ASSESSING REVOLUTIONARY AND INSURGENT STRATEGIES

RESISTANCE MANUAL
DRAFT

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UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
The Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) series consists of a set of case studies and research volumes conducted for the US Army Special Operations Command by the National Security Analysis Department of the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. The purpose of the ARIS series is to produce a collection of academically rigorous yet operationally relevant research materials to develop and illustrate a common understanding of insurgency and revolution. This research, intended to form a bedrock body of knowledge for members of the Special Forces, will allow users to distill vast amounts of material from a wide array of campaigns and extract relevant lessons, thereby enabling the development of future doctrine, professional education, and training.

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Introduction and Background

Overview

This manual is for the US Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) soldier. Whether attending his/her first course at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) or already deployed, the ARSOF soldier must be a student-practitioner of his/her craft: providing support to or countering a resistance movement.

This manual is a product of the Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies (ARIS) project. The ARIS project consists of research on the phenomenon of resistance conducted by the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) for the US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) G3X Special Programs Division. The ARIS program produces operationally relevant and actionable information for ARSOF soldiers encountering resistance movements. ARIS studies are academically rigorous and operationally relevant research materials that address challenges that ARSOF soldiers can encounter when conducting their mission sets. ARIS’ multi-disciplinary research seeks to inform the ARSOF operator’s mission preparation through applied learning of historical case studies, topically focused studies, and selected specialized topics across the global security landscape. The ARIS project further seeks to expand the study of resistance by synthesizing academic research, informing doctrinal development and professional education and training, and translating academic findings into operational impact.

In addition to drawing on case studies and topical studies in the body of ARIS products, this manual further draws on the body of academic work from the scientific study of resistance to provide a fundamental understanding of a resistance movement. It leverages the 2018 ARIS study Conceptual Typology of Resistance to identify variables relevant to the actors, causes, environment, organization, and actions that a resistance movement develops, operates, and uses to achieve its objectives.

Goals of the Manual

The ARIS Resistance Manual is designed to support teaching about resistance in the training and education of the ARSOF soldier. Accordingly, the goals for this manual are set in the context of instructional design theory. Specifically, each section in the manual provides application-based discussion questions for the reader to further explore the lessons embedded in that section. In turn, the manual identifies the content alignment to ARSOF doctrine and concepts by marking the specific sections of the content that directly correspond to the ARIS publications.

The specific goals for the ARIS Resistance Manual are:

1. **Identify** the aspects of resistance that an ARSOF soldier must understand to be an effective practitioner of his/her profession.

2. **Categorize** the features of the conceptual typology (actors, causes, environment, organization, and actions) and **map** the factors to existing ARIS literature and emerging academic work in resistance studies to provide the ARSOF soldier with foundational understanding of the phenomenon of resistance.
3. **Integrate** ARIS historical case studies and topical deep dives into the ARSOF soldier’s operational preparation and planning.

4. **Incorporate** emerging academic literature into ARIS historical case studies and the features of the conceptual typology to enable the ARSOF soldier to **differentiate** between various features of resistance movements.

These goals endeavor to assist the ARSOF operator to independently:

1. **Use criteria for evaluation** in SWCS classroom studies, independent study, and practical application.

2. **Design/plan** unconventional warfare operations in the SWCS classroom, independent study, and practice.

**The Narrative**

To provide academic content in a more relatable format, this reference book uses an overarching narrative to facilitate contextualizing and applying the material. This narrative tells the tale of a local leader in a fictional country on the brink of political change. The reader should adopt the perspective of an ARSOF operator tasked with planning operations to support this leader as he builds a resistance.

**Arturo Bolanieves and the Sarca Resistance in Estatu**

Estatu is a country that recently experienced an election that favored an administration focused on the majority population. It spearheaded two controversial pieces of legislation: (1) an economic stimulus bill widely viewed as benefitting the wealthy, in part because it funded infrastructure improvements in the expensive downtown districts of the country’s two megacities but not for rural areas and (2) a language law that makes minority languages invalid for government business and all contracts. Estatu has two megacities because rural populations have been migrating from those two urban centers in search of more economic opportunity. These populations struggle to find it and have built extensive shanty towns on the outskirts of those cities, and technology companies installed a temporary Internet infrastructure in these shanty towns as a humanitarian effort. The rural provinces of Estatu contain large deposits of rare metals where foreign companies have set up extraction industries. The towns there, however, lack sufficient infrastructure and local residents lose jobs to foreign workers tied to the extraction companies. Geographically, Estatu is predominately flat plains, except for a few forested areas and a large river running north and south cutting the country in half.

Arturo Bolanieves, a regional politician in the country of Estatu has risen to prominence by advocating resistance against the central government. He is a charismatic figure who comes from a humble background and rose to the upper middle class as a business owner. The movement he leads is known as Sarca. It began as a not for profit assisting minority populations with translation needs after the central government made the majority language the only legally acceptable one for contracts and government services. When Bolanieves was impeached for questionable reasons, he became the CEO of Sarca and broadened its mandate to advocate for better economic and infrastructure conditions for
minority and poor populations. He rose to national prominence in part by using popular social media to highlight the struggles that the poor in his province face.

**Sarca** began as a not for profit to help minority language speakers adapt to the new language law. However, as Bolanieves expanded its scope, it also expanded its operations. It became a broad-based movement not only for changing the language law but for bringing social and economic change to improve the lives of the poor, whether in rural or urban areas. Sarca needed to increase its funding. Sarca continued its original fundraising approach of charitable donations and community events but added fundraising from the diaspora and foreign donors. As its operations continue to grow, it struggles to find more sources of funding. Some within the group advocated taking over local natural resources to sell on the open and black markets. Others advocate partnering with the companies engaged in resource extraction. Within Sarca, Bolanieves struggles to balance its radical and moderate elements. The radical elements undertake violent activities in the shadows to pressure the central government, while moderate members pursue nonviolent approaches.

**Ajust**, an advocacy group by and for the middle class in the megacities, developed almost in parallel to the rise of Sarca. The group advocates for economic reform that will bring more investment into its communities, impose higher taxes on the wealthy, and reduce its own tax burden. Leaders in Ajust view Sarca as a radical movement, and the two groups occasionally criticize each other in the media.

**The Decision to Engage in Unconventional Warfare**

The US president approved the employment of unconventional warfare (UW) in Estatu because the president views the goals of Sarca to be in alignment with the United States. The president tasked USASOC to take the lead in UW planning and execution. US ARSOF must plan a UW campaign for Estatu. This campaign will not be in support of a conventional forces campaign. This UW campaign must accomplish the president’s goal of a change of administration in Estatu without resorting to conventional forces.

An Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) was instructed to support Bolanieves and Sarca to replace the current administration threatening oppression of minority groups.

Therefore, the ARSOF soldier needs to understand the definition of, tactics employed for, and measures taken in support of a resistance. This reference book will enable that understanding. It will revisit Bolanieves’ story intermittently throughout the text to provide opportunities to practice thinking about how to support a resistance leader. The first step is to understand where the resistance, Sarca, is in its evolution, and then the ODA can determine what the resistance needs.

**States of Resistance**

From guerilla warfare practitioners, such as Mao Tse-tung, to the doctrine writers behind the Army Technical Publication (ATP) on Unconventional Warfare, to academics studying resistance as a social phenomenon, many frameworks describe the evolution of resistance movements. In this vein, the ARIS program produced a study that considered various phasing constructs from different arenas and disciplines and developed its own based on the similarities across those constructs.
The construct proposed in the ARIS study contains four main states of resistance: preliminary, incipient, crisis, and institutionalization. The fifth and final state is the resolution state that can be reached from any of the four other states via a variety of resolution paths. The following paragraphs describe those states and provide an example for each.

The ODA tasked with supporting Bolanieves can use these states to map out the current state of Sarca’s resistance as well as its future goals. Then the ODA can use its training and education to help achieve future states.

**Preliminary**

| Increase in general unrest among disparate actors without coordination. Unclear or multiple conceptions of grievances, responsibility for them, and how to solve them. |

The first state of resistance is the preliminary state, also referred to as “latent” in Army doctrine or “emergent” in modern social movement theory. The preliminary state’s most defining feature is the growth of unorganized and unattributed unrest. It occurs when the population begins to perceive that its legitimate aspirations are repressed or hindered, albeit without knowing exactly how, why, or necessarily by whom. This is the infancy of a resistance, well before a conscious effort to build an organized movement. Whether characterized as incubation, or “milling” and “circular interaction,” undirected restlessness slowly becomes directed. Mao Tse-tung, ATP 3-05, and French military scholar David Galula did not propose phases similar to this preliminary phase in their writings; those constructs assume the preexistence of an aggrieved population and offer the organization of an already motivated population as the first phase.

**RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: Solidarity**

The years 1956 to 1976 marked the preliminary state of the Solidarity movement in Poland. In this state, the movement was not represented through the single organization of Solidarity but through emerging disparate groups and activity. Aggrieved social groups, primarily students, workers, and intellectuals remained disparate and acted independently. For example, during workers’ strikes in 1956 and 1970, students did not participate, while the workers did not participate in the student protests in 1968. Meanwhile, intellectuals distanced themselves from protests in favor of focusing on concessions and reform within the government. Despite separate, uncoordinated actions, demands for free organization, speech, and association were largely in concert across the resistance’s groups. During this period, economic downturns and subsequent government cuts brought about an increase in general unrest and insecurity. Despite a surge in unrest, the goals and strategies of the resistance remained uncertain.

This state was also characterized by a renewed focus on and vocalization of historical, political, and religious grievances among Polish citizens. A history of Russian oppression tracing back to the eighteenth-century blended with dissatisfaction against the standing Soviet-backed regime to foster a Polish identity for the resistance against a common enemy. The influence of the church in the resistance also contributed to the narrative of a common struggle against oppression by providing the resistance with symbols and rituals that resonated with the people. This renewed focus on history and identity provided a
salient narrative to a population willing to come together in struggle against a common enemy, enabling Solidarity to amass a popular following that reached fourteen million members.

**Incipient**

Leaders and organizations emerge as conceptions of grievance, responsibility, and solution narrow and crystallize. Outlook becomes formalized and strategic instead of short term/haphazard, as does the pattern of action the resistance engages in. As the organizational level increases and views crystallize, factions develop.

Transition to the next state of resistance occurs when disparate factors coalesce into a clearer and identifiable narrative. The incipient state also features loose and/or formal organizations mobilizing. One can think of this state as having participants with a clear sense of what is wrong and who is responsible, and they are beginning to take limited actions, including organization. This phase is called coalescence in much of social movement theory, but it has also been referred to in the literature as the incipient phase.

The defining feature of the incipient state is the development of intentional organization and a common narrative. Leaders come forward and shape the movement. Grievances become explicit, widespread, and open. Coordination between once separated actors becomes organized and strategic in its outlook. Some specific indicators identified in the literature include the formation of an intellectual cadre, as well as early signs of factions within the movement. Incipient state activities are evident in Mao’s organization and political unification phases, as well as the Special Operations Research Office’s (SORO) organization and covert activity phases. The word incipient implies progressing to the next state, or achieving the next action, but recall that, as in all incipient things, reaching the next state or achieving the next action is not guaranteed. Some resistance movements might not make it past the incipient state.

**RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: Orange Revolution**

The Orange Revolution in Ukraine experienced the incipient state from 1999 through 2004. Opposition to President Leonid Kuchma’s standing government coalesced throughout 1999 and 2000, most notably after three events in 2000: Kuchma’s rumored authorization of the murder of an investigative journalist, his removal of Deputy Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, and the subsequent removal of his popular prime minister, Viktor Yushchenko. These events, on top of claims of electoral fraud from the 1999 election, brought previously disparate groups together and provided a clear sense of what was wrong and who was to blame. Discernable collective action and mobilization against the regime ensued, exemplified by the “Ukraine without Kuchma” campaign and anti-government protests in Kiev through 2000 and 2001.

This period also saw the development of resistance leaders and an intellectual cadre. Interestingly, this leadership evolved largely from Kuchma’s removed inner circle, most notably Tymoshenko and Yushchenko. Strategies developed with a focus on resistance and revolution through electoral channels and peaceful protest. One example was the formation of the “Our Ukraine” Party by Yushchenko in 2002 and the party’s get-out-the-vote campaign leading up to the 2004 elections. Believing that the overwhelming public
support for new leadership (Kuchma, facing term limits, handpicks Yanukovich to run as his successor) would bring about change simply by getting people to the ballot box, the resistance focused solely on getting citizens to vote rather than advocating for its own nominee, Yushchenko, against Kuchma’s handpicked successor, Yanukovich. The first round of elections in October 2004 did not produce a winner, and a runoff election was planned for November 21. Rampant electoral fraud in the runoff election incited massive protests, marking the revolution’s transition into the crisis state.

Crisis

Escalated and overt confrontation with opponents (violent or nonviolent) that demonstrates clear division of resistance and those opponents. Real threat to opponent’s interests, authority, and/or existence such that they must respond.

The crisis state distinguishes resistance movements from social movements more generally. The essential characteristic defining a resistance in the crisis state is a decisive moment of escalated confrontation with opponents, however long or short. This moment can be violent or nonviolent. By allowing for both, this construct blends social movement theory with political science and military thought. Moving from an incipient to crisis state occurs when the movement grows powerful enough to pose a serious threat to its opponent. A threat becomes serious when the opponent of the resistance, the state, escalates its approach because previous methods of countering the resistance failed. A resistance can be incentivized to escalate its actions, violent or nonviolent, when an incipient resistance gains power and influence. That escalation can bring about a confrontation with and real risk to the government. The idea of movements escalating to a state of outbreak or crisis is prominently acknowledged in the early literature on revolutions, but this notion became less common after the field shifted away from revolutions and toward the study of social movements more generally.

The crisis state features actions that mark the clear separation of the resistance from the state. Scholars identified signals of this state to include a decisive loss of legitimacy by the government, financial collapse, breakdown in authority, strong symbolic actions, and perception of dual sovereignty or provisional authority, among others. This state is often characterized as the peak in revolutions, where a shift occurs from academic to militaristic values, structured collective action, and the strategic exercise of new power. Maoist and related constructs straddle the crisis state between transitional stages—particularly the second and third phases of Mao’s three phases, buildup and employment, as labeled in ATP 3-05 on unconventional warfare, and SORO’s transition from expansion to militarization.

RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: Provisional Irish Republican Army

From January to July of 1972, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), known locally as the Provos or the RA, was in the crisis state. The maintenance of barricaded “no-go” and “free” zones in Derry/Londonderry and Belfast during this period contributed to perceptions of provisional authority and separation of resistance from opponents. Heightened contention and escalation of resistance action occurred after British troops killed thirteen civilian demonstrators at the civil rights march that became known as...
“Bloody Sunday.” Public and international backlash against the British government increased its vulnerability to resistance demands.

Additionally, an escalation in resistance action occurred in retaliation, most notably a violent bombing campaign. As the resistance threat intensified, the British government initiated secret talks between the IRA and British Secretary of State. The secret talks were unsuccessful, and in July 1972, IRA bombs exploded across Belfast in what is known as “Bloody Friday,” resulting in nine civilian deaths. Despite backlash from the “Bloody Friday” bombings, the IRA persisted through the crisis state and transitioned into the institutional state.

**Institutionalization**

Resistance has survived crisis confrontation(s) with opponents and needs to consolidate gains. Viewed more equally to its opposition and possesses long-term staying power. Resistance organization establishes its role in society. Referred to as bureaucratization in modern social movement theory, the institutional state of resistance exists if the group or movement either persists through, or gains strength from, the crisis state. Surviving the crisis state deepens its organizational and strategic prowess as an established opposition player, and it broadens its appeal and long-term staying power. In other words, the essential characteristic of a resistance in the institutional state is an established role in society.

Scholarship characterizes this post-crisis state by the need for the resistance to consolidate its gains and authority and to secure its role in stability. As Professor Hopper claims in his social movement theory work, “the out group must finally be able to legalize or organize their power” as a permanent organization “that is acceptable to the current mores.” Maoist and derivative phasing constructs regard the institutional state of specifically violent resistance movements in the variously named consolidation, transition, or regaining lost territories phases. The institutional state is the most mature phase of resistance before resolution (either successful or otherwise), but it can persist almost indefinitely if resolution is not achieved.

**RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: Hizbollah**

Hizbollah in Lebanon is an example of resistance in the institutional state that presently remains in this state. In July 1993, Hizbollah transitioned into the institutional state after cease-fires ended the Seven Day War against Israel. By this time, there existed a perception of Hizbollah as a provisional authority and legitimate representative of the Shi’a population in Lebanon. Additionally, Hizbollah operated as a political and paramilitary organization, participating in Lebanese elections as well as armed confrontation against Israel. For these reasons, Hizbollah transitioned into the institutional state as an equal opposition player with broadened appeal.

Hizbollah’s organizational and strategic prowess deepened in this period as attacks against Israel/Israeli targets became more sophisticated, characterized by cyber attacks, rocket launches, terrorist activity, and war from 2006 to 2008. The group structuralized its role...
through control of media outlets, including a satellite channel and several radio stations and newspapers, and signaled its consolidation of authority and gains in domestic support with significant electoral victories in 2009. Hizbollah demonstrated its continued staying power through its recent involvement in the Syrian Civil War, fighting with Assad against Sunni rebels, and in domestic political conflicts in 2011, 2013, and 2014. The institutional status of Hizbollah was further signaled by international recognition of the political arm of Hizbollah within Lebanese politics, with only the armed wing considered a terrorist organization.

In the following diagram (Figure 1) depicting the states of resistance, one can see “off-ramps” along the bottoms of the states. These represent paths to resolution. Scholars and analysts identified a variety of forms of resolution, and one can see that several of them repeat. That is because a resistance movement can take that path to resolution from multiple states. Just as the diagram aims to show the fluidity of the states, the resolution states should not be interpreted as strict or rigid. Resistance groups may experience multiple resolution states at once or over a period of time. Likewise, resolution does not only mean the absolute termination of the movement. The resolution state is simply another state, meaning a resistance group can move into and out of it as the circumstances evolve.

Resolution States

Radicalization

Radicalization can be reached from all of the states. Radicalization is “a shift in ideological commitments toward the extremes and/or the adoption of more disruptive and violent forms of contention.” Radicalization can be thought of as a “mechanism for
demobilization” often simultaneous with the resolution of a rival wing of the movement via institutionalization; one wing radicalizes while the other institutionalizes itself in society. As the institutionalized wing moderates its positions and tactics, the other wing radicalizes further toward nonnegotiable positions and tactics that are more escalatory, confrontational, and violent.

RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: The Chechen Revolution

A wing of this movement experienced a radical Islamist shift, distancing the movement from its initial nationalist-separatist demands. Increased Russian opposition caused regionalization, dispersion of resources, and exacerbation of internal cleavages. This resolution state also resulted from Vladimir Putin’s hardline rhetoric of the resistance as terrorists, highlighting the gap between the resistance and the Chechen people.

Institutionalization

Institutionalization as a resolution can be reached from the institutionalization state. Institutionalization is the opposite of radicalization: the resistance adopts more conventional views and less disruptive actions. The process of institutionalization is characterized by a group seeking “accommodations with elites and electoral advantage” by moderating its tactics and goals. During this resolution process, the group transforms itself into a permanent organization “acceptable to the current mores.” The group loses its resistant nature and becomes absorbed by the status quo. Unlike in the state of institutionalization previously mentioned, where the resistance group continues to oppose the government but as an established part of society, here the resistance group resolves into being the status quo and no longer resists. As noted earlier, this institutionalization can often occur simultaneously with radicalization by another wing of the group. While both lead to a decline in the movement, institutionalization may be seen as at least a partial success of the movement. However, depending on the perceived extent of this success, the resistance movement may lose its initial motivations.

Repression

Repression can be reached from all of the states. Repression occurs when the government or other authority uses force to stop movement organizations from functioning or prevent people from joining. The tactics of repression include indictment, infiltration, physical attacks, harassment, threats to job and school access, the spread of false information, and “anything else that makes it more difficult for the movement to put its views before relevant audiences.” While those actions can lead to resolution on their own, it can also cause the resistance to splinter. Repression is the resolution state when the government effectively halts the resistance, but if the government’s actions create a more radical offshoot, the resolution state may be radicalization.

Facilitation

Facilitation can be reached from all of the states. Facilitation occurs when the government or its agents bring about the decline of a resistance by satisfying at least some of the claims of contenders. This acquiescence can be accomplished at the same time as using limited and selective means of repression. This form of resolution functions by dividing the resistance. When the government facilitates some but not all of the resistance group’s
claims, such efforts can attract moderates to legitimate action or satisfy elites with the government response. Meanwhile, satisfying only some of the group’s demands, with public acceptance by the moderates, can frustrate and inspire radicals who want more change. In turn, such a split can weaken the resistance, especially if it coincides with a decline in popular support because the larger population is satisfied with the government’s responses and does not support the radicals. It should be noted that it is possible to end in multiple states of resistance.

RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: Provisional Irish Republican Army

The Provisional IRA transitioned into the resolution state on April 10, 1998 through facilitation. The facilitation resolution state was marked by a decline in resistance through satisfaction of some resistance claims or demands by the government. In the case of the IRA, the decline of resistance occurred when the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) or Belfast Agreement in 1998 satisfied some demands of the IRA. The agreement enacted policing reforms, released political prisoners, set up provisions for a popular vote on Northern Ireland’s status, and established power-sharing institutions in line with IRA demands. After the agreement, Sinn Fein, the political arm of the IRA, became one of largest parties in Northern Ireland and remains active to this day. The agreement also led to the disarmament of the IRA, and in 2005, international observers announced the complete demobilization of the IRA. Popular support for the agreement was displayed when 71 percent of voters in Northern Ireland and 94 percent in Ireland voted in favor of the resolution in 1999. Despite these achievements, the primary movement goal of an independent and unified Ireland was not met, and the resistance entered the resolution state. Although the IRA transitioned into the resolution state, one should not confuse the resolution state with the resolution of the real (or perceived) grievance and/or the holistically resolved conflict.

Success

Success can be reached from all of the states. Success is not as simple as it sounds. A resistance can set goals, achieve them, and then fade away, no longer being a resistance but part of governance. However, it is more common for movements to be forced into compromises that include concessions by the government that also transform them into mere interest groups. The shape of success, and the concessions required, also reveal internal fractures within the resistance movement that lead to impotence and decline. For instance, some members of the resistance movement may see success when certain goals are achieved, but others may see success only when the movement continues to grow. However, growth may also include the addition of members who are less committed to the original resistance than earlier members, leading to factions that weaken the movement overall. In considering the complexity of a movement’s success, one should consider how a resistance can be forced to change its values or demands and lose some of its identity or attraction to gain concessions from the government as part of a compromise. Therefore, in succeeding, the resistance ends up in some ways no longer claiming to represent an aggrieved or radical population. Scholars demonstrate that some within the resistance will view this concession as success, while others will not, leading to internal division that can neuter the resistance all on its own.
RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: The Orange Revolution

The Orange Revolution in Ukraine is an example of a resistance movement that transitioned to the resolution state through success. Resolution through success indicates some degree of fulfillment of resistance goals, as well as the decline of the resistance in response to those successes. The Orange Revolution transitioned from the crisis state to the resolution state through success on December 26, 2004, when a third election took place and Yushchenko, the resistance’s candidate, won by a clear margin. After a prolonged legal battle waged by Yanukovich, the Supreme Court upheld Yushchenko’s electoral victory, and Yushchenko was sworn in as Ukraine’s president on January 23, 2005, signaling the successful resolution of the resistance. The resistance further deteriorated after the decisive election due to the absence of a unifying enemy (Kuchma/Yanukovich), and ultimately Yanukovich was elected as president in 2010, defeating former resistance leader Tymoshenko. The re-emergence of the resistance continues to be debated in light of the 2014 uprisings in Kiev, the ousting of Yanukovich, and the ongoing conflict in Eastern regions of the country.

Failure

Failure can be reached from all of the states. An internal divide in a resistance movement can threaten the movement as a whole. Failure refers to the internal collapse of a resistance, rather than being undone by outside forces. This resolution state is particular to issues within the specific resistance organization, rather than attributable to overpowering external conditions (though the two can be related). Accordingly, factors that lead to the failure of a resistance in this sense are highly specific to the individual resistance, and commonalities are difficult to identify.

One scholar on the subject states that organizational failure takes two shapes: factionalism and encapsulation: “[F]actionalism arises from the inability of the organization’s members to agree over the best direction to take,” leading to an internal conflict that proves fatal to the organization. “[E]ncapsulation occurs when the movement organization develops an ideology or structure that interferes with efforts to recruit members or raise demands,” eventually causing a critical decline in mobilization and capabilities.

Other scholars on this subject present four additional failure states specific to incipient movements. First, groups can fail by neglecting to establish “a preexisting network of communication linking those groups of citizens most likely to support the movement,” effectively isolating themselves from growth or mobilization potential. Second, the “failure of an emergent leader to incorporate...[other] leaders into his organization” can undermine a resistance group before it matures. Third, a young movement may lack “a program to which a major section of the [participants] could give wholehearted support,” stifling recruitment and internal commitment. It essentially lacks a narrative and goals or values that appeal to enough people. The alternative is that the resistance’s narrative and goals do not inspire people to commit to the movement. Finally, highly publicized failures can create a fatally “weakened . . . public image” and result in the resistance movement’s rapid failure because it is discredited in a slow decline when confidence in the group fails to recover from the embarrassing failure.
Co-Optation

Co-Optation can be reached from the incipient and institutionalization states. Co-optation occurs “when individual movement leaders are offered rewards [or positions] that advance them as individuals while ignoring the collective goals of the movement.”53 This reward approach serves to align the resistance leadership with the interests of the government or residing power.54 Groups that are “highly dependent on centralized authority or on charismatic leadership” are especially vulnerable to co-optation.58 Beyond co-opting leadership, this process also includes appropriating the language, symbols, and tactics of the resistance, assimilation of resistance participants, transformation of resistance goals, and regulation of enacted changes by state or vested interests.56

Establishment with the Mainstream

Establishment with the Mainstream can be reached from the incipient and institutionalization states. This state of resolution occurs when the resistance becomes “an accepted part of the system—typically after realizing some of their goals—so that although they continue to flourish, they no longer challenge the status quo.”57 The resistance essentially transforms from an opposition voice into another voice in the chorus of the mainstream. Although establishment with the mainstream is similar to institutionalization, when a movement enters this state, it is accepted as a voice within the dominant power structure while avoiding co-optation. This means the resistance is not just a radical wing of the many parties involved in governance but instead is involved in governance and decision-making. For instance, if the resistance becomes a marginal, radical party that only holds a few seats in government, it likely reached the resolution of institutionalization or co-optation, whereas if it becomes an active voice in a ruling coalition, the resistance becomes established with the mainstream.

Exhaustion

Exhaustion can be reached from the crisis and institutionalization states. After a resistance movement matures, particularly in the face of an extended crisis state, the movement may experience gradual decline through “psychological exhaustion which undermines the emotional foundations of the revolution.”58 This slow deflation of zeal for resistance accompanies the eventual success of the status quo and a return to normalcy.59 Some scholars also cite the personal costs of resistance as contributing to this form of resolution: “although street protests, demonstrations, and violence are exhilarating at first...[resistance movements] involve risk, personal costs, and, eventually, weariness and disillusionment.”60 This dynamic can also contribute to movement radicalization or institutionalization.

Abeyance

Abeyance can be reached from the institutionalization state. Abeyance (sometimes referred to as dormancy) is technically not a resolution because it does not mark the end of the resistance. Instead, it occurs when the resistance group or movement consciously practices little or no mobilization and reverts to an incipient state of “inward... focus on identity or values.”62 Essentially, the resistance chooses to remain in the incipient state and does not progress. During this time, it avoids decisive confrontations and reduces recruitment efforts. Scholars argue that abeyance allows movements to “sustain themselves...through internal structures” and orient themselves internally to maintain their values, identity,
Another scholar similarly theorizes that a movement’s abeyance provides a measure of continuity for groups. It allows them to successfully build a base of support despite confronting a political and social environment unreceptive to its message or struggle. A resistance movement, despite falling back into an incipient state through abeyance, can reemerge and remobilize after reinforcing its group identity and developing a larger support base. Therefore, abeyance can be thought of as deliberately prolonging the time spent in the incipient state, as opposed to continuing to drive toward a confrontation with the opposition or a resolution.

To use the aforementioned states of resistance construct, or any other phasing construct, in analyzing this manual’s narrative for Estatu, the ODA will need information to inform its decisions about where Bolanieves and Sarca are in their evolution and the help they will need. An integral part of that information is the actors in the resistance and its society; the characters in their story and their roles. Another important piece of information is the motivations of Sarca. Why do its members participate in resistance? The ODA will need to be aware of the physical, social, and economic environment in which Sarca and Bolanieves operate. What is the stage on which Sarca’s story plays out? To be effective advisors, the ODA needs to understand Sarca’s organization. How are the characters’ roles connected? Finally, the ODA will need to learn and advise which actions Sarca and its characters have available to them and which they should take. Each of these will be considered in turn through the rest of the manual.

ACTORS

Thus far, this reference book has covered the states of resistance movements. It will now examine the different elements of a resistance, specifically the actors that could become a part of it, the causes and motivations that could start and drive it, the environment in which it operates, the organizational approach it could take, and the actions that a resistance could undertake against the standing government. Each resistance movement is specific to its time, place, and circumstances, but no resistance movement is entirely unique from its historical predecessors; there are commonalities in resistance. Accordingly, while all the constructs, theories, observations, lessons, and ideas covered in this manual that were derived from the history of resistance movements may not apply to a specific resistance, it is imperative to learn from past resistance movements to understand current and future ones. The discussions about the elements of resistance that follow do not instruct the reader on what to do; rather, the following discussions use the narrative in the blue text to assist the reader in conceptualizing and thinking through a resistance generally. It introduces and walks through the general concepts and ideas that emerge from the history of resistance. The first area where these general concepts will be covered is the element of actors involved in resistance.

As a resistance leader, Bolanieves will need to answer several questions about the actors that are and potentially could be part of the movement. Actors can be individuals or groups, such as nongovernmental organizations, private businesses, foreign governments, or a diaspora.
Who does he need to recruit? How will he recruit them? What functions does he need fulfilled? What kind of people does he want and need in which roles? What will his leadership style be? What actors are needed to exercise control and govern the movement?

When it comes to planning, ARSOF operators should know Bolanieves from the news and intelligence sources. However, what about the actors surrounding him? How do supporting elements fit into Bolanieves’ leadership style? Maybe they lack the charisma to lead groups but possess exceptional managerial skills that can be used in organizing underground operations. As Bolanieves builds a shadow government, who will he put in charge of its different functions? Governance requires effective leadership in finance, law enforcement, and logistics to name a few. Who can Sarca entrust to make choices dividing resources between military operations and providing governance? If Sarca is ultimately successful and supplants the government it will need talent and experience in all aspects of a society and government to facilitate a smooth transition to governing. Resistance movements need more than just charismatic leaders and brave fighters. How can the ODA facilitate Bolanieves getting the right people into the right roles? How will ARSOF operators learn about his supporters and his critics? What other actors should the ODA consider? Resistance and UW are human centric and therefore require knowing the humans involved, how to persuade them to participate, and how to lead them.

Leadership

Leaders mobilize institutional, political, financial, psychological, and other resources to motivate, engage, and satisfy members of a resistance. They also work to develop the group’s ideology, legitimacy, and strategy and to build the organization according to the physical, human, and security environments. In this section, the reader will examine a series of different components of leadership that will be important for deployment: transactional and transformational leadership; charismatic leadership, targeting leaders, leaders chosen from inside the resistance, and leaders chosen from outside the resistance.

Resistance leaders can find themselves operating inside or outside the country. For example, a well-known resistance leader may be targeted by the government and forced to flee. Or the resistance may be capable of protecting the leader so s/he does not have to leave the country. Leading from outside the country can challenge the leader’s legitimacy by bringing into question his/her loyalty (if s/he cares about the country, why did s/he leave?) or by distancing the leader not only in space but also in understanding the resistance group and the larger population. However, being outside the country can provide an advantage. For instance, if the leader flees to a democratic country, then s/he could have more access to information, better communications, and a greater ability to develop outside support for the resistance, moral, political, and material.

Bolanieves has been the de facto leader of this resistance, but he will need to cement his position. Legitimacy is important for leadership, so Bolanieves will need to find a way to establish that legitimacy and credibility to a variety of audiences. Sarca may have a wide variety of society members, and all of them cannot be managed or led in the same fashion.
Bolanieves will have to decide whether he should be a transformative or transactional leader and in relation to which members. He will also need to develop a charisma that appeals to a sufficiently broad population and not alienate segments important to the resistance’s efforts. For instance, alienating the overt, more moderate Sarca members (the public component) could dissuade them from supporting the covert, less moderate Sarca members (the guerilla, underground, and auxiliary components).

**Transactional and Transformational Leadership**

Studies about leadership highlight two types: transactional and transformational. In transactional leadership, the focus is on monitoring employees and rewarding and punishing them based on performance. It can be an effective style, but it can become counterproductive if overused. Transformational leadership inspires and communicates common purpose. This style has shown to more directly impact productivity than the transactional style. It also better increases trust and group identity.

Based on that research, an ODA might advise Bolanieves to adopt a transformational leadership style. However, this decision may depend on the cultural aspects of Estatu society. Are people in Estatu like Americans on whom that research was done? How are they different?

Studying the corporate world, researchers also identified three categories of leadership behaviors: task, relationship, and change:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Behaviors</th>
<th>Relationship Behaviors</th>
<th>Change Behaviors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plan short-term activities</td>
<td>Provide support and encouragement</td>
<td>Monitor the external environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarify task objectives</td>
<td>Provide recognition for achievement and contributions</td>
<td>Propose an innovative strategy or vision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitor operations and performance</td>
<td>Develop member skill and confidence</td>
<td>Encourage innovative thinking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consult with members when making decisions</td>
<td>Take risks to promote necessary changes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Empower members to take initiative in problem solving</td>
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As organizations expand, this range of leadership functions must be accomplished by teams, not individuals, because of the amount and complexity of the work to be done. Also, different leadership styles have different advantages and disadvantages. Effective leaders surround themselves with a team that both accentuates their strengths and complements them where they are weakest.

Accordingly, the ODA may want to identify Bolanieves’ weaknesses and help him find the right team members to complement him as a leader. It is important for Bolanieves to understand how the right team members will re-enforce the skills, resources, and organizational capacity that he envisions. The ODA might consider assessing whether he is able to and has enough support to accomplish all the tasks previously listed and others.
that may not have been captured in the corporate literature, such as the more practical parts of resistance leadership, such as logistics and intelligence.

**Charismatic Leadership**

Charisma is the “quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.” Charisma helps to begin movements by motivating populations and to keep resistance groups together through challenges. Charismatic leaders are seen as visionaries, and they demonstrate some combination of emotionality, activity, sensitivity to the sociopolitical landscape, intense interest in and empathy toward followers, superior rhetorical and persuasive skills, and exemplary behavior in sacrificing personal ambitions to the movement’s.

Abimael Guzman from the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), Velupillai Prabhakaran from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Osama bin Laden of al Qaeda, and Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi are all considered charismatic leaders.

Charismatic leadership can be difficult to maintain as movements grow larger. Charismatic leaders must accomplish these four functions: (1) maintain the public persona of the leader; (2) moderate the effects of the psychological identification of followers with the leader; (3) negotiate the routinization of charisma; and (4) achieve frequent new successes.

Group members need to see and hear from charismatic leaders on a regular basis. This can be done with large, staged, public displays, or with smaller appearances. These leaders might favor smaller appearances because their personalities have a more effective impact on smaller groups. A challenge facing the use of charismatic leadership is ensuring the safety and security of that leader. As a result, they might also avoid public displays because it places the leader at risk as a target. As a public figure, Bolanieves could make appearances regularly, and social media technology facilitates making appearances to a broad audience in a way that can feel intimate.

At the same time, charismatic leaders need to balance public appearances with maintaining auras of mystery or supernatural power. That isolation has its own drawbacks, like making decisions without sufficient information and therefore failure from internal fractures over the direction of the resistance.

**RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: A Cautionary Tale of Charismatic Leadership**

A limitation of charismatic leadership can be demonstrated by the LTTE’s Prabhakaran, who had a force of personality that inspired followers but also meant he had little capability for political compromise. His unwillingness to compromise likely perpetuated the kinetic component of the conflict and decreased the bargaining room for the Sri Lankan government. This stubbornness in turn limited the Tamil minority’s options for achieving
political objectives without more bloodshed, and it ultimately resulted in the destruction of Prabhakaran’s movement.  

Leaders Chosen from Inside the Resistance

*Where do leaders come from? The answer often depends on the resistance group’s origins. Bolanieves rose up after falling out of political office and moving on to lead a nonprofit advocacy group.*

Undergrounds often form from existing networks, such as political parties, labor organizations, civic clubs, or military units. For example, the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom, or ETA) resistance organization in Spain built around the Basque institution of the “cuadrilla,” a group of friends roughly the same age who spent most of their time together drinking, sharing meals, and mountain climbing, with group ties often stronger than family ties. A leader in these kinds of groups may emerge organically. *Bolanieves emerged organically from the pre-existing structures of his political party and the not-for-profit corporation.*

Leaders Chosen from Outside the Resistance

Occasionally, the external government supporting a resistance selects and emplaces a leader in the resistance. In Yugoslavia during World War II, for example, the allied forces withdrew support from Dragoljub Mihailovic and recognized Marshal Josip Broz Tito because they felt he employed aggressive action against the Germans and would thereby be of greater assistance to the military mission. External sponsors can, however, decide to cease support of the resistance, for instance, because their objectives no longer align. This was the case in El Salvador with the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, or FMLN). The critical flow of arms, money, and training from the Soviet Union was curtailed in the late 1980s, which fatally weakened the resistance.

Some movements may also demonstrate divided leadership, where political and military leaders function independently. Such an approach might be an option for Bolanieves to preserve his legitimacy by separating him from the violent elements of Sarca. One can easily see the challenges of such a leadership structure. Namely, ensuring the two leaders do not develop different visions for the resistance and take their respective elements away from the other. If Sarca split into multiple resistance movements, it might not withstand efforts by the Estatu government to subdue it.

*If the ODA helps Bolanieves identify his leadership weaknesses, one option to fill that weakness is to recruit from outside Sarca. Members often join a resistance for a variety of reasons, but leaders more frequently join a movement for ideological reasons.* Accordingly, recruiting leaders can be very selective, and they frequently hold existing close associates or friends of current resistance leaders.

When a resistance grows, it needs middle-level leaders: provincial leaders, influential agents within a university or government agency, and military leaders. New capabilities, resources, and members can be gained by recruiting key figures who already wield great influence in a society, such as a provincial leader, clan elder, or local religious scholar. They can bring
legitimacy to the resistance and bring the resources of their respective constituencies to help the resistance.

Those same influential community members can also serve as recruiting tools, whether based in convenience—a former KGB agent called such people “useful idiots” or in true conviction. Lebanese Hizbollah, for example, always benefited from Shiite clerics who lend religious authority and respectability to the insurgent movement. In this case, the insurgent leaders share the religious faith of the clerics, even if the two groups often differ on matters of strategy and tactics.

**Targeting Leaders**

Regardless of the type of leadership or the leader’s origins, resistance leaders are often the target of counter-resistance efforts, counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, or counterterrorism. Younger and smaller organizations are more vulnerable to attacks that remove leaders than larger and more-developed organizations.

Additionally, religious organizations more frequently survive the murder of leaders, while nonreligious ideological organizations more often decline and terminate after their leaders were killed. Counter-resistance efforts can also discredit leaders and undermine their legitimacy. Leaders outside the country uniquely face the danger of counter-resistance efforts to manipulate or disrupt their communication with elements in the country to create friction in the resistance.

**The Form and Function of Shadow Governance**

*To manage the movement as a leader, Bolanieves will need to institute some form of governing system. If he and Sarca are permitted to remain in the country, they can create a shadow government. However, if they are exiled from Estatu, they will need to set up a government in exile. Bolanieves will need to establish his shadow government or a government in exile with the infrastructure set up to command and control the multiple components of Sarca. It is important also to note that one function of the shadow government (or government in exile) is to interface with other resistance movements and potentially with actors outside the state. Bolanieves might contact the diaspora for support and/or liaise with foreign governments sympathetic to his cause.*

Resistance leaders that remain in the country can form a shadow government (instead of a government in exile) and control a portion of the territory. A shadow government provides services to the civilian population in the territory it controls and carries out other typical governmental functions, such as bringing justice and collecting taxes. In some cases, shadow governments gained greater legitimacy and popularity by successfully creating benefits for the people they govern, such as schools, hospitals, roads, clean water, and safety.

During World War II, there were many governments in exile because Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union occupied their countries. Resistance groups today are more likely to establish an internal shadow government because they are challenging and seeking to change or replace the existing government. Resistance groups mimic the functions of the state to bolster a shadow government’s legitimacy in the eyes of both its domestic and international audiences.
Government Versus Governance

State governments are backed by formal authority and police powers to enforce formal laws. Having a government, however, does not automatically mean it provides good governance. For instance, in weak states, there are state governments with formal institutions that lack the resources or ability to provide governance. Shadow governments fulfill the role of state governments but without formal authority or institutions to enforce laws. In other words, taxation, education, and security are still provided without recognizable formal institutions, such as an Internal Revenue Service, a Department of Education, or formal police forces. Successful shadow governments provide good governance where state governments do not.

Shadow governance is part of the constant interaction between a resistance and the population. Research identified attributes of shadow governance in competition with the government: extension of force, national identity and legitimacy, revenue generation, and provision of social services.

In Uganda, the National Resistance Army, or NRA, adopted governance strategies supporting the civilian population until military pressure stopped them. The NRA offered a series of services, including health care and security, to the civilian population in its liberated areas. As its hold on those areas deteriorated during the war, the NRA evacuated civilians to safe pockets in the Luwero Triangle, still encouraging civilians to maintain the democratic village councils it established in its safe areas. Eventually, as its position became more precarious, the NRA was forced to terminate all ties with the civilian population to free the group from allocating resources to civilian defense. The NRA demanded that civilians leave the war zone. The NRA only resumed governance activities when its military position vis-à-vis the incumbent government considerably improved.

When a resistance successfully uses force against the government, it can keep the government from exercising authority over that territory. For example, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola’s (UNITA) challenged the Angolan authorities:

Lodged like a bone in the throat, [UNITA] offered a permanent challenge to Luanda’s [ruling MPLA party] authority, to its ability to implant policies that might ordinarily have improved the lives of Angola’s people. It denied the very title that MPLA had won for itself as the Government of the People’s Republic of Angola. Savimbi’s campaign . . . meant that the MPLA did not, could not, govern the country.

Similarly, when the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC) took control of five municipalities granted to it by the Colombian government, the state admitted its inability to effectively govern those areas. The FARC stepped in with effective shadow governance and brought a significant drop in serious crimes, such as murders, robberies, and rape. The FARC’s experience illustrates the importance of providing security, perceived strength, and generosity to the people for legitimacy.
Legitimacy

Legitimacy, or the consent of a population that a political organization has the right to expect and enforce its obedience, is at the core of the governance relationship with the population. In Western liberalism, legitimacy is based on the social contract between the state and the people. Other sources of legitimacy include ancestral or religious authority. Colonial powers often created states without considering the diversity in identity. The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, or EPLF, used this fact to its advantage by appealing to the Ethiopian threat to put Eritrean identity above religious and ethnic divisions. Today, Eritreans have a strong sense of nationality.

The ODA and Bolanieves should understand how legitimacy is gained in the eyes of Estatu’s populations. Assuming Estatu society operates the same way as US society could be a trap for the ODA’s efforts and doom Bolanieves’ chances. It would be important for Bolanieves’ legitimacy to be gained from the sources of authority that Estatu society views as valid and important.

Funding

Even with ironclad legitimacy, a resistance movement’s shadow government needs to generate revenue. Shadow governments and resistance groups raise funds in a variety of ways, including taxation, voluntary contributions, control over valuable natural resources, or criminal activity. Sympathetic populations may prefer to pay taxes charged by the resistance, such as during the Kosovo insurrection when the Kosovo diaspora in Germany paid informal payroll tax. In particular, if the resistance is seen as less predatory and more secure than the government, even non-sympathetic populations may prefer to pay taxes to the resistance. Alternatively, UNITA faced challenges after its primary source of income, foreign assistance, evaporated after the end of the Cold War. The group’s revenue-generating strategies transformed to rely heavily on territorial control of diamond-rich areas and leveraging other commercial activities in the group’s territory—these strategies sometimes generated as much as $5 million a month.

Providing Social Services

It is important for shadow governments to provide social services to the civil population, such as charitable acts, public services like education and health, and infrastructure development, such as telecommunications networks and roads.

Hizbollah has been especially effective in this regard. The group used half of Hizbollah’s 2007 budget for social services, which were delivered to mostly Shia constituents. The social services component of the group comprises six subgroups supporting various needs of the community, from reconstruction to provisions for the families of martyrs, women’s welfare, and education. Hizbollah’s social service efforts, such as the reconstruction of homes and structures damaged by the 2006 war with Israel, far outstrip those of the Lebanese state.

RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: Good Governance by the LTTE

One of the most effective shadow governance activities systems was that established by the LTTE in Sri Lanka. Both the political and military wings of the LTTE were under the authority of a single commander. The political wing’s ministries included finance, justice,
protection, economic development, health, and education. LTTE representatives oversaw the implementation of the group’s governance directives in each of its territorial districts. The shadow government’s relationship with the incumbent Sri Lankan state was particularly unique. Both the incumbent government and the LTTE vied for legitimacy among domestic populations and international audiences through the provision of services. As a result, the competing governments formed a symbiotic relationship whereby they worked jointly to provide health and education to local populations. In LTTE territories, governance activities were conducted under the auspices of a dual authority—an LTTE representative and a Sri Lankan representative. The LTTE benefitted from the relationship because it was able to meet the demands of the residents without taxing LTTE resources, and the Sri Lankan government benefitted because it was able to maintain a hold, however tenuous, on the population living under LTTE control.

Like most insurgencies, the LTTE first established an effective policing and justice system that sought to “normalize” life for civilians in its regions. Its police force eventually grew to over three thousand officers and became a legitimate and respected institution among residents. An expansive judiciary not only mediated disputes among residents but also acted as a source of revenue for the civil administration through land courts that instituted annual property taxes. The taxes generated steady income for the LTTE, particularly from the wealthy diaspora concerned about property they still owned in rebel areas. Moreover, the LTTE set up a respectable legal system, which included elements of Sri Lankan penal code and Tamil cultural norms, after more informal and ad hoc measures generated complaints. The system provided the populace with swift justice, and the LTTE was very vigilant to keep corruption to a minimum.

In terms of providing social services, the LTTE was more involved and effective in education than health services. The group faced numerous constraints in establishing health care infrastructure, including an embargo on medical goods and the flight of highly trained professionals upon whom health care depends. International aid organizations offered basic health care, mainly through mobile centers that often lacked physicians. Residents with serious health conditions typically sought care in government-controlled areas. The LTTE met more success in providing education. Tamil families traditionally place a great deal of importance on the education of their children as a path to social mobility. The Tamil Eelam Education Council was tasked with carrying out education tasks in concert with the government provincial representative. The result was an impressive continuation of the educational system despite interruptions due to the conflict. Before the cease-fire in 2002, 1,994 primary and secondary schools with an enrollment of 648,000 operated in the province.

International aid and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which flowed into LTTE territory after the 2002 cease-fire and the 2004 tsunami, altered LTTE’s governance system. The LTTE’s civil administration expanded its efforts to facilitate aid money, setting standards for work and where and how to establish projects. Moreover, the tsunami and the influx of aid encouraged greater cooperation between the government and the insurgent administration as they developed joint mechanisms to distribute aid and reconstruction efforts. The government and international NGOs viewed the events as an opportunity to coax the LTTE into the mainstream. The goodwill between the combatants dwindled as the government stalled over a final settlement and the intransigence of the LTTE leadership,
which would not accept anything short of full independence. The government soundly defeated the LTTE in 2009 through military measures.

**Poor Governance by the Congolese Rally for Democracy**

A lack of shadow governance activities can reflect a strategic decision to forgo governance of local populations or a failed attempt at governance. The Lord’s Resistance Army, or LRA, in Uganda, for instance, opted not to control territory in favor of greater mobility and, as a result, makes no effort to govern local populations.

In contrast, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), operating in Congo, is a case of failed governance efforts. The group faced numerous internal and external challenges that prevented the execution of its governance strategy. Internally, the leadership was divided between those supporting governance strategies to gain popular support while another division wished to devote scarce resources to strengthening its military capacity. Additionally, well before the war began, the Congo state retreated from territory that came under RCD control, abandoning administration to a diverse set of non-state actors—NGOs, the Catholic Church, and civil society groups. The RCD proved unable to persuade these disparate groups to follow along with its governance project. Civil society leaders “[portrayed] the RCD as a tool of Tutsi domination,” and Church authorities also evidenced resistance to RCD rule, expressing similar ethnic sympathies.

Although the RCD attempted to integrate itself into the systems providing justice, health, and education to residents, it failed to do so. Non-state actors such as the Catholic-based Caritas and other humanitarian organizations offered more comprehensive and effectual dispute-resolution services to residents. Many residents viewed the security and justice structures operated by the RCD as tools for revenue extraction because justice typically went to those who could pay the higher bribe. Likewise, churches and international aid organizations provided most of the available health services in the Kivus. Although it took control of the health ministry, the RCD outsourced health services to the disparate groups already providing it to residents upon capture of the Kivus. The RCD’s role was limited to monitoring and oversight of NGOs operating in the region and directing the type of health campaigns on which NGOs embarked and the areas in which they operated, typically limiting NGOs to areas known to be sympathetic to the RCD while precluding their operation in areas known to house the RCD’s armed competitors.

Lastly, the RCD failed to cultivate legitimacy among the civilian population and develop a strong local base. This failure can be attributed in part to the group’s inability to present itself as a unifying, multi-ethnic revolution and its methods of revenue generation. The RCD’s dependence on its external patron, Rwanda, and resulting close ties with Tutsi elements led to the perception that the RCD was a monoethnic organization and the puppet of its Rwandan patrons. The perception of this excessive Rwandan influence spurred opposition, including armed opposition, to the RCD’s attempts to fully govern the Kivus. Similarly, the RCD’s reliance on external patronage and extraction of natural resources precluded any pressing need for the group to cultivate popular support. With easy access to
weaponry through Rwanda and Uganda, the RCD’s strategy was a quick military victory and regional control through coercive means.123

As Sarca grows to include more people and more territory, so too will its shadow government. It could use that shadow government to win over the population by providing good governance, including social services. These efforts, however, require raising revenue and fostering sufficient legitimacy so that people provide money voluntarily instead of by threat or extortion. One can see how Bolanieves might find himself in a cycle seeking legitimacy to gain revenue to provide services to gain legitimacy. How might the ODA help Bolanieves through that cycle? It is important for Bolanieves and Sarca to determine how they should assert legitimacy if there is a competing resistance movement.

Other Resistance Groups124

Recall that Sarca is not the only resistance group in Estatu. Ajust has been growing and developing at the same time. However, its aims are different, so it may or may not be an ally on different issues and at different times. Resistance groups can compete or cooperate, and they can do so on a case-by-case basis or as a principle applied to the group’s decisions and actions. Bolanieves will have to figure out how best to interface with Ajust and its membership, as well as its recruiting pool. The ODA might consider how to assist Bolanieves in this task. The ODA might also consider assessing Ajust in the same way it assessed Sarca for its compatibility with US interests.

Intrastate conflict since the end of the Cold War has commonly involved more than one rebel group. For example, in 2002 and 2003, 30 percent of conflicts involved more than one challenger to the state,125 and in 2009, 20 percent of conflicts involved more than one challenger.126 Frequently, these multiple challengers to the state seek to “dominate, ally with, or destroy weaker rivals” in order to “establish national control by one’s own forces.”127 Every group wants to win, whether by working together or eliminating the competition. The LTTE engaged in a bitter rivalry with other Tamil insurgent groups in the mid-1980s,128 and the Provisional IRA’s domination in the Northern Ireland conflict required the armed defeat of its rival rebel group, the Official IRA, in the early 1970s.129

The following presents two case studies in governance. The LTTE was widely recognized for its success in meeting the needs of the local population while boosting the influence and standing of the insurgent group among civilians. The Congolese Rally for Democracy, however, failed to exercise good governance.

The ODA will need to consider how similar and different Bolanieves, Sarca, and Estatu are to the actors in these cases. Bolanieves faces questions about population needs, perceptions that Estatu is not providing those needs, and Sarca filling those gaps. He also faces questions about the resources at his disposal to accomplish governance. What kinds of people does he need to help him lead? Are there persons available who already know how to provide social services, raise funds, and implement security?

Gaining Popular Support130

This narrative considered the definition and functions of a shadow government, but in line with effectiveness, a shadow government needs the support and trust of the population.
Otherwise, it finds itself in the same position as the government it challenges. If Bolanieves and Sarca establish an effective shadow government, they still face the related challenge of gaining and maintaining popular support. This means Bolanieves will have to invest in continuously building that effectiveness, assessing and mitigating risks to the population from the government and from Sarca’s own elements and rogue groups, and not asking too much of the local populations. In short, it is a relationship that requires continuous work to maintain a healthy symbiosis from which both sides benefit.

**Choosing Between Military Operations and Governance**

Groups have limited resources and often choose between military operations or governance activities. That calculus includes the impact on the population that the resistance is trying to gain support. When the government increases military pressure on the resistance, the movement can face difficult choices between protecting and serving civilians and the survival of the resistance. When its survival was uncertain because of increased military pressure, the NRA abandoned its territory and halted all shadow governance activities until its position improved.

Bolanieves will have to weigh these issues, allocate resources, and mitigate risks as best he can. His goal should be gaining popular support and lowering the risk of losing that support, as it can be critical to the success of a resistance. After all, the fight for territory in resistance is second to the contest for the population. Could Bolanieves leverage the distributed network of NGO offices across the country to facilitate a shadow government? Where will he seek additional resources as governance activities increase? Should he limit the promises by the shadow government, so as not to risk losing popular support by over promising and under delivering? How does he distribute resources?

**Setting and Meeting Local Expectations**

Providing governance can set expectations by the population that the resistance group will have to continuously meet or risk losing popular support. The IRA’s political wing, Sinn Féin, put a crude justice system into place in the urban enclaves under its control where regular police forces were unable to operate. At one point, because of the resources required to maintain the rudimentary justice system, the IRA chose to stop. Shortly afterward, public pressure led the Provisionals to reverse that decision.

However, providing poor governance can also harm a resistance. Even after the Provisionals’ reinstated its crude justice system, the punishments it ordered were gruesome and led victims and their families and friends to act as informants. Even as the IRA transitioned away from violence to more political efforts in the 1980s, the legacy of that crude justice system and its cruel punishments made it difficult to attract the support of moderate populations.

Conversely, the NRA’s operations in Uganda show that cultivating popular support through governance offers operational advantages. Yoweri Museveni, leader of the NRA in Uganda, formed local governments, or resistance councils, in areas under NRA control that included representation of noncombatants. This ensured that locally elected members governed their communities. NRA leaders also set and enforced rules for how the group interacted with the civilian population. Stealing was not allowed, and by giving the role
of food collection to the village committees, the NRA leadership instituted policies that encouraged more voluntary participation and support. In exchange, the NRA provided civilians security by developing early warning systems, alerting villagers to approaching enemy soldiers. The NRA also provided health care services to prevent and treat infectious diseases and other ailments in the liberated zones.

### Components of a Resistance

Sarca must develop the components of a resistance: the armed component, the underground, the public component, and the auxiliary. The armed component is the visible element organized to perform overt armed operations using guerilla, asymmetric, or conventional tactics. The underground will be Bolanieves’ clandestine arm to operate in denied areas or conduct activities unsuitable for the overt components. The public component of Sarca will be its overt political element. If Sarca is successful, it can become the new government or part of it as a political party, and the public component would fulfill that function. Often the public component works with the underground to make their propaganda and communications work together. Finally, Bolanieves will need to pull on the auxiliary. Persons in Bolanieves’ auxiliary operate clandestinely and do not openly indicate their sympathy or involvement with Sarca. The auxiliary is different from the underground because its members participate occasionally while maintaining a full, “normal,” inconspicuous life outside of the resistance. The functions they perform can vary, from providing food and shelter, to providing arms and ammunition, to joining the underground on a covert mission.

There are four main components to a resistance:

- **Underground**—A clandestine organization established to operate in areas denied to the armed or public components, or to conduct operations not suitable for the armed or public components. Its activities can include intelligence, counterintelligence, subversive media campaigns, logistics, clandestine medical support, financing, and material production (e.g., false identification).

- **Armed component/guerillas**—The visible element of a resistance organized to perform overt armed military and paramilitary operations using guerilla, asymmetric, or conventional tactics. Guerillas are distinct from mercenaries and criminal gangs. They are not simply paid fighters; they fight for the cause of the resistance, not for profit. They are not freewheeling criminals; they are organized similar to military concepts. It is worth noting that historical and modern cases include elements of resistance movements that fight for other or additional reasons than just the cause of the resistance. The traditional conception of the guerilla as an ideologically pure soldier of the resistance is being challenged by deeper understanding of the complexities of resistance movements.

- **Auxiliary**—The support element of the resistance with clandestine organization and operations, and members do not openly indicate their sympathy or involvement with the resistance. Members of the auxiliary are more likely to be occasional participants of the insurgency with other full-time occupations. The activities of the auxiliary can overlap with the underground. The difference between the two is that the auxiliary can be thought of as part-time members of the underground, while the underground
is a full-time effort. Some of its activities include supporting logistics, providing early warning to other elements of the resistance, acting as communications couriers, and managing safe houses.

- **Public component**—The overt political component of a resistance. Some resistance movements pursue military and political strategies. The public component negotiates with the state government (or occupying power), depending on whether and how much the state permits the existence of a public component. If the state is extremely authoritarian, it may be impossible to have a public component.

Figure 2 illustrates the division of activities between these components.

At the termination of conflict, or occasionally during the conflict, the movement can transition to the sole legitimate government or form part of an existing government. Thus, the four components engage in an evolving relationship that changes in response to internal and external drivers. The public component’s overtness distinguishes it from the clandestine underground. However, the public component and the underground can frequently overlap in some of their functions. Figure 3 provides an illustration of their relationship.

That the “public component” represents the overt political element of a resistance, such as a political party or an NGO, means a resistance can and frequently does simultaneously engage in nonviolent and violent opposition. Sarca and Bolanieves began as an NGO. They can continue to use that platform as its public component to deliver its political message and participate in the open debate. Specifically with the public component, Bolanieves and Sarca will want to keep an eye on the end goal because it is this component that transitions into governance. Armed components and guerilla forces may be incorporated into the armed forces or be disbanded, and the auxiliary can return to its normal life. However, as the overt political arm of Sarca, the public component will become the government if this resistance is successful.
Figure 2. Covert and overt functions of an underground.
A study about the connection between terrorist groups and political parties shows that a very common relationship was for the political party to create the terrorist group, or some form of violent element. Sometimes this happens because factions break away from the political party or, other times, because the party supported an external violent element. The opposite, where a violent group creates a political component, like the IRA creating the Sinn Fein, is less common. However, the study also showed that political parties that turn to violence become unstable, while violent groups that turn to politics exhibited more stability, provided the transition to politics was successful.

One reason violent groups establish political elements is to communicate with outside parties because their operations are clandestine. The clandestine group needs an avenue to communicate its objectives and messages to a variety of audiences.

Take Hizbollah as an example. In Lebanon, Hizbollah is able to use public to include legislative representatives in government to announce its views. In Israel, though, Hizbollah must operate clandestinely. Political wings, or public components, are
critical for negotiating with the government because it provides the government with a negotiating partner not directly connected to the armed component.

Unlike many armed opposition groups, Hizbollah laid the infrastructure for political activities, including establishing schools, mosques, hospitals, and voluntary welfare associations. From early in its career, “the aim of Hizbollah and Iran had been to strike roots in the Shiite society in Lebanon.” Hizbollah did not, however, contest a parliamentary election until 1992, several years after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. Khomeini’s death allowed Hizbollah leadership a bit of breathing room to follow a more independent path—one that included establishing a political party and participation in the Lebanese political process, a move now supported by Iran despite Hizbollah’s abandonment of revolutionary goals. Hizbollah viewed participation as an opportunity to block any normalization of relations with Israel after the Gulf War, and it also provided the organization with an avenue of survival should it ever be induced to disarm. Additionally, the benefits of political participation, including “access to political resources such as governmental posts, contracts, authorizations, permits, and public exposure” proved attractive as well. The election of Hassan Nasrallah to the post of Secretary General of the organization solidified its dual military and political trajectory.

A resistance can also abandon violent approaches and pursue only political methods. Factors that impact on that decision include ideological flexibility, strong centralized leadership, and internal cohesion among the support base. Some groups experience violence that ruins this transition, such as the Omagh bombing in 1998 by the Real IRA in protest of the IRA’s Good Friday Agreement. However, groups that successfully transition often feature strong, committed leadership that moves the resistance toward a peaceful settlement. Like Hizbollah, the IRA and Sinn Féin operated on dual tracks, with Sinn Féin taking a peripheral role. The balance did not switch, and Sinn Féin did not take on a larger role until there was a generational change in the group’s leadership.

Gerry Adams took the reins of Sinn Féin in 1983, and by 1986, the Provisionals approved the pursuit of seats in the Republic of Ireland’s parliament. After a series of operations that yielded civilians deaths, and dwindling popular support, Sinn Féin and the Provisionals sought a political solution to the conflict. Secret talks between Gerry Adams and the moderate leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party, John Hume facilitated the solution. In 2005, the IRA formally announced the end of its decades-long armed struggle and the decommissioning of its weapons.

Researchers suggest that violent resistance groups are changing their tactics to include more politics for two main reasons. First, becoming involved in the political process can remediate the original legitimate grievances, such as exclusion from political power. Second, involvement in a political process gives the violent component an incentive to reach a deal for peace. Support for this approach of including insurgencies in political processes to resolve grievances has been encouraged by the international community, and it led to former resistance groups becoming new government parties, such as the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, opposition parties, like in Central America, or occupying seats in government according to power sharing agreements, like in Angola.
Challenges of Transition

Resistance groups face numerous challenges in transformation from an illegal, armed opposition group to a bona fide actor in the political process, and researchers stated that transitioning to conventional politics “requires adopting a new political culture, formulating a new programme, installing party organisational structures, recruiting party cadres, and building their capacity to govern.” A leader of the ANC in South Africa notes that despite the organization’s victory in the 1994 elections after the peace process, it would have benefitted from paying more attention to building a team “ready to govern and build up its capacity to deliver.” Leaders within the Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist, or CPN-M, in Nepal anticipated obstacles to the transition:

After 10 years of the People’s War, we had entered into the phase of the peaceful development of the revolution. The form of our struggle had changed. Before, our activities were concentrated in rural areas and our main fighting forces were the PLA [People’s Liberation Army]. But now, we had to do more in urban areas, with mass mobilisations and open activities as the primary focus of our work. We therefore had to train the party and PLA cadres in this new approach. For that purpose, Comrade Prachanda and I visited five regions throughout May and June 2006 to give political classes, mainly about how to develop the peaceful revolution.

The CPN-M initiated many organizational changes to adapt the group to peaceful politics. PLA political commissars transferred from the military wing to the new party. Former members of the central committee became district-in-charges responsible for dialoguing with other political parties. The CPN-M also shifted its organizational structures to match those of the state administration and dissolved regional bureaus previously used to facilitate communication between the central committee and cadres in favor of state committees that were better reflections of the ethnic and geographic diversity of Nepal. Chairman Prachanda also dissolved all existing shadow government structures, the People’s governments, and the parallel judicial system, the People’s courts.

Resistance groups also face dilemmas of transitional justice. This requires a balance between society’s need for justice for crimes committed during the conflict and reconciliation of the parties with society. One approach is amnesty, total forgiveness, and legal release of responsibility for actions during the conflict. Another approach that can be separate or complementary is a truth and reconciliation commission, a body formed with the purpose of hearing the facts and striking the balance between justice and reconciliation. In South Africa, the interim constitution included provisions granting amnesty for offenses associated with political objectives during the conflict, as well as establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Similar mechanisms calling for amnesty established in other post-conflict settlements, such as in Aceh and Colombia.

Fighters and Guerilla Forces

Recruiting into the Sarca resistance can target several population segments, but each must be approached uniquely by appealing to the motivations and passions among them. For some, that may be more transactional and pragmatic, such as resources or better...
living conditions. For others, that may be more emotionally based, such as a sense of purpose expressed through an ideology. Potential members will be suited for a particular component. Bolanieves and his leadership circle will need to develop a method for attracting members and then evaluating and screening them for their particular value to Sarca or the underground or auxiliary components.

Recruiting Soldiers

The armed component in a resistance needs security forces, local militias, guerilla armies, and/or conventional military forces. Recruiting these fighters becomes an important function of resistance. Sarca began as an NGO, so its original members may not be natural fits for the armed component of guerilla forces. Bolanieves will have to adapt recruitment strategies from those used for other components. Where will he look in Estatu’s population, and how can he convince people to risk so much for the cause?

In the case of the Viet Cong, it was relatively easy to find potential recruits who were hostile to Japanese, French, and later, American invaders. In the wake of World War II, Vietnamese nationalists cultivated a strong sense of resistance toward foreign powers seeking to occupy and exploit their homeland. Local militia and guerilla leaders based in villages were the main source of recruiting for the Viet Cong. Later, after 1964, as the Viet Cong began to adjust its aims toward the defeat of American forces, they provided manpower for more conventional forces to fight wherever needed. Recruitment therefore became more difficult, and communist leaders resorted to forced conscription and methods of deception and coercion to keep drafted soldiers in their assigned military units.

Terrorists, and particularly suicide operatives, often have a strong sense of victimization, and propaganda methods to recruit them exaggerate the degree of victimization. Members of a resistance who later engage in acts of terror or suicide operations often first engaged in more benign activities. This is a case where fighters are recruited from within the organization, as opposed to outside it. That initial participation could have been casual or devoted, including protest marches, financial support, participation in the militia, or housing other operatives before being approached and recruited for more violent activity.

Psychologists studying the phenomenon of terrorist recruitment describe a recruit being pulled in opposite directions. The incentives not to engage in terrorism include family ties (in cases in which the family is not friendly to the insurgency), jobs, and associations with nonviolent organizations. The incentives pulling toward violent involvement include monetary incentives (for the member and/or his family), the perceived impending success of the insurgency, and even intangibles such as the respect of elder leaders and group acceptance.

The LTTE portrayed suicide operations in a semi-religious light and cultivated a wide acceptance of such acts as necessary for the hastening of the day when they would achieve autonomy. Other organizations, such as the New People’s Army (NPA) in the Philippines, leveraged peer pressure in youth organizations as a means of gaining new recruits, while young foot soldiers in Sierra Leone and Nigeria were often drawn to (or kept in) the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Movement for the Emancipation of the
Niger Delta (MEND), respectively, because of the availability of drugs and money (blood diamonds, bunkered oil, etc.).

Resistance movements also recruit for the armed component from existing military personnel, whether conventional forces or illegal/quasi-legal militias. Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula, for example, recruited heavily from the ranks of those Saudis who fought in Afghanistan in the late 1990s. These men offered several advantages: they were trained in combat techniques, they had proven themselves as religiously committed, and they shared a common and strong bond of camaraderie with their fellow veterans. These attributes make for strong and reliable insurgents. A second example is the “sobel” (soldier-rebel) phenomenon in Sierra Leone in which soldiers would join their rebel friends at night to share drugs and alcohol, periodically conduct joint raids on villages to steal property, and jointly run illegal diamond-mining operations.

Professional forces, whether veterans, paid contractors, or defected national soldiers, can be force multipliers for poorly trained and equipped armed components in resistances by filling key roles like training and logistics, as well as serving in combat. Introducing air assets or advanced sniper teams are two examples from the Balkans and West Africa. There is potential risk in that their commitment is defined by the contract they entered.

Conversely, governments also resorted to the use of professional soldiers when their armed forces are poorly trained, undisciplined, or under-resourced, but they have sufficient wealth to hire professional soldiers. This led to curious scenarios, such as FARC insurgents serving as hired snipers to defend Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in November 2011 during the Libyan uprising and mercenaries who served together in Angola finding themselves supporting two different contracts and opposing each other a year later in Sierra Leone.

The Underground

The underground is the clandestine organization established to operate in areas denied to the armed or public components or conduct operations not suitable for the armed or public components. Bolanieves can consider this component as Sarca’s special operations forces. They can operate covertly and clandestinely to coerce, subvert, and sabotage the government, and they can conduct operations that help sway the population in areas denied to Sarca. The ARIS program of work also produced a volume on undergrounds that can be consulted regarding this situation. The Captain of the ODA supporting Bolanieves and Sarca should consult these and other doctrine available to him.

Recall back to Figure 2 that showed the range of organizational functions performed by an underground. The configuration of the components of a resistance depends on the group’s operational requirements, which can depend on that state it occupies in its evolution. Take the Orange Revolution in Ukraine as an example. Experienced and highly effective organizers during the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine mobilized hundreds of thousands of people (often despite frigid temperatures) against the sitting government while simultaneously avoiding the use or provocation of violence. On November 22, 2004, the day after a fraudulent vote, approximately five hundred thousand people (many dressed in orange) gathered in Independence Square in Kiev and marched to the headquarters of
the Ukrainian parliament while carrying orange symbols (e.g., orange flags). This scene was broadcast globally, sending an unambiguous message to the members of parliament who would vote a few days later to void the election results.\textsuperscript{171}

Figure 4\textsuperscript{172} depicts a time series component model of the Orange Revolution, which represents how the auxiliary subsumed the armed component and served essentially as a security element to protect prominent members of the political component from government attacks. The Yushchenko camp anticipated and prepared for violence. For instance, Yevhen Chervonenko led Viktor Yushchenko’s personal security detail, which included fifty-five former military special operations and Interior Ministry security experts. Chervonenko claims that they had an “elaborate system of reconnaissance, intelligence, and physical protection.”\textsuperscript{173} However, the deciding factor was nonviolent political expression in large numbers with an international audience. The Orange Revolution, the resistance, did not engage in violence, and its armed component became less and less needed as the success of the public component increased. While the underground was initially prominent, the relatively rapid expansion of the Orange Revolution was almost entirely in the public component.\textsuperscript{174}

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\textbf{Figure 4.} Time series component model for the Orange Revolution.

\textbf{Target Populations for Recruitment}\textsuperscript{175}

The myth that only disaffected or unemployed people join insurgencies has been proven wrong. Resistance movements of all types recruit from all groups in society. The ideologies, propaganda tools, and recruiting methods may change from audience to audience, depending on their motivations and ways to consume information. Those motivations vary:
sense of duty, religious obligation, nationalism, hatred, despair, desire for vengeance, desire for personal gain, and more.

Some scholars think that resistance movements that develop past their early states occur in populations with a culture of radicalization. By this, they mean the culture in that society created a value system where participating in a resistance movement, including violent ones, is not discouraged, derided, or judged wrong. Instead, it is tolerated as normal or even celebrated. An example is Saudi Arabia, where the society tolerates Muslim men fighting in religiously motivated conflicts abroad, even if their behavior is illegal.176

A culture of radicalization can also develop out of harsh treatment by the government of suspected radical group members. Perceptions of victimization and injustice or other grievances can result from police crackdowns, poor conditions in prisons, and arbitrarily violating someone’s person, property, and privacy. Examples of where this occurred include:

- The killing of Boko Haram founder Mohammed Yusuf in police custody in Northern Nigeria in 2009;
- The Serbian killing of popular Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) leader Adem Jashrai and his family in Kosovo in 1998;
- El Salvadoran “death squads” targeting FMLN sympathizers in the 1980s; and
- The British Army’s use of live ammunition against Irish protesters in Derry in 1972 (“Bloody Sunday”).

Societal factors can also contribute to radicalization for recruitment, most notably unemployment and underemployment. However, while it is a strong contributing factor, it is not automatic that unemployed people join violent groups; wealthy and employed people join as well. Examples, though, of the unemployed joining a resistance includes the “lumpen” youth who joined the RUF in Sierra Leone and recently laid-off coffee plantation workers in Rwanda who were deliberately drawn into soccer clubs and indoctrinated with the concept of “Hutu Power.”

Rural Populations177

It is important to note that recruiting in rural areas can be fruitful because the threat to the resistance is greater in the denser terrain than in rural areas. Governments tend to have more presence in urban areas, leaving a resistance more free to approach the rural population directly. Resistance movements are often direct and immediate when recruiting rural populations because they tend to be less educated, depending on the country. They emphasize opportunities for improvements in economic and security situations to these populations. Examples of this recruitment method can be found in the FARC, the FMLN, and MEND in Nigeria.176 The FARC was successful recruiting youth in rural settings with Marxist propaganda about three square meals a day.179

RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: Viet Cong Rural Recruiting

The Viet Cong based much of its recruiting efforts in the rural communities of South Vietnam, in part because the government had little influence there. However, village
recruiting, particularly in the Central Highlands of Vietnam, was not simply the result of opportunity; it was part of the overall objective of limiting and disrupting the reach of the government in Saigon. The creation and sustainment of a rural power base not only sustained the insurgency with a reliable source of manpower, but it also demonstrated the weakness of the American-backed regime.\textsuperscript{180}

**Urban Populations**\textsuperscript{181}

Rural settings may attract recruitment efforts, but resistance movements inevitably must move to urban areas where the majority of today’s populations live. Recruiting in urban areas has a security tradeoff. It places members of the resistance closer to government personnel, but it also provides them opportunity to hide amongst the larger, denser population. Being more easily concealed is an attractive condition for recruitment because recruiters can recruit with less concern for their own security, and the potential members are able to support the resistance with less fear of exposure (if so desired).

**RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: FARC Urban Recruitment**

In the 1970s, the FARC had limited reach and impact on society because it remained largely a rural movement.\textsuperscript{182} As the country continued to urbanize, however, leaders decided that they would expand operations into the cities. The opportunity came as poor urban workers began to protest against their living conditions and economic stagnation. The FARC secretariat quickly attached themselves to this grievance and represented the movement as that of the proletarian struggle against the imperialism and corruption of the government. It established student groups and civic action programs within universities and schools, and it used these platforms to persuade people to vote for left-wing politicians and agitate for reforms that would benefit the insurgency. The FARC also drew upon the growing urban population for recruitment into local militias and mobile guerilla armies. Leaders learned to adapt their recruiting methods to various target audiences. Whereas rural recruits were typically drawn into the insurgency with promises of basic necessities, urban youth responded more to strong ideological propaganda.\textsuperscript{183}

**Elites**\textsuperscript{184}

Socioeconomic and political elites join resistance groups for different reasons than lower class society members. Generally, elites join for ideological motivations and personal grievances. In contrast, lower class citizens join more commonly for incentives related to necessities: food, shelter, protection, or money. Another motivation for elites is if the government threatens or harms their interests or excludes them from the benefits of their elite status.\textsuperscript{185} Otherwise, elites are often incentivized to support the government because it has been a source or contributor to their elite status. Recruiting elites can pose a security risk as their elite status may create a public profile that could draw attention to the resistance once recruited.

**Women**\textsuperscript{186}

Resistance movements choose to recruit women for multiple reasons. The first is to replenish numbers lost during operations. Second, women can be effective operatives in areas where norms discourage close contact with women who are not family members. Finally, they can serve propaganda purposes by signaling modernism and friendliness to
women’s rights. The conflicting incentives for women who are recruited include the obvious dangers of joining and fighting in a resistance, such as getting arrested or killed. However, participation in a resistance movement can also provide an opportunity to undo patriarchal norms in the society.

The LTTE targeted women for recruitment as a means for siphoning strength from other Tamil resistance movements.187 The ruthlessness of Eritrean female fighters during the insurgency against Ethiopia became legendary.188 The FARC brought women into the movement and encouraged romantic relationships to strengthen recruitment and sustainment.189

Youth190

Recruiting children is politically volatile, but some resistance movements do so to replace lost members or gain new members that can evade detection. Those members are used for intelligence and courier tasks in urban settings, as well. Sometimes youth are recruited with the expectation of developing them in the resistance to eventually join the regular ranks. This is in contrast to those groups that develop entire units of youth.191 Children from all walks of life can be recruited. One method is to use precursor groups or activities, such as student groups, athletic clubs, religious organizations, or refugee camps. These places provide opportunities to draw children into the group slowly as well as assess them for their utility. In these instances, the leaders of these groups perform some of the recruiting, but youth have been self-radicalizing through the various media with which they engage.192 Other methods for recruiting children include persuading them with promises of food, shelter, security, and acceptance, or they can be kidnapped.

When a country has a so-called youth bulge, when the country’s population has a high share of young people, the risk of resistance, whether riots, protests, or terrorism, can rise.193 This dynamic usually arises from the tendency for young populations to possess beliefs, ideas, and demands that clash with or challenge the status quo established by the older generations.194 Studies propose that youth bulges contributed to some historical resistance examples, including the European Revolutions of 1848, the rise of Nazism in Germany in the 1930s, and the American anti-war and civil rights protests (led by “baby boomers”) in the 1960s. The researcher Henrik Urdal195 examined a large historical dataset196 and found a relationship between nations with a comparatively large percentage of young people (fifteen to twenty-four years old) and levels of smaller scale political violence. Using a separate dataset,197 Urdal also found a relationship with levels of terrorism and rioting. This effect seemed to hold across different types of governance but seemed to be a greater risk factor in autocratic regimes.

Prisoners198

Recruiting in prisons takes advantage of a captive audience to increase the insurgency’s ranks. The Korean War provides an example when the communists took over the prisoner-of-war camp Koje-do. In that case, the insurgents used persuasion, coercion, and violence to take control of large sectors of the prison population and eventually set up courts. They executed those convicted of crimes against the communists, warred against
anti-communist factions, and triggered armed intervention by the US Army. The incident served as propaganda against the West and remains a stunning example of how prisons can become breeding grounds for rebellion and violence.199

Today, prisoners are vulnerable to faith-based or ideology-based recruitment where inmates already recruited and indoctrinated convert other inmates to their brand of radicalization. These recruits can serve to recruit more prisoners, or upon release, they can operate for the insurgency. The dynamics in prisons sometimes yield the merging of religious influences and gang dynamics, resulting in conversions aimed at filling the ranks of various gangs or co-opting gang organizations into radical religious movements. Individual prisoners often turn to radical religions partly because of genuine spiritual convictions and partly for protection.200

**Native Populations**

Native populations can be recruited for the same reasons as any other group (money, food, promise of purpose, etc.), but their unique dynamic is that their indigenous identity can be politicized around a demand for rights and political influence.201

_Bolanieves will have to decide the kinds of people and skills Sarca needs to succeed. The first task is finding those people, but then Bolanieves and his cadre will need to convince them to join Sarca. Some recruits will come for pragmatic purposes, while others for psychological ones. Sarca’s recruiting efforts will need to be tailored to each population and even each individual. The factors previously addressed can help guide that tailoring, but the best judgment of the Sarca recruiter is the final decision maker._

**External Support**202

_In addition to managing the variety of actors within Sarca, Bolanieves will have to manage relationships with external actors. Sarca could receive assistance from the Estatian diaspora, whether individuals or businesses abroad. Alternatively, Bolanieves will be viewing the ARSOF soldier as an external state actor seeking to assist him and his resistance movement. He will consider his objectives, risks, and which US interactions are best for him and the resistance movement._

States sometimes choose to support a resistance inside another state. It might be because the external state benefits from weakening its rival, and the resistance can accomplish that. It could also result from a population of the external state that wants to support the resistance because of a connection such as ethnic identity.203 Additionally, the state may be positioning itself to demand reciprocal assistance in some form. Alternatively, the resistance may seek state assistance because the resource and logistic demands, as well as its aim to remain self-sufficient to avoid debt. The NPA in the Philippines during the Ferdinand Marcos presidency was designed from the start to be self-sufficient. As the insurgency became more complex, however, the logistics requirements became greater. During 1971, the Communist Party of the Philippines established a permanent delegation in Beijing to coordinate support from the Chinese government.204

The types of provided support can be displayed in a two-by-two matrix using cells derived from US Army doctrine (see Figure 5).205
The two categories represent forms of support (material or nonmaterial) and the assertiveness of the support (passive or active). Moral support is a nonmaterial form of passive support, such as sympathetic public statements or similar measures. Political support is active and nonmaterial, including diplomacy in the form of advocacy and symbolic actions to express support. Sanctuary is a material form of passive support by providing training sites, operational bases, protection from extradition, or other shields from adversary actions. Finally, the provision of resources (funds, weapons, food, advisers, training, foreign fighters, etc.) is active material assistance, the most involved type of resistance support offered by an external actor.

Foreign governments may decide to provide its support clandestinely to avoid attribution and provide plausible deniability. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operating in Iraq after the 2003 American invasion used this method to provide Shiite militias with materials to produce improvised explosive devices. Other potential external supporters include NGOs, diaspora, transnational crime groups, and individuals. Individuals can choose to provide support from outside the country, such as by raising money in the diaspora or from foreign communities. Political opposition to President Maduro of Venezuela receives funds from the Venezuelan diaspora in the United States. Other individuals can choose to join the conflict because of sympathy, conviction, or shared grievance against the government. This has been most notable with the foreign fighter phenomenon in ISIS.206

Businesses can also support a resistance by serving as a conduit for resources. For instance, a company could import contraband items under non-contraband labels. The companies involved would be paid for the goods and services to keep records clean. In 2010, a similar scenario emerged when thirteen shipping containers labeled “building supplies” were seized in the Nigerian port of Lagos and found packed with rocket launchers, mortars, explosives, and ammunition. Authorities remained unsure of whether the weapons—originally shipped from Iran—were destined for internal insurgent groups, such as the MEND or Boko Haram, or whether the weapons were en route to Gaza via West Africa.207
Bolanieves and Sarca

Resistance leaders must gain and maintain legitimacy, manage the components, recruit members, and negotiate external support. Bolanieves has to manage a wide variety of actors as a resistance leader. Likewise, the resistance will demonstrate a diversity of members and participants, and some form of culture, norms, or rules will be needed to govern them harmoniously. As Sarca grows, it should be thoughtful and careful about how it incorporates and governs populations that come under its control. The population can be a great asset or a great danger for Sarca. Sarca meanwhile will be challenged to maintain its legitimacy as the public component of the resistance. Finally, Bolanieves should not neglect the opportunities to leverage external support to the Sarca resistance. They represent valued actors for a resistance movement, and their support can range from money to messaging, arms, or diplomacy.

Questions

Arturo Bolanieves is the resistance leader that the ODA was tasked to support. In this section on actors, the reader learned about resistance leadership, shadow governments, inter-group competition, popular support, resistance components, fighting forces, underground elements, recruitment, and external support actors. To best prepare to support the Sarca resistance, the reader should further explore how this knowledge should apply to Bolanieves and the Sarca movement. A series of discussion questions follow that examine the content in the context of the Sarca narrative. The questions are scaled to the required level of reader knowledge: introductory, intermediate, or mastery. Those seeking an intermediate level of knowledge should demonstrate competency in both introductory- and intermediate-level questions. Those seeking a mastery level of knowledge should demonstrate competency in all three levels of questions. Finally, these questions may be used for individual analysis, group discussion, and/or instructor assignments.

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**INTRODUCTORY - BLOOMS LEVEL ONE**

- Identify: What does Bolanieves have to think about when determining whether to pursue a shadow government or government in exile?

**INTRODUCTORY - BLOOMS LEVEL TWO**

- Identify and Categorize: What are the components of the Sarca resistance? How are they different from one another?
INTERMEDIATE - BLOOMS LEVEL FOUR

- Attribute and Differentiate: How can Bolanieves use those components?

MASTERY - BLOOMS LEVEL FIVE

- Detect and Evaluate: What kinds of considerations should Bolanieves account for when exercising leadership?
- Detect and Evaluate: What kinds of recruiting methods and tools should the Sarca resistance consider?
CAUSES

After establishing his leadership position and identifying segments of the population that could join Sarca, Bolanieves faces the challenge of understanding the many and varied motivations behind a resistance as it emerges and continuously evolves. No single factor or problem fully explains resistance by itself. Multiple different issues across many aspects of society can affect Sarca and its motivations; economic, political, ideological, religious, ethnic, and social issues may all play a role in Sarca’s resistance. History, sociology, and politics could all help Bolanieves explain Sarca’s motivating factors and root causes.

Bolanieves could first consider the problem of relative deprivation. In this case, the people of Estatu may feel entitled to reach for and achieve a certain quality of life, but the actual opportunities to succeed in reaching that life in Estatu are very limited and fall short. This failure could lead to conflict as people violently protest against the limitations and join Sarca’s movement. For example, a sudden loss of job opportunities in Estatu or high inequality across different social groups in Estatu would both be cases of relative deprivation. To motivate Sarca’s resistance, Bolanieves could bring together the people of Estatu who feel deprived of the ability to achieve economic success, political freedom, or other benefits and rights. However, some researchers challenge this economic deprivation theory. One study found that supporters and members of terrorist groups are actually often better educated and more economically advantaged, not poor or lacking opportunity. Additionally, historically economic inequality has not been significantly connected with causing violent conflict. Knowing this, Bolanieves would also want to identify and assess other potential causes that motivate Sarca.

In Estatu’s political arena, emerging opportunities for participation, such as breakdowns of traditionally powerful groups in the country and new paths to power, could motivate Sarca’s actions. In this case, Bolanieves could leverage the new political opportunities to demand change and publicize Sarca’s grievances and complaints. Conversely, if Estatu’s government used harsh oppression and violence against its people, more people might join Sarca if they started to believe there was no other choice but to fight back.

Ethnic and religious identities in and around Estatu could also contribute to resistance and violence. If the government of Estatu mostly includes people from only certain ethnic groups, other people could feel excluded and disadvantaged, leading to resentment of the powerful group’s status. Similarly, if Sarca primarily recruits members from a particular ethnic group, fear of a threat from or hatred of another group could further contribute to the problem in some cases.

If religion plays an important role in Estatu, a nonreligious city government or the rising presence of a different religion in the city could lead resistance fighters to believe they are rightfully defending their religion from a threat. If Sarca had religious motivations or influences, the group could take on greater symbolic meaning. However, Bolanieves should be aware that multiple studies suggest that ethnic and religious divisions are not usually primary causes of resistance by themselves.
Bolanieves should consider another potential motivation to change the structure of Estatu’s society. Warfare between social and economic classes, especially in the context of Marxist ideology or anti-colonial resistance, often falls under this social revolution motivation. In this scenario, Sarca might seek to change both the social and government structures of Estatu. This is especially so if the state government lacks legitimacy.

Lack of Government Legitimacy

Legitimacy of the government is an important factor in its ability to govern, especially in the face of challenges. A government only has legitimacy when it is seen to have both the right to rule and the ability to carry out expected functions of government. These are the most important factors affecting legitimacy:

- **Security.** People who experience threats to their physical safety often lose faith in their government. This is particularly true when threats are internal, from crime, insurgency, or terrorism, rather than external threats, which evoke a unifying reaction. (Not surprisingly, governments tend to blame internal security problems on “outside agitators” or external manipulation whenever they can). Terrorism attempts to undermine a government’s legitimacy by undermining people’s sense of security.

- **Justice.** Governments are expected to settle disputes fairly and quickly. Widespread corruption in the judicial system undermines legitimacy. Many countries with widespread corruption rely on alternate judicial systems, such as the Shura system in Afghanistan and adoption of Shari’a law in a number of states in northern Nigeria; these workarounds undermine the legitimacy of federal governments.

- **Economic needs.** Governments are expected to make sure people of the nation are fed and to meet their other basic needs, which could include fuel, roads and utilities, health care, education, and employment. Expectations for the services a government should provide vary widely between cultures and nations and are tied closely to prior conditions and conditions of immediate neighboring countries. Widespread corruption, by which employment, health care, and other services can only be obtained through bribes or connections, can undermine legitimacy (although judicious use of patronage can in some circumstances increase it).

- **Ideological legitimacy.** Cultures also have idiosyncratic expectations for what constitutes a legitimate government. Religious leaders may undermine a government by withholding sanction or declaring the government illegitimate. The Catholic Church in the past held such power over many European states (Henry VIII founded the Church of England because he could not obtain legitimization by the Roman Catholic Church). Modern-day Islamists often direct their most vehement criticism at secular leaders of Muslim nations who do not meet their standards for Islamic rulers. Nonreligious ideologies also matter; governments may forfeit legitimacy for violating strongly held ideals of freedom and democracy or other values that a population feels to be ideologically nonnegotiable.

Legitimacy is ultimately a subjective judgment in the eyes of the people. Regimes that provide poorly for their people may still enjoy popularity or acceptance among those people. However, exposure to information from outside may sometimes raise
questions about the government’s legitimacy and lead to changes in how people see their government. Information and communication with the outside world are therefore important factors in determining legitimacy, and underperforming governments have good reason to try to control perceptions among a population. Attacking the government’s legitimacy is regularly a central theme of the war of words between insurgents and the government.

**Economic Rationale**

Economic hardship plays a significant role in resistance as a justification for violence or as a factor in a person’s decision to join a resistance group. In broad terms, political violence is more likely to break out in countries with lower levels of economic development and less likely to appear in prosperous countries.

However, insurgencies do not spring up solely because of a population’s anger about poverty or other similar deprivations such as lack of education, health care, or employment. Deprivation may lead individual poor people to participate in “bread riots” to demand basic necessities or to commit minor crimes, but it does not directly lead to organized, sustained insurgencies.

A similar theory focuses on relative deprivation, or the idea that the difference between the life people expect to live and the life that people can actually achieve motivates violent resistance. For example, the sudden loss of job opportunities or high economic inequality between the very rich and very poor are both cases of relative deprivation that could lead to political violence. However, other research challenges this theory. One study found that supporters and members of terrorist groups are often better educated and more economically advantaged, not poor or lacking opportunity.

As shown by these different theories and ideas, the economic factors in resistance are diverse and complicated. Poverty may lead young people to feel that they have fewer options in life and less to lose, which makes joining an insurgency a more attractive option. Additionally, poverty may increase lawlessness and violence, which undermines the government’s legitimacy and authority because it cannot maintain order.

**Political Rationale**

A country’s system of governance is an important risk factor for resistance. However, what kinds of governments are the most at risk for violent insurgencies? It might be natural to assume that the most violent and repressive governments are most likely to have violent resistance, but the answer is actually more complex.

Generally, the most democratic governments are the least vulnerable to violent insurgency because there are many nonviolent opportunities for opposition, including elections, public protests, and free speech. Most potential resistance members realize that they have better and safer options than trying to take on the central government with force.

Highly repressive regimes are also less likely to experience violent resistance. The most repressive regimes prevent resistance groups from forming and resistance messages from disseminating. Additionally, these types of governments usually have powerful secret police that gather intelligence on potential resistance groups and crush them before they
can grow in strength. Modern North Korea is an example of a highly repressive but stable regime.

Most countries fall somewhere in between full democracy and the most repressive dictatorships. These governments may allow opposition political parties but rig elections so that the ruling party is not truly challenged. They may restrict political freedom while allowing a lot of economic freedom. Similarly, they may restrict the media but otherwise allow relatively free Internet access.

When looking at these three kinds of states, one theory is that countries at each of the ends—the most democratic and the most repressive—are the most stable. Democracies allow nonviolent disagreements and protests so people are less likely to escalate to violence, while dictatorships completely crush all resistance. However, the middle of the road regimes with a mix of democratic and repressive policies may be the most unstable. These governments allow enough freedom of speech and assembly to allow opposition groups to form but are simultaneously repressive enough to use force against the groups. As a result, existing resistance groups may gain support to escalate violence against the government.

**Ideological Rationale**

The crucial role of ideology in an insurgent or resistance movement cannot be overstated. An ideology grows out of discontent with the status quo; it is the intangible idea that gives rise to acts of defiance and rebellion. Ideology also plays a dual role in an insurgency in that it serves as the basis for recruitment and illuminates strategic direction.

Successful movements often rely on a narrative for recruitment, legitimacy, and support that resonates with a deep cultural, ethnic, or historical myth/memory within the population.

Common to most underground movements is an ideology, a set of interrelated beliefs, values, and norms. Ideologies are usually highly abstract and complex and are more than a group of rationalizations and myths that justify the existence of a group; they can manipulate and influence the behavior of the individuals within the group.

These observations seem obvious. What is not so obvious is the decisive role leaders assume as they cultivate, develop, and evolve ideology during the course of a resistance. Their decisions and motivations regarding the specific ideological principles of the movement serve to characterize the movement’s ability to appeal to the masses, and they both energize and constrain the progress of the movement’s strategy.

Ideology evolves. It is rare for a movement’s ideology to remain unchanged throughout the course of the struggle. It moves along a spectrum of exclusivity and inclusivity as leaders stake out the movement’s position on politics, religion, social justice, etc. *Exclusive* ideologies aim at energizing a targeted sector of the population, helping the members of that population to define themselves in relation to those they oppose. *Inclusive* ideologies seek to unify various groups and encourage them to coalesce around the insurgency’s main goal. Exclusive ideologies facilitate strategic focus because they embrace specific
and dramatic goals. The disadvantage of exclusivity, however, is that the ideology does not appeal to a broad sector of the population. Inclusive ideologies embrace large portions of the population, but they suffer from multiple, vague, and often conflicting goals that make strategic focus problematic (see Figure 6).

Yasser Arafat’s leadership of Fatah and, later, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) illustrates both the strengths and weaknesses of an inclusive approach to ideology. The most fundamental goal of the PLO was the destruction of Israel so that displaced Palestinians could return to their homeland. Beyond that single point of congruity, however, there were many competing ideas within the movement. Pan-Arabists viewed the unification of Arabs as the key to achieving the overall goal (the destruction of Israel) and agitated for the PLO to subordinate itself to the Arab leaders of surrounding states—primarily Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser. Communists insisted that the entire Palestinian conflict was a manifestation of the universal struggle against capitalism and imperialism. Islamists interpreted the conflict in theological and eschatological terms and pushed for religious revival as the means to victory. Confronted with these and other disparate ideas, Arafat welcomed them all, and an inclusive attitude led to the growth and sustainment of the movement.

The drawback, however, was that Arafat was under constant attack from leaders within his own organization. To them, he was not Arab enough, socialist enough, or Islamic enough. Not only did this inherent disunity foil his attempts to cement his control of the organization, but it also led to various subgroups “hijacking” PLO strategy. As factions sought to dominate both the headlines and the parent organization, leaders would sometimes engage in spectacular acts of terror or other violence. Arafat often found himself racing to keep up with events and trying to rein in recalcitrant colleagues. In this he was never fully successful.

Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), the Maoist insurgency in Peru, developed an exclusive ideology rooted in the ethnic and class conflict within the country. The movement allied
itself with the largely disenfranchised and impoverished indigenous population, and that ideology garnered immediate and widespread support within the local communities of the Peruvian highlands. However, this ideology did not resonate as strongly with other communities in the coastal plain or in the urban communities of Lima and other Peruvian cities. Oddly, Abimael Guzman, the leader of Sendero, chose to not reach out to other constituencies or to potential external sources of support. Instead, his ideology, and that of his followers, remained focused on the centrality of Guzman and the Maoist model he endorsed within Peru for addressing ethnic and class conflict. Consequently, the exclusivity of the Shining Path ideology served as a brake on the movement’s progress, just as it initially helped to accelerate the movement’s development in the early stages.3

Finally, the complete absence of a strong, unifying ideology (whether inclusive or exclusive) can severely limit the development, growth, and sustainment of an insurgency, especially when this ideological void is filled by personal motivation and ambitions. Insurgencies such as the FARC in Colombia, the RUF in Sierra Leone, and the MEND in Nigeria all started with pseudo-ideological foundations related to government repression and government control of resources but soon deteriorated into struggles between local insurgent leaders and their control over drug crops, diamond fields, and oil bunkering operations (respectively). In this environment, where individual aspirations usurp any strategic ideology, organizational cohesion quickly deteriorates.

The grievances of those in Estatu supporting Sarca and Bolanieves began under economic and political rationales, but as it grows, different members join for ideological reasons regarding ethnicity and language. The recruiting methods may change to reflect this, or the goals of the movement may evolve to make more members feel part of the group. The ODA would benefit from maintaining awareness of why people join and stay in Sarca and why they follow Bolanieves or disagree with him.

Religious/Ethnic

From history, Bolanieves is aware that one of the most powerful causes of resistance is the marginalization or persecution of social identity groups. In Estatu, identity groups based on religion and ethnicity could be especially important for uniting similar groups of people or creating societal divisions. As with many other countries that have peacefully coexisting religions and ethnic groups, diversity in Estatu does not automatically mean that resistance and conflict will break out. However, when diversity combines with some form of economic or political exclusion, as Bolanieves witnessed in Estatu, there can be a strong motivation for resistance. If the government of Estatu broadly discriminates against, excludes, controls, or uses violence against a certain religious or ethnic group, people from that group may be more motivated to join Sarca because they have no other way to protect their rights. For example, the Estatu government’s language law heavily impacts and discriminates against certain minority ethnic groups that speak other languages. Those ethnic minority groups would have a powerful reason to side with Bolanieves to regain their rights and recognition.

To understand the typical types and ranges of discrimination, it is interesting to look at the criteria for discrimination used by the ongoing Minorities at Risk (MAR) project.
Criteria for ratings of government repression, political discrimination, and economic discrimination categories are listed in Table 1.  

Table 1. Code guidance for three discrimination categories from the MAR dataset.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Government Repression</th>
<th>Political Discrimination</th>
<th>Economic Discrimination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Surveillance, e.g., domestic spying, wiretapping, etc.</td>
<td>Neglect/remedial policies</td>
<td>Neglect/remedial policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Substantial underrepresentation in political office and/or participation due to historical neglect or restrictions. Explicit public policies are designed to protect or improve the group's political status.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Significant poverty and underrepresentation in desirable occupations due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. Public policies are designed to improve the group's material well-being.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Harassment/containment, e.g., saturation of police/military presence, militarized checkpoints targeting members of group, curfews, states of emergency</td>
<td>Neglect/no remedial policies</td>
<td>Neglect/no remedial policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Substantial underrepresentation due to historical neglect or restrictions. No social practice of deliberate exclusion. No formal exclusion. No evidence of protective or remedial public policies.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Significant poverty and underrepresentation due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. No social practice of deliberate exclusion. Few or no public policies aim at improving the group's material well-being.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nonviolent coercion, e.g., arrests, show-trials, property confiscation, exile/deportation</td>
<td>Social exclusion/neutral policy</td>
<td>Social exclusion/neutral policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Substantial underrepresentation due to prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral or, if positive, inadequate to offset discriminatory social practices.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Significant poverty and underrepresentation due to prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral or, if positive, inadequate to offset active and widespread discrimination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Violent coercion, short of killing, e.g., forced resettlement, torture</td>
<td>Exclusion/repressive policy</td>
<td>Exclusion/repressive policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public policies (formal exclusion and/or recurring repression) substantially restrict the group's political participation by comparison with other groups. (Note: This does not include repression during group rebellions. It does include patterned repression when the group is not openly resisting state authority.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Public policies (formal exclusion and/or recurring repression) substantially restrict the group's economic opportunities in contrast with other groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Violent coercion, killing, e.g., systematic killings, ethnic cleansing, reprisal killings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Social identity groups in Estatu are not limited to religion and ethnicity. People could join Sarca through any relationship or group that provides a sense of belonging or encourages them to participate in resistance. For example, the rural migrants who feel marginalized...
and excluded in Estatu could begin to question their place in urban society and seek out other people in Sarca with similar backgrounds. Social identities and relationships that Bolanieves might use for reaching people are professional connections from work and friendships.

Study of the al Qaeda social movement identifies similar motives for joining. The study compiled biographies of four hundred al Qaeda-affiliated radicals from trial transcripts, press accounts, academic publications, and corroborated Internet sources. The organization was a bottom-up, self-organizing group with no centralized recruiting mechanism. Of those interested in joining, only very few were actually accepted. Sixty-eight percent joined because of pre-existing friendships with members, and 20 percent joined because of familial ties with members; in 98 percent of the cases, social bonds preceded ideological commitment.233

- **Multiplicity of motives.** Usually, more than one motive is present when a member joins. A combination of factors is cited; no one factor by itself causes resistance.

- **Personal and situational factors.** Most of the motives cited for joining relate to situational or personal problems and reflect the individual’s immediate needs.

- **Belief in the cause or political reasons.** Only a minority admits that political reasons or sympathy with the ideology or organization relate to joining.

- **Propaganda and promises.** Few join because of propaganda or promises alone. These are apparently more effective when combined with situational factors.

- **Coercion.** Coercion alone is a small but important factor in joining.

- **Coercion with other positive incentives.** When combined with other positive incentives related to personal or situational factors, coercion yields a significantly large number of recruits.

- **Government persecution.** This factor appears to be a small but significant factor leading individuals to join the movement.

There was no evidence of coercion or brainwashing; individuals acquired the beliefs of those around them. In each case, the individual joined the jihad through human bridges (acquaintances, relatives, and imams) and not electronic or bureaucratic ones.234

**Motivations of the Individual**

One major challenge that Bolanieves faces in trying to determine causes of resistance is understanding individual people. It is easier for Bolanieves to look at the big picture of society in Estatu than it is to understand each individual, unique person. Bolanieves can think about societal issues and groups, such as government illegitimacy, economic hardship, and religion and ethnicity, from a broad perspective. However, when it comes to individual people, it would be impossible for him to know every single person’s unique experiences and thoughts. People may join Sarca due to emotion or a new experience, such as witnessing or suffering through poor treatment by Estatu’s government forces. Individual people can also change their minds or experience different thoughts or feelings quickly, which means Bolanieves cannot expect to know the personal motivations of every
member of Sarca. To help him think about this complicated topic of personal motivation for resistance, there are some common individual issues and experiences of which Bolanieves should be aware.

**Personal Connection to a Grievance**

Identification with victims (actual or vicarious) will influence an individual and perhaps encourage resistance. If a person witnesses harm to a close friend, family member, coworker, or even another citizen who happens to be physically close by, there can be a greater chance of joining in resistance. Any political or military action taken by the government against its people will have unintended consequences, including causing individuals to suffer physically, psychologically, financially, or in some other way. This suffering will be seen by other people and influence how they personally think and feel.

Shamil Baseyev’s Riyadus-Salikhin reconnaissance and sabotage battalion of Chechen martyrs is often associated with employing female suicide operatives recruited from pools of women whose husbands were killed by Russian forces. These “Black Widows” are often described as being vulnerable because of this personal tragedy. Superficially, this is an exemplar of the personal grievance mechanism. Reality, however, is more complex. The degree to which these individuals willingly participated is debatable. Baseyev’s recruiters coerced some, and others felt the social pressure of marginalization from an insulated culture of strict Islamic mores; others still may have been acting out of a sense of grief-induced hopelessness (along a depressive continuum).

**Vicarious Experience of Grievance**

A personal grievance need not be direct but can be experienced by proxy. This dynamic is particularly prevalent in modern recruitment strategies of radical Islamic groups, which emphasize victimization of Muslims at the hand of Westerners. Vicarious victimization can be experienced through self-study, media exposure, or accounts learned from members of the same social network. Al Qaeda’s narrative, from Osama bin Laden’s fatwas to Dr. Ayman Al-Zawahiri’s speeches and their propagation throughout the information environment, continues to call for devout Muslims to rise up and serve the greater umma through jihad. The individuals with no direct contact to al Qaeda leadership or even operatives (sometimes referred to as self-radicalized or super-empowered) become adherents to the narratives of violent extremists and radicalized to the point of contemplating terrorist acts. There are several variants of these grievances, including grievances against governments, a hatred for the perceived erosion of fundamental values, disaffection from society, anger over unequal economic opportunities, the desire to belong to a cause larger than self, and a desire to make a name and prove oneself.

Vicarious grievances are most effective when supported by ideological frameworks articulating perceived problems, a vision of the future, and a prescription for action. Cases of individual radicalization to political violence (when the individual acts alone rather than as part of a group) are relatively rare. In such cases, the individual is likely to associate with a larger intellectual community or social movement.
Mechanisms of Recruitment

It is important to note that the adoption of radical beliefs alone does not mean an individual will become violent; the transition from activist to violent radical is not inevitable. In addition, an individual need not personally suffer a transgression to seek out radicalization opportunities. Any individual with a degree of empathy, sufficient emotional vulnerability, and the opportunity to access informative materials could potentially succumb to this mechanism. However, there may be underlying factors that predispose one to vulnerability, but those factors have not been studied with sufficient rigor to generate a set of empirically determined criteria for susceptibility to radicalization. These risk factors and mechanisms discuss the methods under which and the reasons why an individual chooses to participate in violent radical behavior. Some radicalize because of a personal or political grievance whereas others do so because of social or environmental pressures. Examples of the application is included in Table 2, where the mechanisms apply to Zawahiri.

Table 2. Radicalization mechanisms and their relevance to the Zawahiri case study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Relevance to Zawahiri</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radicalization due to personal grievance: Harm to self or loved ones can move individuals to hostility and violence toward perpetrators.</td>
<td>High: Zawahiri’s close relationship with his maternal uncle (Sayyid Qutb’s attorney)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalization under threat: Threat or harm to a group or cause the individual cares about can move the individual to hostility and violence toward perpetrators.</td>
<td>Medium: Generalized predisposition to perceived threat indicative of intolerance of uncertainty (manifested both individually as well as generally on behalf of Egyptian Islamists toward the secular regimes of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small involvements in political conflict can create new forces that can move an individual toward radicalization.</td>
<td>High: Early days (1966) as a clandestine cell leader within Muslim Brotherhood faction provided sense of political identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalization through social networks: Love for someone already radicalized can move an individual toward radicalization.</td>
<td>Low: Zawahiri’s radicalization resulted more from his admiration for the idealized, martyred Qutb than the social network argument put forth by Sageman and McCauley and Moskalenko</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalization by disposition: The attractions of risk taking and status can move individuals, especially young males, to radical political action.</td>
<td>Low: Zawahiri did not exhibit novelty- or sensation-seeking behaviors in childhood, adolescence, or adulthood; in fact, he tended to be more “bookish” than athletic or adventurous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalization through isolation: Loss of social connection can open an individual to new ideas and new identity that may include political radicalization.</td>
<td>Medium: This is more of a perception emanating from an introverted tendency as both maternal and paternal sides of his family were well connected socially, academically, and politically</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussion among like-minded individuals tends to move the whole group further in the direction initially favored.</td>
<td>High: Particularly so during the internment period subsequent to the Sadat assassination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalization in competition for the same base of support: Groups are radicalized in competition with other groups.</td>
<td>High: Particularly so when comparing the Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG), and EIJ (although more so EIG-EIJ) from the late 1970s through the 1990s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Mechanism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Relevance to Zawahiri</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radicalization through condensation or splitting: The power of group dynamics is multiplied to the extent that group members are cut off from other groups.</td>
<td>High: Particularly during the period immediately after internment when Zawahiri and many EIJ leaders “escaped” to Peshawar and linked up with Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalization through jujitsu politics: Terrorists often count on government reactions to advance their causes.</td>
<td>Medium: This seems to have been a consideration in the Embassy operations; however, al Qaeda’s organizational reasoning was biased by the 1993 incident in Mogadishu and thus it miscalculated the U.S. response to 9/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalization through hate: In protracted conflicts, the enemy is increasingly seen as less than human.</td>
<td>High: Particularly so when analyzing the content of Zawahiri’s speeches/press releases; his abrasive negativity has become more pronounced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalization through martyrdom: A successfully constructed martyr can radicalize sympathizers for the martyr’s causes.</td>
<td>Medium: The salience of Qutb’s martyrdom remains with Zawahiri; however, he has demonstrated lack of empathy in considering the human effect (e.g., surviving family members, innocents, etc.) of martyrdom operations instead focusing on the enemy—bin Laden on the other hand, seems to have displayed more empathetic reactions toward the families of both suicide operatives and those killed in combat against the Soviets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Bolanieves and Sarca**

Many different experiences, beliefs, fears, goals, and hopes may motivate the people of Estatu to join Sarca in resistance. To better prepare Sarca for resistance, Bolanieves should therefore remember that it is important to not only understand the people of Estatu and the environment in which they live, but also their motivations. The American ODA also needs to keep the motivations and causes of resistance in mind when engaging with Bolanieves and Sarca because it may not have the ability to control or affect all of the potential motivating factors. It could be a delicate and difficult process to manage or direct people’s motivations for the good of Sarca as a whole, especially if members and supporters demonstrate different motivators.

Shared motivations and causes could be a positive force for Sarca by giving people a reason to join the resistance and unite together. However, motivations and causes based on divisive factors across society could alternatively fracture or isolate the resistance. Additionally, because motivations can be very personal and based on individual experiences, Bolanieves knows that there may not be one single way to address motivations. He may have to unite both large groups of people with common views and individuals or small units who have different perspectives. When encouraging people to support Sarca, planning Sarca’s strategy, and setting objectives, Bolanieves will have to consider all of these factors.

**Questions**

Bolanieves must understand the central causes for resistance in Estatu. As the reader learned in this section on causes, there are many important concepts upon which the ODA must be prepared to advise Bolanieves. Among these resistance-based concepts
are government legitimacy; economic, political, and ideological rationales for resistance; ethnic/religious and social identities involved in a resistance; and individual motivations such as grievances and relational recruitment. It is important for the reader to examine this content by applying it to the Sarca resistance with the following discussion questions.

**INTRODUCTORY - BLOOMS LEVEL ONE**

- Identify: What kinds of factors are motivating Sarca’s goals and the people who may want to join?
- Identify and Categorize: Are some motivating factors better for Sarca than others? In other words, will some motivating factors align better with Sarca’s objectives, or could some motivations create risks for Sarca?
- Identify and Categorize: Could individual motivations play a role in Sarca, or are larger scale societal motivations more important?

**INTERMEDIATE - BLOOMS LEVEL FOUR**

- Attribute and Differentiate: How can Bolanieves shape these motivating factors, or are they outside his control?
- Attribute and Differentiate: How could different motivations and causes of resistance affect different segments of Estatu’s society?

**MASTERY - BLOOMS LEVEL FIVE**

- Detect and Evaluate: How should Bolanieves approach account for different motivations?
ENVIRONMENT

Resistance does not exist in a vacuum—a group must operate within the environment around it. The environment in which Sarca and Bolanieves operate consists of external factors that not only shape Sarca’s actions but are also shaped by Sarca’s actions. Some of the environmental factors that Sarca can face include the national and local economies, social structures and values, the state and its organs and institutions, and technology, to name a few. Factors from the geography to the economic structure of a country affect a resistance group. Furthermore, the state actively responds to the resistance movement and shapes the environment with its own actions. The consideration and study of environmental factors are integral to the study of any social phenomenon. This section reviews several factors and characteristics believed to be formative or impactful on resistance according to existing research.

Physical Environment

The physical environment plays a significant role in resistance because it defines the places in which conflict occurs. For example, countries with mountainous terrain have a higher risk of violent resistance because mountains can provide safety to fighters.244 Physical geography intersects with social structures when looking at differences in urban and rural regions. Traditionally, insurgencies are based in rural areas where they can leverage the weak government presence in remote locations. Additionally, rural insurgents benefit from local knowledge, including the details of knowing people in individual villages.245 Conversely, in emerging urban settings, a resistance group is more likely to struggle against the state’s centralized power, influence, and support. As such, it is usually not able to control large amounts of territory as it would in a rural region. However, cities also provide benefits to a resistance group, such as high-profile targets, financial opportunities, and easier access to resources.246

Rural/Urban247

Rural terrains can provide protection to a resistance. For instance, the Afghani Taliban benefits from mountainous terrain that hinders surveillance and pursuit. Mountainous terrain also isolates villages, making it harder for the government to protect and easier for insurgents to influence or intimidate. Two studies found a correlation between mountainous terrain and civil war in which conflict is more likely in countries with mountainous areas.248

Dense forest can have a similar effect. The FARC in Colombia benefitted from hiding and organizing in the thick jungles of that country. The Viet Cong may have benefited similarly, despite American attempts to deforest sections of the country. However, a general statistical relationship between forest cover and adverse political events has not been demonstrated comparable to that with mountains. It could be that difficult terrain does not encourage insurgencies to develop; it could lead them to last longer by hindering government response.249 There are examples of prolonged insurgencies without any particular geographic cover. For example, the IRA relied on the human terrain of Catholic enclaves in larger cities for safe havens and bases of operations.
Megacities

As populations from the rural provinces of Estatu moved into the urban centers, two cities became megacities, featuring wealthy downtowns, industrial zones, infrastructure (both formal and informal), and shanty towns. The populations of these megacities have two constituencies in Sarca and Ajust. Those living in the shanty towns and out of reach of public services have gravitated toward Sarca as fighting for their position by calling for more radical change. Middle class segments of the urban population, however, have more commonly supported the agenda put forward by Ajust for moderate reform that will still protect their position in society and the economy.

Urbanization, the process of people moving from rural regions into cities, affects resistance movements and groups in many different areas from recruitment and support to legitimacy to operations. This trend of urbanization is rapidly changing cities: megacities with more than ten million people and other growing urban centers present a new environment with their government structures, high concentrations of people, diversity, and economic inequalities. Megacities are also often critically important centers of government, economic growth, and business, which means “security and stability of the city has a direct impact on the security and stability of the nation.” Together, these unique characteristics provide both challenges and opportunities for resistance movements and groups in the urban environment.

Studies have found many different complex connections and relationships between large cities and conflict. First, violence in the country as a whole and poverty in rural regions may drive a higher rate of urbanization as civilians are forced to migrate to cities to escape conflict or seek economic opportunity. Once urbanization has caused growth in cities, one study showed that large urban population sizes and a high number of large cities in a country can then lead to more protests. Similarly, another study supported the idea that cities enable more “coordinated public action” and “enhance the effectiveness of uprisings.”

Because urbanization is connected with increasing resistance, it is important to specifically understand how this appears and works in cities. Some cities, called fragile cities, are at particular risk for resistance movements because they fail to provide important services to the population. For example, parts of Rio de Janeiro in the favelas, or slums, have long been neglected by the rest of the city, leading to violence and conflict in those neighborhoods with little loyalty to the government. Resistance groups can take advantage of these failings in fragile cities by reaching out to marginalized rural migrants for support, recruiting dissatisfied urban youths, rallying people against corrupt government structures in cities, exploiting racial and ethnic tensions, and using black markets. Furthermore, when cities cannot provide resources, resistance groups have the opportunity to actively and positively gain legitimacy by providing necessities such as housing or water. Some groups additionally integrate into the city and gain supporters by providing security and policing for the neighborhoods in which they operate.

The density of massive megacities also benefits resistance groups by making it difficult for the government to collect intelligence or target resistance members. With millions and millions of people moving through a megacity, a resistance group can easily physically hide amongst the “clutter.” The density and connectedness of megacities also allows resistance
groups to quickly communicate with people, receive supplies from around the world, or globally publicize an event such as an attack or protest. \(^{260}\)

However, there are also constraints on building large resistance movements and groups in cities. Due to migration from around the country, cities typically have high levels of diversity across many different ethnic groups. This diversity can hurt and hinder efforts to organize people into one single movement – people may live together in one city and have grievances against the government, but they may be too divided along ethnic lines to organize together into a bigger movement. Instead, the city may simply have many smaller resistance groups that do not cooperate with each other. \(^{261}\) Similarly, if a group is often involved in urban election-related violence, this type of violence tends to increase divisions and conflict among ethnic groups who support different political parties. As a result, the group may lose legitimacy and support based on ethnic identity throughout the city. Additionally, if a resistance group becomes involved in urban organized crime, it may lose support from civilians that had wanted the group to provide security or stop crime in their neighborhoods. \(^{262}\)

When evaluating resistance movements and groups in large cities, it is important to understand both the benefits and advantages of urban resistance operations and the potential challenges. As resistance and conflict in cities increases with urbanization, groups will need to decide how to best operate in this environment.

**Characteristics of the State**

Because resistance interacts with the government, the government significantly shapes the environment in which a group must operate. Under a weak, unstable state with little ability to provide services to its people or control its territory, resistance and rebellion can flourish. \(^{263}\) However, a stronger or more competent government has other options open to it. Governments can buy off elites and powerful local leaders in the country to ensure their support against a resistance movement. Government actions may also include imposing harsh controls on civilian populations and using forceful measures to cut off resources for the resistance group. \(^{264}\) In a different approach, other government responses may be to hold peace negotiations or make concessions to resistance group demands. \(^{265}\) All of these potential state actions affect the resistance environment, whether by escalating the violence or opening new ways for resolving the conflict.

The state against which Sarca resists will both be part of the environment and determine the environment. It will be part of the environment by reacting to Sarca’s actions and undertaking operations of its own against Sarca. The state’s strength may be a determining factor in how it reacts, so Bolanieves will have to consider that in his calculus of when and where to execute different kinds of operations. Strong law enforcement and military could squelch violent protests, but use of force may not produce a good reaction if the protests are nonviolent. In that circumstance a strong police and military facing nonviolent protesters can present an image of the oppressor against the oppressed that Bolanieves might be able to use. The state can determine the environment by opening or closing physical and virtual spaces.
Another way in which the state can determine the environment is by the level of openness or closedness that it institutes for activities a resistance might undertake to convince the government to change policies. If the state is open and democratic, Sarca can have opportunities to engage in resistance peacefully and legally, as well as illegally. An open society can provide physical and communication space to Bolanieves to spread Sarca’s message and to engage in resistance activities. However, the state can tighten its control over society and close physical and communication spaces for Bolanieves and Sarca to act. This will change the tactics that Sarca uses and can increase the risk Bolanieves’ and Sarca components’ actions bring.

Characteristics of the state can fuel or defuse a resistance movement’s rationale or motivation. For instance, state unwillingness to accommodate any demands for change can fuel resistance. Similarly, failing to meet the population’s needs can drive individuals to resist. In contrast, holding free and fair elections can defuse resistance, as can providing popular access to and involvement in governing institutions. Finally, the capability and capacity of state institutions responding to and countering the resistance will always be an integral factor in the environment of a resistance.

**Justice System**

The legal contexts (local, national, regional, international, and even religious, in some communities) within which a resistance operates can be a fundamental factor, particularly in the analysis of resistance strategy, tactics, and the barrier to collective action. While many means of nonviolent public activism are legal and protected in Western and industrialized countries, the imposing legal structures of authoritarian and totalitarian countries can outlaw some forms of speech or association, a factor that could greatly impact participation, organization, strategy, and tactics. Authoritarian and totalitarian regimes can also enforce laws unevenly and use questionably legitimate charges and trials to impede a resistance, otherwise known as kangaroo courts. Recent examples also include shutting down access either to the entire Internet or to key websites, such as Facebook and Twitter, the Internet-based social messaging service. Conversely, as was discussed in the section on legitimacy, the failure of a resistance to administer a justice system acceptable to the public can undermine the resistance’s efforts.

**Social Structures**

Sarca's strategy and tactics will interact with the larger society around it - including its people, its structures, and its values. Sarca might choose to engage in activities that match and reflect society’s values in order to build trust and support. If Sarca’s goal is to upend traditional power structures in society, it would interact with social structures by challenging and breaking them. Bolanieves would want to think carefully about how he himself interacts with the social environment as a representative of Sarca to the larger population. He and Sarca will have to answer how it fits into the society.

The dominant social structures of the country, region, and participants can also play a key role in the shape and development of resistance movements, regardless of the movement’s cause. Some key questions to consider include, how old or entrenched is the norm, and how would it impact perception of or participation in the resistance?
Preexisting and emerging relationships among individuals, organizations, various social groups (social, class-based, religious, ethnic), and governments can be significant. An example of preexisting relationships shaping resistance movements is the role of Baathist military officers in the growth, organization, and rise of the Islamic State, which later became the most prolific insurgent terrorist group in Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere in the region.268

**Social Identity Groups: Categorization and Salience**

The social environment can be important in resistance movements because it impacts group dynamics and must be navigated. Commonly, individuals seek out joining groups when anxiety and conflict are higher or more prevalent. Identifying and understanding identity affiliations, that is groups formed based on identity, can inform directions groups may take. In the context of Sarca and Bolanieves, this information could aid decision-making about in what direction the resistance will evolve.

**Identity Stability**

The notion of an identity’s stability describes the reliability of a group’s identity over time or in the face of challenge. For example, some identities can command commitment for only a short period of time. In contrast, other identities, like ethnicity, can last a lifetime. However, all identities are subject to change and redefinition. The measure is following the narrative surrounding the identity and determining the identity group’s interests. Identity groups can merge or split. Splitting can occur from independent variables like geography or language, but also from leaders’ efforts to pursue maximizing their influence.

Bolanieves may have to grapple with a shifting identity, but how would he determine where the group’s identity is moving? Where does he look to for the group’s narrative and its interests? What are the influences that could shape Sarca’s identity?

**Salience**

The idea of salience is the importance of an identity to an individual. For example, a sub-group of Sarca might share the identity of a policy position, but it may not be as salient, in other words as important, as the identity of being from a particular region. If those two identities come into conflict, salience becomes relevant because that subgroup would likely act to benefit its regional identity over its policy identity. An example that goes in the opposite direction, from smaller identity to larger, can be religious groups. Within the Catholic Church there is division regarding issues like the importance of the environment, divorce, and social justice. American conservative Catholics disagree with Pope Francis on these and other issues.271 However, their larger Catholic identity may be more salient to the conservative American Catholics than their identity based on the issues.

**Conflict**

Studies have shown that ethnic identity in Africa increases in its importance during election years because they are seen as competitions, or conflict, between ethnic groups.273 This is an example of how identities can increase or decrease in salience depending on the circumstances. Professional or economic identity may not be important until land use issues come to the forefront.
An important takeaway is that identities can be re-imagined to reinforce cleavages, invoke historical divisiveness, and institutionalize conflict. For example, Protestants in Northern Ireland identified themselves with religion, specifically that of the Protestant Ascendancy and the Glorious Revolution of 1688, to evoke a narrative of Protestant domination and Catholic subjugation. Meanwhile, the Irish Republican Army may have been predominantly Catholic, but referred to itself as Irish and Republican instead of Catholic. They cast their opponents as British Loyalists. This created a narrative of an Irish Republic struggling against politically dominant British oppressors and their Protestant steeds.

In-Group and Out-Group Formation

The identity issues posed above come into play when actors, whether leaders or disruptors, encourage the creation of in-groups and out-groups. In-groups form easily. Lab experiments found that psychologists could manufacture in-groups with anything, including arbitrary labels. The important implication is that in-group members demonstrate biases toward other in-group members, for instance by giving them more of a resource or showing more empathy.

These inward biases can express themselves as outward discrimination. When out-groups are defined they are generally treated unfairly, particularly through the pseudo-justifications by using stereotypes. Sometimes in-group leaders will use hostility toward out-groups to build cohesion within the in-group. Divides can make reconciliation difficult. For example, in Sri Lanka the Sinhalese language majority was mostly Buddhist, but the Tamil language group included Hindus, Muslims, and Christians. In contrast, the shared religion between African-Americans and white activists during the Civil Rights Movement enabled more in-group cohesion.

Competition Between Groups

Many other factors contribute to the resistance environment. The existence of multiple resistance groups with the same objectives may create competition for members, power, and influence. The different resistance groups must then find ways to operate within alliances or hierarchies. Conflict length and duration also contributes to an understanding of resistance. Poverty, economic inequality, and some ethnic group tension can all lead to conflicts that last a long time, and the decrease in value of primary resources and outside military assistance to the resistance fighters can shorten the conflict. Connecting the concepts of multiple resistance groups and duration, the existence of more groups may lead to a longer conflict when the different groups cannot agree on an end to the conflict. For example, they may have different demands for peace negotiations, which slows down the process.

Intergroup dynamics may not play an important role when resources are plenty and interests do not conflict. However, competition over resources can highlight these differences and bring identities to the forefront. It can also push individuals to decide between competing identities within themselves. A particular area of competition has been positions in governance. The perception of favoring one group in the distribution of governance positions and powers can lead to the perception and belief that unfairness and corruption exists. If Bolanieves fills his close leadership positions in Sarca only with people from a particular language or ethnic group, this can create in-group out-group tension.
because members of other language and ethnic groups can perceive those decisions as bias and a threat against their group. Another factor that should be considered by Bolanieves is the economy.

**Economy**

Bolanieves could find funding for Sarca in natural resource extraction, but research has found that approach commonly leads resistances to become more interested in the resources and the resistance (and its leadership) is corrupted by this practice. Similar negative consequences can come if Bolanieves encourages raising money through extortion. Such approaches alienate the demographic environment around the resistance and can make them a liability, or even an enemy. Beyond Estatu, Bolanieves may also reach out to the Estatian diaspora to take advantage of the economic wealth and opportunity generated by Estatians working in and sending money back from other countries. All of these different economic challenges and opportunities can push Bolanieves to take Sarca in a variety of directions.

At the country level, the structure of the entire economy contributes to conditions for resistance and violence. Economies that depend on the export of primary resources – oil, diamonds, timber, and other natural resources – create financial opportunities for a resistance group. It should be noted that if a state becomes extremely wealthy from resource exports, such as Saudi Arabia, then that economic structure actually benefits the government and not the rebels. However, in most other resource economies, a group can extort money from those resource industries and use that funding to sustain its operations. Similarly, if a country has a large number of people working abroad and sending money home, a resistance group may be able to renew and re-ignite conflict with that monetary support. Although these economic factors are not motivating resistance in terms of core objectives, they are providing the economic environment and financial means that help rebels.

A provocative theory argues that violent rebellions are more likely when there is a “primary commodity resource” that can be used to finance a rebellion. Examples of resistance movements financed in this way would be the FARC, which is financed by cocaine trafficking, and Nigeria’s MEND, which is financed with “bunkered” oil, and Angolan rebels, who are financed with “conflict diamonds.” It can be difficult for resistance movements to sustain themselves financially with legitimate businesses and other revenue sources because of the resistance’s covert nature or because the government makes it difficult as a counter-strategy. Accordingly, some will resort to criminal enterprises. The controversial theory noted above argues also that funding a rebellion through theft and smuggling valuable commodities makes radical rebellions more likely.

This theory seems to align with the research saying that countries with abundant natural resources are at a higher risk for internal conflict. In particular, when those resources are located inside the conflict region, internal conflicts tend to last longer. A competing theory, however, asserts that abundant natural resources do not encourage populations to rebel and fight, but that abundant resources corrupt the government and lead to a weak state with poor policy decisions.
Large diasporas living in more developed countries are also asserted as increasing the risk of internal conflict. Diaspora populations living in wealthier countries can send more funds home. For example, Tamils living in North America were a significant source of funding for the insurgency in Sri Lanka, as well as the Kurdish diaspora living in Europe.

Apart from valuable commodities, resistance movements can finance themselves through extortion, sometimes referred to as protection, depending on the viewpoint. This method fits well with those groups that have mobile armed forces. This method of funding often requires the extorted populations to be rural because the more expansive geography and sparse population enable safer freedom of movement by the resistance.

Financing resistance through exploiting resources and populations has been thought to incentivize the use of conflict to generate revenue. This means a shift to raising funds through illicit means instead of through popular support. In these cases, shadow governments do not serve the populations but serve the resistance to extract resources and extort people more efficiently. These resistance movements begin blurring the lines between the rebels pursuing justice and the criminal networks seeking resources.

One of the preeminent examples of this new insurgent, and the variation of insurgent tactics over the lifetime of an organization, is UNITA. UNITA was initially a legitimate opposition group driven by Maoist practices struggling to overthrow the kleptocratic and ethnically exclusive MPLA regime. The group sought greater democratic and ethnic representation, especially for the majority Ovimbundu. Its initial strategies aimed at eroding the authority and legitimacy of the Angolan state. As the MPLA continued to survive, UNITA redirected its efforts to extracting resources, including ivory, timber, gold, and, particularly, diamonds, and wealth accumulation. Its strategy evolved, as one researcher and first-hand witness acerbically noted, into a guerrilla force “whose primary objective is inflicting unrelenting and indiscriminate suffering upon defenceless civilian populations while obliterating all infrastructures as a means to render the country ungovernable.” The discovery of diamond mines in areas under UNITA’s control is partially responsible. The resulting wealth allowed the group to acquire a considerable cache of weapons and other supplies needed to continue its armed struggle. As it became apparent to the group that the MPLA could not be dislodged by either “ballots or bullets,” UNITA instead focused on creating enough disorder in the country to continue its diamond-mining efforts. Through violence and intimidation, UNITA drove away rural populations to government-controlled urban centers to facilitate diamond extraction. The trend is apparent in other African countries such as Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo in addition to Angola, where effective governance of civilian populations is increasingly regarded as unduly burdensome when groups like UNITA can instead “enrich themselves without the political and administrative costs of governing.”

Technology

The importance of technology for resistance groups has grown. It provides tools and spaces for Bolanives and Sarca to spread their messages to various audiences at home and abroad, and to seek and acquire resources. States, however, can make it harder for Bolanives and Sarca to use technology tools and spaces by controlling access to the Internet, for example. Popular access to, and the growing capabilities of, various...
technologies is a factor that can be examined as potentially directly formative on tactics and strategy, as well as indirectly on the shape or rationale of resistance movements. The Internet is an obvious technology that a resistance must use and navigate, but older and less obvious areas of technology are worth consider, namely manufacturing.

The Internet\(^{291}\)

The properties of being inexpensive, decentralized, and anonymous make the Internet a favorable environment for resistance groups, but state governments are learning how to combat that advantage; access to the Internet has become a new arms race.\(^{292}\) The relative low cost of spreading information has made it easier to reach larger audiences in terms of both geography and demography. The intentional redundancy built into the Internet makes it ideal for those avoiding censors and government controls. This decentralization also makes borders less restrictive for resistance movements, and it enables command and control across a wider network. Another battle in this new arms race is the ability to identify actors and attribute actions on the Internet. Anonymity has always been good cover for resistance movements, and the Internet provides opportunity to continue that.

Uses of the Internet\(^{293}\)

The way resistance movements employ the Internet grows as quickly as those groups can creatively invent them. The list grows constantly. Accordingly, below are some categories of uses the resistance groups have used in the past to be illustrative but not exhaustive.

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The ARIS volume *Resistance in the Cyber Domain* provides a comprehensive study of cyber resistance.

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*Bolanieves will need to consider his risks and rewards of using online methods. For instance, do the populations he wants to enlist or convince get their information online, or do they still use radio, TV, or newspapers? Does that change for different demographics? Sarca will also risk its legitimate online efforts being tainted by online activities of its underground or armed component. The ODA will need to consider the amount of exposure versus gain for using online methods.*

Publicity and Communications\(^{294}\)

A resistance historically used handbills and newspapers and leaflets to spread their messages. They would write anonymously or with a fake name. Famous examples can be recalled from the American Revolution, but other resistance movements have used this method throughout history. They often depended on coded language to clandestinely communicate themes and messages under the close watch of the government they resisted. Today it is more common for a group to publicize and communicate online. However, the same risk is present: when one speaks one can be identified and targeted. Accordingly, depending on the message or content, resistance groups communicating online will continue to obfuscate who they are. One might consider, for instance, how the subversive messages of an underground component could endanger the legitimacy or safety of the public component if they became associated.
RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: Online Publicity and Communications

The Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka made particularly effective open use of the Internet for publicity through sites including Tamilnet.com\textsuperscript{34} and eelam.com.\textsuperscript{35} Support from the diaspora was critical for the Tamil cause, and the Tamilnet website provides a much faster and easier means of keeping information flowing to distant supporters than printed newsletters did previously. In Sri Lanka, the government suppressed stories about police abuse (newspapers often printed “blacked out” stories in protest) and denied foreigners, including journalists, access to Tamil areas in the north and east of the country. The militant insurgents (the Tamil Tigers) also prevented unfettered coverage and did not permit journalists to enter territories they controlled unless they were sympathetic to the cause. Underground websites including Tamilnet (which does not appear to have been closely tied to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) were often the most reliable source of information on government/Tamil clashes during the latter years of that insurgency. More than one observer has noted that despite the violent content, Tamilnet maintained the detached tone of a Western news source. Stories followed journalistic conventions and generally did not mix facts with commentary or political rhetoric. Even in accounts of graphic torture, stories were carefully sourced and referred to “alleged” police misdeeds. This suggests that Tamilnet’s target audience went beyond its supporters and that the site sought to reach a skeptical foreign audience including the press. By providing information in a credible format, the site maximized its chances of being used as a source by foreign media, thereby creating traceable credibility for the movement and bolstering its legitimacy.

Targeting the Enemy\textsuperscript{295}

Online media can provide a potent avenue for messages targeting the enemy by undermining the enemy’s messaging efforts. For instance, Hizbollah revealed on its website that when the Israeli Defense Forces returned a coffin home it contained not one body but multiple. Parents of Israeli soldiers then began consulting Hizbollah.org because it could have information about the conflict not provided elsewhere.\textsuperscript{296} In this way a resistance can damage the legitimacy of the government and gain legitimacy and trustworthiness of its own.

Recruitment and Radicalization\textsuperscript{297}

According to Rita Katz, director of the Search for International Terrorist Entities Institute Intelligence Group, “We know from past cases—from captured al Qaeda fighters who say they joined up through the Internet—that this is one of the principal ways they recruit fighters and suicide bombers.”\textsuperscript{298}

Producing videos of operations has become so important to recruiting that several groups have included a videographer on operational teams. The videos serve multiple functions. They attract attention to the group and excite followers. They provide imagery that serves as a narrative for potential recruits; they can imagine themselves in the group more easily. Repetitive images can lead viewers to believe success is common. Finally, they desensitize recruits to violence and make dehumanizing opponents easier.

Technology also facilitates contact during the recruitment process. At some point, recruits reach out to groups, and technology also enables recruiters to reach out to potential
recruits. The increasing ability of civilians to encrypt their communications also makes these communications increasingly secure and therefore a more viable option. However, the same anonymity and secrecy also enables government personnel to pose as recruits or supporters and infiltrate resistance groups. A report in 2010 about the Irish Republican Board featured invitations to marches, to support prisoners with letters, as well as links to online petitions. The board also had a chat feature that facilitated viewers and visitors connecting with one another.

Training

Insurgent groups are utilizing Internet platforms to train followers and members all over the world. Historic manuals like The Terrorist’s Handbook, The Anarchist’s Cookbook, and The Mujahadeen Poisons Handbook are available online. A more modern approach is exemplified by Abu Omar, a Palestinian bomb maker who had been employed in Iraq to teach foreign fighters how to make bombs and carry out roadside attacks. In an interview with the New York Times, he explained that he had worked with two cameramen to videotape his bomb-making classes for online instructional videos.

Fundraising

National legislation prohibiting monetary and material donations to terrorist groups has led many resistance groups not to seek donations online. They, however, continue to sell items online. Selling is not donating. For instance, the 32 County Sovereignty Movement, a group associated with the Real IRA (RIRA) at one time joined Amazon.com’s “Associates” program and received a cut from book sales when they redirected visitors to buy those books at Amazon. The company removed the IRA from the program when it learned about its connections to the insurgency.

Command and Control

The Internet can also facilitate command and control (C2). In leaderless models, groups may attempt completely decentralized C2, for example, by openly suggesting targets and tactics and expecting that self-managed sub-groups will engage them. The website irelandsown.net once published specific information related to Prince William’s boarding school, including a suggested location for an attack. In this case, the Internet disseminated information as command guidance in a manner in which the resistance understood to substitute C2 from higher. However, the state may be aware of such methods, so suggestions that obvious and open could alert law enforcement.

Other examples include Hizbollah and World Trade Organization (WTO) protests. Hizbollah has installed a dedicated fiber optic network parallel to Lebanon’s cable television and Internet lines. When the government threatened to dismantle it, Hizbollah’s political power was able to lead the government to retract its threat and keep the Internet-based C2 network in place. In another example, protests against the WTO in Seattle pioneered the use of text messages and social media for coordination. Previously, the use of strategic movement of crowds had to be pre-planned, but modern technology has enabled flexibility with real-time decision-making and execution of adaptive C2.
**RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: Iran**

Internet and cell phone technology are thought by some to have played an important mobilizing role in the Iranian protests after the disputed 2009 elections, although this claim is controversial. The use of Twitter during these protests received a great deal of attention. \(^{307}\) Twitter is a very flexible text messaging service that can be used either to broadcast to a large audience or to send personalized messages among friends, and the messages can be broadcast using either the Internet or SMS (cell phone based). It is clear that Twitter, along with other services such as YouTube, were closely monitored by people outside the country who wanted to follow events. Some authors have questioned whether Twitter played an important role in mobilizing and organizing the protests themselves. \(^{308}\)

On June 16, during these protests, the U.S. Department of State contacted Twitter to ask them to delay a scheduled server upgrade that might have disrupted Twitter traffic. Later, the Iranian government intentionally disrupted Twitter traffic by shutting down or throttling (slowing) both Internet and cell phone services in sections of Tehran.

**Egypt**

There is a clearer case to be made that the Internet played a role in mobilization of popular protests in Egypt, which forced the resignation of Hosni Mubarak in 2011. One group at the center of the movement was the 6th of April Youth Movement, whose main outreach mechanism was a publicly accessible page on Facebook. The group had organized earlier demonstrations on April 6, 2008, with minimal impact, but had continued to gather followers, mostly among younger and better-educated Egyptians. This group was also able to communicate with and learn nonviolent protest tactics from the Serbian student group Otpor. \(^{309}\) The January 25 protests, however, were not preplanned; they were an opportunistic response to events unfolding in Tunisia. A protest was hastily scheduled for the nearest available holiday, which ironically was “Police Day.” Such rapid, coordinated response requires open and accessible communication channels, which the Internet provided. Mubarak’s government shut down almost all Internet access to the country on January 26 in an attempt to control the movement. This was done relatively easily by pressuring four major telecommunications providers in Egypt. The move was ineffective at dispersing the already-assembled crowds, however.

The Internet also facilitates using traditional media. For instance, protestors in Egypt wanted to keep a pamphlet (see Figure 7) \(^{310}\) out of the hands of the government, which monitored Facebook and Twitter. Instead of distributing it with Facebook and Twitter, protestors provided instructions on the pamphlet to distribute it only by photocopying or emailing it. In this way, the Internet served as a method to spread a piece of traditional media, in this case a pamphlet, quickly to a wider audience.
The page reproduced shows how the Egyptian protestors assembled groups outside of Tahrir Square, which allowed protestors to recruit local residents and aggregate people in the square more quickly and in a manner that was harder to prevent or disperse.

Figure 7. Instructions for crowd assembly from Egyptian protestors’ pamphlet.

Communications

Bolanieves will need to institute mechanisms for communicating effectively and efficiently within Sarca and to the broader population. They will need a way to share their ideas and important information, to coordinate activities, to tell its version of events, and to interact with local, regional, and international populations and governments. Without tools to communicate Sarca could die before it gets started by failing to make itself and its ideas known. Undoubtedly, Sarca has access to and capability to use the Internet, but there may instances where it is either not available or not the best option. For instance, Sarca’s underground may need to contact and coordinate with its armed component. Traditional nontechnical means of communication may not want to be discounted because in today’s technology run world an analog method could be the least traceable. Also in a world dependent on technology, analog means could be useful if power is cut or Internet is denied.

A resistance cannot operate without the ability for its different components (underground, armed, auxiliary, public) to exchange information, orders, intelligence, requests for assistance, and other messaging required for any organization. The need for security and secrecy, however, leads to the need for clandestine communications. A resistance’s communications will start undisciplined and ad hoc, but as the resistance grows its communications methods will evolve to develop secure, redundant systems by using diverse means: face-to-face meetings, couriers, mail, dead drops, radio, cell phones,
the Internet, and social media, to name a few. The communications system will need to continue to evolve as the government increases its response. The rapid advance of technology presents a new battleground where the resistance and government will continuously compete. Accordingly, the advantage in communications may alternate between the parties to the conflict.

Cell phone technology and social media have opened a new dimension in resistance communications. Evidence suggests that these technologies can benefit both the resistance and the government. They may enable clandestine operations, but they also provide opportunity to intercept, monitor, and gather intelligence. Urban centers provide resistance groups the most opportunity to use cell phones and the Internet, but both technologies are rapidly spreading into rural areas. The spread of these technologies and its declining cost to the consumer disrupt government's traditional methods of controlling information.

**RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: Resistance Use of Cell Phones and Social Media**

The Orange Revolution in Ukraine that unfolded from November 2004 through January of the following year featured perhaps the first widespread use of the Internet to help foster revolution. Web postings, combined with the use of cell phones, bolstered ever-growing crowds protesting the rigged elections in Kiev. By using technology that could not be easily interdicted or controlled by authorities, the crowds organized demonstrations, sit-ins, and strikes to compel the government to annul the suspicious election results. The outrage felt in the streets of Kiev found an international audience through the new technology, and the result was the deposing of a tyrant in favor of Victor Yushchenko.

Four years later, popular resistance in Moldova capitalized on Twitter. Angered by perceptions of fraud in parliamentary elections, citizens erupted in demonstrations and rioting in April 2009. They used Twitter to incite unrest, provide updates on protesters’ actions and the government’s reactions, and appeal to the international community for help. The protesters used hashtags to group messages under popular headlines, such as “#pman,” which stood for “Piata Marii Adunari Nationale,” the name of the biggest square in Moldova’s capital of Chisinau. The use of the messaging service was so influential in the unrest that the incident became associated with the so-called Twitter Revolution.

Later that year in June, the Green Movement in Iran—an abortive attempt to overthrow the government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad—made effective use of Twitter and YouTube to garner international attention. The amateur filming of the shooting death of a young woman named Neda Agha-Soltan appeared on Facebook and YouTube and incited outrage both within Iran and around the world. Protesters even conducted denial-of-service attacks against government websites, prompting the Iranian government to shut down Internet access. As the massive unrest continued, the government also shut down or limited cell phone usage and reinstated Internet access with low bandwidth to try to prevent video footage from being used. The conflict saw both sides very determined to control cyberspace for their own purposes, and both the government and the protesters demonstrated growing technological sophistication and innovation in their attempts to thwart each other.

Mohammed Nabbous, a Libyan businessman and technologist, established an Internet television station that he named “Libya Alhurra” (Free Libya) in Benghazi in February 2011.
Able to thwart government attempts to shut down his broadcasts, Nabbous found a worldwide audience and contributed both to the growing insurgency within Libya and to international outrage and eventual action from NATO. He was eventually shot and killed in a gun battle, but his efforts helped propel the anti-Gaddafi forces to victory over the tyrannical regime.

### Education

Bolanieves will need to consider the various levels of education that he should recruit. He may choose to recruit a well-educated group to effectively run the movement but it is possible that these individuals may not be the best recruitment candidates. Some successful resistance leaders (Che Guevara, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., Hassan Nasrallah, Abu Bakr al-Baghda) were well-educated through formal schooling, but others like Mao Tse-tung and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had little to no formal schooling. In turn, educated may not be a byproduct of formal education. Mao, for example, was quite intelligent and well-read, but he lacked the formal education of some other resistance leaders.

It is also important for Bolanieves to consider recruiting educated specialists to perform key administrative functions. This form of targeted recruitment tends to emerge once a resistance movement matures to the point of bureaucratization and identifies specific needs to increase and/or expand their capabilities. For example, Osama Bin Laden saw the need for database administrators to support the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and recruited them. The Islamic State specifically recruited web developers, software engineers, and/or other specialized skills sets after Baghdadi’s seminal Mosul speech. In sum, recruiting a variety of well-educated leaders and targeting the recruitment of specialized skills will support the organizational development and capacity of the resistance movement.

### History of Conflict in the Country

Countries with a history of violence are more likely to experience violence in the future. The same is true for countries whose geographic neighbors have experienced violence. There are both psychological and non-psychological reasons for this. The simplest cause may be the available supply of weapons and people trained to use them, either in-country or nearby. When one conflict ends or dies down, both weapons suppliers and soldiers may be unemployed and have few other skills; they may return to their home countries or cross borders as mercenaries. A second reason for the bleed-over of violence across borders may be large numbers of refugees or other displaced persons. These refugees may strain the resources of new areas, leading to violence. Or the refugees may hold claims on their prior land (such as displaced Palestinians) or have other grievances (e.g., lost relatives and friends) to be redressed with violence in a new location.

### Bolanieves and Sarca

Bolanieves must be aware and keep track of the various environmental factors surrounding Sarca. Each time Sarca takes an action, including decisions not to act, it interacts with the different environments around it. Those interactions will lead to a feedback loop in which Bolanieves should participate because Sarca does not exist in a vacuum. Whether it is the social context in which Sarca is arguing its case, the physical
geography where Sarca bases its operations, or the local economy’s environment will be an influential factor. The environmental factors can also range from very simple to the complex. For instance, Sarca members will need to eat, drink, dress, and bathe. Bolanieves will be responsible for finding and securing a place where Sarca members can do this in relative safety. If Bolanieves does not accomplish this, then Sarca members could start leaving because its living environment is untenable. Bolanieves could negotiate for food and supplies from the local population, but if the state threatens the community and makes good on that threat, then Sarca will be forced to find new sources. Bolanieves could face this dilemma in rural and urban areas.

Megacities present complicated environment with social structures, physical terrain, and technological infrastructures with which a resistance movement must engage. Bolanieves and Sarca might represent one segment of society that is disliked by segments of society that dominate and run neighborhoods, impacting their transit routes, supply lines, and supply sources. This would also complicate Sarca’s messaging as it tries to build shared resistance against the state across different groups with different ideologies or values. Sarca’s values might trigger a rival resistance group to form and present a new challenge for Bolanieves. If Bolanieves permits a culture to grow within Sarca that violates social norms, the resistance can lose its popular support and become easier for the state to target. Alternatively, Sarca could leverage the state’s violation of social norms in the city. The physical components of the megacity could provide multiple routes of ingress and egress but also limit Sarca’s mobility if the state creates barriers that close off streets, underground tunnels, or other connective infrastructure. Finally, the megacity’s technological infrastructure could provide Bolanieves and Sarca strong intelligence and communication capabilities, but if the state takes control of it, that technological infrastructure could become a vulnerability. If it becomes a vulnerability, Bolanieves and Sarca will need to develop alternative approaches.

Questions

Bolanieves and the Sarca movement are shaped by the environment of Estatu. In this section, the reader reviewed the importance of physical environment, state characteristics, social structures, economic factors, technology, education, and conflict history upon the creation of a resistance. By answering the following discussion questions, the reader can demonstrate how these factors can impact the Sarca movement.

- Identify: What are some examples of environmental factors for the Sarca resistance? Is it limited to physical geography?
Although Bolanieves has begun to identify members for Sarca and to understand the environment, it is clear to him that Sarca also needs a well-defined organizational structure to achieve the movement’s strategic goals. Without good organization, the movement would simply be a jumbled collection of people with no leadership or plan and could fall apart quickly. To avoid that, Sarca’s organization will have to bring its members together under his leadership to work toward a common goal. For example, if Sarca values media exposure and coverage, Bolanieves would want to develop an active and well-supported media team. However, if Sarca intends to affect the political process, Bolanieves may instead focus on improving public relations and creating a political wing of Sarca.
When looking at other aspects of organization, Bolanieves would have to reflect on his own leadership style, such as whether he wants to have a strict centralized system with himself at the top of the hierarchy or whether he wants to promote more equal relationships that are decentralized across many leaders. His style of leadership will shape Sarca’s development, the experiences of the group’s members, and ultimately how it carries out its actions. His leadership approach will also set the tone for Sarca’s culture and the way all of its subordinate leaders and members interact. Additionally, Bolanieves will have to make decisions on Sarca’s messaging and how the group communicates with the public. In order to spread its message and gain greater support for its larger goals, Sarca will need an effective way to reach out to other people. Bolanieves knows he has to give serious thought to all of these issues because most successful movements require effort and vision to evolve the group’s organization, command and control, and messaging.

To exercise C2 over the many different participants in a resistance group, resistance leaders need an organizational structure. Ultimately, good organization is critically important for carrying out effective operations and achieving a group’s objectives against the government. Even when outnumbered or outgunned against a government, a resistance group can use strong organizational “cohesion and discipline” to overcome its disadvantages.

Although organization in general is important to all resistance groups, it can look very different across individual resistance groups. Many factors, including strategy, objectives, historical background, and available resources, all help determine the organizational structure that best fits a group’s needs. For example, if a group wants to lead a revolution and eventually replace the existing government, its structure should be inclusive of new members. It should also have broad administrative features, such as having a branch of the group working on running schools or hospitals to serve the people. That style encourages the public to support the group and trust that it is organized appropriately to govern the country in the future. However, a resistance group based on a specific identity, such as ethnicity, can exclusively organize its leadership, membership, and messaging around promoting that single identity. It does not need a complex structure to gain legitimacy or control other people outside the group.

**Movement Structures**

The structure of a resistance movement can be defined as the system of relationships in the resistance movement, including how relationships are structured within individual groups and between groups in a larger resistance movement. Both the overarching movement and the individual groups within the movement have their own organizational structures. Sometimes the structures share similar features and characteristics, while other times one group can be very different from its partner groups and the movement as a whole. For example, the organizational structure of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt specifically is not the same as its partner groups around the Middle East and Africa or the broader Society of the Muslim Brothers.

Two of the foundational factors of organizational structure are level of formality (the strength of ties between the organizational nodes of the movement) and degree of centralization (hierarchical or networked authority). Adapted from the typology
proposed by Jurgen Willems and Marc Jegers\textsuperscript{322} and presented in the ARIS volume \textit{Conceptual Typology of Resistance} with permission, these two factors can be combined and categorized into four different types: formal-centralized, informal-centralized, formal-networked, and informal-networked (see Figure 8\textsuperscript{323}).

In hierarchical organizations, one leader has authority over the other members and participants, usually due to the leader’s control over information and other resources.\textsuperscript{324} Alternatively, networked relationships mean actors have relatively equal power status with a “mutual exchange of information [or resources].”\textsuperscript{325} Regarding formality, informal relationships tend to be flexible and based on trust or shared “culture, habits, and beliefs.”\textsuperscript{326} Formal organizations, on the other hand, have a more “rigid” structure “based on a legal system and/or a set of widely accepted rules.”\textsuperscript{327}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{movement_structures.png}
\caption{Movement structures.}
\end{figure}

\textbf{Dynamics and Characteristics}

Although resistance movements and groups usually have common ground and shared beliefs, there can still be sources of division in ideological, religious, social, ethnic, personal, or strategic differences. These dynamics can be examined through the strong or weak sources of division and commonality that the groups may have (see Figure 9).\textsuperscript{328}
Cohesive movements or organizations have strong shared beliefs and few divisions, creating more unity. Reversing those features, segmentary movements or organizations have few shared beliefs and many divisions, driving participants apart. Polycentric movements or organizations have both many commonalities and many divisions, which often means there are competing leaders and influences across all the different critical issues. Finally, networked organizations have weak shared beliefs and weak divisions, often leading to loose alliances of convenience. This dynamic can be seen when groups share a common enemy or have some similar beliefs, but are otherwise not strongly connected. 329

There is no single organizational structure that is best suited for all groups under all conditions. A group must consider a number of major factors to decide the organizational style that will allow it to be most successful. Additionally, on the administrative side the underground must develop an effective organization in order to support its operational missions. This requires resistance groups to perform certain “housekeeping” functions to address problems and challenges.

Available resources and countermeasures employed by governments affect these organizational decisions and functions. As a result, there are many possible techniques and structures for organizing resistance movements and groups. For example, insurgencies in the modern world range from jungle tribes using drums for communication to Internet-savvy urban operatives leveraging the latest technology.

**Foreign and Domestic Characteristics of Resistance Movements or Organizations**

Resistance movements and groups can have foreign or domestic features in their organizational structures, which may affect recruitment, support, strategy, and many other factors (see Figure 10). 330 When a resistance group or movement is perceived as domestic and operates primarily within the given country, it is a domestic resistance. Although some
domestic groups may have a few transnational activities, they are still primarily focused on the domestic issues and are popularly seen as being domestic. Conversely, a truly transnational organization or movement is actually perceived as foreign by the population even if it operates inside the country. Foreign resistance groups or movements are both seen as foreign and operate primarily outside the country. For example, from the point of view of the United States, the Irish Republican Army is a foreign resistance group, as it is both rooted and active in a foreign country. Finally, groups or movements that are perceived as domestic but primarily operate in foreign contexts are called displaced. The most notable example is a government in exile that has been forced out of its home country.

Figure 10. Types of foreign and domestic characteristics in resistance movements or organizations.

Command and Control

When looking at the organization of a group, it is important to consider the C2 structures. One organizational theory for resistance groups categorizes a group as either integrated, vanguard, parochial, or fragmented. An integrated group has both strong central leadership at the top and good discipline within the locally-based lower ranks. On the opposite end of the spectrum, a fragmented group fails in both areas, with both weak central leadership and a lack of discipline at the local level. Vanguard groups and parochial groups fall in the middle of these two extremes. A vanguard group has effective top leadership, but struggles to implement the leadership’s vision at the local level. Conversely, a parochial group enjoys influence and power at the local level, but the local units lack a strong centralized command at the top that unites all their smaller efforts. These different structures can impact the strength, effectiveness, and survivability of a group over time.\textsuperscript{331}

Another organizational theory focuses on the idea that the economic resources available to a resistance group shape the organization of that group. If a resistance group can profit from taking valuable resources such as diamonds, oil, or drugs, studies have argued that the group’s organization tends to lack discipline and be at higher risk for disintegrating. This may happen because the large amounts of money involved attract members who primarily
care about material gain and the money is not used to fund the group’s core mission. Conversely, a group with few economic resources must recruit members based on social connections, shared beliefs, and common goals. A group with members who join for these ideological reasons benefits from strong organizational discipline and cooperation.\textsuperscript{332}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pyramid</th>
<th>Equal Interactions</th>
<th>Edge Structure</th>
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<tr>
<td>Centralization has implications for command and control and is worth examining. A classic military unit has a very strict hierarchy, with clear lines of authority, often drawn as a pyramid. Authority is established by one’s level and position in the hierarchy.</td>
<td>On the other hand, network structures rely on personal relationships, reputations, and connections to decide authority among people who are equals.</td>
<td>A third option called an “edge” structure has clearer vertical lines of authority and position as in a hierarchy, but is also designed to distribute more authority to individuals and be more flexible as in a network.\textsuperscript{333}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hierarchy, network, and edge structures have different strengths that resistance groups have to consider. Examples of important questions related to the choice of command structure are:

- How important is speed of response? Hierarchical command structures almost always suffer from delays as requests move up and down a chain of command. Meanwhile, network systems typically gain speed but sacrifice reliability and quality control. The speed of competitors or enemy forces and the time window of opportunities drive this decision.

- How important is unity of command? Hierarchical command structures maximize consistency and enable crucial coordination of military, political, and communications actions.

- How important is efficiency? Hierarchical structures maximize efficiency by centralizing systems such as training, and enforcing consistency across the group. However, hierarchies can be increase bureaucracy, thereby increasing time and money.

- Are there cultural reasons to favor centralization? Hierarchies may be preferable when an organization’s membership strongly favors it. For example, if a resistance movement recruits heavily from ex-military personnel, military-style organization may be easy to implement. This might also be the case in national cultures that have strong expectations for the roles of leaders and followers.\textsuperscript{334}

None of these considerations and trade-offs are set in stone. It is possible to have fast-adapting hierarchies or efficient networks due to well-developed practices, competent leadership, or other factors that affect a specific group. However, these considerations help provide a framework for comparing a centralized hierarchy with a decentralized network.
Centralized and Decentralized Structures

In practice, Bolanieves can develop a balance between centralized and decentralized command and control for Sarca in order to take advantage of both organizational structures. To benefit from centralized strategic decision-making, Bolanieves can issue orders for tactical objectives and recommend activities that he believes can best accomplish the objective from Sarca’s central command location in Estatu. If Bolanieves has special assignments for Sarca members, he can also send his own special representative to Sarca’s individual units to supervise the operations directly. Furthermore, Bolanieves would have central authority to call for mass demonstrations, strikes, and other mobilizing actions as he sees fit. This allows Bolanieves to measure how quickly Sarca’s participants respond to his orders and how many people mobilize for Sarca’s causes. However, with such centralized power and importance, Bolanieves would need to have plans to transfer authority or reestablish the chain of command in the event that he is captured or killed.

Yet, to also benefit from decentralization, Bolanieves has the option to grant individual units the authority to devise their own plans for carrying out his orders. Since Bolanieves is often physically located in one central command location, he usually does not know precisely how many members belong to Sarca’s individual units in other areas or the specific identities of those members. Furthermore, when working on local issues that he is not familiar with, Bolanieves has found it helpful to allow Sarca’s individual local units to make independent decisions with only general guidance from him.

Centralization of Administrative Functions

Resistance movements and groups that exist for a long period of time generally centralize administrative activities in the command. Activities such as fundraising, supply purchases, intelligence analysis, and new recruit security checks may be better performed by the central command, not by the individual units who have fewer resources.

The central command may also be located in a physically safer place than the individual units so that members can meet openly and discuss plans and procedures without fear of being captured or of having records fall into the hands of government security forces. For example, in the Philippines, the Communists had an intelligence analysis and planning command safely located in guerrilla-held territory. Similarly, during World War II, governments that fled from other European countries centralized their operations in England.

Decentralization of Units

However, decentralization also has its own security benefits as the government or other adversaries cannot easily identify the resistance group members or target one single centralized command. In this case, the individual members may not know the real names of their fellow members. If the members operate as an intelligence unit, they may never even come in contact with each other and may only communicate with a leader through intermediaries. Decentralized units also avoid direct contact so if one unit is compromised its members cannot inform on anyone else.
To further reduce the possibility of its members being discovered, the underground decentralizes and disperses its units over widely separated geographic or territorial areas and groups. This extends the government security forces so that they cannot concentrate on any single area or group. Additionally, functions, roles, and duties may be duplicated across multiple different units or networks of units so that there are backup units if some are compromised.

Essentially, a decentralized organization and many of its activities are based upon a “failsafe” principle: if one element fails, there are few serious consequences for the resistance group as a whole. In general, this type of effective decentralization requires two factors: communications technology and highly trained and educated resistance members. First, information technology allows faster, more widespread, and more efficient communication between decentralized units in networks. Second, when intelligent and capable members are available, it is easier to train those members to adapt, coordinate, and optimize actions without direct management.

Evolution and Growth of Organizations

A key factor in an insurgency’s success is the adaptability of its leaders and the flexibility of its strategy and ideology. For example, recruiting tactics must change over the course of an insurgency. During the early stages, leaders seek to carefully select, investigate, and approach potential fellow insurgents. During the middle stages of an insurgency, leaders usually have to expand the recruiting effort in order to fill out its membership. It is during this transition period that some revolutionary movements fail while others succeed, and the question often comes down to the organization’s ability to find new sources for recruitment and support. During the latter stages of an insurgency, recruiting is characterized by the momentum of the movement. A successful insurgency that is able to either take power (replacing the former government) or achieve political, legal, or quasi-legal status will normally expand recruitment operations.

Ideology serves two purposes in an insurgency: it serves as the basis for recruitment, and it guides strategic direction. Ideology unifies a resistance movement and provides a common perspective from which members can see their environment. An insurgency’s ideology can be based on exclusivity or inclusivity as leaders establish the movement’s beliefs on any number of social, political, and/or operational issues. Exclusive ideologies define the resistance by contrasting it with the government and set the resistance group apart from other parts of society. Inclusive ideologies, conversely, seek to unify groups and encourage them to come together for a common goal.

Resistance group organizational structures may evolve in response to a changing security environment or to reflect the increasing legitimacy of a movement. The degree to which an insurgency recognizes these internal or external changes and adapts appropriately correlates with longevity. Although restructuring does not come without its costs (for example, the highly ideologically oriented may disapprove of a more inclusive recruiting strategy and thus may discontinue their association with the movement), overly rigid organizations are unlikely to enjoy success.
Messaging

Messaging is also an important factor in the organization of a resistance group because it helps with recruiting new members and communicating with the civilian population. To share its message, a resistance group needs to be organized in terms of both its infrastructure and the approach it uses for shaping the message. On the infrastructure side, religious spaces, community centers, social media platforms, and other open spaces offer public forums for resistance messaging to reach potential new members. As a next step, private homes, hidden locations, and restricted social media groups provide opportunities for sharing radical or violent messages underground. Together, these spaces form an organized network through which a group can spread its message. For shaping the message, some groups rely heavily on a single popular leader to create a united identity, while others such as Islamic State have a broad media strategy across multiple issues.

Since a resistance movement is full of competing actors, motivations, and goals, narratives are especially important tools for turning these many different parts into a united story and message. Traditionally, militaries have focused on the impact of kinetic operations on conflict outcome. Studying narratives helps highlight the social and political dimensions of conflict that often remain overlooked when conflict is limited to a purely force-on-force manner. Both the government and the resistance movement seek to influence key members and supporters in ways that favor their political objectives. Narratives affect all of human experience, whether in the social or political realm or at the individual or group level. Therefore, it is important to pay special attention to the role narratives play in resistance — how to mobilize people to participate in organized political support or action. As discussed in previous sections, grievances such as political exclusion, economic hardship, discrimination can all potentially motivate resistance. However, the existence of these issues alone does not always cause resistance by itself. Messaging and narratives can help overcome the many difficulties resistance movements face in mobilizing others to join and support their goals.

For example, narratives can be used to provide legitimacy to government security forces and their actions by creating a positive story and message. A persuasive narrative may help the government justify its use of force and explain why its citizens should support it. On the opposite side, a resistance group can shape its narratives and messages to the public to argue that it should be the legitimate government and to gain sympathetic support. Narratives can also take advantage of culture or other beliefs to craft messages that resonate meaningfully with local supporters. Above all, resistance movements need to leverage narratives to persuade their audiences of the necessity and effectiveness of taking collective action to mobilize and resist in support of the strategic goals. As a result, understanding these narratives and their uses helps with influencing desired outcomes in conflict.

Messaging of Resistance Movements or Groups

Because narrative messaging and media exposure play a significant role in the support for a resistance group, Sarca and Bolanieves would need to communicate with the following groups to some extent:
- **Internal supporters.** Sarca needs to communicate internally to spread news that may be suppressed by the government, support Sarca’s ideology, provide encouragement, and reinforce loyalty.

- **External supporters.** In Estatu and beyond, Sarca relies on networks of supporters, ranging from local residents, whose main contribution may be forgetting what they have seen when questioned by police, to international sympathizers, who may provide money to Sarca or advocate to foreign governments to support Sarca. Sarca’s use of media and messaging will help to preserve this support and encourage sympathy from outsiders.

- **Non-sympathetic audience.** Terrorist groups, in particular, target media at external audiences that do not support them. In this case, the group usually wants to intimidate and terrorize outsiders and gain publicity for the group. Bolanieves would have to consider whether negative messaging is an approach that Sarca would want to employ. He may potentially be advised that using a messaging tactic often associated with terrorists could hurt his ability to gain more support.

- **The enemy.** Sarca could potentially use external communications to demoralize or mislead its enemy combatants. For example, Sarca could learn from the FMLN in El Salvador, which organized a letter-writing campaign that encouraged resistance supporters to write letters to soldiers urging them to desert the military.

As part of this messaging to different parts of society, Bolanieves and Sarca have several options for media and communication. Most often, resistance movements want to appear united and strong, which would require Bolanieves to create and enforce a united message for all of Sarca’s members and activities. A single strong message would show unity and cohesion of the group. If Bolanieves fails to create a shared message that unites the group, he might be faced with conflicting messages from other Sarca members that contradict his official message.

However, a united message is not the only option for Sarca. If Bolanieves does not want to try to impose a single message and wants to avoid potential conflict, he could instead welcome diversity of opinion among Sarca’s members. In this context, Bolanieves would work with members to coordinate a message that everyone can debate and finally agree on together. Alternatively, Bolanieves could allow an open forum for Sarca members to voice their different opinions and messages freely.

Finally, once Bolanieves has identified an audience and created the message, Sarca would need a method to carry out distribution of that message. Sarca could use combinations of many different methods to reach out to people: face-to-face conversations, indirect contact, mass public announcements, and private messages can all be adapted for use in different situations. Sarca might use traditional media like newspapers or invest in radio and television broadcasts. Additionally, Bolanieves would need to strategize the best way for Sarca to use the Internet for communications and other important resistance activities.
Narratives

Insurgent groups often employ narratives as a means of communicating grievances, goals, and justifications for their actions within a story-like framework. A narrative has three distinct elements: (1) actors and the physical, social, and informational environment within which they operate; (2) events across time; and (3) causality, with cause and effect attribution. Narratives provide a way to contextualize and justify grievances against the government. Narratives also frame a struggle and tie grievances to specific goals and actions.

Different types of movements will employ different types of narratives that align with their goals. In another volume in the ARIS series, insurgent movements were classified into five types, depicted in the : Revolution to Modify the Type of Government, Revolution Based on Identity or Ethnic Issues, Revolution to Drive Out a Foreign Power, Revolution Based on Religious Fundamentalism, and Revolution for Modernization or Reform (see Table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Movement</th>
<th>Group</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revolution to Modify the Type of Government:</td>
<td>New People’s Army (NPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common narrative themes are class-based</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>arguments, ideological alternatives to the</td>
<td>Forces of Colombia, or FARC) and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional</td>
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<tr>
<td>existing government, and the illegitimacy of the</td>
<td>(ELN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>government.</td>
<td>Sendero Luminoso</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Iranian Revolution of 1979</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Martí National Liberation Front, or FMLN) of El Salvador</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolution Based on Identity or Ethnic Issues:</td>
<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Common narrative themes are the existence of</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>distinct cultural or ethnic identities,</td>
<td>Hutu-Tutsi genocides</td>
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<tr>
<td>cultural preservation, unequal treatment of</td>
<td>Ushtia Çlirimtare e Kosovës (Kosovo Liberation Army, or KLA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>certain groups, and self-determination for</td>
<td>The Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>different groups.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revolution to Drive Out a Foreign Power:</td>
<td>Afghan mujahedin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Common narrative themes are the desire for</td>
<td>Viet Cong (VC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>independence, the need for reform, and the</td>
<td>Chechen Revolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>illegitimacy of the occupying power.</td>
<td>Hizbollah</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Hizbul mujahedin (HM)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revolution Based on Religious Fundamentalism:</td>
<td>Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common narrative themes are claims of religious</td>
<td>Taliban</td>
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<tr>
<td>scholarship and interpretation, religious</td>
<td>al Qaeda (AQ)</td>
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<td>symbology, and the extreme illegitimacy of the</td>
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<td>government.</td>
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<td>Type of Movement</td>
<td>Group</td>
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<td>Revolution for Modernization or Reform: Common narrative themes are demands for political inclusion and calls for reform in a specific policy or issue area.</td>
<td>Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Orange Revolution of Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front (RUF)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polish Solidarity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Traditional Media

Handbills and newspapers have been important tools for resistance groups for centuries, and they remain so, even as new media replaces them. The two have different purposes: handbills are used for short, often time-dependent and highly localized events; newspapers are aimed at somewhat broader parts of society and broader issues.

As an example of connecting these forms of media with methods of distribution, face-to-face hand delivery of traditional handbills and newsletters seems to be a key to their effectiveness. In the Philippines, Malaya, and Korea, handbills were passed secretly from person to person by hand or by chain letter. Giving a handbill thus implied a proof of confidence, an honor, and a privilege. In fact, it was reported that people saw, read, and remembered more of the handbills handed to them personally than those received by indirect mass distribution.

### Global Broadcast Media

Technological changes in broadcast media – which means radio and television before the Internet – have been impacting insurgency groups for at least a century, with particularly dramatic changes around the development of satellite television in the 1980s. Broadcast media provide insurgents with immediate access to large audiences in a way that is more engaging than traditional media. Although it has some limitations, particularly with the requirements for expensive and vulnerable infrastructure, the rise of international broadcast media brought many changes. It not only changed the way insurgent groups publicized themselves, but also changed their targets, their methods, and their goals as well.

The Irgun, a small terrorist offshoot of the Haganah paramilitary organization that was part of the Zionist movement to create a Jewish homeland, was one of the first to recognize and exploit the opportunities international broadcast media provided. The most successful attack Irgun undertook was small but effective because of the gruesome, symbolic images that accompanied it: they publicly hanged two British sergeants in retaliation for the execution of three Irgun terrorists.

Additionally, the hijacking of TWA flight 847 in June 1985 and subsequent hostage taking represented a low point in the media’s unwittingly publicizing of attention-seeking terror groups. Hizbollah gunmen hijacked the flight on June 14 with the purpose of exchanging hostages for a group of associates imprisoned in Israel. Over the next several days, the hijackers took the plane back and forth between Algiers and Beirut, releasing non-American passengers along the way and killing one American Navy diver. The crisis became the subject of constant attention by the three major U.S. television networks. “During the 17 day crisis, while Americans were held hostage in Beirut, nearly 500 news segments—an average of 28.8 per day—were broadcast by the 3 major U.S. television networks . . . and their regularly scheduled
programs were interrupted at least eighty times over those 17 days with special reports or news bulletins.\textsuperscript{356} The drawn-out nature of the crisis created more media exposure than a single attack or simpler hostage-taking event might have.

From these examples, insurgent groups aspiring to broadcast media coverage could learn lessons for managing the media:

- **Go where the coverage is.** Broadcast media coverage is much easier to gain in urban areas, and the largest cities are the most media saturated.

- **Guarantee access to the media.** Savvy insurgent groups may go out of their way to develop relationships and guarantee access. Former Chechen insurgent leader Shamil Basayev was particularly proactive; he openly courted the media, frequently gave interviews from his command post or living quarters, and had correspondents as guests in his home.

- **Images matter.** A small event with memorable video or imagery may have a greater effect than a larger operation conducted away from cameras.

- **Follow news cycles and provide a sustained trickle of news over time.** Broadcast media thrive on events that are drawn out over time. Media-savvy insurgent groups can sustain attention by providing a steady stream of developments or new information rather than a single rush of information.

**Insurgent-Owned Broadcast Media\textsuperscript{357}**

To avoid the difficulties of managing externally controlled broadcast media, resistance groups have occasionally set up and run their own broadcast media sources. The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador, Sendero Luminoso in Peru, and the Contras in Nicaragua all used radio to broadcast propaganda aimed both at sympathizers and the neutral population. The FMLN actually operated two stations, including one that temporarily switched from shortwave broadcast to FM and operated from atop the Guazapa volcano outside of the capital, San Salvador. This location presented an excellent broadcast location but was also very vulnerable to attack, requiring a large commitment of manpower to protect the facility. As can be seen from this experience, setting up actual broadcast facilities presents considerable logistical challenges and gives the adversary a fixed, high-value asset that can be attacked.\textsuperscript{358}

One of the more successful resistance-run broadcasts is Hizbollah’s Al-Mansar television station. Al-Mansar is primarily dedicated to promoting Hizbollah’s point of view but is also notable for its variety of programming. Besides news, it broadcasts documentaries such as “My Blood and the Rifle,” about Hizbollah’s guerilla fighters, and “In Spite of the Wounds,” dedicated to individuals who have been injured while fighting against Israel. Even supportive audiences may not be interested in talk formats that present only repetitive, ideological rants. Insurgent media is subject to the same demands for high-quality production and “immediacy, exclusivity, and drama” as other media.

**Communication Network\textsuperscript{359}**

The emergence of the Internet as a globally accessible communications network has changed and will continue to change, the equations for insurgent communications and
Several aspects of the Internet make it particularly valuable to resistance movements and groups:

- **Inexpensive.** Newsletters, historical information, and press releases can be made accessible worldwide for a few dollars a month. Furthermore, groups can cheaply and quickly stream audio or video around the world.

- **Decentralized.** The Internet was developed by the U.S. military to be a communications network that was resistant to disruption at any one node. This decentralized property is a perfect match for modern, stateless insurgencies such as al Qaeda.

- **Anonymous.** The Internet was developed without strong identity verification measures. It is easy to use a fake identity and there are many options for anonymous activity.

The most important current uses of the Internet for undergrounds and insurgencies fall into the following categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publicity and Communications.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Publicity, international media relations, and reports on resistance operations or government abuse are all part of resistance on the Internet. The Internet also helps recruitment, especially from distant locations. Furthermore, more traditional media benefit from Internet distribution. A twenty-six-page pamphlet with instructions for protestors played an important role in the Egyptian revolution and was distributed in either print or pdf format from person to person.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targeting the Enemy.</th>
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<tr>
<td>A less common goal of Internet communications, but one that still exists, focuses on terrorizing or manipulating the opponent.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recruitment and Radicalization.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Videos of successful terrorist attacks, guerilla missions, and extreme graphic violence are popular features of sites focused on recruitment. Producing these videos is important enough that a number of violent groups, including Hizbollah, the Chechen resistance, and Al Qaeda, routinely include a videographer as an essential part of an operational team. These videos serve several functions. First, they attract attention and excite passions of sympathizers, particularly young males who may be recruited to perform these types of actions. Second, they create repetitive mental imagery, allowing recruits to imagine themselves as successful operatives. Third, they begin the process of desensitizing recruits to violence and dehumanizing opponents.</td>
</tr>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Training.</th>
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<tr>
<td>A variety of insurgent groups are experimenting with use of the Internet as a channel for training in operational techniques. Self-training manuals such as The Terrorist’s Handbook, The Anarchist’s Cookbook, and The Mujahadeen Poisons Handbook are available online. However, some skills such as bomb-making are complex and difficult to learn alone, so online self-training is probably more effective for simply updating already-trained operatives with new information rather than for training absolute novices.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fundraising.

The first generation of insurgent websites included explicit appeals for online donations; however, subsequent legislation preventing fundraising for terrorist organizations forced this activity underground. Aboveground websites sometimes make money by selling souvenirs and may imply that the money will support the insurgent cause. However, financial transactions are easier to track than other kinds of information that flow over the Internet, making online fundraising more difficult for insurgents than simple Internet recruitment or publicity.

Command and Control.

The Internet can also facilitate command and control. Mass protests sometimes rely on text messages and Twitter to mobilize supporters, share information on issues such as police presence, and publicize the movement. As an example of Twitter’s potential influence, on June 16, during Iranian election protests, the U.S. Department of State contacted Twitter to ask them to delay a scheduled server upgrade that might have disrupted Twitter traffic. Later, the Iranian government intentionally disrupted Twitter traffic by shutting down or slowing both Internet and cell phone service in sections of Tehran.

Organization Theories and Membership

Membership Strategies

In addition to deciding leadership and structure, Bolanieves is responsible for determining the type of members Sarca will recruit. Sarca will need to recruit members to grow, but Bolanieves knows that to be successful Sarca also needs to think about the way that membership affects the organization. Bolanieves can set high barriers to membership to limit Sarca to only elite members or he can open up membership to more people by having low barriers. He will also have to make decision on whether new participants are integrated into the core membership or used in front organizations (see Figure 11).

In many resistance movements, recruitment is chaotic and varies widely across the movement, meaning it does not always fit into a perfect framework. However, this is still a good starting place for Bolanieves to think about the organization of recruitment and membership for Sarca.

Figure 11. Types of membership strategies in resistance organizations.
Types of Organization

Organizational structure varies with the organizational theories of the resistance or the revolutionary leaders. As discussed earlier in this section, a group’s organization should align with the strategy it is pursuing. For example, if a group wants to carry out very complex guerrilla warfare that requires high levels of physical fitness or weapons skills, it would likely need high, exclusive standards for membership. Conversely, if the group wants to mobilize mass protests and marches it would be more effective to have an inclusive membership that welcomes as many people as possible. There is no single answer for the best way to organize a group since every group is different, but this chart provides a way to think about the options and the effect on the group.

Mass Organization

When leaders conclude that a large number of people are necessary to overcome the power of the governing authority and its instruments of force, they may opt for mass organization. Membership is open to anyone who wishes to join, and the objective is to recruit as many people as possible. For the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the attempt to mobilize the entire population in the territory it controlled led it to create in 1999 a policy for a “Universal People’s Militia” that would impose military training on anyone over the age of fifteen.

One disadvantage of this organizational structure is the loose security measures associated with it. The members are usually not practiced in security precautions, and the identities of underground members are easily obtained through loose talk and careless, overt actions. However, organizations of this type have managed to minimize the threat of informers primarily through the public sympathy for the movement and through the use of terrorism, as was the case of the Provisional IRA and its practice of “knee-capping” informants.

Another disadvantage of mass organization is in the command and control structures, as the large number of members may lack training and discipline. It is then difficult to organize united action against the government.

Elite Organization

The theory here is that a small elite organization can make up in skill and discipline what it lacks in size and that at the proper moment, a small militant group can accomplish more in one blow than a large mass organization can accomplish over a prolonged period of time. The membership in a movement such as this is small, and each individual is carefully screened and tested before he is permitted to join. Once a member, he is subjected to intensive training and discipline to develop the skills necessary for clandestine work. This type of organization usually works toward a coup d’état, or a revolution from the top. In a police state, where the mechanisms of internal security are extensive, this is the most common form of resistance. The disadvantages of this type of organization can include that it must remain relatively inactive while waiting for the proper moment, and inactivity usually works against a movement because its members may lose their enthusiasm, as well as small numbers can limit the types of actions they can undertake.

Elite-Front Organization

Communist insurgents have historically worked from this type of organizational theory. Recruitment is very selective, and the core party itself does not expand rapidly. Instead, a
“front” organization is created that claims to seek some popular objective such as liberation or independence. Within the front movement, Communists organize military and civilian groups and take leadership positions. If the front group fails, the core Communist resistance is not damaged either organizationally or by reputation because it is the front group and not the Communists who lose the insurgency. On the other hand, if they are successful, the Communists are in firm control of the revolutionary organization.

**Internal Governance**

The internal governance of a resistance organization relates to several concepts. Command and control, which has already been discussed in depth, fundamentally shapes the nature of authority and governance in the resistance group. However, in addition to command and control, other factors directly contribute to governance. First, disciplinary measures and rules enforce the objectives of internal governance on members. Second, organizational culture affects member behavior within the group.

**Discipline and Rules**

Internal discipline may include oaths; rigid codes of conduct; standing orders and standing operating procedures; operation orders; military manuals; internal organization documents on issues such as command structure and authority; and penal or disciplinary codes.

Another instrument for internal governance is a founding charter, which more generally addresses the goals and vision of the resistance and is written for both internal members and the wider public.

**Organizational Culture**

Resistance groups are composed of individuals who must collectively coordinate their efforts toward the achievement of shared, common goals. Therefore, it is worth looking at how resistance members interact and the type of group culture they develop.

Various studies created a framework that examines a group’s acceptance of culture dissonance, or cultural differences and disagreements, and the antagonism, or hostility, of relationships between group members (see Figure 12).

First, an organizational culture of rivalry exists when cultural differences are accepted but relationships are hostile. This results in a culture characterized “by strong rivalry” where “members believe that it is necessary to prove their superiority.”

Second, organizations have a culture of dominance when there is both a lack of acceptance of cultural differences and hostile relationships between various types of groups, cultural and otherwise. In this case, members hold the “belief that they are superior” to others. Dominance cultures also usually make cultural beliefs and expectations one of the most important factors in deciding the group’s actions. Because of the fundamental nature of resistance and the groups that practice it, the vast majority of resistance organizations and movements should theoretically have cultures of dominance.
Third, in a culture of adaptation, the organization remains unaccepting of cultural differences, but relationships are not hostile. Adaptation cultures place significant weight on the quality of interpersonal bonds and similarities, but also tolerate uncertainty and often look to the future.\textsuperscript{373}

Finally, organizational cultures of cooperation (likely the least common organizational culture among resistance groups), have both the acceptance of cultural differences and non-hostile relationships. As such, they have more “harmony” and avoid of “conflicts and rivalry.” This includes employing democratic management styles that value personal bonds and communication under “equality” and “respect for differences.”\textsuperscript{374}

Environmental factors may significantly influence how the culture of a resistance organization develops. Additionally, the organizational structure of the group often affects or is affected by the organizational culture of the resistance group. For example, lack of trust due to security necessities can lead to dominance cultures, as the group wants members to conform to group requirements for cultural and security reasons. Bolanieves will need to balance the need to retain operational security with empowering members of the movement to engage within the movement itself.
Bolanieves and Sarca

After considering all of these aspects of organization, Bolanieves has many decisions to make on the type of structure, leadership, messaging, governance, and culture he wants to develop for Sarca. The type of authority he chooses to establish, centralized or decentralized, could have large effects on Sarca operations and functions. After establishing his authority, Bolanieves also needs to consider the internal culture that Sarca will promote among its members. Interactions and acceptance of different people and perspectives would create a very different atmosphere than a more hostile and exclusionary environment. There are also questions for Sarca’s messaging because messaging is crucially important for recruiting members, gaining supporters, and highlighting Sarca’s positions and goals. Bolanieves’ use of different types of media and distribution methods could determine who Sarca can reach in Estatu and where the message can spread. Sarca’s organization affects all components from the top-level structure of the group to the individual members to the people of Estatu. Ultimately, his decisions will help determine Sarca’s in pursuing its strategic goals.

Questions

The reader now understands the dynamics of organizational features on the capacity of a resistance movement. Using the following discussion questions, explore components of the movement’s structure, C2 (including communications), organizational theories and membership, and internal governance. Examine how these factors will, in particular, be important for Bolanieves and Sarca movement.

- **Identify**: Who should Sarca target with messaging?

- **Differentiate**: What types of media will be most effective, engaging, safe, secure, and distributable for Sarca?

- **Attribute**: Does Bolanieves want Sarca to be accepting of different viewpoints or be more exclusive among its member beliefs? What would be most effective for achieving Sarca’s objectives?
Critique: In what ways can Bolanieves enforce internal discipline for Sarca and create a group culture?

Use Criteria for Evaluation: How should Bolanieves make a decision on whether to be a centralized, hierarchical leader or a decentralized leader who shares authority with other Sarca commanders?

**ACTIONS**

The act of resistance can manifest in either violent or non-violent strategies and employ a wide variety of tactics within those overarching strategies. Once decided, a resistance group’s chosen actions define the nature of the movement and the impact it has on the government.

It is important to acknowledge that in some cases a resistance group is not in control of the actions of all its members. If a group suffers from weak leadership or top leaders are killed in targeted strikes, violence could escalate as lower ranking members are empowered to potentially follow personal incentives for attacking and harming people with little oversight from official leaders. However, in other cases, a group has the ability to explicitly evaluate the political utility and propriety of engaging in violence or remaining non-violent to achieve its goals. In this way, it can plan its resistance tactics and organize its other activities, such as fund-raising and training, in accordance with its desired strategy.

In a democracy, violence may not be necessary since there are peaceful sociopolitical vectors through which people can gain representation or participate in government, and in a heavily repressive dictatorship violence may be unsuccessful against powerful government security forces. Additionally, violence can limit opportunities for a group to obtain change, particularly when violence leads the government to refuse to negotiate or make concessions on principle, as often occurs with terrorist groups. As such, non-violence is often a reasonable strategy with both pragmatic and moral advantages. In particular, non-violent movements create a more appealing environment for mass participation by lowering the barriers to entry – fewer physical fitness requirements or moral challenges in attracting people to join – and can then leverage that broad support to achieve desired outcomes. Within this non-violent framework, a resistance group can benefit from monetary donations, use unique tactics such as subversive humor, and even attend classes taught by groups that have conducted successful non-violent campaigns.

However, violence is still a viable, powerful option that can be an effective means to quickly exert change on a weaker regime, intimidate political candidates and voters, or fight for influence in a highly competitive political arena crowded with numerous factions. It can also provide the means for a group that feels unjustly relegated to a low status to aggressively fight for higher status against a dominant rival.
Occasionally, violence even becomes an attractive force for its own sake, as a group can celebrate sacrifice and glorify violent acts in its efforts to recruit new members.\textsuperscript{388} Violence can further extend to other functions, such as opening new vectors for fund-raising by enabling threats of violence for extortion payments or involving a group in lucrative drug trafficking.\textsuperscript{389}

**Tactics**

Once Sarca has members, supporters, and an organizational structure, it will be time for Bolanieves and Sarca to act. Resistance requires action and Bolanieves knows Sarca will have to take that step. However, before carrying out acts of resistance, Bolanieves must decide on and shape the tactics that Sarca will use. Sarca’s actions can be legal or illegal, and violent or nonviolent (see Figure 13).\textsuperscript{390} Bolanieves must think about the variations and combinations of violence and legality to decide what is best for Sarca.

In the category of legal nonviolent resistance, rightful resistance tactics are similar to conventional political and activist efforts. Sarca can make use of these tactics when needed or when they would be effective, such as encouraging a protest or strike in Estatu, but these tactics alone would not necessarily qualify as resistance.

The vast majority of violent resistance tactics that Sarca would use are illegal. If Sarca’s resistance eventually progressed to the point of looking more like traditional interstate war, Sarca’s actions could be recognized as legal under international laws of war. However, in general, most of Sarca’s resistance tactics would continue to be illegal under domestic laws within the country.

**Violent Tactics**\textsuperscript{391}

When focusing in on use of physical violence, Bolanieves must consider the lethality of the tactics Sarca is willing to use. Bolanieves would expect lethal violent tactics to result in
deaths, while he would intend for nonlethal violent tactics to only result in some harm or damage.

Bolanieves could decide to take the path of paramilitary operations and guerrilla and insurgent groups, including small-arms and light-weapons combat and the use of explosive mines and improvised explosive devices, and mortar and rocket attacks. He could also authorize targeted killings and assassinations of Sarca’s enemies. Other resistance movements willing to use lethal violent tactics, often at an asymmetric disadvantage in numbers and resources, may resort to terrorism.

Bolanieves also has nonlethal violent options for Sarca’s actions. Nonlethal violent tactics include violent but nonlethal riots and mobs that Sarca could organize, as well as various forms of nonlethal crime and intimidation, such as extortion and kidnapping. Sexual violence is another tactic that applies to this group. With nonlethal tactics, it is important for Bolanieves to remember that some actions intended to be nonlethal, such as protests, can become lethal if they escalate into greater levels of violence.

**Escalation of Violent Actions**

Besides moral justification, groups also escalate their violent actions over time as they individually and collectively desensitize themselves to violence. Many law enforcement organizations have employed a staged approach to assess this mechanism. The Seven-Stage Hate Model, depicted in Figure 14, comprises the following.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STAGE 1</th>
<th>STAGE 2</th>
<th>STAGE 3</th>
<th>STAGE 4</th>
<th>STAGE 5</th>
<th>STAGE 6</th>
<th>STAGE 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group Gathers</strong></td>
<td><strong>Group Defines Itself</strong></td>
<td><strong>Group Disparages Target</strong></td>
<td><strong>Group Taunts Target</strong></td>
<td><strong>Group Attacks Target Without Weapons</strong></td>
<td><strong>Group Attacks Target with Weapons</strong></td>
<td><strong>Group Destroys Target</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Like-minded individuals find each other and recruit others who may or may not initially share their ideology.</td>
<td>Individuals see themselves as members of a defined group; symbols and rituals are often chosen at this point.</td>
<td>Groups define themselves with a narrative of grievances and conspiracies and develop an ideology of hatred.</td>
<td>The group’s ideology is revealed to outsiders. Graffiti, use of symbols, and insults shouted from cars are typical.</td>
<td>Schafer and Navarro tie these types of attacks to “thrill-seeking” behavior; attacks tend to be more violent than comparable crimes. Defending turf is a typical rationale for gang-type groups.</td>
<td>Weapons range from tools and belts to more lethal weapons. Some members prefer up-close violence (knives as opposed to guns or explosives) for personal and thrill-seeking aspects.</td>
<td>Groups move to more lethal weapons with larger effect.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The personal story of Lars, a former member of Norway’s right-wing extremist National People’s Party, illustrates the process of one person working through these stages. Lars, who would later be imprisoned for bombing a mosque, began his involvement with no particular hatred toward Muslims or other groups targeted by the National People’s Party. Instead, he began as a lonely and disconnected teenager in Oslo. He contacted the party after seeing a bumper sticker and was unaware of their political views; he was invited to gather with other young people at a social event (Stage 1). After becoming involved socially, he became exposed to the group ideology of hatred. The ideology at this point began to be a part of identity (Stage 2) but not yet a matter of political urgency. Gradually, he began to take part in small acts of aggression against opportunistic targets, such as small shops owned by Pakistani and Indian immigrants. Taunting (Stage 4) took the form of surveillance...
and putting glue in the door locks at night. Smashing shop windows was another small escalation (Stage 5). Only after these lines were crossed was Lars encouraged, indirectly, to make an attack with some dynamite stolen from a construction site (Stage 6). He intended to commit only property damage in this attack, but several people were injured. Presumably Lars might have escalated to more lethal attacks had he not been arrested and undergone an ideological transformation in prison.

**Thresholds of Violence**

Violence is a double-edged sword for the resistance and the government. Both sides need to engage in violence to win, but both sides are also competing for the support and sympathy of the population. “On the one hand violence is needed to fight the other side and perhaps deter individuals in the population from supporting the other side, but on the other hand it can turn the population against the source of that violence.” Scholars have supported this common sense idea with the equivalent response model.

The equivalent response model (see Figure 15) simply explains that there are a lower and upper threshold to the level of violence used. The lower threshold is the minimum amount of violence or force necessary for effectively responding or harming your opponent. Act below that threshold and it either has no impact on the adversary, or it makes the actor look weak and lose support of the population. The upper threshold is the maximum amount of violence or force that can be used before the actor loses popular support either because the violence harms the community or because it brings a response from the adversary that harms the community. Accordingly, to use violence effectively a resistance and a government must operate in the zone in between the lower and upper thresholds. Crucially, these thresholds are determined by the communities and are constantly changing.

Accordingly, Bolanieves needs to stay up to date about how the populations feel and perceive the amount of force and violence being used, both by Sarca and the government. That requires an advanced intelligence capability and continuous assessment. Misreading the level of acceptable violence can prove damaging to Sarca even if its operation successfully destroys government assets.

Speaking of the use of violence by the IRA, Darby noted:

On the evidence of the IRA’s use of legitimate targeting, its denials of unwanted casualties, its exclusion of certain groups from attack and its care to anticipate internal criticism, it is clear that the IRA is aware of the limits of its own community’s tolerance. The need to maintain the tolerance has been a major restraint on its escalation of its campaign of violence towards a more genocidal indiscriminate slaughter. The instruments for measuring the community’s toleration are not precise ones. The limits are often defined only when they are breached, and the community indicates by the means of communication at its disposal that the violence has gone too far.
The attribution of resistance actions is a critical strategic decision, particularly for violent movements that might seek to either take credit for successful strikes against opponents or avoid blame for potentially unpopular operations or mistakes. With attribution, the resistance group chooses whether to publicize its actions or not. However, the group cannot control how much the general public or opponent knows if information is exposed in other ways. This results in four scenarios for attribution of violent actions: clandestine operations, exposed operations, public operations, and suppressed or ignored operations (see Figure 16).

First, clandestine operations are those in which the role of the resistance organization is successfully concealed from the public and opponent. Suspicions about the resistance group’s involvement may exist, but the group does not openly take credit for the action and may actively deny involvement.

Exposed operations are those in which the resistance tried to conceal its role in a given action but was exposed by its opponents or other external actors such as journalists. This scenario can lead to blame for the consequences of the action, the prosecution of participants for their roles, or negative propaganda against an operational failure.

Public operations are those in which the resistance group readily and publicly accepts attribution for its actions. Usually the group will either openly identify as a participant or claim attribution for the action.

Finally, suppressed or ignored operations are those in which the resistance group wants to publicize and announce its role in a given action, but that attribution is overshadowed. Knowledge of the group’s role is then suppressed or credited to another group.
### Nonviolent and Rightful Resistance

In his book *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, scholar Gene Sharp presented a thorough accounting of the types of non-violent resistance, which became widely known as his 198 methods. There has been no effort here to differentiate between particular methods as either legal (rightful resistance) or illegal (nonviolent tactic), as this categorization will differ for every country or city based on local laws and environments.

Although exhaustive when originally written in 1973, the advent of the Internet and the widespread availability of innovative information technologies have dramatically changed the face of resistance movements and created a vast number of completely new tactics. For the thorough and effective analysis of modern cases of resistance, there is a glaring need to expand Sharp’s methods to include both methods of cyber protest and noncooperation and methods of nonviolent cyber intervention.

However, his methods are still relevant for many other aspects of resistance that still remain important to resistance groups and movements and their members and supporters. These non-violent and rightful resistance actions are still open for people to join and contribute their support for pressuring the government. Sharp’s methods of nonviolent action can be found in the appendix for further exploration. Next, this section will discuss broader themes that help with thinking about and understanding all of these different actions.

Sharp’s key theme that shapes these 198 methods of non-violent resistance is that political power is not derived from the qualities of those in positions of authority. Rather, the power of any state is derived from the consent of the governed, and the people have the moral and political authority to take the power back. Essentially, leaders lack power without the consent of the people they govern. Since the government usually holds the monopoly on the use of force, nonviolent methods are the ideal means for the people to impose their will...
on the state. The arsenal of the passive resister contains a number of weapons of nonviolence. One reason these weapons may be effective is that the government forces may not know how to cope with nonviolence. Police and soldiers are trained to fight force with force but are usually “neither trained nor psychologically prepared to fight passive resistance”.

Actions of passive resistance may range from small isolated challenges to specific laws to complete disregard of governmental authority, but the techniques of nonviolent resistance have been classified into three general themes: attention-getting devices, noncooperation, and civil disobedience. These three themes take the different approaches that resistance can use, and organizes and unites them under these themes that describe the level and effect of resistance. For example, Sharp’s action number eight of “communicating with slogans, caricatures, and symbols” is a different action from number fifty-four of “turning one’s back to renounce” something. However, both could be for the purpose of attention-getting and publicizing the resistance movement’s goals. Similarly, noncooperation could have many different types of actions, but they are all united by the common intent of refusing to cooperate correctly with the government’s wishes and throwing a wrench into the government’s plans.

**Attention-Getting Devices**

Passive resistance in the early stages usually takes the form of actions calculated to gain attention, provide propaganda for the cause, or be a nuisance to government forces. These actions force the authorities to choose between allowing such activities to continue and taking the risk that the resistance will gain influence, or imposing harsh punishment on people who are engaged in a nonviolent and seemingly harmless activity. Attention-getting devices include demonstrations, mass meetings, picketing, and the creation of symbols to bring attention to the resistance and educate the public about the goals of the resistance. Symbols can include martyrs, religious leaders, flags, and certain symbolic actions, such as during World War II when the King of Denmark would ride his horse through the capital city of Copenhagen despite the Nazi occupation. Other unique attention-getting actions involve the use of humor to attract supporters and joke about the government or the use of nuisance activities to annoy government forces, such as when Algerian children would publicly spit on French soldiers.

**Noncooperation**

Techniques of noncooperation call for a passive resister to perform normal activities in a purposefully different way, but not so that police or government can make accusations of breaking ordinary laws. Activities such as “slowdowns,” boycotts of all kinds, and various forms of disassociation from government are all examples of noncooperation. There are numerous examples of noncooperation in the anti-Nazi resistance movements, including workers in shipping departments of Nazi factories addressing shipments to the wrong address or conveniently forgetting to include items in the shipments. Feigned sickness was also widespread. In Yugoslavia, railroad workers used a particularly effective noncooperation technique: during an Allied air raid, they deserted their jobs and, after the raid, they stayed away for twenty-four hours or more because of “feigned fear.” This seriously delayed railway traffic. As a result, these acts of noncooperation harmed the Nazi war effort while appearing simply to be honest mistakes.
Noncooperation is a principal tool of passive resistance and has been shown to be most effective in disrupting the normal processes of society and challenging a government—all in a way that is difficult for the government and its security forces to challenge. Many individuals altering their normal behavior only slightly can still add up to a society behaving most abnormally.

**Civil Disobedience**

Mass participation in deliberately unlawful acts is considered civil disobedience. This is perhaps the most extreme weapon of passive resistance. Although it usually involves misdemeanors and other minor crimes, the boundary between those small crimes and potential serious crimes can be considered the dividing line between nonviolent and violent resistance. Forms of civil disobedience include the breaking of specific laws, such as tax laws (nonpayment of taxes), traffic laws (disrupting traffic), and laws prohibiting meetings, publications, free speech, and so on. Civil disobedience can also take the form of certain kinds of strikes and walkouts, mass resignations, and minor destruction of public or private property.

For example, in Palestine, after the Haganah raided the British and hid in a nearby village, passive resistance by the Jewish population was effective in preventing their capture. When the police began a search, people vigorously refused them entrance to their homes, stopping only short of using weapons. Additionally, sirens would alert villagers to the British arrival in an area, prompting villagers to rush into that area and flood it with people in order to confuse the British in their search for the resistance fighters.

Civil disobedience is a powerful technique, but to be effective, it must be exercised in large numbers. There is a calculated risk involved - breaking the law automatically justifies punishment by the government and security forces. However, the more massive the scale on which civil disobedience is organized, the less profitable it is for the government to carry out punishments. For example, Gandhi led so many millions of people in the breach of law that it proved impractical, if not impossible, for the British to jail all offenders. As the jails became impossibly full, Gandhi’s position in making demands on the government significantly increased.

Organizers of passive resistance are selective about the laws that are to be broken. The laws should be related in some manner to the issues being protested or the demands being made. Examples are Gandhi’s selection of the salt tax in India, which was considered a hardship tax on the peasants and representative of unjust British rule and the civil rights sit-ins in the United States, which were directly related to discrimination in public places. Finally, hacktivism, or hacking for a political purpose, brings methods of civil disobedience to cyberspace. Hacktivist tactics include numerous evolving techniques such as denial-of-service (DOS) attacks, automated e-mail bombs, and computer viruses and worms.

**Normative Factors**

One method by which leaders of passive resistance movements secure widespread legitimacy is by cloaking their movement and techniques in the beliefs, values, and norms of society—those things people accept without question.
For example, the clergy led the earliest stages of the Norwegian resistance against the Nazi occupation. The religious leadership of Norway turned public opinion against the Nazis by invoking the voice of the church and refusing to cooperate in religious affairs with the Nazi occupation. Because the institutions of religion were held in high esteem, and because the clergy appealed to religious values, the Nazis never were able to break the church’s resistance.

**Mystical Factors**

Rare or extraordinary factors such as charisma play an important part in mobilizing public opinion in a passive resistance movement. Gandhi’s leadership of India’s independence struggle verged on the mystical. Thousands of villagers from rural India, who perhaps could not be touched or aroused by any modern means of communication or organized population pressure, were mobilized into action by Gandhi’s fasts and his religious mystique.

**Consensual Validation**

The technique of “consensual validation”—in which the simultaneous occurrence of events creates a sense of their validity—is often used to unite public opinion. For example, if demonstrations take place at the same time in diverse parts of a country, the resistance cause appears to be valid and right simply because many people are involved. Ostracism, or social exclusion and shunning, is frequently used to apply social pressure on individuals not participating in the passive resistance campaign.

**Undermine Military and Security Services**

A primary strategy of insurgent forces is to seek to undermine the authority and influence of the opposing military and security services. Highlighting and bringing attention to abuses committed by the government often turns the population against the government and increases support for the insurgency.

In the absence of abuse, or in situations where abuse by government security or military organizations has not recently occurred, insurgent groups may spread false reports about new abuses or, in some cases, conduct abuses themselves but blame the military or security apparatus. In an extreme scenario, that became a violent strategy, an insurgent group can conduct atrocities against the population and then blame these actions on the governing military force, as the RUF rebels did in Sierra Leone when they performed “false flag operations” while wearing Sierra Leone Army uniforms during some of their raids and attacks on villages.

**Economic Degradation**

Deliberate degradation of the economic capabilities of a country or government reduces its financial stability and creates hardships for the general population. This often leads to popular backlashes against the government. In Nigeria, where the country’s economy is depends on oil revenues, the MEND periodically targeted the oil industry in order to force the Nigerian government to give in to its demands.
Removal of Dangerous Persons

Some resistance groups may believe that certain people in the government or society pose a potential risk to the insurgency because of their role in active countermeasures or ability to undermine the resistance’s influence. In these situations, nonviolence may beget violence, whereby the resistance may cross the threshold of violence when deciding to remove the person through kidnapping, intimidation, or murder.

Undermine Political Authority and Morale

A central approach for undermining the government is to carry out actions that weaken the political authority of this government. This includes actions such as a resistance group establishing a shadow government to provide services to the population or holding its own elections independent of the official government.

Organizational Subversion

The ability of a resistance movement to influence or control key organizations in a country can shape the strategy and outcome of the insurgency. For example, in El Salvador and Northern Ireland, where the Catholic Church is very influential, the ability to obtain support from priests and nuns provided a degree of legitimacy to the insurgencies that were taking place.

Intelligence

To perform many of the actions, organization, and functions discussed in this book requires gathering intelligence about the adversary, its own members, and the larger populations. Other intelligence targets and subjects include political developments, lucrative targets for attack, defectors, social dynamics, and criminal activity. The information and insight gathered from intelligence will support Bolanieves’ decision-making and Sarca’s tactics and strategy.

Resistance movements usually build intelligence networks out of the other preexisting social, political, and messaging networks. Additionally, because the group membership commonly comes from the areas in which they operate, they have the advantage of knowing the human and physical terrain, whether rural or urban. Supporting the population incentivizes those preexisting networks to participate in intelligence. For example, the communist NPA in the Philippines won the loyalty of the people with economic advocacy and opportunities for democratic organization. As a consequence, local populations provided accurate, timely intelligence concerning government operations and countermeasures.

Intelligence operations also take place outside the country in populations sympathetic to the resistance for purposes of logistics, procurement, and knowing international attitudes. For example, the LTTE maintained more than fifty offices and cells in foreign countries with large numbers of Tamil expatriates. Canadian intelligence discovered that the LTTE had communication hubs in Singapore and Hong Kong to facilitate its weapons procurement activities, with secondary cells in Thailand, Pakistan, and Myanmar and front companies in Europe and Africa. From these locales, LTTE operatives coordinated purchases and shipments from Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.
**Military Intelligence**

To increase the effectiveness of operations and reduce the risk to the armed component, resistance groups need timely and accurate intelligence. Resistance groups, however, typically do not have the kinds of intelligence methods and tools that governments do, so they rely on infiltrating society and building networks of operatives and supporters. The Viet Minh manual referred to auxiliary members who collected intelligence as popular antennae. One example is the Viet Minh’s use of children playing near Japanese and later French bases to gather information that untrained children could easily gather, such as troop movements and timing, as well as guard systems. **If Sarca and Bolanieves pursue this tactic, they will need to learn how to ask children the right questions and how to convince them to participate. Likewise, Sarca will want to gather that information from children in a manner that does not endanger the children so as not to alienate the community and lose popular support.**

If a foreign government is supporting the resistance, intelligence can be one form of that support. Military advisors or companion forces can provide targeting information or give technical direction for intelligence gathering on the resistance’s own. Most resistance members, after all, will commonly lack experience in intelligence because they come from diverse backgrounds. If foreign government forces are not able to be present with the resistance group, they can also provide manuals that the resistance can use to learn on their own. For instance, during World War II the Soviet Union distributed detailed booklets, such as the *Guide Book for Partisans*, in regions under German occupation. The following excerpt from a passage in this manual is a typical instruction:

> If you happen to encounter troops . . . do not show that you observe the enemy . . . ascertain the colour of their headgear, their collar braid, and the figures on their shoulder straps. If they have questioned the inhabitants about something, try to find out what the Fascists have asked.4277

Communications technology that the government uses can be a source of intelligence if the resistance can intercept messages or capture the hardware, such as radios. For example, the Karen National Liberation Army in Burma captured VHF radios during operations and used them to gather information about the Burmese military’s operations and movements. Another source can be industry or other civilian entities with knowledge of infrastructure or buildings like factories. If the resistance targets infrastructure or government facilities, those who operate in them, built them, or keep records about them can provide key information for sabotage operations. That intelligence should also include which targets will inflict the most damage. These sabotage operations might be used to hinder government operations or to interfere with the government’s ability to provide services and thereby undermine its legitimacy. The FARC and Sendero Luminoso practiced this approach.

An example from World War II shows how intelligence can be collected by multiple components of a resistance and used by its military forces. Prior to the blowing up of a Norwegian heavy-water plant being operated by the Germans during World War II, the preliminary reconnaissance was done by a Special Operations Executive agent parachuted into Norway. Details about the factory’s equipment were obtained from a Norwegian scientist in London. Other data, perhaps about the guard system and access to the equipment, apparently were supplied by underground workers in the plant.
**Political Intelligence**

Resistance groups need to know the political state of affairs and the direction social and political dynamics are developing. Recall that this is key to staying with the thresholds of violence. It is also critical to deciding on Sarca’s tactics and strategy. If it moves in the opposite direction from the popular political direction it risks losing support and effectiveness. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine provides a very good example. The ability to rapidly acquire and distribute nonpartisan election data on the Internet, radio, and television enabled the resistance to target their messaging to populations in the districts where the voting was rigged. Providing clear evidence quickly mobilized individuals and garnered international support.428

Part of political intelligence is not only the attitudes of society, but the morale of the adversary’s forces. For example, Polish civilians who worked in the postal service during German occupation read and photographed mail sent to German soldiers, providing an estimate of troop morale. Knowing that information can enable the resistance to tailor its messaging to that audience to undermine their effectiveness or sow discord in their ranks.

**Fundraising**

To achieve its objectives and carry out operations over long periods of time, Sarca must fund-raise and obtain money. Sarca cannot do anything significant without money. Bolanieves knows that sustaining and growing a movement into something that will lead to change requires time, patience, and above all, money. As a result, one of Bolanieves key resistance functions is raising money, and he has many options for how to obtain that money. His decisions on fund-raising tactics could have a direct impact on the nature, ideology, and strategy of Sarca.

Sarca may need money to meet the following expenses: the salaries of full-time Sarca members; the purchase of materials, such as Internet access, for propaganda publications; the purchase of explosives and other supplies for sabotage; aid to families who shelter refugees; aid to the families of Sarca members who have been captured or forced to flee; and money to families of suicide bombers or other “martyrs.” Money is also often needed for bribery since Sarca may need to pay money to key officials in Estatu to obtain their protection or silence. Bribery also plays a part in the gathering of intelligence if Sarca needs to buy information.

Finally, if Bolanieves wants to carry out social outreach work and shadow government activities, such as providing school and hospital services to people in Estatu, Sarca will need additional money to fund that work. Just as legitimate state governments struggle with the rising cost of medical care, unemployment insurance, food aid, housing subsidies, and pensions, Sarca could also end up struggling to provide similar services in an attempt to undermine the government, care for people in their areas of control in Estatu, and provide a cover for illegal and violent activities. Aware that these activities are expensive and require sustained and reliable income, Bolanieves has to consider how he will fund-raise and who he will work with for fund-raising.
External Sources of Money

Foreign Governments. Often an underground is aided by an outside sponsor, usually a government. Much of the money used by the anti-Nazi Belgian resistance of World War II, for example, came from franc reserves in London released by the British government. The Viet Cong’s resistance against the government of South Vietnam and its American allies was funded by both China and the Soviet Union. Some external sponsors, such as Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, supported a number of different insurgencies. Foreign governments extend support to undergrounds for several reasons. The most important is that the activities of the resistance often contribute to the defeat of a common enemy.

Non-State Actors. In addition to governments, friendship societies or quasi-official aid groups may channel funds to a resistance movement. Perhaps the best known of the latter was the Jewish Agency, which, during the Palestine revolution, had offices or representatives in every part of the Western world. In the run-up to the Israeli War for Independence, Palestinian Jews obtained critically needed financing from fellow Jews throughout the world, especially in Europe and the United States. Open appeals for money were made in newspapers and lectures and at charity balls and other social events. Similarly, the main source of overseas funding for the NPA in the Philippines during the Ferdinand Marcos administration was from humanitarian organizations, including a number of European churches, and radical groups in Europe.

Cash in the Local Currency. Aid is often given in the form of cash in the local currency, which has the advantage of being easily exchanged for goods or services. The main problem is the physical transfer of the money. Usually this is handled by a front business organization, through diplomatic channels, through clandestine couriers, or by infiltrated agents.

Substitute Currency. Hard currency, such as U.S. dollars or British pounds, is sometimes given to a resistance group when the sponsoring government lacks adequate amounts of the local currency. Hard currency makes a good substitute because it is easily exchanged on the black market for local currency or goods.

Counterfeit Money. One other way to finance a resistance movement is through counterfeit money. Since resistance groups usually lack the necessary facilities and technical skills to counterfeit money, the main effort is generally carried out by friendly governments.

Online Fraud. Insurgencies increasingly use illegal online operations to steal money or goods. Techniques include credit card and online banking fraud. In some cases, insurgents purchase stolen credit card or bank account numbers and passwords from criminal organizations and then use that information to withdraw money from compromised accounts or to buy goods directly. This avenue of obtaining funds illegally features an ongoing conflict between insurgents exploiting vulnerabilities in global computer networks and various government and international organizations attempting to fix those vulnerabilities and shut down online fraud through technical means, legislation, and enforcement.

Parallel Financial Systems

Islamic history and culture gave rise to an innovative and effective approach to financing insurgency as practiced by members of the Muslim Brotherhood and al Qaeda. Hasan
al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, viewed finance as a critical weapon in undermining the infidels and reestablishing the Islamic caliphate. To do so, he believed Muslims must create an independent Islamic financial system that would parallel and later overtake the Western economy.\footnote{Al-Banna’s successors set his theories and practices into motion.}

In 1962, the Muslim Brotherhood convinced the Saudi Arabian king Saud bin Abdul Aziz to launch a global financial joint venture that established numerous charitable foundations across the globe. This joint venture became the cornerstone of the Brotherhood and was used to spread Islam, and later to fund terrorist operations, worldwide. In 1978, Saudi Arabia backed another Brotherhood initiative, the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), an entity that has been implicated in funding organizations such as al Qaeda and Hamas.

Furthermore, most Muslim nations collect mandatory Islamic charity (zakat) of approximately 2.5 percent from Muslim institutions and companies.\footnote{Zakat is intended to go to those who are less fortunate. However, the Brotherhood determined that those engaged in jihad against the enemies of Islam are entitled to benefit from the charitable offering.}

### Internal Sources of Money\footnote{Internal Sources of Money}

| Noncoercive Means | Gifts. | Voluntary financial gifts from wealthy individuals and, occasionally, from commercial enterprises have constituted a good source of income for many resistance groups and are easier to hide from security forces. For example, money that comes as a cash gift will not leave a trail through the banking system. |
| | Loans. | The resistance group may also borrow funds. If the resistance group can borrow in the name of some established authority such as a government-in-exile, it is more likely to receive a favorable response than if a loan is sought in the name of an aspiring underground whose trustworthiness for later repayment may be in doubt. In addition, if an underground has access to some form of collateral, such as oil or diamond fields, they may be able to secure funding, weapons, and other needed assets in exchange for granting access to the resource. The RUF in Sierra Leone obtained funds and weapons from Liberia and Libya in exchange for diamonds and access to mines. |
| | Embezzled Funds. | A resistance group may obtain funds embezzled from government agencies, trade unions, businesses, and nongovernmental organizations. For example, in Somalia, drought relief funding and supplies were intercepted by Al Shabaab to support their network. |
| | Sales. | The sale of various items through door-to-door canvassing or through “front” stores may provide money. |
### Coercive Means

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Robberies.</th>
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<tr>
<td>To bring in money, resistance groups frequently resort to robberies. The Hukbalahap in the Philippines[^438] for instance, was able to collect funds by staging train robberies. However, robberies are risky for a resistance that wants political power because they may hurt the reputation of the resistance and make it look like an illegitimate criminal group.</td>
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<th>Kidnapping and Hijacking.</th>
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<tr>
<td>The practice of kidnapping to collect a ransom has been conducted by insurgent groups across the globe, ranging from the FARC in Colombia, to the Taliban in Afghanistan, to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Northern Africa, to MEND in Nigeria. These organizations utilize elaborate networks of middlemen and negotiators to exchange their captives for funding.</td>
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<th>Forced “Contribution”.</th>
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<td>Although undergrounds usually do not rob the public so as to avoid alienating the population, they sometimes coerce individuals into making donations under the tacit threat of reprisals. Aggressive application of this technique is usually reserved for targeting wealthier people. OAS in Algeria demanded predetermined amounts of money to be taken from wealthier professionals, but allowed people with less wealth to only give what they wanted.</td>
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<th>Taxes.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Taxes may be imposed against the general public in areas where resistance administrators can collect taxes with the backing of nearby military units. Many different things can be taxed for revenue. For example, the Taliban taxed the heroin drug economy, collecting a 20 percent tax from opium dealers as well as the drug transporters.[^439]</td>
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<th>Narcotics and Black Market Trade.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Modern insurgencies have increasing connections to the illegal drug trade throughout the world. The burgeoning industry of supplying marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, and other drugs offers opportunities for financing that most underground leaders find too lucrative to ignore.</td>
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Although extortion and kidnapping sustained the FARC for many years, growing the “little guerrilla army” required a corresponding growth in funding. To do this, the FARC reluctantly became involved in the narcotics trade. Initially, both Manuel Marulanda and Jacobo Arenas were opposed to *las drogas* for ideological reasons. In the long run, however, pragmatism won the day. The estimates of FARC financing obtained through narcotics run from at least $30 million annually to as high as $1.5 billion.[^440]

It is important to recognize that when resistance groups become involved in the drug trade or other black market activities, it tends to impact the organization’s core ideology and strategy. With the new drug trade came money and corruption for the FARC. Some of the FARC in coca-rich areas began to live as drug lords with gold jewelry, fancy cars, and other luxuries. This created dissent in the ranks as FARC members who stayed true to the guerrilla life realized others were living as gangsters.

Ultimately, finances are the lifeblood of an insurgent or revolutionary movement. Normally such organizations obtain financing through a combination of internal and external sources. The nature of the movement’s fundraising tends to affect the organization, in some cases despite its founding ideology.

Furthermore, how the movement handles acquired funds tends to characterize the organization in the eyes of the wider civilian population. Insurgencies that distribute money to impoverished citizens gain favor as the champions of the underprivileged. Conversely,
leaders who fall into patterns of corruption tend to discredit their organizations. This could be a concern for American ODA operators if resistance leaders have other corrupt financial interests or decide to use risky fund-raising methods.

Finally, finances need to be used to further the goal of the resistance movement by enabling resistance actions. The purpose of fund-raising is to pay for things such as supplies, member incomes, member family support, and training. Training is an especially important function to fund since it prepares new members to fully participate in the movement and enhances the skills of existing members.

**Training**

Training remains one of the core functions of an insurgent underground and that is true for Sarca as well. Through the training process, Bolanieves will select, evaluate, and develop recruits to join Sarca’s forces. Additionally, Bolanieves will want to take advantage of the Internet and the privatization of security operations to improve Sarca’s training program. Previously, resistance groups faced a problem of lacking access to training materials, but now Sarca can quickly and easily find training information on many useful hard skills: weapons, explosives, guerrilla tactics, surveillance, communications, and so on.

Beyond the basic resistance training, Bolanieves knows that insurgent training is very different from conventional military training when it comes to ideological preparation of Sarca members. Bolanieves must replace each Sarca member’s previous loyalty to the government with an allegiance to Sarca’s ideology. This type of training includes immersion in propaganda, whether religious or political. A recruit’s mastery of and devotion to Sarca’s ideology may ultimately help Bolanieves determine the recruit’s potential for advancement within Sarca.

Given the nature of Sarca as a resistance group acting against the government, Bolanieves will have to plan and prepare for clandestine training operations to avoid detection. Sarca’s clandestine training most often aims at training individual recruits and very small units, because dealing with larger units would compromise security. Similarly, Bolanieves wants Sarca’s training to focus on the opening minutes of an attack, rather than sustained land combat operations. Finally, Bolanieves will have to deal with time requirements for training because clandestine training tends to take a long time if it is interrupted by government forces in Estatu or needs to take place in small pieces to stay hidden. Conversely, training in less controlled environments, such as those enjoyed by al Qaeda in Afghanistan, allows for more intensive and continuous training all at once.

Even after initial training, Bolanieves puts a premium on adapting to lessons learned from Sarca’s operations. He reviews Sarca’s battles, acts of sabotage, terrorist attacks, and other operations—whether they succeeded or failed—to better understand mistakes and best practices. Later, Bolanieves takes those lessons learned to improve training techniques and prepare for future operations.

Bolanieves also finds it helpful to establish rules on “do’s and don’ts.” In general, he thinks it is often easier to tell Sarca members what not to do than what to do.
In addition to training dedicated Sarca members for violent resistance operations, Bolanieves may want to prepare other passive resisters for nonviolent actions such as noncooperation and civil disobedience. These actions may not require hard skills training such as weapons training, but Bolanieves knows that nonviolent resistance still involves organization, solidarity, and other forms of training. To achieve this nonviolent training, Bolanieves has several options. He could model Sarca’s training after Gandhi’s nonviolent actions, which were based on a moral creed and included a code of conduct and oath for volunteers. Another option would be training Sarca’s nonviolent resisters to withstand violence and physical abuse without responding with more violence.

Training Infrastructure

Training camps are the center of terrorist and insurgent training throughout the world. As described in numerous first-hand accounts, the camps provide an environment of isolation, focused skill building, and indoctrination that can mass produce deadly and committed warriors.

Al Qaeda maintained secret training camps in Afghanistan and Bosnia that were later exposed and destroyed. But these well-known examples are in fact typical of similar facilities in every corner of the globe. The Bekaa Valley in Lebanon has long hosted training camps for both Hizbollah and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), while the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka based several training sites in the remote north of their country and Jemaah Islamiyah provided weapons and explosives training in Indonesia.

Once placed in a training camp, Hizbollah recruits received training and instruction in weapons, explosives, ambush techniques, infiltration, intelligence, and myriad other subjects, including psychological warfare. Hizbollah and IRGC agents paid close attention to actual combat operations, sifting through lessons learned in order to strengthen subsequent attacks.

Al Qaeda’s training regime, like that of many other terrorist groups, puts a premium on religious indoctrination, which al Qaeda considers to be infinitely more important than the development of military skills. The exact ideology taught, however, differs from camp to camp, based on the cultural context of each particular insurgency. In camps supporting ethnic-based insurgencies, for example, the ideology focuses more on the history and mythology of the subject’s ethnicity and how it has been wronged. Other camps that develop jihadists for the restoration of the Caliphate emphasize jihad as a religious duty.

Training camps in safe locations can evolve into highly effective institutions for training terrorists. Al Qaeda’s camp at Darunta, near Jalalabad, Afghanistan, was one such location and typifies the smaller facilities. Only about a quarter-square mile in size, it consisted of a tunnel complex, four sub-camps, each with a different purpose, and a defensive system of trenches and outposts. The entire complex was camouflaged. Within the camp, al Qaeda ran a chemical training laboratory and a guerrilla training center. The Taliban owned a part of Darunta, and Pakistani terrorists operating in Kashmir ran the fourth sub-camp. Investigation of the abandoned site revealed extensive training and indoctrination materials—many in English, and much of it downloaded from the Internet.
Training Online

The information age introduced a new avenue and method for training. Previous mention of the Internet’s use for training demonstrates how it provides access to knowledge. Prior to the advent of the Internet, access to information sources on weapons, explosives, tactics, and other resistance methods was limited. Today, anyone can download a manual that instructs him or her how to conduct illegal attacks and other operations. Insurgent groups also use the Internet, however, to host training exercises that can combine motivational and operational aspects.

Online resources for insurgent and terrorist training include both motivational and operational information. Most often, these two categories are combined into a single document because the psychological preparation of a student is deemed to be equally important to the development of hard skills. Motivational information includes psychological, sociological, political, or religious components.

Hizbollah, under the direction of its senior leaders, developed a video game called “Special Force,” in which players experience a simulated operation against Israeli soldiers based on real-life events (see Figure 18). The game was released in 2003 and allowed players to
conduct “target practice” against Israeli political leaders. Thousands of copies of the game were sold in the Middle East, in the United States, and throughout the world. Through the publication of a game, Hizbollah was able to export both its ideology and a form of skill building that would prepare youngsters to one day assume the role of jihadist. Hizbollah copied this training technique from American supremacist groups that offer, on their websites, similar games focused on racial hatred. These games allow players to kill Jews, black people, or other targeted groups in “first-person shooter” formats. 

Figure 18. Screenshot from “Special Force.”

An important emerging area of online insurgent training is the ever-growing community of hackers. Thousands of new websites emerge annually that offer instruction and tools for hackers. While such sites offer little motivational information, they are replete with operational know-how, tips, tricks, and “best practices.” Visitors to such sites can learn detailed techniques for conducting denial of service attacks, stealing passwords, overloading websites, and probing networks for vulnerabilities. They can also download tools for encryption, programming, and data manipulation to facilitate their efforts. Islamic jihadist groups all over the world have devoted resources to encouraging their followers to conduct cyberterror attacks and providing training and tools to assist them.

Training Process

Training is central to the success of an insurgency. The most successful and long-lived movements treat this key function as a major area of concern and focus for leadership. The experience of the Provisional Irish Republican Army is instructive as an example of how an insurgent organization plans, organizes, and conducts training.
RESISTANCE IN FOCUS: The Provisional Irish Republican Army

The IRA organized a training department under its general headquarters with the responsibility to maintain all training resources and facilities. They conducted training in three areas: new recruit training, operational skills training, and intelligence/counterintelligence/security training. During new recruit training, the emphasis was on motivational information—i.e., what it means to be a Republican and the history of Irish resistance against the British occupation. The other two phases of training focused on the necessary hard skills to conduct operations and to protect the security of the organization.

New recruits were required to attend training sessions about once per week during their first three months in the organization. The sessions included lectures and discussions about member duties, the history of the organization, the rules concerning military engagement, and how to resist interrogation. During this period of initial training, the recruit was also evaluated as to his potential for service and his risk to the security of the organization.

The IRA learned to emphasize rigorous training and instruction in hard skills—weapons, explosives, and urban and rural tactics. Since unsophisticated attacks by impulsive and unskilled youths led to arrests, interrogations, and political failure, training was considered highly important. Similarly, inexperience with weapons and explosives caused numerous accidental deaths among the insurgents, emphasizing the need for a military training program. The IRA put recruits into covert training camps where they learned to shoot and maintain weapons, employ demolitions, and other basic skills. Due in part to the requirement for secrecy, the average IRA insurgent’s training took about six months.

Before the advent of the Internet, it was difficult for insurgent leaders to get access to training resources. IRA operatives solved this deficiency by recruiting former military members, obtaining printed military manuals, and in some cases sending members to pursue education opportunities that they could use in later insurgent activities. In the 1970s, IRA leaders had to devote resources to producing written materials to support training. This resulted in, among other products, the infamous Green Book, which included both ideological and operational information for potential members.

These efforts paid off in better operational performance. Better-trained insurgents began to operate collectively instead of individually, giving them the ability to stand their ground in skirmishes with government forces. Resistance marksmanship improved, and British casualties increased.

Beyond the general training of recruits in weapons and tactics, IRA leaders also sought to improve performance in bomb making, sniping, logistics, and intelligence. Specialists in these areas would occasionally come together to receive training and pass on lessons learned with the intent of improving safety, security, and performance in battle.

Since weapons ranges—especially those designed to handle mortars, explosives, and other large weapons—tend to be noisy and hard to conceal, the IRA used remote locations throughout Ireland, including abandoned farm houses, unused beaches, and woods. In one case, they used a beach for mortar fire using dummy (i.e., nonexplosive) shells. In other cases, they positioned their live-fire ranges near army training facilities so that their gunfire noise would not attract attention. Recruits were often not told the exact location of the...
camps where they trained in an attempt to prevent the authorities from discovering and shutting them down. The IRA also turned to other sympathetic groups based in foreign countries for training support, such as support for using training camps in Libya.

Bolanieves and Sarca

When considering actions to take, Bolanieves faces a critical question on Sarca’s use of violent and nonviolent resistance options. A decision to use violence, especially lethal violence, sets the tone for the movement and could affect the lives of Sarca members and the people of Estatu in a significant way. Nonviolent resistance also has its own important considerations, such as how to prepare people to withstand abuse and other effective actions. In both cases, whether Sarca chooses violence or nonviolence, Bolanieves knows that Sarca should concentrate on training its members to be most effective with its actions. Bolanieves may have to find ways to hide training areas from Estatu government forces for physical training or learn to use online training resources to quickly reach more Sarca members. Finally, resistance operations, training, supplies, and all other actions require money. To sustain the movement, Bolanieves will need to engage in fundraising, but there are many different options and approaches in this regard as well. Bolanieves may want to reach out to external and foreign donors to support Sarca’s cause. Additionally, the earlier question of violence or nonviolence could also affect how Bolanieves thinks about fundraising. If he accepts violent resistance actions, he might also approve of using threats to extort money or kidnappings for ransom. Criminal activities is an option for Sarca to make money. In all of these ways, Sarca’s actions will affect the people of Estatu and will show a certain image to the public—either violent or nonviolent. Bolanieves’ decisions on training and fundraising will further ingrain that image for Sarca.

Questions

A resistance movement is often defined by the actions that are attributed to it. The reader now understands how the concept of a threshold of violence will influence the movement’s decision to employ violent or nonviolent tactics. In turn, the reader examined the importance of intelligence, fundraising and internal support mechanisms, external financial support, and the role of training camps, programs, and online studies. These factors are essential actions of a resistance movement, and the reader should explore this knowledge in the context of the Sarca narrative with the following discussion questions.

- Identify and Compare: What options should Bolanieves consider for training? What does each option provide him? Is online training a useful option for Sarca?
Identify and Explain: If Bolanieves wants to remain nonviolent, which actions are most effective for Sarca’s goals?

Differentiate and Deconstruct: If he authorizes violent resistance, would he willingly take lethal resistance actions? What are the different effects for the ODA and US objectives?

Differentiate: For funding, which voluntary, nonviolent or violent, and coercive options would work best for Bolanieves and Sarca?

Critique and Evaluate: What issues should he and the American ODA team consider for relying on foreign donors for money, using criminal activities, engaging in threats for payment, or carrying out other fundraising efforts? What are the critical components of external support for Sarca?

Detect and evaluate: How should Bolanieves decide on the use of nonviolent or violent resistance to achieve Sarca’s objectives? Which factors are critical to determining the threshold of violence to achieve Sarca’s stated objectives?
CONCLUSION

With all of the decisions Bolanieves must make for Sarca and its growing resistance movement, he needs to carefully consider all of the factors, issues, and areas of opportunity. The actors that will support Sarca and provide its membership base need to be identified. Causes and motivations of resistance for those supporters become equally important to understand when forming Sarca into a movement. Outside of the people of Sarca, Bolanieves recognizes that the environment around Sarca and its supporters in the city of Reseau will affect the movement. Then, once Sarca motivates supporters and an understanding of its environment, Bolanieves needs to organize his leadership and the people’s support into an operational group. Finally, Bolanieves should decide the actions, operations, and sustainment measures Sarca will employ.

These are difficult and complex questions for Bolanieves. However, if Sarca wants a chance to change the government of Reseau and successfully bring greater representation to the marginalized groups, Bolanieves will have to make difficult decisions on preparing Sarca for resistance. However, Bolanieves is not the only one with big questions to consider. If the United States is tasked with supporting Bolanieves and providing advice to help him succeed, there are other questions to answer.

How can the United States help Bolanieves with his decisions on organizing and growing Sarca? What guidance can it give him to help him consider different options? As the ODA helps Bolanieves, one of the first phases to consider is preparation. At this stage, the causes of resistance and the environment surrounding the resistance are particularly important to understand. Establishing the legitimacy of the resistance leaders and the goals of the movement within this environment sets the foundation for the next phases. Because the United States already made contact with Bolanieves and is working with him in Reseau, the next phase is organization. Organization is critical to becoming an effective and sustainable group that can conduct operations. Organizing resistance actions includes many seemingly smaller details, such as logistics and fundraising.

After initial organization, Sarca will need to recruit, train, supply itself, and prepare for real operations. Planning for operations could include advising Bolanieves to decide on the actions to take, the targets to pursue, and the most effective Sarca operation to employ. Once decisions are made and Sarca starts growing into an active resistance, Bolanieves can employ his forces to start achieving Sarca’s strategic goals. Throughout this entire process, Bolanieves should consider his role in command and control. Finally, the United States should pursue achieving its own objectives and see Bolanieves and Sarca successfully become the legitimate government of Reseau.

Whether the mission is counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, or UW, the object of the ARSOF soldier’s profession is the phenomenon of resistance. Understanding resistance as a concept empowers the ARSOF soldier to maximize his or her expertise and experience when working with or against the resistance as a living entity on the ground. This text seeks to guide the ARSOF soldier through the basics of resistance, as well as provide frameworks, theories, and concepts he or she can use in confronting the questions, issues, and decisions that need to be answered, addressed, and made in the field. While the phenomenon of
resistance undoubtedly continues to evolve, it is built on the history that comes before each new case, and there is no new case completely unique from those that came before. The frameworks, theories, and concepts in this text all derive from that history, and they can be found in more detail in the volumes created by the ARIS program. This text introduced and explained those frameworks, theories, and concepts to the reader. It is up to the ARSOF soldier to marry this material and the understanding it provides with his or her training, expertise, and experience to execute his or her missions without equal.
Methods of Nonviolent Protest and Persuasion

**Formal Statements**
1. Public speeches
2. Letters of opposition or support
3. Declarations by organizations and institutions
4. Signed public statements
5. Declarations of indictment and intention
6. Group or mass petitions

**Communications with a Wider Audience**
7. Slogans, caricatures, and symbols
8. Banners, posters, and displayed communications
9. Leaflets, pamphlets, and books
10. Newspapers and journals
11. Records, radio, and television
12. Skywriting and earthwriting

**Group Representations**
13. Deputations
14. Mock awards
15. Group lobbying
16. Picketing
17. Mock elections

**Symbolic Public Acts**
18. Displays of flags and symbolic colors
19. Wearing of symbols
20. Prayer and worship
21. Delivering symbolic objects
22. Protest disrobings
23. Destruction of own property
24. Symbolic lights
25. Displays of portraits
26. Paint as protest
27. New signs and names
28. Symbolic sounds
29. Symbolic reclamations
30. Rude gestures

Pressures on Individuals
31. “Haunting” officials
32. Taunting officials
33. Fraternization
34. Vigils

Drama and Music
35. Humorous skits and pranks
36. Performances of plays and music
37. Singing

Processions
38. Marches
39. Parades
40. Religious processions
41. Pilgrimages
42. Motorcades

Honoring the Dead
43. Political mourning
44. Mock funerals
45. Demonstrative funerals
46. Homage at burial places

Public Assemblies
47. Assemblies of protest or support
48. Protest meetings
49. Camouflaged meetings of protest
50. Teach-ins

Withdrawal and Renunciation
51. Walk-outs
52. Silence
53. Renouncing honors
54. Turning one’s back

The Methods of Social Noncooperation

Ostracism of Persons
55. Social boycott
56. Selective social boycott
57. Lysistratic nonaction
58. Excommunication
59. Interdict

*Noncooperation with Social Events, Customs, and Institutions*
60. Suspension of social and sports activities
61. Boycott of social affairs
62. Student strike
63. Social disobedience
64. Withdrawal from social institutions

*Withdrawal from the Social System*
65. Stay-at-home
66. Total personal noncooperation
67. “Flight” of workers
68. Sanctuary
69. Collective disappearance
70. Protest emigration (hijrat)

**The Methods of Economic Noncooperation: (1) Economic Boycotts**

*Actions by Consumers*
71. Consumers’ boycott
72. Nonconsumption of boycotted goods
73. Policy of austerity
74. Rent withholding
75. Refusal to rent
76. National consumers’ boycott
77. International consumers’ boycott

*Action by Workers and Producers*
78. Workmen’s boycott
79. Producers’ boycott

*Action by Middlemen*
80. Suppliers’ and handlers’ boycott

*Action by Owners and Management*
81. Traders’ boycott
82. Refusal to let or sell property
83. Lockout
84. Refusal of industrial assistance
85. Merchants’ “general strike”

Action by Holders of Financial Resources

86. Withdrawal of bank deposits
87. Refusal to pay fees, dues, and assessments
88. Refusal to pay debts or interest
89. Severance of funds and credit
90. Revenue refusal
91. Refusal of a government’s money

Action by Governments

92. Domestic embargo
93. Blacklisting of traders
94. International sellers’ embargo
95. International buyers’ embargo
96. International trade embargo

The Methods of Economic Noncooperation: (2) The Strike

Symbolic Strikes

97. Protest strike
98. Quickie walkout (lightning strike)

Agricultural Strikes

99. Peasant strike
100. Farm workers’ strike

 Strikes by Special Groups

101. Refusal of impressed labor
102. Prisoners’ strike
103. Craft strike
104. Professional strike

Ordinary Industrial Strikes

105. Establishment strike
106. Industry strike
107. Sympathetic strike

Restricted Strikes

108. Detailed strike
109. Bumper strike
110. Slowdown strike
111. Working-to-rule strike
112. Reporting “sick” (sick-in)
113. Strike by resignation
114. Limited strike
115. Selective strike

**Multi-Industry Strikes**
116. Generalized strike
117. General strike

**Combination of Strikes and Economic Closures**
118. Hartal
119. Economic shutdown

**The Methods of Political Noncooperation**

*Rejection of Authority*
120. Withholding or withdrawal of allegiance
121. Refusal of public support
122. Literature and speeches advocating resistance

*Citizens’ Noncooperation with Government*
123. Boycott of legislative bodies
124. Boycott of elections
125. Boycott of government employment and positions
126. Boycott of government depts., agencies, and other bodies
127. Withdrawal from government educational institutions
128. Boycott of government-supported organizations
129. Refusal of assistance to enforcement agents
130. Removal of own signs and placemarks
131. Refusal to accept appointed officials
132. Refusal to dissolve existing institutions

*Citizens’ Alternatives to Obedience*
133. Reluctant and slow compliance
134. Nonobedience in absence of direct supervision
135. Popular nonobedience
136. Disguised disobedience
137. Refusal of an assemblage or meeting to disperse
138. Sitdown
139. Noncooperation with conscription and deportation
140. Hiding, escape, and false identities
141. Civil disobedience of “illegitimate” laws

Action by Government Personnel
142. Selective refusal of assistance by government aides
143. Blocking of lines of command and information
144. Stalling and obstruction
145. General administrative noncooperation
146. Judicial noncooperation
147. Deliberate inefficiency and selective noncooperation by enforcement agents
148. Mutiny

Domestic Governmental Action
149. Quasi-legal evasions and delays
150. Noncooperation by constituent governmental units

International Governmental Action
151. Changes in diplomatic and other representations
152. Delay and cancellation of diplomatic events
153. Withholding of diplomatic recognition
154. Severance of diplomatic relations
155. Withdrawal from international organizations
156. Refusal of membership in international bodies
157. Expulsion from international organizations

The Methods of Nonviolent Intervention

Psychological Intervention
158. Self-exposure to the elements
159. The fast: Fast of moral pressure, Hunger strike, Satyagrahic fast
160. Reverse trial
161. Nonviolent harassment

Physical Intervention
162. Sit-in
163. Stand-in
164. Ride-in
165. Wade-in
166. Mill-in
167. Pray-in
168. Nonviolent raids
169. Nonviolent air raids
170. Nonviolent invasion
171. Nonviolent interjection
172. Nonviolent obstruction
173. Nonviolent occupation

**Social Intervention**

174. Establishing new social patterns
175. Overloading of facilities
176. Stall-in
177. Speak-in
178. Guerrilla theater
179. Alternative social institutions
180. Alternative communication system

**Economic Intervention**

181. Reverse strike
182. Stay-in strike
183. Nonviolent land seizure
184. Defiance of blockades
185. Politically motivated counterfeiting
186. Preclusive purchasing
187. Seizure of assets
188. Dumping
189. Selective patronage
190. Alternative markets
191. Alternative transportation systems
192. Alternative economic institutions

**Political Intervention**

193. Overloading of administrative systems
194. Disclosing identities of secret agents
195. Seeking imprisonment
196. Civil disobedience of “neutral” laws
197. Work-on without collaboration
198. Dual sovereignty and parallel government
ENDNOTES


2. This section was excerpted from the ARIS volume Understanding States of Resistance. W. Sam Lauber, et al., Understanding States of Resistance (United States Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC, 2015).

3. ATP 3-05.1, Unconventional Warfare, Headquarters, Department of the Army (Washington, D.C., September 2013).


13. Christiansen, Four stages of Social Movements.


16. Ibid., 273; Christiansen, Four Stages of Social Movements 3.

17. Christiansen, Four stages of Social Movements, 3.

The Provisional IRA was established at the conclusion of the December 1969 Army Convention after a two-third vote ended the IRA’s policy of abstentionism (not assuming elected seats in British legislative institutions such as Westminster Parliament). Those who remained were called the “Officials” and supported an electoral strategy. Those who walked out became known as the “Provisionals” or “Provies.” This split was reflected at Sinn Fein’s 1970 Ard Fheis where a similar motion split the movement. The Provisionals later ended their own policy of abstentionism in 1985/6.
43. Ibid., 54, 127, 189-190.
44. ARIS, Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II, 2012, 293-327.
47. Miller, “The End of SDS,” 305
48. Ibid., 307-308.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Christiansen, Four Stage of Social Movements, 4.
59. Edwards, Natural History of Revolution.
60. Tarrow, Power in Movement, 206.
62. Christiansen, Four Stages of Social Movements, 6.
65. ARIS does not set intelligence requirements. It is educational material. The questions in this section prompt the reader through possible inquiry about the relevant group. The questions in this section do not constitute and should not be interpreted as setting intelligence requirements.
67. This section is adapted from Human Factors and Undergrounds in Resistance. ARIS, Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies, (United States Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC, January 25 2013), 89-108; ARIS,


70. ARIS, Human Factors, 91 et seq.


74. ARIS, Human Factors, 92 et seq.


76. Ibid.

77. Abimael Guzman was the undisputed leader of Sendero Luminoso. This physically unremarkable man, rarely seen by Sendero members apart from the highest leadership, employed an extraordinary capacity for persuasion and organization to create a cult-like organization whose members literally revered him as a god in many cases. For the Sendero members, Guzman was shrouded in mystery—a charismatic, almost hypnotic leader who held the one true vision of the future and the means to achieve it. In their minds, he was almost superhuman, and his commands were obeyed without question or hesitation. He demanded and received absolute devotion. Indeed, Guzman saw himself as a “revolutionary Moses who will lead his followers across a river of blood into the Maoist promise land of communism.” Sendero believed that Peru was the epicenter of a world revolution and that ultimate victory depended on absolute obedience to Guzman, the leader of the world revolution. In one sense, the near deification of Guzman ensured unparalleled organizational unity and clarity of vision. (Ron Buikema and Matt Burger, “Sendero Luminoso,” in ARIS, Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare, Volume II: 1962–2009, (United States Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC, January 25 2012), 58–59.)

78. Post, Psychological Assessment.


81. This portion was taken and adapted from ARIS, Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare, (United States Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC, January 25, 2013), 10, 24.


83. ARIS, Undergrounds, 24 et seq.


87. ARIS, Human Factors, 107.


89. Ibid.

90. ARIS, Undergrounds, 131 et seq.


94. ARIS, Undergrounds, 138 et seq.


97. Spears, States-within-States, 15–34.


100. People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola–Labor Party or the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola–Partido do Trabalho.

101. Alan Cowell as quoted in Spears, States-within-States, 21.

102. Ibid., 20.


104. ARIS, Undergrounds, 144 et seq.

105. Spears, States-within-States, 22-23.

106. ARIS, Undergrounds, 133 et seq.


108. Spears, States-within-States, 25.


111. Ibid., 26.

112. This case study is taken from the ARIS volume Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare. ARIS, Undergrounds, 146-148.


114. Ibid., 118-119

115. Ibid., 119-120.

116. Ibid., 120-123.

117. Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 123-127.

118. This case study is taken from the ARIS volume Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare. ARIS, Undergrounds, 148-149.


120. Ibid., 182. The RCD initially attempted to co-opt what was left of state institutions in their efforts at governance but eventually realized these institutions were “incapable of being resuscitated.”

121. Ibid., 190-208.

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid., 191.

124. ARIS, Undergrounds, 131 et seq.

128. Ibid.
130. ARIS, Undergrounds, 149 et seq.
131. ARIS, Undergrounds, 149 et seq.
133. ARIS, Undergrounds, 149 et seq.
134. Kasfir, Dilemmas of Popular Support in Guerilla Warfare, 273. Kasfir observed similar difficulties in the NRA’s management of the governance activities in its territories.
135. Andrew Silke, “Rebel’s Dilemma: The Changing Relationship between the IRA, Sinn Fein and Paramilitary Vigilantism in Northern Ireland,” Terrorism and Political Violence 11, no. 1 (1999): 81. The military and political wing of the PIRA had reasons for disliking the necessary, but troublesome, governance activities associated with curbing criminal behavior. The military wing thought they brought ill repute to the movement and wasted resources. For members of the political wing, in addition to tarnishing the movement, they also made it difficult to gain political support among more moderate populations.
136. Ibid., 84.
140. ARIS, Human Factors, 35 et seq.
141. Human Factors, 6; Undergrounds, 172.
142. Figure adapted from ARIS, Human Factors, 36.

145. Ibid.
146. Ibid.
147. Ibid.
148. Weinberg et al., Political Parties and Terrorist Groups.
155. This section is taken from ARIS, Undergrounds, 153 et seq.
156. Dudouet, From War to Politics, 39.

157. Ibid.


159. Ibid., 41-42.

160. Dudouet, From War to Politics, 39.

161. ARIS, Undergrounds, 27 et seq.


165. Judith Burdin Asuni, “Understanding the Armed Groups of the Niger Delta,” (working paper, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, September 2009), 7. One survey of members of MEND found that many of the young members were drug users—and some drug dealers—with limited education and no economic resources, so they were completely dependent on their leaders for financial support, food, and shelter.


169. ARIS, Human Factors, 290 et seq. The ARIS program has published two volumes specifically on the underground component of resistance movements. Information about the other components can be found throughout volumes one and two of the Casebook on Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare. Other resources for information on the auxiliary, armed component, and the public component include...


172. ARIS, Human Factors, 292.


175. This section is taken and adapted from Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare. ARIS, Undergrounds, 27 et seq.


177. ARIS, Undergrounds, 28 et seq.


181. ARIS, Undergrounds, 29 et seq.

182. This case study is taken from Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare. ARIS, Undergrounds, 29.


184. ARIS, Undergrounds, 29.


186. ARIS, Undergrounds, 31 et seq.


188. Jerome Conley, interview with former rebel commanders, Asmara, Eritrea, June 1997


190. ARIS, Undergrounds, 31; ARIS, Human Factors, 25 et seq.


198. ARIS, Undergrounds, 37.


202. Portions of this section are taken and adapted from Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare, as well as Conceptual Typology of Resistance. ARIS, Undergrounds, 58 et seq., 85 et seq.; Typology, 18-19.


204. Molnar, Undergrounds.

205. ARIS, Conceptual Typology, 18-19.


207. ARIS, Undergrounds, 85.

208. The following sections were taken and in some cases adapted from the ARIS volumes, Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies and Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare. Nathan ARIS, ed., Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies, (United States Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC, January 25 2013); Robert ARIS, ed., Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare, (United States Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC, January 25, 2013).


216. Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” See also Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.”

217. Theda Skocpol, State and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

218. ARIS, Human Factors, 19.

219. ARIS, Human Factors, 15.


222. ARIS, Human Factors, 17; ARIS, Undergrounds, 5.

223. Ibid., 123.


225. ARIS, Undergrounds, 4.

226. These case studies are taken from the ARIS volume, Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare. ARIS, Undergrounds, 5-6.


229. Lars-Erik Cederman and Luc Girardin, “Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity Onto Nationalist Insurgencies,” American Political Science Review 101, no. 1

231. ARIS, Human Factors, 22.

232. ARIS, Human Factors, 131.


234. Ibid.

235. ARIS, Human Factors, 194.


238. ARIS, Human Factors, 194.


241. ARIS, Human Factors, 197.

242. Ibid., 198.


245. Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.”


247. ARIS, Human Factors, 27.


263. Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.”


266. ARIS, Conceptual Typology of Resistance, (United States Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC), 28.


269. ARIS, Human Factors, 159.
270. Ibid., 160.
272. ARIS, Human Factors, 160.
274. ARIS, Human Factors, 161-163.
276. ARIS, Human Factors, 163.
280. Ibid., 26; ARIS, Undergrounds, 142.
281. Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.”
283. Ibid.
284. Collier and Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, 1–2.
287. Collier and Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War.
288. Ibid.
290. Steven Metz, Rethinking Insurgency (Fayetteville, AR: Juniper Grove, 2007), 30.
291. ARIS, Human Factors, 220.
293. ARIS, Human Factors, 220-228.
294. ARIS, Human Factors, 220.
295. ARIS, Human Factors, 223.
297. ARIS, Human Factors, 223.
300. ARIS, Human Factors, 225.
302. ARIS, Human Factors, 225.
304. ARIS, Human Factors, 226.
306. Weimann, Terror on the Internet.
310. ARIS, Human Factors, 228.
311. This section is taken from ARIS, Undergrounds, 107-116.


317. This section is taken from ARIS, Human Factors, 23 et seq.


323. ARIS, Conceptual Typology of Resistance, 38.


325. Ibid.

326. Ibid., 70.

327. Ibid.

329. Ibid., 289-290.
330. ARIS, Conceptual Typology of Resistance, 41.
331. Paul Staniland, Networks of Rebellion, 6-9.
335. This section is taken from ARIS, Undergrounds, 13.
336. This section is taken from ARIS, Undergrounds, 14.
337. This section is taken from ARIS, Human Factors, 43.
339. See Chapter 1 of Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare for further discussion of the dilemma of inclusiveness.
340. This section adapted from ARIS, Narratives and Competing Messages (United States Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC), 1-4.
346. This section is taken from ARIS, Human Factors, 208 et seq.
347. ARIS, Conceptual Typology, 64.
348. This section is taken from the ARIS volume Haufler, Lauber, Agan, and Pinczuk, Narratives.


351. Table is taken from ARIS volume ARIS, Human Factors, 263.

352. This section is taken from ARIS, Human Factors, 209.

353. This section is taken from ARIS, Human Factors, 211.


355. Ibid.

356. Ibid., 69.

357. Ibid., Human Factors, 218.


359. This section is taken from ARIS, Human Factors, 219 et seq.

360. This section is taken from ARIS Conceptual Typology of Resistance, 44.

361. Figure from ARIS, Conceptual Typology of Resistance, 45. ARIS, Undergrounds, 10–12.

362. This section is taken from ARIS, Undergrounds, 10.


364. This section is taken from ARIS, Undergrounds, 11.

365. This section is taken from ARIS, Undergrounds, 11.

366. This section is taken from ARIS, Conceptual Typology of Resistance, 45.

367. This section is taken from ARIS, Conceptual Typology of Resistance, 45.


369. This section is taken from Cosgrove and Hahn, Conceptual Typology of Resistance, 46.


372. Ibid.

373. Ibid.

374. Ibid.


384. Muller, “Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence.”


390. ARIS, Conceptual Typology of Resistance, 52.

391. This section is taken from ARIS, Conceptual Typology of Resistance, 53.

392. This section is taken from ARIS, Human Factors.


395. This section is taken from ARIS, Thresholds of Violence.


400. This section is taken from ARIS, Conceptual Typology of Resistance, 62.

401. ARIS, Conceptual Typology of Resistance, 63.

402. This section is taken from ARIS, Human Factors,


406. This section is taken from ARIS, Human Factors, 283.

407. This section is taken from ARIS, Human Factors, 287.


410. This section is taken from ARIS, Human Factors, 288.


414. This section is taken from ARIS, Human Factors, 293.


416. This section is taken from ARIS, Human Factors, 295.
417. This section is taken from ARIS, Human Factors, 296.

418. This section is taken from ARIS, Undergrounds, 173.


420. This section is taken from ARIS, Undergrounds, 174.

421. This section is taken from ARIS, Undergrounds, 175.

422. This section is taken from ARIS, Undergrounds, 176.

423. This section is taken from ARIS, Undergrounds, 176.

424. This section is taken from ARIS, Undergrounds, 43 et seq.


429. This section is taken ARIS, Undergrounds, 58 et seq.


431. This section is taken from ARIS, Undergrounds, 62 et seq.


433. Ibid.

434. Ibid.

435. This section is taken from ARIS, Undergrounds, 65 et seq.


441. This section is taken from ARIS, Undergrounds, 91 et seq., and ARIS, Human Factors, 299 et seq.


443. This section is taken from 94 et seq.


445. Ibid.

446. ARIS, Undergrounds, 95.

447. This section is taken from ARIS, Undergrounds, 99 et seq.

448. ARIS, Undergrounds, 100.
