USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE WAR OF IDEAS: ASPECTS OF THE NATIONAL PUBLIC DIPLOMACY EFFORT AND POSSIBILITIES FOR MILITARY SUPPORT

by

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This paper will examine certain aspects of United States public diplomacy policy and strategy and some of the mechanisms and resources available for executing that strategy. There are a number of military activities which parallel national public diplomacy efforts. These military activities have similar goals, but are not actively aligned or coordinated with United States strategic public diplomacy. This paper proposes how the United States military can contribute to the national endeavor to change negative perceptions, beliefs, and behavior toward the United States.
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There is no doubt that the United States suffers from an image problem in today’s world. Historical European allies refused to join the United States in a coalition in the war in Iraq. Muslim extremists espouse hatred of the United States, its policies, and our allies. There is a great mistrust of the U.S. in the Muslim world. While there does not appear to be true hatred for the United States in Europe, there exists a dislike for our policies, politics, and national strategy.

There are many theories for why this hatred, mistrust, and dislike occur. These theories include disagreement with our support for Israel, our presence as non-Muslims in the Middle East, and our emergence as the world’s only true superpower. The United States is suffering from a negative perception in many parts of the world. How does the United States military contribute to the national effort to change these negative perceptions, and how can the military contribution be improved and enhanced?

The four elements of U.S. national power are diplomatic, economic, information, and military. Of these, the information element is the least understood and perhaps the most underutilized. Most people understand how military might may affect an adversary, or how economic sanctions are a powerful force against a government or state, or how diplomatic measures are effective across the spectrum of conflict. But true understanding of the contribution and use of information as a tool for achieving national objectives has been difficult for most people to grasp. How does the United States employ the information element to affect its perception in the world?

The information element of national power consists primarily of what is referred to as public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is the principal information tool of our civilian government, while military information operations are a subset of military power. Certain aspects of military information operations closely parallel the concepts employed in the use of information and public diplomacy at the national level. This can be confusing, as public diplomacy can span from the diplomatic efforts of an Ambassador to the information efforts of the Department of State to Theater Security Cooperation activities executed by the U.S. Combatant Commander responsible for the area of concern. All try to achieve the same ends through different means.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

There are many definitions of public diplomacy, each slightly different. Public diplomacy, as defined by the Planning Group for Integration of the United States Information Agency (USIA) into the Department of State in 1997, “seeks to promote the national interest of the United
States through understanding, informing and influencing foreign audiences.”¹ Hans N. Tuch, a former officer with the United States Information Agency who has written extensively on modern diplomacy, defines public diplomacy as “a government’s process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and foreign policies.”² The Department of State (DOS) opines that public diplomacy “refers to government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries; its chief instruments are publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, radio and television.”³

Prior to its dissolution and integration into the Department of State in 1997, the United States Information Agency (USIA) viewed public diplomacy as “seeking to promote the national interest and the national security of the United States through understanding, informing, and influencing foreign publics and broadening dialogue between American citizens and their counterparts abroad.”⁴

Many Americans are familiar with U.S. government spokespersons who explain U.S. policies and actions to the domestic U.S. public. Public diplomacy informs foreign audiences overseas and attempts to influence their perceptions in much the same way as government spokespersons do in the domestic environment. Overseas public diplomacy efforts are not immediately evident to the U.S. populace at large. There is a rising perception among many Americans and our allies that the U.S. government is not sufficiently explaining its position and reasons for its policies to others. Countless interviews and commentaries from all sectors of the press have expounded on this topic.

The employment of public diplomacy is a key component in U.S. national strategy. Military force, economic, and diplomatic options are not always viable in addressing some of the causes behind why radical elements in the world desire to do us harm. While a terrorist can be killed through force of arms, and diplomatic and economic pressure can be placed upon foreign governments or state sponsors, the only element of national power that can influence the motivations behind why individuals and governments wish to do us harm is information, exercised through public diplomacy.

The military conducts a number of activities that reflect the goals of public diplomacy as defined earlier. These activities do not involve the force of arms; nor are these activities considered traditional public diplomacy efforts in the true sense of the word, and typically are not coordinated within a coherent strategic framework.

Military programs and activities exist that can contribute to changing perceptions in foreign audiences. These military activities bear close parallels in concept and purpose to public
diplomacy, but focus on a narrower target audience. This narrower target audience is primarily foreign militaries, but in many instances includes foreign civilian audiences. These audiences are increasingly important to achieving success in the war on terror.

This paper will examine how military activities support public diplomacy as the primary tool of the information element of national power and how these activities could be improved to enhance U.S. national policy and security objectives.

BACKGROUND OF UNITED STATES INFORMATION POLICY

President Reagan's 1982 Westminster Speech to the British Parliament in 1982 introduced the theory of ideology as a weapon. While ideology as a weapon or tool had been used on numerous occasions in the past, Reagan's concept of utilizing the precepts of democracy as a tool was new. Using these precepts of individual freedom and equality, freedom of the press, and democratic principles as information tools to appeal to a populace in order to influence them or affect change in their government became a key U.S. strategy. These same concepts and precepts are incorporated into many of the military activities discussed later.

Reagan’s National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 130 established U.S. national information policy and outlined his strategy for information efforts during both peacetime and war. This strategy included a robust public diplomacy effort as a soft power weapon targeting the populace of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Reagan’s NSDD 77 outlined U.S. policy concerning the management of public diplomacy relative to national security. Both these NSDDs strengthened Reagan’s earlier NSDD 45 that placed U.S. nonmilitary international broadcasting, a key tool of public diplomacy overseas, on an equal footing and priority, especially in funding, with other programs deemed vital to the national security. Though these NSDDs did not affect U.S. military broadcast assets, military broadcast assets can be a useful soft power tool when employed correctly in the same manner as those broadcast assets covered under the NSDDs.

Later in 1990, President George H. W. Bush replaced the Reagan Administration’s NSDD 77 with National Security Directive (NSD) 51, ordering that U.S. international broadcasting activities be continued. These activities explained U.S. policies, culture and institutions to foreign audiences, provided an unbiased news conduit, and broadcast information into areas where no free press existed. The NSD directed a study which eventually resulted in the creation of the Broadcast Board of Governors, an independent organization with the responsibility of overseeing all nonmilitary U.S. government international broadcasting.
became the main information and public diplomacy effort of the U.S. government during this time frame.

The end of the Cold War brought a gradual drift away from what had been the informational strategy of public diplomacy during that epoch. The demise of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) in 1997, the prime conduit for informational public diplomacy efforts beyond those conducted by overseas DOS entities, reduced the United State’s ability to portray the U.S., its values, and policies in a positive light. This, as well as fiscal restraints, relegated U.S. public diplomacy efforts to relative obscurity.

The Clinton administration came into office with an agenda of improving the U.S. economic position in the world. As such, the focus of public diplomacy shifted to supporting and explaining U.S. economic policy and the various trade agreements that resulted from that policy. However, events in the Balkans and Rwanda energized the administration into implementing information policy and public diplomacy efforts to counter hostile misinformation about the U.S. role and intentions in the Balkans and to explain U.S. policy toward Rwanda. Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 68 attempted to coordinate all government international public information and public diplomacy activities and integrate them into national policy development.1 Lack of funding support rendered this initiative relatively ineffective.

When President Clinton signed into law the 1997 legislation that abolished USIA, he also created the position of Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs with supervisory responsibility for those two functions within DOS. The former USIA Bureau of Broadcasting, which included the Voice of America and Radio Martí, became a separate agency supervised by the Broadcasting Board of Governors.2

The stated purpose for dismantling USIA and merging its assets within the State Department was twofold: first, to save money, and second, to insure public diplomacy efforts were merged with policy development within DOS. The State Department now has responsibility for all nonmilitary overseas information and public diplomacy activities.

In September 2002, President George W. Bush published his National Security Strategy (NSS). This NSS implemented new policy measures that responded to the terrorist attacks of September 2001. This strategy expounded that, “as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed.” With this, Bush initiated his “preemptive action” strategy and placed renewed emphasis on public diplomacy efforts in an attempt to attack terrorism at its base with information power and to garner support for U.S. efforts in a global context.3
The White House published the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism in February 2003. This strategy expanded on the NSS by stressing the need to destroy terrorist organizations, win the “war of ideas,” and strengthen America’s security at home and abroad. The strategy stated, “ultimately, our fight against terrorism will help foster an international environment where our democratic interests are secure and the values of liberty are respected around the world.” These measures reemphasized public diplomacy as a tool of the information element of national power.

In August 2003, DOS and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) published a combined strategic plan for fiscal years 2004-2009, outlining how together they would implement U.S. foreign policy and development assistance. The plan explains DOS and USAID intent to support NSS objectives through their own means. They intend to shape perceptions of the U.S. in overseas audiences by enhancing public diplomacy and public affairs efforts in three areas: first, to develop messages and programs that are simultaneously regional and trans-regional; second, to build support and maintain dialogue at home; and lastly, to focus on younger and broader audiences.

GOVERNMENTAL SOFT POWER RESOURCES

Within DOS reside three organizations directly supervised by the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs: the Office of International Information Programs (OIP), the Bureau of Public Affairs, and the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. The OIP is the successor to the USIA Information Bureau.

The Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs promotes understanding between the U.S. and other countries through international educational and training programs. These programs promote personal, professional, and institutional ties between private citizens and organizations in the U.S. and abroad, as well as present U.S. history, society, and culture to overseas audiences. These are the same goals of several military programs that involve personnel exchanges and military education opportunities.

In 2002, President George W. Bush created the Office of Global Communications (OGC). The OGC was formed to advise those agencies involved in information and public diplomacy efforts on the strategic direction and themes that U.S. agencies utilize to reach foreign audiences. This was the first use of the term “strategic communication”. The term described the variety of instruments used by governments to understand global attitudes and cultures, to engage in a dialogue of ideas between people and institutions, to advise policy makers, diplomats, and military leaders on the public opinion implications of policy choices, and to
influence attitudes and behavior through communications strategies. Today the OGC remains focused on employing strategic communication to prevent misunderstanding and conflict, build support for and among U.S. coalition partners, and inform international audiences more effectively. However, Executive Order 13283, which created the OGC, also specified that the office did not have the authority to issue directives to other agencies. This includes issuing directives to the Department of Defense (DOD). This is a significant point that adversely affects an overall coordinated information effort.

POSSIBILITIES FOR MILITARY SUPPORT TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

There are similarities between some U.S. government public diplomacy programs and several military programs, including military information operations (MILOPS). Military to military contacts are key tools in professionalizing foreign military forces and demonstrating U.S. values to them. Military to military contact programs involve contact between U.S. military forces and the military forces of a foreign nation for an activity such as a combined exercise. Many of these military to military contact programs evolved concurrently with national public diplomacy programs. National public diplomacy concepts and ideals are incorporated into the military regulations and directives that outline these military programs. The purpose of many military programs is to spread human rights and democratic ideals. While not officially considered part of the public diplomacy effort, the desired end results closely mirror public diplomacy goals.

Military Support to Public Diplomacy (MSPD) is a relatively new concept. MSPD is sometimes referred to as Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (DSPD). The consistency of USG themes and messages coordinated through the interagency process attempts to enhance the quality of official USG information provided to foreign leaders and populations. DOD contributes to strategic communication by coordinating its public affairs, MILOPS, and other overt information activities through the interagency process as part of an integrated and synchronized effort. Again, as the OGC does not have the authority to issue directives to DOD regarding strategic communication policy, the coordination effort is only as good as the interagency process.

MILITARY INFORMATION OPERATIONS

The unclassified attachment to Department of Defense Directive (DODD) S-3321.1, “Military Psychological Operations”, states,

Military Support to Public Diplomacy (MSPD) may be defined as those measures taken by DOD components to support and facilitate the public diplomacy (PD) efforts of the USG. DOD may conduct MSPD as part of approved guidelines for theater security cooperation and may collaborate with other agencies’ PD
programs that directly support DOD missions. When directed, Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and other DOD capabilities can provide support to MSPD. It is DOD policy that the Department of Defense supports USG information activities, which are effective and essential instruments of national policy for advancing U.S. interests abroad, preventing and mitigating foreign crises, and supporting contingency operations and war.

Military information operations (IO), including psychological operations (PSYOP) and the related activities of civil-military operations (CMO) and public affairs (PA), while not formally grouped under USG public diplomacy activities, can certainly contribute to and support the overall effort. Military PA, while not considered a core element but rather a related activity of IO, is complementary to and coordinated with the overall IO effort. Military Public Affairs Offices (PAO) overseas seek to inform foreign audiences on U.S. policy and the purpose of U.S. military activities. PSYOP forces use a variety of media and methods, including face-to-face communication, to influence foreign audiences. Both are participants in perception management, an attempt to affect the perceptions of the target audience of the intended message. However, PA and PSYOP approach this task differently. PA attempts to manage perception by providing factual information to broad audiences, usually via official statements to the news media. PSYOP attempts to influence the behavior of specific audiences through many means in direct support of military objectives. The two disciplines are not always compatible.

Military IO is the employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, PSYOP, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influence decision-making. IO integrates these core capabilities with the supporting activities of physical destruction, counter-propaganda, information assurance, counterintelligence, counter deception, and physical security at the operational level. These elements complement PA and CMO efforts by controlling and shaping the information available to enemy combatants and noncombatants. While not all IO core capabilities or supporting activities can support U.S. public diplomacy efforts, several of these elements have utility, especially PSYOP and counter-propaganda.

The key points above are the statements “controlling and shaping the information available,” and “influencing” certain audiences, whether they are true enemies of the U.S. or simply those audiences not amenable to or supportive of U.S. foreign policy or actions. As mentioned earlier, public diplomacy attempts to promote the national interest of the United States through understanding, informing and influencing foreign audiences.

Joint Pub 3-61, “Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations” states,
The mission of joint PA is to expedite the flow of accurate and timely information about the activities of U.S. joint forces to the public and internal audiences. Information given to news media representatives must be consistent with national and operational security and must respect the privacy of the members of the force. PA personnel should communicate with service members, civilian employees, and family members in order to create an awareness of organizational goals and inform them of significant developments affecting them and the organization.26

Military PA doctrine fulfills the need to reconcile the mission of the Armed Forces of the United States with that of the news media. Both institutions communicate with the same audience – the public.27

This public can be either foreign or domestic. The military is accountable and responsible to the public for performing its mission of national defense. The news media are the principle means of communicating information about the military to the general public. Relations between the military and the news media succeed best through regular interaction, building mutual trust and credibility.28

DOD has several principles for PA that apply across the full spectrum of military operations. These principles dictate that information be timely and accurate and be fully available unless classification prevents it or it endangers the lives of service members. Information cannot be classified solely for the purpose of protecting the government from criticism or embarrassment.29 PA responsibilities include media and community relations, internal or command information, and planning.

Many of the larger units operating in Iraq have public affairs organizations that produce publications that highlight the many public works underway in an attempt to show the U.S. military in a positive manner. Their efforts attempt to affect perceptions and garner support for U.S. policies and activities. These PAO efforts are similar to the goals of public diplomacy of reaching out to foreign publics, strengthening the understanding of American society, and increasing support and appreciation for U.S. policies.30 However, most PA activities conducted in Iraq focus on local activities with little coordination with other U.S. government public diplomacy entities and are not incorporated into overall strategic communication efforts.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a memorandum in 2004 that advises that PA and IO audiences differ. The memo states:

PA’s principle focus is to inform the American public and international audiences in support of combatant commander public information needs at all operational levels. IO serves to influence foreign adversary audiences using PSYOP capabilities. While audiences and intent differ, both PA and IO ultimately support the dissemination of information, themes, and messages adapted to the audience and operational level.31
The memorandum concludes by stating, “commanders, in turn, must ensure appropriate coordination and synchronization between PA and IO efforts.”

PA activities are a useful tool in the dissemination of information. A military PA effort coordinated with other public diplomacy activities, themes and messages, and targeted at times at the appropriate target audience can contribute to the overall public diplomacy goal. Credible information informs an audience. Timely, relevant, and credible information will affect perceptions and promote public diplomacy.

**MILITARY PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS**

Military PSYOP assets are ideally suited to support public diplomacy efforts. PSYOP target audience analysis techniques, theme and message development, and experience in designing products that influence the behavior of foreign audiences are easily adapted to public diplomacy activities. DODD S-3321.1, “Military Psychological Operations”, states “when directed, PSYOP capabilities will support MSPD to shape the peacetime operational environment in areas such as, but not limited to, humanitarian mine action, counter-drug, humanitarian relief and assistance, force protection, and activities supporting the War on Terrorism.”

For years, small Military Information Support Teams of PSYOP soldiers worked in Latin American embassies supporting counter-drug activities and U.S. foreign policy objectives. PSYOP forces are accustomed to working with different media, whether in the form of print, broadcast, and video, or simply face-to-face. Examples of current PSYOP efforts in support of the Global War on Terror include support to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) rewards programs, weapons buy-back programs in Iraq and Afghanistan, and promoting U.S. nation assistance activities and policies in many overseas locations.

The Psychological Operations Lessons Learned study, commissioned by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), defines theater-level PSYOP as “PSYOP directed toward general audiences that typically attempts to modify general attitude sets.” The study identifies theater and operational PSYOP as having a dominant approach involving rational argumentation designed to achieve longer lasting effects, and recommends that by “engaging the thought process of the target audience to a greater extent, the PSYOP effort will inspire a greater, longer lasting effect.” These long-term effects are also a primary goal of public diplomacy.

The Lessons Learned study indicated that Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) identified that theater-level PSYOP integration with national efforts is required, and that the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) (USD(P)) should publish guidance that effectively provides interagency
coordination and national level guidance for PSYOP themes. The study further highlighted a finding from the Joint Staff Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned report that the USG lacks the organization to coordinate the full spectrum of national “perceptual assets” and activities. National guidance on information themes improves the likelihood of an effective PSYOP campaign. Without such guidance, PSYOP products conveyed to general audiences at the theater-level are likely to be a less specific formulation of broad U.S. public policy positions.

Recall the mission of the White House OGC to coordinate national themes and messages. Any PSYOP conducted at the strategic level should be coordinated with the overall national effort. This coordination must occur at the interagency level and involve the OGC and the USD(P) and guide the PSYOP themes and messages at the strategic level.

While not clearly stated as such, much of PSYOP conducted at the theater-level is, in effect, support to public diplomacy. One reform measure identified in the PSYOP Lessons Learned study recommends that “PSYOP be coordinated with public diplomacy and PA efforts to avoid conflicting and dissipating effects.” Current PSYOP doctrine does not include support for public diplomacy or PA as either a primary mission or a collateral activity.

The PSYOP Lessons Learned Study concludes that current PSYOP doctrine and mission statements are wrongly interpreted at times as mandates to conduct public diplomacy and PA. PSYOP must clearly distinguish between their primary and collateral missions to minimize this confusion, especially where different funding sources are involved. The task should be clear, whether it is to conduct the primary mission or a collateral activity. Identifying PSYOP support to public diplomacy or to PA as PSYOP collateral activities in doctrine will clarify the task as such. The execution of coordinated activities will ensure a well-orchestrated information effort that generates consistent messages across multiple news media outlets. If changes to doctrine are realized, support to public diplomacy activities by military PA and PSYOP can occur without the appearance that PA are participating in a PSYOP campaign or that public diplomacy entities are engaged in military deception activities.

There are caveats to the employment of PSYOP even in a role which supports public diplomacy. PSYOP programs require approval at the highest levels of DOD before implementation. The unclassified attachment to DODD S-3321.1, “Military Psychological Operations”, directs that

PSYOP and PSYOP programs in support of MSPD shall be submitted by the COCOMs through the Joint Staff to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict) for review, coordination, and approval by the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. The geographic combatant commanders shall insure that the U.S. Ambassador or chief of mission approves
country-specific PSYOP programs in support of MSPD prior to submission to the Joint Staff. MSPD may impact friendly, neutral, and hostile foreign audiences.\textsuperscript{41}

However, existing pre-approved generic PSYOP programs enable the geographic combatant commanders to execute PSYOP in support of public diplomacy without having to obtain DOD approval, as long as the efforts and products remain within the constraints of the pre-approved programs.\textsuperscript{42}

\textbf{THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION PLANS}

Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) plan and execute numerous activities under their Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP). TSCPs are primarily a strategic planning document to link COCOM-planned regional engagement strategies with national strategic objectives.\textsuperscript{43} Security cooperation gained attention in 1995 with the publication of Clinton's National Security Strategy (NSS). In his NSS, Clinton stressed the importance of preventative diplomacy. Theater engagement later became a critical element of his national strategy. Clinton's NSS outlined that “our leadership must stress preventative diplomacy — through such means as support for democracy, economic assistance, overseas military presence, interaction between U.S. and foreign militaries and involvement in multilateral negotiations in the Middle East and elsewhere...”.\textsuperscript{44} The concepts behind the TSCPs closely reflect those precepts outlined in President Reagan’s NSDD 130 and 77 and George H. W. Bush’s NSD 51. TSCP’s evolved along with national public diplomacy concepts.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Shalikashvili, in the 1995 National Military Strategy, indicated that peacetime engagement comprise a “broad range of non-combat activities undertaken by our Armed Forces that demonstrate commitment, improve collective military capabilities, and promote democratic ideals.”\textsuperscript{46}

While DOD’s Security Cooperation Guidance is classified, other documents outline specific goals of the program. DODD 5111.7, “Subject: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs”, directs the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA) to develop and oversee the implementation of Policy, plans, activities, and uses of DOD resources and related military aspects of the promotion of constitutional democracy and respect for human rights in other countries, including civilian control of the military, the appropriate role of the military in constitutional democracies, and standards of military professionals respectful of elected civilian authority and human rights.\textsuperscript{47}

A DOD Security Cooperation briefing lists security cooperation as a key U.S. policy to “promote American principles and values and promote democracy abroad.”\textsuperscript{48}
One of the key methods the COCOMs utilize to support U.S. security cooperation policy is to maintain military to military contact with foreign forces in their areas of responsibility via the Joint Combined Exercise for Training Program (JCET). JCETs are low-cost, small unit operations that provide training for U.S. military forces, but at the same time provide benefit to the host nation where the JCET is taking place. The objectives of these exercises are to ensure the training of U.S. forces to conduct their highest-priority mission contained in regional command contingency plans, to provide joint training for commanders, staff, and forces, and to project a military presence worldwide and support commitments to U.S. allies.49

JP 3-07.4, “Joint Counterdrug Operations”, defines a JCET as an overseas, combined training event primarily designed to benefit U.S. Special Operations Forces mission essential task list and joint mission essential task list training. A JCET utilizes 10 US Code 2011 reporting procedures, is Major Force Program 11 funded, and uses no foreign military assistance funds. The theater combatant commander prioritizes the JCET and coordinates it through the U.S. Ambassador and Department of State. Final approval resides with the Secretary of Defense.50

For many years, U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) has required that any JCET into the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility conduct human rights related training as a part of the training exercise in an effort to promote these U.S. national values to the armed forces of Latin America. This program promotes civilian control over the military and other democratic values. However, the efforts to promote U.S. national values to foreign military forces is not a coordinated effort between the regional commands, nor does it receive centralized direction from DOD.

Another key element of U.S. military security cooperation is the Joint Security Assistance Training Program (JSATP). The JSATP consists of U.S. military training assistance to eligible countries. Security Assistance (SA) training includes all training of foreign personnel authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended. Three of the four components of the JSATP have application to public diplomacy: the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, the Professional Military Exchange (PME) program at Command and Staff and War Colleges, and reciprocal unit exchanges.51 A key objective of the JSATP is “to promote a better understanding of the United States, its people, political systems and way of life, as well as human rights awareness.”52

These are also the primary goals of the U.S. public diplomacy effort. The contact this program has with aspiring members of foreign society is invaluable. Many of the participants go on to be prominent members of their societies as influential political and military leaders. This
program functions in ways that can benefit the U.S. in the far term, and can be compared to similar DOS activities such as the Fulbright Scholarship program.

The information program (IP) associated with the JSATP is an integral part of the overall program. DOD guidelines and policy for the conduct of the JSATP direct that each international military student attending military training in the U.S. must have the opportunity to participate in the DOD IP in accordance with DODD 5410.17, “Informational Program for Foreign Military Trainees in the United States”. The stated objective of the JSATP IP is to ensure that international students return to their homeland with an understanding of the responsibilities of governments, militaries, and citizens to protect, preserve, and respect the rights of every individual. Further instructions direct that the IP be developed and implemented with the specific objective of providing students with an awareness and functional understanding of internationally recognized human rights and the American democratic way of life. U.S. military installation commanders that host JSATP activities are responsible for developing IPs and ensuring the information programs meet these objectives.

In the early 1990s the U.S. Army School of the Americas identified the requirement to develop a period of study that stressed the tenets of the JSATP program, in addition to the mandated information program visits of international students to institutions that familiarized them with U.S. laws and way of life. The School developed a mandatory curriculum for the study of human rights for every student. The longer the course, the more instruction in human rights the students received. Every tactical exercise incorporated human rights' training and all students received a mandatory class outlining the American political system, the formation and basis of U.S. values, and the concept of civilian rule over the military. This curriculum continued when the School of the Americas transitioned to the DOD Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation and serves as an example of how, in the absence of centralized direction of the JSATP information program, an individual academic facility provides support to public diplomacy ideals.

This is an isolated situation. While all installations sponsoring training for foreign students comply with the regulations and guidelines, there is no centralized guidance that standardizes this process. There is no central program of instruction or curriculum taught to all international students that insures all receive the same specific instruction. This public diplomacy effort should be centrally directed and coordinated both laterally and from top to bottom.
CONCLUSIONS

Many military activities are closely aligned in concept and purpose with national-level public diplomacy endeavors, and evolved into their present form as public diplomacy also matured. While the majority of the directives that guide the different military programs outline the public diplomacy goals of the activities, there is no centralized direction or coordination that insures a unity of effort with what the Department of Defense is executing and that of the rest of the government's public diplomacy architecture.

Military resources such as public affairs and psychological operations are ideally suited to support public diplomacy activities, yet they are underutilized for this purpose and receive no centralized guidance on themes and messages to be employed in public diplomacy endeavors, although the approval process for PSYOP programs insures compliance with overall USG policy. Military public affairs do receive press guidance from their higher headquarters. Military public affairs activities overseas are closely aligned in mission with other USG public affairs entities, but are not fully incorporated into national level themes and messages. Clear delineation does not exist for PSYOP forces between executing their primary mission and providing support to public diplomacy. Each military installation that supports training of foreign military forces designs their program of instruction based on their own interpretation of regulation and policy. Each Combatant Commander executes their TSCP and exercise program in a different fashion, based on different interpretations of the same directive. While the intent behind the different military activities is clear and their relation to nonmilitary public diplomacy efforts seems obvious, they are neither coordinated within the Department of Defense nor with existing public diplomacy efforts.

There is not a mechanism within the Department of Defense to coordinate public diplomacy support, themes, or messages at all levels. This creates inconsistencies between the different geographic areas of responsibility and differences between military and nonmilitary activities, and results in a disjointed effort, or at a minimum, a faulty unity of effort. One solution to this situation is the creation of an entity that provides the missing coordination mechanism. This entity should insure the DOD message is coordinated with the OGC, State Department, or any other government organization engaged in public diplomacy.

Guidance in the form of a field manual that participants in military-to-military activities can use for reference would also be useful. Many of the COCOMS already issue cards outlining rules of engagement and other guidelines. This might be a useful tool for public diplomacy activities.
Military support to the public diplomacy effort can contribute significantly to the overall endeavor. Integrating this support at the highest levels with ongoing national level efforts will ensure continuity and focus. Especially important is the continued impact that our military-to-military contacts have on foreign military forces, including many that had little contact with the West prior to the end of the Cold War and the current War on Terror. A coordinated program from the strategic to the tactical level involving all the assets the government can bring to bear could have a significant impact on our long-term success in the Global War on Terror.
ENDNOTES


4 USIA Alumni Association, 2.


16 Ibid., 30.


22 Ibid.


24 Ibid., 4-31.

25 USIA Alumni Association, 1.


27 Ibid.

28 Ibid., vi.

29 Ibid.


32 Ibid.

33 Department of Defense.


36 Ibid., 8.
37 Ibid., 9.
38 Ibid., 10.
39 National Defense University, 10.
40 Ibid., 11.
41 Department of Defense.

42 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 2002, CJCSI 3110.05C (Washington, D.C.: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 18 July 2003), 1.

43 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Theater Engagement Planning, CJCSM 3113.01A (Washington, D.C.: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 31 May 2000), A-1.


47 Department of Defense, Subject: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD(ISA)), DODD 5111.7 (Washington, D.C.: Deputy Secretary of Defense, 9 October 2004), 3.5.3.


52 Ibid.

Ibid., 4.3.1.

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