

**Army Special Operations Forces and Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) Integration: Something a Joint Task Force Commander Should Consider.**

**A Monograph  
by  
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## Abstract

ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABLE) INTERGRATION: SOMETHING A JOINT TASK FORCE COMMANDER SHOULD CONSIDER BY Major Kevin Henderson, United States Army, 60 pages.

Due to the current and future world events, the United States Armed Forces have to be more flexible, far reaching, and timely to react to or deter conflict. To meet these demands the military must have interoperability, which in this monograph means jointness. This monograph addressed whether it is beneficial in future conflict for a JTF commander to integrate ARSOF with a MEU (SOC). This monograph did not address the current issue of the Marine Corps developing a unit for Special Operations Command (SOCOM). However, this paper explored the possibility of the interoperability of the MEU (SOC), a conventional marine unit, and ARSOF.

Operation Assured Response and Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines were used as case studies. The analysis of the case studies revealed issues of basing, logistics, force protection, MEDEVAC, and mobility. Each issue was addressed with the benefits of integrating ARSOF and a MEU (SOC).

In order to make the recommendations a reality; this monograph concludes there is a need to improve the officer education system, update doctrine, and the MEU (SOC) and ARSOF need interoperability training during the MEU pre-deployment training.

The theme of this monograph was interoperability and timeliness. Today, the U.S. military is deployed worldwide. In order to meet the demands there needs to be an understanding of jointness. One service cannot accomplish all the current missions alone. During planning, staffs and commanders should understand the power and consider utilizing the combined capabilities of ARSOF and the MEU (SOC). This monograph has demonstrated that by using ARSOF and the MEU (SOC), JTF commanders would have more versatility and responsiveness.

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# CHAPTER ONE

## Introduction

Due to the current and future world events, the United States Armed Forces have to be more flexible, far reaching, and timely to react to or deter conflict. To meet these demands the military must have interoperability, which in this monograph means jointness. The Merriam-Webster on-line dictionary defines interoperability as the “ability of a system to use the parts or equipment of another system.”<sup>1</sup> The idea of one system using the parts of another system takes integration, cohesion, and understanding. These elements are essential for the services of the military to understand. Integration of systems must exist to respond to current and future conflict.

An example of fusion is the jointness of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (special operations capable) (MEU (SOC)) and U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF). One might argue that there are documented cases of MEU (SOC) elements functioning with ARSOF. For example, in 1996 the United States European Special Operations Command (SOCEUR) formed a Joint Task Force (JTF) to conduct a Non-Combatant Evacuation (NEO) of the American Embassy in Liberia. This operation used Special Operations Forces and a MEU (SOC). Was this operation actual integration of ARSOF and the MEU (SOC)? Or is this an example of deconfliction? This monograph addressed whether it is beneficial in future conflict for a JTF commander to integrate ARSOF with a MEU (SOC).

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<sup>1</sup> Merriam Webster Dictionary online at <http://www.merriam-webster.com>. Accessed on 02 March 2003.

This monograph did not address the current issue of the Marine Corps developing a unit for Special Operations Command (SOCOM). The new Marine unit begins training in June 2004. However, this paper explored the possibility of the interoperability of the MEU (SOC), a conventional marine unit, and ARSOF.

Today, MEU (SOC)'s and ARSOF deploy all over the world. In order to meet the demands of our nation the military is demonstrating an understanding of jointness. One service cannot accomplish all the current missions. For example, foreign internal defense (FID) was primarily tasked to SOF, even though the U.S. Marines have been doing it since their inception. Today Marine and Army conventional units are conducting FID throughout the world. Examples of this exist in Iraq and the Republic of Georgia.<sup>2</sup> This break down of parochialism is an example of services working together to meet the demands of current conflicts. This monograph explored whether the MEU (SOC) and ARSOF, under a single headquarter can have synergy, economy of force and unity of effort, to meet crisis action response.

## **Conflict**

As the 21<sup>st</sup> century progresses, the nature of conflict is changing. The end of the cold war has changed the face of the world and conflict. During the cold war, the enemies were more identifiable. After the end of the cold war, smaller wars threatened the United States' interests and the security of the homeland. This section explored different theories as to why the world is

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<sup>2</sup> United States Marines are training Georgian troops in the Republic of Georgia as part of the Georgian Train and Equip Program. Justin M. Colvin, "Foreign Weapons Training Prepares Marines for Georgia Deployment," (MCAS Cherry Point: 31 July 03), online at <http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf/0/F8C6E8EF9A760EE185256D7A006251AE?opendocument>. Accessed on 02 March 2004. The U.S. Army 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division is training Iraqi security officers in Iraq. Chad D. Wilkerson, "Task Force 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division Prepares Iraqis for Embassy Security Duties," (Baghdad Iraq, 2003), online at [http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews/Stories/01\\_10.htm](http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews/Stories/01_10.htm). Accessed on 02 March 2004.

in such turmoil. It has also explored why the US military is deployed worldwide in many different countries. To understand today's world situation one must understand the effects of globalization, the end of the cold war, the information revolution, and population growth.

According to Globalist Muqtedar Khan, globalization is a phenomenon that manifests the complex interconnectedness of human life around the world. This interconnectedness is becoming the dominant characteristic of our political, cultural, economic, and natural environment. The two key engines of globalization are the technology revolution and the politico-economic liberalization.<sup>3</sup> The new environment of liberalization has made it easier, with the help of technologies, to move people, ideas, capital, and goods quickly across borders.<sup>4</sup>

The end of the cold war has had an enormous effect on the world. One effect is the rise of intrastate conflict over interstate conflict. During the cold war, interstate conflict was the most prevalent type of conflict. To gain advantage over the other, the U.S. or the USSR backed these conflicts.<sup>5</sup> It seemed the two superpowers had an orderly effect on the world's stability by quelling or ignoring conflict as needed. These intrastate conflicts were very dangerous to the strategic setting for national powers. The major causes of intrastate conflict were failed states, multinational states, and new ideologies. As a RAND study points out, "This [end of support] results in anarchy, lawlessness, and warlordism, factors that often bring about mass violations of

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<sup>3</sup> Muqtedar Khan, "Teaching Globalization" (28 August 2003), online at <http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/define/2003/0828teaching.htm>. Accessed on 30 December 2003.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> According to Ronald Powaski the cold war was a struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union (the super powers) for global influence. Both countries employed a variety of methods to (indirectly) attack each other's homeland. The methods employed were creating rival alliances, the extension of military and economic aid to states, an arms race, propaganda campaigns, espionage, guerrilla warfare, counterinsurgency warfare and political assassination. Ronald E. Powaski, *The Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), ix.

human rights, interminable low-level violence between armed gangs, and large refugee flows into neighboring countries.”<sup>6</sup>

According to Robert Kaplan, traveling correspondent for the *Atlantic Monthly* and author, the future of conflict mirrors the turmoil in Western Africa. In his book, The Coming of Anarchy, Kaplan explains, “West Africa is becoming the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and societal stress, in which criminal anarchy is emerging as the real strategic danger.”<sup>7</sup> An assumption derived from this theory is that more conflicts will present themselves throughout the world, but on a smaller scale.

According to Kaplan, “disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarce resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nation states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels are now most demonstrated through a West African prism.”<sup>8</sup>

There are common trends in world problems since the end of the Cold War. The trends are culture clashes, new ideology, refugee problems, slum like conditions, and the uneducated staging military coups ruling under harsh law. Since the end of the Cold War, the world is increasingly unbalanced and unpredictable. According to the Institute for International Mediation and Conflict Resolution there were 26 high intensity conflicts, 78 low intensity conflicts and 89 violent political conflicts in 2002.<sup>9</sup> Today each conflict is unique, but each illustrates at least one of the trends identified. The world is unstable and due to the growing world trade, globalization,

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<sup>6</sup> James A. Winnefeld et.al., *Intervention in Intrastate Conflict: Implications for the Army in the Post-Cold War Era* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1995, MR-554/1-A), 13.

<sup>7</sup> Robert D.Kaplan, *The Coming of Anarchy* (New York: Random House, 2000), 7.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Institute for International Mediation and Conflict Resolution conflict map online at [www.iimcr.org/info/conflictmap.asp](http://www.iimcr.org/info/conflictmap.asp). Accessed 30 December 2003. High intensity conflict is defined as a large scale armed conflict that caused more than 1,000 deaths from mid 1999 to mid 2000. Low intensity

and the technological revolution; the Western World to include the United States has interests and responsibilities throughout the world. This means that the United States has obligations to protect itself, its allies, and perform humanitarian roles throughout the globe.

In the Forward of the September 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, President Bush defines the responsibilities the U.S. has to the world. These responsibilities relate directly to how the military will respond to the demands. President George W. Bush maintains that people everywhere want to be able to speak freely; choose who will govern them; worship as they please; educate their children regardless of gender; own property; and enjoy the benefits of their labor. The President feels that these rights are for every person in the world and that the duty of protecting these rights “is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages.”<sup>10</sup> The President goes on to say that the first and foremost job of the Federal Government is to protect our nation against its enemies.

One such threat is that of terrorism. The President said that the war against terrorism is a “global enterprise of uncertain duration.”<sup>11</sup> The president went on to say that “freedom is the non-negotiable demand of human dignity; the birthright of every person- in every civilization”. He finally stated; “The United States welcomes the responsibility of leading the mission of furthering freedom.” The National Security Strategy calls upon the military to transform in order to focus on the new threat and get away from the cold war era. Therefore, the military must transform maneuver and expeditionary forces.<sup>12</sup>

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conflict is defined as armed conflict that caused 100 - 1,000 deaths from mid 1999 to mid 2000. Violent political conflict is defined as armed conflict that caused less than 100 deaths from mid 1999 to mid 2000.

<sup>10</sup>Office of the President, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America September 2002*. (Washington D.C. The White House, September 2002), 1.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 29.

The Department of Defense (DoD) white paper entitled *An Evolving Joint perspective: U.S. Joint warfare and Crisis Resolution In the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* explains that the defense strategy of the United States guides the evolution of U.S. joint warfare and crisis resolution by operational themes to maintain U.S. military preeminence in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. Two of the operational themes are:

- a. Ability to project a smaller, but more capable joint force over a relatively short period.
- b. Tailored combat forces that are joint and expeditionary in character, rapidly deployable and immediately employable from a forward posture to assure US allies and partners, or dissuade, deter, or defeat an adversary when necessary.<sup>13</sup>

To meet the evolving nature of conflict, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Peter Schoomaker, is changing the task organization and mindset of the Army. In General Shoomaker's white paper *Relevant and Ready the Way Ahead*, the Army CSA outlines what the US Army needs to strive for the present and future. The CSA states:

“In order to prosecute the Global war on terrorism (GWOT) and ensure our Nation's security, the Army must provide the Joint Force with relevant and ready capabilities and forces to support the National Security and Defense Strategies- a campaign- quality army with a Joint and Expeditionary mindset.”<sup>14</sup>

The Army CSA is determined to meet the future threat by maintaining a Joint Forward Presence, ready at all times. General Schoomaker understands, like Robert Kaplan, that, “there is an importance for a lean mobile military force that conflates the traditional categories of police

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<sup>13</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Requirements Oversight Council, *An Evolving Perspective: U.S. Joint Warfare and Crisis Resolution In the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, 28 January 2003, online at [http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jwcr\\_screen.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jwcr_screen.pdf). Accessed on 15 November 2003.

<sup>14</sup> Department of the Army, *The Way Ahead, Relevant & Ready*, (Washington, D.C.: Army Strategic Communications, 2003), online at <http://www.army.mil/thewayahead/foreward.html>, Accessed on 30 December 2003.

officer, commando, emergency relief specialists, diplomat, and intelligence officer.”<sup>15</sup> The U.S. will continue to reach out to conflicted countries to spread democracy and peace, and to protect its homeland and interests abroad.

Currently the United States is taking the lead on the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Timely operational reach is essential for these endeavors. To do this, the Department of Defense (DoD) wants the military to be more joint, expeditionary, and forward deployed.

To fulfill crisis action plans the regional combatant commander will place Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters to command and control elements in particular areas. During crisis action execution, the JTF commander must task organize to accomplish his mission. Included in this task organization are Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) Headquarters. This headquarters and its combat power can perform many different missions for the JTF commander, from Foreign Internal Defense (FID) to unconventional warfare (UW).

The operations in Afghanistan represent a possible model in low intensity conflict (LIC) for the future. The U.S. military model of operations in Afghanistan has conventional forces integrated with ARSOF under the control of the JSOTF commander. In crisis action there may not be time to get conventional forces into the particular area of operations to assist. To meet this time factor, JTF commanders can task organize different services to augment ARSOF with combat power. One of these conventional units is the MEU (SOC). The MEU (SOC) is not a Special Operations Force; it is a conventional force that has specified capabilities. This paper explored whether or not it is beneficial for a JTF commander (CJTF), in certain situations, to

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<sup>15</sup> Kaplan, *The Coming of Anarchy*, 106.

utilize a MEU (SOC) to fill voids when task organizing Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) and conventional forces for a crisis action plan.

## CHAPTER TWO

### MEU (SOC) and ARSOF Capabilities

#### Introduction

President George W. Bush wants U.S. military forces to have the capability of timely force projection. DoD is transforming the joint military force to be expeditionary, light and lethal. For the Army to fit into the joint picture, the CSA wants the Army to be light, lethal, have an expeditionary mindset, and be positioned forward. The Marines are an expeditionary force and bring many capabilities to a theater of operation. A combination of a Marine Force and ARSOF may create a joint team that will have interoperability, sustainability, and the ability to meet the current and future conflict. To understand the elements of the joint team this chapter explored task organizations, functions and capabilities of a JTF, JSOTF, ARSOF, and the MEU (SOC).

#### Joint Task Force

A Joint Task Force (JTF) is an operational level headquarters activated or created to accomplish specific missions. A JTF is established on a geographical area or functional basis when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics.<sup>16</sup> The JTF headquarters is a joint force and established only by the Secretary of Defense, the commander of a combatant command, subordinate unified command, or existing

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<sup>16</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Publication 5-00.2, Doctrine for Joint Task Force Guidance and Procedure* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 13 January 1999), I-1.

JTF.<sup>17</sup> In most cases, according to JP 5-00.2, the JTF establishing authority will be a combatant commander. Doctrine calls for the assigned JTF mission to require responsibilities involving a significant and integrated joint force. The execution of this integrated joint force may “involve air, land, sea, space, and special operations in any combination, executed unilaterally or in cooperation with friendly nations.”<sup>18</sup>

A Joint Task Force task organization is tailored to fit the mission. It employs across the range of military operation in all environments. The staffing will vary based on mission, environment, potential enemy forces, and the time available to reach the desired end state.<sup>19</sup> To accomplish the mission, the Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF) will task organize the JTF based on vision, concept of operation, unity of effort, optimization of centralized planning, and maximization of decentralized execution.<sup>20</sup>

The commander also considers basing of the JTF. Considerations for basing are mission, operational environment, available capabilities, and support. The JTF commander decides between four basing options: (1) Land-based (2) initially land based and then moves afloat (3) sea based (4) initially sea based then transitions to a land-based staff.<sup>21</sup>

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
<sup>17</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 10 September 2001), II-14.

<sup>18</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 5-00.2, Doctrine for Joint Task Force Guidance and Procedure* (13 January 1999), I-1.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, I-3.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, II-1.

<sup>21</sup> *Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations*. (10 September, 2001), II-14.



**Figure 1 Possible Joint Task Force Task Organization<sup>22</sup>**

The JTF consists of service components and functional components. The service components consist of the Service Component Commander and all service forces that are assigned to the task force (i.e. Army forces, Naval forces, Air Force forces, and Marine Corps forces).<sup>23</sup> These forces are necessary for administrative, logistic support, and training responsibilities. The CJTF has the authority to create functional component commands to control military operations.

CJTF creates functional component commands to control military operations. Functional component commands are appropriate when forces from two or more military departments are utilized to accomplish a mission. “The CJTF will designate the military capability that will be

<sup>22</sup> *Joint Publication 5-00.2, Doctrine for Joint Task Force Guidance and Procedure, III-2.*

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, II-16. The Theater Special Operations Command can also be a service component command.

made available for tasking by the functional component commander and the appropriate command relationships the functional component commander will exercise.”<sup>24</sup>

## **Joint Special Operations Task Force**

Each geographical combatant commander has a Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) within the command. This TSOC is responsible for advising the combatant commander on the proper employment of SOF and normally exercises OPCON<sup>25</sup> of all assigned and attached SOF in theater. When a JTF is developed, the combatant commander can designate the TSOC as the Joint Forces Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC).<sup>26</sup> The JFSOCC can act as the JSOTF, or can create a JSOTF around an already established unit such as a Special Forces Group. The TSOC can also form an ad hoc JSOTF with augmentation such as the combined joint special operations task force in Afghanistan. The JSOTF is as a functional command component created to execute a specific special operations mission or campaign.<sup>27</sup> The JSOTF is responsible for the planning, coordination, and execution of SOF missions in the Joint Operational Area (JOA). Its primary utility is in its flexibility in size and composition. The JSOTF is task organized with SOF elements from other services and can have conventional non-special operations units assigned or attached.<sup>28</sup> In figure 2, the TSOC is displayed as a component command which provides a JFSOCC as a functional command.

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. (JP 1-02).

<sup>26</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operation* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 17 December, 2003), III-4.

<sup>27</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication, The Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 16 July 1997), 426.

<sup>28</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 12 April 2001), 230.





Figure 2 Special Operations Force Command and Control (C2) in Theater<sup>29</sup>

**ARSOF**

United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). USASOC is responsible for the training and readiness of SF, 75<sup>th</sup> Ranger Regiment, 160<sup>th</sup> Special Operation Aviation Regiment (SOAR), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), and Civil Affairs (CA). The USASOC commander exercises command of active and United States Army Reserves (USAR) SOF based in the continental United States. The mission tasking process for ARSOF begins with a combatant commander request of forces through the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS). The request continues to USSOCOM passed onto USASOC. The USASOC commander decides which forces

<sup>29</sup> Joint Publication 3-05, Joint Special Operations, III-5.

to allocate to the geographic combatant commander, which are normally OPCON to the Regional Combatant Commander through the TSOC.<sup>30</sup>



**Figure 3 Command and Control of ARSOF<sup>31</sup>**

By doctrine, ARSOF performs seven-principle missions: unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), direct action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR), combating terrorism (CBT), counter proliferation (CP), and information operations (IO).<sup>32</sup>

The Special Forces Group (Airborne) (SFG (A)) is a versatile and flexible organization that “plans, conducts, and supports special operations activities in any operational environment across the full spectrum of conflict.”<sup>33</sup> There are currently five active duty SFG (A) and two National Guard SFG (A)’s in the U.S. Army. The active duty groups are regionally oriented

<sup>30</sup> Department of the Army. *Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces Operation*, (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 26 June 2001), IV-1. The Army Staff reviews the request of forces for any Title 10, United States Code responsibilities, such as mobilization of National Guard or Reserve components.

<sup>31</sup> United States Special Operations Command, *United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement 2003-2004*, online at <http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/solic>. Accessed on 10 January 2004.

<sup>32</sup> *Field Manual 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations* (26 June 2001), summarized from II-21-II-24.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, II-1.

along the geographical unified commands and the National Guard groups are aligned with a respective active duty group.

The SFG (A) is similar to a conventional brigade or regiment of the conventional Army. The SFG (A) is commanded by a colonel and contains a Headquarters Company (HHC), Group Support Company (GSC) and three Special Forces Battalions. The headquarters provides the administration, staff, and special staff for the group and the GSC provides the signal, intelligence, and combat service support (CSS). When deployed into a theater the SF Group Headquarters can function as a JSOTF.<sup>34</sup>

The backbone of Special Forces is the Operational Detachment Alpha (SFODA). Doctrinally, this is a twelve-man team organized to equip, train, advise, or direct, and support indigenous military or paramilitary forces engaged in UW or FID activities. Using its capabilities, the SFODA also performs other SF missions and collateral activities.

A captain commands the SFODA, the assistant detachment commander is a warrant officer and the operations NCO is a master sergeant. Each position on the team is broken down into functional areas. The four primary functional areas of a Special Forces Non Commissioned Officer are Weapons, Communications, Engineering, and Medical. There are two specialists in each functional area on the team to make the team more versatile in split team operations. Each soldier goes through specialized training in one or more of the areas.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> The SF Group performs the duties of a JSOTF with augmentation from other services provided by the TSOC.

<sup>35</sup> Special Forces structure and capabilities were summarized from *Field Manuel 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations*, III-1-29.



**Figure 4 Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha<sup>36</sup>**

The Army Civil Affairs and Psychological operations Command (USACAPOC) is the headquarters of all CONUS based CA and PSYOP operational units. About 96 percent of USACAPOC elements are Army reserve. The active duty units consist of one PSYOP Group of six battalions and one Civil Affairs battalion.<sup>37</sup>

Civil Affairs, Psychological Groups, and Battalions are designed like the SFG (A). CA and PSYOP elements operate in small teams (4-6 personnel). These teams, like the SFODA are the backbone of the organization. CA and PSYOP personnel are trained in a foreign language, possess cultural expertise, and are geographically aligned with a combatant command.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., III-26.

<sup>37</sup> *United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement 2003-2004*, online at <http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/solic>. Accessed on 10 January 2004.

CA provides the coordination with civil authorities and civilian population. They provide support activities for SOF and conventional forces and are capable of assisting the supporting the civil administration within the area of operation (AO).<sup>38</sup> U.S. military psychological operations objective is to convince the target audiences to take favorable actions toward the United States and its allies. PSYOP provides the means to employ a non-lethal capability across the range of military operations.<sup>39</sup>

The 160<sup>th</sup> SOAR(A) is the Army's special operations aviation unit . The 160<sup>th</sup> SOAR(A) provides support to SOF worldwide. The headquarters is located at Fort Campbell with elements stationed throughout the world. The 160<sup>th</sup> SOAR (A) provides SOF with precision rotary wing operations, long-range infiltration and exfiltrations, long-range precision attacks, rotary wing, foreign internal defense, and personnel recovery.<sup>40</sup>

## **MEU (SOC)**

The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is task organized and tailored by mission and for rapid deployment by air or sea.<sup>41</sup> The MAGTF may task organize into the following four forces: Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), the (MEU (SOC)) and the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF). The MEF is utilized in large-scale operations and is commanded by a Lieutenant General. The MEB is a mid-sized MEF with 20,000 marines and commanded by a Brigadier General. The Marines

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<sup>38</sup> Department of the Army, *Field Manuel 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington D.C.:US Government Printing Office, 14 Feb 2000), chapter II.

<sup>39</sup> Department of the Army, *Field Manuel 3-05.30 Psychological Operations* (Washington D.C.:US Government Printing Office, 19 June 2000), Chapter I.

<sup>40</sup> *United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement 2003-2004*, online at <http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/solic>. Accessed on 10 January 2004.

specifically design the SPMAGTF for missions, operations or regionally focused exercises.<sup>42</sup> The fourth type of unit is the MEU (SOC). The United States Marine Corps (USMC) has constructed a maritime special operations capability within their smallest unit, the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).<sup>43</sup>

The MEU (SOC) is a task organized, forward deployed MAGTF commanded by a colonel. It is not a special operations force by general definition and the Marines do not give it the primary mission of conducting special operations. The MEU (SOC) is a Marine Expeditionary Unit that has enhanced training and additional equipment that achieves the capabilities to accomplish selective maritime special operations. These certain missions include reconnaissance and surveillance; special demolitions; tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel; seizure/recovery of off shore energy facilities; seizure recovery of selected personnel or material; visit board, search and seizure of vessels; and in extremis, hostage recovery.<sup>44</sup>

The MEU (SOC) is normally embarked on three ships of an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG).<sup>45</sup> By Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-0, a MEU (SOC) operates continuously in the Mediterranean Sea, the western Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean or Arabian Gulf Region.<sup>46</sup> There are six MEUs that are capable of becoming a MEU (SOC). Three of the MEU's are stationed at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina and operate within the U.S. Marine

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<sup>41</sup> The Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) are combines arms forces consisting of ground, air, and combat support elements under the command and control of a single Marine commander. See the Glossary for full definition.

<sup>42</sup> United States Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Concepts and Programs*, online at <http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/p&r/concepts/2003/pdf>. Accessed on 22 November 2003.

<sup>43</sup> H.T. Hayden, *Shadow War*, (Vista CA, Pacific Aero Press: 1992), 31.

<sup>44</sup> Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0, Marine Corps Operations* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 27 September 2001), 3-18.

<sup>45</sup> Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Order 3120.9B, Policy for Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable (MEU (SOC))*(Washington D.C.: 25 September 2001),10.

Corps Forces Atlantic, Europe, and South. Three other MEUs are located at Camp Pendleton, California and operate within the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, Central Command, and Korea.<sup>47</sup> For a MEU to be certified as a MEU (SOC) it has to go through an extensive pre-deployment training program (PTP).<sup>48</sup>

The PTP is a focused and standardized 26-week training program with the objective of obtaining the operational capabilities required for the MEU to be certified as a MEU (SOC). The MEU commander conducts the evaluation and certification of the MEU (SOC). The supported Geographical Combatant Commander's Marine Component Commander receives guidance concerning unique theater requirements. This guidance is passed to the USMC Component Commander of the Supporting Unified Combatant Commander who provides the MEU; to the MEF Commander; and subsequently to the respective MEU Commander, who then develops the MEU Mission Training Plan (MTP).<sup>49</sup> This capability is nested into the combatant commanders' span of control. The forward deployed MEU (SOC) is trained and equipped to provide the Naval or Joint Force commander with an expeditionary force that is inherently balanced, sustainable, flexible, responsive, expandable, and credible.<sup>50</sup>

The MEU (SOC) mission is to provide a forward deployed, flexible sea-based MAGTF capable of rapidly executing Amphibious Operations, designated maritime special operations,

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<sup>46</sup> United States Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-0, Marine Corps Operations* (27 September 2001), 3-18.

<sup>47</sup> United States Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Concepts and Programs*, online at <http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/p&r/concepts/2003/pdf.192-193>. Accessed on 22 November 2003.

<sup>48</sup> Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Order 3502.3A. Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) pre-deployment training program (MEU (SOC) PTP)* (10 January 2001), online at <http://216.239.39.104/search?cache:Ev-F2W26ibUJ:www.usmc.mil/directiv.nsf/c535c102fact2e4748525651700581759/e366e99b834a5fd185256aa800>. Accessed on 30 December 2003.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

military operations other than war (MOOTW), and supporting operations to include enabling the introduction of follow-on-forces.<sup>51</sup>

The MEU (SOC) has five core capabilities and 23 mission essential tasks. These capabilities and mission essential tasks are trained and evaluated during the PTP. The MEU (SOC) must demonstrate that it can perform the core capabilities and essential tasks before it can embark into an AOR. The core capabilities are amphibious operations, maritime special operations, military operations other than war (MOOTW), and supporting operations. The mission essential tasks are:

- amphibious assault
- amphibious raid
- amphibious demonstration
- amphibious withdrawal
- direct action Operations
- tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP)
- security operations (SO)
- humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR)
- noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO)
- peace operations
- provide command, control, communications, and computers (C4)
- fire support planning, coordination and control in a joint/combined environment
- limited expeditionary airfield operations
- terminal guidance operations
- enhanced urban operations
- enabling operations
- airfield/port seizure
- employ non-lethal weapons
- tactical deception operations
- information operations
- intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR)
- anti-terrorism
- rapid response planning process (R2P2)<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> *Marine Corps Order 3120.9B. Policy for Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable (MEU (SOC)),10.*

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-5.

The MEU (SOC) is embarked aboard three ships of an amphibious readiness group (ARG) and is positioned for the purpose of providing the fleet commander with a force capable of timely response to a variety of contingencies. In order to meet these contingencies the MEU (SOC) contains a command element (CE); a ground combat element (GCE) comprised of a reinforced infantry battalion (BN); an aviation combat element (ACE) which is comprised of a reinforced helicopter squadron ; and a combat service support element (MEU service Support Group (MSSG))<sup>53</sup> The structure and organization is displayed in figure 5.

MEU(SOC) Structure and Organization			
Command Element (CE)	Ground Combat Element (GCE)	Aviation Combat Element (ACE)	MEU Service Support Group (MSSG)
MEU(SOC) Command and Control is provided by the command element	The GCE is structured around a reinforced infantry BN.	The ACE is a composite helicopter squadron	The MSSG provides the following:
Approximately 169 personnel: USMC 25 OFF and 140 ENL USN: 1 OFF and 3 ENL	Approximately 1200 personnel: USMC 59 OFF and 1086 ENL USN: 3 OFF and 50 ENL	Approximately 417 personnel USMC: 75 OFF 337 ENL USN: 1 OFF 4 ENL	Approximately 275 personnel USMC 15 OFF and 235 ENL USN: 3 OFF and 22 ENL
MEU(SOC) Commander and Staff	H&S Company	Medium Helicopter Squadron <u>Det.</u>	Headquarters and Service Platoon
Force Reconnaissance <u>Det.</u>	Rifle Company X3	Heavy Helicopter Squadron	Communications <u>Det.</u>
Force Imagery Interpreter Unit <u>Det.</u>	Weapons Company	Light Attack Helicopter Squadron	Maintenance <u>Det.</u>
Counterintelligence Team	Tank Platoon	Marine Attack Squadron <u>Det.</u>	Supply <u>Det.</u>
Topographical Platoon <u>Det.</u>	Artillery Battery	Marine Refueler/Transportation Squadron <u>Det.</u>	Landing Support BN <u>Det.</u>
Radio BN <u>Det.</u>	LAR Platoon/ Company	Marine Air Control Group <u>Det.</u>	Medical/Dental <u>Det.</u>
Communication BN <u>Det.</u>	Shore Fire Control Company	Marine Wing Support Squadron <u>Det.</u>	Engineer Support Battalion <u>Det.</u>
Universal Spotter <u>Det.</u>	Combat Engineer Platoon	Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron <u>Det.</u>	Motor Transportation Battalion <u>Det.</u>
	Reconnaissance Platoon		
	Assault Amphibian Vehicle Platoon		
	Scout Sniper Platoon		

**Figure 5 MEU (SOC) Organization<sup>54</sup>**

Figure 6 is taken directly from Marine Corps Order (MCO) 3120.9B which displays the equipment that is inherent to a standard MEU (SOC). According to the MCO 3120.9B, the 31<sup>st</sup> MEU does not embark tanks.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 10-15.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

MAJOR END ITEMS (For a notional MEU (SOC))			
CE	BLT	ACE	MSSG
(1) MEWSS	(7) LAVs	(12) CH-46Es	ROWPUs
(14) HMMWVs	(15) AAVs	(4) CH-53Es	(5) Refuelers
(6) CRRCs	* (4) Tanks	(4) AH-1Ws	(1) M88A1
JTF Enabler	(6) M198s	(2-3) UH-1Ns	(18) 5-Ton
	(20) CRRCs	(6) AV-8Bs	(1) AAVR7
	(15) 5-Ton Trucks	KC-130's (OPCON)	(18) HMMWVs
	(8) 81MMs		(2) ACE
	(8) TOW Launchers	(2) Avengers	(1) D-7
	(64) HMMWVs	(3) Stinger Trms	(1) SEE Tractor
	(7) IFAVs	HMMWVs	

**Figure 6 MEU (SOC) Assets<sup>55</sup>**

The MEU (SOC) is a very versatile force. According to the MCO 3120.9B dated Sept 2001, “The MEU (SOC) is task organized and trained to operate with SOF as mission requirements dictate. This interoperability may be in the role of a supporting force, or as the supported force if directed by the CJTF employing the force.”<sup>56</sup>

The MEU (SOC), by Marine regulations, is a force that is flexible to the regional combatant commander. This force is trained under the Marine Corps on land. The MEU (SOC), when embarked, is OPCON to the combatant commander through the Naval Component commander. Unless otherwise directed by the supported unified combatant commander, the U.S. Navy component commander normally exercises OPCON of the MEU (SOC) through the numbered fleet commander for exercises, contingency employment, anti-terrorism/force protection, and redeployment. This gives the combatant commander flexibility in the command and control of the MEU (SOC) throughout the theater. The combatant commander can OPCON the MEU (SOC) to a JTF. MCO 3120 states, “The [MEU (SOC)] Commander may be designated

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 7.

as the commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF), a separate USMC component commander within a joint force, or a functional component commander. The MEU (SOC) commander can be directed to report to a Joint Forces Commander, another Service component commander or a functional Component commander, OPCON, TACON or Support for the conduct of an exercise/operation.”<sup>57</sup> Marine Corps doctrine gives the command and control of the MEU (SOC) flexibility that allows the marine unit to be integrated with SOF forces.

As described in this chapter, the capabilities of the MEU (SOC) and ARSOF are suited for interoperability. The command and control of a joint force is flexible and allows forces to work under one headquarters toward a common goal. The MEU (SOC) and ARSOF are flexible units. This chapter addressed how doctrine explains joint command and control functions, how ARSOF and the MEU (SOC) are deployed, and how each force is utilized. This doctrinal base provides a key aspect to analyzing the opportunities that may be present in the future to integrate the MEU (SOC) and ARSOF.

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

## CHAPTER THREE

### Case Studies

#### Operation Assured Response

In late March 1996, violence broke out between two rival factions in Liberia, Africa. The United Nations observers and the Economic Community of West African States Cease Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) were unable to settle the unrest. In early April, the fighting had spread to the capitol city of Monrovia. Over a four-day period an estimated 10,000 Liberians surrounded the U.S. Embassy. The U.S. Ambassador felt the situation untenable and requested more forces to secure the American Embassy.<sup>58</sup>

On 7 April 1996, the National Command Authority alerted the United States Commander In Chief Europe (USCINCEUR) to prepare for the evacuation of noncombatants in Liberia. USCINCEUR directed SOCEUR to establish JTF Assured Response (JTF AR) and conduct the noncombatant evacuation (NEO).

At the time of the request for more security in Liberia, SOCEUR was heavily involved in other operations. The headquarters and assigned forces of SOCEUR were conducting operations in Bosnia- Herzegovina and recovery operations of personnel, to include Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown, killed in an Air Force CT-43 crash in Dubrovnik, Croatia.<sup>59</sup>


Upon notification, SOCEUR formed JTF Assured Response with the following elements: 1/10<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group (Airborne) (SFG (A)), Naval Special Warfare Unit 2 (NSWU-2), the

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<sup>58</sup> Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-05.104, Army Special Operations Forces Noncombatant Evacuation Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 2004), A-2.

<sup>59</sup> "The History of the 10<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group (Airborne)," online at <http://www.soc.mil/SF/history.txt>. Accessed on 16 March 2004.

352<sup>nd</sup> Special Operations Group (SOG), 160<sup>th</sup> Special Operations Regiment, and the 3-325 IN from Southern European Task Force (SETAF).<sup>60</sup>



**Figure 7 Force Structure of JTF Assured Response<sup>61</sup>**

The mission of the JTF AR was to conduct a NEO to protect the lives of American citizens, and designate third country and host country nationals. The operational objectives were to enhance the security of the Embassy, maintain accountability of evacuees, and to conduct the NEO as quickly as possible.<sup>62</sup>

To meet the operational objectives JTF AR sent a USEUCOM Survey/Assessment Team (ESAT) and a U.S. Naval Sea, Air and Land (SEAL)<sup>63</sup> element to the Initial Staging Base (ISB).

<sup>60</sup> John Partin and Rob Rhoden, *Operation Assured Response: SOCEUR's NEO in Liberia April 1996*, (Tampa Florida: Special Operations Command History and Research Office, September 1997), 5.

<sup>61</sup> *Field Manual 3-05.104, Army Special Operations Forces Noncombatant Evacuation Operations* (February 2004), A-2.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>63</sup> See Glossary for the definition

These two elements were on order to infiltrate into the US Embassy in Monrovia. The ESAT was to assess the situation to provide information on viable options for a NEO to CJTF AR. Concurrently the JTF set up an ISB in Freetown Sierra Leone (190 nautical Miles from Monrovia).<sup>64</sup>

Once sufficient forces and assets closed on the ISB, CJTF infiltrated the ESAT with a SEAL platoon to reinforce the security of the US embassy compound. The JTF HQ, the forward operating base (FOB) of 1/10 SFG (A), and the 352<sup>nd</sup> SOW HQ were located at the ISB. Next, the 1/10 SFG (A) moved into the US Embassy in Monrovia to assume the security mission and conduct the evacuation. A JTF command and control cell was co-located with the Evacuation Control Cell (ECC) in the U.S. Embassy Monrovia. A Company from 3-325 Parachute Infantry acted as the quick reaction force (QRF) from the ISB. SOF Rotary wing aircraft transported non-combatants from Monrovia to Freetown where they were transloaded onto SOF fixed-wing aircraft and flown to the designated safe haven of Dakar, Senegal.<sup>65</sup>

From 10-20 April 1996, JTF AR, headed by COMSOCEUR, evacuated 2,126 non-combatants, including 436 Americans. On 20 April 1996, COMSOCEUR turned over command of JTF AR to the commander of Task Force 62. Task Force 62 consisted of a Marine Amphibious Ready Group that deployed the 22<sup>nd</sup> MEU (SOC) from the USS Guam. The MEU (SOC) commander assumed duties as CJTF AR.<sup>66</sup>

Analysis:

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<sup>64</sup> *Field Manual 3-05.104, Army Special Operations Forces Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, A-3.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Global Security Network, "Operation Assured Response," online at [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/assured\\_response.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/assured_response.htm), Accessed on 14 February 2004.

The first step in organizing a JTF is the force structure. According to Joint Publication 3.0, the force structure should give the JTF commander responsiveness and versatility. SOCEUR is a sub-unified command and controls its own ground, air, and maritime assets. This allowed timely alert notifications because these forces work inherently together in the EUCOM Theater of operation. The forces include 1/10<sup>th</sup> SFG (A) and the, Naval Special Warfare Unit-2 (NSWU-2) stationed in Stuttgart, Germany, the 352<sup>nd</sup> SOG based in Mildenhall, UK, and the SOCEUR staff based in Stuttgart Germany. Additionally, two AC 130's from the 16<sup>th</sup> SOW from Hurlburt Field, FL, the 3-160<sup>th</sup> SOAR from Vicenza, Italy, and the 3-325 Parachute Infantry from Vicenza Italy were assigned to the JTF. The United Kingdom agreed to base a naval ship off the coast of Liberia to provide a contingency platform for immediate execution of the NEO.

Another unique aspect of JTF AR was that there was prior planning for the NEO in Liberia. The SOCEUR Integrated Survey Program developed a Liberian NEO plan in 1995. That same year 1/10 SFG (A), 352<sup>nd</sup> SOW, NSWU-2, and 3-325 all developed plans to complement the SOCEUR plan and participated in a SOCEUR “generic” NEO exercise.<sup>67</sup> Because of the force structure of SOCEUR with its air, ground, and maritime assets and the contingency planning, JTF AR had the responsiveness and versatility that JP 3.0 states a JTF should possess.

According to Joint Publication 1, the principles of war provide the basis for the fundamentals of joint warfare. One of the principles is unity of command. Unity of command is defined as all forces operating under a single commander with requisite authority to direct all forces, employed in pursuit of a common purpose.<sup>68</sup> In joint operations, commanders have to rely

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<sup>67</sup> Partin and Rhoden, *Operation Assured Response SOCEUR's NEO in Liberia April 1996*, 5.

<sup>68</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 14 November 2000), Annex B.

on unity of effort. Unity of effort requires coordination through cooperation and requires common interests. A key consideration of unity of effort is the centralized planning and decentralized execution of the operation.

Upon notification by CINCEUR, SOCEUR immediately demonstrated unity of effort. The SOCEUR staff conducted initial planning, which had two courses of action (COA), a 16-hour and 48-hour COA. This involved alerting and moving units immediately. Because SOCEUR was a sub-unified command, they were able to move units that were under OPCON within its command.<sup>69</sup> Time was of the essence, and though SOCEUR was the JTF HQ, they could not control everything and had to rely on the unity of effort of many different organizations. The United Kingdom (UK) demonstrated unity of effort by agreeing to move a naval vessel off the shore of Liberia for a contingency platform for an immediate evacuation of the embassy. Southern European Task Force (SETAF) assisted in deploying troops and assets into the area of operation. SOCEUR had to rely on United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) to assist at the safe haven and ISB for intratheater and intertheater transport of assets and supplies. TRANSCOM deployed a Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR) to the JTF HQ to provide expertise and represent the JTF in TRANSCOM and Air Mobility Command (AMC).<sup>70</sup>

Another example of unity of effort was the efforts of diplomacy. The ambassador plays a key role in NEO operation. The ambassador is responsible for all United States citizens, nationals abroad, and safeguarding their property within their assigned country.<sup>71</sup> It is imperative

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<sup>69</sup> Partin and Rhoden, *Operation Assured Response SOCEUR's NEO in Liberia April 1996*, 6.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 18.

<sup>71</sup> U.S. President, Executive Order, "Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, Executive Order 12656," *Federal Register* 53, no. 228 (23 November 1988), online at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/EO12656.htm>. Accessed on 31 March 04. Another source is U.S. State Department, "Organization and Functions," *Foreign Affairs Manual Volume 1*, online at <http://foia.state.gov/masterdocs/01fam/01m0010.pdf>. Accessed on 30 March 04.

to have unity of effort with the ambassador and the country team. Diplomacy enabled JTF AR to have an ISB and a safe haven in other African countries. This unity of effort with the U.S. State Department was essential to operation Assured Response.

Lines of communication (LOC) are essential to gain operational reach for a joint force. The LOCs for JTF AR were long and required many sorties of different types of aircraft. The forces that formed JTF AR were from the EUCOM AOR and included assets from the continental United States.

One LOC extended from Hurlburt Field, FL that is 4,100 Nautical Miles (NM) from the ISB. Another LOC extended from Europe to the area of operation (AO). The forces from Mildenhall, UK, Stuttgart, Germany, Vicenza and Brindise were all about 3,400 NM from the ISB. The flights skirted the western coast of Africa because over flight rights could not be gained from numerous African countries quickly. The safe haven in Dakar, Senegal was 2,900 NM from the forces in Europe. These LOCs required in-flight refueling for certain essential aircraft.<sup>72</sup>

Within the AO the LOC extended from Monrovia, Liberia to Free Town Sierra Leone (190 NM) and from Freetown to Dakar Senegal (496 NM). To evacuate the personnel out of the embassy, JTF AR used MH-53 and MH-47 helicopters. The flight from the embassy to the ISB took the helicopters one hour and thirty minutes. The evacuees were then transloaded to C-130's and transported to Dakar (two-hour trip). Within 24 hours of notification, JTF AR had the ISB established and by 48 hrs had the initial forces infiltrating into the embassy compound in Monrovia.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Partin and Rhoden, *Operation Assured Response SOCEUR's NEO in Liberia April 1996*, 15-19.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.



**Figure 8 Assured Response Intertheater Line of Communication<sup>74</sup>**

Basing was one of the first concerns for the planners of Operation Assured Response. Because of the situation in Monrovia Liberia, the initial staging base had to be in relatively close proximity to Liberia. There was no time to get over flight privileges from numerous African States.<sup>75</sup> The JTF established the ISB in Freetown, Sierra Leone and Dakar, Senegal as the safe haven. The ISB encompassed the JTF AR staff, QRF, the initial forces to go into Monrovia, the logistics personnel and assets, maintenance crews, and airfield operations personnel and equipment. The total number of personnel in Freetown was 574. The safe haven was set up similarly, containing 628 personnel, and housing many of the fixed wing assets.<sup>76</sup>

Because of the limitations of the infrastructure, the ISB and the safe haven became overcrowded. The housing and Class I supply was an initial problem for the JTF.<sup>77</sup> Air traffic

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., 37.

<sup>75</sup> Center for Army Lessons Learned, *NEO, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CALL), online at <http://www.call.army.mil>. Accessed on 04 February 2004.

<sup>76</sup> Partin and Rhoden, *Operation Assured Response SOCEUR's NEO in Liberia April 1996*, 17.

<sup>77</sup> Class I supply refers to food and water. For the definitions of Classes of supply, see glossary.

control became overwhelming and a request for more air traffic controllers was made to handle the airspace in both locations. The JTF also took responsibility of controlling civilian commercial air of the Freetown airport.

Joint Publication 3.0 addresses the basing of the JTF headquarters. The options run from sea based to land based or a combination of both over time.<sup>78</sup> The JTF HQ was land based 190 NM from Monrovia, Liberia. There was a liaison element forward in the embassy and at the safe haven. Because of the situation in Monrovia and the quick response to the situation, the JTF based itself where it could control the evacuation. Liaisons enabled the JTF commander to have situational awareness of the whole operation. The land basing was the only option because there were no U.S. Naval vessels in the AO. The ARG was heading from the Mediterranean and could not be there in the necessary period. The only sea-based option was with the United Kingdom Naval Vessel, *Gold Rover*.

As part of military operations, one must address support operations to include logistics. The support operations were complex for this contingency operation. The MH-53J Pave Low helicopters were air lifted by C-5 Cargo planes into the ISB because of the distance and the lack of air space rights. The 352<sup>nd</sup> SOG had to do this from two locations. The 352<sup>nd</sup> SOG had helicopter assets deployed in the Balkans and others based Mildenhall, UK. The infrastructure at the ISB (Freetown, Sierra Leone) could not support the unloading of the helicopters out of the C-5s. The 352<sup>nd</sup> SOG had to send support assets (aircraft tugs, maintenance crews, cranes and forklifts) to assemble the helicopters upon arrival at the ISB. The 352<sup>nd</sup> SOG worked the problem and the assets arrived in the correct order.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> *Joint Publication 3.0, Doctrine for Joint Operations*, II-14.

<sup>79</sup> *Field Manual 3-05.104, Army Special Operations Forces Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, A-3

Another aspect of support was flowing classes of supply into the AO. As the ISB grew in size, it became quickly crowded and the JTF reported that “life support” for the arriving units was a problem.<sup>80</sup> There was only four days worth of Class I and living space was crowded. Initially the Class I situation in the embassy was of immediate concern. The embassy required immense amounts of Class I for the forces inside the compound as well as the refugees. The evacuation force had deployed with one day’s worth of water and three days of rations.<sup>81</sup>

The lines of communication ran from England, Italy and Germany to the safe haven in Dakar and the ISB. The extended lines of communication forced the JTF to airlift all assets into the AO. The airflow had to run 24 hours in order to support the personnel, assets, and the evacuees. Repair parts for the support aircraft had to follow the lines of communication and required numerous sorties. Because of the heavy airflow, the JTF requested additional air traffic controllers and additional maintenance crews to maintain 24-hour operations.

Because of the air operation and evacuation procedures at the ISB and the safe haven, many support assets and personnel were required. Because of the requirement and the infrastructure of the ISB, it became crowded and had as many as 574 personnel. The safe haven was similar in structure and limitations. Because it based all of the fix-winged assets, it required 628 personnel.

In crisis action, timeliness is a key factor to the situation. The response by SOCEUR (JTF AR) met the time standard that the situation dictated. SOCEUR received a notification of a possible NEO in Monrovia, Liberia on 6 April 1996. By 7 April, when the ambassador requested more forces, SOCEUR was able to deploy the ESAT and a SEAL element to augment the embassy. SOCEUR from official notification to having forces in the ISB was within a 24-hour

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<sup>80</sup> Partin and Rhoden, *Operation Assured Response SOCEUR’s NEO in Liberia April 1996*, 14.

period. By 8 April 1996, the JTF AR staff, elements from 1/10 SFG (A), air control assets and a MH53J closed on the ISB. On 9 April 1996 a SEAL element, the ESAT moved into the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia. It took 48 hours from official notification to having forces into the embassy.

The next phase was flowing 1/10 SFG (A) into the embassy to augment the security within the embassy and set up the evacuation control center (ECC). On 10 April 1996, elements of 1/10 SFG (A) established additional security and had the ECC operational. In addition, on 10 April, the helicopters from the 3-160<sup>th</sup> SOAR and elements from the 9<sup>th</sup> Psychological Battalion arrived at the ISB. By 19 April 1996, JTF AR had evacuated over 400 American citizens and over 1,700 citizens from other countries.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

<sup>82</sup> *Field Manual 3-05.104, Army Special Operations Forces Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, A-3.

## Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines

Terrorism and insurgent groups have plagued the Philippines for more than one hundred years.<sup>83</sup> In the southern island of Mindanao and the Sulu island chain, southwest of Mindanao, there have been land disputes between Muslims and the catholic majority Government of the Philippines since the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

As part of the Muslim extremist movement, Abu Sayyaf was formed in 1990. This organization received financial support from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.<sup>84</sup> It is believed that Abu Sayyaf had ties to al Qaeda in the early 1990's. Abu Sayyaf's current ties to al Qaeda are disputed. The Philippine Government says that by 1995 the ties were broken when a terrorist plot was uncovered. The Philippine military still believes that the ties are strong.<sup>85</sup>

Through the early 1990's, Abu Sayyaf has staged ambushes, bombings, kidnappings, and executions against Filipino Christians on Basilan Island and the west coast of Mindanao. By 1996, Abu Sayyaf curtailed their acts due to an agreement between the government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The turn of the century brought new violence and criminal activity. In the early part of the year 2000, ABU Sayyaf began kidnapping operations aimed at foreigners, with the aim of extracting ransom payments. Throughout 2000 and 2001, Abu Sayyaf kidnapped many foreigners and Filipinos on Basilan and Mindanao, releasing some and executing others.<sup>86</sup> In September 2001, Philippine President Arroyo deployed over 4,500 troops against

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<sup>83</sup> Larry Nicksch, *Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippines-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation* (Congressional Research Service: 25 January 2002) on line at [www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31265.pdf](http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31265.pdf). Accessed on 03 March 2004

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> Abu Sayyaf was responsible for kidnapping two American Christian Missionaries; Martin and Gracia Burnham in May 2001. This was of national news and in the Spring of 2002, during a rescue

Abu Sayyaf. The operations focused on Jolo and Basilan islands. In December 2001, the AFP estimated the strength of Abu Sayyaf on Basilan Island was below 100.<sup>87</sup>

President Gloria Arroyo was a strong supporter of the United States after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The Philippine President allowed U.S. military forces to use Filipino ports and airfields to support military operations in Afghanistan. President Arroyo defined the national interest “as linking a struggle against international terrorism with the struggle against terrorism within the Philippines.”<sup>88</sup>

On October 2001, the United States sent military observers to the Philippines to assess the situation in the southern region. Earlier in the year, President Bush extended \$93 million in military aid to the Philippines and offered a direct role for U.S. forces in combating Abu Sayyaf. President Arroyo “insisted the U.S. Military role remain advisory and the AFP would retain responsibility.”<sup>89</sup> In January 2002, the United States government would send 650 troops to Mindanao and Basilan islands within 30 days.

United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) formed JTF-510 to conduct the mission. JTF-510 consisted of U.S. Special Forces troops stationed on Okinawa, Japan and at Fort Lewis Washington, U.S. air components from Kadena, Japan, Marines from Hawaii and a naval element from Okinawa. JTF-510 Headquarters consisted of the elements from SOCPAC. The commander of JTF-510 was Air the COMSOCPAC.


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attempt by the Philippine government, Martin Burnham was killed. Summarized from Gracia Burnham and Dean Merrill, *In the Presence of My Enemies* (Wheaton, Illinois: Tyndale House Publishing, 2003), 263.

<sup>87</sup> Larry Nicksch, *Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippines-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation*, 1-5.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*



**Figure 9 JTF-510 Task Organization<sup>90</sup>**

JTF-510's task was to train, advise, and assist the AFP in combating terrorism. Implied tasks were to support humanitarian assistance and provide medical assistance programs (MEDCAP) to assist in fighting terrorism in the SOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) focusing on Basilan Island. The JTF-510 mission statement was:

When directed, JTF-510 conducts military operations to train, advise and assist designated AFP forces to enhance their ability to combat terrorism in SOUTHCOM in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)<sup>91</sup>

JTF-510 set up Forward Operating Base (FOB) on the southern tip of Mindanao Island near Zamboanga City. ARSOF was based on Basilan Island. ARSOF consisted of one FOB, and three AOBs with eleven Special Forces A-teams. ARSOF operated on Mindanao and Basilan Island. U.S. Navy SEALs were OPCON to the NAVFOR and operated out of the FOB in

<sup>90</sup> Special Operations Command Pacific, *JTF-510 Enduring Freedom*, unclassified briefing slides, on line at <http://www.socom.smil/socs-ho/aar11/Counterinsurgency/CHOD.ppt>. Accessed on 26 January 2004.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

Zamboanga City. The III Marine Expeditionary Force Naval Construction Task Group (NCTG) operated on Basilan Island. JTF 510 has been working side-by-side with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) providing advice and assistance to enhance their ability to deal with the terrorist threat in AFP SOUTHCOM's AOR. The Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), MARFOR, NAVFOR staffs were collocated with the JTF HQ. The JSOAC consisted of MC-130, MH-47s helicopters and HH-60 helicopters.

To meet the operational objectives JTF-510 used a counterinsurgency model to complete the mission in four phases. Phase I ran from January 2002 to 31 July 2002 under a training exercise known as Balikatan 2-1.<sup>92</sup> This phase was the training and advising of the AFP forces on Basilan Island in counter insurgency. Simultaneously, humanitarian assistance (HA) projects were executed as part of phase one and the counter insurgency model. The second phase consisted of a medical capability exercise (MEDCAP), which ran for four weeks in August 2002. The third phase lasted from September to November 2002 and focused on HA. The fourth phase focuses on security assistance (SA) and is still on going.

During phase I, ARSOF advised and assisted the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) on counter insurgency operations (COIN) down to the battalion level. ODAs conducted training of AFP forces on Zamboanga Island. The Marine component conducted HA and force protection support during phase I. The AFFOR and Filipino Air Force provided the lift necessary to sustain the U.S. forces throughout all phases. JTF 510 also provided uniforms, weapons, building material and helicopters to the AFP. JTF 510 concentrated the effort in the AFP SOUTHCOM

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<sup>92</sup> The Balikatan training exercise is an annual event aimed at improving Philippine and U.S. combined planning, combat readiness, and interoperability. The exercise also enhances security relations and demonstrates U.S. resolve to support the Republic of the Philippines against external aggression. Global Security Network, "Balikatan, Shouldering the Load Together," on line at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/balikatan.htm>. Accessed on 23 February 2004.

AOR focused on Basilan Island, where the Abu Sayyaf set up a sanctuary in the triple canopy jungle in the middle of the island. The FOB at Edward Evans Air Base near Zamboanga City was the logistical hub within the AO for all operations. All U.S. forces flowed into the FOB before conducting operations.

Phase I of the Balikatan exercise ended July 31, 2002. The MEDCAP, Phase II, began on 01 August and ended in September 2002. With limited advisory personnel, Phase III began in October 2002. This phase enabled the AFP to take over HA operations. The security assistance phase is limited to joint combined training and mobile training teams to continue the training of the AFP.

In October 2001, elements of SOCPAC and 1<sup>st</sup> SFG (A) assessed the situation in the Philippines. In January 2002, JTF-510 began the deployment of 660 troops into Edwin Andrews Air Base (EAAB), Philippines. The forces flowed in over a month's time and by the end of February 2002, the OEF Philippines (OEF-P) was operational. The total force package was about 1,650 U.S. military personnel.<sup>93</sup> Because of concerns that U.S. troops may be involved in direct combat with the Abu Sayyaf, the U.S. Government and the Republic of the Philippines agreed upon a Terms of Reference (TOR). The TOR enforced a U.S. Force CAP of 660 personnel on the ground in Basilan and limited the AFP to 3,800 troops.<sup>94</sup> The TOR also imposed that U.S. Special Forces advisors could only operate at the battalion level or higher.<sup>95</sup>

JTF-510 HQ, with logistical support, was the first element to flow into the AO. The JTF 510 commander wanted to set the conditions for the SFODA before deploying them onto Basilan

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<sup>93</sup> Global Security Network, "Balikatan, Shouldering the Load Together"

<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

<sup>95</sup> COL David Maxwell, "Sun Tzu and Operation Enduring Freedom in Asia: How Would the Great Master Assess It?" unpublished article, 24 February 2004, Fort Leavenworth, KS. COL Maxwell was the 1/1 SFG (A) Commander and acted as the ARSOF commander during OEF-P.

Island. The next unit to flow into the AO was the ARSOTF HQ, 1/1 BN HQ (ARSOTF) and the Special Forces company HQ's (ODB). Once the JTF commander felt that the conditions were set, the SFODAs arrived and employed into Basilan. The delay of integrating the SFODAs with their respective BNs was the lack of a U.S. night capable MEDEVAC in the AO.<sup>96</sup>

The Special Forces teams trained and advised the AFP BNs through July. During that time, the Naval Construction Task Group flowed into Basilan and completed many civic actions. The NCTG built roads and bridges, improved helicopter landing zones, runways, and ports to include improving the water sources throughout the island.<sup>97</sup> AFP aviators successfully trained on night vision goggles (NVG) and the AFP SOUTHCOM forces successfully trained in COIN operations. USPACOM used assets from all over the Pacific to include forces from the continental United States to accomplish the mission. JTF-510 used forces from all services and had the cooperation of the HN. Together with the civic action, civilian participation and training of AFP forces, the remaining Abu Sayyaf outlaws fled the island. In August 2002, JTF-510 re-deployed back to Hawaii leaving behind about 100 soldiers to continue the HA and SA phases.

Analysis:

PACOM maintains three Basic JTF cores for planning purposes. The Seventh Fleet or III MEF is the primary effort for maritime operations. The I CORPS HQ is the JTF core for land operations. SOCPAC forms the nucleus for JTF-510 and is structured for timely response to special contingencies.<sup>98</sup> SOCPAC is a sub-unified command and serves as the SOF component

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<sup>96</sup> COL David Maxwell, interviewed by author, 24 February 2004, e-mail, Fort Leavenworth, KS, [David.Maxwell@US.Army.mil](mailto:David.Maxwell@US.Army.mil).

<sup>97</sup> U.S. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion One, *Operation Enduring Freedom- Philippines After Action Report*, 29 October 2002.

<sup>98</sup> Global Security Network, "Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) Joint Task Force 510," on line at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/socpac.htm>, Accessed on 23 February 2004.

command for USPACOM. Because it is a sub- unified command it has an inherent working relationship with Air Force, Naval and Army SOF.

The force structure of JTF 510 was unique in that it had a combined operations group for formal coordination with the AFP. The U.S. forces consisted of 150 Special Forces soldiers from 1/1 SFG (A) from Okinawa and elements from 1<sup>st</sup> SFG (A) from Fort Lewis Washington. The ARSOTF consisted of the 1/1 SFG (A) HQ and the (ARSOF) FOB was commanded by the 1/1 SFG (A) BN Commander. Army aviation came from E/160 based in Taegu, Korea with MH 47s. The Air component from the 353<sup>rd</sup> Special Operations Group in Kadena, Japan consisted of the 1<sup>st</sup> SOS (MC-130H), the 17<sup>th</sup> SOS (MC-130P) the 320<sup>th</sup> STS (combat controllers, weather, pararescue, medical care, air traffic control). The AFSOF also consisted of the 33d Air Rescue Squadron from Kadena Air Force Base. The maritime component consisted of U.S. Naval Mobile Construction Group (NCTG) from Okinawa and a 180 Marine security element from Kanohe Bay, Hawaii. The Naval component consisted of a SEAL platoon and a ridged hull inflatable boat detachment (RIB) from Okinawa and the USS Germantown (Landing Ship Dock (LSDSD 42)) to support the transport of the Naval Construction Task Group. For intra-theater and inter-theater air movement, a DIRMOBFOR was located at EAAB.

JTF-510's mission was to train, advise and assist designated AFP forces to enhance their ability to combat terrorism in SOUTHCOM. To do this JTF-510 was parallel to that of the AFP SOUTHCOM HQ. SOUTHCOM consisted of a JTF HQ and three Task Groups with 12 BNs task organized between the three. The APF provided air support with UH1H Helicopters. The Combined Planning Operations Group (CPOG) was a combined cell with U.S. and AFP personnel coordinating all combined activities. The AFP SOUTHCOM was in the lead and JTF-510 was advising and assisting.

In combined operations, unity of effort is imperative. The Philippine Government invited the U.S. to train, advise and assist the government and the AFP forces in fighting terrorism. In

partnership with the Philippines, the U.S. Government formed OEF-P under the training exercise Balikatan. In order to commence the training exercise the two governments had to come to an agreement on legitimacy. The U.S. State Department and the Filipino governments sustained legitimacy by creating a Term of Agreement statute. The U.S. State Department worked with the DoD on getting an agreement so the operation could commence and both nations remaining legitimate in the eyes of the respective populations.

JTF-510 worked hand in hand with the SOUTHCOM HQ and had a combined cell to coordinate operations. JTF-510 worked with the Army, Navy and Air Force of the AFP. This was a Philippine led operation with JTF-510 advising and assisting. Rapport with the host nation's military was established and both nations worked together on combating terrorism. The mutual working relationship was apparent at the AFP BN level and SFODA level.

Being a Joint Headquarters, unity of effort was necessary to coordinate logistics, gain interoperability between services, and conduct centralized planning and exercise decentralized execution. JTF-510 utilized all services for OEF-PI. The coordination between the services for airframes to flow forces and assets into theater was imperative. Throughout the operation, unity of effort was implemented for mission success. The interoperability of ARSOF and the NCTG is an example. ARSOF did not have any operational control of the NCTG, but the interoperability between the SFODAs and the naval engineers is apparent due to the success on Basilan Island. Another example of unity of effort was between ARSOF and the AFP air component. SFODAs on Basilan often relied on helicopter support from the AFP.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>99</sup>COL David Maxwell, interviewed by author, 24 February 2004, e-mail, Fort Leavenworth, KS, [David.Maxwell@US.Army.mil](mailto:David.Maxwell@US.Army.mil).

Because the PACOM has a large span of responsibility, the lines of communication extended over many miles. To gain the operational reach, JTF 510 established the ISB on Okinawa. All CONUS based and Hawaii based assets processed through Kadena Air Force Base, Japan. All assets that flowed into the JTF-510 AO flew into EAAB near Zamboanga City on the Southern Philippine Island of Mindanao. The LOC from Okinawa to EAAB was 1,458 Miles. The physical make up of the LOC was from Fort Lewis Washington to Okinawa, from Hawaii to Okinawa, from Okinawa to EAAB and EAAB into Basilan. From Hawaii, it is 4,660 miles, and from Fort Lewis, Washington, it was 5,744 miles. Another LOC was from Korea to EAAB, 2,164 miles. Once at EAAB, it was only 18 miles to the northern tip of Basilan. Because of the USPACOM area of responsibility, the lines of communications were extended.

The Air Force routes flowed from either U.S. Base to U.S. base or it flowed into a friendly host nation. The ISB in Kadena AFB on Okinawa was essential for flowing personnel and equipment into the JTF -510 AO. The JTF had time to set up the ISB and the forward operating base out of Zamboanga, before troops went operational.

Basing was essential for OEF-PI. JTF 510 established the ISB on Okinawa utilizing Kadena AFB and temporary facilities were established at Torii Station on the 1-1 SFG (A) compound. Tenth Area Support Group provided additional support with transportation and billeting.<sup>100</sup> From Okinawa, all assets and personnel flew into the JTF-510's AO via the Forward Operating Base at EAAB on Mindanao. FOB EAAB served as a transloading point, logistical hub for the forces on Mindanao and Basilan, and housed air assets. JTF-510 established it's HQ on Camp Navarro, Zamboanga City. The infrastructure on Zamboanga lacked the capability to support JTF-510. PACOM contracted a private organization to build billets and work spaces.



**Figure 10 Lines of Communication for OEF-P<sup>101</sup>**

The ARSOF HQ (SFODC) was established at Camp Tabiawan, Basilan Island. The infrastructure was insufficient and ARSOF contracted locally to build facilities on Basilan. The NCTG also assisted in the construction of the infrastructure. All of the HQ's were land based. They were in a relatively permissive environment and opted for land basing. The JTF HQ was land based approximately 20 miles from Isabella. ARSOF positioned LNO's at the JTF HQ to include the U.S. Embassy in Manila.

The concept of the operation addressed the support requirement and flowed support assets into the AO before operational forces deployed to the theater. JTF 510 deployed the HQ and supporting assets first, to set the conditions for the employment of ODAs into Basilan Island. This allowed USPACOM to contract a private organization to build the infrastructure needed to conduct operations on Zamboanga. This private organization also contracted vehicles for the

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<sup>100</sup> COL David Maxwell, ([David.Maxwell@US.Army.mil](mailto:David.Maxwell@US.Army.mil)) "COL Maxwell's Answers," 24 February 2004, personnel email

<sup>101</sup> Summarized from Special Operations Command Pacific's unclassified briefing slides.

ARSOF. This organization did not contract for the proper package of trucks and the ARSOF had to further local purchase the proper equipment for the trucks.<sup>102</sup>

Due to the distance of the LOC's the rotary winged aircraft was air lifted into the AO. The 353<sup>rd</sup> SOG and E-160th needed additional assets on the ground for the reception and assembly of the aircraft. Because of the airflow, the processing of personnel, the maintenance, the distribution of all classes of supply and local contracting, the number of personnel on the ground totaled about 1,700.

All U.S. units during OEF-P locally procured as much help and logistics as possible to bolster the economy in Basilan and Mindanao. The units procured local labor and all classes of supply when available. For example, the NCTG procured labor and the bedrock from the island of Basilan to construct the roads and build the infrastructure such as schools and hospitals.<sup>103</sup>

The flow of equipment and personnel onto Basilan was by C-130 or by rotary winged aircraft. Due to the poor road trafficability, rotary wing assets were initially essential for re-supply to the SFODAs. To reduce the flying requirement of the helicopters, the SFODAs locally procured most of their supplies. The LOC initiated at EAAB and supplies were air lifted to the ODC or directly transported down to the SFODAs on Basilan Island.

To handle the initial push of force packaging into the AO and coordinate intratheater and intertheater air movement, a DIRMOBFOR was collocated with the JTF HQ. This assisted in the support operations by allowing managed flow of airframes into theater. The DIRMOBFOR

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<sup>102</sup> COL David Maxwell, "Commander's Summary of Operation OEF-P," 05 May 02, personal e-mail 24 February 2004.

<sup>103</sup>, U.S. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion One, *Operation Enduring Freedom- Philippines After Action Report*, 35.

provides expertise and represents the JTF in TRANSCOM and AMC. U.S. OEF-P forces were sequentially phased into the AO over a two-month period.

Even though OEF-P was a training exercise, timeliness was an essential factor for the GWOT in the Philippines. The planning for the mission began well before 11 September 2001. In October 2001, an assessment team went to the Philippines and refining of the plan began. By January 2002, JTF-510 was ready to deploy. Governmental considerations delayed the deployment to 15 January 2002. Another factor of time was the phasing of troop flow. The JTF wanted to deploy all support assets before any operational units. ARSOF did not close into the AO until 22 February 2002.

The JTF commander's plan was to set the condition before the ODAs arrived. CJTF 510 focused on force protection and wanted all air assets to be in position before any deployment onto Basilan Island. The CJTF wanted a U.S. night MEDEVAC capability operational in Zamboanga with a Marine QRF before any operational employment.

The mission was not a crisis action response. The timeline was not short and had flexibility. The training exercise was to last for six months ending on a specific date. The environment was permissive with host nation support.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### Recommendations and Conclusions

Chapter three of the monograph analyzed two case studies using six criteria. One case study was executed in crisis action, and the other operation was executed under deliberate planning. The monograph analyzed both case studies by force structure, unity of effort, lines of communications, basing, logistics, and timeliness. Using the analysis, issues were identified that assist the reader in understanding the necessity to have interoperability between the MEU (SOC) and ARSOF.

The analysis identified four critical issues in Operation Assured Response: mobility, force protection, logistics, and basing. The first issue was the lack rotary wing mobility. There was no secure area, within the host nation, to land fixed wing assets to assist in the evacuation. The evacuation from the embassy to the ISB was conducted by rotary wing. These rotary winged assts had to be air lifted from England and Italy. It took 48 hrs to get one aircraft into operation and an additional 48 hours to get the remaining rotary wing aircraft into operation. This limited the number and type of rotary winged aircraft available for the mission.

Time played an important factor in this uncertain environment. The MEU (SOC), if available, can provide 16 lift rotary winged aircraft that do not require an additional land force to secure the aircraft, its pilots, and support personnel. Having an off shore capability reduces the requirement for host nation or other supporting nations forces.

In regards to the securing of assets and personnel on the ground, force protection is the second issue identified. JTF AR accepted risk in force protection due to the crisis action timeline. The JTF placed the ISB within a friendly, but unstable country. The number of personnel at the ISB was strenuous on the infrastructure and services in Freetown. All of the rotary wing ground crews, air controllers, JTF Staff, fuel, logistical support, and the quick reaction force (QRF) were

located at the ISB. The MEU (SOC) could have reduced the risk at the ISB by reducing the number of assets and personnel on the ground. It could have also provided a sea based QRF, and provided needed security personnel at the embassy.

The third issue in Operation Assured Response was logistics. During the operation, flowing supplies into the ISB and the Embassy became a concern due to the number of personnel at both sites. The JTF only deployed with four days of Class I for personal at the embassy and the ISB. Other Problems of re-supply were due to the long lines of communications and the number of available rotary winged aircraft. There were only nine helicopters available. Each sortie was a three hour round trip from the ISB to the embassy. The logistical response lagged because of the long line of communication. The time it took to travel the distance made it difficult for a quick logistical response. The immediate problem identified was the flow of class I. The JTF only deployed with four days of supplies. The MEU (SOC) could have provided 15 days of supplies to the embassy and would have prevented the huge overcrowding at the ISB if the MEU (SOC) was part of the JTF. In the future, a MEU (SOC) must be part of the JTF in order to maintain its logistical support and alleviate the problem noted.

Basing of forces is the last issue. Sea Basing of JTF AR would have worked for Assured Response if there were enough time. During April 1996, the EUCOM MEU (SOC) was conducting a mission off the coast of the Balkans. Because of the situation in Liberia, the MEU (SOC) could not reach the AO in a timely manner. However, JTF AR did have an option of sea basing, but chose not to utilize the British Naval Vessel, the *Gold Rover*. JTF planners must consider sea basing with the MEU (SOC) during missions like Assured Response where force protection, logistics, and mobility are potential problems.

The timeline for OEF-P was more deliberate than Assured Response. OEF-P had an extended timeline, over six months. The U.S. JTF headquarters (JTF-510) deliberately planned

the operation and set the force protection and logistical measures before SFODAs deployed to Basilan Island. It took over six weeks to deploy all forces into the AO. This operation took place under the guise of a training exercise known as Balikatan -2-1. The U.S. was to assist the Filipino Government in combating an insurgency that had ties to al Qaeda as part of the Global War on Terrorism. Timeliness was essential, even though the operation was not considered crisis action. The analysis revealed issues with mobility, MEDEVAC, force protection, and basing

In OEF-P, the rotary wing aircraft were also air transported into the AO. JTF 510 had the MH-47s transported from Korea to Cebu City on Mindanao Island, 240 miles from Zamboanga City. The MH 47's did not base in Zamboanga City until all force protection measures were emplaced. In the initial phase of OEF-P, MH 47s flew 250 miles from Cebu City to Basilan Island via Zamboanga city in order to support the forces on Basilan Island. The initial basing of the rotary winged aircraft constrained the mobility of ARSOF, which reduced timely response to situations.

As discussed in the analysis of Assured response, OEF-P could have benefited from the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) of the MEU (SOC). The ACE can provide 16 rotary winged aircraft based just miles off a coastline. Having the MEU (SOC) in the AO alleviates land basing the helicopters. This basing frees up security forces, reduces the land footprint, and provides over the shore air capability. In planning operational reach must always be considered. The MEU (SOC) gives planners the over the shore aviation capability that will give commanders more flexibility. In the future, planner must consider this capability during planning.

The second issue identified was the lack of MEDEVAC. During OEF-P, MEDEVAC was a priority with CJTF-510. The SFODAs did not go operational until a night capable MEDEVAC was emplaced. The delay was due to the air transporting of the MH 47's and HH-60's. The MEU (SOC) could have acted as the interim MEDEVAC until the land based

MEDEVAC was operational. This would have afforded ARSOF to enter Basilan Island on an accelerated timeline. Planners must consider the MEDEVAC capabilities the MEU (SOC) can provide in future operations.

The third issue identified was force protection. In OEF-P, a conventional force directly assisted ARSOF. On Basilan Island, a Marine security element provided security for ARSOF bases and protected a U.S. Naval construction unit. It is essential to have conventional forces integrated with ARSOF for force protection measures. It is imperative that during planning, JTF staffs research the possibility of having a MEU (SOC) provide the initial security in order to allow time for follow on forces to flow into the AO. The security and forced entry capability of the MEU (SOC) gives flexibility for commanders to compress timelines and respond to situations more rapidly.

The last issue identified was basing of forces. As discussed, initially basing ARSOF off shore with the MEU (SOC) would have enabled SFODAs to enter Basilan Island sooner. Time was of the essence, even though the mission was not crisis action. As discussed in chapter three, the AFP was dealing with an insurgency on Basilan Island. Abu Sayyaf was operating in the interior of the island and was holding Philippine citizens and foreign citizen's hostage. Abu Sayyaf had already murdered one hostage and the lives of the remaining hostages were at stake. Sea basing of the ARSOTF with a MEU (SOC) gives the JTF commander options. This sea basing would have allowed ARSOF forces to enter Basilan Island earlier and would have assisted the AFP in dealing with the hostage situation sooner. Furthermore, sea basing would have assisted in the force cap of 660 troops on the ground. Initial sea basing would have provided timely mobility, initial MEDEVAC, initial force protection, and additional basing. Planners must understand the capabilities of the MEU (SOC) in order to provide commanders with feasible options to compress timelines.

## Conclusions:

The analysis revealed issues in which recommendations were presented to overcome like challenges in the future. From the recommendations, three conclusions are presented. To make the recommendations a reality, the military, especially the Marine Corps and ARSOF, must improve in three areas: publishing doctrine, joint training, and education. These three areas are mutually exclusive and therefore all three areas must be improved before the conduct of future operations.

Joint doctrine states that a JSOTF can have conventional elements as part of the task organization, but does not mention the use of a MEU (SOC) as part of a JSOTF. However, the (MEU (SOC)) pre-deployment training program order (MCO 3502.3A) mentions the interoperability of a MEU (SOC) and a JSOTF, but fails to mention suggestions on task organization. Joint doctrine must address the relationship of a MEU (SOC) and ARSOF in order for the services to follow suit. One such doctrinal tactic, technique, and procedure is the task organization of the two elements within a Joint Task Force.

The research shows the best way to task organize the MEU (SOC) and ARSOF is under a JSOTF HQ. When task organizing a MEU (SOC) with a JSOTF, the MEU (SOC) should be tactical control (TACON) to the JSOTF exercising unity of effort. The ground combat element and the aviation combat elements should remain under the direct command of the MEU (SOC) commander. The ACE should not be OPCON or TACON to the JSOAC. Keeping the air assets in the MEU (SOC) provides the commander the flexibility for immediate response. De-confliction of air space will be coordinated through the JSOAC or the air operations center of the JSOTF HQ. This example of MEU (SOC) relationship to ARSOF under a joint HQ should be added to joint doctrine to give commanders and planners guidance on the optimal way to task organize.

Marine doctrine does not mention the direct relationship of ARSOF and the MEU (SOC). However, Marine doctrine does address the idea of the MEU (SOC) being placed in a supporting or supported relationship with SOF. Marine training guidance mandates the MEU (SOC) to be proficient at conducting maritime special operations independently or with naval special warfare detachments, but fails to mention operating with ARSOF. MCO 3502.3A must include the necessity for ARSOF/MEU (SOC) integration task organized under a JSOTF in order to help in guiding the MEU commanders certification training plan.

ARSOF doctrine does not mention the direct relationship with conventional forces. FM 3-05.20 only mentions that an army special operations task force can have other combat forces assigned to it. To meet current needs ARSOF needs to update SF doctrine. To correct this shortcoming, the United States John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School must address integrating the MEU (SOC) and ARSOF during operations and training in doctrine. In order for doctrine writers to have current examples of this integration, commanders and staffs need to formally publish tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), and lessons learned.

The initial step in publishing information about ARSOF/MEU (SOC) integration is for the Marine and ARSOF units to publish lessons learned and TTP's. These TTP's and lessons learned must be provided to each service proponent of doctrine or centers for lessons learned. All services must share this information. Future JTF commanders and staffs need to be informed on the potential lethality, responsiveness, and operational reach capability of integrating a MEU (SOC) and specifically ARSOF under a JSOTF. The study shows that there is a distinct lack of doctrine in regards to intra-service interoperability.

As explained in the monograph, ARSOF and the MEU (SOC) are complimentary. Each service can provide unique assets to each other. To validate doctrine, the MEU (SOC) and ARSOF must train together. This training would allow both forces to become familiar with each

other and further develop a working relationship. Each force would grow to understand the capabilities it could provide each other. Therefore, future joint exercises must include training for both forces in terms of interoperability.

The MEU (SOC) PTP is where the initial steps of integrated joint training will begin. The PTP is a 26 week training period that validates the MEU (SOC) as outlined by MCO 3502.3A. The PTP is divided into three phases. The first phase is the individual training, the second phase is the collective MEU level training, and the third phase is the final evaluation, which is the special operations capability exercise (SOCEX).

The MEU and ARSOF would begin training during the intermediate training phase (phase II). Marine training guidance directs that the MEU perform interoperability training as part of the second phase. The purpose is to integrate the C2, reconnaissance and surveillance, assault and security, and aviation elements. The Marine training guidance recommends that the MEU train with the Naval Special Operations Forces (NAVSpecWAR) detachment. The Marine guidance should make it mandatory to train with both the NAVSpecWAR detachment and ARSOF. During this phase, the MEU, NAVSpecWAR detachments, and ARSOF must coordinate to train at one of the Army training centers or Marine training exercises that utilize the MEU and the amphibious readiness group (ARG). In order to achieve the correct level of interoperability training it is imperative that all levels of ARSOF and the MEU (SOC) participate.

During phase II of the PTP, the command element (CE) of the MEU must demonstrate its interoperability with JSOTFs. According to 3502.3A, the primary means to do this is through situational training exercises (STXs)<sup>104</sup> and crisis interaction requirements exercises (CIREX).

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<sup>104</sup> Situational Training Exercises are normally exercises that involve headquarters, but operational forces on the ground.

The CIREX is a discussion built around a crisis scenario. The participants of the CIREX are the MEU commanders, their primary staff officers, and MSE commanders with SOF elements.<sup>105</sup>

The CIREX, at best, educates each service on capabilities, but does not ensure interoperability. A discussion is not action. The interoperability needs to be exercised through joint readiness exercises (JRX) and field training exercises (FTX). The CIREX is not enough. Phase II and phase III of the PTP is where the MEU (SOC) and SOF must gain synergy and interoperability.

The final issue to be improved is the education of officers on the integration of the MEU (SOC) and ARSOF. The education should be at the command and staff level in all services. Majors (LT Commanders) are the young minds taught at the service and staff schools. Mid-level officers are the driving force of command staffs, and will bring this concept forward into the military. While doctrinal TTP's are published and training ARR's are written, education must begin on the concept of integrating these two forces. Officers coming into mid level education will make this concept grow. Through doctrine and training, this concept will be common practice in theaters of operations. It is necessary that the concept of ARSOF and the MEU (SOC) working together under one headquarters be taught at the education centers throughout the military in order to make the concept a reality.

The theme of this monograph was interoperability and timeliness. Today, the U.S. military is deployed worldwide. In order to meet the demands there needs to be an understanding of jointness. One service cannot accomplish all the current missions alone. During planning, staffs and commanders should understand the power and consider utilizing the combined

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<sup>105</sup> MCO 3502.3A does not mention what SOF elements participate, but recommends that the CIREX meet at Fort Bragg.

capabilities of ARSOF and the MEU (SOC). This monograph has demonstrated that by using ARSOF and the MEU (SOC), JTF commanders would have more versatility and responsiveness.

## GLOSSARY

**Class I of supply (Class I)**- Subsistence, gratuitous health and comfort items. (FM 4-0)

**Class III of supply (Class III)**- Petroleum, fuels, hydraulic, and insulating oils, preservatives, liquids and gasses, bulk chemical products, coolants, deicer and antifreeze compounds, components, and additives of petroleum and chemical products, and coal. (FM 4-0)

**director of mobility forces –(DIRMOBFOR)** Normally a senior officer who is familiar with the area of responsibility or joint operations area and possesses an extensive background in air mobility operations. When established, the director of mobility forces serves as the designated agent for all air mobility issues in the area of responsibility or joint operations area, and for other duties as directed. The director of mobility forces exercises coordinating authority between the air operations center (or appropriate theater command and control node), the tanker airlift control center, the air mobility operations control center (when established and when supporting subordinate command objectives), and the joint movement center, in order to expedite the resolution of air mobility issues. The director of mobility forces may be sourced from the theater's organizations or US Transportation Command. Additionally, the director of mobility forces, when designated, will ensure the effective integration of intertheater and intratheater air mobility operations, and facilitate the conduct of intratheater air mobility operations. (JP 3-30).

**foreign internal defense (FID)**- Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (JP 3-05)

**joint special operations task force (JSOTF)**- A joint task force composed of special operations units from more than one Service, formed to carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or other operations. The joint special operations task force may have conventional non-special operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions. (JP 3-05)

**joint task force (JTF)**- A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a sub-unified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. (JP 0-2)

**line of communications** -A route, either land, water, and/or air, that connects an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. (JP 0-2)

**lines of operations** - Lines that define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives. (JP 5-0)

**Marine air ground task force (MAGTF)**-The Marine Corps principal organization for all missions across the range of military operations, composed of forces task-organized under a single commander capable of responding rapidly to a contingency anywhere in the world. The types of forces in the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) are functionally grouped into four core elements: a command element, an aviation combat element, a ground combat element, and a combat service support element. The four core elements are categories of forces, not formal commands. The basic structure of the MAGTF never varies, though the number, size, and type of

Marine Corps units comprising each of its four elements will always be mission dependent. The flexibility of the organizational structure allows for one or more subordinate MAGTFs to be assigned.

**Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) (MEU (SOC))**- The Marine Corps standard, forward-deployed, sea-based expeditionary organization. The Marine expeditionary unit (special operations capable) (MEU[SOC]) is a Marine expeditionary unit, augmented with selected personnel and equipment, that is trained and equipped with an enhanced capability to conduct amphibious operations and a variety of specialized missions of limited scope and duration. These capabilities include specialized demolition, clandestine reconnaissance and surveillance, raids, *in-extremis* hostage recovery, and enabling operations for follow-on forces. The MEU (SOC) is not a special operations force but, when directed by the National Command Authorities, the combatant commander, and/or other operational commander, may conduct limited special operations *in extremis*, when other forces are inappropriate or unavailable. MEU's are commanded by a Colonel (O6).

**military operation other than war (MOOTW)**- Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. (JP 3-07)

**noncombatant evacuation (NEO)**- Operations directed by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, or other appropriate authority whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States (JP 3-07)

**sea-air-land team (SEAL)**- US Navy forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations in maritime, littoral, and riverine environments. (JP 3-05)

**special forces group (airborne) (SFG (A))**- A combat arms organization capable of planning, conducting, and supporting special operations activities in all operational environments in peace, conflict, and war. It consists of a group headquarters and headquarters company, a support company, and special forces battalions. The group can operate as a single unit, but normally the battalions plan and conduct operations from widely separated locations. The group provides general operational direction and synchronizes the activities of subordinate battalions. Although principally structured for unconventional warfare, special forces group units are capable of task-organizing to meet specific requirements. (JP 3-05)

**special operations (SO)**- Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. (JP 3-05)

special forces (SF)- US Army forces organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations with an emphasis on unconventional warfare capabilities. (JP 3-05)

**special forces operational detachment alpha (SFODA)-** The SFODA is designed to organize, equip, train, advise or direct, and support indigenous military or paramilitary forces engaged in UW or FID activities. Using its inherent capabilities, the SFODA also performs the other SF missions and collateral activities discussed in Chapter 2. The time-tested composition of the SFODA remains as viable and relevant today as it has been throughout SF's history. The commander of an SFODA is a captain. His two primary assistants are an assistant detachment commander (an SF warrant officer) and an operations sergeant (a master sergeant). The SFODA has one assistant operations and intelligence sergeant and two specialists in each of the four primary SF functional areas (weapons, engineer, medical, and communications).

**unconventional warfare (UW)-** A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. (JP 3-05)

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