

INTERROGATION: IS THE US ARMY EQUIPPED AND TRAINED
TO MEET THE PRESENT CHALLENGES IN TODAY'S
CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT?

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

INTERROGATION: IS THE US ARMY EQUIPPED AND TRAINED TO MEET THE PRESENT CHALLENGES IN TODAY'S CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT? by MAJ Tony L. Thacker, (total--see 3d set of numbers at bottom of page after slash 3/36) pages.

Interrogations are a critical method for the United States of America to identify and develop intelligence on an asymmetric battlefield. The ability to gathering information that allows other elements within the military to conduct surgical attacks against enemy targets will remain a vital need for the United States military. In order for interrogations to be effective, the interrogator must be properly trained and equipped.

The research in this thesis compares training methodologies between the US Army interrogation course, other countries' military courses, government agencies, and civilian interrogation courses. The research addresses equipment that may be used to better enhance the effectiveness of interrogator on the battlefield.

Interrogation is the art of questioning and examining a source to obtain the maximum amount of usable information. The goal of any interrogation is to obtain usable and reliable information, in a lawful manner and in the least amount of time, which meets intelligence requirements of any echelon of command. Sources may be civilian internees, insurgents, Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW), defectors, refugees, displaced persons, agents, or suspected agents. According to FM 34-52 (1992), a successful interrogation produces needed information which is timely, complete, clear, and accurate.

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ACRONYMS

AFMM	Army Force Management Model
APOE	Airport of Embarkation
CEE	Central and East Europe
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
COE	Centers of Excellence
CRO	Crisis Response Operations
CS	Combat Support
CSS	Combat Service Support
C2	Command and Control
DCI	Defense Capabilities Initiative
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Days of Supply
DSSC4ISR	Deployability, Sustainability, Survivability Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities
ECAP	European Capabilities Action Plan
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EU	European Union
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
FSSU	Field Service Support Units

GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HQ	Headquarter
HNS	Host Nation Support
HUMINT/SIGINT/IMINT	Human, Signal and Imagery Intelligence
IMET	International Military Education and Training
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan
JCDEC	Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Campaign
JMETL	Joint Mission Essential Task List
MAP	Membership Action Plan
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
METL	Mission Essential Task List
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MPFSEE	Multinational Peace Force in Southeastern Europe
MTP	Mission Training Plan
MTR	Military-Technical Revolution
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NMLT	National Military Liaison Teams
NRF	NATO Response Force
NSE	National Support Element
NSS	National Security Strategy
NTEEP	NATO's Education, Training, Exercise, and Evaluation Policy

OFP	Objective Force Program
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PARP	Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process
PCC	Prague Capabilities Commitment
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PGs	Partnership Goals
PPBES	Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation System
POD	Ports of Debarkation
POE	Ports of Embarkation
POTH	Processes, Organizations, Technologies and Human Capital
PSO	Peace Support Operations
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
RO-RO	Roll On-Roll Off
ROL I	Echelon I Level of Medical Care
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
ROTA	Releases Other than Attack
RSOI	Reception, Staging, Onward Moving, Integration
SAR	Search and Rescue
SPOE	Seaport of Embarkation
SRO	Stability and Reconstruction Operations
STANAG	Standardization Agreements
TIM	Toxic Industrial Material
UJTL	Universal Joint Task List
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

WPSND

White Paper on Security and National Defense

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Introduction-Background

Thesis Question: Are US interrogation teams properly trained and equipped for the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE)?

Interrogation techniques have been controversial in warfare throughout history. Prior to the adoption of the “Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of Prisoners of War” on 12 August 1949, war atrocities against prisoners were common on all sides of a conflict. Without any agreement between warring parties, prisoners were often tortured, killed, or severely neglected. The underlying concern is how a country’s soldiers will be treated if captured. One key element that helps enforce mutual compliance is the possible retribution against one’s own soldiers being held as prisoners of war if the enemy violates this policy with the soldiers they have in confinement. This unwritten rule was formalized as a treaty on 12 August 1949 as part of the Geneva Conventions.

The Geneva Conventions discussed the categories of combatants and noncombatants and also the ability to interrogate prisoners. Following World War II, most countries of the world realized the need for rules of war that all sides would agree to. Since the approval of the Geneva conventions, countries of the world have done a great deal to quell the amount of violence against combatants and noncombatants, yet in every conflict since there have still been cases of torture and abuse. Many humanitarian groups (such as Doctors Without Borders, Red Cross, Red Crescent, etc.) do not believe in any interrogation, and yet others understand the need for obtaining information from enemy personnel who have been taken off the battlefield. Humanitarian groups (i.e., Red

Cross, etc.) are often put in the middle of this debate. Because the Red Cross has the ability to meet with enemy prisoners of war, the Red Cross is often influenced by the prisoners' accusations against the United States and other allied countries. How does the US Army balance the need for information with the rights of different categories of prisoners? Is the US Army capable of carrying out effective interrogation, or should the Army examine how other civil and military organizations interrogate prisoners in order to find the answers? In this thesis, the author looked at how the US Army was currently equipped, organized, trained, and selected and compared a variety of other groups of interrogators who have been successful and unsuccessful in their efforts to obtain information.

Definition of Interrogation

Interrogation is the art of questioning and examining a source to obtain the maximum amount of usable information. The goal of any interrogation is to obtain usable and reliable information, in a lawful manner and in the least amount of time, which meets intelligence requirements of any echelon of command. Sources may be civilian internees, insurgents, EPWs (enemy prisoners of war), defectors, refugees, displaced persons, agents, or suspected agents. A successful interrogation produces needed information which is timely, complete, clear, and accurate. An interrogation involves the interaction of two personalities: the source and the interrogator. Each contact between these two differs to some degree because of their individual characteristics and capabilities and because the circumstances of each contact and the physical environment vary (FM 34-52 1992, 4).

Objective of Interrogation

The objective of any interrogation is to obtain the maximum amount of usable information possible in the least amount of time. Each interrogation has a definite purpose: to obtain information to satisfy the assigned requirement which contributes to the successful accomplishment of the supported unit's mission. The interrogator must keep this purpose firmly in mind as he obtains the information. The objective may be specific, such as establishing the exact location of a minefield, or it may be general, seeking order of battle information about a specific echelon of the enemy forces. In either case, the interrogator uses the objective as a basis for planning and conducting the interrogation. However the interrogator should not concentrate on the objective to the extent that he overlooks or fails to recognize and exploit other valuable information extracted from the source. For example, if during an interrogation he learns of an unknown, highly destructive weapon, he should not disregard this unexpected, but significant, piece of information. Although this information may not be in line with his specific objective, he develops this lead to obtain all possible information concerning this weapon. The objective of an interrogation can be changed as necessary or desired.

Purpose

The purpose of the study is to look at how the US Army conducts interrogations, and determine if the US Army interrogators are ready to meet the challenges of today's battle space. The need for timely and reliable information is crucial in fighting the insurgency our nation faces today. The US Army needs to look at interrogation as a critical tool, essential to our success on the current and future battle space. Interrogation is a key element that must be fully integrated at all levels. Often the Combatant

Commander (from tactical to operational) receives information that is old and unreliable. In the current conflict, just 72 hours gives high value targets time to move locations and be out of the reach of friendly forces.

The problem is: Tactical commanders are not receiving the information from interrogators that enables them to effectively fight the insurgency. Although exceptions do exist, the majority of US Army interrogators do not possess the proper training to provide commanders the timely information gathered from their sources. Case in point - the Abu Ghraib Inspector General's report stated that "Military Intelligence officers were poorly trained in interrogation, and the interrogators could not perform such tasks to any general standard." (LTG Jones, Anthony R., 2005 pg 32) The enemy that America faces today moves across the battlespace mixed within the civilian populace. Without proper friendly-enemy intelligence tools, the United States cannot capture them. The need for more timely and effective human intelligence has been identified by the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); and many senior Army leaders. Interrogation is a tried and proven effective method to gather information that often leads to the capture of high value targets. Other agencies within the US government (i.e., Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), CIA, Secret Service, and others) have a more effective track record of interrogating prisoners. In this study the thesis author analyzed and compared methods for improvement of interrogations.

Some of the questions that are answered in this thesis are:

1. Are US Army interrogators properly trained and equipped for gathering timely and reliable information from prisoners in the COE?

2. How do other armed forces and civilian agencies differ? Are there other models that are more effective? Can current technology assist the interrogator? What does history say about effective and ineffective interrogation techniques?

Assumptions

To begin this study several assumptions were needed to focus the thesis author's effort. Some of the assumptions are the following:

For the foreseeable future, America will face asymmetric threats consisting of opponents and adversaries with forces integrated into the civilian populace. Every potential future threat looks at America's vulnerabilities dealing with asymmetric warfare. There is not a single country that can defeat the United States military through conventional force-on-force operations, but now the goal is not to defeat the US militarily, but to destroy America's will to fight through protracted asymmetric warfare.

America's policy on the treatment of detainees must meet the Geneva Conventions' criteria. This will allow the international community to also work within the coalition and continue to partner along with the US to fight the continuing Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

In order to be effective, the US must obtain timely and reliable information from prisoners and detainees.

Detainees possess relevant information that, if extracted through effective interrogation operations, would serve to safeguard American lives.

If information is not timely, military units significantly lose the chances of apprehending enemy combatants, or spoiling attacks against civilian and military targets.

During this study changes will be made on a national level. There are currently ongoing investigations about interrogation, to include two bills in the US Congress. As this thesis is written, new information may be forthcoming regarding these legislations.

Current Applicability of Study

Interrogation has always been a crucial tool used by all militaries and civilian law enforcement personnel to gather information that protect innocent lives or gain a marked advantage over an adversary. This is just as true today as it has been in the past. As the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) continues, the need for accurate and timely intelligence on an enemy's actions is required. The US is involved in a war where the enemy lives and operates closely among civilians; the United States military presently does not have an overt military force to combat against. In order to break into these enemy lines of operation, the US needs the capability to question detainees and persons of interest who could possess valuable information.

The area of concern and debate currently taking place is just what are, and what are not, acceptable actions when conducting interrogation? What interrogation techniques should the United States employ against enemy combatants? What is the true, accurate definition of physical torture? Just how much stress should be placed on an individual, both mental and physical, that is viewed in the international court of opinion as appropriate? Do these detainees have the same rights afforded under the Geneva Convention as those of "conventional" enemy combatants? What is the true, measurable, quantifiable definition of "torture," both in a physical and mental capacity? Through effective training and equipping of Army interrogators, they are able to gain valuable information that is applicable to military and intelligence objectives.

This study looks at how US civilian law enforcement agencies and the interrogation agencies that reside within the Israeli, British, and US military conduct interrogations and then compares the results. This is a good time to compare and recommend changes to help in America's present war situation and in future doctrine development.

Limitations

The number one limitation in this study was the availability of time. Due to the author attending the United States Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), the available time the author had been able to devote to this project is between five and ten hours a week. This study was conducted at the unclassified level. Some of the names of the personnel interviewed were not used and certain information gathered (effects of interrogations) will be purposely kept vague in order to keep this at the unclassified level. Due to sensitivities, the thesis author wished to preserve the anonymity of the subject matter experts. They candidly offered their opinions on the aspect of interrogations, and what they think is lacking in the U.S. Army's military interrogation teams.

I was not able to make more than one trip away from Fort Leavenworth for this study, so most of the interviews were conducted at Fort Leavenworth or via email and telephone conversations. The surveys that were given are consistent with regard to content and are statistically correct. The breakdown of how the surveys were distributed and collected will be discussed later in chapter 3.

At the end of this study the reader should understand different techniques used and analyze their applicability to asymmetric warfare. The reader should also decide if

some of the training techniques mentioned would work in the US Army training model for interrogators.

Scope and Delimitations

The study assessed the feasibility and suitability of interrogation practices of the US Army. The focus was on the training and equipment that are currently used and the methods used to evaluate them. This study was compared to other countries, agencies, civilian police, FBI, and organizations that conduct interrogations. The study also looked at interrogation teams that have been successful and compare them to teams that were not.

The following related issues or cases was not described or assessed:

(1) This study did not investigate classified material or give details that will hamper operational use.

(2) The study did not address the international court system or current indictments.

(3) This study did not address how interrogation relates to force structure.

(4) This study did not investigate methods of interrogation.

(5) This study did make recommendations on additional training that may be required for all interrogators or specialized interrogators. It looked at how the interrogators are currently trained and what limitations that the interrogation school, located at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, should consider for possible change.

How does the Army currently measure the effectiveness of an interrogation? Are there certain ways to measure the success or failure of an interrogation procedure? How

much does culture affect the interrogation process? These are questions that the writer plans to answer during this study.

The results could advance scholarship in the field of military art and science. This subject deals with personal interaction between adversaries. An effective interrogation is a measured blend of both art and science between the interrogator and the interviewee, with the end result being the transfer or acquisition of information. Not everyone has the innate talents required to interact on this level, but this should set the stage for further discussion within the military community.

Summary

Interrogation is a crucial link in the chain of events that contributes to disrupting enemy plans and to saving both combatant and noncombatant lives. The volumes of material already written on this subject look at interrogation from different viewpoints. This study did investigate the gaps in current information available and may become a stepping stone for future research.

It is hoped that this study will serve as a catalyst for change in the way the Army recruits and trains interrogators. Training challenges, cultural challenges, and language challenges are all areas that may lead to change based on the results of this study. Through observation and analysis of many different interrogation techniques, a conclusion can be made as to whether or not the US Army interrogation organization, training and equipment are effective for the current Contemporary Operational Environment (COE). If the results are not satisfactory, then what changes could aid in the future development of interrogation?

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Nonetheless, Article 5 makes clear that if an Iraqi civilian who is not a member of the armed forces, has engaged in attacks on Coalition forces, the Geneva Convention permits the use of more coercive interrogation approaches to prevent future attacks.

John Yoo, American Enterprise Institute

Historical Perspectives

In early May of 1809, Napoleon's army had fought, and then broke contact, with the Austrian III Corps, under the command of General Hiller. Napoleon halted his Army at Molk (about forty-five miles from Vienna) and personally planned and directed a "prisoner snatch" from the Austrian camp, located across the swollen Danube River. The three prisoners later obtained were personally interrogated by Napoleon on the morning of their capture, and through the interrogation process not only revealed the current location of Hiller's III Corps, but the location of the entire Austrian army as being on the far side of the Danube river. Through this intelligence, Napoleon was able to seize and capture intact the well-stocked Vienna arsenal on 10 May 1809. On this and many other occasions, Napoleon demonstrated the importance he placed upon obtaining information, especially from prisoners.

General George Washington and later on General Robert E. Lee both used interrogation extensively to alter the outcomes of their separate battles and to gain valuable information about the enemies they were opposing. During World War I, interrogations were highly valued and deemed necessary as part of intelligence requirements. The US, Army Intelligence Regulation of 1920 states:

Experience has shown that the information derived from documents is second in value only to that secured by the actual examination of prisoners.

In 1936 the former head of the American Expeditionary Force's intelligence service, Major General D. E. Nolan, in a lecture at the Army War College explained:

In all wars, the principal source of information has been enemy prisoners, so we made no new discovery in this respect in the World War. We simply rediscovered a fact that is lost sight of in long intervals of peace.

The evidence of historical studies does not end with World War II, but continues through America's operations in Korea, Vietnam, and the Middle East. When the analysis is done of the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the same conclusions may well apply.

Interrogation methods have been used by law enforcement as well as the military since the founding of the United States. The military used interrogation in every war, questioning prisoners of war and using important information obtained to shape the intelligence picture. Law enforcement has also realized the critical role that interrogation plays in solving individual crimes and the penetration of criminal organizations. In the 1920-1930s, many major crimes were solved through effective interrogations. This chapter looked at prominent authors and authorities in the field of interrogation and their applicability to the military.

Military Writers

“Will the Army Tactical Interrogation be ready for War?” is a question that US Army Major Mark Partridge raised in his 1986 Master of Military Art and Science thesis. When put into perspective, Operation Desert Shield, followed by Operation Desert Storm, would be just a couple of years away, and yet the need for interrogation was being

looked at in comparison to other types of intelligence assets (signal intelligence and imagery intelligence). Major Partridge includes this key assessment of what an interrogator must possess in order to be effective:

Interrogators need the most extensive military education, must have a high degree of fluency; should be educated in the culture and history of the state or nation from which the prisoner or detainee comes, must be schooled in interrogation techniques, and must have a good knowledge of the current tactical situation and enemy order of battle and equipment. (1986, 7)

He compared the force structure in 1986 to evolving threats and came to the conclusion that the United States military did have the minimum force structure required for any potential threat. From a 2005-2006 view, it is easy to see that his assessment was heavily influenced by the Soviet Cold War threat poised at the time. Although he addresses the need for interrogation as an intelligence collector's tool during low intensity conflict (LIC), the emphasis was not placed on that type of campaign. Major Partridge believed that human intelligence (HUMINT) should grow in the Army and be pushed down to tactical levels within the Army's force structure. While changes have been made in the Army's Brigade Combat Team (BCT) structure to meet some HUMINT needs, the intent of this paper is to determine if the proper training and equipment is given to the BCT in order to make them effective in today's contemporary operational environment.

In his book *The Road to Abu Ghraib: US Army Detainee Doctrine and Experience*, Major (Retired) James F. Gephardt, US Army, looks at detainee operations and interrogation and compares Abu Ghraib in a historical context. Gephardt cites the Geneva Conventions and displays similarities with issues that plagued the Abu Ghraib

prison scandal with incidents involving prisoners and interrogation methods from World War II to the present.

What this does is put detainee operations (which include the need and role for interrogation) in an historical perspective. Gephardt addresses the same problems the US Army faces today on the battlefield to those of previous conflicts and discusses the methods in which they were handled and where doctrine has changed. He brings out statistics in his arguments such as:

The US Army acquired considerable experience in handling enemy prisoners of war (EPW) during WWII. The number of EPW in US custody grew from a miniscule 32 (enemy personnel) in May 1942 to approximately 4.3 million at the end of hostilities in the European and Mediterranean Theaters of Operations. In the Pacific Ocean Theater of Operations, US Army personnel were operating EPW facilities on Saipan, Guam, and the Hawaiian Islands for small numbers of prisoners, and at the cessation of hostilities in September 1945 Army personnel had to construct camps in the Philippine Islands to hold over 260,000 surrendered Japanese soldiers. Prisoners from both theaters of operations were held in custody for many months after the war ended. (2005, 2)

Another area that gives credibility to Gephardt's argument is the development of US Army field manuals that followed each conflict. He ties each conflict with a new revised policy and lessons learned. He uses a key policy from the Vietnam conflict that was later written into FM 31-73, *Advisor Handbook for Stability Operations* (1967), which makes historical reference to today's situation:

In insurgent wars, guerrillas generally are not accorded prisoner-of-war status because such status may support their recognition by other nations. . . . Generally, the guerilla, in insurgent wars is considered a violator of municipal law, or a common criminal, and while US forces must accord any prisoners or internees humane treatment by US regulations, care must be exercised to prevent enhancing the status of the guerrilla force to that of a recognized belligerent power.

Force is neither an acceptable nor effective method of obtaining accurate information. Observation of the Geneva Conventions by the interrogator is not only mandatory but advantageous because there is a chance that our personnel,

when captured, will receive better treatment, and enemy personnel will be more likely to surrender if our treatment of prisoners of war is humane and just. (p. 37)

FM 30-15, *Intelligence Interrogation* (June 1973), also addressed the point that interrogators must work closely with the guards at field army cages during searching, screening, and segregation of prisoners of war. Informed and cooperative guards and military police (MP) personnel are essential to the successful accomplishment of the interrogation mission. Guards in charge of the holding cages are employed in the maintenance of discipline during the screening process, the marching of groups to designated areas in the prisoner of war (PW) cage, and the guarding of groups during their detention at these facilities. Appreciation of proper handling methods by the guards only serves to enhance the effectiveness of the interrogation by reducing resistance of the prisoner. At Abu Ghraib, many did not understand their roles as military police and interrogators, and the relationship that must exist between them, and the outcome became that what is was.

Major Gephardt points out that following Operation Desert Storm the revised FM 34-52, *Intelligence Interrogation*, left out the chapter on interrogations conducted in LIC operations. As stated previously, this chapter first appeared in the 1967 version. In the later version the only concise expression of interrogation support for LIC contained in the manual is a one-half-page table that lacks any supporting discussion in the accompanying text. Why is the absence of a chapter on LIC important? It is noted because historically the LIC chapter contained a lengthy and detailed discussion of the legal status of insurgents.

Major Gephardt does a good job putting an historical perspective on the challenges faced today and how they were addressed in the past. Quite often America's

history has been to prepare to fight the last conflict. Unfortunately, America has drawn down forces following every conflict. This creates an environment in which doctrine does not change or evolve in a timely manner, and the Army's difficulty in trying to predict those future threats.

Sergeant First Class (SFC) Chris Mackey served as a US Army interrogator in Afghanistan in early 2002. *The Interrogators* relates problems with lack of interrogation training, interagency coordination, inadequate facilities, poor doctrine, and obscure interrogation methods. SFC Mackey observed that the current techniques taught to interrogators were not effective against the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces. Once the detainees realized what your limitations were under the Geneva Conventions, all cooperation ceased. How do you deal with such issues? For SFC Mackey and his team it came through trial and error.

SFC Mackey's group engineered breakthroughs in interrogation strategy, creating highly sophisticated ruses and elaborate trickery to bluff, worry, and confuse their opponents into yielding up precious information. SFC Mackey uses an example of trickery that he learned attending the interrogation school at Fort Huachuca, Arizona:

One scenario involved telling Soviet prisoners they were going to be turned back over to their country, which had a history of executing or imprisoning troops it suspected of betrayal. You could tell the prisoner something like: "Do you know how many of your own people were killed at the end of World War II when the German prisons opened?" But you couldn't take that extra step and say, "If we send you back, you know they're going to kill you." It was a thin line. As the Huachuca instructors said constantly, "You can't put a dagger on the table." (2004, 46)

The current interrogation doctrine promulgated at the US Army Interrogation School is the "direct approach." The other approaches taught there are love of comrades; pride and ego down; fear up, hands down, fear down, futility; and finally, incentive. The

Intelligence School at Ft. Huachuca wanted the interrogators to find order of battle, troop movements, etc. Demand for these items centered on a conventional fight mentality.

Chapter 3 explores the different focuses that other countries have developed for training their interrogators for effective interrogations.

SFC Mackey describes how during the first weeks in Afghanistan most of his interrogators could not find out any information with a hardened detainee. Each of the interrogators would come back with the same “He was only a low level fighter, with no intelligence value” (Mackey 2004, 106). However, there were two interrogators that were consistently bringing back critical information on every prisoner they interrogated. Not all information was about high-value targets (HVT), but it did serve to build an intelligence picture, such as:

Cavanaugh (6 foot 2 inch former infantryman and Russian linguist) wasn't finding anything earth-shattering, but he was getting good stuff. He reported on backdoor routes of travel into Afghanistan, police forces prepared to face American forces in Jalalabad, how medical supplies were being brought in from Pakistan, and where Taliban fighters were being medically treated. (Mackey 2004, 97)

After adapting different techniques that they had to learn while in theater, this group of interrogators was able to gather critical information about threats not only in the region, but Al Qaeda operatives still active in Europe.

Torture in Investigations

The Interrogators brought a unique perspective on whether torture is a viable option to be used during interrogations. This book begins by looking at the historical perspective of torture, and then attempts to tie it into the GWOT. Some factors to

consider are the political factors, legal history, escalation and necessity, and validity of information.

The Interrogators presents itself in a moral, legalistic fashion. One of the chapters titled “Five Errors in the reasoning of Alan Dershowitz” was of particular interest. In that chapter SFC Mackey criticizes Alan Dershowitz’s book *Should the Ticking Bomb Terrorist Be Tortured? Why does Terrorism Work?* It makes the point that although Dershowitz is often seen as an advocate of the ACLU and like organizations, he makes a strong case that if it becomes evident that a terrorist knows of a plot to destroy one of America’s cities, then that is justification to use torture as part of the interrogation process. In his rebuttal to the position of Dershowitz, Sanford Levinson disagrees on that method in a brief to George Madison University in 2004.

One important perspective of *The Interrogators* is how it ties in law enforcement in the last chapter. The difference in the way interrogations are conducted between military detainees and American citizens is very different, and it was not explained well. It seemed as if the author attempted to give the same civil rights under the constitution to enemy combatants as to criminals who are American citizens. This book looks at the legalities better than any other, but does attempt to lead the reader toward a particular viewpoint.

Japanese Methods of Prisoner of War Interrogation

This research report was completed in June 1946 for the War Department. The report opens by stating its findings as:

This report, based on material available to ATIS, GHQ, to 19 November 1945, presents evidence that the Japanese Army had a high regard for intelligence obtained through the interrogation of prisoners of war; that interrogation was

conducted at both the front and rear areas; that interrogation techniques varied from the gentle to the cruel; that prisoners were interrogated for the purpose of obtaining tactical, technical, and propaganda information; and that interrogation was detailed and thorough. (Walker 1946, 1)

The importance of interrogating prisoners immediately upon capture is emphasized in various Japanese Army directives. One of the reasons given was: “Prisoners of War captured at the front line should preferably be interrogated at the spot on matters requiring the pointing out of actual locations on the ground.” (Walker, 1946, 5)

The manual for interrogation for the Japanese was very detailed. The manual used psychological ruses, body language, interrogation without torture, and interrogation with torture. This document also is a record of the actual data of information the Japanese gathered during World War II as part of their interrogation process. The information gathered was extensive and complete. The techniques accomplished their objectives of collecting critical information.

British Interrogation of Germans during World War II

This document, developed in 1944, was written by a British interrogator, Captain Stopp, for Colonel Harold E. Pride. The document starts out by stating that there are no “Golden Rules” for interrogation. It is an art that not every one possesses. Some of the major points are the need to interrogate captured personnel in forward positions. It was clear to Captain Stopp that during the period that the German prisoners were scared and confused, they would give plenty of information. When transferred to the rear area, the prisoners were able to calm themselves and prepare themselves for interrogations.

Captain Stopp only believed in documenting information that applied to the level of operations that the interrogator was working for (i.e., brigade, division, corps, etc.). The author thinks that this is not viable today and can lead to problems in processing of information between the military and interagencies. Captain Stopp continues to talk about the importance of interrogating civilians on the battlefield. This helped British commanders to match air-land photos with actual locations on the ground and discover the locations of German unit positions and troop strengths.

Reid Technique

The Reid Technique was developed by an individual named John E. Reid, who established a private polygraph firm in 1947 in Chicago, Illinois. It represents the cumulative experiences of dozens of associates who successfully utilized the technique to solve literally hundreds of thousands of crimes committed over the years. The training was first made available to the public in 1974 and more than 200,000 investigators in private industry, law enforcement, and the federal government has attended these seminars (which range in length from three to five days). The book *Criminal Interrogation and Confessions* is considered by investigators and courts alike to be the authoritative text describing The Reid Technique.

The purpose for interrogation is to elicit the truth from someone the investigator believes has lied during an interview. Television and movies often portray an interrogation as a session where the investigator presents his evidence and the suspect breaks down and confesses in a matter of minutes. This is pure fantasy. First, it is rare for investigators to possess compelling evidence of a suspect's guilt prior to conducting an interrogation. This is precisely why an interrogation is conducted: it is an effort to obtain

such evidence. Second, the consequences facing a criminal suspect are significant and often several hours of interrogation are required to persuade a guilty suspect towards revealing the truth. The persuasive efforts used during an interrogation must be balanced against the possibility that the suspect is innocent of the offense. On the one hand, the techniques must be effective enough to persuade a guilty suspect to tell the truth, but not so powerful as to cause an innocent person to falsely confess to a crime. The author's position is that if *The Reid Technique* is properly employed, both of these criteria are satisfied.

It will be beneficial to understand some fundamental concepts relating to deception and the criminal mind. The first is that all deception is motivated to avoid the consequences of telling the truth. These consequences may be real (going to prison, losing a job, paying a fine) or personal (feelings of embarrassment, shame or humiliation). One goal of interrogation, therefore, is to reduce perceived consequences of telling the truth. Legally, an investigator cannot reduce the real consequences of the commission of a criminal act (offer a promise of leniency in exchange for a confession). However, there are many legal and proper procedures an investigator can use that would not risk a false confession from an innocent suspect and yet may allow the deceptive suspect to perceive lesser consequences associated with his crime. Consequently, one technique that should be avoided is to inform the suspect about the possible sentence facing him if so convicted. The investigator who tells a suspect, You're in a lot of trouble and face the next 20 years behind bars, has made it psychologically very difficult for the suspect in telling the truth. For a similar reason the investigator should refer to the crime with "soft" language such as taking money rather than stealing money. It is

psychologically much easier to admit causing a person's death than it is to admit murdering that person. In addition, the investigator should portray an understanding and compassionate demeanor toward the suspect which allows the suspect to feel better about himself and the crime he committed.

The second principle is that every person who has committed a crime will have justified the crime in some way. A crime against a person is often justified by blaming the victim (the rape victim encouraged the sexual encounter; the robbery victim was showing off his wealth; or the murder victim got the suspect angry). Crimes against property may be justified in a variety of ways. The employee who steals may justify the theft because he is underpaid and overworked; the businessman who burns down his warehouse to collect the insurance money may justify his arson by blaming the insurance company for charging him high premiums over the past years. This failure to accept personal accountability for a crime, and the concomitant attitudes displayed toward the crime, are so pervasive within the guilty suspect that they form the basis for the Behavior Analysis Interview. With a combined experience of over 45 years dealing with criminal suspects, the authors have yet to meet a guilty suspect who exclaimed, "The reason I committed the crime is because I am a basically dishonest criminal and have no respect for another person's property or life."

Related to this principle is a concept termed forming a "victim mentality." Criminals believe that they are the casualty of an unjust and unfair criminal justice system. If a suspect incriminates himself as a result of a false statement made to him by the police he immediately cries foul. While he may accept that what he did was wrong, the criminal believes that he deserves special consideration because of his unique

situation. A most interesting part of the victim mentality is the urge to protect this victim image, even at the cost of making an incriminating statement.

These insights to the criminal mind play an important role in understanding interrogation utilizing *The Reid Technique*. The procedures advocated in the technique reinforce the guilty suspect's own justification for his crime and culminate by taking advantage of the suspect's victim mentality, where the first admission is obtained when the suspect rejects a false assumption about the crime he committed.

Although quite a few other authors have written articles, pamphlets, and books, the above-mentioned authors provide a vast array of historical and current perspectives on interrogation. The goal is to analyze the current field manuals that the US Army uses as techniques, and the methods used by the government, police force, historical accounts, and other nations, in order to determine if the Army should look at adopting any new techniques or equipment.

Chapter 3 reveals how others in this field conduct interrogations and what changes they think are necessary for today's interrogations. It is important to compare and contrast the different training techniques and see if answers to the questions of whether it is feasible for the US Army to adopt any of these methods and why they may be feasible were answered. The second issue was an attempt to uncover possible equipment and technologies that will better enhance the US Army's interrogation process.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Every discourse, even a poetic or oracular sentence, carries with it a system of rules for producing analogous things and thus an outline of methodology.

Jacques Derrida, brainy quotes.com

In order to gather the broad array of training techniques on interrogation, the thesis author sent out surveys, conducted phone interviews, and conducted personal interviews with SMEs in the field. Each person surveyed or interviewed was asked the same questions and given the opportunity to offer their answers and validate their opinions. The surveys were equally weighted, with all participants having either taught interrogation in the past or presently instructing in interrogation methods. It is important to note that the core task was to get an honest opinion and not just the “party line.” To do this, the author addressed the organization that the instructors are part of, without mentioning the names of instructors. Anonymity was requested by over 50 percent of the surveyed audience.

The structure of this paper is in chronological order of the questions asked on the surveys. The purpose of this format is to allow the reader to easily compare the viewpoints of different experts in regard to the same question. This will enable them to more efficiently use this document for comparison with current training and equipping of the US Army interrogation teams, and conducting additional individual research. The author used the answers from the leading experts in this field that filled out a survey in order to establish a baseline. Any additional comments may have been offered by other participants in order to show a contrarian viewpoint.

The thesis author received 32 completed surveys, out of the 50 surveys sent out. From those that responded, The author divided them into two groups. The first group (Tier I) is composed of six experts who are vastly experienced in the field of interrogation and have all instructed courses and continue to work in the field. I, as well as many others within the interrogation community, consider them true experts. The second group (Tier II) are involved in the field of interrogation, but are not considered to be at the same level of expertise as the Tier I group. Some of these consist of soldiers who have only attended the interrogator's course, or police officers who regularly interview subjects or investigate crimes.

The Tier I group provided detailed answers that were consolidated and rephrased below. The Tier II group appears in a matrix in order to accurately represent the number that responded to each question in a positive or negative manner. The Tier II group validates the detailed answers that Tier I group provided.

The type of survey conducted was a "purposeful sampling." This type of survey is validated by Ellen Taylor-Powell, who is a Program Development and Evaluation Specialist at the University of Wisconsin. This adaptability survey was in compliance with RP-4-98.5M-200, "Program development and evaluation sampling," May 1998.

In some cases the statements from the respondents by researchers were modified in order to protect the respondents' anonymity. The description of the following subjects has been generalized in order to remain anonymous.

Tier I Comments (Introduction of Participants)

Subject 1. A former instructor of the Israeli school for interrogation (for special operations). This subject has attended a variety of interrogation training programs offered

in Israel, Britain, and the United States. As such, is considered by the US Army Special Operations Command as a premier expert in this field and teaches additional courses to their soldiers. This subject worked for Israeli special operations units, and currently teaches tactics, techniques and procedures for both government and military members. Speaks Hebrew, Arabic, English, Farsi, and French fluently.

Subject 2. Is a graduate from the US Army Interrogation School (located at Fort Huachuca, Arizona). Attended and graduated from the British interrogation course, and has participated in Operation Enduring Freedom. Currently trains military and civilian personnel participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom. This subject is fluent in both German and Arabic languages, and understands the difficulties involved in language training. During his participation in Operation Enduring Freedom, observed hundreds of interrogations, and was recognized by the command for creating a link analysis methodology that was used by the interrogators in the unit that yielded great results.

Subject 3. Is a retired British officer who worked in the British interrogation school during the Cold War and researched the interrogation techniques used by the British during World War II. The British are revisiting their interrogation techniques, and this retired officer has been asked to assist with that process.

Subject 4. Is the owner of one of the largest civilian interrogation schools in the country. This organization trains the civilian law enforcement professionals, to include the FBI, Department of Homeland Defense, the Secret Service, as well as state and local law enforcement agencies. In reviewing their client sheets, and calling graduates from this organization, the thesis author found that this center is one of the premier training centers for federal law enforcement agencies in the field of interrogations.

Subject 5. Is an officer from the Central Intelligence Agency and has been involved in thousands of interrogations. Responsible for the development of new agents through mentoring their techniques. This officer has conducted thousand of interrogations, and conducts lectures on interrogation procedures and techniques.

Subject 6. Currently works at the US Army Intelligence Center (USAIC), Ft. Huachuca, Arizona, as a contract instructor. This expert currently works on doctrine for the Army and is interested in the management process of interrogation. This instructor not only looks at the training of the interrogator, but is also attempting to develop leader training programs for the officers in the Military Intelligence (MI) field.

The following is the statement each participant read before starting the survey:

Before taking the survey the author wanted each participant to fully understand what this study is for. I am working on a thesis that may be looked at by both military and nonmilitary organizations for review. I am looking for honest opinions and not just the textbook answers. This is an opportunity for you to give input into advancing the US Army's training and equipment. The information you provide could alter how interrogation occurs and who interrogates detainees. Please let me know if you do or do not want your name attached to this paper that will be produced at the end of my research. I will not violate anyone's privacy by producing your name if it might defeat the honesty this survey is intended to discover. I need this survey back no later than February 22, 2006. I appreciate your help in advance and would like to be able to continue this email dialogue with interested parties. All have the same goal of defeating enemies both on today's battlefield and in the future.

Question 1: Do you think the US Army interrogation is effective in today's contemporary environment? Please explain your answer. How could the US Army improve it?

Subject 1: No. Based on my experience, I believe that the US Army interrogators lack very critical components to their training. First, most of the interrogators are too young. I sat and assisted in many interrogations where our detainee mocked us due to the fact that he felt the interrogator had no clue as to what he was doing. This detainee was not intimidated and thus the effectiveness of the interrogation was lost and we were unable to gain the information that was needed. The main point for this is our interrogators are too young and lack experience. Second, most interrogators still need more language training. I understand that DLI (Defense Language Institute) has a certain set time to run soldiers through their Advance Individual Training (AIT); however this caused many problems while in country. The interrogators not only lack the ability to effectively communicate with the local nationals, they also were unable to understand what motivated the individual they interrogated. I equate this again to their age, language ability, and lack of cultural understanding. The way I improve the interrogator is by extending the training for interrogators. I would allow soldiers to have more time to learn and understand the language. I would make this career feel similar to Special Forces (as far as selection). Potential candidates would have to serve a minimum amount of time before they were allowed to go through a selection process. The last point I would like to interject is the rules for interrogating. If the above changes were made I believe that the US Army's "Umbrella Principle" could actually work in a positive and not negative way. I mean this by allowing the interrogator to actually do his job and not limit his ability to actually interrogate. This was by far the most devastating factor when it came to losing

valuable intelligence because our interrogator was afraid to push the envelope in an interrogation room.

Subject 2: Sometimes. I think the interrogation is not developed within institutions but rather on an individual soldier level. When I supervised interrogations in the early part of Operation Enduring Freedom, I quickly realized that even though each soldier had received the same training, there were only two of my interrogators who were effective in gathering information. My best interrogator had just transferred from the infantry and understood how to project himself as a confident figure. When I attended the interrogation course it was based on Cold War doctrine, and did not prepare me for the new Contemporary Operational Environment (COE).

Subject 3: No. The British interrogation course is more realistic training. The British conducts half of their interrogation training under field conditions. I think that the American interrogation program will continue to mature as a result of the experience they are receiving in OEF/OIF; it is evident that both the British and American interrogators were not prepared for the current COE. However, as I look at the future direction for the British interrogation course, we are looking at what techniques are effective with the current culture that we are engaged with. I think the American force should look at cultural training. Often the term “Cultural Awareness,” is used which implies being aware of differences. I think interrogators must go farther and understand the culture in depth. Only by knowing your enemy can you hope to get into his decision cycle.

Subject 4: I think all of our interrogation processes can improve and I do not think that many understand the balance between immediate information requirements, versus long term intelligence collection effort. In my opinion it is in the long term human

intelligence gathering that the US has slipped behind. Our society is somewhat of an immediate gratification society. Society wants the information right now. Sometimes the best information is like a good wine-it takes time to develop. From my experience it seems to me that the younger investigators can be in too much of a hurry and that seems to cause a systemic problem.

Subject 5: No. I have worked with the Army interrogators and interrogators from different countries, and the Army is attempting to use the science over the art of interrogation. Some of the questions addressed later in this survey: Age, dominance, posture, and command presence are all necessary in order to mold the relationship between the interrogator and the detainee. It is crucial that the boundaries are established early so that the detainee understands the format of the interrogation and what is expected from him. It is this process that establishes the ground work and will amplify the pressure of future interrogations. It is crucial that the detainee believes that the person he is talking to is the decision maker. If the detainee believes the interrogator must ask a higher authority to make deals that detainee will never work with that interrogator. All of us have learned the importance of cultural awareness. It is important to send the interrogators to professional institutions for training and seminars. It is also important to develop required reading lists that are discussed among a group environment. Working with the US Army, I observed a lack of understanding of the culture that they were dealing with, and thus did not understand when that detainee would answer the way he did. It is also important to understand Islam in today's battlefield. The detainee will use the Quran and Islam during interrogation. It is crucial that the interrogator understands why he is using that claim, and what you can leverage against that thought process.

Subject 6: Yes. The legal approaches work. I think the issue comes from interrogation management. Officers are not allowed to attend the interrogators course, which creates a gap in the employment and interrogation process. The interrogators need to have access to the intelligence process, so that a more relevant questioning format can be developed.

Question 2: What should be added to the US Army interrogation course?

Subject 1: There is a need for a cooperative learning environment that incorporates a combined curriculum. The need for a cultural training center where small groups receive the history of the targeted culture as well as current issues will enable the interrogator to better perceive the situation. I also think there should be a selection process that I explained further in the next few questions. The bottom line is that unless we select the interrogator the curriculum will always be secondary to the selection process.

Subject 2: I think we should take the British model emphasizing interrogation in field conditions. Looking at long term investigation as well as the traditional Cold War thinking of immediate need for intelligence needs to be incorporated and taught. There are different techniques and skills for short term versus long term interrogation. Both are important, and each will require different skill sets, and a different approach.

It is important that the school refocus to looking at the deception piece that the British used during World War II. Some of the techniques used were taking enlisted soldiers and dressing them up in senior officers uniforms in order to get the respect of the Nazi prisoners of war during World War II. The Nazi soldiers would look at the higher ranking interrogator with respect and often stand up and salute them when they entered

the room. Command presence is important in all investigations. This process enabled great results and assisted with the authoritarian figure needed to produce the prisoners of wars need to negotiate. I do not think that using soldiers who have little military experience will work in this circumstance.

Subject 3: Since I have not looked at the US Army's interrogation course in detail, I do not think I can make an educated opinion. The need for understanding the hidden agenda is essential and needs to be addressed in the course. In order to "break the detainee" the interrogator must identify and have knowledge about the core issue creating the enemy's motivation. This must be taught in an academic environment.

Subject 4: I only have old information about the US Army's interrogation course. What new things I think need to be addressed in all interrogation courses. What technologies are available to assist with interrogation (addressed latter in subsequent questions). Courses need to address cultural and language issues. Developing effective interrogators require a long-term training program. Additional courses need to be developed for all leadership that is involved in the process. One of the problems is going to be a strict adherence to the field manuals and not allowing the creative expertise that inevitably will be found during real life experiences and circumstances.

Subject 5: I would focus on recruiting. The interrogation course is a good first step. Everyone in the process needs to understand that interrogation will need to be a career-long education process. I would add interrogators working with paleographers during interrogations. Paleographers are trained specialists who operate lie detector equipment. The lie detector evaluates those changes in heart rate and stress in the body. These have proven to be effective during investigations. Even if the normal interrogator

might not have this capability on the battlefield, this technique helps refine the interrogator in training and may lead to assisting the developmental process of learning human reaction and behavior. It is also a good technique to use against different cultures prior to deployment in order to assess the different body language used in different cultures.

Subject 6: USJFCOM needs to step up to the plate as the DOD Joint Command for training and develop a course for Joint Interrogation Directors Course (JIDC) managers. Historically, on-the-job training (OJT) in this department seems to be an MI (Military Intelligence) career ender. Nowhere in DoD is there a course to train Joint officers on the massive complexities in running a Joint Exploitation Center (JEC)...see Joint Doctrine for Detainee Operations JP 3-63 (Draft) and Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations JP 2-01. Intelligence Interrogation FM 34-52 and FM 2-22.3 (Draft) are the Army's standard interrogation manuals. They do little to aid officers/managers charged with planning for Joint Interrogation Operations (JIO). JEC operations are by today's standard. They are as complex as that that of a Garrison Commander (food, transportation, medical, legal, engineer, interpreters, religion, psychologist, security, etc). Where is the school/training for our MI leaders? What is the skill identifier for a JEC Commander? US Army lacks a qualified interrogation /source operations overt human intelligence officer. The Army needs a complete redress of interrogation management.

Question 3: Should there be an age requirement for interrogators? Does age matter in certain cultures? If so what age should that be? Why is age important in general?

Subject 1: Yes. As I mention in answer one, I think for a variety of reasons age is important. In the Arab culture/ Islamic culture it is very important. Age is respected and required. I would make the age requirement at a minimum of 25 years old. I think that a selection process should also be required (such as Special Forces selection). I think a 19 year old soldier cannot be effective with the majority of detainees in the Arab culture. There is a reason the Israeli military puts an age requirement in the Israeli interrogation course.

Subject 2: Yes. I think age is important. I probably always thought that, but it was reinforced from what I observed on multiple deployments. The US Army has to address the need for skilled experienced soldiers who are eligible for higher security clearances with the recruiting issues that the Army now faces.

Subject 3: Yes. The British are looking at categorizing levels of interrogators in the British forces. The British will classify them by immediate interrogators and valuable target interrogators. For the more important detainees, the interrogators will be older and have a higher level of training to deal with educated and politically savvy detainees.

Subject 4: In a study conducted at our school, the data revealed that older students seem to get more information from subjects. Talking with the government agencies and police that our company works with seem to believe in the same results and agree with that belief. This is something that I think should be looked at closer with a scientific study. For civilian police agencies, the base level of gathering information is taught to every "beat" officer. Because criminal investigations are crucial to prosecute a case the

civilian agencies have placed a time requirement and course requirements before you can be selected for a detective position.

Subject 5: Yes. Being involved in a number of interrogations, I have observed both military and civilian interrogations. Age is an important factor. On one occasion I was observing an interrogation being conducted by a young soldier. I observed the body responses and eye contact of the detainee. After approximately 30 minutes, a senior non-commissioned officer came in to talk to the detainee, and immediately the detainee focused on the senior man in the room. For the rest of the session, the detainee never made eye contact with the young soldier again.

Subject 6: No. I do not think age has any relevance to the interrogation process.

Question 4: What level of language training is adequate to conduct interrogations and understand the hidden details (i.e. 2+/2+ etc)? A language proficiency of 2+/2+ means that the person can conversationally read and comprehend the language they are trained in.

Subject 1: The level will work at 2+/2+ however there are so many “cultural concepts” that are not taught in the language school. The only way I believe this problem can be corrected is by updating the course at the Defense Language Institute (DLI). Additionally, our interrogators need to not be trained under the “Cold War” mind-set; they need to better understand how this very unpredictable battlefield operates and what motivate the individuals they speak with.

Subject 2: Language is important. I do not think the US Army will be able to train the standard interrogator to be proficient in the details of a language, but that does not mean that language training should not continue. Sometimes it will go a long way to establish communication with the detainee or locals and then bring an interpreter when

details are more important. The base relationship made by using language goes a long way in assisting with the communication between detainee and interrogator.

I did have an experience in Afghanistan in which I heard the detainees speaking German, and I was the only one who could tell what they were saying. This led to us being able to pressure the detainees on information that the detainee did not know how the interrogator was able to exploit.

Subject 3: Language is important. The British have a long history during our colonial days realizing the importance of language. I do not know if the United States of America can always predict the next theater of conflict, but learning a language also assists with understanding culture.

Subject 4: Fluency is critical. Even when our company trains officers we show videos of how interrogators need to understand the gang “slang,” and how information is lost without the language understanding. I do not know the issues with the US Army’s language capabilities or lack thereof.

Subject 5: Language is important. At the same time it is crucial that interrogators learn how to use translators, select translators, and validate translators. Each of these is a process of learning your environment and recruiting the proper translator that fits the detainee population you may face. It is also good to use multiple translators during interrogations.

Subject 6: There is no need for language training for the interrogator. The Army will do best to train the interrogators of the future to use an interpreter. The Army will never be able to get the right language that will be required for a future conflict. Consider if the US were to fight China, or another country, interrogators will always be guessing

what language to study. Learning a language will only waste critical resources trying to second guess the next country. It is not an interrogation necessity. Interrogators will always have to buy or contract a linguist.

Question 5: How important is cultural training and is it adequate in our training? What should be added to make cultural training more effective?

Subject 1: I cannot stress the importance of cultural training. Learning the language alone is completely insufficient. The only way I was able gain trust with my informants was to acknowledge some of the very simple cultural norms. If US Army interrogators had this component to their training they would be much better served due to the fact that they would be able to understand where that individual is coming from or his view of the situation.

Subject 2: Cultural training is the most important aspect of understanding your enemy and getting into how he thinks. It is also necessary to know the food, drink, and daily habits (i.e., prayer, special diet, religious requirements etc). This is an area in where the US should strive to improve and can improve. Although the interrogation school attempts to add this to the curriculum, it is not where it should be or as in-depth.

Subject 3: This has been a repetitive lesson learned over our long history throughout the world. History shows that major mistakes with gaining popular support came from not understanding the cultural issues important to the local populace. The need for the interrogator to understand these issues cannot be emphasized enough.

Subject 4: Cultural training is critical. Knowing the environment is the first step in understanding the mindset of a target population. Knowing the culture is needed to

establish the technique to open and maintain relationship building. Prior study enables success and prevents mistakes that will inevitably spread across the detainee population.

Subject 5: Cultural training should be mandatory training at every level. During Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, I often asked US Army interrogators if they received cultural training before deploying. They always said yes, and that the Army said it was important. I am not sure what they received but they severely lacked real cultural training. When so many experts evaluate cultural training as critical to operational success, I am not sure why the US Army does not give credence to it. I do not know if the US Army thinks that they are giving adequate cultural training in the interrogation course or not. I can say that what I have observed it is not sufficient.

Subject 6: There is a new course called Enhanced Analysis and Interrogation Training (EAIT). At EAIT, there is a significant emphasis on cultural awareness.

Question 6: How have you seen properly trained and equipped interrogators conduct interrogations? What went well, and what did not?

Subject 1: I have seen interrogations go both ways. It depended on several of the factors that are mentioned above and on the individual being interrogated. Stress positions worked extremely well or constantly applying questions to the detainee. There were times when this did not and a different approach was used.

Subject 2: Two of my interrogators consistently gathered more actionable information than any other interrogator in our group. Observing these two, I learned a couple of things. The first thing I learned is that both of them exuded confidence in everything they did. There was never a time that they entered the interrogation room unprepared or looking like they did not know exactly what they wanted to do. The second

thing I observed is that they would combine an approach of both firm questioning and then taking a break with the detainee and seem caring while they gave water or checked on their bindings. This dual approach created an atmosphere that the detainees did not know how to respond and yet did respond to the interrogators.

Subject 3: Often a committee was formed to deal with detainees. Through trial and error, the British found that group interrogation with multiple detainees enabled the interrogator cell group put pieces of the puzzle together that they were unable to with one-on-one interrogation. The hard cell/soft cell approach worked well. With detainees that the interrogators are unsure of the knowledge they have, they will start with a standard questioning format and then after 12 hours start again in a softer environment where treats and tea might be offered. The detainee has to determine if he wants to remain each session in the soft cell environment or not cooperate and move back to hard cell interrogation.

Subject 4: Understanding body language is one key to how to alter questioning. Often if the interrogator can create an environment in which he asks questions that lead to the detainee having to answer with lengthy answers. This type of questioning will create an opportunity to find mistakes or inconsistency in the detainee's story.

Subject 5: The key to interrogation is combining trained and equipped interrogators with the intelligence assets. When intelligence exists on a detainee, the interrogator has leverage in the questioning process. Even details on families can assist in cross-referencing statements made and creating a link analysis. I do not think an interrogator that is skilled without understanding the environment and the intelligence can produce effective results. During the cold war, the important timely issues were

questions about unit identification, troop strength, location of troops, and higher level chain of command. Today the interrogator must understand the higher environment picture and available intelligence prior to talking with the detainees.

Subject 6: EAIT and its students who have rotated to Guantanamo Bay have often come back with great comments as to their training.

Question 7: What equipment would help with interrogation in today's battlefield and in the future?

Subject 1:

Voice Stress/Lie Detection Devices- This is new technology that has developed very rapidly within the past few years that detects stress levels of an interrogation subject. This technology can be modified very easily for face-to-face interrogation. This technology using computer analysis is also portable and easily trained. It is a good tool for interrogators and is being used by countries intelligence services around the country.

Hypnosis is a unique technique that I have further developed that, even if the interrogation subject tries not to be hypnotized, he cannot resist. The interrogator can then extract information from him through the subconscious. Moreover, the interrogator can create post-hypnotic suggestions that will actually program him to be more compliant during nonhypnotic interrogations or interviews.

Extremely cruel threats but without actually hurting the interrogation subject. For example, place two subjects in adjoining rooms (one subject will be the "dummy"). Neither subject should be able to see the other. Subject 2 should be able to hear subject 1 (dummy subject). Use loud threats and props in order to create an effect (like casualty

training with blood, body parts, etc). When you are taking back subject 1, he will see the blood in that room and remember the sounds he heard.

Subject 2: Taping conversations is critical. It can be used to validate interpreters or replay to better take notes. The ability of information of interrogations to timely be transmitted to the force are still being worked. The need for a 360 degree information flow is required in order to keep situational awareness for the intelligence community and combatant commanders. A communication link with the intelligence chain should be strengthened.

Subject 3: There has been research conducted in several fields that may influence interrogations. The hidden recording devices in cells, light interaction to mood, voice analyzers, and soundproof modular cages are all tools that should be looked at for interrogators.

Subject 4: Having the ability to record the interrogation (by visual means) if possible. Biometrics, fingerprint analysis, and climate control. All of these will enhance the effectiveness of interrogations.

Subject 5: Some of the advancements (but not all) are listening devices, recording (audio-visual) devices, biometrics, fingerprint, lighting advancements (type of lighting), climate controls, optic scanning, paleographers, and voice-stress analysis. These are just a few technological advancements that can assist the interrogator.

Subject 6: Video-Sound analyzers, change of environment equipment for select interrogation booths, and computers are all useful to the interrogation process.

Question 8: What additional comment on improving training would you add?

Subject 1: Develop a selection process that enables the selected soldiers to undergo long-term training. This may cause a longer commitment of contract for the soldier for the US Army to accept the length of training and utilization.

Subject 2: Joint training programs with civilian agencies and field training.

Subject 3: Since the British and Americans will continue to work together in the future, a joint training program should be developed during coalition training operations.

Subject 4: The military should develop a closer relationship and integration with civilian interview and interrogation training. There are a lot of things that have been learned in the civilian field that would be beneficial in the military venue.

Subject 5: None

Subject 6: Leader training is required. Any additional comments are encouraged to assist with improving interrogations. One area that should continue to grow is the USJFCOM and a Joint Exploitation Center Training Course (personnel, documents and material exploitation center). The Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) is a valuable process for gathering intelligence, but also in the interrogation process. When an interrogator has information that he knows is true from the SSE there is a leverage the interrogator has over the detainee. Interrogators also need to leverage more analysis components into the interrogation architecture. Guantanamo proved this with the success of the Tiger Team standard (Interrogator, Interpreter, and Analyst).

Tier II Comments

The Tier system has already been explained, but here is a recap of the number involved in Tier II. Fifty surveys were sent out with thirty-two responding. Six of the

thirty-two were evaluated as being Tier I category. The remaining twenty-six responses are annotated in a yes-no format to each question for additional background and how the Tier II matches with the expert response from Tier I. Some of the surveyed audience did not respond to every question due to having little to no experience in that area and are annotated as “No response.”

Question 1: Do you think the US Army interrogation is effective in today’s contemporary environment? Please explain your answer. How could we improve it?

Yes: 6 No: 10 No response: 10

Question 2: What should be added to the US Army interrogation course?

Additional culture: 11 Greater Language: 2 No response: 13

Question 3: Should there be an age requirement for interrogators? Does age matter in certain cultures? If so what age should that be? Why is age important in general?

Yes: 24 No: 2

Question 4: What level of language training is adequate to conduct interrogations and understand the hidden details (i.e. 2+/2+ etc)? A language proficiency of 2+/2+ means that the person can conversationally read and comprehend the language they are trained in.

Proficient required: 12 Not necessary: 5 No response: 9

Question 5: How important is cultural training and is it adequate in our training? What should be added to make cultural training more effective?

Important: 26 Not important: 0 No response: 0

Question 6: How have you seen properly trained and equipped interrogators conduct interrogations? What went well, and what did not?

Not quantifiable for Tier II

Question 7: What equipment would help with interrogation in today's battlefield and in the future?

Lie detector test-stress analyzer: 9

Video products: 8

Climate control: 5

Computer databases: 4

Question 8: What additional comment on improving training would you add?

Not quantifiable for Tier II

Summary

The above views were from experts who have a deep commitment in assisting with making the interrogator better trained and equipped. Not all of the technology was included due to classification levels. Research is being conducted on more reliable systems to assist with the interrogation process.

What recommendations can be made to the US Army in order to improve the interrogation process? In chapter 4 the writer analyzed the data in chapter 3 and started the process of preparing recommendations for chapter 5.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

This chapter addresses the surveyed questions from chapter 3, compares and analyzes the six SMEs (Tier I introduced in chapter 4) comments, and analyzes their comments with the surveyed questions. This chapter assists the reader to understand the data and prepare them for recommendations in chapter 5.

Question 1: Do you think the US Army interrogation is effective in today's contemporary environment? Please explain your answer. How could the US Army improve it?

Five out of six of the Tier I SMEs did not feel that the US Army interrogators were effective. The five experts came to this conclusion based on personal involvement with US Army interrogators. As stated in Chapter 3, these experts have long and extensive experience conducting interrogations and observing US Army interrogators. All of the experts have been involved in the current Global War on Terrorism since its inception.

Some individuals within the US Army interrogation teams were effective. These individuals all received the same training at Fort Huachuca, but those who were effective understood complex situations and seemed to have a command presence about them. The data shows that although some very talented interrogators have success, this is not the norm of graduates from the interrogation course at Fort Huachuca. The data is clear from experts who have observed the US Army interrogation teams in Afghanistan and Iraq that the interrogation course does not properly prepare the interrogator in understanding the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE).

The one expert (subject 6) does believe that the US Army interrogators are being effective in the COE. This expert works at Fort Huachuca, AZ as an instructor and course developer, and has a different perspective from the rest of the Tier I experts. The interrogation course has made significant changes since 2001, and is currently updating curriculum in order to adapt to the COE. This process will continue to develop, and this research may assist with that process.

This expert understands challenges with attempting to change a curriculum taught in a Department of Defense school. The difference in opinion between this expert and the other five respondents come from the ties this expert has to the interrogation course taught at Fort Huachuca.

Major Thacker has personally observed 50 to 70 interrogations in the field and agrees with the majority of experts surveyed that the US Army interrogators are not as effective as they should be. When asked how the interrogators could become more effective, the data gathered consistently reveals that by properly training and equipping our interrogators this fixes the problem.

In question 1, the words “contemporary operational environment” was used. The purpose of placing an importance on the COE is to realize that only by conducting Operational Preparation of the Environment (OPE) can the interrogator understand what techniques would be effective in a certain culture. OPE is a new term used to separate (and sometimes replace) the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). OPE is a detailed analysis of the environment in which a unit may operate. Mission analysis is part of the military decision-making process (MDMP) that commanders conduct. Part of the mission analysis process is IPB. The IPB process helps a commander assess the enemy,

terrain, weather, and culture. The process that must be done in order to better understand the environment is the new form of OPE.

The experts in chapter 3 all have spent time in training for, or in combat operations with, US Army interrogators and understand their need for improved training and equipment. The experts who have worked side by side with Army interrogators do not believe that current training and equipment meets the U.S. Army's stated requirements. The two most common responses as to why training and equipment does not meet the current operational requirement is:

1. The interrogation course trained interrogators for a conventional threat model that existed prior to 2001.
2. Priority for resources that interrogators need was not a focus until the past two years.

Both of these issues are currently being addressed. This research paper may assist with that process.

One of the problems the data reveals is the need to train differently based on two factors. The first factor is the immediate need for information as soon as a detainee is captured. The second factor is the need for training on how to deal with detainees who will need to be interrogated over a long period of time in order to obtain information the detainee may have. An approach for extracting immediate intelligence from detainees takes a command presence with possible intimidation (if needed). Long-term information gathering from detainees requires a slower, more deliberate, and methodical breaking down of barriers through building relationships between the interrogator and the detainee.

Each of these requires different skill sets, and needs appropriate, focused training to be effective.

I think the data shows that the US Army is not very effective when it comes to conducting interrogations, either for near-term requirements or with respect to long-term intelligence gathering. Interrogations are important in order to gain information, infiltrate the current insurgency, and conduct counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. To improve the US Army's interrogation capability will require a look at the interrogator, the training program, and equipment that can be provided to them.

Question 2: What should be added to the US Army interrogation course?

Field training should become more intensive and interrogation training should take place in more austere conditions. The British believe this is a key to success in their interrogation course. Prior to 2001 the philosophy of the US interrogation course was oriented toward the Cold War scenario. The belief was that approximately 20 minutes spent on interrogating a detainee would be sufficient in gathering all relevant information. It was thought that 96 percent would respond to this tactic, and the 5 percent that did not respond would not matter, because of the sheer volume of detainees who would provide the information needed.

The British model concentrated on other, more subtle aspects of interrogation. The British expert made constant references to combat experience in Malaya, the Falklands, the Persian Gulf, and Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland taught the British a great deal about insurgency warfare and counterterrorism interrogations. In the British interrogation course they may bring detainees into a tent bleeding, dirty, without a captured tag, etc. This creates an environment where an interrogator must be creative and

adaptive in his approach. The environment is not structured for the interrogator, which enhances the learning models. The British understand that part of an effective training model comes from changing environments to observe if the interrogator can adapt and alter his methods accordingly.

Experience in effective interrogation results from repetition of training conditions in various environments. This is also a proven principle for the Army's training model. Conducting interrogation training in tents, with poor lighting, or in extreme heat is different from interrogation training in rooms offering comfortable climate control. Training in austere conditions should be added to the interrogation training course to reflect the adaptive techniques required for today's interrogators.

The majority of respondents believed that there is a need for selection criteria for interrogators. The Israeli expert emphasized this in more detail than the rest of the respondents. The Israeli expert suggested a selection based on the methodology used for Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS). The police, FBI, CIA, Israeli, British, and civilian interrogation schools all believe that an interrogator must undergo a selection process. The mission that is required for an Army interrogator is demanding. To be successful at interrogation the need for culturally sensitive people, who understand the strategic/operational/tactical problem, and is a mature person is vital to success. For this reason alone the current criteria for becoming an interrogator does not match the mission requirement.

A leader education course should be established at Fort Huachuca. Subject 6 believed that a major issue that has not been identified is the need for officers to attend an interrogator manager's course. There is a breakdown in the interrogation programs in the

field due to a lack of understanding from leaders in the Military Intelligence community on how interrogations work (or should work). An interrogation leader course will educate officers on the interrogation process and how the information gathered is distributed throughout the Army.

A more in-depth cultural training program should be added to the course. This seems apparent from all respondents. The data shows that Americans lack a worldly view and knowledge base that is needed for foreign deployments and interaction with different cultures.

Cultural training will enable the interrogator to build relationships with detainees through sharing customs, granting access to religious items, and understand the reason the detainee may be supporting enemy activities.

Question 3: Should there be an age requirement for interrogators? Does age matter in certain cultures? If so, what age should that be? Why is age important in general?

Subjects 1-5 all felt that age was important for the interrogator. Age is a factor in engaging people in conversation and building relationships. In many cultures the lack of age reduces the credibility, command presence, and experience of the interrogator. The experts who have either conducted thousands of interrogations or observed them believe that age is a critical component for an interrogator's effectiveness. Subject 1 believes that selection for interrogators should include age as a factor. The average age given to become an interrogator by the majority of respondents is 25 years old.

Age is often linked to maturity. The older our soldiers become a greater maturity level usually follows. Age is also important in many cultures. Cultures in both Afghanistan and Iraq consider age as a very important factor. The current enemy the US

faces on many of today's battlefields is the radical Islamic fighters. In this culture age is linked to respect. An additional barrier is already in place when a young 18-19 year old soldier tries to provoke the captive to talk. When this issue is addressed in Chapter Five, the thesis author addresses rank and military service in addition to an age requirement as all important selection criteria.

Question 4: What level of language training is adequate to conduct interrogations and understand the hidden details (i.e., 2+/2+ etc)? A language proficiency of 2+/2+ means that the person can conversationally read and comprehend the language they are trained in.

Subject 6 felt that language was not important. It was his or her feeling that the US has a hard time predicting the location of future conflicts, thus the proper language on which to train is difficult to foresee. Currently, interrogators have to use interpreters due to the lack of proficiency in Pashtu and Arabic (just to name a few languages in which interrogators lack proficiency). Subject 6 said that future conflicts will require the interrogator to understand how to use interpreters, but the interrogators do not need to know a language.

Subjects 1-5 responded that language was important and necessary. The more people involved in a conversation, the more mistakes to be made. There are issues with relaying voice inflection, subtleties, nuances, etc. Subject 1 goes into the most detail, stating that interrogator's language proficiency should be at a level where they are fluent. Knowing the nuances of a language can help an interrogator read between the lines and uncover important information.

The Army is not required to send interrogators to the Defense Language Institute (DLI). Subject 6 explained why the Army decided to stop sending the interrogators to

language school. The interrogators course does teach their students how to use interpreters. The author agrees with Subject 6 that the need to learn how to use interpreters is and will continue to be important. In spite of the fact that interpreters will be needed in the future, a command of a language is still very important for the interrogator's effectiveness.

The Army realizes how important language is and that is why Army Knowledge Online (AKO) sites exist for soldiers to learn a language. At the US Army Command and General Staff College a new emphasis on language is being placed in the curriculum as well. If the senior leaders in the Army understand how important language proficiency is for every soldier, then how much more necessary is language training for interrogators? The data supports sending every interrogator to language school, and require each interrogator to take language tests annually to remain proficient.

Even if an interpreter is needed for detailed conversations, building relationships can occur directly between the interrogator and the detainee through simple conversations. The importance of this cannot be underestimated. Language is another tool which helps the interrogator tear down the natural barriers through simple conversation.

Question 5: How important is cultural training and is it adequate in our training? What should be added to make cultural training more effective?

Every surveyed respondent agreed that cultural training is crucial to success in interrogations. Without a great knowledge of the culture an interrogator will not be successful. It is impossible to be an effective interrogator without understanding the operational environment which includes understanding the local culture. Without a strong cultural knowledge of the locations in which the interrogator may operate, many mistakes

will be made. Not understanding tribes, religion, family structure, nationalistic views, and historical perspectives lessens the ability of the interrogator to analyze behavior of detainees. Everyone surveyed understood the importance of cultural training. It is not adequate to just understand the basic issues of culture and religion. It takes a deep understanding of culture to engage in conversation with detainees. It is important to realize why they decided to fight and what the underlying motivation is. If the interrogator cannot engage in conversations that seem to communicate the motivation of detainees, the interrogation will not be as effective as it could be.

All surveyed participants agree on the need to be able to build relationships between the interrogator and the detainee. In order to do this it is important to understand cultural norms. Some of the areas to understand are what local diets consist of, religious practices, or customs. The need for interrogators to understand these basic norms are important. An appreciation of how important cultural norms are to the people, and what happens when they are violated, are necessary for the interrogator to understand all of these issues and be able to address them.

The impact of understanding cultural issues is that an interrogator is able to provide items to detainees for rewards programs, participate in conversations to determine the motivation of the detainee, and identify what barriers the detainee may have. By understanding the environment, the ability of the interrogator to tear down these barriers is greatly enhanced.

Often the Army uses the term “cultural awareness” for soldiers to learn about an area of the world in which the soldier may operate. “Cultural training” is a more in-depth study of culture that should be required for soldiers who may have greater interaction

with host nation populace. The interrogator requires cultural training versus cultural awareness. Cultural training should include an historical perspective, religion, cultural norms, current political situations, tribal divisions, ethnic differences, and customs of the populace. Historical background study brings to light why a situation has developed and what the local perceptions of the issues are. The need for this type of information creates an historical reference that can be used in evaluating a person's beliefs and also helps in the relation-building process.

Question 6: How have you seen properly trained and equipped interrogators conduct interrogations? What went well, and what did not?

Subjects 1-4 have a common response. Subject 1 believes in a strong presence that includes stature, maturity, and age. Subject 2 relays a story of how the British during WWII used to dress their interrogators in uniforms that always ranked above the captured detainee (prisoner of war). When the interrogator entered a room where a captured Nazi officer was in, the Nazi officer would stand at attention and salute the British interrogator.

Subject 2 believes that interrogation teams are more effective than one-on-one interrogations. Subject 4 agrees with the concepts of interrogation teams. It is important to use several interrogators to get responses from detainees. Using a team approach has proven to be successful in many of the government and civilian law enforcement models. Subject 4 has a good team teaching technique. The key for team interrogation is building a team that regularly works together and understands a combined approach to interrogation.

Subject 4 believes that understanding body language is important in determining what the detainee is thinking or when the detainee is getting nervous. He/she also believes that creating an environment in which the detainee is required to give a lengthy answer is a good tool for extracting information. The more the detainee talks, the more information an interrogator can use to find gaps in a story, or determine how honest a detainee is with their capture.

From the data, most experts surveyed said that experience is significant. One police detective during an interview for this research project responded to experience as follows:

I don't think any police officer I know would suggest that a new officer, who has never worked "the beat," could become a detective. To think that a police department would not realize the relevance and importance of the experience developed as a basic police officer before becoming a detective would be ludicrous. I don't know how the Army works, but I doubt if the fundamental understanding of experience would not be looked at the same way. (Washington DC detective)

The author agrees with this police officer's assessment of the need for experience. The Army cannot bring young soldiers into the Army and create interrogators out of them when they do not understand the Army yet. This is looked at in chapter 5.

Question 7: What equipment would help with interrogation in today's battlefield and in the future?

As technology progresses, it is important to understand how the Army can leverage the newest equipment on the market. For interrogation teams, equipment can enhance the effectiveness in the collection process. Lie detectors, stress voice analyzers, listening devices, hidden cameras, and biometrics can all be effective tools to assist interrogators in their effort.

To develop Paleographers (lie detector analysts) would be too expensive and impractical for each interrogation team. Training with portable stress voice analyzers is well within the capability of each interrogation team. Each team has access to computers that can run these programs. Interrogators can be trained to use this program and the program is easily portable. In the United States legal system a stress analyzer is not admissible in a court of law, but with detainees there is no legal prohibition (i.e. the right not to self incriminate etc) in this regard. The voice stress analyzer will give the interrogator an indicator of the truthfulness of the detainee's story and induce additional stress on the detainee to reveal information.

Biometrics is another important tool to identify detainees and provides a reliable way of future positive identification if they are captured again. This is a relatively new technology which is still being fielded. Biometrics can be integrated into a link analysis program to create databases for intelligence purposes. Interrogators are responsible for gathering information and should be in charge of obtaining the biometrics and updating the detainee databases.

Controlling the environment in order to obtain certain effects has always been a tool for the interrogator. Altering lighting and understanding the effects of colors and lighting on moods can help "break down" detainees into revealing relevant information. The use of heat, air-conditioning, smells, and space are all important elements in effecting behavior patterns.

Taping interrogations was talked about by several respondents. The experts felt that taping and recording interrogations was a tool for critiquing interrogation techniques as well as having a record to replay in order to gather information that might have been

missed during the initial meeting with the detainee. Taping interrogations have added value. One of these additional advantages of taping interrogations is the ability to evaluate the interpreter. This will let the interrogator check out how well his interpreter is translating material and the intent of the conversations. The interpreter should be trained to translate all conversations between the interrogator and the detainee verbatim.

Question 8: What additional comment on improving training would you add?

Subject 1 brought out a new technique of hypnosis as a possible area that should be considered. He/she also discusses the importance of a selection process for interrogators. Recommendations were made in Chapter Five regarding selection of interrogators. The two core issues of selection for Subject 1 were age and experience. Both of these areas have been covered above.

It is hard for a soldier who has been in the Army for eight months to understand what is happening on the battlefield. The traditional way for interrogators to gather information is by asking questions that have been provided by his superiors. In today's COE, there is a need for interrogators to understand the overall intelligence picture and what information the tactical commanders need. Having the knowledge of the overall operation and being able to put this into context amplifies the effectiveness of interrogators. This type of operational assessment can only be made by someone who has a coherent understanding of the Army and the way it fights. That person can then understand the current operation and put both the operational need and intelligence requirement together.

Subject 3 suggests that since coalitions work together in almost all operations, there should be coalition training for the interrogation process. School exchanges

between countries should increase, and a cross sharing of information between countries could improve.

Conclusion

This chapter discussed the data given for each question and provided an analysis of the input from Tier I experts. The data reflects an ideal interrogator as someone who has great qualities. Figure 1 is a quick snapshot of what an ideal interrogator may look like.




Figure 1. Example of the Characteristics of an Ideal Interrogator, MAJ Thacker

The next chapter addresses each question and makes recommendations as to what the Army could do in order to improve the effectiveness of interrogations. The focus will be on better training and equipping the future interrogators, so that they have a greater ability to accomplish their mission.

CHAPTER 5

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

Are US interrogation teams properly trained and equipped for the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE)? The research indicates that the US Army can and should improve the training and resourcing for the Army interrogator. During the research phase of this thesis, the thesis author discovered that, since 2001, the Intelligence Center and School has looked very hard for creative ways to modify the interrogation course. The recommendations in this chapter will help the US Army improve the selection, training and equipping of the current and future interrogator.

The thesis author's recommendations should be part of an integrated methodology for training and equipping the interrogation community. It is the authors hope that some of these recommendations will be reviewed by the Intelligence Center's interrogation course directors and incorporated into the selection and training of the future interrogator.

There is always a debate in the Army between how long schooling should be in order to fully train soldiers in their job versus getting soldiers quickly out to the Army for utilization. It is the author's observation that it is always best to fully train a soldier prior to sending him to an operational unit. The data also supports the view of fully training interrogators in all facets of their job that they will be expected to perform. In today's Army, a soldier may deploy shortly after completing the required schooling and should be fully prepared for what the he or she will encounter. The Chief of Staff, Army, General Peter J. Schoomaker, in his address to the US Army Command and General Staff College on 3 April 2006 also has expressed the belief in the importance of fully training the soldier in all tasks required prior to sending the soldier to operational assignments.

The recommendations in this chapter may be controversial. Any area that is considered crucial towards winning wars should be given the proper training dollars and resources for them to be effective. It is the thesis author's intent that this research will help the Army understand the importance of the changes required in the interrogation training.

Recommendations

Selection of Interrogators

Age, military experience, the ability to gain a top secret security clearance, and language aptitude should be the four primary criteria for selection of interrogators. The Intelligence Center and School should develop an assessment and selection board that evaluates all soldiers who desire in becoming interrogators. The board should meet annually to select the appropriate number of interrogators needed for training in the following year. Other boards that support this model are officer's candidate selection board, Special Forces Assessment and Selection, and the Command and General Staff College board (starting with the 1995 year group all majors will attend Intermediate Level Education without a board process). Each of these models understands the annual requirement for training and meets annually to select the appropriate number of soldiers to be trained within the next fiscal year. Interrogators must come from the pool of soldiers that have spent at least four years in another Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) prior to transferring to the Interrogation MOS. New soldiers should not go straight into the Interrogation MOS without first serving in another MOS and experiencing Army life prior to becoming an Interrogator.

Chapter 4 mentioned the need for effective interrogators to understand how the US Army operates. Having at least four years of experience will better prepare the soldier's understanding of Army systems. This experience and associated experience will help the interrogators understand acronyms, terms, and graphics that are all required to be effective interrogators.

As the research showed, age is an important factor during interrogation. Age is one of the components of command presence for the interrogator. Most cultures respect older men versus younger men. If this is true and all accept how important it is for the interrogator to be able to form relationships with the detainee, it is reasonable for age to be a factor in the selection process. The most common answer to what the minimum age should be for interrogators was 25 years old; The thesis author agrees with this based on cultural norms in most societies and the maturity level of most men that age.

Military experience is another component that was revealed as significant during this research project. It is important that the interrogator understand the tactical situation as well as the operational environment. Soldiers who have just enlisted in the Army do not understand the Army system, joint operations, coalition relationships, or interagency coordination enough to understand operations and how they are conducted. Four years of military experience should be the minimum selection criteria for candidates who apply for the interrogation course.

The ability to obtain a top secret security clearance should be mandatory for interrogators. He must have access to classified information, may be required to interrogate high-level detainees, and work with highly classified information databases. Because of these requirements, the need for that level clearance is required. Following

the Assessment and Selection board the candidate must have an interim clearance prior to starting the course.

Language aptitude is important in learning another language. The current US Army interrogator is no longer required to attend the Defense Language Institute. Language should be placed back in the interrogation curriculum (training “pipe line”) in order to make the interrogator more effective in building relationships. I agree with the argument that future conflicts cannot be predicted. If these assumptions are true, they do not nullify the benefit of learning a language described in chapter 4.

The core languages the interrogator should focus on are Arabic, Farsi, Spanish, French, and Chinese. Arabic Farsi, Chinese, and Spanish cover a large portion of the globe in which future conflicts may occur. France colonized most of Africa, is still influential in that part of the world, and French is often the only language common between different African cultures and nation states. Most of the populace throughout the continent of Africa (even though they speak local dialects) can speak and understand French.

Training

Historically, the National Training Centers were focused on combat arms operations (kinetic, force-on-force, symmetric). Logistics, medical, and other combat service support operation were never role-played in their entirety, from the beginning of the operation through the process until the cycle of training is complete. Interrogation should be part of the scenario in our training centers. Capturing detainees who may have information should be part of the scenario. Depending on how effective the interrogators are should determine if important information is revealed by the detainees.

Coalition training is also needed. The US conducts joint and multinational training annually. These exercises should bring together interrogators from different countries in order to compare techniques, training models, and new equipment. This would be a forum to address changes in the field of interrogation and develop coalition relationships for future deployments.

Currently, cultural awareness is included as part of the curriculum in the US Army interrogation course. The Army should develop a cultural training program using the regional studies program at the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) at Fort Bragg, NC. This will better prepare interrogators to understand the historical background and cultural norms required to be effective. The cultural training program should be given a high priority within the interrogation course at the intelligence center, and replicated in all training events.

One of the most frequent conversations interrogators have with detainees is about the Quran. The importance of this document to the Islamic culture cannot be stressed enough. A general class on religion will not prepare and give the tools required for the interrogator to discuss these kinds of issues. Old thinking philosophy taught the soldier not to discuss religion with locals or detainees. The author's belief is that only by understanding the issues that are important to the locals and being able to discuss them will the interrogator ever be truly effective. The cultural training should discuss history, cultural norms, and religion. An additional required reading list should be made for the interrogator.

There is a need for an interrogations manager's course for Military Intelligence officers. To prevent gaps in training and supervising, all leaders need to understand the

process of interrogation, the manuals associated with them, and the legal requirements under the Geneva Conventions. Officers will be overall in charge of interrogations programs and they are currently not trained to work in this field. Subject 6 discussed the importance of the need for this course to bridge the gap that currently exists in the interrogation management process. The data is convincing, and the thesis author agrees with the requirement for a course to train the leaders.

Technology

This research brought to light new equipment that may enhance the effectiveness of US Army interrogators. Some of the equipment the author discusses is the voice stress analyzer, paleographers, video surveillance, listening devices, and biometrics. The need to constantly consider how technology may enhance the effectiveness of interrogation is ongoing. A few pieces of equipment that are practical and are currently available to assist with interrogations need to be acquired and studied. This equipment is currently being used by some of the experts in chapter 3 outside of the military.

Voice stress analyzer is a tool that the US Army should use. This software can be placed into any laptop computer. The training for the user is easy, and can be used in any environment. The language can be changed to reflect any environment that the US might find itself in.

Reliability has been a factor with the voice stress analyzer, but over the past two years the newer software has proven much more reliable. The author recommends an additional effect by using wires (as with a lie detector test) to induce additional stress on the person being questioned.

Paleographers (personnel trained in the operation of lie detector equipment) are very rare in the US Army, and rarely used for interrogations, but often used by the criminal investigation division. The author recommends that a few systems be made available for high value targets that are believed to possess crucial information.

Paleographers are used in agencies outside the military when deemed necessary. Because the US Army does not interrogate American citizens there is no prohibition from using this technique.

Video is a great tool for interrogations. Video enables the interrogator to have a record for future prosecution. Not knowing what may develop, it is important to have a record of the specific words used when the detainee revealed information. Currently there is too much reliability on the interpreter to correctly translate information and intent. By recording the meeting, the interrogator can replay the recording and take additional notes at a later time. Video is also a good technique to evaluate how well the interpreter translates information (evaluation tool).

Video also gives the opportunity to identify detainees. This can be done from pictures, face analysis programs, or to keep on record for future reference. Video should also be used in the detainee holding facilities. The detainee should be isolated in the early portion of the interrogation process, but moved to an integrated facility later on. Security is increased when video is used, but there is an intelligence-gathering opportunity as well. Evaluating detainee behavior is possible through video surveillance. Often the leaders can be identified by how other detainees react to them within the holding facility.

Listening devices are tools that assist the interrogator gather information that can be used against the detainee. Hidden listening devices should be placed in the

interrogation rooms as well as the holding areas of detainees. The purpose of listening devices in the interrogation room is to be able to leave one or more detainees in a room that has audio/video surveillance to monitor them in between interrogations. Hidden devices in general holding cells can record conversations the detainees are having with each other. Little pieces of information such as family names, personal feelings, etc., are all important in trying to get into the mindset of the detainee.

Biometrics is still a new technology. US interrogators should ensure all detainees have been placed in a biometrics database. All the uses of biometrics are still to be discovered. What should always be done is to use biometrics on all detainees captured and build a database from this information. Technology is available today that can take biometrics signatures and use them as part of a link analysis program.

One of the problems with attempting to track personnel comes from the differences between languages. The Arabic alphabet is different from the Latin-based system that most European languages are based on. The difference creates many spellings for the same name in our databases. That is one reason that personnel slip past databases and security checklists. Biometrics will also help prevent this type of problem.

I recommend that an interrogator be the proponent for the detainee biometrics program and integrating the biometrics into a fusion database (data bases that are combined into one system). The fusion database must be able to link into other military and national databases. Biometrics will need to be added as part of the training model, and integrated into the force as part of the standard equipment issued to interrogation teams. A certification should be created that authorizes interrogators to operate the biometrics system.

Chapter 4 provides a proposed chart that reflects what the data showed to be the ideal interrogator (see figure 1). Since the selection process would need to change from the present recruitment of volunteers, a question is how would the US Army find this type of soldier? The answer will need to come from further research. One idea is to take a soldier, such as a Special Forces soldier, who has sustained injuries that preclude him from being able to perform the mandated Special Forces mission. He already has language proficiency, understands cultures, and can operate in austere environments. There are other soldiers in the Army who fit this model, and would rather feel productive being an interrogator than holding a staff position or working in some other less exciting job. This will require future research in order to fully provide the answer to the selection process for the future interrogator should some of the recommendations made in the paper be implemented.

Throughout this project, additional areas of possible research arose. The thesis author listed a few additional areas in which future research may be warranted. Future research will be necessary in order to continue a process of reform and transformation within the interrogations training, selection, and equipping program.

Proposed Future Research Questions

1. Does research show that there is a difference in the effectiveness between male versus female interrogators?
2. Which methodology of interrogation models is the most effective?
3. What is the difference between mental torture and deception authorized by the Geneva Conventions?

4. Where is the best place in the US Army force structure to place interrogators in order to be most effective?

5. What should the career progression of interrogators look like?

6. How does the US Army retain interrogators who have special training (i.e. incentive pay, promotion, etc.)

Conclusion

Interrogation has been identified by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in a March 2005 testimony to Congress, as one of the key components in uncovering the radical Islamic networks. Because of the significance placed upon interrogation, it is important to further investigate the effectiveness of the interrogation process.

In each conflict, interrogation has played an integral part of gathering information on the battlefield. The current conflicts the US face are no different, and require improved techniques to gather this information.

Since the 1980s interrogation received less emphasis because the Army knew from overhead imagery where large formations of enemy troop concentration were on the battlefield. In the asymmetric battlefield, the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms are not able to identify underground networks. What is needed are skilled, versatile, smart, and savvy interrogators who can gather information from detainees and be able to link the information together in order to create a clear operational picture for the military leaders to base their decisions on.

The challenge for interrogators is to possess the creativeness required to out-think the enemy, but also relate to detainees in order to gather critical information. The last thing the detainee wants to do is to help their captors, but yet a well-trained interrogator

can tear down those barriers. The need for effective interrogators will only increase in the future. Interrogation remains an important part of current and future conflicts. The recommendations in this thesis should be discussed and implemented in order to build the force required to meet the challenges in today's battlefield.

GLOSSARY

AKO- Army Knowledge Online

BCT- Brigade Combat Team

Beretta- A 9 millimeter pistol and common sidearm for officers, machine gunners, and rear-echelon troops

Booth- A cell or tent where an interrogation is conducted

CFLCC- Combined Forces Land Component Command

Chinook- A large, two-rotor-blade helicopter used for troop and equipment transport

COE-Contemporary Operational Environment

DLPT- Defense Language Placement Test

Echo- Slang for interrogator

Facility- Euphemism for the interrogation apparatus at a prison facility

GTMO- Short for Guantànamo Bay, the US naval garrison on Cuba

GWOT- Global War on Terrorism

HUMNINT- Human intelligence

HVT-High value target

ICE- Interrogation control element; the oversight body that organizes and tasks interrogators

IIR- Intelligence information report; highly structured template to report intelligence collected during an interrogation

IMINT- Imagery intelligence

IPB- Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

IRP- Instructor role-player; a schoolhouse term for an interrogation instructor playing a source for training purposes

JIDC- Joint Interrogation Directors Course

JIF- Joint interrogation facility; the part of a POW compound used for questioning prisoners

JIO- Joint Interrogation Operation

Joint Working Group- Oversight committee in charge of the search for “high value” fugitives like Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar

JTF 180- Joint Task Force 180; name of the overall command in charge of operations in Afghanistan from May 2002 onward

LIC- Low Intensity Conflict

M-4- A shortened version of the 5.56 mm M-16 A2 rifle

MI- Military intelligence

MIT- Mobile interrogation team; a small group of 4-6 interrogators, usually led by a warrant officer assisted by a sergeant

MOS- Military Occupational Specialty

MP- Military police

MVT-Medium value target

NCOIC- Noncommissioned officer-in-charge (senior sergeant)

OGA- Other Government Agency

OIC- Officer in charge

OJT- On the Job Training

OPE- Operational Preparation of the Environment

OPS- Operations section

SIGINT- Signal intelligence

SME- Subject matter expert

SSE- Sensitive Site Exploration

Terp- Slang for interpreter

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