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UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND



White Paper "Redefining the Win"

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The Redefined Win Concept

The Redefined Win Concept centers on proactive U.S. competition with State / Non-State Actors for the relative superiority over the physical, cognitive and moral security of key populations in the areas we choose to campaign. This paper sets forth the SOF contribution to the larger Redefined Win. It acknowledges but does not discuss the vital contributions of the JIIM community.

The Win is framed as follows: (1) Decision space has been preserved for our National leaders. Of note, decision space is characterized as providing decision makers with scalable, cost imposing options to hold, either unilaterally or with our partners, potential adversary interests at risk. (2) Conditions are set for an acceptable political outcome in the areas that matter to the United States. (3) Positional advantage is retained in terms of time, forces and relationships to advance U.S. interests.

Trends in International Competition

The United States is facing a strategic inflection point characterized by an "uncertain strategic security environment paradoxically framed by diminishing defense resources and an increasing number and variety of potential threats." Social, political, informational and economic trends in international competition are converging between state and non-state actors and others for the relative superiority over the physical, cognitive, and moral security, and adequate governance of populations. This competition generally centers on the left side of the operational continuum where the Department of State is the lead department as noted in the slide below.

Political Warfare Human Domain Land Domain Conventional Joint Interagency Capabilities / Competencies **Forces Core** Special Operations under Title Competency **Forces Core** 22 & 50 Competency and other authorities as they apply Re-Emphasized ARSOF Core Competency **Emerging Army Capabilities (RAF)** State-Based **Combined Arms** FID UW / CT / CP COIN / SFA / FID Competition for Maneuver Range of Diplomatic and Political Action **Range of Military Operations DoS Lead DoD Lead Re-Emerging Trends in Warfare Traditional Warfare**

Trends in International Competition

¹ LTG Charles T. Cleveland and LTC Stuart L. Farris, "Toward Strategic Landpower," Army Magazine, July 2013, p. 22.

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Framing the Environment

The operational environment is characterized by disorder, scarcity of resources, ecological challenges, toxic ideologies, game-changing technologies, emerging resistance movements and opportunistic competitors employing hybrid warfare capabilities. As the foreseeable future's "new-normal," this setting will challenge the effectiveness of traditional forms of power while enabling non-traditional forms. We need to effectively engage in this environment.

The requirement to protect and advance U.S. interests will demand new ways of thinking, with unique approaches that broaden strategic options for our National Leaders. Essential to any new approach will be a comprehensive definition of what strategic success, or "the Win," looks-like in an increasingly disordered world punctuated by competitors capitalizing on hybrid warfare capabilities.

Hybrid Warfare to Challenge the United States

Select Nation-State and Non-State competitors are developing hybrid warfare capabilities to compete in the Human Domain and dominate the left-side of the operational continuum. Russian and Chinese military doctrines recognize the growing necessity of synchronized political, diplomatic, economic, military-kinetic, cyber and mass-media operations to advance their respective interests.

We need not imagine the character of the competition on the left-side of the operational continuum. We must only observe Russia's actions in Georgia, Crimea, and eastern Ukrainian provinces and its use of a multi-echeloned approach consisting of coercive diplomacy, cyber capabilities, propaganda, unconventional warfare and surrogates has challenged U.S. and NATO efforts to craft a comprehensive strategic response.

The actions of the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" demonstrate that non-state entities can also engage in hybrid warfare, and they have been particularly successful in the use of mass-media operations to shape perceptions of the conflict. These examples illustrate once again that we do not get to choose the domains we compete and fight in - they choose us.

Redefining Win - Winning Early on the Left Side of the Operational Continuum

The totality of the security challenges facing the Nation and the evolving character of these threats require an operational framework to "Win Early" to prevent these challenges from scaling beyond our level of strategic depth and capacity to respond.

The Special Warfare operational framework to "Win Early" is presented in a separate USASOC White Paper. A brief summary is presented below to add context to the Redefined Win Concept.

Theater Special Operations Commands, enabled by the Global SOF Network and the Global Landpower Network, conduct Special Warfare Campaigns to solve security challenges outright, or rescale these challenges to manageable levels. If a security challenge cannot be rescaled, the option for conventional major combat operations always exists. The Special Warfare Operational Approach assumes an earlier "Strategic Start Point" and envisions three operational lines effort to

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meet current and emerging National Security challenges. These are: (1) Expanded SOF Support to Joint Forcible Entry, (2) Unconventional Warfare, and (3) SOF Support to Political Warfare.

An earlier "Strategic Start Point" requires new thinking about the traditional, military Phase 0 and most importantly for this effort, new thinking about "Left of Phase 0" campaigns and operations to consider how we assess, sort, form and rescale security challenges to win early and preserve strategic depth and decision space for our National Leaders. The framework for this approach centers on a persistent SOF forward presence in and around the people with deep knowledge of the environment to generate decisive situational awareness to better inform the strategic start point for campaigns where the "Win" occurs at a much lower level of National effort. An example of this approach is the U.S. effort to aid the El Salvadorian Government from 1980-1992, that cost approximately \$6.0 billion, and consisted of 55 U.S. in-country advisors enabled by an out-of country support element that assisted the government in the defeat of the communist backed FMLN insurgents.

The Redefined Win Concept acknowledges the trends in international competition and the necessity to proactively compete with State / Non-State Actors and others for the relative superiority of the physical, cognitive and moral security of key populations. The Win is defined as:

- Strategic Power Retained Current and emerging security challenges will present many opportunities to commit significant resources, including service member lives, fiscal strength, good will and partner trust. These resources along with the diplomatic, information, military and economic elements of power constitute a finite capacity. Similarly, the support and will of the American people must be considered as well. The U.S. must consider its strategic power when imposing a cost to hold, either unilaterally or with our partners, potential adversary interests at risk.
- *Influence Expanded* In a hyper-connected, social-media enabled cognitive world, the positive perceptions, beliefs, trust and credibility that others (Nation-States, Non-State Actors, Sub-Groups, and yet known entities) hold of the United States will be the center of gravity in relation to our ability to conduct successful campaigns, operations and activities to advance U.S. interests.
- Governance Increased In an under-governed, resource-constrained and fragile world, governance will be relative, particularly in conflict and at risk zones. Our ability along with our partners (Nation-States / Non-State Actors and others) to increase the moral security of key populations through adequate governance supported by development programs and enabling efforts like the Institute for the Military Support to Governance (IMSG) will be a decisive point in how populations in the operational area view and support U.S. actions.

Winning in a Disordered World

In summary, the totality of the security challenges facing the Nation and the evolving character of hybrid threats demand earlier action to prevent these challenges from scaling beyond our level of strategic depth and capacity to respond. Winning in a disordered world requires a proactive stance to successfully compete with State, Non-State Actors and others for the relative superiority over the physical, cognitive and moral security of key populations in the areas we choose to campaign.

