report that corruption among police is “deeply entrenched from the bottom ranks to the top and in every section of each station – administration, prevention and suppression, crime detection, investigation and traffic.” (Thip-Osot, 2004). Reasons listed for the graft are lack on incentives such as financial rewards and career advancement, systems that allow corrupt officers to escape unpunished, government policies towards brothels and gambling that allow officers to cheat, obsession with status, money and lavish lifestyles, and “corruption in the promotion system that forces officers to resort to extortion so they can find money to buy key positions” (Thip-Osot, 2004).
• November 9. The Islamic Committee of Thailand announces that it will conduct its own investigation of the October 25, 2005 Tak Bai incident. The group announces that it does not believe that the government’s investigative committee will tell the truth (“Islamic committee to undertake its own investigation,” 2004).
• November 16. Her Majesty the Queen Sirikit speaks for 45 minutes in an unprecedented, televised address to urge the people of Thailand to help the government solve the problems in the south.
November 16. PM Thaksin announces that Thai Muslims in the south are receiving support from extremists that they met overseas while studying abroad. Thaksin denies that any actual terrorist organization or government is supporting the southern insurgency.

November 17: The US Department of Defense provides a five-day anti-terror training course and equipment worth about US $50,000 to the Royal Thai Police Region 8. The training was designed to prevent a Bali-like situation in the southern resort islands (Ehrlich, 2004).

November 19. Thailand denies a UN probe into the October 25, 2004 Tak Bai incident. PM Thaksin states that because the Thai government is conducting its own investigation, the UN probe is inappropriate.

November 24: PM Thaksin announces that he will take over the strategic planning in the south from Deputy PM Chavalit Yongchaiyudh “in a bid to streamline the command structure of state agencies working to quell the southern violence” (“PM taking control of strategic planning in the deep South,” 2004).

November 24: The deputy governor of Pattani is shot and wounded.

November 26: The PULO website offers a bounty of over 90,000 Thai baht (US $2,000) for the killing of governors of senior government officials in the south (“Muslim separatist group offers bounty for Thai officials: website,” 2004).

Select November incidents: 58-year old Jaran Torae, a Buddhist assistant village leader is beheaded as revenge for the October 25 Tak Bai incident; A Yala man is found with his throat slit in a rubber plantation; Gunmen open fire on a woman and her son in Narathiwat, killing the mother; A Narathiwat sub-district official is shot in the arm but survives; Two gunmen break into a house and steal a shotgun that authorities had given to a local Pattani man for his work as a defense volunteer; A 60-year old Buddhist laborer is beheaded on a rubber plantation in Narathiwat; a bomb explodes in Narathiwat that seriously wounds 16; Security forces throughout the south try to stop distribution of video CDs that show graphic footage of the October 25 Tak Bai incident; five public schools are burned down.
December 5. 50 Thai Air Force planes drop nearly 100 million paper origami cranes over the three southernmost provinces in an effort by the Thai government to send a message of peace and goodwill to southern Muslims. The birds contained messages written from Thai citizens to those in the south. The event coincides with the 77th birthday of Thai King Bhumibol Adulyadej. Muslim leaders in the south seem bemused and say that a political solution is necessary, not paper birds ("Off-target airdrop of the week," 2005, p.6).

December 6. Hours after the December 5th drops, two bombs explode in Narathiwat. Five soldiers are injured. Another bomb is defused before it explodes.

December 23. Malaysia condemns the Thai government for not following appropriate intelligence etiquette after the Thai government’s public release of photos of alleged militant training camps in northern Malaysia. The Thai government claims that the camps are used for terrorist training while the Malay Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) says that Malaysia is "totally unaware of the existence of any camps in Malaysia used to train militants as alleged by the Thai prime minister." The DPM continues to say that following such a public release, the militants would surely close the camps, further complicating Kuala Lumpur’s efforts to verify Bangkok’s claims ("Malaysia slams Thailand over photos of alleged militant camps," 2004).

December 26. An earthquake in Indonesia generates a tsunami wave that collectively kills hundreds of thousands throughout South and Southeast Asia. Army Chief Pravit Wongsuvan is optimistic that Thailand’s southern violence will ease since Free Aceh Movement (GAM) separatists in Indonesia, which support Thai militants, are hit hard by the Tsunami. Intelligence officers believe that GAM rebels have "trained Thai separatists, here [in Thailand] and in Aceh" ("Army hopes unrest will ease after Aceh tragedy," 2004).
In addition to thousands of dollars in property damage, roughly 500 people were killed in Thailand’s southern provinces in 2004. The killings involved shootings, arson, and bombings.

2005

- January 14. Ustad (Muslim religious teacher) Hama Jehta, or Samad Luepae, is arrested on treason charges and is accused of being a core leader of Muslim militants and involvement in violence in the deep south. He is among eight teachers arrested within two weeks (Benyakaj, 2005). Arrest warrants are issued for 21 religious teachers for treason.
- January 16. A bomb explodes outside a noodle shop in Yala Province. One person is killed; 47 are injured, including six children.
- January 20. Muslim organizations and leaders in the south condemn the shooting of a local school bus full of Buddhist students. The shooting leaves two children injured (Nanuam, 2005a).
- January 21. Gunmen shoot and seriously wound a political candidate and one of his supporters while campaigning in Narathiwat.
- January 26. PM Thaksin approves the purchase of four spike-sweeping vehicles to be used against insurgents in the southern provinces. The vehicles, which cost 2.9 million baht each (approximately US$73,000), will clear the roads of metal spikes that militants often throw on the road when chased by security forces (“Spike-sweeping vehicles for South,” 2005).
- January 26. PM Thaksin announces that Doramae Kuteh, AKA Chae Kumae Kuteh, the mastermind behind the January 4, 2004 army depot raid, has been captured by authorities in Malaysia. Thailand is seeking extradition orders. Doramae, considered Thailand’s most-wanted man, is wanted for premeditated murder and inciting a guerrilla movement, and has a bounty of five million baht (approximately US$125,000) on his head (“Thailand’s most wanted separatist arrested,” 2005). Malaysia and Thailand criticize each other over the handling of the issue while determining if Kuteh has Malay or Thai nationality.
• Select January incidents: A man is shot by two men on a motorcycle while he is waiting for a bus in Pattani; A police officer is shot dead in Songkhla; Five people are injured by a mobile-phone triggered bomb explosion in Yala; A food shop owner is shot dead and his customer seriously wounded in Narathiwat; A police officer is shot dead while on patrol near a local school in Narathiwat; A post office worker is shot dead in Yala; A political candidate’s secretary receives a death threat for acting as a police informant in Narathiwat (Harai and Pathan, 2005); A policeman and his informant are shot and wounded by a motorcycle gunman in Narathiwat; 3 assault rifles are found in Pattani after informants tell security forces of the location of the weapons; A former defense volunteer is shot dead in Narathiwat.

• February 6. PM Thaksin is re-elected for another term in Thailand’s general election. Thaksin’s Thai-Rak-Thai (Thai love Thai) political party, however, loses all of its seats in the southern provinces where people voted en masse for the Democrat and Chart Thai parties. The election demonstrates a clear dissatisfaction among the southern population over Thaksin’s handling of the continuing violence in the south.

• February 8. The army hires motorcycle taxi drivers in the Sungai Kolok district of Narathiwat for 4,500 baht (US $112) a month to report on unusual and suspicious movements to identify insurgent activity in the southern border tourist town (Nanuam, 2005b).

• February 10. A bomb is detonated by mobile phone in a Narathiwat stadium. The bomb injures six people but misses the local governor who is attending a parade there.

• February 11. PM Thaksin demands better cooperation among all agencies that work under the Southern Border Provinces Peace-building Command (SBPPC). According to the PM, there is too much emphasis on military operations and not enough cooperation among agencies.
• February 12. After one soldier is injured following a bomb blast in Narathiwat, a massive man-hunt to find the suspects is initiated by over 100 soldiers.
• February 17. A car bomb explodes in Narathiwat leaving 44 people injured and six dead. This is the first car bomb detonated in Thailand. Previous vehicular explosives were all on motorcycles. The bomb exploded hours after PM Thaksin ends a controversial visit to the south where he says he will enact zoning of the south, freeze development funds and use military force against those who support Islamic separatists. During the visit, the prime minister says decisive action is needed and he will not allow a single inch of Thailand to be separated, even "if blood covers the land" ("Hotel car bomb kills four," 2005).
• February 19. After speculation by Narathiwat’s provincial governor that the unprecedented February 17, 2005 car bomb may have been linked to foreign terrorists, PM Thaksin strongly denies any involvement by anyone other than local Thais.
• February 25. The Krue Se Mosque, location of the April 28, 2004 attack that left more than 100 insurgents dead, is handed over to local officials in Pattani after months of government renovation.
• February 26. Following Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) criticism of Thailand’s handling of the southern insurgency and “persistent bloody acts of violence” perpetrated against Muslims in the south, the Thai Foreign Ministry orders its embassy in Saudi Arabia to clarify the Thai government’s handling of the situation. Nimu Makajae, deputy chairman of the Yala Islamic Committee in southern Thailand says that the Thai government should not dismiss the OIC’s appeal and instead should consider its recommendations on how to end the violence (“South: OIC lashes Kingdom,” 2005).
• February. Controversy erupts over PM Thaksin’s plan to divide the deep south into red, yellow, and green zones according to the level of violence that villages experience. Red zones – those most dangerous and prone to experiencing violence – will not receive any development funds unless they
improve their status to yellow or green through self-policing. Opponents argue that innocent people will be punished and that insurgents will simply relocate to green zones where they can operate more freely. After several weeks of constant pressure from critics to abandon the idea of mass punishment for the south, government spokesman Jakrapob Penkair publicly announces that the zoning is merely an idea, not government policy, and that it is “not being implemented or prepared at all” (“Thailand steps back,” 2005).

- Select February incidents: A bomb is triggered by a mobile phone as police in Pattani investigate the murder scene of a man whose throat is cut; Insurgents in all three southern provinces hand out leaflets titled “peaceful warning” which threatens local community leaders not to cooperate with the government, an act which will result in putting their lives and property at risk (“Rebels warn not to help govt [sic],” 2005).

- March 6. A Tak Bai investigation panel announces that three senior army commanders in the south will be removed from their positions as punishment for the incident which resulted in 78 deaths in October 2004.

- March 7. Human rights groups in Thailand and elsewhere in Southeast Asia will submit the case of the disappearance of Muslim lawyer Somchai Neelapaichitr (see March 12, 2004) to the UN Human Rights Commission conference. Sunai Phasuk, advisor to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, criticizes the Thai government for failing to answer questions about Somchai’s disappearance (Charoenpo, 2005). Somchai has yet to be found and is feared dead.

- March 10. Eight Islamic teachers (or ustaz) from Yala Province are charged and plead not-guilty in Bangkok for allegedly organizing in the south. The charges include treason, separatism, and murder. The teachers, who work at the Thammawithaya Foundation School in Yala are accused of being members of the BRN (see Chapter 2) (“Eight ustazes deny all charges,” 2005).
March 21. After experiencing years of terrorist activity, to include the JW Marriott and Bali bombings, the Indonesian government announces that it will formally outlaw Jemaah Islamiah (Brummitt, 2005).

March 27. Approximately twenty people are injured when insurgents detonate two bombs to stop an armored train patrolling in the south.

Select March incidents: Two armed men in Narathiwat ram their car into four roadblocks and shoot at police before one man is shot dead and the other escapes; Two policemen in Narathiwat are shot dead while guarding a railway station; Three policemen and a civilian bystander are injured when a bomb explodes at a place in Yala where teachers gather for police escorts to school; Two gunmen on motorcycles shoot dead a village chief in Pattani.

April 3. Near-simultaneous bomb blasts at Hat Yai International Airport, a Carrefour superstore, and the Green World Palace hotel in Songkhla Province kill two people and injure at least 60 more (including two Americans).

April 5. Provincial Police Major General Panya, a senior officer in the south, testifies that former Thai Rak Thai (political party) Member of Parliament (MP) Najmuddin Umar has “allegedly trafficked narcotic drugs to Malaysia and used the drug money to finance separatist activities in the South” (“Senior police testify against Najmuddin,” 2005).

April 7. The US, Australia, and Canada issue warnings against travel to southern Thailand following the April 3, 2005 bomb blasts in Songkhla, including the popular tourist area of Hat Yai. According to the US State Department warning, the bombings “represent a continuing spread of indiscriminate violence in public areas where tourists may congregate” (“Public announcement: Thailand,” 2005).

April 22. The government announces that mobile phone users must now show identification and register their names when purchasing mobile phone SIM cards. The announcement comes after several bombs in the south are detonated using pre-paid mobile phone plans.
Select April incidents: A policeman is shot dead when insurgents open fire on a police base in Yala; Four villagers are shot in Narathiwat; Six insurgents steal government-issued shotguns from defense volunteers in Narathiwat; Mobile phone-detona ted bombs injure six soldiers in Narathiwat Province; A bomb in Narathiwat explodes and kills two policemen;

Terrorist attacks in southern Thailand continue to take lives on an almost-daily basis.

In April 2005, three simultaneous bomb attacks occurred in Songkhla Province. Thai authorities are concerned that the insurgency may now be spreading beyond the three southernmost provinces of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat.
APPENDIX C. US-ASEAN JOINT DECLARATION ON COMBATTING TERRORISM

Washington, DC
August 1, 2002

The Governments of Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Republic of Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the United States of America (hereinafter referred to collectively as “the participants”);

Mindful of the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, which, inter alia, undertakes to strengthen cooperation at bilateral, regional and international levels in combating terrorism in a comprehensive manner and affirms that at the international level the United Nations should play a major role in this regard;

Reaffirming their commitment to counter, prevent and suppress all forms of terrorist acts in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, international law and all the relevant United Nations resolutions or declarations on international terrorism, in particular the principles outlined in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1373, 1267 and 1390;

Viewing acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed wherever, whenever and by whomsoever, as a profound threat to international peace and security, which require concerted action to protect and defend all peoples and the peace and security of the world;

Recognizing the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States;

Acknowledging the value of existing cooperation on security, intelligence and law enforcement matters, and desiring to strengthen and expand this cooperation to combat international terrorism through the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime, as a leading ASEAN body for combating terrorism, and other mechanisms;
Recognizing the transnational nature of terrorist activities and the need to strengthen international cooperation at all levels in combating terrorism in a comprehensive manner;

Desiring to enhance counter-terrorism cooperation between the relevant agencies of the participants’ governments;

Solemnly declare as follows;

Objectives

1. The participants reaffirm the importance of having a framework for cooperation to prevent, disrupt and combat international terrorism through the exchange and flow of information, intelligence and capacity-building.

2. The participants emphasize that the purpose of this cooperation is to enhance the efficacy of those efforts to combat terrorism.

Scope and Areas of Cooperation

3. The participants stress their commitment to seek to implement the principles laid out in this Declaration, in accordance with their respective domestic laws and their specific circumstances, in any or all of the following activities:

   I. Continue and improve intelligence and terrorist financing information sharing on counter-terrorism measures, including the development of more effective counter-terrorism policies and legal, regulatory and administrative counter-terrorism regimes.

   II. Enhance liaison relationships amongst their law enforcement agencies to engender practical counter-terrorism regimes.

   III. Strengthen capacity-building efforts through training and education; consultations between officials, analysts and field operators; and seminars, conferences and joint operations as appropriate.

   IV. Provide assistance on transportation, border and immigration control challenges, including document and identity fraud to stem effectively the flow of terrorist-related material, money and people.
V. Comply with United Nations, Security Council Resolutions 1373, 1267, 1390 and other United Nations resolutions or declarations on international terrorism.

VI. Explore on a mutual basis additional areas of cooperation.

Participation

4. Participants are called upon to become parties to all 12 of the United Nations conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

5. The participants are each called upon to designate an agency to coordinate with law enforcement agencies, authorities dealing with countering terrorism financing and other concerned government agencies, and to act as the central point of contact for the purposes of implementing this Declaration.

Disclosure of information

6. The participants expect that no participant would disclose or distribute any confidential information, documents or data received in connection with this Declaration to any third party, at any time, except to the extent agreed in writing by the participant that provided the information.

7. All the participants are urged to promote and implement in good faith and effectively the provisions of the present Declaration in all its aspects.

Signed at Bandar Seri Begawan this first day of August, Two Thousand and Two.

For the United States of America:
Colin L. Powell
Secretary of State

For ASEAN:
Mohamed Bolkiah
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Brunei Darussalam

APPENDIX D. US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THAILAND

The following information was researched by the Center for Defense Information (Garcia, 2004).

1. BACKGROUND

Thailand, known as Siam until 1939, is the only Southeast Asian country never to have been colonized, although it was occupied by Japan during World War II. Since 1945, Thailand has been a close U.S. ally. The two nations have entered into several bilateral and multilateral arrangements including the 1954 Manila Pact and the 1962 Rusk-Thanat agreement, both of which solidified a long-term bilateral security alliance. The U.S-Thai alliance granted the United States use of Thai military facilities during the Vietnam War. Additionally, Thailand’s anti-communist stance and geographic proximity to Vietnam were vital to the United States during the Cold War, and its current support in the “War on Terror” has once again united the two nations. Thailand has been ruled by King Bhumibol since 1946, however, until recently, the country suffered a series of political crises and undemocratic installations of heads of state – primarily via bloodless military coups. Since the 1992 elections, Thailand has been a democratically-governed constitutional monarchy. The current leader, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, was elected in 2001.

In its 2003 Human Rights Report, the U.S. State Department described Thailand as having a worsening human rights record, as it has experienced an increase in extrajudicial killings and arbitrary arrests as well as persistent corruption in the security forces and the judiciary. Since it is part of the notorious tri-border Golden Triangle – where Burma, Thailand, and Laos intersect – Thailand struggles immensely with drug trafficking and corruption issues. In an effort to stem the flow of narcotics in the country, the Thai government undertook a “war on drugs” from February to April 2003, leading to more than 2,000 casualties and 50,000 arrests. While the government has reported that the majority of deaths were caused by battles among drug dealers, human rights
groups have accused the government of undertaking a “shoot to kill” policy during that period. Human rights groups have also criticized the government’s use of excessive lethal force in April 2004, when violent clashes between government forces and Muslim separatists fighting in the southern part of the country resulted in the death of 107 suspected Muslim militants, many of whom were between the ages of 15 and 20. Other human rights violations noted in the U.S. State Department’s annual report include: prolonged pretrial detentions; restriction of privacy rights; sexual exploitation; discrimination against minorities; violence and discrimination against women; child labor and child trafficking.

2. U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE PRIOR TO SEPT. 11, 2001

Thailand’s armed forces are currently estimated at 314,200 active personnel. Thailand’s military expenditure was approximately $1.8 billion in 2000, which is 1.8 percent of its Gross Domestic Product. Since the 1950s, the United States has been furnishing Thailand with military equipment and assistance. According to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, from 1993 to 2003, Thailand received 238 armored vehicles, 48 combat aircraft, 125 battle tanks, 40 large caliber artillery systems, two warships, and 166 missile launchers. According to U.S. government data, between 1990 and 2001 Thailand received approximately $335 million in Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) and over $100 million in Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Also during that period, Thailand received approximately $3 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF). The FMF, however, was distributed only in 1990. In addition to military equipment, since the early 1990s the United States has been increasing its military training programs in Thailand; sometimes reaching up to 40 joint exercise programs a year. Indeed, between 1990 and 2001 Thailand received close to $18 million in International Military Education and Training (IMET).
3. **U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE SINCE SEPT. 11, 2001**

Thailand has been a major supporter and ally in the U.S. “War on Terror.” Thailand has sent military engineering units to Afghanistan and Iraq, and Thai officials have made public statement in support of the effort to stamp out terrorism worldwide. In August 2003, Thai authorities captured Nurjaman Riduan bin Isomuddin – commonly referred to as Hambali – a top Jemaah Islamiya (JI) leader. JI is a radical Islamic terrorist group based in Southeast Asia with links to al Qaeda and other extremist groups, that seeks to establish a large Islamic state in the region. Hambali has been deemed the mastermind behind the October 2002 bombing in Bali, Indonesia, and is the prime suspect in the J.W. Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta, Indonesia, on Aug. 5, 2003. Although there were no major terrorist acts in Thailand in 2003, between June and July of that year, Thai authorities arrested four suspected JI operatives implicated in a plan to bomb numerous targets in Thailand. Following the bombing in Jakarta, Thai officials enacted an antiterrorist decree that has been criticized for allowing police to search and detain suspected terrorists without trial, and for its potential misuse against Muslims in the southern part of the country.

Since Sept. 11, 2001, the United States has continued to supply Thailand with IMET funding. During Fiscal Year 2002 (FY 02) and FY 03, Thailand was the recipient of over $1.7 million in IMET each year. For FY 04 and FY 05, Thailand has been promised approximately $2.5 million in IMET each year. Additionally, the United States resumed FMF to Thailand in FY 02, which had not been delivered to the country since 1999. Specifically, Thailand was allotted $1.3 million in FMF for FY 02 and nearly $2 million for FY 03. For FY 04, Thailand has been promised close to $1 million in FMF, and for FY 05, $500,000. In June 2003, the United States delivered 30 refurbished UH-1 helicopters, plus spare parts and training, as part of a $30 million deal signed in late 2001 between the two governments. In addition to granting Thailand increased military assistance since Sept. 11, 2001, the U.S. administration gave Thailand Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status in October 2003. According to a senior administration official, MNNA status was given to Thailand specifically for their long-standing alliance.
with the United States and for support and assistance in the “War on Terror.” While MNNA status does not provide a country with the same mutual defense guarantees provided to NATO member states, it gives a state access to commercial satellite technology; makes a country eligible for loans of materials and equipment for cooperative research and development projects; permits a country to use FMF for commercial leasing of defense articles; and allows it to buy depleted uranium from the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>6 Armored combat vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>26 Armored combat vehicles, 20 Large caliber artillery systems, 1 Warship</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>38 Armored combat vehicles, 20 Large caliber artillery systems, 18 Combat aircraft</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>101 Battle tanks, 32 Armored combat vehicles, 8 Combat aircraft</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>130 Armored combat vehicles, 1 Warship, 166 Missiles and missile launchers</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>6 Armored combat vehicles</td>
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<td>7 Combat aircraft</td>
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<td>IMET</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$26,226,000</strong></td>
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President Bush publicly announced the designation of Thailand as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) on October 19, 2003 during his State Visit to the Kingdom of Thailand. The Departments of State and Defense had notified Congress of the intent to designate Thailand in early October 2003.

**Background Information:** MNNA Status does not entail the same mutual defense and security guarantees afforded to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members. However, designation of Thailand as an MNNA represents an affirmation of the importance the US places on the US-Thai alliance relationship in the 21st century. Thailand has been a treaty ally of the United States for nearly 50 years, since the 1954 Manila Pact. The alliance partnership has continued to expand over the years. Recently, Thailand has made important counterterrorism contributions and has sent troops to coalition efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

(MNNA) Definitions: U.S. legislation creates two categories of MNNA status. The first category is under Title 10 U.S Code Section 2350a (Nunn Amendment of 1987). The Second is under Section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA) (title 22, USC Section 2321k).

**Title 10 U.S. Code Section 2350a** authorizes the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to designate MNNAs for purposes of participating with the Department of Defense (DOD) in cooperative research and development programs. Israel, Egypt, Japan, Australia, and the Republic of Korea were given MNNA designation under Title 10 in 1987, followed by Jordan (1996), Argentina (1998), New Zealand and Bahrain (2002), and the Philippines and Thailand (2003).

Designation under this provision:

- Permits firms of the country to bid on certain USG contracts for maintenance, repair or overhaul of DOD equipment outside the Continental US. (10 USC 2349)
- Makes a country eligible for certain joint counterterrorism research &
development projects. (22 USC 2349a-10(b); PL 104-132 sec. 328(b))
· Allows DOD to enter into cooperative R&D projects with the country to improve conventional defense capabilities on an equitable cost-sharing basis. (10 USC sec 2350a)

Section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, authorizes the President to designate a country as a MNNA after 30-days notification to Congress, for purposes of the FAA and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). The statute, enacted in 1996, initially designated Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand as MNNA. Subsequently, Jordan (1996), Argentina (1998), Bahrain (2002), and the Philippines and Thailand (2003) have also been designated as MNNA under this provision.

Designation under this provision:
· Makes a nation eligible, to the maximum extent feasible, for priority delivery of excess defense articles if it is on the South or Southeastern flank of NATO. (FAA §516)
· Makes a nation eligible to buy depleted uranium ammunition. (FAA §620G)
· Makes the country eligible to have U.S.-owned War Reserve Stockpiles on its territory outside of U.S. military installations. (FAA §514) [Note: The US closed down a previously existing War Reserve Stockpile, established in 1987, in 2002, and transferred the remaining munitions to Thai ownership.]
· Allows the country to enter into agreements with the USG for the cooperative furnishing of training on a bilateral or multilateral basis under reciprocal financial arrangements that may exclude reimbursement for indirect costs and certain other charges. (AECA §21(g))
· Allows the country to use U.S. provided Foreign Military Financing for commercial leasing of certain defense articles. (Section 589 of the FY01 Foreign Operations Appropriation Act, Public Law 106-429)
· Makes a country eligible for loans of materials, supplies and equipment for cooperative R&D projects and testing and evaluation. (AECA §65)
· Makes a country eligible for expedited processing of export licenses of commercial satellites, their technologies, components, and systems. (Section 1309 of the James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001, Public Law 106-113)

MNNA designation under section 517 of the FAA can be terminated at the discretion of the President with 30 days notice to the Congress, but no specific criteria or precedents exist regarding termination.

LIST OF REFERENCES


Bamrungsuk, S. (2004, September 13). Interview conducted at Department of International Relations, Chulalogkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand.


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