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U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN AFRICA AND THE FUTURE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM (GWOT): A PROPOSAL TO CREATE AN AFRICAN REGIONAL COMBATANT COMMAND AND A REGIONAL AFRICAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

by

Charles M. Brown

September 2005

Thesis Advisor: Anna Simons
Second Reader: George Lober

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The purpose of this thesis is to address the current need for a unified or sub-unified military regional combatant command headquarters within Africa. The United States needs such a command in order to protect U.S. national interests, provide a proactive forward deployed stance against the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and better execute crisis resource contingency operations throughout the entire continent of Africa. Thus, this thesis will argue that given the continued focus on the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the United States should consider establishing a future political-military organization such as a unified or sub-unified African Regional Combatant Command (ARCC) and a Regional African Special Operations Command (RA-SOC) to both promote democratic initiatives and regional stability within the region, and to better assist and support U.S. national security interests by deterring and defeating international and regional terrorist networks well away from US borders. This newly proposed organization, at a minimum, should have a forward deployed political-military element positioned and located somewhere within the region of Sub-Saharan Africa. Specifically, this thesis will recommend that this proposed forward deployed regional headquarters should strategically be located within the sub-region of West Africa or East Africa.

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US NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN AFRICA AND THE FUTURE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM (GWOT): A PROPOSAL TO CREATE AN AFRICAN REGIONAL COMBATANT COMMAND AND A REGIONAL AFRICAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

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I would like to dedicate this thesis to all the men and women who have dedicated all or have given an invaluable portion of their lives through their combined humanitarian efforts toward helping and assisting the people, societies, and the many critical natural environments within the beautiful continent of Africa. I also personally would like to recognize the man and women who have given their lives for protecting this great nation, the United States of America, and for their ultimate individual sacrifices for defending this country. May we never forget September 11, 2001.

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Our quality family time shared together here at the Naval Post Graduate School (NPS) has been a great family experience, especially with the birth of our son, Hudson in 2005. California’s Monterey Peninsula will always be a significant memory for our family.

--De Oppresso Liber--
I. INTRODUCTION

A. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM

The focus of this thesis is the strategic problems that historically and geopolitically continue to affect Africa. This thesis will propose the establishment of a unified or sub-unified African Regional Combatant Command. This thesis will specifically look at Africa in terms of three areas of concern to the United States: U.S. national energy interests (i.e., energy resources and strategic minerals), the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT), and the political requirement for a committed U.S. military regional command structure.

Unfortunately, the current Geographical Combatant Command (GCC) structures within Africa geo-politically continue to divide Africa by splitting economic and political regions, cultural zones, and economic trade areas, while fracturing U.S. military regional attention. By having the existing three Regional Combatant Commands geographically, strategically, operationally, and tactically continue to divide the continent of Africa among U.S. Europe Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), the U.S. strategy and policy for Sub-Saharan African affairs continues to inadequately reflect the changing geo-political landscapes in Sub-Saharan Africa today.

This thesis will recommend the establishment of either a unified or sub-unified African Regional Combatant Command and a Regional African Special Operations Command to successfully support, assist, and advise current and future U.S. National Security strategies for the continent of Africa. This single regional command and control headquarters would effectively support existing African regional and sub-regional economic institutions, influence future U.S.-African democratic progress, build better political and military professional leadership, and effectively better support any crisis action planning or conflict resolution operations within Africa.

Most importantly, this proposed African Regional Combatant Command and Regional African Special Operations Command will help support U.S.
national initiatives to strengthen, integrate, assist, coordinate, and support future U.S.-African democratic security cooperation throughout the region. This single organization will be able to effectively plan and execute a regional political-military strategy that should successfully accomplish regional and country team objectives.

Finally, the creation of this new regional military organization would provide better strategic regional expertise, enhance cultural planning and operational advice, and better integrate cooperation among U.S. embassies, the Department of State (DoS) and Department of Defense (DoD), as well as other U.S. departments and agencies that regionally focus on Africa. This organization would effectively and efficiently place coordinated Military-to-Military and Civil-Military relationships under the command and control of one unified or sub-unified African regional geo-political-military headquarters that would in turn command responsibility and regional authority for the entire continent of Africa.

This regional military command will need to be both focused and dedicated toward Africa and granted the appropriate U.S. military force structure in order to effectively command and control international, regional, and coalition supported Civil-Military Operations (CMO), Counterinsurgency (COIN), Counterterrorism (CT), Humanitarian Assistance Operations (HA), Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO), as well as effectively support Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) within Africa.

This thesis will also identify the remarkable differences in approach between the Department of State (DoS) and the Department of Defense (DoD) concerning initiatives in Africa. The main argument that this thesis will present is that if the United States is going to be dedicated to Africa, then Africa should not continue to be sub-regionally divided between the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) three Regional Combatant Commands. If we are to be politically serious about Africa in this 21st Century, then there needs to be a strategic correction within the Unified Command Plan (UCP) that currently separates Africa geopolitically between USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and USPACOM. In order to be
effective in Africa, the US will need to support African regionalism, and the US can begin this effort by empowering these African sub-regional organizations, and institutions.

B. PURPOSE

The purpose of the thesis is to identify and present a realistic approach for establishing and promoting future regional security and economic stability within Africa. United States policy makers are going to have to begin a process that identifies how US foreign policy should shape and create a more positive environment for Africa in the near future. The U.S. ideal seems to be to create improved regional security in order to assist African civil societies with democracy and reverse Africa’s poverty, eliminate threats from the AIDS pandemic, persuade African governments to address governmental corruption through public transparency, and increase human rights through encouraging ethnic and racial equality.

In the near term, the US will need to encourage a dedicated long-term economic investment in African countries if they are to sustain and increase their regional security initiatives. Since the early 1990’s and most recently with President Bush’s second term in office, the continent of Africa has become visibly important for U.S. national security strategy. The U.S. has begun to heavily increase its national efforts in promoting democracy and economic development within Africa, waging the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT), providing for future U.S. energy security by tapping sources of energy in Africa, and by promoting prosperity and equality in general throughout the region.

However, despite recent US economic relief and support, Africa is still considered a backburner region and U.S. foreign policy is still executed with a minimal integrated regional strategy. In fact, many academics will argue that increased international debt relief and aid from the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) will continue to only further destabilize African state government capacity and lead to short-term economic fixes or relief within
the region. With the recent increased discovery and production of new sources of oil within Sub-Saharan Africa, critics will also argue that, as in the Middle East, Africa may become a region of increased political violence. With reference to the past regional crises which gathered steam in the 1990s, these ongoing conflicts will only continue to destabilize the region economically. Africa’s historical legacies of numerous wars, humanitarian crises, and political violence continues. In truth, the continent remains affected by regional terrorism, insurgencies, tribal and ethnic violence, genocide, civil war, border disputes, disease, famine, governmental corruption and the inability to control ungoverned territories, religious violence, economic decline, and the possibility of more regional wars over highly lucrative energy resource rights and control.

C. SIGNIFICANCE

The time has come to stop treating Africa as a backwater region. Unfortunately, many Cold War attitudes and historical references still affect U.S.-African political affairs (Schraeder, 1994, P 250).

A version of the historical ‘Race for Africa” in the 19th Century is likely to recur again in this 21st Century with the discovery of vast new resources. Since the 1990’s, the monumental discoveries of large potential energy sites located off-shore in the Gulf of Guinea and along the equatorial belt of west Africa are receiving tremendous attention from competing international investors and energy companies. Sub-Saharan African countries in this region are becoming of strategic interest to the U.S. similar to the Middle East in the 1970’s and 1980’s. The US and other nations are competing against one another in order to secure joint energy discovery rights and provide advanced technology. Extensive economic programs, like the U.S.-African New Economic Policy for African Development (NEPAD), African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGAO) and the Millennium Challenge Accounts (MCA) which are directed towards limiting poverty and promoting democratic progress, also represent attempts to curry regional favor.
D. METHODOLOGY

The findings and recommendations of the African Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG) demonstrate that Sub-Saharan Africa, specifically the Gulf of Guinea region, will become a strategically significant location for future U.S. national interests. Current U.S. national policies are still too tied to political and cultural legacies from the Cold War. The U.S. needs to quickly adapt and reorganize in order to meet the current regional challenges that are affecting Sub-Saharan Africa. The US will strategically need to combine all the elements of political, economic, and military power towards building a African regional focus and making a long-term, serious political-military commitment.

The primary impetus for this thesis is to address the need to create either a unified or a sub-unified Regional African Combatant Command (RACC). The conclusion of this thesis tracks with the recommendations that were presented by the African Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG). The AOPIG members, along with Interagency and a Congressional Review Board, were comprised of numerous special representatives from the Department of State (DoS), Department of Energy (DoE), the House of Representative, the United States Senate, International consultants, major U.S. oil companies, and other U.S. investors.¹

In Chapter I, I will explain the ongoing problem with current U.S. strategy concerning Africa, and how geographic and foreign policy responsibilities are divided up. Chapter II will review the historical, current, and future significance of Africa and U.S. national security interests. Chapter III specifically describes how Africa has been affected by geo-strategic politics within the unified combatant command relationships under the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Unified Command Plan (UCP). Chapter IV identifies the strategic requirement for a geo-political re-alignment for Africa within the Department of Defense, specifically of the geographical combatant command boundaries and their areas of responsibility (AOR) within USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and USPACOM. Finally, Chapter V recommends strategic changes in order to correct historical and

¹ African Oil: A Priority for U.S. National Security and African Development. The African Oil and Policy Working Group (AOPIG), 4
current ineffective U.S. foreign policy. In the conclusion I summarize why DoD should create either a unified or sub-unified regional African combatant command.

E. OVERVIEW

The world continues to be an irregular environment that constantly changes as, following the Cold War, strategic alliances shift and become realigned. Africa continues to be threatened by the economic impacts and environmental challenges of globalization. The continued threats from international terrorism and intra-state insurgencies can now be considered the primary national security challenges for the U.S. for the foreseeable future. Non-state actors will continue to threaten and challenge the sovereignty and legitimacy of weak states where no effective government exists to control the territory and the population, a problem particularly plagues Africa.

Since September 11, 2001, the United States has had new concerns about the threats posed by regional insecurity. The United States has a national strategic interest in continued global economic development, the establishment of regional security and stability, and an increase in multilateral security cooperation. Yet, in one of the most underdeveloped, least secure parts of the world, namely Africa, the “region” is organized and treated in ways that make little strategic sense from a 21st century American point of view.

History has created a situation in Africa today that demands a more coherent long-term economic and security strategy. This strategy can be achieved by both international partners and the U.S. through increased economic development, the promotion of democratic values, and strengthening organizations. Since the end of the Cold War, Africa has been the only continent to continue to fall deeper into political unrest, ethnic violence, and continued governmental corruption. History has shown that in Africa military intervention is a reactionary event. Contingency operations and peacekeeping enforcement executed either by UN peacekeepers or multilaterally by the U.S. and European partners have been tactically successful, but for the most part remain ad hoc
events. A long-term political-military strategy is needed in Africa in order to effectively engage in a preemptive strategic approach that ideally mitigates the need for international peacekeeping efforts, let alone evacuations.
II. THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF AFRICA

A. THE UNITED STATES MILITARY STRATEGY IN AFRICA

1. Strategic and Regional Vision

In the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld stated on March 1, 2005 that a strategic vision emphasizes the national importance of influencing regional events before they become significant challenges to the United States. By preparing, establishing, and creating the strategic and regional environments most favorable to us today, the U.S. will be able to better confront these regional threats and irregular challenges in the future:

We live in a time of unconventional challenges and strategic uncertainty. We are confronting fundamentally different challenges from those by the American defense establishment in the Cold War and previous eras. The strategy we adopt today will help influence the world’s strategic environment, for the United States is an unusually powerful player in world affairs. President George W. Bush is committed to ensuring the security of the American people, strengthening the community of free nations, and advancing democracy reform, freedom, and economic well-being around the globe.

The Department of Defense is implementing the President’s commitment to the forward defense of freedom as articulated in the National Security Strategy. This National Defense Strategy outlines our approach to dealing with challenges we likely will confront, not just those we are currently best prepared to meet. Our intent is to transform how we think about security, formulate strategic objectives, and adapt to achieve success.\(^2\)

The United States will need to identify and prepare an attainable strategic vision that objectively and reasonably addresses the international and regional vitality of Sub-Saharan Africa. The importance for America to have strategic access to critical foreign energy resources is a U.S. national interest. Sub-Saharan Africa is increasingly one such area as the U.S. begins to shift its

attention to investing in African oil and off-shore discovery technology within the Gulf of Guinea region especially. The strategic value of African oil deposits and energy reserves will likely only become more significant as the Sub-Saharan African nations continue to allow foreign oil and energy companies to develop and discover these new sites.

2. **Securing Strategic Energy Resources**

Today, the U.S. currently receives an estimated 16 percent of its foreign oil imports from sub-Saharan Africa.³ Future projections by the National Intelligence Council conclude that the U.S. will get at least an estimated 25 percent of it oil from Africa by the year 2015, thereby surpassing the share that comes from the Persian Gulf region. The vast majority of Africa’s oil is from the eastern Atlantic Ocean along the African coastline from Ghana to Nigeria, continuing down to Angola, in a region called the “Gulf of Guinea” or, historically, the colonial “Gold Coast”. Many future discovery estimates are still largely undetermined, and many large U.S. energy companies have begun their “energy discovery race for Africa” in the hopes they will discover large reserves.

The future oil capacity of this region is still considered largely unknown. The estimates suggest, however, that this region will produce enormous amounts of oil well into the next century. Many oil experts predict that the Gulf of Guinea will become the world’s next global “oil sweet spot”. This large equatorial region in Sub-Saharan Africa has become renowned for its quality of crude oil which exceeds the quality of oil produced in the Middle East.

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3. **Shaping Democracy By, With, and Through Regional Security**

The Department of State (DoS) combined with USAID (US Agency for International Development) have merged their economic development strategies for developmental assistance in Africa into a five year plan. The strategic plan set forth by former Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and the Director of USAID, Andrew S. Natsios, will increase DoS and USAID’s assistance to African states and the African Union (AU). This new strategy acknowledges the fact that the United States most significant security threats are failing states, international terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

In order to meet these threats, the government is shifting towards a strategy of encouraging democracy as the means by which to reduce both the spread of state collapse and governmental corruption:

> Instability and conflict among states arise from diverse causes. Ethnic hatred, unequaled economic opportunities, and political discrimination within states can lead to instability and refugee flows that spill across borders. Societies that lack means of dissent can nurture radical ideologies that appeal to those who feel threatened by existing norms and arrangements. Often, legitimate grievances provide opportunities for unscrupulous or shortsighted leaders who exploit and exacerbate tensions. Stable relations among states also can be threatened by changes in their relative wealth, power, and ambitions.

The democratic transformation sweeping much of the world is a factor that supports stability by removing potential causes of conflict. In addition, for the first time in 100 years, there is the prospect for a durable peace among the great powers based on a strategic alignment against common threats. Despite these positive developments, regional tensions and crisis harm U.S. national security in varying degrees. They strain our alliances, threaten peace, create fertile ground for terrorism, damage national economies, and intensify human suffering.

---


Securing stable and peaceful relations among states is a fundamental, traditional goal of diplomacy. Building the foundations for stability and addressing the root causes of conflict are vital roles of development assistance. In each region of the world, we will build effective ties with allies, friends, partners, and regional and international organizations ultimately to resolve existing and emergent conflicts. In each region, we will focus on key priorities to achieve this goal.6

The Department of Defense has a distinct role to play to support these regional challenges and either defend or protect U.S. national interests against such regional security threats and global changes. In Africa, correcting these regional challenges while encouraging democratic progress is a slow and deliberate process. The current U.S. strategy in Africa is to identify and empower regional anchor states that are aligned with U.S. national interests, such as Morocco, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Angola, and Ethiopia.

This alignment continues to support specific African anchor states, but emphasizes a larger political role for the African Union (AU) and the regional and sub-regional organizations like ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), SADC (South African Democratic Community), EAC (East African Community), IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority for Development), and UMA (Union du Maghreb Arab)). A significant element to shaping democracy in Africa is our continued assistance and support for these African regional and sub-regional economic and democratic organizations.

African Union Sub-Regional Economic Organizations

A number of years ago, the RAND Corporation conducted a case study of “The Effects of Defense and Security on Capital Formation in Africa: An Empirical Investigation”. In this study, Daniel F. Kolher concludes that regional security fosters economic growth:

The most obvious manifestation of military influence persists despite the fact that in terms of resources devoted to defense, most African countries, as well as the region as a whole, are considerably below average for the developed or developing world… If the military has any positive effects on economic development, they must come from its traditional role as a security force. Security influences development through its effect on investor confidence. Private domestic investors, as well as foreign investors (or foreign bankers financing government investments), will be more willing to invest in countries that seem relatively secure, all other things held equal.

Security is an elusive concept; it cannot be observed or measured in the way other variables can be measured. Even worse, from the econometrician’s point of view, what matters in investment decisions is not so much a somehow objective assessment of the security situation as the investor’s perception of that situation. We can hypothesize, though, that in general the strength of the defense forces should increase security, objectively as well as in the investors’ perception, and the presence of external and internal threats should reduce it...7

By this indirect effect on investment, through security, the military can directly contribute to capital formation in two ways: By training individuals, and providing them with management and vocational skills, the armed forces contribute to the formation of human capital. Through civic action, whereby military units undertake projects that result in capital useful to the civilian population (e.g., road construction); the military can contribute to the physical capital stock.8

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B. THE STABILITY CHALLENGES FOR AFRICA

The United States will have to focus more on supporting African governments if it hopes to help build stronger democratic institutions throughout all of Africa. First, we may need to concentrate on regional stability. Regional instability can be easily defined as the use of political violence between intrastate and interstate actors of Africa. Instability includes the civil-military conflicts between warlords within corrupt or failing states, violent border disputes over disputed territories, interstate aggression over the control of limited natural resources, potential for internal civil wars, insurgencies, and continued oppressive military regimes all of which also can lead to large scale refugee flows that in turn affect the stability and security of neighboring countries. Unfortunately, U.S. interventions in Africa throughout the 1990s have not always been successful.

Throughout the 1990’s, Sub-Saharan African intervention became the object of both international and US policy and military objectives during Peace-Keeping Operations (PKO), Peace Enforcements Operations (PEO), Noncombatant Evacuations Operations (NEO), and numerous Humanitarian Assistance Operations (HA). The United States has historically conducted these operations in Africa as an extension of both U.S. national policy and our increased regional interest within this continent. Since the 1960s, Africa has known numerous civil wars, irregular wars, and insurgencies.
During the last several decades many African states gained their independence. Yet, these countries continue to be affected by low-intensity conflict and irregular warfare. If left ignored for another decade, such conflicts are bound to affect U.S. national security within these regions. Societal challenges are likely to continue to increase throughout this region as the direct result of increased social and political pressures on many existing African governments and their weak governmental institutions. This is described in detail by Herbert Howe in his book, *Ambiguous Order: Military forces in Africa States*. As Howe notes:

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9 Figure 8: Illustration diagram during course instruction by Professor, Dr. John Arquilla, for the illustration for "The Historical and Future Dilemma of Unconventional Wars" at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California
Most African conflicts since independence have been intrastate, generally featuring an ethnic or regional group opposing an existing regime. Nevertheless, African wars are increasingly presenting strong interstate aspects: invasion, direct or indirect support for insurgents, and armed intervention on behalf of the threatened regime from outside the country. African, rather than Western, states have become the major interveners… Rebels can tap into widespread public disillusionment or anger directed at a string of unaccountable, personal rulers…

They can press gang child soldiers to swell their ranks, if necessary, and rarely suffer from international retribution. Thus, they prove less controllable by outside forces that were those in previous insurgencies. They can divide and subdivide into smaller splinter groups, lessening the chances for successful comprehensive negotiations; the attraction of personal gain may lesson their desire for political negotiations.10

1. The Threat of Regional Terrorist Environments

Major characteristics of modern insurgents and terrorist are described by Donald Snow as:

The apparent absence of clear military objectives that can be translated into coherent strategies and tactics. The insurgents do not engage in fixed-position combat (and wear no uniforms), and can shift alliances quickly, given their lack of ideology.

Factions often target any valuable resource or population without needing to obey established codes of conduct and may use drugs to induce extreme behavior and they are increasingly engaged in urban warfare.

This last point frustrated the United States and the United Nations (UN) in Somalia and ECOMOG in Sierra Leone and, given Africa’s rapid urbanization will increasingly bedevil state or foreign intervention forces. Recent urban battlefields include Mogadishu (Somalia), Brazzaville (Congo-Brazzaville), Bangui (Central African Republic), Huambo (Angola), Kigali (Rwanda), Freetown (Sierra Leone), Bujumburua (Burundi), and Monrovia (Liberia).11

The United States has recently identified the need to shift some of its focus and influence toward Northern African, the Horn of Africa (HOA), and

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throughout Africa’s Pan-Sahel region. In 2003, Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld called for a systematic change in the military strategic engagement strategy towards Africa for the near future. This change to a better regional-focused strategy has caused the Department of Defense (DoD) to redefine its objectives and initiatives from an older conventional engagement strategy of multiple Theater Engagement Plans (TEP) to more regionally focused Regional Theater Security Cooperation Plans (RTSCP).

The current U.S. Counter Terrorism (CT) Strategy is politically organized and militarily structured toward combating the structures of terror and identifying

12 “National Strategy For Combating Terrorism, February 2003: This National Strategy reflects the reality that success will only come through the sustained, steadfast, and systematic application of all the elements of national power-diplomatic, economic, information, financial, law enforcement, intelligence, and military-simultaneously across four fronts. We will defeat terrorist organizations of global reach through relentless action. We will deny terrorists the sponsorship, support, and sanctuary they need to survive. We will win the war of ideas and diminish the underlying conditions that promote the despair and the destructive visions of political change that lead people to embrace, rather than shun, terrorism. And throughout, we will use all the means at our disposal to defend against terrorist attacks on the United States, our citizens, and our interests around the world.” 2003, 23, 29

13 Figure 9: The National Security Strategy For Combating Terrorism, illustration of “The Structures Of Terror” (NSS), 2003
environmental conditions within each geographical region, to include the underlying conditions, the international environment, the state, and terrorist organizations. Concurrently, the strategy is directed toward targeting the senior terrorist leadership within these global networks and regional terror organizations.  

The current U.S. policy in Africa is still largely focused on a post-9/11 Counter Terrorism Strategy as illustrated in the diagram “Structures of Terror”. These definitions of the structures can be helpful in our continued efforts to identify U.S. foreign external influences within the region. They can further focus our efforts on a long term process centered around achieving future regional stability and security where U.S. national interests are threatened. However, the major problem with attempting to reach these objectives in Africa is that efforts are usually not mutually enforced or properly coordinated among the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State (DoS), or other important U.S. Governmental Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The critical elements for supporting African governmental institutions that can help increase their national capacities to govern their people, provide better security, and support them in controlling their border territories with existing national sovereignty has seldom been coordinated across the U.S. government.

The United States politicians and senior military leadership must recognize that in order to shape African countries for the future, our current efforts at developing a long-term strategy in Africa must be politically organized with a central authority, with proper coordination and integration undertaken between all U.S. efforts within this region.

Throughout Africa, foreign external resources are especially critical for African “state” survival as the result of economic globalization and the states’ limited access to international financial resources. African states require such resources in order to politically and institutionally survive the rising internal challenges that affect their political legitimacy and ability to govern their

14 National Strategy For Combating Terrorism, 2003, 6
15 Ibid. Figure of ‘Structures of Terror’ is extracted from the National Strategy For Combating Terrorism, 2003, 6
territories. The recent trend in Africa is to recognize that external foreign influences are able to influence internal politics and influence political interactions and successful cooperation between the state and internal rational actors, especially in terms of their capacity to extract available resources. Foreign influence by external governments, corporate firms, NGOs, mercenaries, and other political organizations can also influence weak state rulers, economic strongmen, and even help regional warlords through the preexisting African patrimonial networks that existed prior to the end of the Cold War and commercial globalization.16

2. Stopping Radical and Extremist Violence

The National Defense Strategy provides theoretical, strategic, operational, and tactical capabilities for defeating radical and extreme violence and terrorism by concentrating on multilateral and regional coalitions, interagency coordination and integration, capable and actionable intelligence, maximizing Special Operations Forces (SOF) regional expertise and unilateral engagement capabilities, and identifying and creating long-term strategic effects for accomplishing U.S. national interests. In Africa, the counterterrorism initiatives need to be regionally focused in order to successfully integrate the realistic constraints and limitations inherent to the region and to each country.

One of the key strategic capabilities for the US is its ability to advise, equip, train and support foreign militaries and security organizations around the world as described in the National Defense Strategy, a primary document for this GWOT:

Security cooperation is important for expanding international capacity to meet common security challenges. One of our militaries’ most effective tools in prosecuting the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) is to help train indigenous forces.

The U.S. Government created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the State Department to bolster the capabilities of U.S. civilian agencies and improve

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16 National Strategy For Combating Terrorism, 2003, 222-223
coordination with international partners to contribute to the resolution of complex crisis overseas. The Department is cooperating with this new office to increase the capacity of interagency and international partners to perform non-military stabilization and reconstruction tasks that might otherwise often become military responsibilities by default. Our intent is to focus our efforts on those tasks most directly associated with establishing favorable long-term security conditions.\textsuperscript{17}

The U.S. policy approaches defeating terrorism, insurgency, and political insurrection by meeting the following strategic security requirements:

1. Identify, disrupt, and destroy terrorism groups and supporting networks
2. Expand Counterterrorism (CT) and Counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities to regional organizations and states
3. Diminish African States’ Underlying Conditions (UC) that are linked to supporting Terrorism
4. Win the War of Ideology by spreading Democratic Development Initiatives
5. Increase Regional Intelligence capabilities and resources
6. Establish and support the creation of an US assisted African Union (AU) Combined Regional Security-Stand By Force (CRS-SBF)
7. Develop Country and Regional African governmental institutions and ‘capacity-building’ institutions and infrastructures

Strategically, the regional focus will have to involve a continued political-military effort to successfully engage and sustain the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT). In order to effectively counter terrorism and deter ethnic violence and radical extremism, a monumental effort towards increasing and integrating intelligence collection and analysis by, with, and though international, multilateral, and interagency coordinated efforts and actions is paramount. The GWOT demands increased state cooperation in order to combat international,

\textsuperscript{17} The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. The Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld. March 01, 2005, 12-16
transnational, and regional security threats. At the same time, an opportunity exists for establishing and executing regional security cooperation agreements between the United States, international partners, and African states in addition creating new governmental security institutions.

3. **Size and Shape of Geography Effects Regional Security and Stability**

Africa is the world’s second largest continent and occupies about 20% of the Earth’s land area. The sheer size and geographical composition of Africa along with its diverse cultures and ethnic tensions will only continue to overwhelm international and U.S. economic investment effects unless regional security can be achieved. Consider the following political, economic, cultural, and social features:

1. Africa measures about 5,000 miles (8,000 km) from north to south and about 4,600 miles from east to west. Africa’s land area is roughly 11.724 ml sq. ml. (30.3657 ml. sq. km). The coastline of Africa is 18,950 miles. The prime meridian (0º longitude) crosses Africa from north to south, passing through the Terma near Accra in Ghana.

2. The African continent is almost equally geographically separated by the Earth’s equator. Most of Africa lies within the tropical region, bounded on the north by the Tropic of Cancer and on the south by the Tropic of Capricorn. The largest lake in Africa is Lake Victoria, the chief reservoir of the Nile River. Other great lakes in Africa are Tanganyika Lake (in Tanzania and Congo) and Lake Nyasa in (Tanzania and Malawi).

3. The Nile River is the world’s longest river, spanning 4,160 miles from the Mediterranean Sea in North East Africa to Lake Victoria in South East Africa. Other long rivers in Africa are the Congo, Niger, Zambezi, and Orange Rivers.

4. Africa has an average elevation of about 2,200 feet (670 m). The East African Rift System constitutes Africa’s most extensive mountain system. The highest mountain in Africa is Mt Kilimanjaro (19,317 ft) in Tanzania. The Atlas Mountains along the northwestern coast rise to

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more than 13,000 feet (4,000 m). The Sahara is the world’s largest contiguous desert with 3.5 million square miles of land area. Other major deserts in Africa are the Namib and the red-sanded Kalahari in southern Africa.\footnote{Globe Africa, Inc., General Facts. Retrieved on August 21, 2005 from the Internet from http://www.globeafrica.com/Commons/geo.htm. 2003, 1}

5. Only about 6% of Africa is arable; nearly 25% is forested or wooded. The largest country in Africa is Sudan spanning 968,000 sq mi. Africa’s population is slightly less than 14% of the total world population.\footnote{Ibid. Globe Africa, Inc., General Facts. 2003, 1}

6. Africa’s share of the world’s major strategic mineral reserves is estimated as follows: 12% petroleum, 27% bauxite, 29% uranium, 20% copper, 67% phosphates, and substantial reserves of iron ore, tin, manganese, chromium, cobalt, platinum, and titanium. Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, and Nigeria are the major petroleum and natural gas producing countries in Africa. Botswana, Congo (D. R.), and South Africa together produce 50% of the world’s diamonds. Ghana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe together produce nearly 50% of the world’s gold.\footnote{Ibid. Globe Africa, Inc., General Facts. 2003, 1}

7. Africa’s major languages include Arabic (North), Berber (Morocco and Algeria), Bantu group of languages (Central and Southern Africa), Swahili (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda), Akan (Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire), Saharan and Maba (Chad basin), Koma (the Blue Nile basin), and Songhai (upper-middle Niger River region).\footnote{Ibid. Globe Africa, Inc., General Facts. 2003, 1}

8. The most prevalent diseases in Africa include malaria, dysentery, tuberculosis, whooping cough, typhoid fever, gonorrhea, and HIV/AIDS.\footnote{Ibid. Globe Africa, Inc., General Facts. 2003, 1}

C. CORRECTING U.S. DEPARTMENTAL AND REGIONAL FLAWS

Once we consider this diversity it should quickly become apparent that the typical U.S. government approach needs to be re-thought, in part because the U.S. government does not have a ‘typical’, let alone coherent approach across agencies. For instance, the Department of State (DoS) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) define the region of Africa differently than does the Department of Defense (DoD). The DoS and USAID

23 Ibid. Globe Africa, Inc., General Facts. 2003, 1
combine their geographical regional area operations as 1) Asia and the Near East, and 2) Sub-Saharan Africa.

The African countries that characterize the DoS-Bureau of Near East Affairs are located along the northern Arab region called the Maghreb. The Maghreb geographically defines the Arabian regions of Northern Africa by including the countries of Morocco, Western Sahara, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt:27 In contrast, Sub-Saharan Africa is comprised of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

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27 Department of State (DoS). The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. Regional responsibility and list of countries along the Maghreb and Middle East. Map illustration was retrieved August 17, 2005 from the Internet at http://www.state.gov/p/nea
The geographical responsibility for how the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA), Department of State (DoS) defines North Africa as the “Maghreb” as an extension of the Middle East.

Figure 4. Department of State (DoS): The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. Regional responsibility and list of countries along the Maghreb and Middle East. Map illustration was retrieved August 17, 2005 from the Internet at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/

The geographical responsibility for how the Bureau of African Affairs (AA), Department of State (DoS) defines Sub-Saharan Africa.

Figure 5. Department of State (DoS): The Bureau of African Affairs. Regional responsibility and list of countries within Sub-Saharan Africa. Map illustration was retrieved August 17, 2005 from the Internet at http://www.state.gov/p/af/ci/
Historically, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of State (DoS) have competed against one another for resources and have often had different political objectives. That is one explanation for why each agency treats the map of Africa so differently. The current DoD organizational structure within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) at policy level also recognize a North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, but with somewhat different dimensions.

Currently, DoD divides regional responsibility for Africa among three separate geographical combatant commands (GCC’s): USEUCOM (United States European Command), USCENTCOM (United States Central Command), and USPACOM (United States Pacific Command). Within each of these specific geographical unified commands, USEUCOM controls North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, and USCENTCOM has responsibility for the Horn of Africa, while USPACOM controls the five African islands within the Indian Ocean region, to include Madagascar.

One sees the potential for confusion when one considers that, although the Horn of Africa (HOA) is strategically important within the Middle East region, the sea lines of communication (LOC’s) within the Red Sea continue to be controlled regionally by USCENTCOM. Yet, the African island countries of the Seychelles, Mauritius, Comoros, and Madagascar, located in the Indian Ocean, meanwhile regionally fall under USPACOM’s purview.

If the regional responsibility for Africa is separated internally between three DoD unified geographical combatant commands how, we might wonder, does this possibly mesh with DoS’s configuration? How can DoD and the DoS possibly support one another with foreign diplomacy meant to effectively focus on supporting U.S. national interests within Africa?

At the very least, we also need to bear in mind Africa’s own regional and sub-regional divisions. For example: the African Union (AU) member states are recognized and regionally organized into five geo-political-economic sub-regions within Africa:
**North Africa** - Five (5) AU Member States: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Tunisia, and Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic

*(NOTE: Morocco is the only African country that is not a member of the African Union (AU)).*

**West Africa** - Sixteen (16) AU Member States: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.

**Central Africa** - Nine (9) AU Member States: Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Sao Tome and Principe.

**East Africa** - Thirteen (13) AU Member States: Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.

**South Africa** - Ten (10) AU Member States: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Africa: The current USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and USPACOM Unified Geographic Combatant Commanders’ Area of Responsibility (AOR)

If the U.S. intends to work through regional organizations like the AU, shouldn’t it realign its coverage to better fit such regional and even sub-regional entities?

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III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. AFRICA AND THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE UNITED STATES UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN (UCP)

The United States has been operating under the Unified Command Plan of 1946 with few organizational changes since World War II. During the years between 1949 and 1952, the United States’ unified commands throughout the world were strategically affected by Cold War threats and more traditionally by European NATO alignments. The strategy during both the post-World War II and the post-Cold War eras has been to be able to fight in two major theaters of war concurrently. The UCP’s World War II legacy still affects DoD today. We see this in how USEUCOM and USPACOM are currently aligned and historically have been organized and structured to fight. In many ways, they remain the geo-strategic model for the DoD, especially since the two largest unified geographical combatant commands still strategically control most U.S. forces in the world.

The establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, with Europe as its center of gravity, influenced allied strategic partnerships and cooperation developments throughout Europe, and only since the end of the Cold War has U.S. national security strategy been focused on other geographical regions. This shift in focus, as the world develops and global cooperation strengthens, has led to revisions in the Unified Command Plan (UCP). However, the UCP is currently an inadequate reflection of U.S. national initiatives and security cooperation within Africa.

In 1956, the first annual review of the Unified Command Plan of 1946 was conducted. This revision included a document from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that proposed creation of a Middle East Command (MECOM). The increasingly hostile political developments occurring in the Middle East during the 1960s not only presented new strategic challenges to the United States, but signaled to the JCS that a change in the unified command structure was indeed needed. The 1958 Department of Defense Reorganization Act can be described as the early equivalent to command reorganization and transformation of regional authority that took place under the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. Yet, to this day Africa remains woefully neglected.

B. THE CREATION OF USEUCOM AND NORTH AFRICA

During the years between 1949 and 1952, the United States military unified commands in the world were greatly affected by rising Cold War threats and the formalization of NATO’s political alignment. The creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 influenced strategic developments within Europe against the increasing security threats from the Soviet Union.29 By 1954, the European Command (EUCOM) was established and the geographical responsibilities of this command would include all post-WWII countries within western Europe, countries along the Mediterranean Sea, and all the Algerian

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29 Cole, et al, 17
Departments of France. EUCOM’s responsibilities within North Africa were only limited to French Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya.30

1. U.S. Strike Command (USSTRICOM) and the Creation of MEAFSAIO (Middle East, Africa South of the Sahara, and South Asia, and the Indian Ocean)

In 1963, the United States Strike Command (USSTRICOM) assumed regional responsibility for the Middle East, Africa south of the Sahara, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean, all of which comprised a region called MEAFSAIO.31 During this time, the unified and sub-unified commands between the military services located in the United States and the unified and sub-unified regional commands located throughout the world began to compete against one another in their efforts to govern resources and influence.

During the 1960’s, the effects of continued military combat operations during the Vietnam War had enormous impacts on the military service commands, and regional unified commands began to resist the DoD’s commitment to transform and centralize its power under then-Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. During this decade, a long inter-service rivalry occurred between specific military services over regional responsibility and military control of the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. USSTRICOM was regionally responsible for planning and executing all military operations within the geographical region of MEAFSA, but in 1964 it was EUCOM that coordinated the hostage rescue mission in the Congo and operationally assisted Belgian

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30 “USCINCEUR assumed command in Europe effective 1 August 1952. In a message approved by the Secretary of Defense, the JCS on 2 December 1952 spelled out for the USCINCEUR his geographical area of responsibility: Norway, Denmark, West Germany, Berlin, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Austria, Trieste, the Mediterranean Sea, The Mediterranean Islands, Algerian Departments of France, the United Kingdom, including the territorial water of those countries... His North African responsibilities were limited to joint planning in French Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya and to military aspects of negotiations for base rights.” Cole, et al, 18-19

31 Cole, et al; 69
Paratroopers with U.S. aviation transportation assets. Also in 1967, EUCOM conducted multiple Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) from numerous Middle Eastern countries during the Arab-Israeli War.  

So, despite these structural and command organizational complications within the unified command organizations, EUCOM was nevertheless able to regionally effect military operations in both the Middle East and Africa with U.S. military forces and logistical support from U.S. Military Operational Bases (MOB) located throughout Europe. These two operations were the main cause for the disestablishment of STRICOM / MEAFSA, which occurred in 1971. The result was a new unified command organization, the Readiness Command (USREDCOM), which became regionally responsible for the MEAFSA and was officially established in 1971.

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32 “In November 1962, Secretary of Defense assigned CINCLANT the responsibility for plans and operations pertaining to Sub-Saharan Africa; he instructed CINCLANT to establish a small Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF-4) under an Army lieutenant general. A controversy arose over whether CINCLANT was now excluded from “routine” Sub-Saharan operations. In July 1965, Secretary McNamara apportioned Sub-Saharan responsibilities as follows: Military Assistance Program (MAP) to USCINCEUR and the Secretary of the Army, The Congo air evacuation to USCINCEUR, and the Congo sea evacuation to CINLANT.” Cole, et al, 30-31

33 Cole, et al, 34
2. U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM) and MEAFSA

In 1971, crises in the Middle East heightened increased interest in security initiatives for the Middle East. In June of 1971, President Nixon approved a new plan to change the command responsibility of the 1963 Unified Command Plan (UCP). The new recommendations from the Secretary of Defense and JCS forwarded to the President suggested the extension of USEUCOM to include the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and Iran. The JCS also recommended that the PACOM area should meet the EUCOM geographical area east of Iran and south of east Africa and connect with LANTCOM’s area of

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responsibility around the entire African continent. The UCP of 1972 authorized the disestablishment of the unified command of USSTRICOM / USCINCMEAFSA. Consequently, Africa south of the Sahara became strategically unassigned and no regional combatant command assumed geographic responsibility for the sub-Saharan areas of Africa.

In 1975, the approved UCP was distributed. The final recommendations concluded that the geographical boundaries of USPACOM would include the entire Indian Ocean to the east coast of Africa, as well as the African islands of Seychelles, Mauritius, Comoros, and the Maldives. The President also authorized that North Africa and the Middle East were to remain within the USEUCOM area of responsibility. Finally, in May 1976, the Unified Command Plan (UCP) became effective and the area known as “Africa South of the Sahara” continued to remain geographically unassigned to any unified or sub-unified command.

3. U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM) and the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force

In 1976 Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger created REDCOM (Readiness Command), with responsibilities that focused on executing global contingency planning and providing a Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters staff for future operations. But REDCOM was not regionally assigned any area of responsibility nor given any additional military forces.

In 1977, the JCS initiated an investigation into creating a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) that would assume regional contingency planning within the U.S. Readiness Command in the Middle-Eastern region and merge the

35 Cole, et al, 40
36 “The USCINCMEAFSA area would be divided as follows: southern Asia to PACOM, the Middle East to USEUCOM, and Africa south of the Sahara to LANTCOM.” Cole, et al, 40
37 Cole, et al, 48
38 “The Joint Chiefs of Staff also informed the Secretary that, as of 1 March 1980, the RDJTF headquarters had become fully operational. While the RDJTF headquarters would be under the operational command of USCINCRE for planning, training and deploying, the new headquarters would be a separate subordinate element of USREDCOM. Once deployed to the Persian Gulf region, the RDJTF headquarters and forces would come under the operational control of either USCINCEUR or CINCPAC.” Cole, et al, 69
command structures into a Joint Rapid Deployment Task Force (JRDTF) that would assume regional responsibility as a separate unified command within USREDCOM.39

C. THE CREATION OF U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND (USCENTCOM)

On January 1, 1983, President Ronald Reagan and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) authorized the creation of a new unified command, the United States Central Command. The United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) initially was created because rising U.S. national security interests focused around the growing Middle East Crisis in 1973 and the Israeli-Egypt War of 1974.40

The Unified Command Plan (UCP) of 1983 historically recognized the long-standing relationship between NATO, Europe, and the European countries, former colonies in Africa. The seven African countries within East Africa located along the Red Sea were included within the geographical responsibility of U.S. Central Command's (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility while the African

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39 “Expanding upon the recommendations of 18 May 1981, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to the Secretary of Defense on July 6 1981 terms of reference and additional forces for the RDJTF...The proposed RDJTF area of operations included Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Democratic Yemen, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya, and the red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Once the RDJTF developed its capacity to perform all normal operations as a unified command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to expand the area of operations to include some or all of the following: Egypt, Israel, Syria, Jordan, India, and the Indian Ocean.” Cole, et al, 75

40 “The Joint Chief of Staff had not agreed in 1979 on the creation of a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, and command arrangements for the Middle East remained a controversial issue during 1980. Not until April 1981 did the Secretary of Defense instruct the JCS to submit a five years or less into a “separate unified command” for the countries bordering the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the western part of the Indian Ocean...In a memorandum on 23 September 1981, they added Egypt and Sudan to the “ultimate” geographic area of RDJTF. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also agreed to designate the RDJTF as a separate joint task force, effective 1 October 1981.” Cole, et al, 74-76
island countries located in the middle of the Indian Ocean, including Madagascar, became geographically aligned within U.S. Pacific Command’s (USPACOM) area of responsibility.\footnote{“In response to a JCS call for a biennial review, both CINCLANT and CINCPAC expressed dissatisfaction with the assigned area of the RDJTF. CINCLANT recommended broadening the RDJTF area of Africa to include all the remaining states not already assigned to it or to USEUCOM, that all of Africa south of the Sahara and west of the Sudan and Kenya. CINCPAC asserted that responsibility for naval operations in the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the Red Sea should not be artificially divided between himself and COMRDJTF but should be assigned entirely to himself as the commander with the experience and naval resources to do the job.” Cole, \textit{et al}, 77}

The U.S. geographical boundaries for USCENTCOM (the Middle East and the Horn of Africa) and USEUCOM (North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa) persists.\footnote{“Effective 1 January 1983, USCINCCENT would plan and conduct all normal operations, with one exception, for the northeast African countries of Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia; the Arabian peninsular countries of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, the Yemen Arab Republic, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, and Bahrain; the Middle East mainland countries of Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Jordan; and the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. The exception, security assistance to Pakistan and Afghanistan, would continue as a CINCPAC responsibility until transferal to USCENTCOM on 1 October 1983. Also under the revised UCP of 1983, USCEUR would remain responsible for the North African states of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. All other African states south of the Sahara and west of Sudan and Kenya would continue to be unassigned.” Cole, \textit{et al}, 78} The current Unified Command Plan (UCP) continues to treat Africa as a misbegotten stepchild. Nor can the current boundaries possibly promote a cohesive U.S. strategy that effectively supports regional stability and security.
D. UNITED STATES REGIONAL STRATEGY FOR AFRICA

Unfortunately, since the end of the Cold War, U.S. political and military leaders have chosen to ignore issues related to Africa in favor of other geographical regions such as Eastern Europe, Southwestern Asia and, most recently, the Middle East with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation...
Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Africa is a continent that is considered to be of little national strategic importance and is most commonly referred to as a “Limited Engagement Theater”.

One obvious solution is to create a stand alone unified or sub-unified Regional Combatant Command (RCC) that is focused on both the Africa of today and on future U.S. national security issues within this region. The significance of Africa is similar to that the Middle East during the mid-to-late 20\textsuperscript{th} Century. A regional joint headquarters that eventually became the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), able to provide the JCS with strategic regional capacity developed from a forward positioned Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJFT), initially established on March 1, 1980.\footnote{United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) replaced the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was established in March 1, 1980. Beginning in 1977, the JCS again undertook to merge command arrangements for MEAFSA with efforts to create a rapid deployment force (RDF) for use in the area. After the Arab-Israeli War in October 1973, oil-producing states in the Persian Gulf region raised oil prices to punish the Western countries and Japan for Israeli occupation of former Arab lands. Concerned that the Arab states might choke off the flow of oil to the West or that the Soviet Union might invade neighboring Islamic states, President Carter on 24 August 1977 directed that a study be made of creating a rapid deployment force of two or more light divisions for use in the Persian Gulf region.” Cole, \textit{et al}, 66-67}

After all, the Department of the Defense Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) establishes four key strategic principles that focus on regional cooperative security relationships: (1) enhance regional capacities of foreign partners; (2) expand cohesion within U.S. inter-agencies that define building strategic security partnerships to defeat terrorism; (3) defend the homeland in-depth; (4) shape ‘pivotal’ countries to balance future strategic crossroads; and (5) prevent the acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction by a hostile state or non-state actors.\footnote{“The discovery of large oil reserves in the Gulf of Guinea there is tremendous economic potential for the region that has heretofore been absent. The energy potential is, in a sense, a double-edged sword: while it provides economic development value for the region, it is also a lightening rod for conflict that simmers below the surface of an ethically and culturally diverse region. Our presence and security cooperative measures can help mitigate instability, assist fragile democracies to confront threats, and provide the basis for real progress and economic prosperity in the region.” General James L. Jones, USMC, Commander, USEUCOM; official statement before The House Armed Service Committee on March 09, 2004, 16}

This would seem to suggest for all the reasons explained in Chapter 1 that Africa be treated differently than it has been up to now. Yet, how much change
has there been? For instance, in an official statement released on March 9, 2005 General James L. Jones Commander USEUCOM, addressed the House Armed Service Committee regarding USEUCOM’s future strategic assessment of the region. In the beginning of his statement Africa is mentioned as a critical area where future political, economic, military, and social realities deserve attention, but ironically, as the statement continues, EUCOM remains far more interested in its other strategic partners.

Even though domestic problems exist throughout Africa, states there are demonstrating collaborative efforts toward finding regional solutions to stability and security problems. With regional security arrangements and sub-regional approaches, countries are developing the capacity to build and rely on sub-regional organizations, and are now better arranged for integration and cooperation with a regionally oriented U.S. unified or sub-unified military command that can help them establish a more robust framework for long-term stability and security in the area.

This decade will present an opportunity for the U.S. to establish and secure a regional long-term military strategy that shapes African regional security for the future:

46 Statement made by General James L. Jones, Commander U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) in his official statement to The House Armed Service Committee on March 9, 2005: “Our 21st Century center of gravity reflects the continuing importance of the greater Middle east, the Caucasus, the Levant, and the “ungoverned” regions of North and West Africa.” The need to transform is a result of the successful integration of former Warsaw Pact nations into an overall European security framework, recognizes our growing strategic interests, and addresses the new operational requirements of the Global War On Terrorism…EUCOM’s Strategic Theater Transformation Plan is a component of the department of Defense Global Posture Strategy announced in August 2004.” General James L. Jones, USMC, Commander, USEUCOM; official statement before The House Armed Service Committee on March 09, 2004, 3-6

47 “The U.S. faces strategic options and competition in Africa. ‘According to the 2004 report on UN Organization for Industrial Development, Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region of the world where, for the last 20 years, extreme poverty hasn’t stopped gaining ground.’ Continued poverty is but one of the many effects of years of tragic violence and instability in certain regions of Africa…Further, transnational extremists have demonstrate an interests in exploiting areas where nations are already struggling with resource scarcity, weak national institutions, poverty and inexperienced militaries. These regions are defined by endemic imbalances in the distribution of wealth, staggering health problems, fragile political systems, regressive social systems, and disenfranchised youth susceptible to the lure of extremism.” General James L. Jones, USMC, Commander, USEUCOM; official statement before The House Armed Service Committee on March 09, 2004, 6-8

This failure to engage Africa closely has led to a policy that more often than not is reactive rather than proactive. It limits the ability to engage African decision makers on security issues, undermines the ability to obtain warnings of impending political crisis, and retards the ability to shape the regional security environment. A unified command with exclusive responsibility for this region would assist in developing needed access and in bringing significantly greater focus to US regional security policy.

If the United States is to effectively pursue its own security strategy in Africa, respond to the needs of its African partners, and mitigate extreme human rights tragedies, the United States must be able to anticipate crisis earlier, respond more rapidly in their initial stages, and cooperate more efficiently with regional actors. But no matter how pressing the potential scenarios, the United States is not now prepared to act in a timely manner in this Limited Engagement Theater.49

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The proposed establishment of a Unified or Sub-Unified Regional Combatant Command for Africa


IV. THE REQUIREMENT FOR AN AFRICAN STRATEGIC REALIGNMENT

A. THE STRATEGIC REQUIREMENT TO CREATE A SUB-UNIFIED REGIONAL COMMAND AND HEAD-QUARTERS FOR AFRICA

In a post-September 11, 2001 world, international events continue to remind us of the dangerous threats posed by future international terrorist attacks and the continuing spread of a radical ideology born from Al Qaeda (AQ) and Usama Bin Laden (UBL). In response, the world is prepared to engage in preemptive strategy against global and regional terror networks. Today, this preemptive strategic vision is required just as much in Africa as anywhere else. Africa has recently become a center of increased attention following the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. The United States European Command (USEUCOM) has recently been focusing counter-terrorism on the Sahel, for instance, and the Horn of Africa (HOA) has received special attention from the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) in terms of tactical operations against Al Qaeda linked terror cells known to be operating within the region.

There are many reasons why a specialized geo-political military organization and command headquarters should be planned, organized, equipped, and implemented for the entire continent of Africa. The common sense approach for our U.S. national strategy would be to recognize the sheer geographical size of Africa that has been identified in Chapter 1. The enormous size, never mind diversity, of Africa outstrips that of any other geographical regional command in the world today. Today, Africa is challenged with monumental humanitarian crises, economic instability, continued civil wars, regional famine, governmental corruption, AIDS, crime, terrorism, and continued human rights violations.

Since September 11, 2001, President Bush has created the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). A Free Trade Act (FTA) between the U.S. and Morocco has been instrumental in strengthening at least one bilateral alliance as part of the Global War On Terror (GWOT). Other selected African countries have
improved relations and poverty through the Free Trade Act (FTA) as well, and the continued African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has helped strengthen ties initially implemented by former President Clinton in 1996.

This strategic rationale for continuing economic assistance for Africa is based on supporting the regional fight against terrorism and Al Qaeda’s radical ideology throughout Africa. But perceived economic changes are not likely to improve security and stability rapidly enough. This is where military-to-military relations also become important. Our national security strategy can be influenced by unconventional methods and state building in the form of military-to-military programs that support regional and interstate Foreign Internal Defense (FID), either in the form of investment in coalition support structures or joint military security regional cooperation throughout Africa.

Africa is often characterized as a complex region with many overlapping problems and constraints. Since its early colonial development, both state independence and Cold War realities have contributed to ongoing African turmoil. The Department of Defense (DoD) National Defense Strategy of the United States of America lists our vulnerabilities:

1. Our capacity to address global security challenges alone will be insufficient.
2. Some Allies and partners will decide not to act with us or will lack the capacity to act with us.
3. Our predominant position in the world affairs will continue to breed unease, a degree of resentment, and resistance.
4. Our strength as a nation state will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial process, and terrorism.
5. We and our allies we be the principal targets of extremism and terrorism.
6. Natural forces of inertia and resistance to change will constrain military transformation.51

Yet, through this lens, if one compares stated policy goals with actual policy initiatives on the ground the current treatment of Africa can be viewed as strategically flawed.

THE AFRICAN UNION (AU)
THE RECOGNIZED FIVE AFRICAN GEOGRAPHICAL SUB-REGIONS

Figure 11. The African Union (AU) The Recognized Five African Geographical Sub-Regions. Retrieved on 08/08-05 from the Internet at http://www.africanaction.org/bp/regional.htm

52 Figure 10: The African Union (AU). The Five Sub-Regions of Africa. Retrieved on August 08, 2005 from the Internet at http://www.africanaction.org/bp/regional.htm
B. NEW SYNERGIES

Another way in which the military can help is to follow the suggestions made by the African Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG). In its recommendation to the U.S. Congress and Senate on U.S. energy security interest AOPIG defines a critical role for Special Operations Forces (SOF). AOPIG sees long-term opportunities to break away from current existing geo-strategic political pressures that exist between the three unified Regional Combatant Commands (RCCs) for USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and USPACOM by having SOF focus efforts on the Gulf of Guinea sub-region. What is intriguing about AOPIG’s recommendations is that these would create a new security environment and region of integrated security and economic prosperity, one that is already politically receptive to a U.S. political presence and valued military assistance. As AOPIG puts it:

As the Gulf of Guinea emerges as a new energy center of gravity and a vital U.S. interest, Washington needs to work with its regional allies to develop a practical set of foreign policy initiatives underpinning a long-term alignment. These initiatives could provide for a U.S.-West Africa relationship defined by:

1. A new and vigorous focus on U.S. military cooperation in Sub-Saharan Africa, to include design of a sub-unified command structure which could produce significant dividends in the protection of U.S. investments, improving the level of military professionalism and subordination of African militaries to civil leadership, and in cooperatively confronting and eliminating global and regional terrorism;

2. Large scale U.S. capital investment in regional infrastructure projects such as the Chad-Cameroon (Oil) and West Africa (Gas) pipeline projects leading to economic diversification in the agro-business, hydrological and manufacturing sectors;

3. Expansion of the ideas articulated in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) to effect the creation of a U.S.-African free trade agreements, and

4. A carefully measured and monitored U.S. commitment to debt forgiveness contingent upon bilateral partnerships promoting free market reforms in critical sectors as energy, banking, and
transportation, all the while recognizing that African States need to
do their part to secure debt relief.53

Such an improved regional security framework might even help create and
possibly accelerate democratic reforms in African civil governance and promote
increased American capital investment throughout the region. An increased and
focused African Regional Combatant Command supported by a Regional African
Special Operations Command could easily adapt and lead this sub-regional
initiative by improving African political-military leadership, supporting regional
trade and economic development, and assisting in the institutional capacity
building needed in order to create better regional security. The U.S. security
requirements met by doing so could help deter and deny potential terrorists
networks the capability to further infiltrate and find refuge in Africa.

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Prepared by the African Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG). This supporting thesis document was
retrieved from the Internet on August 08, 2005 from
http://66.102.7.104/search?q=cache:wT_NhgTLJo8J:www.israeleconomy.org/strategic/africawhit
epaper.pdf+&hl=en, 78-81
C. U.S. NATIONAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AFRICA AND THE FUTURE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM (GWOT)

The Current Commander’s Area of Responsibility


1. Change USEUCOM’s, USCENTCOM’s, and USPACOM’s Geographical Area Of Responsibility (AOR) within Africa

Another argument for a broadened, but also more region-specific approach to Africa has to do with preemption. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have busily transformed the military into smaller units of action, organized and capable of both meeting regional challenges as future war fighters and peacekeepers, and rapidly deploying to any crisis around the world, a tremendous amount of effort has gone into man-hunting. Presumably, if we invested more in nation building we could take away
not only the terrorists ability to recruit, but also to hide. If we are serious about regional security and stability, and if invest in these, then the population should prefer us to insurgents and terrorists.

Indeed, in order for the DoD to become better prepared to support the Department of State’s (DoS) foreign policy more effectively and efficiently, the DoD should seriously start looking at regional capacity building as a core military mission. Nothing else is likely to be more effective at combating regional threats from civil wars, insurgency, terrorism, ethnic and racial violence, ungoverned territories, and failing states.

**Recommendation 1: Realign the Commander’s Area of Responsibility and create a unified geographical U.S. African Combatant Command (USAFCOM)**


Today, from a western perspective, Africa continues to be extremely complex. Thus, my first recommendation is to transform and realign our
conceptions of Africa to meet the current geo-political realities of Africa. This recommendation relies on the fact that in order to build African regional capacity, Africa will need to be supported by a unified U.S. African Command (USAFCOM) that is able to geo-politically assist, organize, command and control, provide a unity of effort to, and support US-African foreign policy and regional interests. Africa is similar, but is very different from USCENTCOM. In Africa, the U.S. will be required to deepen and strengthen our cultural knowledge, language capabilities, economic awareness, and consolidate our regional expertise.

The current geo-political relationship that USEUCOM has with Africa is ineffective and sometimes considered too European. It is impossible for USEUCOM to continue to focus on African issues while Eastern Europe expands and NATO politically affects U.S.-African foreign policy. It is entirely impossible for someone stationed in Western Europe to become an expert on Africa. In order to become an African expert one must be stationed in Africa and become familiar with the cultural and ethnic differences, as well as the many different tribal languages that make up Africa. Today, approximately 460 million people live in Africa, roughly 11% of the world’s population. The world is estimated to have about 6,200 languages; within Africa there are an estimated 2,582 languages and approximately 1,382 dialects. European and colonial foreign powers at the turn of the century drew the current national boundaries in Africa. The most important historical lesson learned from these demarcations was that the colonials paid little attention to the cultural, ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic, or historical complexities within Africa. Africans themselves are working hard to overcome these complexities through their sub-regional organizations. This is in and of itself a reason for the U.S. to support such efforts by reconceptualizing its view of Africa accordingly.

In this regard, the final and most important aspect of a unified African Command (USAFCOM) is improved U.S. support for the regional and sub-regional African Union economic and security communities. In order to support African economic growth and security, a unified command will be required. If, as predicted, the U.S. comes to increasingly rely on African sources of energy from
the Gulf of Guinea and Central Africa, then a U.S. African Command now and in the near term will become increasingly more vital to U.S.-African relations. If Africa becomes a major source for U.S. foreign oil, following events similar to those that unfolded in the Middle East, then in this 21st Century the U.S. will be required to invest heavily in this region and continent in order to protect those vital resources from foreign competitors by establishing a unified U.S. African Combatant Command (USAFCOM).

**Recommendation 2: Realign the Commander's Area of Responsibility and create a sub-unified regional U.S. Sub-Saharan African Command (USSSAC) within USEUCOM**


Again, we must transform our conceptions of Africa so that our conceptions better fit our stated foreign policy. The DoS and the DoD both recognize at the national policy level that Africa features natural and cultural separations at the Sahel, between North Africa (the Maghreb) and Sub-Saharan Africa (Black Africa). Nonetheless, there have been long-standing relations
between these regions and this is no more significant a divide than that between Sudan and Ethiopia, or between South Africa and Mozambique, for instance. Africa needs to be re-united on our eyes.

At the very least, there needs to be U.S. unity of military command under one regional African command, similar to that of the U.S. Forces Command-Korea (USFC) under USPACOM and the Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-B) that regionally commands and controls all of Central America within USSOUTHCOM. A regional command assigned to Sub-Saharan Africa under USEUCOM will not jeopardize the current geo-political strategy between the U.S. and our European allies, partners, and coalitions. Rather, this recommendation will create a better working relationship for the United Nations (UN) and provide better civil-military support to ongoing peacekeeping and humanitarian operations within Africa.

Finally, the creation of a regional U.S. Sub-Saharan African Command would support future US-African foreign policy and U.S. national interests. The creation of an U.S. Sub-Saharan African Command (USSSAC) could directly assist in improving African governance, state infrastructure, and regional capacity. This initiative would be the ideal mechanism for coordinating diplomatic, economic, intelligence, security, and external foreign assistance. The USSSAC would also significantly contribute to improving support to U.S. Embassies.
2. Recommend an Increase for Supporting African Union (AU) Regional and Sub-Regional Organizations in Support of U.S.-African National Interests

**Africa Political**

![Africa Political Map](image)

*Figure 15. Africa Political (Origination of this graphic illustration is unknown by this author)*

In America’s Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), foreign policy toward Africa has politically focused on helping Africans find African solutions to Africa’s problems. The current Bush administration believes helping African leaders to eliminate Africa’s problems (i.e. bad governments, terrorism, ungoverned state territories, poverty, insurgencies, ethnic violence, weak state capacities and ineffective institutions, and HIV/AIDS) will strengthen state infrastructures and capabilities that will, in turn, deny safe havens for terrorists. Africa’s civil wars and insurgencies have had a tendency to expand into regional conflicts, thus destabilizing the entire region.

The Bush administration has identified three strategic approaches to attaining our national security objectives in Africa: working with “anchor states” in each sub-region, supporting sub-regional organizations (SROs), and engaging the African Union (AU). Out of these three approaches, supporting SROs is becoming an important strategic consideration for sub-regional organizations like
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), South African Development Community (SADC), and the East African Community (ECA) that have historically provided peacekeeping forces in support of regional security operations within Africa.

However, many academics and Africanists within the Bush administration believe that sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS and SADC need to be strengthened further. Dr Steven Metz, a leading research professor and chairperson for DoD Strategy and Plans at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) at the U.S. Army War College, describes how problems between the states can impede such efforts:

Despite widespread rhetorical support to territorial integrity and the inviolability of the borders inherited at the time of independence, most African borders are permeable, with only sporadic or weak control of the flow of people and goods from country to country. This blurs the distinction between external and internal security problems. Violence often pits an insurgent or secessionist movements against the central government or, increasingly, ethnic militias against governments or other groups. Many of these conflicts generate substantial refugee flows, thus turning internal violence into international problems.\(^{54}\)

Given the weakness of political institutions, personality plays a larger role in African affairs than in any other region of the world. Often, interstate cooperation or antagonisms reflect relations between individual “Heads of State” rather than national interests. Nowhere was that clearer than in 1996-97 war in Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC), as many African leaders seized the opportunity to strike at Mobutu in revenge for his support of their enemies in the past. Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, Rwanda’s Paul Kagame, and Angola’s Jose Dos Santos (among others) provided vital support to the rebels. During the initial stages of the war, South Africa’s Nelson Mandela and Kenya’s President Daniel Arap Moi attempted to mediate. Because of personal animosities, Moi excluded rebel leader Kabila, which virtually guaranteed failure.\(^{55}\)

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\(^{54}\) Metz, Steven. Refining American Strategy in Africa. The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) at the United States Army War College. Carlisle, Pennsylvania. February 2000, 8

\(^{55}\) Ibid, Metz, Steven. Refining American Strategy in Africa. The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) at the United States Army War College. Carlisle, Pennsylvania. 2000, 8
The African Union (AU) regional and sub-regional organizations can only be as strong as their constituent states. This, too we must keep in mind, but again here also mil-to-mil relations can help, especially when many leaders themselves are military men.\textsuperscript{56} If the current administration is truly intent on supporting AU regional and sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS, SADC, ECA, UMA, then the U.S. needs to pursue several strategies simultaneously, while to coordinate them effectively requires constant attention and unity of command.

Meanwhile, even though anchor states such as Nigeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Uganda, Morocco, and South Africa are extremely important in leading military interventions in Africa under UNPKO and Humanitarian Assistance missions, if the U.S. continues to focus too much political and military attention on finding, fixing, killing, and capturing terrorists, such attention will only foster animosity toward the United States. Because of current U.S. national interests in Nigeria, Angola, Ethiopia, Uganda, Morocco, and South Africa, these countries are viewed by the other African states within their region as U.S. proxies. Not only is a new long-term African regional strategy needed, but also an information operations (IO) campaign in order to successfully develop these regional and sub-regional organizations (SROs). The U.S. should develop a long-term strategy in Africa that is not so much politically structured at promoting the most powerful country in the SRO, but develops the AU’s regional economic institutions and sub-regional security capabilities, and thus oversight of these SROs. For this reason too, the Bush administration should focus more on developing the economies and state structures of all the AU member states in the SRO and not just the more powerful African regional hegemon.

The final strategy for Africa is that the U.S. will need in the near term to shift our foreign policy focus toward properly addressing the threats from the underlying conditions of many weak and failing African states. The U.S. will need to increase both the political role of the Department of State (DoS) and

\textsuperscript{56} Metz, Steven. \textit{Refining American Strategy in Africa}. 2000, 11
encourage interagency support toward solving the realities of animosities, poverty, ungoverned territory and border areas, ethnic and racial violence, transnational crime, governmental corruption, and not continue to focus almost all efforts on terrorist man-hunting operations in support of the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT). The U.S. will need a regional strategy that can focus more on the reform challenges in each African state.

In conclusion, the U.S. will need to make sure that African solutions to African problems incorporate African states as partners. The U.S. will need to implement a new U.S.-African foreign policy, emphasizing a larger supporting role for regional and sub-regional organizations. If executed, this would signify to Africa’s leaders that the U.S. is committed to rational step-by-step approaches toward assisting African regional cooperation and takes Africa’s own organizations seriously.
V. CONCLUSION

The United States should recognize the sub-regional diversity within Africa. There are substantive differences, for instance, between West Africa and the Horn of Africa in terms of the numerous disputes over control of their borders, yet we have seen wars easily escalate in these sub-regions. It is strategically vital that the U.S. recognize the need to plan, equip, train, execute, and support future nation building and ongoing peacekeeping operations and to establish proper border and regional security initiatives for the five African Union sub-regional organizations (SROs). Dr. Steven Metz from the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) at the U.S. Army War College explains:

While traditional, cross border, state on state warfare is rare in Africa; internal conflict arising from a struggle for control of the government is common and thus constitutes a major source of instability and insecurity. In 1999, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Congo, Guinea Bissau, Rwanda, Somalia, Burundi, Uganda, and Angola were all wracked by internal war. Other long-standing conflicts were in hiatus but, capable of exploding at any time. At the root is the struggle for power and resources, but ideology or ethnicity was often used to mobilize support and define “us” and “them.” What makes these internal conflicts particularly debilitating is the tendency for them to become internationalized.57

Today, the most pervasive security problem in Africa is what is called “complex emergencies" growing from the combination of weak states, ethnic tensions, and the combination of minorities, corrupt and dictatorial regimes, and support for these regimes by international arms traders, chronic poverty and underdevelopment, and the debt burden. Complex emergencies do not entail traditional, force-on-force warfare, but sustained, low intensity (albeit often brutal) violence involving militias, warlord armies, state forces and, sometimes, private security forces. They are sometimes linked to environmental problems like drought or desertification and, in turn, sometimes spawn other environmental problems like...

57 Metz, Steven. Refining American Strategy in Africa. 2000, 12-13
epidemic disease. Invariably, complex emergencies generate refugees who become both the victims of and pawns in the conflict.58

The question for the United States and Africa is “How do we get there from here? The short answer is that the U.S. should take a different foreign policy approach toward solving problems within Africa. Essentially, the United States should either (1) step away from Africa all together, something that is politically and strategically impossible given the demands of the GWOT, or (2) become more geo-politically involved in U.S.-African regional and sub-regional affairs. Given that the second option is the only one we can really afford, the U.S. will need to be more involved in Africa, especially since the Bush Administration is going to rely less on Middle Eastern energy resources and begin to rely increasingly on the Gulf of Guinea region for increased foreign oil imports. Our current “hands-off” African foreign affairs approach can not be sustained. Under such conditions, the U.S. needs to strategically invest in a national interagency long-term regional security cooperation plan in order to successfully assist the African Union (AU) and sub-regional organizations (SROs) to establish security and governmental capacity.

At the same time, the U.S. needs to improve its strategic capability through improved regional intelligence (RI), support of ongoing UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) and AU regional and sub-regional security organizations, multilateral Counterterrorism (CT) cooperation. In order to developing a preemptive regional SOF stance and increasing the much desired SOF regional CT capability in Africa, the U.S. will first need to develop better regional intelligence, emphasizing tribal language skills, and developing cultural experts within Africa. In order to shape the operational preparation of the battlefield (OPB), provide greater regional human intelligence (HUMINT) access and expertise, support successful operational control elements (OCEs) and advance forces operations (AFO) requirements, the U.S. will have to strategically reorganize itself in Africa in order to better execute a long-term regional strategy.

58 Metz, Steven. Refining American Strategy in Africa. 2000, 13
The various U.S. military initiatives in Africa before September 11, 2001 specifically in Western Africa and the Horn of Africa—such as the African Crisis Reaction Initiative (ACRI), African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance (ACOTA), OPERATION FOCUS RELIEF (OFR)—although sometimes tactically successful, failed politically and strategically.

Post-September 11, 2001, the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI), the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) and, most recently the merging of the PSI into the Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) are also achieving tactical and operational success, but are missing the mark politically and strategically. They could be used to successfully support future US-Africa long-term foreign policy and the GWOT. However, nothing is being done to build on or out from them. The moderate effectiveness of the CJTF-HOA, combined with the TSCTI in western Africa, would likely be more geo-politically effective if there was one unified U.S. military command structure that specified one trans-regional GWOT strategy in support of an integrated U.S.-African GWOT campaign strategy, especially one coordinated among all forms of U.S. power.

The final conclusion is that if future North African or Sub-Saharan African counterterrorism initiatives are to continue, which certainly seems likely, then the U.S. should give a serious long-term look to what is needed for our military command structure in order to effectively support U.S.-African foreign policy. In order to be successful in Africa, first the U.S. must get serious about how we currently geo-strategically align and organize in Africa. The U.S. must acknowledge that a realistic geo-strategic change is needed for the near future in Africa in order to meet ongoing security threats and challenges.

A dedicated geo-political organization is needed with full operational command and control over all of Africa that includes current USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, and USPACOM areas of responsibilities (AOR’s). The U.S. will likely also need a forward-deployed SOF stance and a regional capability that enhances our cultural and linguistic intelligence. As for what we need to do for Africa, the AU regional and sub-regional organizations need to be politically
recognized, adequately organized, professionally trained, specially equipped, and economically supported by a unified or sub-unified military organization that supports existing AU regional and sub-regional organizations.
APPENDIX

DEFINITIONS

USSOCOM Operational Environments:

1. **Permissive Environments**, where a friendly government or occupying power has authorized US military operations and has effective control of the territory and population in the operational area, and the capability and intent to assist the joint force effectively.

2. **Contested Environments**, where-
   - A friendly government or occupying power has authorized US military operations but does not have effective control of the territory and population in the operational area, or the capability or intent to assist the joint force effectively; or
   - A hostile government or occupying power is opposed to US Military operations but does not have effective control of the territory and population in the operational area, or the capability or intent to oppose the joint force effectively.

3. **Ungoverned Environments**, where no effective government exists to control the territory and population in the operational area or to assist or oppose the joint force effectively.

4. **Hostile Environments**, where a hostile government or occupying power is opposed to US military operations and has both effective control of the territory and population in the operational area, and the capability and intent to oppose the joint force effectively.

5. **Denied Environments**, where a friendly or neutral government is opposed to US military operations and has both effective control of the territory and population in the operational area, and the capability and intent to oppose the joint force effectively.
Definitions of Changing DoD Security Environments:

1. **Traditional Challenges:** These challenges are most often associated with States employing armies, navies, and air forces in long-established forms of military competition. Traditional military challenges remain important, as many States maintain capabilities to influence security conditions in their region. However, allied superiority in traditional domains, coupled with the costs of traditional military competition, drastically reduces adversaries’ incentives to compete with the U.S. in this arena.\(^{59}\)

2. **Irregular Challenges:** Increasingly, sophisticated irregular methods—e.g., terrorism and insurgency—challenge U.S. security interests. Adversaries employing irregular methods aiming to erode U.S. influence, patience, and political will. Irregular opponents often take a long-term strategic approach, attempting to impose prohibitive human, material, financial, and political costs on the United States to compel strategic retreat from a key region or course of action.\(^{60}\)

3. **Catastrophic Challenges:** In the face of American dominance in traditional forms of warfare, some hostile forces are seeking to acquire catastrophic capabilities, particularly weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Porous International borders, weak International controls, and easy access to information–related technologies facilitate these efforts. Particularly troublesome is the nexus of International terrorists, proliferation, and problem States that possess or seek WMD, increasing the risk of a WMD attack against the United States.\(^{61}\)

4. **Disruptive Challenges:** In rare instances, revolutionary technology and associated military innovation can fundamentally alter long-established concepts of warfare. Some potential adversaries are seeking disruptive capabilities to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities and offset the current advantages of the United States and its partners.\(^{62}\)

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\(^{60}\) Ibid. 2005, 3

\(^{61}\) Ibid. 2005, 3

\(^{62}\) Ibid. 2005, 4
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**Guest Speakers, Interviews, and Conferences**

Andrews, Robert. (Colonel, Retired, U.S. Army) The Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DDASD), the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (OASD-SOLIC). Mr. Andrews was a guest speaker at the U.S. Naval Post Graduate School (NPS) in October 2004. The topic of his discussion was an UNCLASSIFIED presentation of “Strategic Decision Making Lessons Learned and Unconventional Warfare” (U).

Brigadier General Fredovich, David P. Commander, United States Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC). BG Fredovich was a guest speaker at the U.S. Naval Post Graduate School (NPS) in February 2005. The topic of his discussion was an UNCLASSIFIED presentation of: “SOCPAC support for OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM-Philippines (OEF-P) and the GWOT” (U).

Major General Thomas Csrnko, Commander, United States Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR). MG Csrnko was a guest speaker at the U.S. Naval Post Graduate School (NPS) on March 16, 2005. The topic of his discussion was a UNCLASSIFIED presentation of “SOCEUR’s support for OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and the GWOT” (U).
McCracken, David. E. (Colonel, Retired, U.S. Army). The Acting Principle Director for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism, The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (OASD-SOLIC). The topic of his discussion was a UNCLASSIFIED presentation of “Global War On Terrorism: A Long-Term USG Strategy for Victory” (U). Mr. McCracken was a guest speaker at the U.S. Naval Post Graduate School (NPS) on September 2, 2004.

Center On Terrorism and Irregular Warfare (CTIW) Man-Hunting Conference hosted by the CTIW within the Department of Defense Analysis (DA) at the U.S. Naval Post Graduate School (NPS). The CTIW Man-Hunting Conference was an UNCLASSIFIED conference conducted for the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The conference was held from March 9-11, 2005 at NPS, Monterey, California. The CTIW Man-Hunting Conference and final conference report was completed by Major Mathew T. Nilson (USN), Major Steve Marks (USA), and Captain Tom Meer (USAF). The goal of this conference was to collate the best practices in the art of man-hunting by drawing on the expertise of individuals and agencies that excel at identifying, locating, and capturing fugitives. The objective of the conference were to develop mutual understanding and trust among participants; forge greater cooperation between operators, intelligence analysts, and investigators; and identify any shortcomings in the current man-hunting systems and processes. The accomplishment of these goals and objectives will improve man-hunting by specifically giving the Department of Defense (DoD) critical insight into the methods needed to conduct global man-hunting operations.

The Sixteenth Annual Strategy Conference conducted by the U.S. Army War College on April 12-14, 2005, at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The conference focused on current U.S. National security interests providing senior military leaders and advisors, leading universities and professors, media, and the policy making community to consider, discuss, and debate current topics concerning U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and to help frame vital questions that offer insights on "America's Irregular Enemies: Securing Interests in an Era of Persistent Conflict". American strategic leaders recognize that irregular enemies pose a significant and increasingly complex challenge for the United States and its international partners. These include purposeful direct challengers who threaten the United States with terrorism as well as a host of other capable opponents who hold enduring American interests at risk by violently undermining the political stability of key strategic regions. Irregular enemies may grow more capable over time. This strategic challenge requires conceptual innovation. This is particularly important to help military and civilian leaders frame the issues for the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review. The SSI conference website can be visited at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/
Internet References


House Committee on International Relations. 2001. *Africa and the War on Global Terrorism*. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations, 107th Cong., 1st session. [on-line]. Available from the Internet and accessed April 21, 2005 from: http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intrel/hfa76191.000/hfa76191_0f.htm;


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