Department of Education
Graduate Research Management Office
Research Papers
Academic Year 2005

The War of Ideas Aspects of the National Public Diplomacy Effort and Possibilities for Military Support

This paper will examine certain aspects of United States public diplomacy policy and strategy and some of the mechanisms and resources available for executing that strategy. There are a number of military activities which parallel national public diplomacy efforts. These military activities have similar goals, but are not actively aligned or coordinated with United States strategic public diplomacy. This paper proposes how the United States military can contribute to the national endeavor to change negative perceptions, beliefs, and behavior toward the United States.

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US National Security Interests in Africa and the Future Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) a Proposal to Create an African Regional Combatant Command and a Regional African Special Operations Command

The purpose of this thesis is to address the current need for a unified or sub-unified military regional combatant command headquarters within Africa. The United States needs such a command in order to protect U.S. national interests, provide a proactive forward deployed stance against the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT), and better execute crisis resource contingency operations throughout the entire continent of Africa. Thus, this thesis will argue that given the continued focus on the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the United States should consider establishing a future political-military organization such as a unified or sub-unified African Regional Combatant Command (ARCC) and a Regional African Special Operations Command (RA-SOC) to both promote democratic initiatives and regional stability within the region, and to better assist and support U.S. national security interests by deterring and defeating international and regional terrorist networks well away from US borders. This newly proposed organization, at a minimum, should have a forward deployed political-military element positioned and located somewhere within the region of Sub-Saharan African. Specifically, this thesis will recommend that this proposed forward deployed regional headquarters should strategically be located within the sub-region of West Africa or East Africa.

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Success in Civil Military Operations

The purpose of this thesis is to answer the question of what determines the success of Civil Military Operations (CMO). With the United States military involved in the largest CMO mission since World War II in Iraq, answering this question becomes even more important. In this thesis, success will not be confined to tactical, operational or strategic CMO success. To determine what causes success or failure in CMO, this thesis will conduct three different case study analyses of Iraq based on the three predominant ethno-religious regions of the country: Kurdish North, Sunni Center, and Shi’a South. In order to analyze, compare, and contrast these three separate cases, this thesis will use three independent variables: integration of CMO in all phases of the operations; balance of CMO between the combat or civilian operations; and attitude of the Host Nation (HN) or occupied area. These variables set the conditions necessary for CMO success. In conclusion, this thesis provides essential principles for CMO planning and identifies requirements in doctrine, training, organization, and structure of CMO forces for future operations.

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Personnel Recovery: Using Game Theory to Model Strategic Decision Making in the Contemporary Operating Environment

The contemporary operating environment and recent increases in asymmetric tactics to counter the conventional military superiority of the U.S. presents significant operational challenges. Recovery forces are vulnerable conducting personnel recovery because the situation, not the military, dictates the terms of engagement. Thus, the central research question is: Given a report of the physical location of an evader, is the military using the most rational decision-making model to offset the predictable nature of traditional recovery activities? As a flexible and adaptive strategic decision-making tool, game theory offers a logical way to graphically represent and compare all strategy combinations in order to test the rationality of current recovery doctrine. After evaluating the generalized motives and capabilities of seven types of adversaries, in six cases the strategic costs of not recovering an evader outweighed the tactical costs of predictability. Deploying recovery assets is, more often than not, the optimal choice based on adversarial capabilities, ideology, motivation, and strategy. With a potentially devastating strategic vulnerability to hostage exploitation aimed at its legitimacy, credibility, and public will, the U.S. can ill afford not to recover those forced to evade. In this strategic context, the military’s decision-making process with regard to personnel recovery is completely rational.

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A Joint and Interagency Unconventional Warfare Training Strategy for Special Forces in the 21st Century

In response to the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, the President, as Commander-in-Chief and as authorized by congress in a Joint Resolution 23, ordered our armed forces into combat to Afghanistan in order to defeat the al-Qaeda terror organization and the repressive Taliban regime that harbored them. The President wanted to execute this war in an unconventional manner. He turned to the experts in unconventional warfare, the Army Special Forces and tasked them to take the rag tag Northern Alliance and execute an unconventional warfare campaign the like that the world had never seen. In only 60 days the Special Forces units defeated both the al-Qaeda and the Taliban and for the first time in 23 years the Afghan people were free from oppression. This strategy research paper explores the training deficiencies the Special Forces units identified while prosecuting the war in Afghanistan. This paper will discuss how we currently train our Special Forces officers and noncommissioned officers in unconventional warfare, identify new unconventional warfare training opportunities, and ultimately make recommendations on how to improve unconventional warfare training. Operation Enduring Freedom was Special Forces’ finest hour. To ensure that Special Forces remains the world’s premiere unconventional war fighting force during the Global War on Terrorism today and in the future it must improve the way it trains its soldiers and units.

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Terrorism Prevention: How Does Special Operations Fit in?

The 2002 US national security strategy is a proactive, world integrated strategy against terrorism. The US chose to highlight preemption as a viable option to deal with terrorists or rogue states. The aim of this thesis is to address the planning and execution of this policy at the operational level with regard to prevention more so than preemption. As such, strategic and operational decisions regarding actions to be taken against impending terrorist threats will need to be made to prevent the onset of hostile acts against the US. The decisions to act will also incur associated military and political risks. Once possible terrorist activity is detected, the US may choose to use diplomatic, economic or informational means but often the only sure means of stopping terrorist attacks will be by military means. This thesis addresses the unanswered operational level questions regarding the US strategy as well as the preventive military actions that the US and regional combatant commander can take to effectively mitigate the use of terrorism against America. The primary focus revolves around Special Operations Forces (SOF) capabilities and the circumstances to use them, as well as finding out how they fit into the grand scheme of the war on terrorism.

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A Standing Unconventional Warfare Task Force to Combat Insurgency in the 21st Century

Today, the U.S. military confronts transnational, and theologically based radical Islamic insurgent movements. In Afghanistan and Iraq these insurgents have joined with local insurgents that comprise elements of the deposed Taliban and Ba’athist regimes, respectively, and other groups including criminals and foreign fighters. Collectively, these groups have one objective; to overthrow regimes they consider illegitimate, to evict any vestige of foreign influence associated with the existing order, and to seize power for themselves. The predicted global persistence of insurgencies and the constant pressures placed on our military forces to confront insurgency necessitates the restructuring of the existing U.S. Army Special Forces Command headquarters organization into a standing, deployable Unconventional Warfare Task Force. This organizational model offers the Department of Defense a permanent, expeditionary, and cohesive headquarters specifically designed to command and control a modular unconventional capabilities-based force, while minimizing the size of direct conventional force participation in future counterinsurgency campaigns. My intent is to briefly examine the key aspects of the security environment, the lessons learned from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, force structure considerations and forces structure recommendations to determine the most effective organizational model at the national level for conducting counterinsurgency. My conclusion will ultimately make the recommendation to restructure the existing U.S. Army Special Forces Command Headquarters into standing, deployable Unconventional Warfare Task Force to combat current and future insurgencies.

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Honing the Dagger: The Formation of a Standing Joint Special Operations Task Force Headquarters

This monograph explores an alternative way of providing a JSOTF headquarters to the Joint Force Commander. Beginning with a history of joint SOF doctrine, the monograph outlines the evolution of special operations command and control and the subsequent need for a standing operational-level headquarters. Having identified this void in capability, the monograph then presents a model for a SJSOTF headquarters possessing a full-time complement of qualified personnel and robust capabilities to conduct special operations across the spectrum of conflict. The monograph then analyzes the SJSOTF headquarters model against evaluation criteria established by USSOCOM.

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Outsourcing Small Wars Expanding the Role of Private Military Companies in U.S. Military Operations

“Outsourcing Small Wars: Expanding the Role of Private Military Companies in U.S. Military Operations” argues that, under current domestic and international laws, and current military regulations and doctrine, the U.S. Army could, with only a few uniformed personnel, employ a force consisting of predominately private military companies (PMCs) to fight a non-vital interest U.S. small war. This work identifies a historical U.S. willingness to outsource operations that are traditionally conducted by its uniformed military; categorizes outsourcing as surrogate warfare and, therefore, manageable by U.S. Army Special Forces; addresses some of the risks involved with outsourcing; and analyzes the legal environment in which PMCs operate in today’s environment. The recommendation from this thesis includes an illustration of how a Special Forces-led private military force should be organized, paying particular attention to the key components of the contract.

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The Impact of Technology on the Command, Control, and Organizational Structure of Insurgent Groups

Recent world events in Iraq have highlighted the power of insurgent groups in battling a more powerful opponent like the United States. Some reports have characterized the insurgency in Iraq as a technology-empowered, network-centric organization without a defined command and control structure while others have painted the insurgency as an undefined hierarchical organization. These contradictory reports have prompted the question: Has technology changed the way the Iraq insurgency operates? Three historical examples, the FLN in Algeria, the IRA in Ireland, and the Vietcong in South Vietnam display examples of insurgent organizations and further illustrate how these groups used technology for command and control. These historical examples were compared with reported trends of insurgent organization and insurgent activity in Iraq. The ultimate conclusion is that, although Iraqi insurgents attempt to utilize technology for command and control, they must revert to the same methods used by past insurgent groups because the US and coalition forces enjoy superiority in the area of technology. Furthermore, the Iraqi insurgency is an immature organization moving toward a hierarchy.

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Special Operations Forces and Foreign Internal Defense: An Effective Counterterrorism Method

Special Operations Forces (SOF) can be expected to maintain the current commitment levels in both Iraq and Afghanistan; however, Senior US military and SOF leadership must recognize the difficulty of balancing short-term goals and long-term solutions in the War on Terrorism. In a war of such long duration, SOF can provide the nation with many more strategic and operational options than just special reconnaissance and direct action missions in support of the JTF commander during combat operations. This paper argues that uniformly coordinated Foreign Internal Defense (FID) activities, undertaken by United States SOF, is the appropriate method for achieving long-term results in the War on Terrorism. The utility of persistent SOF activities with allies is described using recent case study examples, strategic level CT capstone documents, and current FID doctrine. Senior United States military leadership retain considerable influence over the direction and magnitude of the US’s military FID participation, although the primary agency for planning and supervising US sponsored FID programs lies with the Department of State. Operationally, Combatant Commanders translate strategic FID guidance into actionable plans as part of their Theater Security Cooperation Programs, with pervasive input by the combatant commander’s POLAD and theater SOC commander. SOF represent all elements of our national power during FID activities. Militarily, SOF are recognized internationally as elite warriors. Economically, SOF provide the US and host nation governments significant cost-benefit savings. SOF also communicate positive human rights and self-determination messages while all the while fostering strong diplomatic relationships that are exceptionally durable.

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Islamic insurgency and transnational terrorism in Thailand analysis and recommended solution strategy

The Kingdom of Thailand currently faces internal and transnational Islamic insurgent threats that have the potential to disrupt Southeast Asian regional stability. As a Major Non-NATO Ally and the signatory of several bilateral and multilateral security arrangements with the US, Thailand has solidified itself as a security alliance partner whose stability and influence in Southeast Asia has become increasingly more important to the US and its War on Terror.

The purpose of this thesis is to provide a history and analysis of the Islamic insurgency and transnational terrorist operations that exist in Thailand today. Secondly, this thesis will highlight current Thai, US, and regional security initiatives and underscore policy deficiencies. Finally, this thesis will recommend a solution strategy necessary for the purge of radical Islamic insurgency and transnational terrorism in Thailand. By accepting current policy deficiencies and implementing the courses of action recommended in this thesis, the US and Thailand will both contribute to a greater Southeast Asian security.

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PSYOP in Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations Preparing for Korean Reunification

Psychological operations (PSYOP) forces should undertake significant doctrinal, training, and operational reforms to ensure the viability of support provided to U.S. led stabilization and reconstruction efforts. Such operations involve increased civil military interactions and necessitate effective cross-cultural communications with not only the indigenous populace, but a host of transnational actors as well. Today’s PSYOP training is reflective of a persisting “Cold War mentality” that fails to adequately prepare soldiers for effective post-conflict situations such as the reunification of the Korean peninsula, whether brought about either through a renewal of combat operations or the result of diplomatic means. Meanwhile, North Korea’s formidable and adept propaganda machine has persisted in isolating its populace from external influences for more than a half century. Post-Korean War generation North Koreans have been successfully indoctrinated since birth to despise the United States. Furthermore, anti-U.S. sentiment has been on the rise in South Korea for a number of years. Under the current training model, contemporary psychological operations forces are ill-prepared to conduct effective operations in an environment involving two-way, face-to-face communications such as those required while stabilizing and reconstructing a nation. The case of Korean reunification serves as an extreme scenario that nevertheless depicts the drastic need for improvements in the capabilities of modern PSYOP forces.

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Suicide Terrorism how Psychological Operations can make a Difference

Military Psychological Operations (PSYOP) is based on a Cold War construct that has not been significantly overhauled since the end of that era. Today’s most pressing challenge, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) requires a different solution set. The Quadrennial Defense Review, the Information Operations Roadmap, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and the Report of the 9/11 Commission all recognize this fact. How the military PSYOP community can best adjust to this new environment and effectively address one of its major threats, that of suicide terrorism, is the subject of this paper.

I will argue that examining what can, and arguably should, be done to counter the threat of suicide terrorism will also help us to see ways in which PSYOP could better be configured and employed in this new era. The first chapter of my thesis will examine the evolution of suicide terrorism in some detail but will quickly focus on what have emerged as the consensus opinions as to the motivations and vulnerabilities of this tactic. Chapter two looks at the identified motivations and vulnerabilities from a PSYOP perspective and tries to apply logical PSYOP measures against them. In chapter three I review the assets and organizational structure of the PSYOP community and suggest ways the current structure could be best applied to meet the threat. Chapter four then looks for a way ahead and focuses on how and why making three critical changes to military Psychological Operations could improve the organizations ability to accomplish its mission; not only in terms of seeking to mitigate suicide attacks but also with respect a whole host of new and expanded missions the PSYOP community will increasingly be called upon to address in the contemporary operating environment.

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Strategic PSYOP Management a Marketing Management Approach

United States Military Psychological Operations are engaged in a type of mass marketing of ideas. To accomplish this The United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) employs active and reserve PSYOP units to conduct PSYOP campaigns. However the methodology used to manage these campaigns often hinders the effective employment of timely and effective Psychological Operations. PSYOP has a difficult job to accomplish but PSYOP does not have the proper management tools and their national stakeholders do not understand the process. The opportunity derived from this study is to adapt principles of civilian marketing management to provide a framework and tools to develop PSYOP campaign management into a more efficient, target audience based mechanism.

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From the Ashes of the Phoenix: Lessons for Contemporary Operations

For five years during the Vietnam War, as part of its counterinsurgency strategy, the United States executed an attack, codenamed the Phoenix Program, against the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). The VCI were the estimated 100,000 clandestine operatives living within South Vietnamese society that supported the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units in the field. They performed recruiting, financing, political indoctrination, intelligence collection, and logistical support tasks. It was not until 1967 that a concerted effort was made to neutralize this component of the insurgency. As the program developed over time, it was extremely effective and severely hindered the insurgency’s ability to support operations against the regime. Today, the United States is faced with another insurgency, conducted by militant Islamic fundamentalist organizations that seek the overthrow of friendly regimes, the reestablishment of an Islamic caliphate, and the eventual overthrow of Western civilization. This paper argues that as part of its counterinsurgency effort against this threat, the United States must neutralize the militant Islamic infrastructure (MI2) that enables the insurgency’s global attacks. The paper provides an overview of the Phoenix Program, outlines the nature of the current insurgent threat, and identifies critical strategic lessons from the Vietnam experience that should be applied to a modern day Phoenix Program.

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Transforming the American Soldier: Educating the Warrior-Diplomat

In this thesis, we examine the current levels of cultural understanding and irregular warfare being taught in U.S. Army conventional military schools. Given engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is our view that the military needs a deeper understanding of the indigenous people due to the extremely close and on-going interaction between American Soldiers and the local populations. Current analysis of the difficulties being reported suggests U.S. Army Soldiers are having trouble combating irregular warfare due to cultural misunderstandings and a lack of counterinsurgency training, thereby reflecting a likely educational gap in the U.S. Army’s formal military educational training system.

This thesis analyzes the current problems and difficulties Soldiers are reported to be having while attempting to combat irregular forces in non-western environments. We analyze the amount of training U.S. Army Soldiers receive in cultural understanding and irregular warfare in the military schools pipeline and conclude that there is a connection between problems Soldiers currently face and a lack of training for the conduct of operations in foreign countries. We propose a number of solutions to overcome these suspected gaps in education and suggested changes to the Army’s professional education curriculum.

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SOF Contributions to Strengthening Weak or Failing States

This monograph addresses the use of Special operations forces (SOF) to strengthen and stabilize weak or failing states. The paper’s central research thesis is that proper SOF employment in stability operations can minimize or even preclude the requirement of large-scale conventional force interventions. The monograph uses criteria derived from current doctrine and strategic guidance to examine stability operations in Colombia and Afghanistan. U.S. military efforts in both of those countries rely heavily upon special operations forces to achieve strategic and operational effects. Based on examination of these two operations, the monograph makes recommendations to further enhance the United States’ capabilities to effectively conduct stability operations in the immediate future. The recommendations in this study reinforce SOF’s capacity to produce positive outcomes in stability operations. Strengthening weak or failing states enhances the security of the United States and supports the achievement of many U.S. foreign policy objectives as well. Special operations forces provide a unique tool for achieving decisive effects in these types of environments. Further refinements of SOF organizations, and a thorough understanding of SOF employment, will ensure the United States is prepared for the problems of tomorrow and beyond.

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Gallipoli: The Failure of a Commander-In-Chief

An Operational perspective of the Dardanelles Campaign during World War I. Despite a viable concept with feasible objectives and adequate resources, General Ian Standish Monteith Hamilton, the Commander-In-Chief of allied ground forces Dardanelles Campaign, lack of operational art was directly responsible for one of the most documented failures and needless loss of lives resulting in strategic consequences for the Triple Entente. The Dardanelles Campaign commonly known as Gallipoli, consisted of a series of operations to gain control of the Dardanelles Straits in order to threaten Constantinople. The Triple Entente (Britain, France and Russia) were convinced the formidable continental power of Turkey would immediately cease all support and relations with the Central Powers (Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire) as a result of an attack on the capital. This brilliantly conceived, poorly planned, poorly commanded and poorly executed effort had the potential to completely alter a costly and destructive World War I. This campaign was one of many firsts in modern warfare; First major amphibious operation; The military use of aircraft, aircraft carriers, aerial reconnaissance, landing craft, radio communications, artificial harbors and submarines. The Dardanelles Campaign, one of the first major Joint-Combined amphibious operations in modern warfare, has many lessons for present-day operational level commanders and staff planners. Gallipoli is a good example of how a campaign with attainable objectives and adequate resources could result in a catastrophic failure due to a lack of operational level planning, communication and leadership; Operational Art. General Hamilton’s shortcomings in leadership, overly optimistic assumptions, poor subordinate-superior communication, lack of battlefield synchronization - - Operational Art - - Are directly responsible for the allied failure at Gallipoli.

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