

UNDERSTANDING STATES OF RESISTANCE



Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies



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Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

UNDERSTANDING STATES OF RESISTANCE

POCKET GUIDE

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ASSESSING REVOLUTIONARY AND INSURGENT STRATEGIES

The Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) series consists of a set of case studies and research volumes conducted for the US Army Special Operations Command by the National Security Analysis Department of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. The purpose of the ARIS series is to produce a collection of academically rigorous yet operationally relevant research materials to develop and illustrate a common understanding of insurgency and revolution. This research, intended to form a bedrock body of knowledge for members of the Special Forces, will allow users to distill vast amounts of material from a wide array of campaigns and extract relevant lessons, thereby enabling the development of future doctrine, professional education, and training.

The ARIS series follows in the tradition of research conducted by the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) of American University in the 1950s and 1960s, by adding new research to that body of work and in several instances releasing updated editions of original SORO studies.

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Figure 2. Continuum from legal protests to insurgency and belligerency. Originally published in the ARIS volume *Legal Implications of the Status of Persons in Resistance*, published in 2015.

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Figure 3. Proposed states for phasing construct analysis. Originally published in the ARIS volume *Understanding States of Resistance*, published in 2018.

Left-most figure on cover, titled 2009 Tibetan People Demand ~ Remember Tiananmen Remember Tibet in NYC on the 20th Anniversary of June 1989 Massacre in Beijing, China, attributed to Students for a Free Tibet, licensed under <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>. No changes were made. Other photos included in the cover design were purchased through Getty Images.

INTRODUCTION

The Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) project undertakes the study of resistance as a phenomenon and the object of the Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) profession. It provides ARSOF soldiers with materials to help explain resistance and empower them to accomplish their missions. Those materials include historical case studies, volumes on topics within resistance, such as the law, narratives, or cyber, as well as audiobook versions and pocket guides of select volumes. This is such a pocket guide. A full ARIS volume can range from one-hundred to four-hundred pages to completely cover its dedicated topic. A pocket guide is designed to present the same material in a condensed format. Therefore, a pocket guide contains a snapshot of the analysis; soldiers should seek out the full volumes for more information.

ARIS began as a way to educate ARSOF soldiers about the object of their profession: resistance. Whether the mission is counterinsurgency (COIN), counterterrorism (CT), foreign internal defense (FID), or unconventional warfare (UW), and whether a soldier is in civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PsyOps), or Special Forces (SF), the main object of their missions is a resistance movement of some form. When ARIS products discuss resistance, they use a broad definition. It includes violent and non-violent methods, political, economic, ethnic, movements, and all manner of environments.

It is a tenet of the ARIS program that for an ARSOF soldier to best perform his or her missions, that soldier needs to build an understanding of resistance, because whether the mission is to help or to hinder it, the ARSOF soldier must interact with a resistance.

One of the topics often raised about resistance is how a movement evolves and declines. From Mao Tse-tung's famous three phases to the sociologist Rex Hopper's social movement theory approach, this pocket guide will briefly explain the history of thinking about the phases of resistance movements, and then present the research team's own states of resistance construct built out of the historical line of thought on phases. This pocket guide is titled *Understanding States of Resistance*, not Phases of Resistance, because the team decided the term "states" more accurately captured the more-than-linear evolution of a movement; it can double back, repeat states, skip a state, speed through a state, or indeed, also proceed linearly from inception to success.

This is not a manual. This is not doctrine. This is a reference resource grounded in academic study that is intended to help soldiers conceptualize and analyze the challenges they face in operations.

OVERVIEW OF PHASING CONSTRUCTS

Constructs are frameworks that organize information to help explain an idea or phenomenon. A phasing construct refers to a framework that explains how a movement progresses, develops, or evolves from beginning to end. How does it grow? How does it decline? How does it change while it is growing? If a trained ARSOF soldier can organize and conceptualize information about a resistance relevant to its growth, he or she could use that information to help him or her determine what a resistance needs to survive and advance or what host-nation security forces need to undermine a resistance.

To make sense of revolutions, many scholars—including military historians, political scientists, military commanders, and doctrine writers—developed various phasing constructs over the last several

decades. Most famous is undoubtedly Mao's three phases. However, several other constructs also exist. The ARIS program leadership asked whether Mao's three phases is the best construct available, or the most appropriate for resistance, whether other constructs exist that might be better, and what might that be? This study scoured the literature in several disciplines to identify other existing constructs. The team also sought to determine whether ARSOF soldiers and the consulted academic disciplines could benefit from a different construct.

The results yielded constructs from military writings (like Mao and the Army COIN field manual¹), international law, political science, and social movement theory.² The team also consulted the fields of business management, economics, and history, but the team found a lack of or unrelated constructs. Therefore, the team focused on military literature, law, political science, and social movement theory. The team also determined that Mao is not the best construct for capturing the full life of a resistance. Instead, it would be helpful to the two audiences, ARSOF soldiers and academia, to produce a construct that brought together several commonalities from different constructs. Before presenting this new construct, it is worth undertaking a brief discussion of the constructs the team found.

EXISTING CONSTRUCTS – MILITARY PERSPECTIVES

ARSOF soldiers and others across the Services know Mao Zedong's three phases of guerilla warfare. They characterized his guerilla warfare campaign in rural China against Japanese imperialism.

Mao Zedong's Three Phases³

1. Organization, consolidation, and preservation of regional base areas. Volunteers are trained and indoctrinated. Agitators and propagandists persuade and convince local populations to support them. Military operations are sporadic.
2. Direct attacks increase in importance, targeting vulnerable military and police outposts with the primary purpose of procuring arms, ammunition, and other essential material. Political agents continue indoctrinating more local populations. Collaborationists and reactionary elements are liquidated.
3. Decision, or destruction of the enemy. A significant percentage of the guerilla force transforms into a force capable of engaging the enemy in conventional battle.

However, these three phases only represent guerilla warfare, not the full variety of resistance. Additionally, while Mao speaks of propaganda, recruitment, sustainment, and negotiations, the focus remains on military preparation and operations. Resistance is more than guerilla warfare. It includes violent and non-violent methods, legal and illegal means, as well as overt and clandestine tactics. Already, one can see the need for a construct broader than Mao's three phases to accommodate the varying types of resistance before and after guerilla warfare.

Mao himself recognizes that guerilla warfare is only one part of a larger campaign, which he calls national revolutionary policy.⁴ He details a separate construct for his national revolutionary policy that includes seven steps.⁵

Mao's Seven Steps

1. Arousing and organizing the people
2. Achieving internal unification politically
3. Establishing bases
4. Equipping forces
5. Recovering national strength
6. Destroying enemy's national strength
7. Regaining lost territories

Again, the focus remains on armed struggle. In the same vein, David Galula published a notable and popular work on the evolution of insurgencies, in which he proposed a five-phase construct that places guerilla warfare as only one part. He created a second construct based on the first, but that includes a so-called shortcut. The two constructs are as follows. Both revolve around the use of armed force.

Orthodox Communist Pattern	Bourgeois Nationalist Shortcut Pattern
1. Create a party	1. Blind terrorism
2. Unified front	2. Selective terrorism
3. Guerilla warfare	3. Guerilla warfare
4. Movement warfare	4. Movement warfare
5. Annihilation campaign	5. Annihilation campaign

Galula and Mao, however, theorized their constructs from specific insurgent experiences. This selection bias limits their applicability to those historical experiences. The US Army Field Manual 3-24 on counterinsurgency adopted Mao's three phases and injected more

focus on non-military efforts, such as funding, coordination with civil groups, and psychological operations.⁶

Phases from Field Manual 3-24⁷

1. Strategic defensive, when the government has a stronger correlation of forces and insurgents must concentrate on survival and building support.
2. Strategic stalemate, when force correlations approach equilibrium and guerilla warfare becomes the most important activity.
3. Strategic counteroffensive, when insurgents have superior strength and military forces move to conventional operations to destroy the government's military capability.

However, this construct remains driven by military considerations and therefore cannot fully categorize the diverse forms of resistance. Field Manual 3-24 is, after all, about counterinsurgency, and insurgencies are “the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region;”⁸ they represent a form of violent and militaristic resistance.

The Army manuals on UW also focus on a model based on guerilla warfare and insurgencies. Army Technical Publication (ATP) 3-05.1, *Unconventional Warfare*, uses Mao's three phases: “The three-phase construct presented below is a historical representation of how insurgencies mature based on the Chinese communist model as articulated by Mao... Admittedly, not all insurgencies and resistance movements are mass-based protracted conflicts.”⁹ The ATP recognizes that an insurgency-based construct is not necessarily the best suited for the task. However, it also reiterates the importance of having a construct: “However, this classic insurgent model does provide an extremely useful analytical model to start from and a

template for planners to communicate precisely an insurgency's stage of development."¹⁰ This evidence illustrates the community's recognition of the need to conceptualize the development of resistance movements.

This guide does not argue that Mao, Galula, FM 3-24, or ATP 3-05.1 are wrong or unhelpful. It only says that those constructs are limited to describing insurgencies and guerilla warfare. The goal of this pocket guide is to help conceptualize the progression of a resistance in a way that can include insurgency, guerilla warfare, and more.

In the mid-twentieth century, the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) at American University conducted case studies and extensive study of resistance movements in addition to insurgencies and guerillas to educate US Special Forces soldiers charged with conducting unconventional warfare. It developed its own five-phase construct that rebalances the focus more toward non-military measures:¹¹

SORO's Five Phases

1. **Clandestine organization phase:** Small cells recruit and train cadres, infiltrate government organizations and civil groups, fundraise, establish safe areas, and establish escape and evasion nets.
2. **Subversion stage:** Conduct subversion against the enemy and psychological operations to gain support. Covert agents in mass organizations call for demonstrations, and agitators turn the peaceful demonstrations into riots. Operational cells conduct selective threats and terrorist acts.
3. **Expansion phase:** The organization has expanded and mass support and involvement crystallized. Auxiliary cells screen new members.

4. Militarization phase: overt creation and use of guerilla forces in three stages.
 - a. Outnumbered by state forces, small guerilla units harass state forces.
 - b. Government forces are required to defend installations and territory with substantially larger forces.
 - c. The full guerilla offensive to create and extend liberated areas.
5. Consolidation phase: underground elements create shadow governments, as well as schools, courts, and other institutions to shape popular thought and behavior.

SORO's Phases

- 1 Clandestine organization
- 2 Subversion and psychological operations
- 3 Expansion of the organization and its support
- 4 Militarization/guerilla warfare
 - a. Harass state forces
 - b. Government forces overextend
 - c. Full guerilla offensive
- 5 Consolidation and shadow governance

Mao's Phases

- 1 Organization, consolidation, and preservation
- 2 Progressive expansion through sporadic attacks
- 3 Decision, or destruction of the enemy

Figure 1. Mao's guerrilla warfare aligned to SORO's resistance phases.

Notice that Mao's three phases nest into SORO's phase number four and comprise only one part of a larger effort. Recall that Mao said as much when describing that guerilla warfare cannot succeed by itself;¹² it has to be part of the seven-step Chinese communist national revolutionary policy against Japanese imperialism. The SORO five-phase construct also loosely maps onto Mao's seven-step

national policy, but it discusses the organizational and underground activities more fully.

The phasing construct from the SORO, and as will be seen those from political science and social movement theory, seeks to describe events broader than guerilla warfare. The first two stages only briefly mention military operations of the resistance. Instead, they focus on non-military actions, such as demonstrations, protests, and development of underground and auxiliary elements (for more information on undergrounds and auxiliary, see *Human Factors and Undergrounds*¹³). This focus contrasts with Mao, Galula, FM-3-24 on COIN, and ATP 3-05.1 on UW in which the majority of the description of the phases discussed military activities, vice non-military actions. The academic disciplines consulted next focus on non-military actions, more than military activities.

ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES – A MULTI-DISCIPLINARY REVIEW

In addition to historical and contemporary military perspectives, this study also consulted the disciplines of law, political science, and social movement theory. Law produced a clear spectrum, but with a narrow purpose, so it is addressed here but does not significantly contribute to the original construct proposed later. Political science and social movement theory provided the most useful frameworks for conceptualizing the full spectrum of resistance beyond insurgencies and guerillas and significantly contributed to the original construct proposed later in this pocket guide.

International Law

The ARIS study *Legal Implications of the Status of Persons in Resistance* explains how international humanitarian law applies during resistance movements using a spectrum (see Figure 2). The result is a phasing construct for resistance movements based in international law.

A resistance group's progression along these stages is determined:

- By the intensity of the group's activities
- By the organization
- By the duration of the resistance at that point.

Higher intensity, greater organization, and a longer duration move the resistance to the right along the continuum (see Figure 3). Progressing along the continuum indicates that the resistance increasingly resembles a state actor. International law uses this scale to determine which area of law applies and which legal protections participants should expect. Such protections depend on whether the hostilities qualify as an armed conflict.




Figure 2. Continuum from legal protests to insurgency and belligerency.

International court cases (see *Prosecutor v. Tadic*, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and its progeny) and treaties (see Geneva Convention Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II) clearly say that a resistance is not an armed conflict until it reaches the level of an insurgency, in which case it constitutes a non-international armed conflict governed by international law. In the three phases to the left of insurgency, normal peace-time law applies, but in insurgency and belligerency the protections of international humanitarian law apply.




Figure 3. Resistance movements on the continuum.

While this construct provides clear variables and a structure, it was developed for a specific purpose, namely, to help determine when an armed conflict exists to know which legal protections apply to the relevant actors. Nonetheless, grappling with the characterizations of each stage and identifying where a given resistance falls on the continuum can help the soldier and planner characterize the movement they are encountering.

Political Science and Social Movement Theory

The disciplines of political science and social movement theory are addressed together because they jointly contributed the most to developing this study's states of resistance construct. They exhibit a pattern:

- Begins with building discontent among a population
- Followed by coalescing that discontent into an agreed viewpoint and narrative amongst a loosely organized segment of the population
- Directing that discontent through violent or nonviolent direct oppositional behavior
- Leading to a moment of significant confrontation between the resistance and the government that acts as a turning point
- Established itself by surviving attempts either to destroy it, take it over, or appease it
- Can reach variety of possible resolutions, including success, failure, co-optation, and dormancy.

The different constructs commonly focus on nonmilitary actions to externally express resistance and internally support the resistance. When military actions are discussed, they are employed in addition to non-military measures and they begin near what could be considered the middle of the resistance life cycle.

For example, Lyford Edwards, a reverend and professor who worked closely with the University of Chicago Department of Sociology, wrote that revolution is the extreme result of long and unnoticed social change. He characterized the beginning of resistance as when individuals experience or perceive dissatisfaction beyond

what is normal, whether it be economic hardship, ethnic or religious discrimination, or political repression.

As individuals express their discontent openly, they discover one another, sympathize, and build toward social, as opposed to individual, discontent.¹⁴ However, there is not yet organization or thought of revolution; there is only collective dissatisfaction.

Edwards' Five Stages of Revolution¹⁵

1. Preliminary Symptoms: vague general unrest and dissatisfaction brews in society.
2. Advanced Symptoms: the formation of a narrative justifying and spreading the resistance.
3. Outbreak of Revolution: an event leads people to choose a side, separating repressors from repressed and their respective followers.
4. Crisis in Revolution: the radical wing of the resistance vilifies and attacks its real and perceived opponents.
5. Return to Normalcy: moderates and conservatives bring back the status quo.

Similarly, historian Crane Brinton and Professor Paul Meadows describe the early stages as the incubation of unrest driven by insecurity.¹⁶ Although, Brinton's construct does not cover this incubation period. His first stage starts with organized groups taking concrete actions and focuses on alternating regimes.

In social movement theory, Professor Rex Hopper described this period in resistance as when unrest is milling, but there is uncertainty with regard to the actions that should be taken to address it and the actors against whom these actions should occur.¹⁷ In Hopper's construct, agitators and propagandists who ignite the passions of

people by appealing to generic complaints and issues influence the resistance and could become leaders in it.¹⁸

Brinton's Four Stages of Revolution

1. **Preliminary:** Opposition groups compete with one another taking actions against the governing regime.
2. **First/Moderate Regime:** The governing regime is shown to be incapable of ruling when it tries to respond to opposition groups, and the moderate opposition group(s) seize power and establish legitimacy.
3. **Crisis/Radical Regime:** The moderate regime is challenged by conservative supporters of the old regime and supporters of the radical opposition groups. Greater organization and fanaticism enable the radical regime to takeover.
4. **Recovery:** To avoid a new revolution against itself, the radical regime is forced to soften and moderate until it resembles the original regime that governed before the moderates seized power.

Multiple constructs view the coalescence of this general, individual discontent as another phase. Brinton, Hopper, and Jonathan Christiansen characterize this coalescence as:¹⁹

- When discernible collective actions begin occurring
- Organizations (however loose or formal) form
- Ideas and narrative about what is wrong and who is responsible become clear.

Writers referred to the emergence of leadership, organization, and action by groups as markers of progress. For example, Brinton highlights the turn to concrete action for a shared cause, as opposed to separate, random acts.²⁰ Others, like Hopper, Edwards, and Bob

Jessop, call attention to the development and crystallization of a narrative, as well as the formation of an organization with a view toward strategy.²¹ The *CIA Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency* fits well with these more academically focused writers when it describes the activities of its incipient phase as centered on identity, leadership, popular support, and logistics, even though it expressly addresses insurgencies and not resistance more generally.²²

Meadow's Three Phases of Revolution

1. **Incubation:** Ideas about what to fight for and against formulate and drive the construction of narratives by different individuals and groups.
2. **Crisis:** Organized groups turn those ideas and narratives into actions, often violent, that prompt a crisis that removes or changes the laws, policies, people, practices, or institutions that were identified as unacceptable in phase 1. The resistance attempts to exert control over information and violence.
3. **Reconciliation:** The resistance has succeeded and now must adapt to governing, consolidate its authority, and bring social and political stability.

The phasing constructs the team found then move on to variously characterize direct confrontation with the host nation government.

Some refer to it as a crisis and outbreak of revolution.²³ Others call it a formal stage in which the opponent's authority decisively breaks down.²⁴ Brinton viewed this as outbreak of revolution and the seizure of power through losing legitimacy, financial collapse, symbolic actions, and dramatic events.²⁵ Meadows viewed the clash between the resistance and the entity it resists as the peak of the

resistance, wherein the organized resistance group takes structured collective action to remove obstacles and assert new power.²⁶ While the scholars refer to violent and military actions being used in these circumstances, they also discuss the importance of continuing to strengthen the resistance internally through increased organization, developing leaders, and devising a strategy.²⁷ Social movement theory showed a tendency not to separate confrontation between the movement and the government. It appears that a violent or nonviolent inflection or turning point is particular to resistance in political science.²⁸ The literature overall asserted that confrontation between the resistance and the government came only after general discontent formed specific, shared discontent and was enabled by organization and leadership in the resistance to become collective actions directed at the government that had been cast by the shared narrative as the source of the problem the resistance seeks to address.

CIA's Four Stages of Insurgency

1. **Pre-insurgency:** primarily underground activities with no violence. Activities in the open are nonviolent political activity. Organization, leadership, grievances, and identity are only incipient and undeveloped. Recruitment, training, and stockpiling arms and supplies may be occurring.
2. **Incipient Conflict:** First use of violence by insurgents. Group is balancing demonstrating viability, publicizing its case, and rallying supporters versus provoking and surviving a government response.
3. **Open Insurgency:** No doubt exists that the government faces an insurgency because it is openly challenging state authority and attempting to exert control over territory. Attacks increase in intensity, violence, frequency, and

sophistication. The political potential of the insurgency is apparent: it is attempting to replace and not just undermine state authority.

4. Resolution: Three possible end-states – insurgent victory, negotiated settlement, or government victory. Insurgent victory is the only likely clear-cut result, but still carries risk of new conflict. Negotiated settlement faces numerous risks and delays, including renewed violence or reversion to an earlier stage. Government victory likely to be drawn out with an indistinct end.

Across the literature, there was a final stage that took some form of incorporation into society either as a member of the governing structure or the new governing force. Meadows, for instance, describes how the resistance must consolidate its gains and authority to establish its role in providing stability.²⁹ Hopper discusses that the resistance must be able to institutionalize itself as a permanent fixture acceptable to the social attitudes of the time.³⁰

However, the work of Sidney Tarrow helps explain how there are smaller cycles within these larger phases; that resistance is a continuously churning series of feedback loops.³¹ Tarrow referred to this as a mechanism and process approach, and he identified the mechanism in those processes as:³²

- Perceived opportunities and threats
- Attribution of threats
- Demographic changes such as population growth
- Resource fluctuations
- Relational mechanisms like contact with new parties that relate to the cause.

As cycles take place tactics and approaches trend from protest campaigns toward directed action and violence. An important contribution from this scholarship is the emphasis on the continuously adapting nature of resistance. It reminds analysts, planners, and ARSOF soldiers not to view resistance too linearly or as a step-by-step process, but as a series of back and forth interactions between the resistance and the government. As these interactions occur, each side adjusts in response to the other. The CIA *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency* also reiterates that the particular path of a specific resistance will be case specific. They can skip stages, revisit stages, and die anytime.³³

Overall, the political science and social movement theory literatures provided multiple examples of phasing constructs that characterize a resistance's evolution as moving from hot debate to contentious actions like demonstrations or terrorism. They start with the spread of discontent, develop clarity in the discontent and its source, spread the now clear discontent to more of the population, and drive organization and leadership until the resistance moves from thought to action based.

It is at this point in a resistance lifecycle that the constructs from political science and social movement theory can merge with those from military history and doctrine because the focus turns from forming a basis in ideas and developing an organization to taking action.

To be sure, the military history and doctrine constructs include mention of developing narratives and leveraging ideas about discontent as well as forming an organization, but they focus on developing armed capacity for violence, whereas the constructs from political science and social movement theory focus on developing organizational and operational capacity for non-violent action.

The military perspectives and the social science perspectives are not incompatible; they complement one another. To describe the full spectrum of resistance, they must be combined so that the result accounts for the non-military and non-violent concepts and developments found in social science literature, as well as the non-military, military, and violent concepts and developments found in military literature. One might, therefore, think about a resistance lifespan as beginning in social science concepts and picking up military-based concepts, particularly insurgency and guerilla warfare and their preparations, then operating together toward a resolution.

The legal continuum demonstrates this idea in a highly specific manner: it begins with a focus on coalescing around a set of ideas and building organization, then progresses to a focus on direct action, violent or nonviolent, that confronts government forces (including not just armed and security forces but reigning government structures that are viewed as requiring resistance).

For instance, professor and sociologist Lyford Edwards' construct introduces a potential for military action in its third stage, outbreak of revolution. However, it is also worth noting that he describes this stage as signaled by some act that separates the repressed and its followers from the repressors and their followers. That act does not necessarily need to be violent or even illegal; it could be non-violent and legal like a mass protest. The legal continuum operates under the assumption of moving from non-violent to violent tactics. However, resistance can take either form.

For the purposes of this study, the team attempted to combine the political science and social movement theory and create a flexible construct to analyze resistance movements that employ violent methods as well as those that do not. Toward that end, we identified a few key takeaways.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

- ◆ Military literature tends to focus on describing guerilla warfare and insurgencies, but resistance includes more varieties.
- ◆ In discussing phasing constructs, political science and social movement theory literature tend to spend more time describing non-military and non-violent aspects of a wider array of resistance.
- ◆ Military literature and the academic literature are not mutually exclusive; they complement one another with different emphases.
- ◆ Because resistance includes both non-military, non-violent forms and militaristic, violent forms, a phasing construct for resistance should incorporate and accommodate both bodies of literature.
- ◆ Resistance starts with some form of general, vague unrest by a part of the population. A resistance might appear to start with a flash, which may indicate that the preliminary incubation period was fast, not necessarily that it did not happen.
- ◆ As resistance movements form and advance, a narrative is crucial to explain the purpose of the resistance and motivations for people to join. The creation and dissemination of a narrative both signals and enables the growth of the resistance.
- ◆ Characteristics of different stages are continuous and cumulative. Do not be overly strict about which characteristics appear in which state; there is some flexibility and characteristics build throughout the states.

- ◆ Each movement will follow its own unique path that might include doubling back and revisiting states, jumping over a state, remaining in a state for an extended period, failing at any state, or succeeding at earlier states. Any visual representation will have to facilitate or allow for that flexibility.
- ◆ A states of resistance framework should address more than the guerilla warfare component. It will have to include activities outside of armed violence.
- ◆ By the same token, a states of resistance framework should not ignore guerilla warfare—regularly shown to be a part of resistance.
- ◆ Resistance movements can take many forms with different goals and tactics, so a phasing framework to help operators evaluate the one they encounter and help academia compare across different cases should accommodate the diversity of forms, goals, and tactics found in resistance movements. It should also include violent and nonviolent, legal and illegal, covert and overt, durable and short-lived.

NEW PROPOSED CONSTRUCT: STATES OF RESISTANCE

The phased framework of a resistance movement's life cycle proposed in this paper is a synthesis of the multidisciplinary literature on the subject. The states of resistance model adapts from commonalities in the literature and the evolution of academic thought, as well as military theories and doctrine. This phasing construct is a framework that users can apply in comparative and contemporary case studies, allowing the user to shed light on specific mechanisms that led resistance movements to take different developmental paths. It is important to emphasize that




Figure 4. Proposed states for phasing construct analysis.

this framework seeks to avoid imposing conclusions or yielding conclusions of its own. Instead, any conclusions and developments should emerge from the analysis and best judgment of the trained soldier or from deeper research by academics examining the shared dynamics of violent and nonviolent resistance movements. To demonstrate, the ARIS team utilized the new framework to illustrate the development of all forty-six case studies in both volumes of the *ARIS Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare*, demonstrating a coding methodology through comparative analysis of patterns across the cases. That demonstration can be found in the appendix of *Understanding States of Resistance*.

The boxes in the diagram in Figure 4 represent each state, and the right edge of each box has an arrow shape to indicate movement from the left to the right, whether it is state by state or skipping a state. The circular arrows on top of each state capture a movement's ability to move backward and revisit a previous state. All of the circular arrows on the top feed into one another, as well as the immediately preceding state. These connections illustrate how a resistance can move around in the states, whether forward by one, back by two, forward by two, and so on. On the bottom of the diagram, there are off ramps representing paths the resistance could take to resolution represented by the circle that is below the states. The possible paths listed in the graphic are many, and not all are covered in this document. For a complete list of explanations, consult *Understanding States of Resistance*.

The States of Resistance

The proposed five states of resistance are: (1) preliminary, (2) incipient, (3) crisis, (4) institutionalization, and (5) resolution. The first four states can be consecutive, or a resistance can toggle between and across states. A resistance can move into a resolution state from any of the other four, but the particular type of resolution will vary because some resolutions are particular to certain states. Detailed descriptions of each state follow.

Preliminary State: Incubation

The first state of resistance is the preliminary state, also referred to as “latent” in Army doctrine³⁴ or “emergence” in modern social movement theory.³⁵ **The preliminary state’s most defining feature is the growth of unorganized and unattributed unrest.** It

Increase in general unrest among disparate actors without coordination. Unclear or multiple conceptions of grievances, responsibility for them, and how to solve them.

occurs when the population begins to perceive that its legitimate aspirations are repressed or hindered, albeit without knowing exactly how, why, or necessarily by whom. This is the **infancy of a resistance**, well before a conscious effort to build an organized movement.³⁶ Whether characterized as **incubation**,³⁷ or **milling** and **circular interaction**, undirected restlessness slowly becomes directed.³⁸ As noted before, Mao, ATP 3-05, and Galula did not propose phases similar to this preliminary phase; those constructs assume the preexistence of an aggrieved population and offer the organization of an already motivated population as the first phase.³⁹

RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: Solidarity⁴⁰

The years 1956 to 1976 mark the preliminary state of the Solidarity movement in Poland. In this state, the movement is not represented through the single organization of Solidarity, but through emerging disparate groups and activity. Aggrieved social groups, primarily students, workers, and intellectuals remain disparate and act independently. For example, during workers' strikes in 1956 and 1970, students did not participate, while the workers did not participate in the student protests in 1968. Meanwhile, intellectuals distance themselves from protests in favor of focusing on concessions and reform within the government. Despite separate, uncoordinated actions, demands for free organization, speech, and association are largely in concert across the resistance's groups. During this period, economic downturns and subsequent government cuts bring about an increase in general unrest and insecurity. Despite a hike in unrest, the goals and strategies of the resistance remain uncertain.

This state is also characterized by a renewed focus on and vocalization of historical, political, and religious grievances among Polish citizens. A history of Russian oppression tracing back to the eighteenth-century blends with dissatisfaction against the standing Soviet-backed regime to foster a Polish identity for the resistance against a common enemy. The influence of the church in the resistance also contributes to the narrative of a common struggle against oppression by providing the resistance with symbols and rituals that resonated with the people. This renewed focus on history and identity provides a salient narrative to a population willing to come together in struggle against a common enemy, enabling Solidarity to amass a popular following that reached fourteen million members.

Incipient State: Coalescence

Transition to the next state of resistance occurs when **disparate factors coalesce into a clear and identifiable narrative**. It also features loose and/or formal **organizations mobilizing**. One can think of it as participants with a clear sense of what is wrong and who is responsible, and they are beginning to take limited actions, including organization.⁴¹ This phase is called coalescence in much of social movement theory,⁴² but it has also been referred to in the literature as the incipient phase.⁴³ **The defining feature of the incipient state is the development of intentional organization and a common narrative:**

- Leaders come forward and shape the movement.⁴⁴
- Grievances become explicit, widespread, and open.⁴⁵
- Coordination between once separated actors becomes organized and strategic in its outlook.⁴⁶

Some specific indicators identified in the literature include the formation of an intellectual cadre,⁴⁷ as well as early signs of factions within the movement.⁴⁸ Incipient state activities are evident in Mao's organization and political unification phases, as well as SORO's organization and covert activity phases.⁴⁹

Leaders and organizations emerge as conceptions of grievance, responsibility, and solution narrow and crystalize. Outlook becomes formalized and strategic instead of short term/hap-hazard, as does the pattern of action the resistance engages in. As organizational level increases and views crystalize, factions develop.

RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: Orange Revolution⁵⁰

The Orange Revolution in Ukraine experienced the incipient state from 1999 through 2004. Opposition to President Leonid Kuchma's standing government coalesces throughout 1999 and 2000, most notably after three events in 2000: Kuchma's rumored authorization of the murder of an investigative journalist, his removal of Deputy Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, and the subsequent removal of his popular prime minister, Viktor Yushchenko. These events, on top of claims of electoral fraud from the 1999 election, brought previously disparate groups together and provided a clear sense of what is wrong and who is to blame. Discernable collective action and mobilization against the regime ensued, exemplified by the "Ukraine without Kuchma" campaign and anti-government protests in Kiev through 2000 and 2001. This period also saw the development of resistance leaders and an intellectual cadre. Interestingly, this leadership evolved largely from Kuchma's removed inner circle, most notably Tymoshenko and Yushchenko. Strategies developed with a focus on resistance and revolution through electoral channels and peaceful protest. One example was the formation of the "Our Ukraine" Party by Yushchenko in 2002 and the party's get-out-the-vote campaign leading up to the 2004 elections. Believing that the overwhelming public support for new leadership (Kuchma, facing term limits, handpicks Yanukovich to run as his successor) would bring about change simply by getting people to the ballot box, the resistance focused solely on getting citizens to vote rather than advocating for its own nominee, Yushchenko, against Kuchma's handpicked successor, Yanukovich. The first round of elections in October 2004 did not produce a winner, and a runoff election was planned for November 21. Rampant electoral fraud in the runoff election incited massive protests, marking the revolution's transition into the crisis state.

Crisis State: Formalization and Outbreak of Action

The crisis state distinguishes resistance movements from social movements more generally.

The essential characteristic defining a resistance in the crisis state is a decisive moment of escalated confrontation with opponents, however long or short.

This moment can be **violent or nonviolent**, but allowing for a violent confrontation distinguishes this construct from

the ones the team consulted from social movement theory. Moving from an incipient to crisis state occurs **when the movement grows powerful enough to pose a serious threat to its opponent.** A threat becomes serious when the opponent escalates its approach because **previous methods of countering the resistance failed.** A resistance can be incentivized to escalate its actions, violent or nonviolent, when an incipient resistance gains power and influence. That escalation can bring about a confrontation with and real risk to the government. The idea of movements escalating to a state of outbreak or crisis is prominently acknowledged in the early literature on revolutions,⁵¹ but this notion became less common after the field shifted away from revolutions and toward the study of social movements more generally.⁵²

The crisis state features actions that mark the clear separation of the resistance from its opponents.⁵³ Scholars identified **signals of this state to include** a decisive loss of legitimacy by the government, financial collapse, breakdown in authority, strong symbolic actions,

Escalated and overt confrontation with opponents (violent or nonviolent) that demonstrates clear division of resistance and those opponents. Real threat to opponent's interests, authority, and/or existence such that they must respond.

and perception of dual sovereignty or provisional authority, among others.⁵⁴ This state is often characterized as the peak in revolutions, where a shift occurs from academic to militaristic values, structured collective action, and the strategic exercise of new power.⁵⁵ Maoist and related constructs straddle the crisis state between transitional stages—particularly the second and third phases of Mao’s three phases, buildup and employment, as labeled in ATP 3-05 on unconventional warfare, and SORO’s transition from expansion to militarization.⁵⁶

RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: Provisional Irish Republican Army⁵⁷

From January to July of 1972, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), known locally as the Provos or RA, was in the crisis state. The maintenance of barricaded “no-go” and “free” zones in Derry/Londonderry and Belfast during this period contributed to perceptions of provisional authority and separation of resistance from opponents. Heightened contention and escalation of resistance action occurred after British troops killed thirteen civilian demonstrators at the civil rights march that became known as “Bloody Sunday.” Public and international backlash against the British government increased its vulnerability to resistance demands. Additionally, an escalation in resistance action occurred in retaliation, most notably a violent bombing campaign. As the resistance threat intensified, the British government initiated secret talks between the IRA and British Secretary of State. The secret talks were unsuccessful, and in July 1972, IRA bombs exploded across Belfast in what is known as “Bloody Friday,” resulting in nine civilian deaths. Despite backlash from the “Bloody Friday” bombings, the IRA persisted through the crisis state and transitioned into the institutional state.

Institutional State: Bureaucratization

Referred to as bureaucratization in modern social movement theory,⁵⁸ the institutional state of resistance exists if the group or movement either persists through, or gains strength from, the crisis state. Surviving the crisis state deepens its organizational and strategic prowess as an established opposition player, and it broadens its appeal and long-term staying power. In other words, **the essential characteristic of a resistance in the institutional state is an established role in society.**

Resistance has survived crisis confrontation(s) with opponents and needs to consolidate gains. Viewed more equally to its opposition and possesses long-term staying power. Resistance organization establishes its role in society.

Scholarship characterizes this post-crisis state by **the need for the resistance to consolidate its gains and authority and to secure its role in providing stability.**⁵⁹ As Professor Hopper claims in his social movement theory scholarship, “the out group must finally be able to legalize or organize their power” as a permanent organization “that is acceptable to the current mores.”⁶⁰ As an example of how political science and military constructs complement one another, Maoist and derivative phasing constructs regard the institutional state of specifically violent resistance movements in their consolidation, transition, or regaining lost territories phases.⁶¹ The institutional state is the most mature phase of resistance before resolution (either successful or otherwise), but **it can persist almost indefinitely if resolution is not achieved.**

RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: Hizbollah⁶²

Hizbollah in Lebanon is an example of resistance in the institutional state that presently remains in this state. In July 1993, Hizbollah transitioned into the institutional state after cease-fires ended the Seven Day War against Israel. By this time, there existed a perception of Hizbollah as a provisional authority and legitimate representative of the Shi'a population in Lebanon. Additionally, Hizbollah operated as a political and paramilitary organization, participating in Lebanese elections as well as armed confrontation against Israel. For these reasons, Hizbollah transitioned into the institutional state as an equal opposition player with broadened appeal.

Hizbollah's organizational and strategic prowess deepened in this period as attacks against Israel/Israeli targets became more sophisticated, characterized by cyber attacks, rocket launches, terrorist activity, and war from 2006 to 2008. The group structuralized its role through control of media outlets, including a satellite channel and several radio stations and newspapers, and signaled its consolidation of authority and gains in domestic support with significant electoral victories in 2009. Hizbollah demonstrated its continued staying power through its recent involvement in the Syrian Civil War, fighting with Assad against Sunni rebels, and in domestic political conflicts in 2011, 2013, and 2014. The institutional status of Hizbollah was further signaled by international recognition of the political arm of Hizbollah within Lebanese politics, with only the armed wing considered a terrorist organization. Given Hizbollah's persistence and continued role as an equal opposition player, a resistance resolution state has not been reached.

Purposefully Prolonged Incipient States: Abeyance

Abeyance (sometimes referred to as dormancy⁶³) is technically not a resolution because it does not mark the end of the resistance. Instead, it occurs when the resistance group or movement consciously practices little or no mobilization and reverts to an incipient state of “inward... focus on identity or values.”⁶⁴ Essentially, the resistance chooses to remain in the incipient state. During this time, it avoids decisive confrontations and reduces recruitment efforts. Scholars argue that abeyance allows movements to “sustain themselves...through internal structures” and orient themselves internally to maintain their values, identity, and political vision.⁶⁵ Another scholar similarly theorizes that a movement’s abeyance provides a measure of continuity for groups. It allows them to successfully build a base of support despite confronting a political and social environment unreceptive to its message or struggle.⁶⁶ A resistance movement in abeyance can reemerge and remobilize after reinforcing its group identity and developing a larger support base. Therefore, abeyance can be thought of as deliberately prolonging the time spent in the incipient state, as opposed to a resolution.

Resolution Paths

The diagram shows “off-ramps” taking a resistance to a resolution state where the movement ends. The presence of an off-ramp leaving each state down to resolution shows that a resistance can end from any state. Each off-ramp has a variety of types of resolution paths written next to it, and while many of them repeat, there are a few paths that are specific to a particular state.⁶⁷ Social movement theory refers to the ending of a resistance as decline.⁶⁸ The Maoist and related phasing constructs do not specify a diversity

of resolution states. Instead, they assume insurgent or guerrilla success and a subsequent need to consolidate power in a transition to governing.⁶⁹ To strike a balance between the negative connotation of failure captured in the word decline and the assumption of success found in Mao's construct, this study uses the term "resolution." The team found this term used in the *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency* by the CIA, which outlines several outcomes in the resolution stage.⁷⁰ This term is preferred for its neutrality; a resistance can reach resolution because it succeeds, fails, stalls, evolves, and more.

Radicalization

Radicalization is "a shift in ideological commitments toward the extremes and/or the adoption of more disruptive and violent forms of contention."⁷¹ Radicalization can be thought of as a "mechanism for demobilization" often simultaneous with the resolution of a rival wing of the movement via institutionalization; one wing radicalizes while the other institutionalizes itself in society.⁷² As the institutionalized wing moderates its positions and tactics, the radical wing moves further toward nonnegotiable positions and tactics that are more escalatory, confrontational, and violent.

RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: The Chechen Revolution⁷³

A wing of this movement experienced a radical Islamist shift, distancing the movement from its initial nationalist-separatist demands. Increased Russian opposition caused regionalization, dispersion of resources, and exacerbation of internal cleavages. This resolution state also resulted from Putin's hardline rhetoric of the resistance as terrorists, highlighting the gap between the resistance and the Chechen people.

Institutionalization

Institutionalization is the opposite of radicalization: the resistance adopts more conventional views and less disruptive actions. The process of institutionalization is characterized by a group seeking “accommodations with elites and electoral advantage” by moderating its tactics and goals.⁷⁴ During this resolution process, the group transforms itself into a permanent organization “acceptable to the current mores.”⁷⁵ This institutionalization can often occur simultaneously with radicalization by another wing of the group. While both lead to a decline in the movement, institutionalization may be seen as at least a partial success of the movement. However, depending on the perceived extent of this success, the resistance movement may lose its initial motivations.

RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: Palestine Liberation Organization⁷⁶

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) offers an example of resolution by institutionalization. The PLO entered into the resolution state through institutionalization in January 2006. Resolution through institutionalization is characterized by the resistance seeking accommodations with power-holding elites and adopting more conventional forms of contention. The PLO made a slow transition from the institutional state to resolution through institutionalization. Throughout the institutional state, the PLO moderated its tactics and shifted from armed resistance to diplomacy and bureaucratization, most notably through its recognition of Israeli statehood, participation in the 1993 Oslo Accords, and creation of the Palestinian Authority. This moderation of tactics led to a decline in popular support over time and allowed the more radical Hamas to gain footing among the public. The shift in popular support to the more radical Hamas was evidenced

by its electoral control of the Palestinian Legislative Council after 2006 elections and violent takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007. The victory of Hamas in the January 2006 elections signaled the PLO's transition into the resolution institutionalization state. The PLO continues to act as a representative for the Palestinian movement, especially among international audiences. In 2010, the PLO agreed to US-mediated talks with Israel, seeking to gain autonomy for Palestine. As of this writing, the PLO is in operation but largely through diplomatic, institutionalized channels rather than armed resistance.

Repression

Repression occurs when the government or other authority uses force to stop movement organizations from functioning or prevent people from joining.⁷⁷ The tactics of repression include:

- Indictment
- Infiltration
- Physical attacks
- Harassment
- Threats to job and school access
- The spread of false information
- "Anything else that makes it more difficult for the movement to put its views before relevant audiences."⁷⁸

While those actions can lead to resolution, it can also cause the resistance to splinter, where the radical components become more extreme and only moderates demobilize.⁷⁹ Repression becomes a resolution state when the government uses it in such a way to

effectively halt the resistance, not necessarily where it splinters the resistance and creates a more radical offshoot.

RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: Hungarian Revolution, Shining Path, and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam⁸⁰

Each one of these resistance movements reached resolution by being repressed militarily by the government. In the Hungarian Revolution the Soviet Union initially lost control of Hungary to the revolutionaries in October 1956. However, on November 4 the Soviet Union sent in tank units and forcefully removed the revolutionary government and reinstalled a one-party communist regime within a week. In Peru, the government intelligence forces captured more than a thousand high- and mid-level leaders, including the charismatic leader of the entire movement, Abimael Guzman (who was found because the trash at an apartment under surveillance for Shining Path activity included tubes for psoriasis cream, which Guzman was known to have). This left an enormous leadership vacuum in the movement and it broke down into various rural self-defense units. For the following year government forces militarily confronted those remaining Shining Path elements and forcefully repressed them. The Peruvian government also induced Guzman to publicly denounce the use of violence and call for peace. By 1999 the country-sides of Peru, Shining Path's origins, were peaceful again. In Sri Lanka, the LTTE reached resolution when it conceded defeat after an offensive by the Sri Lankan army in May 2009. The group had suffered significant setbacks when western countries designated it as a terrorist organization, and it was weakened drastically and lost significant territory when LTTE defectors joined with the Sri Lankan government forces.

Facilitation

Facilitation occurs when the government or its agents bring about the decline of a resistance by satisfying at least some of the claims of contenders.⁸¹ This acquiescence can be accomplished at the same time as using limited and selective means of repression.⁸² This form of resolution functions by dividing the resistance. When the government facilitates some but not all of the resistance group's claims, such efforts can attract moderates to legitimate action or satisfy elites with the government response. Meanwhile, satisfying only some of the group's demands, with public acceptance by the moderates, can frustrate and inspire radicals who want more change. In turn, such a split can weaken the resistance, especially if it coincides with a decline in popular support because the larger population is satisfied with the government's responses and does not support the radicals.

RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: Irish Republican Army⁸³

The IRA transitioned into the resolution state on April 10, 1998 through facilitation. The facilitation resolution state is marked by a decline in resistance through satisfaction of some resistance claims or demands by the government. In the case of the IRA, the decline of resistance occurred when the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) or Belfast Agreement in 1998 satisfied some demands of the IRA. The agreement enacted policing reforms, released political prisoners, set up provisions for a popular vote on Northern Ireland's status, and established power-sharing institutions in line with IRA demands. After the agreement, Sinn Fein, the political arm of IRA, became one of largest parties in Northern Ireland and remains active to this day. The agreement also led to the disarmament of the IRA, and in 2005, international observers announced the complete

demobilization of the IRA. Popular support for the agreement was displayed when 71% of voters in Northern Ireland and 94% in Ireland voted in favor of the resolution in 1999. Despite these achievements, the primary movement goal of an independent and unified Ireland was not met, and the resistance entered the resolution state.

Success

A resistance can succeed by setting goals, achieving them, and then fading away because it is no longer acting as a resistance but is part of governance. However, it is more common for movements to be forced into compromises that include concessions by the government that also transform them into mere interest groups.⁸⁴ The shape of success, and the concessions required, also reveal internal fractures within the resistance movement that lead to decline. For instance, some members of the resistance movement may see success when certain goals are achieved, but others may see success only when the movement continues to grow. However, growth may also include the addition of members who are less committed to the original resistance than earlier members, leading to factions that weaken the movement overall. In considering the complexity of a movement's success, one should consider how a resistance can be forced to change its values or demands and lose some of its identity or attraction to gain concessions from the government as part of a compromise. Therefore, in succeeding, the resistance ends up in some ways no longer claiming to represent an aggrieved or radical population. Instead, it becomes part of the dominant society, and it no longer represents an opposition group.⁸⁵

RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: The Orange Revolution⁸⁶

The Orange Revolution in Ukraine is an example of a resistance movement that transitioned to the resolution state through success. Resolution through success indicates some degree of fulfillment of resistance goals, as well as the decline of the resistance in response to those successes. The Orange Revolution transitioned from the crisis state to the resolution state through success on December 26, 2004, when a third election took place and Yushchenko, the resistance's candidate, won by a clear margin. After a prolonged legal battle waged by Yanukovich, the Supreme Court upheld Yushchenko's electoral victory, and Yushchenko was sworn in as Ukraine's president on January 23, 2005, signaling the successful resolution of the resistance. The resistance further deteriorated after the decisive election due to the absence of a unifying enemy (Kuchma/Yanukovich), and ultimately Yanukovich was elected as president in 2010, defeating former resistance leader Tymoshenko. The re-emergence of the resistance continues to be debated in light of the 2014 uprisings in Kiev, the ousting of Yanukovich, and the ongoing conflict in Eastern regions of the country.

Failure

An internal divide in a resistance movement can threaten the movement as a whole. Failure refers to the internal collapse of a resistance, rather than being undone by outside forces. This resolution state is particular to issues within the specific resistance organization, rather than attributable to overpowering external conditions (though the two can be related). Accordingly, factors that lead to the failure of a resistance in this sense are highly specific to the individual resistance.

There are six ways of failure as identified by scholars. The first two ways are described by a scholar as factionalism and encapsulation.⁸⁷

- Factionalism results when the organization's members cannot agree on the direction of the movement. This leads to an internal conflict that is eventually fatal to the organization and the movement.⁸⁸
- Encapsulation refers to when the organization produces an ideology or structure at odds with recruiting efforts and setting demands. Interference with recruiting leads to a critical decline in the movement's capabilities and ability to mobilize.⁸⁹

Scholars from the University of California, in a 1960 article, "The Failure of an Incipient Social Movement," identified the other four ways of failing:⁹⁰

- Lack of utilizing pre-existing networks
- Inability to consolidate and incorporate leadership
- Failure to develop a program that receives widespread support
- Highly publicized embarrassing failures or setbacks.

First, movements can fail by neglecting to connect themselves with segments of the population through pre-existing networks, whether based in religion, labor, trade, the economy, or local government.⁹¹ These movements do not establish a communications approach that connects them with potential supporters and recruits.

Second, the movement's emergent leadership could fail to incorporate leaders from other localized groups, creating internal divisions that interfere with the movement's growth.⁹² As a resistance

grows, it will take on populations from different localities, and it needs to avoid alienating the new supporters and their leaders.

Third, the resistance may be choosing and building a program, including its goals, tactics, and values, that simply does not appeal to a majority of participants or the population.⁹³ Finally, the movement can suffer an embarrassing tactical loss or fail to meet inflated expectations.⁹⁴ If those embarrassments become well publicized, they can fatally weaken the resistance through a public image that the movement is inept, weak, disorganized, or not supported.⁹⁵

The scholars could not determine if just one of those circumstances could have independently undermined the movement they studied or if they all had to be present to make the resistance fail.⁹⁶ Whether only one of those circumstances was fatal or all of them combined, it can be said they are independently detrimental to a resistance and represent errors that resistance groups should avoid.

RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: Los Angeles County Property Tax Protest⁹⁷

On November 5, 1957, residents of Los Angeles County received tax bills reflecting an appreciable increase from the previous year. Over the following month, protests grew from eight hundred people at Covina High School to eight thousand protestors at Mt. San Antonio College stadium. The protests failed to organize or grow beyond those numbers or those actions. The tax assessor that had been the target of the protests was re-elected by an overwhelming majority, and all but one of the various neighborhood groups disbanded. Scholars point to all four possibilities noted above as contributing to this movement's failure to leave the incipient state. First, even though mass media carried extensive communication about the protests, the geographically dispersed neighborhood groups did not leverage pre-existing networks, such as veteran's organizations,

labor organizations, chambers of commerce, or religious organizations, to coordinate or consolidate between one another. Second, no leaders emerged who was followed by individuals beyond the locality from which they came. The various local leaders and personalities failed to combine their efforts. Additionally, because no previously established community-wide leaders were willing to be anything more than a figure head, the only individual identified by mass media as a community leader was inexperienced and unwilling to make working compromises; he refused to transform from agitator to statesman and so the movement stalled. Third, the groups failed to establish a program of goals and values that was accepted by the majority of protesters. Small families were willing to pay more in taxes for education, which other associations were not, and there was insufficient evidence and argument made to convince everyone that there were unfair, inequitable tax assessments. Finally, the movement suffered a perception of failure when it scheduled a mass meeting in a stadium that seated one hundred thousand people and six thousand to ten thousand people attended. The size of the venue made the crowd look meager. Various factors likely played a role in attendance, such as the location being far away through heavy traffic on a Friday and the weather being cold. There was a venue closer to the concerned communities that seated 6,400. Had the organizers chosen that venue the crowd would have appeared massive. After the event, the established community leaders who attended (former mayor, a movie and TV actor, TV news commentator, a State senator, a County Supervisor, and others) did not continue to associate with the movement. Scholars mark that meeting as the end of the movement.

Co-Optation

Co-optation occurs “when individual movement leaders are offered rewards [or positions] that advance them as individuals while ignoring the collective goals of the movement.”⁹⁸ This reward approach serves to align the resistance leadership with the interests of the government or residing power.⁹⁹ Groups that are “highly dependent on centralized authority or on charismatic leadership” are especially vulnerable to co-optation.¹⁰⁰ Beyond co-opting leadership, this process also includes:¹⁰¹

- Appropriation of the language, symbols, and tactics of the resistance
- Assimilation of resistance participants
- Transformation of resistance goals
- Regulation of enacted changes by state or vested interests.

Establishment with the Mainstream

This state of resolution occurs when the resistance becomes “an accepted part of the system—typically after realizing some of their goals—so that although they continue to flourish, they no longer challenge the status quo.”¹⁰² The resistance essentially transforms from an opposition voice into another voice in the chorus of the mainstream. Although establishment with the mainstream is similar to institutionalization, when a movement enters this state, it is accepted as a voice within the dominant power structure while avoiding co-optation. This means the resistance is not just a radical wing of the many parties involved in governance, but instead wields power in governance and decision-making. For instance, if the resistance becomes a marginal, radical party that only holds a few seats in government, it likely reached the resolution of

institutionalization or co-optation. If, however, it becomes an active, influential voice in a ruling coalition, the resistance has become established in the mainstream.

RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación¹⁰³

The Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, or FMLN) in El Salvador provides a useful example of resolution by establishment with the mainstream. The FMLN transitioned into the resolution state on January 16, 1992, through establishment with the mainstream after signing a peace accord with the Salvadoran government. Peace negotiations leading up to the 1992 accord would have been unlikely without both the growing influence of moderates within the FMLN who saw violence as unsustainable and unlikely to bring victory and the increasing exhaustion among the landed elite who suffered economically during the civil war.

By signing the accord, the FMLN accepted concessions from the government, most notably gaining recognition as a political party, allowing it to enter the mainstream. The accord addressed some of the FMLN's other critical demands by enacting land reforms to help the peasant class, creating an independent body (the United Nations [UN] Truth Commission for El Salvador) to investigate atrocities carried out during the war, establishing a civilian police force, and placing constitutional limits on the military's power. Lastly, the accord outlined the demobilization of both the FMLN and the Armed Forces of El Salvador, and demobilization was carried out under UN observation over eighteen months after the signing of the accord. Today, the FMLN operates as one of the largest parties in El Salvador.

Exhaustion

After a resistance movement matures, particularly in the face of an extended crisis state, the movement may experience gradual decline through “psychological exhaustion which undermines the emotional foundations of the revolution.”¹⁰⁴ This slow deflation of zeal for resistance accompanies the eventual success of the status quo and a return to normalcy.¹⁰⁵ Some scholars also cite the personal costs of resistance as contributing to this form of resolution: “although street protests, demonstrations, and violence are exhilarating at first... [resistance movements] involve risk, personal costs, and, eventually, weariness and disillusionment.”¹⁰⁶ This dynamic can also contribute to movement radicalization or institutionalization.

RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: The Bolivian Revolution¹⁰⁷

The path to resolution for the Bolivian Revolution included a mix of factionalism and exhaustion. The Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) succeeded in becoming the central government and the main political party at the center of Bolivian politics. However, from the late 1950's to 1964 the party experienced numerous splits based on policy and personality differences. Former President Hernan Siles Zuazo (1956-1960) for instance left the MNR and started a separate party. These divisions and dissatisfaction with some of the reforms reduced support from the grassroots components of the movement found in the agrarian and labor communities, particularly mining. The original supporters lost commitment and interest.

FRAMEWORK APPLICATIONS FOR THE ARSOF SOLDIER

Now let's consider some applications of this ARIS states of resistance framework. There are a variety of implications for ARSOF soldiers as they conduct their missions. Several "do"s and "don't"s follow that exemplify cases of how and when this framework can be applied. This framework will help ARSOF soldiers understand life cycles of resistance movements through its application to many different kinds of movements with varying goals and tactics.

This pocket guide has a few intended uses. ARSOF soldiers can:

- Review it before deploying.
- Read it and become familiar with the idea that frameworks exist to describe the evolution of resistance.
- Recall this framework during deployments and when faced with supporting or countering a resistance.
- Use the framework to organize situational information.
- Analyze the development and decline of a resistance.
- Assist in developing questions about a resistance to aid in planning and operations.
- Use the framework as a repository for information to share observations.
- Use it as a tool to train new ARSOF soldiers to the area of responsibility.
- Integrate the framework with ARSOF soldiers' knowledge of the area, circumstances, and people.

DO

- Use this framework as an analytical guide.
- Use this framework to organize information about and analyze a particular resistance.
- Use this framework to compare different resistance movements.
- Allow for some flexibility in applying the characteristics of each state to a resistance. No resistance is going to fit all the characteristics of every state, and often characteristics may bleed and straddle between states. Follow the defining ones.
- View the states as blending and blurring into one another at the edges. Seldom will there be a clear-cut line demarcating the end of one state and the beginning of another. The characteristics should be viewed as continuous and cumulative.

DON'T

- Expect this framework to tell you exactly what to do in your particular circumstances.
- Treat this framework as a predictive model. It can help you think about what could happen next based on how others have behaved in the past and the state of the one you encounter, but there is no mathematical reliability in this framework.
- Isolate this framework from the other analytical tools you have. It is not meant to replace ASCOPE/PMESII or any other analytical guide.

The ARIS team also hopes that academics will use this framework to analyze resistance movements. The larger volume on which this pocket guide is based, *Understanding States of Resistance*, provides a proof of concept for conducting such analysis. With these efforts, the construct can continue to improve through diverse feedback and the establishment of a more systematic study of the life cycle of resistance movements can be achieved.

SUMMARY

- Mao, FM 3-24, and Galula proposed useful phasing constructs for insurgencies and guerilla warfare.
- Resistance, however, includes more than guerilla warfare or insurgency, which can be natural parts of resistance.
- A phasing construct for insurgency and guerilla warfare would be too narrow to capture all of a resistance.
- Resistance needs a broader phasing construct to include states before and after guerilla warfare/insurgency, as well as the diverse goals, tactics, and composition of resistance movements.
- This pocket guide proposes a flexible, analytical framework for the states of resistance based on multidisciplinary literature, including military, law, economics, business, psychology, political science, and social movement theory. Political science and social movement theory proved the most valuable, and the construct reflects those elements the most.

- This framework consists of five states: (1) preliminary; (2) incipient; (3) crisis; (4) institutionalization; and (5) resolution.
 - *Preliminary state*: increase in general unrest among disparate actors who do not coordinate. The grievances, who is responsible for them, and how to solve them remain unclear or have multiple formulations.
 - *Incipient state*: leaders and organizations emerge as unclear grievances, responsibility, and solutions become clearer; segments of the population organize and develop strategy instead of act ad hoc. Degree of organization and formalization of actions and narrative sharpen. Factions can emerge.
 - *Crisis state*: the actions of the resistance escalate to overt confrontation with opponents (violent or nonviolent). Confrontation demonstrates the resistance threatens the opponent's interests, authority, legitimacy, and/or existence enough to force a stronger response aimed at destroying the resistance.
 - *Institutionalization state*: the resistance has survived its confrontation(s) with opponent and needs to consolidate its gains. The resistance now viewed more equally with its opponent, and it possesses long-term staying power via its internal organization (people, supplies, funding, intelligence, etc.). The resistance has established a role in society.

- *Resolution state*: can take many forms, and some of them are specific to a prior state. However, the important takeaway is that a resistance can reach resolution, whether positive or negative, from any state.
- A resistance can move around within the framework; it is not strictly linear. Guerilla warfare and resistance movement constructs share this characteristic.
- The ARSOF soldier should use this as an analytical framework to help him or her employ training and experience to make decisions. This framework will not give the user answers; it will help the user organize and analyze information about the resistance to support the mission.

For more detailed information about the consulted literature, please read the full volume of *Understanding States of Resistance*.

CONCLUSION

This pocket guide presented the reader with a short explanation of phasing constructs from a variety of fields, including military history, military doctrine, political science, international law, and social movement theory. It illustrated how constructs from the military perspective do not cover the whole spectrum of resistance because of their focus on guerilla and insurgency warfare. Likewise, constructs from the social sciences perspective also do not cover the whole spectrum of resistance because of their focus on non-military concepts.

Instead, they should be combined to accommodate the variety of resistance, and the continuum created by international law helps demonstrate how that can be done. It moves from nonviolent, lawful

resistance all the way to internal armed conflict that rises to the level of international armed conflict. That continuum, however, serves a highly specific purpose. It may help the ARSOF soldier, but its purpose is not to describe the life cycle of a resistance.

This guide then presented the study's proposed states of resistance construct. This construct includes five states—preliminary, incipient, crisis, institutionalization, and resolution—including a variety of possible resolution paths.

The construct is meant to enable and assist ARSOF soldiers to understand, describe, and communicate about a resistance, the object of their profession. It is not a predictive model. ARSOF soldiers still use the totality of their training and education and exercise their best judgment to determine the optimal course of action in each circumstance. This construct aims to improve upon past efforts, however, by being applicable for nonviolent and violent movements, movements with all types of motivations, and resistance across the globe.

The team does not pretend that the construct proposed here is the final and only answer. Instead, the team hopes this construct helps both the ARSOF community and the academic community by serving as a framework that can facilitate deeper investigation of resistance.

If the construct here is replaced in the future by an improved construct that helps the ARSOF community even more, it will have succeeded. If ARSOF soldiers learn from this pocket guide and improve their effectiveness, it will have succeeded. If ARSOF soldiers take this pocket guide with them and use it to help understand a resistance they must assist or counter, it will have succeeded. If the ARSOF soldier can do his or her job better, the ARIS program of work will have succeeded.

NOTES

- 1 US Department of the Army, *The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
- 2 See United States Army Special Operations Command, *Understanding States of Resistance* (Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC, 2018) for the full list of constructs considered by the team.
- 3 US Marine Corps, "Mao Tse-tung on Guerilla Warfare," FMFRP 12-18, 1989, 20-22.
- 4 *Ibid.*, p. 41-43.
- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 43.
- 6 US Department of the Army, *The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, 11-13.
- 7 *Ibid.*
- 8 Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," JP 1-02, February 15, 2016, 113.
- 9 US Department of the Army, *Unconventional Warfare*, Army Technical Publication 3-05.1 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2013), 2-6.
- 10 *Ibid.*
- 11 Andrew R. Molnar, *Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies* (Washington, DC: Special Operations Research Office, 1966), 2-3.
- 12 US Marine Corps, "Mao Tse-tung on Guerilla Warfare," 41.
- 13 Nathan Bos, et al., *Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies* Second Edition (Fort Bragg: US Army Special Operations Command, 2013); Robert Leonhard, et al., *Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare* Second Edition (Fort Bragg: US Army Special Operations Command, 2013).
- 14 *Ibid.*, 25. See pages 21-22 in *Understanding States of Resistance* for a longer discussion of Edwards' work.
- 15 Lyford P. Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), 23-25.
- 16 Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York: Vintage Books, 1965); Paul Meadows, "Sequence in Revolution," *American Sociological*

Review 6, no. 5 (1941): 707-709. See pages 22-23 in *Understanding States of Resistance* for more on Brinton and Meadows.

- 17 Rex Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process: A Frame of Reference for the Study of Revolutionary Movements," *Social Forces* 28, no. 3 (1950): 271-272. See pages 23-26 in *Understanding States of Resistance* for more on Hopper.
- 18 Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process," 271-272.
- 19 Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process," 272-275; Brinton, *Anatomy of Revolution*; Jonathan Christiansen, "Four Stages of Social Movements: Social Movements and Collective Behavior," Research Starters Academic Topic Overviews (Ipswich, MA: EBSCO Publishing, 2009), 3.
- 20 Brinton, *Anatomy of Revolution*; Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process," 272-275.
- 21 Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process;" Edwards, *Natural History of Revolution*, 38; Bob Jessop, "Reviewed Work: *The Natural History of Revolution* by Lyford P. Edwards," *Sociology* 6, no. 1 (1972): 130.
- 22 US Central Intelligence Agency, *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency 2012* (Washington, DC: US Government, 2012) 10-11.
- 23 Edwards, *Natural History of Revolution*, 98.
- 24 Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process," 275-277.
- 25 Brinton, *Anatomy of Revolution*.
- 26 Meadows, "Sequence in Revolution."
- 27 Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process," 275-277.
- 28 Christiansen, "Four Stages of Social Movements."
- 29 Meadows, "Sequence in Revolution."
- 30 Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process," 275-277.
- 31 Sidney G. Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, rev. and updated third ed. (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 185.
- 32 *Ibid.*, 187.
- 33 CIA, *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency*, 5.
- 34 US Department of the Army, "Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies," May 2014, 4-8.
- 35 Christiansen, "Four Stages of Social Movements."

- ³⁶ Edwards, *Natural History of Revolution*, 23-25.
- ³⁷ James Chowning Davies, "The J-Curve and Power Struggle Theories of Collective Violence," *American Sociological Review* 39, no. 4 (1974): 607-610; James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review* 27, no. 1 (1962): 5-19.
- ³⁸ Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process," 271-272.
- ³⁹ David J. Danelo, "Exploring the Phases of Contemporary Resistance," in *Special Topics in Irregular Warfare: Understanding Resistance*, ed. Erin Hahn (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2015) 11-13.
- ⁴⁰ Chuck Crossett, et al., *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962-2009* (Fort Bragg: US Army Special Operations Command, 2012), 645-672.
- ⁴¹ Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process," 272-275; Christiansen, "Four Stages of Social Movements," 3; Brinton, *Anatomy of Revolution*.
- ⁴² Christiansen, "Four Stages of Social Movements."
- ⁴³ Maurice Jackson, et al., "The Failure of an Incipient Social Movement," *Pacific Sociological Review* 3, no. 1 (1960): 35-40.
- ⁴⁴ Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process," 272-275.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 273; Christiansen, "Four Stages of Social Movements," 3.
- ⁴⁶ Christiansen, "Four Stages of Social Movements," 3.
- ⁴⁷ Edwards, *Natural History of Revolution*, 38; Jessop, "Reviewed Work: *The Natural History of Revolution*," 130.
- ⁴⁸ Brinton, *Anatomy of Revolution*.
- ⁴⁹ Danelo, "Exploring the Phases of Contemporary Resistance," 11-13.
- ⁵⁰ Crossett, et al., *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II*, 625-644.
- ⁵¹ Edwards, *Natural History of Revolution*; Brinton, *Anatomy of Revolution*; Meadows, "Sequence in Revolution."
- ⁵² Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process;" Christiansen, "Four Stages of Social Movements."
- ⁵³ Edwards, *Natural History of Revolution*, 98.
- ⁵⁴ Brinton, *Anatomy of Revolution*; Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process," 275-277.
- ⁵⁵ Meadows, "Sequence in Revolution."

- ⁵⁶ Danelo, "Exploring the Phases of Contemporary Resistance."
- ⁵⁷ Crossett, et al., *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II*, 293-328. The Provisional IRA was established at the conclusion of the December 1969 Army Convention after a two-third vote ended the IRA's policy of abstentionism (not assuming elected seats in British legislative institutions such as Westminster Parliament). Those who remained were called the "Officials" and supported an electoral strategy. Those who walked out became known as the "Provisionals" or "Proovies." This split was reflected at Sinn Fein's 1970 Ard Fheis where a similar motion split the movement. The Provisionals later ended their own policy of abstentionism in 1985/1986.
- ⁵⁸ Christiansen, "Four Stages of Social Movements."
- ⁵⁹ Meadows, "Sequence in Revolution."
- ⁶⁰ Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process," 275-277.
- ⁶¹ Danelo, "Exploring the Phases of Contemporary Resistance," 11-13.
- ⁶² Crossett, et al., *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II*, 409-442.
- ⁶³ Stacy Keogh, "The Survival of Religious Peace Movements: When Mobilization Increases as Political Opportunity Decreases," *Social Compass* 60, no. 4 (2013): 561-578.
- ⁶⁴ Christiansen, "Four Stages of Social Movements," 6.
- ⁶⁵ Traci M. Sawyers and David S. Meyer, "Missed Opportunities: Social Movement Abeyance and Public Policy," *Social Problems* 46, no. 2 (1999): 188.
- ⁶⁶ Verta Taylor, "Social Movement Continuity: The Women's Movement in Abeyance," *American Sociological Review* 54, no. 5 (1989): 762.
- ⁶⁷ Jackson, et al. "The Failure of an Incipient Social Movement."
- ⁶⁸ Christiansen, "Four Stages of Social Movements," 3-4; Frederick D. Miller, "The End of SDS and the Emergence of the Weatherman: Demise through Success," in *Waves of Protest: Social Movements Since the Sixties*, eds. Jo Freeman and Victoria Johnson (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 303.
- ⁶⁹ Danelo, "Exploring the Phases of Contemporary Resistance," 11-13.
- ⁷⁰ US Central Intelligence Agency, *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency*, 17-21.
- ⁷¹ Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 209.
- ⁷² *Ibid.*, 190, 207-208.

- 73 Crossett, et al., *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II*, 381-409.
- 74 Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 207-208.
- 75 Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process," 277-279.
- 76 Crossett, et al., *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II*, 213-236.
- 77 Miller, "The End of SDS," 304-305.
- 78 Ibid.
- 79 Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 209.
- 80 *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Volume I: 1927-1962* Revised Edition (Fort Bragg: US Army Special Operations Command, 2013), 569-584; Crossett, et al., *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II*, 55-86, 179-212.
- 81 Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 190.
- 82 Ibid., 54, 127, 189-190.
- 83 Crossett, et al., *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II*, 293-327.
- 84 Miller, "The End of SDS," 306-307.
- 85 Ibid., 306.
- 86 Crossett, et al., *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II*, 625-644.
- 87 Miller, "The End of SDS," 307-308.
- 88 Ibid., 305.
- 89 Ibid., 307-308.
- 90 Jackson, et al., "The Failure of an Incipient Social Movement."
- 91 Ibid., 37.
- 92 Ibid., 38.
- 93 Ibid.
- 94 Ibid., 39.
- 95 Ibid., 40.
- 96 Ibid.
- 97 Jackson, et al., "The Failure of an Incipient Social Movement."
- 98 Miller, "The End of SDS," 305.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Christiansen, "Four Stages of Social Movements," 4.

¹⁰¹ Patrick G. Coy and Timothy Hedeem, "A Stage Model of Social Movement Co-Optation: Community Meditation in the United States," *Sociological Quarterly* 46, no. 3 (2005): 411, 413-426.

¹⁰² John J. Macionis, *Sociology*, 9th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 619.

¹⁰³ Crossett, et al., *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II*, 117-148.

¹⁰⁴ Hopper, "The Revolutionary Process," 277.

¹⁰⁵ Edwards, *Natural History of Revolution*.

¹⁰⁶ Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, 206.

¹⁰⁷ Crossett, et al., *Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II*, 159-170.

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