THE DAY AFTER OVERTHROW: HOW THE BEHAVIOR OF THE STATE AND THE RESISTANCE SHAPES POST-OVERTHROW OUTCOMES
Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

THE DAY AFTER OVERTHROW: HOW THE BEHAVIOR OF THE STATE AND THE RESISTANCE SHAPES POST-OVERTHROW OUTCOMES

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United States Army Special Operations Command
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study seeks to understand the nature of post-transition governance. In particular, we seek to explain why some post-transition governments are engulfed by recurring civil wars while other post-transition governments respect human rights, are stable, and are staunch allies of the United States. This data is important to a United States Army Special Operations Force (ARSOF) soldier because that operator must understand how different factors have interacted historically to produce different types of post-transition governments.

Governance is a measure of the government’s capacity to function as an institution and to respond to the needs of each citizen. In this study, we examined the government’s capacity to fund itself, to staff offices with competent people, to legislate, to provide security within its borders, to protect and defend its citizens from attacks, and to provide services.

We identified sixty-nine post-World War II cases in which a resistance movement successfully accomplished its goal and endured for at least five years. We then characterized each case by using a magnitude of overthrow scale shown in Figure ES-1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Magnitude of Overthrow</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Complete Overthrow of Government: A result where the whole of government is removed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Forced Removal of the Head of Government: A result where the chief executive is removed, but other branches remain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Forced Constitutional Reform: A result where the resistance compels desired changes to the Constitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Institutional Disruption: A result where government functions are dramatically revised due to resistance demands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Forced Electoral Reform: A result where election laws are changed to allow resistance-friendly candidates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Judicial Review: A result where a law or election result is reviewed or revised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Dramatic Multiparty Shift: A result where resistance activities lead to a significant shift in the political balance of power.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure ES-1. Magnitude of overthrow.
After placing the cases on the magnitude of overthrow scale, we focused on the thirty-nine historical cases of forced constitutional reform and forced removal of the head of government. For each case, we analyzed information about the overthrown state, the resistance movement, and the post-transition governance, and performed statistical analysis for a correlation study.

This correlation study allows the ARSOF operator to see what variables tend to appear together, but it is not a predictive guarantee of how a situation will play out. Armed with the information that follows, the operator can identify important characteristics of the overthrown states and the resistance movement, enter an operating theater with indications about the characteristics of post-transition governance that will result, and make informed decisions about his/her actions to help bring about desired post-transition governance outcomes.

In cases of forced constitutional reform, the operator should be prepared to encounter the following conditions in their deployment:

- If the state represses the resistance movement, the ARSOF soldier should not expect the post-transition government to act as cultivators by fostering legitimacy within the movement to consolidate support. Conversely, if a state appeases the resistance movement, the operator should expect that the post-transition government will act as cultivators in their diplomatic relations.
- If land ownership is private, the ARSOF soldier should expect civil war recurrence when the post-transition government is in power and that the post-transition government will act as spin doctors in their diplomatic relations to spin messaging that will garner external support for legitimacy.
- If citizenship is defined by birth (jus soli), the ARSOF soldier should not expect the resistance movement to act as shopkeepers in the post transition government. However, the operator should expect the resistance movement to act as spin doctors when conducting diplomacy to seek joint advantage for a negotiated settlement.
- If a resistance movement is hegemonic, the ARSOF soldier should not expect the resistance movement to use coercion or to act as cultivators to foster its legitimacy to consolidate support within the post transition government.
- If a resistance movement’s organizational structure is fragmented, the ARSOF soldier should expect the post-transition government to use coercion. The operator should also expect that the resistance will act as cultivators.
to consolidate support for legitimacy or warriors using external communication as an extension of fighting in the post-transition government, but the ARSOF soldier should not expect the resistance to act as shopkeepers in their diplomatic relations by seeking joint advantage for a negotiated settlement. If a resistance movement employs an outbidding strategy to outdo a rival faction in the movement, the ARSOF soldier should not expect to see early elections.

- If a resistance movement receives external support, the ARSOF soldier should expect to see: citizen security elements arise, popular counter-resistance, a new or modified flag or currency, and the post-transition government to act as cultivators in their diplomatic relations but also use coercion. The operator should not expect the post-transition government to provide health services to the population.

- If the resistance movement leadership has post-secondary education, the ARSOF soldier should not expect to see civil war recurrence or a popular counter-resistance to emerge but the operator should expect elections to be held.

In the cases of forced removal of the head of government, the operator should be prepared to encounter the following conditions in their deployment:

- If there is a military coup, do not expect the post-transition government to promote culture/religion.
- If there has been recent war, expect civil war to recur.
- If industrialization occurred, do not expect expungement of the overthrown state’s police or military.
- If the overthrown state-defined citizenship is by birth, do not expect the resistance movement to conduct diplomacy as spin doctors.
- If the resistance movement is united, do not expect citizen security elements to arise.
- If a resistance movement is fragmented, expect them to act as warriors in their diplomatic relations.

ARSOF soldiers who are advising and assisting resistance leaders can use this study to more accurately discern current organization and behaviors of both the government and the resistance to estimate trends that point to likely outcomes. These outcomes may be favorable—such as the organization of free and fair elections—or unfavorable—such as a return to bloody civil war. By understanding likely outcomes, an ARSOF soldier can better advise resistance leaders toward favorable outcomes and away from unfavorable ones.
INTRODUCTION

Your boots thud softly on the autumn grass. As you gather your parachute and pack it, you scan the dark horizon of a troubled land. You are an Army Special Operations Force (ARSOF) soldier deploying to a country that is on the verge of a civil war. To the world and to the anxious citizens of the country, the situation is unclear, and the future is chaotic. Anxious politicians in Washington, and throughout the region that you are in, hope the crisis does not degenerate into a bloodbath. What will happen if the rebels overthrow the country? If they oust the president? If they replace the constitution? Is it possible to predict with any accuracy how a new government will act toward its citizens? Or how it will conduct diplomacy abroad? Is it possible to estimate the likelihood of free and fair elections after an overthrow? Or the probability that renewed civil unrest will lead to war?

Political change is the way of the world, and now it will visit this land. But while most people must watch it happen and hope for the best, or at least for survival, you and your team will guide its course. In a land of shuttered shops, sudden riots, cowed journalists, and explosive social media, what tomorrow might bring seems inscrutable. But your team came with a powerful tool. You deployed with the normal kit—weapons, communications, medical supplies—but you also brought along the science of resistance. While it is no crystal ball, it has equipped you to make sense out of confusion and to make educated estimates of what is coming. Together with your partners in the resistance, you will summon a brighter future.

The purpose of this study is to equip ARSOF soldiers with the knowledge for analyzing just this type of crisis. Our research shows that there are indeed factors that characterize the actions of both the state and the resistance that are linked with what happens after a state is overthrown. By using this information, an operator can transcend the chaos and base his/her estimate of future outcomes on substantial historical research. Every conflict has unique features, but it often follows the paths of similar state overthrows. By understanding those historical trends, operators can come to grips with what is likely to happen next. Operators can learn to distinguish between the possible and the probable.

In this report, operators can learn the key characteristics of both state and resistance movements that serve as independent variables—i.e., factors that will correlate to future outcomes. By identifying these factors (or their absence) in the country, operators will be able to make educated predictions about the likely course of governance after an overthrow—the dependent variables. Where the common observer will see only unpredictable chaos, operators will learn to see relationships and be able to make predictions.
WHAT IS STATE OVERTHROW?

ARSOF soldiers are deployed to regions of the world that are tumultuous. At times, s/he will be engaging in unconventional warfare, helping a resistance movement trying to overthrow the state. In this report, we explore cases in which a resistance movement successfully accomplishes its goal. Since World War II, there have been sixty-nine cases of state overthrow across the globe, which we were able to identify in a political science database called Polity IV.¹ See Appendix B for a comprehensive list of all cases by country name and year.

State overthrow is a broad category. Cases of state overthrow vary in many ways: how much of the old government they replace, what means they involve (violent or non-violent), and the types of post-transition government that come after. There are potentially many ways to think about and categorize the different types of state overthrow. Figure 1 depicts a “magnitude of overthrow” scale created by the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory research team. Drawing upon rigorous academic research, this scale presents a magnitude of impact to the state based on how encompassing the overthrow is, or how much of the old government is changed or replaced.

It is useful to think of the magnitude of overthrow scale as a ladder, with each type of overthrow being a rung on the ladder. Each rung represents a kind of overthrow and aligns to a number of polity cases examined in this study. At the bottom of the ladder is the lowest magnitude type of overthrow, meaning that all government structures are retained. At the top of the ladder is the highest magnitude of overthrow, meaning that all government structures are removed.

It is important to examine the magnitude of overthrow scale within the context of the resistance movement’s goals, ideology, and intent. A resistance movement may only seek to influence a state’s electoral system by legitimizing multiparty participation in national elections, or to compel a constitutional convention to examine provisions in the state’s constitution. In such cases, the type of overthrow, though not extreme, is no less impactful to the state and the success of the resistance’s goals than a complete overthrow of government. What follows is a brief description about each rung of the magnitude of overthrow scale.
At the bottom of the ladder is the category of **Dramatic Multiparty Shift**, which occurs when resistance activities lead to a significant shift in the political balance of power. For instance, a resistance group could promote the inclusion of an issue (or issues), like the rights of a minority group or universal healthcare, within the existing party system. By popularizing the politicized issue, the resistance creates platform diversification, party competition, and—if it becomes a wedge issue—party realignment.²

Ascending the ladder, the next rung is **Judicial Review**, which includes cases in which a law or election result is reviewed or revised. Judicial review, in principle, is enshrined in a state’s constitution and enables a national-level court to review the decisions and actions of the executive and/or legislature. Although many nation-states claim to have judicial review, it may only be a perfunctory or “rubber-stamp” in reality. Within this rung
Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

on the magnitude of overthrow scale, one would expect to see a shift in real judicial review, meaning that the national court is empowered to make independent assessments of the constitutionality of issues brought before it. This can, and often does, include the review of electoral results. In the Polity IV dataset, we identified one case of judicial review in the Caribbean. The 1999 Electoral Law in Haiti was designed to improve the electoral process and enabled the Haitian Provisional Electoral Council (PEC) to monitor candidate registration and election regulations, in addition to supporting the activities of the international election observers.

The next category is **Forced Electoral Reform**, which includes cases in which election laws are changed to allow resistance movement friendly candidates to participate. In the Polity IV dataset, we found eight cases of forced electoral reform in Africa, South America, and Central America. An example would be the 1992–1993 legitimization of the African National Congress (ANC) party in postapartheid South Africa. The 1993 Multi-Party Negotiation Process (MPNP) engaged twenty-six different stakeholders in the establishment of constitutional principles, like inclusivity, that then became the foundation for the ratified constitution and the 1994 elections.

The **Institutional Disruption** rung concerns cases in which government functions are dramatically revised due to resistance demands. In the Polity IV dataset, we found six cases of institutional disruption in Africa and the Middle East. The wave of democratization across Africa in the 1990s is a source of several of these cases. In Togo, for example, student protesters at the University of Benin kicked off a round of protests that led to the creation of a national coalition, the Democratic Opposition Front (FOD). The FOD called for a nationwide strike to demand the resignation of then President Gnassingbé Eyadema. The FOD’s actions resulted in a national conference to examine democracy in Togo by focusing on transferring powers from the president to the prime minister, among other agendas. Even so, President Eyadema was re-elected and remained in power.
**Forced Constitutional Reform** is when the resistance movement compels the government to make changes to the Constitution. In the Polity IV dataset, there are twenty-two cases of forced constitutional reform spanning Africa, Europe, Oceania, Central America, South America, and Southeast Asia. These cases include a variety of conditions under which a state’s constitution was altered. In Spain, for example, the death of Francisco Franco in 1975 plunged the country into a constitutional crisis. The crowning of King Juan Carlos I that late November afforded an opportunity to dismantle the Francoist state and transition to a constitutional monarchy.

Circumstances were quite different, however, in the midst of ethnic massacres across Burundi. The constitutional referendum on the 1992 Constitution shifted Burundi from a one-party state and embraced a multiparty electoral system. In another interesting case, the government of Fiji was held hostage for fifty-six days while businessman-turned-kidnapper George Speight suspended the constitution and declared himself president before appointing a cabinet. As a condition of armistice (and release of the hostages), the government agreed to a constitutional review, which was halted in 2001 when the Supreme Court reinstated the constitution.

**Forced Removal of the Head of Government** happens when the chief executive is removed, but other branches of government remain intact. In the Polity IV dataset, there are seventeen cases of forced removal of the head of government spanning Latin America, Africa, Asia, Oceania, the Caribbean, Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Europe. We tend to think of forced removal as violent, and this is true of cases like the 1989 removal and summary execution of Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania. The Romanian Revolution began with a trickle of small street protests and efforts to demonstrate for fair wages and protest state-enforced evictions, but was ignited by an ill-fated speech by Ceausescu that December. Within four days, he and his wife were dead, having been court-martialed and executed. This violent outcome led to a new form of governance and a new head of state.
Violent means are not, however, a requirement for removing the head of government. In the Philippines, the 1986 People Power Revolution (or EDSA Revolution) accomplished the removal of President Ferdinand Marcos through non-violent means. Using Radio Veritas broadcasts and taking over the Channel Four television channel, the EDSA resistance mobilized approximately two million citizens onto the streets before the Marcos family evacuated to Hawaii.

**Complete Overthrow of Government** includes cases in which the whole of government is removed. In the Polity IV dataset, there are fifteen cases of complete overthrow of government in Latin America, Asia, Africa, Central America, and Europe. The 1952 Bolivian case demonstrates the simplicity of limited goals and popular resistance alliances that led to a complete overthrow of government. When the Bolivian junta government failed to recognize the election of Victor Paz Estenssoro (the Movimiento Nationalista Revolutionario (MNR) candidate for Bolivian President), a federation of tin miners’ unions led by Juan Lechín and Hernán Siles (the MNR vice presidential candidate) formed an alliance to overthrow the government. Complemented by revolting farmer campesinos and indigenous peoples organizations, the MNR coalition (so-called “reluctant revolutionaries”) lasted long enough to seize power before fragmenting over economic challenges in the Paz government.

These seven rungs comprise the entire magnitude of overthrow scale. In this study, we have focused on **forced constitutional reform** (twenty-two cases) and **forced removal of the head of government** (seventeen cases). The analysis here is based on a review of these thirty-nine cases. Because of this focus, the findings presented here are only applicable to future cases of forced constitutional reform and forced removal of the head of government.

Over time, the ARIS program will research all rungs of the magnitude of overthrow scale and explore the impact of characteristics of the overthrown state and characteristics of the resistance movement on the nature of post-transition governance. By looking at all cases, we will have findings that are generalizable, meaning that they should apply to future cases of overthrow in which the Special Operator may find him/herself involved.

Now that we have established a firm understanding of state overthrow, we turn to a description of what we are trying to understand and explain—post-transition governance.
WHAT IS GOVERNANCE?

In this study, we are trying to understand the nature of post-transition governance. Why are some post-transition governments predatory and engulfed by recurring civil wars while other post-transition governments respect human rights, are stable, and are staunch allies of the United States? These are important and difficult questions, and not all of them can be answered here.

The operator must know how different factors have interacted historically to produce the types of post-transition governments s/he wants to bring about and the types of post-transition governments s/he does not. This type of applicable historical knowledge is an essential tool in the operator’s kit.

So, what is governance? The term has become confused and misunderstood over the past decades of counterinsurgency in Iraq and in Afghanistan. It has meant everything from a government that is Western in orientation (meaning that it respects Western human rights, supports a free market, etc.) to a government that is local. In the context of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the latter often means a government that is tribal and relies on customary law, local strictures, etc.

However, in this study, governance is merely a measure of the government’s capacity, or ability, to do its job. Generally, this refers to the government’s capacity to fund itself, to staff offices with competent people, to legislate, to provide security within its borders, to protect and defend its citizens from attacks emanating from outside the border, and to provide services. This definition avoids being conflated with the particular characteristics that the United States, the United Nations, or an international aid group may want a government to have at any point in time. This definition allows the operator to assess a government’s capacity without assigning a meaning of “good” or “bad” to it. This is useful because the operator is always called on to be intellectually flexible. What might be a useful governance characteristic in one theater and at one time may be a sub-optimal governance characteristic in another theater at a different time.

Table 1 identifies all the aspects of governance we studied for this project, along with a description. There are potentially many other aspects of governance that would be valuable to study, such as the rule of law and gender parity, but because those were difficult to measure or because data was not available, we could not explore them here.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect of Governance</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taxation</td>
<td>The new government takes some action to tax civilians for the production of income.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank slate</td>
<td>In the new government, 60 percent or more of office holders under the overthrown state are removed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patronage</td>
<td>The new government relies on patronage to fill government offices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>The new government holds elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of coercion</td>
<td>The police force is militarized, which suggests it will use or uses violence to maintain order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen security</td>
<td>Non-state actors provide security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil war</td>
<td>There is a civil war within two years of the new government being established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament</td>
<td>The new government disarms its own members (the resistance movement) and other parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil unrest/counter-resistance</td>
<td>There is civil unrest or the development of a counter-resistance within two years of the new government being established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful protests/demonstrations</td>
<td>There are popular peaceful protests within two years of the new government being established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
<td>The new government can establish diplomacy with external nations and internal stakeholders in one of several ways: as warriors (external communication is an extension of fighting); shopkeepers (seek joint advantage for a negotiated settlement); spin doctors (leverage diplomacy to create public relations external messaging and to frame issues and images); cultivators (employ diplomacy to manage internal messaging).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expungement</td>
<td>The new government expunges the overthrown state’s military and police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>The new government provides health services such as increased access to hospitals, medical education, and/or immunizations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Day After Overthrow

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect of Governance</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>The new government provides education services such as increased access to primary, secondary, and/or college-level educational programming.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>The new government implements infrastructure improvements such as expanded roads, general road development, airport improvements/new airports, port improvements/new ports, telecommunications, or internet expansion.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**THE RESEARCH QUESTION**

We are examining cases of state overthrow and trying to understand why certain types of post-transition governance turn out the way they do. To explain how we answered this research question, we have to start with some scientific terminology. In this research, governance is our dependent variable. It is dependent because we know its nature depends on a number of factors that we want to learn more about.

All the factors about the overthrown state and the resistance movement that we know impact governance in some way are independent variables. This means that we are not trying to understand why they are a certain way. We just want to understand the influence they exert on our dependent variable, governance.

For each of the thirty-nine historical cases of forced constitutional reform and forced removal of the head of government studied here, we collected information about the overthrown state, the resistance movement, and the post-transition governance. For more on the information we collected and analyzed, see Appendix D.

The findings that we talk about in the following section are findings about correlation, and not causation. It is important for us to discuss what the difference is between correlative and causative findings because that difference determines what the operator can do with the findings; this discussion is critical.\(^5\) With correlation, we can say that a particular independent variable is associated with a particular dependent variable. The two variables tend to appear together. If an operator is deployed to a theater undergoing forced removal of the head of government and s/he notices that a particular characteristic of the overthrown state is present, then s/he will also know that it is likely that s/he will see a particular post-transition governance characteristic.
But, it would be wrong for him/her to assume that the characteristic of the overthrown state will cause or causes that aspect of post-transition governance.

**Correlation studies** are useful to the operator because they help him/her form hypotheses, or informed guesses, about post-transition governance. Armed with the information that follows, the operator can:

- identify important characteristics of the overthrown states,
- identify important characteristics of the resistance movement,
- enter an operating theater with informed predictions about the characteristics of post-transition governance that will result, or
- make informed decisions about the activities s/he might be able to engage in to bring about desired post-transition governance outcomes.

**STUDY FINDINGS**

Our findings are twofold: those about forced constitutional reform and those about forced removal of the head of government. We will cover each group of cases separately, starting with forced constitutional reform.

Each group of cases will follow the same presentation logic. First, we will outline for operators where the cases are geographically, and group them by the Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) area of responsibility (AoR). This will give operators a quick understanding of where our cases are located and how they might apply to regions of the world in which they deploy.

Second, we will present a table that outlines the post-transition governance factors that we could associate with the independent variables. In addition to identifying the characteristics of the resistance movement’s post-conflict transition government, this table will briefly outline why that characteristic is important, and what it means for an operator.

The following presents the findings in two different ways. First, we present a figure that details the associations between characteristics of the overthrown state and the resistance governance outcome, and the associations between characteristics of the resistance movement and resistance governance outcomes. Second, we provide one to two page tear-outs about each association relationship we found. Much of the language and the definitions repeat from tear-out to tear-out. This is because we want operators to be able to literally tear out the pages of
interest to them and understand them months from now, with no additional context. Each tear-out page is designed to be understood on its own.

We will now turn to our discussion of forced constitutional reform. Table 2 identifies where the forced constitutional reform cases are, by TSOC.
## Forced Constitutional Reform

Table 2. Forced constitutional reform cases by TSOC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOCEUR</th>
<th>SOCPAC</th>
<th>SOCSOUTH</th>
<th>SOCKOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Czechoslovakia</strong>&lt;br&gt;1968&lt;br&gt;Prague Spring – liberalization, decentralization</td>
<td><strong>Fiji</strong>&lt;br&gt;2000&lt;br&gt;Kidnapping of the Prime Minister, land rights</td>
<td><strong>Guatemala</strong>&lt;br&gt;1985&lt;br&gt;International pressure to democratize; indigenous peoples and the disappeared</td>
<td><strong>South Korea</strong>&lt;br&gt;1987&lt;br&gt;Constitutional Court of Korea, student protests, and labor strike(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany East</strong>&lt;br&gt;1989–1990&lt;br&gt;Peaceful Revolution – sociopolitical democratization</td>
<td><strong>Thailand</strong>&lt;br&gt;1968&lt;br&gt;The King, students, and the revised Constitution</td>
<td><strong>Peru</strong>&lt;br&gt;1978–1979&lt;br&gt;End of military rule, martial law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Greece</strong>&lt;br&gt;1974&lt;br&gt;Collapse of the military junta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hungary</strong>&lt;br&gt;1989&lt;br&gt;Peaceful Revolution – sociopolitical democratization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spain</strong>&lt;br&gt;1975–1977&lt;br&gt;End of Francoist state</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event Details</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>University students, national conference for democratization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Economic stabilization and multi-party constitutionalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Coup, shift from parliamentary to presidential system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Multi-party constitutionalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Coup, civil war, rebels in government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>October Revolution – doctors, lawyers, and teachers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Charter of National Unity, ethnic discrimination, new constitution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Forces Vives coalition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo Kinshasa*</td>
<td>1992–2002</td>
<td>March of Hope, general strikes, street protestors, First Congo War and Second Congo War</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria*</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>End military rule, craft presidential federalist system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>End of another military rule, ban on protests is lifted</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2003–2005</td>
<td>Voter registration and elections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Given understanding of where these cases align by TSOC AoR geographically, we want to outline the aspects of post-conflict governance (in cases of forced constitutional reform) that we are able to explain. Recall that these are our dependent variables—the important things that we know depend on factors about the overthrown state and the resistance movement. Our analysis of the cases reveals findings about the following post-transition government outcomes: rebel diplomacy, civil war recurrence, use of coercion, elections, citizen security elements, popular counter-resistance, modified flag or currency, and provision of health services. Table 3 defines each post-transition government outcome, offers a description, and then walk through why this particular characteristic is important to operators.

**Table 3. Post-transition government outcomes – forced constitutional reform.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Importance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebel diplomacy</td>
<td>Did the resistance group establish representatives and strategies to conduct external diplomatic relations or to conduct internal diplomatic relations with intra-state actors? There are four different types of approaches to post-transition government diplomacy that we will discuss.</td>
<td>Early efforts to establish formal channels of consolidated diplomacy indicate an organizational infrastructure capacity to create strategic policy development, communication tactics, and group training for “diplomats.” These characteristics are early indicators of the capacity for statecraft and governance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil war recurrence</td>
<td>Was there a recurrence of civil war within two years of the polity transition?</td>
<td>A state that experiences a civil war within a short period after a government change is indicative of underlying discontent, persistent grievances, and/or sustained group divisions and possibly an indicator of state fragility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Importance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of coercion</td>
<td>Within five years of the polity transition, was the police force militarized? Did it rely on the use of force to provide law, order, and security?</td>
<td>A state with a professionalized, militaristic police force can be an indication of a tense relationship with the citizenry, restriction of liberties, and state spending to maintain a security apparatus.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Importance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Provision of health services</strong></td>
<td>After the polity transition, did the resistance provide increased access to hospitals/clinics, medical education, or immunizations?</td>
<td>Expanded access to a social service can be an indicator of state capacity, public access to those services, and state infrastructure in the new government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* The Fragile State Index (FSI) is a database produced by the Fund for Peace that uses content analysis, quantitative methodology, and qualitative methodology to produce annual data that assesses when the pressures (referred to as “indicators”) facing a state are exceeding the state’s capacity to address those pressures, hence rendering it a fragile state. There are twelve aggregated “indicators” of a fragile state. For more information, refer to [https://fragilestatesindex.org/](https://fragilestatesindex.org/).


Figure 2 conveys our findings concerning forced constitutional reform. This study references positive and negative associations. If a characteristic is positively associated with a governance outcome, it means that if one sees the characteristic, s/he will likely see that governance outcome as well. In these cases, the factor will be green. A green line composed of plus (+) signs will extend from the factor to the post-transition government outcome. If a characteristic is negatively associated with a governance outcome, it means that if one sees the characteristic, s/he will likely not see that governance outcome. In these cases, the factor will be red. A red line composed of minus (−) signs will extend from the factor to the post-transition government outcome. Note that our independent variables, or factors about the overthrown state and the resistance movement, are on the left. Our dependent variables, post-transition government outcomes or characteristics, are on the right.

As Figure 2 shows, there was a statistically significant relationship between three overthrown state factors with the resistance governance outcome within a period of five years after the transition. The factors related to the state’s appeasement or repression of the resistance movement, land ownership rights, and citizenship determination had a significant impact on the resistance governance outcome in the cases of forced constitutional reform.
Specifically, when the state sought to subdue the resistance by force (repress), then rebels did not act as diplomatic cultivators to build legitimacy for the movement; however, when the state sought to pacify the resistance through a spectrum of limited to full concessions (appease), then the rebels acted as cultivators. In turn, when the state maintained strong private land rights within five years preceding the transition, then there was a recurrence of civil war within two years post transition. The existence of strong private property laws also correlated to rebel diplomacy post transition where the new government acted like spin doctors in leveraging diplomacy to create public relations (PR) for external messaging and to frame issues and images. Acting like spin doctors was also expected when the state had jus soli citizenship rights (birthright citizenship). Conversely, jus soli citizenship did not correlate to a new government’s shopkeeper style diplomacy where rebels would have joint advantage for a negotiated settlement.

Figure 2 also depicts a statistically significant relationship between four factors related to the resistance movement with the resistance governance outcome within a period of five years after the transition. Specifically, the resistance movement’s structure, strategy, external support, and education level of the rebel leaders were important. If the movement had a hegemonic structure (where the resistance comprised one significant group), then the rebel government did not use coercion within the first five years post transition or employ a cultivator style of diplomacy. However, if the movement had a fragmented structure (where there were two or more significant groups that were not in alliance), then the post-transition government used coercion, employed a cultivator strategy, and also employed a warrior strategy where external communication was an extension of fighting. If the movement used an outbidding strategy (where the resistance movement was divided and the population was unsure of which faction to support) against the state, then elections tended to occur early on after the transition.

If the resistance movement received external support (finances, logistics, equipment) within the five years prior to the transition, then there were several important correlations. For example, external support correlated to the new government’s use of coercion within five years post transition. External support also correlated to the new government’s use a cultivator style diplomacy as well as formation of a new flag or currency. In turn, the new state environment would include citizen security elements—other than the state/former rebels—performing security activities, and there was a civil unrest within two years post transition. If the resistance movement had not received external support, then the post transition governance did not invest in improving
Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

health services such as access to hospitals and clinics, medical education, and immunizations for the five years post transition.

**FORCED CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Resistance Governance Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>States Goal in Dealing with Resistance</td>
<td>Rebel Diplomacy Characterized as Cultivators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State’s Goal of Repressing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State’s Goal of Appeasing</td>
<td>Rebel Diplomacy Characterized as Spin Doctors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Span of Control - Land Ownership</td>
<td>Rebel Diplomacy Characterized as Shopkeepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Land Ownership</td>
<td>Use of Coercion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>Rebel Diplomacy Characterized as Warriors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jus Soli State</td>
<td>Rebel Diplomacy Characterized as Shopkeepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jus Soli State</td>
<td>Use of Coercion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement Structure</td>
<td>Rebel Diplomacy Characterized as Cultivators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegemony</td>
<td>Rebel Diplomacy Characterized as Shopkeepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmented</td>
<td>Use of Coercion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmented</td>
<td>Rebel Diplomacy Characterized as Warriors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy</td>
<td>Elections in the Early Transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outbidding</td>
<td>Citizen Security Elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Popular Counter Resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Support</td>
<td>Rebel Diplomacy Characterized as Cultivators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Support</td>
<td>Rebel Group has New or Modified Flag or Currency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use of Coercion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rebels Provide Health Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Level</td>
<td>Elections in the Early Transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educated Elite</td>
<td>Civil War Recurrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educated Elite</td>
<td>Popular Counter Resistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2. Forced constitutional reform associations.

Lastly, in cases of forced constitutional reform, if the primary leadership group in the movement was educated elite (meaning they had a post-secondary college/university level education), then elections were held early post transition. However, if the resistance movement had an educated leadership, then there was not a civil war recurrence or
popular civil resistance against the new government within the first two years post transition.

Notice that the resistance movement structure and the presence of external support are important factors in that they are correlated with a number of governance outcomes that will be important to operators as they prepare for missions. Note that there are several findings that pertain to the resistance movement’s form of diplomacy in the post-transition governance. These findings are particularly important because they provide insight into how a resistance movement might foster legitimacy with the population.6

**Association Findings, Tear-Out Section, Forced Constitutional Reform**

Now we turn to the tear-outs about each association finding. The following pages discuss each relationship captured in Figure 2. Each sheet has a gray box at the top that puts each association finding depicted in the figure into words. There is an icon next to each gray box that will identify whether the finding applies to cases of forced constitutional reform or forced removal of the head of government. The iconography we use is from the magnitude of overthrow scale. The icon for forced constitutional reform is a scrolled document with a pen. We include keywords that capture the relevant factors associated with the overthrown state and the resistance movement, as well as the post-transition government outcomes that we discuss on each tear-out page.

We hope operators will literally tear these sheets out of the report and take them on deployments.
Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

**Keywords:** state’s goal in dealing with the resistance, repression, rebel diplomacy, cultivators, warriors, shopkeepers, spin doctors

The state has many different ways it can choose to deal with a resistance movement that it finds threatening: repress, appease, or ignore are three broad categories. Our finding here is about repression, which the state can achieve through coercion, intimidation, or the outright use of force.

If you are preparing to deploy and want to identify the state’s goal in dealing with the resistance movement, you should first look for an official state policy on how it will address a resistance. If you are unable to find a policy, you can draw on clues about the state’s intentions in how state officials talk about the resistance movement, what newspapers report in terms of state actions taken vis-à-vis the resistance movement, and in budget allocations involving internal security and policing.\(^7\)

Our research finds that when a state chooses to repress a resistance movement, it is negatively associated with a form of rebel diplomacy in the post-transition government referred to as “cultivators.” Cultivators employ diplomacy to manage internal messaging.\(^8\)

When a resistance movement overthrows a state, the new government will conduct diplomacy, representing itself in interactions with other sovereign states and cultivating internal messaging with stakeholders within the state. These interactions can be key in fostering legitimacy or in losing it.\(^9\)

Our research suggests if the state represses the resistance movement, you should not expect the resistance government to be cultivators. A cultivator’s focus is on fostering legitimacy for the new government with domestic audiences. If the resistance movement is not likely to act as cultivators, there are three other options: a warrior style, a shopkeeper style, or a spin doctor style. In contrast to the cultivator, all of these diplomatic styles tend to be focused externally.

A warrior diplomat uses communications with external actors (other states, for example) as an extension of fighting. Warrior diplomacy builds upon the principle that talk is the extension of war by other means.\(^10\) In negotiation, a warrior diplomat uses military tactics rather than civilian discourse. If taking this approach, the resistance movement will seek to achieve its own goals at the expense of the goals and wishes of the external actor.
A shopkeeper uses communications with external actors to identify shared interests. The shopkeeper believes that both parties’ interests can be satisfied and each party can be better off through negotiation and compromise.

Spin doctors are focused on using diplomacy to create public relations messaging and frame issues. Spin doctors deliberately and carefully craft messages to get out to as many people as they can. This approach to diplomacy may involve the resistance movement hiring third parties to assist in crafting their messages. Spin doctors are often focused on being recognized on the international stage and may send representatives of the movement and the new government to international events and conferences.
The state has many different ways it can choose to deal with a resistance movement that it finds threatening: repress, appease, or ignore are three broad categories. Our finding here is about appeasement, which the state can achieve through offering concessions over land, law, or other matters.

If you are preparing to deploy to a theater and want to identify the state’s goal in dealing with the resistance movement, you should first look for an official state policy on how it will address a resistance. If you are unable to find a policy, you can draw on clues about the state’s intentions in how state officials talk about the resistance movement, what newspapers report in terms of state actions taken vis-à-vis the resistance movement, and in budget allocations involving internal security and policing. Additionally, you can consult social media as a means to glean real-time information. British journalist David Patrikarakos explores the power of social media to unite and to divide people in his 2017 book, War in 140 Characters. His observations about rapid communication can be seen with the rise of smartphone usage and their role in the informal economy as well.

Our research finds that when a state chooses to appease a resistance movement, it is positively associated with a form of rebel diplomacy in the post-transition governance referred to as the resistance movement acting as cultivators. When a resistance movement overthrows a state, the new government will conduct diplomacy, representing itself in interactions with other sovereign states and cultivating internal messaging with stakeholders within the state. These internal interactions can be key in fostering legitimacy or in losing it.

Cultivators employ diplomacy to manage internal messaging. Their focus is on fostering legitimacy for the new government with domestic audiences. In contrast to other diplomatic styles, the cultivator is focused internally rather than externally.
How people own land is an important factor to consider when entering a theater of operations. Land ownership is generally one of three types: private, state leased, or local customary. Private land ownership is what we have in the United States. State-leased land refers to government-owned land that is either state owned and used or is state owned but leased to citizens. Typically, state ownership of land is indicative of a socialist government. State-leased land can also include land that is used for nationalized industries (e.g., railroads, energy providers). Local customary land rights include recognizing tribal or indigenous land-right practices such as tribal communal ownership and/or gender-restricted land tenure (male only). When a country recognizes customary land tenure, the extension of private ownership or state land use is secondary to customary rights in the area in which customary land rights are recognized and protected.

This finding concerns private land ownership. When land is privately owned, it is positively associated with civil war recurrence. Civil war occurrence within two years of state overthrow suggests that the post-transition government has failed to ameliorate tensions between groups and put in place policies to ensure or promote peace and stability.\textsuperscript{15, 16}
Keywords: land ownership, private, rebel diplomacy, spin doctors

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This finding concerns private land ownership and a particular form of diplomacy—acting as spin doctors. When a resistance movement overthrows a state, the new government will conduct diplomacy, representing itself in interactions with other sovereign states and cultivating internal messaging with stakeholders within the state. These interactions can be key in fostering legitimacy or in losing it.17

Spin doctors are focused on using diplomacy to create public relations messaging and frame issues. Spin doctors deliberately and carefully craft messages to get out to as many people as they can. This approach to diplomacy may involve the resistance movement hiring third parties to assist in crafting their messages. Spin doctors are often focused on being recognized on the international stage and may send representatives of the movement and the new government to international events and conferences.
Keywords: citizenship defined by birth, jus soli, rebel diplomacy, shopkeepers, cultivators, warriors, spin doctors

States define citizenship by birth (jus soli) or by blood (jus sanguinis). Citizenship by birth is more inclusive than citizenship by blood, under which only descendants of citizens are eligible. Policies based on blood can lead to exclusion and ultimately create or reinforce divisions in society.¹⁸

This finding is that when a state defines citizenship by birth (jus soli), it is negatively associated with rebel diplomacy as shopkeepers. When a resistance movement overthrows a state, the new government will conduct diplomacy, representing itself in interactions with other sovereign states and cultivating internal messaging with stakeholders within the state. These interactions can be key in fostering legitimacy or in losing it.¹⁹

A shopkeeper uses communications with external actors to identify shared interests. The shopkeeper believes that both parties’ interests can be satisfied and each party can be better off through negotiation and compromise. Given that jus soli is negatively associated with shopkeeping diplomacy, there are three other options: cultivator, warrior, or spin doctor. Cultivators employ diplomacy to manage internal messaging.²⁰ The focus is on fostering legitimacy for the new government with domestic audiences. In contrast to the cultivator, warriors and spin doctors tend to be focused externally.

A warrior diplomat uses communications with external actors (other states, for example) as an extension of fighting. Warrior diplomacy builds upon the principle that talk is the extension of war by other means.²¹ In negotiation, the warrior diplomat uses military tactics rather than civilian discourse. If taking this approach, the resistance movement will seek to achieve its own goals at the expense of the goals and wishes of the external actor.

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State’s define citizenship by birth (jus soli) or by blood (jus sanguinis). Citizenship by birth is more inclusive than citizenship by blood under which only descendants of citizens are eligible. Policies based on blood can lead to exclusion and ultimately create or reinforce divisions in society.22

We find that defining citizenship by birth is positively associated with the resistance movement acting as spin doctors in the post-transition government. When a resistance movement overthrows a state, the new government will conduct diplomacy, representing itself in interactions with other sovereign states and cultivating internal messaging with stakeholders within the state. These interactions can be key in fostering legitimacy or in losing it.23

Spin doctors tend to be externally focused and use diplomacy to create public relations messaging and frame issues. Spin doctors deliberately and carefully craft messages to get out to as many people as they can. This approach to diplomacy may involve the resistance movement in the government hiring third parties to assist in crafting their messages. Spin doctors are often focused on being recognized on the international stage and may send representatives of the movement and the new government to international events and conferences.
Resistance movements are rarely composed of one monolithic group. Rather, resistance movements are composed of numerous groups, some significant and others fringe. According to political scientist Peter Krause, a resistance movement can be: (1) hegemonic (one significant group), (2) united (two or more significant groups that are in alliance), or (3) fragmented (two or more significant groups that are not in alliance).

When you deploy, it will be crucial to understand the resistance movement operating in your theater. One way to do this is to learn about the movement’s composition and identify it as hegemonic, united, or fragmented. To categorize a resistance movement, current news reports will be useful as they will show how the resistance movement talks about itself in the media.

We have found that when a resistance movement is hegemonic, meaning that there is just one significant group, it is negatively associated with rebel diplomacy as cultivators. When a resistance movement overthrows a state, the new government will conduct diplomacy, representing itself in interactions with other sovereign states and cultivating internal messaging with stakeholders within the state. These interactions can be key in fostering legitimacy or in losing it.

Cultivators employ diplomacy to manage internal messaging. The focus is on fostering legitimacy for the new government with domestic audiences. If the resistance movement is not likely to act as cultivators, there are three other options: a warrior style, shopkeeper style, or spin doctor style. In contrast to the cultivator, all of these diplomatic styles tend to be focused externally.

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We have found that when a resistance movement is fragmented, meaning that there are two or more significant groups that are not in alliance, this is positively associated with rebel diplomacy as cultivators. When a resistance movement overthrows a state, the new government will conduct diplomacy, representing itself in interactions with other sovereign states and cultivating internal messaging with stakeholders within the state. These interactions can be key in fostering legitimacy or in losing it.³⁰

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We have found that when a resistance movement is fragmented, meaning that there are two or more significant groups that are not in alliance, this is positively associated with rebel diplomacy as warriors. When a resistance movement overthrows a state, the new government will conduct diplomacy, representing itself in interactions with other sovereign states and cultivating internal messaging with stakeholders within the state. These interactions can be key in fostering legitimacy or in losing it.\(^3\)

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We have found that when a resistance movement is fragmented, meaning that there are two or more significant groups that are not in alliance, this is negatively associated with rebel diplomacy as shopkeepers. When a resistance movement overthrows a state, the new government will conduct diplomacy, representing itself in interactions with other sovereign states and cultivating internal messaging with stakeholders within the state. These interactions can be key in fostering legitimacy or in losing it.

A shopkeeper uses communications with external actors to identify shared interests. The shopkeeper believes that both parties’ interests can be satisfied and each party can be better off through negotiation and compromise.

Given that a fragmented movement is negatively associated with rebel diplomacy as shopkeepers, there are three other options for approaches to diplomacy: cultivators, warriors, and spin doctors. Cultivators employ diplomacy to manage internal messaging. The focus is on fostering legitimacy for the new government with domestic audiences.
A warrior diplomat uses communications with external actors (other states, for example) as an extension of fighting. Warrior diplomacy builds upon the principle that talk is the extension of war by other means.\textsuperscript{38} In negotiation, the warrior diplomat uses military tactics rather than civilian discourse. If taking this approach, the resistance movement will seek to achieve its own goals at the expense of the goals and wishes of the external actor.

Spin doctors are focused on using diplomacy to create public relations messaging and frame issues. Spin doctors deliberately and carefully craft messages to get out to as many people as they can. This approach to diplomacy may involve the resistance movement in the government hiring third parties to assist in crafting their messages. Spin doctors are often focused on being recognized on the international stage and may send representatives of the movement and the new government to international events and conferences.
Resistance movements are rarely composed of one monolithic group. Rather, resistance movements are composed of numerous groups, some significant and others fringe. According to political scientist Peter Krause, a resistance movement can be: (1) hegemonic (one significant group), (2) united (two or more significant groups that are in alliance), or (3) fragmented (two or more significant groups that are not in alliance).  

When you deploy, it will be crucial to understand the resistance movement operating in your theater. One way to do this is to learn about the movement’s composition and identify it as hegemonic, united, or fragmented. To categorize a resistance movement, current news reports will be useful as they will show how the resistance movement talks about itself in the media.

We have found that when a resistance movement is hegemonic, meaning that there is just one significant group, this is negatively associated with the post-transition government using coercion, or force, to ensure that citizens abide by laws. When a government must resort to coercion, it often lacks legitimacy. As noted political theorist Harold Laswell stated, the “Garrison State” relies on centralized and constricted power, a technologically superior military, and top-down authority. The use of coercion can be a sign of state fragility. Interestingly, political scientist Ted Robert Gurr’s 1988 article “War, Revolution and the Growth of the Coercive State” concluded that only homogeneous democracies with limited alliances and little power capability are unlikely to become garrison states.
Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

Keywords: movement structure theory, fragmented, use of coercion

Resistance movements are rarely composed of one monolithic group. Rather, resistance movements are composed of numerous groups, some significant and others fringe. According to political scientist Peter Krause, a resistance movement can be: (1) hegemonic (one significant group), (2) united (two or more significant groups that are in alliance), or (3) fragmented (two or more significant groups that are not in alliance).43

When you deploy, it will be crucial to understand the resistance movement operating in your theater. One way to do this is to learn about the movement’s composition and identify it as hegemonic, united, or fragmented. To categorize a resistance movement, current news reports will be useful as they will show how the resistance movement talks about itself in the media.

We have found that when a resistance movement is fragmented, meaning that there are two or more significant groups that are not in alliance, it is positively associated with the post-transition government using coercion, or force, to ensure that citizens abide by laws. When a government must resort to coercion, it often lacks legitimacy. The use of coercion can be a sign of state fragility.44
Resistance movements can adopt one of five dominant strategies to achieve their goals. These include: (1) attrition (taking action to persuade the state that the movement is strong and sufficiently resolute to inflict serious costs); (2) spoiling (taking action to ensure that any agreements between the government and another party fail); (3) intimidation (demonstrate that the resistance movement has the power to punish those who disobey them and that the government is powerless to stop them); (4) outbidding (attempts to outdo (through whatever means) a rival faction of the resistance movement); and (5) provocation (persuade domestic audience that the government is immoral and that there is no option but to resist it).

We have found that a resistance movement employing an outbidding strategy, meaning that they attempt to outdo a rival faction or group in the resistance movement, is negatively associated with elections being held by the post-transition government within five years of the overthrow. Holding elections tends to be a recommended approach in setting up a post-transition government because it creates buy-in among many factions in the population, demonstrates the capacity of the new government to embrace differing opinions in a constructive way, and in some cases, signals that peace is assured in cases when holding elections is a contingent for settlement.
If a resistance movement receives external support, expect to see citizen security elements arise.

**Keywords: external support, citizen security elements**

External support to the resistance movement is an important factor to know about.\(^47\) This kind of support can take the form of money, training, tactics, arms, propaganda, and fighters from another state or non-state actor.

We have found that external support to a resistance movement is positively associated with the post-transition government employing citizen security elements. When citizen security elements are present, civilians who are not part of the police force or the military band together to take up arms, protect themselves, and provide order. The presence of citizen security elements can suggest that the government is unable to provide security, deter crime, or combat violence.\(^48\) As such, citizen security elements are often a harbinger of government instability.
Keywords: external support, popular counter-resistance

External support to the resistance movement is an important factor to know. This kind of support can take the form of money, training, tactics, arms, propaganda, and fighters from another state or non-state actor.

We have found that external support is positively associated with popular counter-resistance. A popular counter-resistance to the new government is an indicator of concerns with the hegemony (power) and/or legitimacy of the state with the population. Popular counter-resistance is more than simply political opposition; it is mobilized opposition. This mobilized opposition can negatively impact government stability and may be indicative of problems, such as policies that exclude or penalize a particular group.
Keywords: external support, rebel diplomacy, cultivators

External support to the resistance movement is an important factor to know about. This kind of support can take the form of money, training, tactics, arms, propaganda, and fighters from another state or non-state actor.

Our research finds that when there is external support, it is positively associated with a form of rebel diplomacy in the post-transition governance called acting as cultivators. When a resistance movement overthrows a state, the new government will conduct diplomacy, representing itself in interactions with other sovereign states and cultivating internal messaging with stakeholders within the state. These interactions can be key in fostering legitimacy or in losing it.

Cultivators employ diplomacy to manage internal messaging. The focus is on fostering legitimacy for the new government with domestic audiences.
External support to the resistance movement is an important factor to know about. This kind of support can take the form of money, training, tactics, arms, propaganda, and fighters from another state or non-state group.

Our research finds that external support is positively associated with the post-transition government having a new or modified flag or currency. Governments convey authority and unity to citizens and to other sovereign nations in many ways, but particularly through their flag and currency. A government’s flag and currency are considered to be examples of symbolic messaging. Modifying the flag or currency institutionalizes the government’s new identity, helping to strengthen it.
Keywords: external support, health services

External support to the resistance movement is an important factor to know about. This kind of support can take the form of money, training, tactics, arms, propaganda, and fighters from another state or non-state group.

Our research finds that the presence of external support is negatively associated with rebels providing health services. One function of the government is to provide services. This can take the form of the government providing health services, which we define as increased access to hospitals and clinics, medical education, immunizations, and the like.

In turn, there is an additional nuance that should be noted for further study. While some resistance movements that are heavily sponsored externally might have created a system of shadow medical services among impoverished communities they serve, other resistance movements have leveraged nongovernment organizations to perform medical services in their target communities by adapting, providing, or demanding greater levels of services/access to services at a greater district level.
Keywords: external support, use of coercion

External support to the resistance movement is an important factor to know about. This kind of support can take the form of money, training, tactics, arms, propaganda, and fighters from another state or non-state group.

Our research finds that external support is positively associated with the post-transition government using coercion, or force, to ensure that citizens abide by laws. When a government must resort to coercion, it lacks legitimacy. The use of coercion is often a sign of state fragility.
Resistance movements vary with regard to the education level of their leaderships. The leadership of the resistance movement can be composed of people with primary-level education, secondary-level education, post-secondary education (educated elite), or professional/post-graduate education. You will want to identify the education level of the main group that comprises the resistance movement when you are preparing to deploy to a theater. When there is a coalition of resistance groups, there is usually a dominant organization or council that orchestrates activities. The education level of that unified leadership cell should be noted. Even if the movement is fragmented, there is still usually a dominant group that organizes, equips, and mobilizes resistance activities.

We have found that when the resistance movement is led by the educated elite (post-secondary education), it is negatively associated with civil war recurrence. Its occurrence within two years of state overthrow suggests that the post-transition government has failed to ameliorate tensions between groups and failed to put policies into place to ensure or promote peace and stability.
Resistance movements vary with regard to the education level of their leaderships. The leadership of the resistance movement can be composed of people with primary-level education, secondary-level education, post-secondary education (educated elite), or professional/post-graduate education. You will want to assess the education level of the main group that comprises the resistance movement when you are preparing to deploy to a theater. When there is a coalition of resistance groups, there is usually a dominant organization or council that orchestrates activities. The education level of that unified leadership cell should be noted. Even if the movement is fragmented, there is still usually a dominant group that organizes, equips, and mobilizes resistance activities.

We have found that when the resistance movement is led by those with post-secondary education, it is associated with elections being held by the post-transition government within five years of the overthrow. Holding elections is a recommended approach to setting up a post-transition government because it creates buy-in among many factions in the population, demonstrates the capacity of the new government to embrace differing opinions in a constructive way, and in some cases, signals that peace is assured in cases when holding elections is a contingent for settlement.
Keywords: resistance movement leadership, post-secondary education, popular counter-resistance

Resistance movements vary with regard to the education level of their leaderships. The leadership of the resistance movement can be composed of people with primary-level education, secondary-level education, post-secondary education (educated elite), or professional/post-graduate education. You will want to assess the education level of the main group that comprises the resistance movement when you are preparing to deploy to a theater. When there is a coalition of resistance groups, there is usually a dominant organization or council that orchestrates activities. The education level of that unified leadership cell should be noted. Even if the movement is fragmented, there is still usually a dominant group that organizes, equips, and mobilizes resistance activities.

We have found that the presence of an educated elite is negatively associated with popular counter-resistance. A popular counter-resistance to the new government is an indicator of concerns with the hegemony (power) and/or legitimacy of the state with the population. Popular counterresistance is more than simply political opposition; it is mobilized opposition. This mobilized opposition can negatively impact government stability and may be indicative of problems, such as policies that exclude or penalize a particular group.
Findings about Forced Removal of Head of Government

Now we turn to a discussion of findings about the forced removal of the head of government. The presentation logic will mirror what you saw for forced constitutional reform cases. First, we will outline where the cases are geographically, and group them by Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC) areas of operations (AOs). This provides a quick understanding of where our cases are located and how they might apply to regions of the world.

Second, we will present a table that outlines the post-transition governance factors that we could associate with the independent variables. In addition to identifying the characteristics of the resistance movement’s post-conflict transition government, this table will briefly outline why that characteristic is important, and what it means.

The following presents the findings in two different ways. First, we present a figure that details the associations between characteristics of the overthrown state and the resistance governance outcome, and the associations between characteristics of the resistance movement and resistance governance outcomes. After this comes one to two page tear-outs about each association relationship we found. Notice that much of the language and the definitions repeat from tear-out to tear-out. This is because we want operators to be able to take out the pages of interest and understand them months from now, with no additional context. Each tear-out page is designed to be understood all on its own.

We will now turn to our discussion of forced removal of the head of government. Table 4 identifies where the forced constitutional reform cases are, by TSOC.
Table 4. Forced removal of head of government cases by TSOC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SOCEUR</th>
<th>SOCPAC</th>
<th>SOCSOUTH</th>
<th>SOCAFRICA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Romania</strong></td>
<td>1989</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bloody Revolution – killing Ceausescu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cambodia</strong></td>
<td>1970–1971</td>
<td>Khmer Republic and creation of Khmer National Armed Forces (FANK)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Argentina</strong></td>
<td>1955–1956</td>
<td>Revolución Libertadora and of Peronist regime</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Benin</strong></td>
<td>1963–1964</td>
<td>Dahomeyan coup d’état, new constitution, Bariba tribal rebellion suppressed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fiji</strong></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Prime Minister kidnapped then disposed, land rights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brazil</strong></td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Coalition, coup, overthrow João Goulart</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chad</strong></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Multi-tribal competition for power, Idriss Déby overtakes Hissène Habre with Libyan help</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Philippines</strong></td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>People Power Revolution/Yellow Revolution and peaceful ousting of Ferdinand Macros</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Haiti</strong></td>
<td>2004–2005</td>
<td>Student protests, Cannibal Army, ousting of Jean-Bertrand Aristide</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cote d’Ivoire</strong></td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Contested election, nonviolent resistance, then civil war, UN involved</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>Event/Details</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Second Tulip Revolution – install Roza Otunbayeva</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>National Student Center of Thailand (NSCT), Thammasat University massacre (October 6th event)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Shining Path, Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), 2000 elections and Alberto Fujimori resignation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1998 conflict resolved, then Government of National Unity has coup by rebel military junta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1969–1970</td>
<td>Uprising in now Bangladesh, separatist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Uganda People’s Congress (UPC), Milton Obote seizes power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>National Resistance Army (NRA) rebels and the Acholi people, Yoweri Museveni to power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Given a sense of where these cases are geographically and how they pertain to potential deployments, we outline the aspects of post-conflict governance (in cases of forced removal of the head of government) that we are able to explain. Recall that these are our dependent variables—the important things that we know depend on factors about the overthrown state and the resistance movement. Our analysis of the cases reveals findings about these post-transition government outcomes: rebel diplomacy, civil war recurrence, citizen security elements, expungement of the overthrown state’s police and military, and the rebel’s promoting culture or religion. Table 5 defines each post-transition government outcome, offers a description, and then walks you through why this particular characteristic is important to operators.

Table 5. Post-transition government outcomes – forced removal/head of government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Importance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebel diplomacy</td>
<td>Did the resistance group establish representatives and strategies to conduct external diplomatic relations or to conduct internal diplomatic relations with ‘intra-state actors?’ There are four different types of approaches to post-transition diplomacy that we will discuss.</td>
<td>Early efforts to establish formal channels of consolidated diplomacy indicates organizational infrastructure to create strategic policy development, communication tactics, and group training for “diplomats.” These characteristics are early indicators of the capacity for statecraft and governance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil war recurrence</td>
<td>Was there a recurrence of civil war within two years of the polity transition?</td>
<td>A state that experiences a civil war within a short period after a government change is indicative of underlying discontent, persistent grievances, and/or sustained group divisions and possibly an indicator of state fragility.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a

b
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Importance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizen security elements</strong></td>
<td>Are there groups that are providing security other than the resistance group/state?</td>
<td>When citizens organize security groups, this can be an indicator of a lack of popular confidence in the state’s capacity to provide security for its citizens. It could also indicate communal violence that the state is unwilling or unable to prevent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expungement of the overthrown state’s police and military</strong></td>
<td>Within five years of the overthrow, did the new resistance government expunge former military or policy?</td>
<td>This approach to forming a new government cleans the slate but can foster insurgencies as we saw in Iraq with de-Baathification in 2003.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rebels promoting culture/religion</strong></td>
<td>Within five years of overthrow, is the resistance government promoting religious or cultural infrastructure or facilities improvements? This can include the construction or refurbishment of places of worship and museums, for example.</td>
<td>These activities are evidence that the new government is trying to provide a form of service to the population that will boost national pride and increase unity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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“The Fragile State Index (FSI) is a database produced by the Fund for Peace that uses content analysis, quantitative methodology, and qualitative methodology to produce annual data that assesses when the pressures (referred to as “indicators”) facing a state are exceeding the state’s capacity to address those pressures, hence rendering it a fragile state. There are twelve aggregated “indicators” of a fragile state. For more information, refer to https://fragilestatesindex.org/.
Figure 3 conveys our findings concerning forced removal of the head of government. Notice our reference to positive and negative associations. If a characteristic is positively associated with a governance outcome it means that if an operator sees the characteristic, the governance outcome will follow as well. In these cases, the factor will be green. A green line composed of plus (+) signs will extend from the factor to the post-transition government outcome. If a characteristic is negatively associated with a governance outcome, it means that if an operator sees the characteristic, the governance outcome will follow as well. In these cases, the factor will be red. A red line composed of minus (–) signs will extend from the factor to the post-transition government outcome. Note that our independent variables, or factors about the overthrown state and the resistance movement, are on the left. Our dependent variables, post-transition government outcomes or characteristics, are on the right.

**Figure 3. Forced removal of the head of government associations.**

As Figure 3 shows, there is a statistically significant relationship between the four state factors and one resistance movement factor upon the outcome of post-transition governance. If the resistance movement had a unified organizational structure, then there were not citizen security groups performing security functions in addition to the government post transition. However, if the movement was fragmented, then the post transition government used a warrior style diplomacy where external communication is an extension of fighting.
Figure 3 also depicts four state factors and the impact of post transition governance. If there was a military coup d’etat that produced the forced removal of the head of government, then the post transition government did not promote cultural/religious programming, infrastructure, or facilities improvements within five years after the transition. If there had been an inter or intra-state war in the five years leading up to the year of the transition, then a civil war occurred within two years of the transition. If there had been evidence of industrialization within five years leading up to the transition, then the post-transition government did not expunge former military or police within five years post transition. If the state had a birthright citizenship policy, then the post-transition government did not conduct diplomacy as spin doctors to leverage diplomacy to create public relations for external messaging and to frame issues and images.

**Association Findings, Tear-Out Section, Forced Removal of the Head of Government**

Now we turn to the tear-outs about each association finding. The following pages discuss each relationship captured in Figure 3. Each sheet has a gray box at the top that puts each association finding depicted in the table into words. There is an icon next to each gray box that will tell you whether the finding applies to cases of forced constitutional reform or forced removal of the head of government. The iconography we use is from the magnitude of overthrow scale. The icon for forced removal of the head of government is a chess piece that is being toppled by an arrow. We include keywords that capture the relevant factors associated with the overthrown state and the resistance movement as well as the post-transition government outcomes that we discuss on each tear-out page.

We hope operators will literally tear these sheets out of the report and take them on deployments.
Keywords: military coup, promote culture/religion

A military coup is a seizure of power from within the state orchestrated by the state’s military. Military coups can be low or high in strength, ranging from a handful of persons to an organized unit/division. In the event of a military coup, the forced removal of the head of government is associated with the coup.

We have found that a military coup is negatively associated with the post-transition government promoting culture/religion. By this we mean that the resistance government does not promote religious or cultural infrastructure or facilities improvements within five years of overthrow. Promotion of religion or culture includes the construction or refurbishment of places of worship and museums, for example.
Keywords: recent war, civil war recurrence

Recent inter- or intra-state war is a type of “shifting political opportunity,” a phrase coined in the sociology literature. Events like war transform the structure of power and collective action. War can profoundly shape the nature and quality of governance and overall development.

We have found that recent war is positively associated with civil war recurrence. Its occurrence within two years of state overthrow suggests that the post-transition government has failed to ameliorate tensions between groups and failed to put policies into place to ensure or promote peace and stability.
Keywords: industrialization, expungement of the overthrown state’s police or military

Industrialization is the process by which nonindustrial sectors evolve into industries. This process occasions a transformation in the socioeconomic order. In the sociology literature, it is considered a shifting political opportunity. Industrialization has been found to promote the rise of social movements.76

We have found that industrialization is negatively associated with expungement. Expungement is when the new resistance government expunges or gets rid of former military or police within five years of overthrow. This approach to forming a new government cleans the slate but can foster insurgencies as we saw in Iraq with de-Baathification in 2003.77
States define citizenship by birth (jus soli) or by blood (jus sanguinis). Citizenship by birth is more inclusive than citizenship by blood, under which only descendants of citizens are eligible. Policies based on blood can lead to exclusion and ultimately create or reinforce divisions in society. We have found that when citizenship is defined by birth, it is negatively associated with the resistance movement acting as spin doctors in post-transition government diplomacy. When a resistance movement overthrows a state, the new government will conduct diplomacy, representing itself in interactions with other sovereign states and cultivating internal messaging with stakeholders within the state. These interactions can be key in fostering legitimacy or in losing it.

Spin doctors are focused on using diplomacy to create public relations messaging and frame issues. Spin doctors deliberately and carefully craft messages to get out to as many people as they can. This approach to diplomacy may involve the resistance movement in the government hiring third parties to assist in crafting their messages. Spin doctors are often focused on being recognized on the international stage and may send representatives of the movement and the new government to international events and conferences.

Given that jus soli is negatively associated with rebel diplomacy as spin doctors, there are three other options for the resistance movement’s approach to diplomacy: cultivator, warrior, and shopkeeper. Cultivators employ diplomacy to manage internal messaging. Their focus is on fostering legitimacy for the new government with domestic audiences. In contrast to other diplomatic styles, the cultivator is focused internally rather than externally.

A warrior diplomat uses communications with external actors (other states, for example) as an extension of fighting. Warrior diplomacy builds upon the principle that talk is the extension of war by
other means. In negotiation, the warrior diplomat uses military tactics rather than civilian discourse. If taking this approach, the resistance movement will seek to achieve its own goals at the expense of the goals and wishes of the external actor. A shopkeeper uses communications with external actors to identify shared interests. The shopkeeper believes that both parties’ interests can be satisfied and each party can be better off through negotiation and compromise.
Keywords: movement structure theory, united, citizen security elements

Resistance movements are rarely composed of one monolithic group. Rather, resistance movements are composed of numerous groups, some significant and others fringe. According to political scientist Peter Krause, a resistance movement can be: (1) hegemonic (one significant group), (2) united (two or more significant groups that are in alliance), or (3) fragmented (two or more significant groups that are not in alliance).81

When you deploy, it will be crucial to understand the resistance movement operating in your theater. One way to do that is to learn about the movement’s composition and identify it as hegemonic, united, or fragmented. To categorize a resistance movement, current news reports will be useful as they will show how the resistance movement talks about itself in the media.

We have found that when a resistance movement is united, it is negatively associated with the post-transition government employing citizen security elements. When citizen security elements are present, civilians not part of the police force or the military band together to take up arms, protect themselves, and provide order. The presence of citizen security tends to suggest that the government is not able to provide security, deter crime, or combat violence.82 As such, they are often a harbinger of government instability.
Resistance movements are rarely composed of one monolithic group. Rather, resistance movements are composed of numerous groups, some significant and others fringe. According to political scientist Peter Krause, a resistance movement can be: (1) hegemonic (one significant group), (2) united (two or more significant groups that are in alliance), or (3) fragmented (two or more significant groups that are not in alliance).83

We find that when a resistance movement is fragmented, it is positively associated with the resistance movement acting as warriors in their diplomacy. When a resistance movement overthrows a state, the new government will conduct diplomacy, representing itself in interactions with other sovereign states and cultivating internal messaging with stakeholders within the state. These interactions can be key in fostering legitimacy or in losing it.84

A warrior diplomat uses communications with external actors (other states, for example) as an extension of fighting. Warrior diplomacy builds upon the principle that talk is the extension of war by other means.85 In negotiation, the warrior diplomat uses military tactics rather than civilian discourse. If taking this approach, the resistance movement will seek to achieve its own goals at the expense of the goals and wishes of the external actor.
Applying These Findings to the Life Cycle of Resistance

Because this study helps you to make informed hypotheses, it leaves you better armed to plan and decide what you want to do in theater: who you want to work with, how, and to what ends.

Resistance movements progress through a fairly discernible “life cycle” that comprises five states, as shown in Figure 4: (1) Preliminary; (2) Incipient; (3) Crisis; (4) Institutionalization; (5) Resolution. You may deploy into a country at any point of a developing resistance. But as an insurgency nears the point of success, leaders in the resistance must think hard about what will happen after a successful overthrow of the government. On the life cycle, this moment of truth occurs somewhere within the Crisis-Institutionalization-Resolution states.

Figure 4. States of resistance.
Applying Findings to the Phases of Unconventional Warfare

Unconventional warfare (UW) involves the use of Special Operations Forces (SOF) and other assets to support a resistance movement. The current official definition of UW is:

*Joint Publication (JP) 3-05.1 defines Unconventional Warfare (UW) as:*

*Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.*

When US SOF conduct UW, they progress through seven phases that serve as the guidelines for planning and conducting a successful insurgency. Figure 5 depicts these phases.
The status quo between nation states as established and maintained by the instruments of national power, regional, and international relations. This state establishes the conditional norm, or default setting which, left unchanged, will predictably continue in the future.

Resistance and external sponsors conduct psychological preparation to unify population against established government or occupying power and prepare population to accept U.S. support.

USG agencies coordinate with allied government-in-exile or resistance leadership for desired U.S. support.

SF team infiltrates operational area, establishes communications with its base, and contacts resistance organization.

SF team organizes, trains, and equips resistance cadre. Emphasis is on developing infrastructure.

SF team assists cadre with expansion into an effective resistance organization. Limited combat operations may be conducted, but emphasis remains on development.

UW forces conduct combat operations until linkup with conventional forces or end of hostilities.

UW forces revert to national control, shifting to regular forces or demobilizing.

Figure 5. Phases of unconventional warfare.
CONCLUSION

ARSOF soldiers who are advising and assisting resistance leaders during these stages can use the information presented here to more accurately discern the current organization and behaviors of both the government and the resistance to estimate trends that point to predictable outcomes. These outcomes may be favorable—such as the organization of free and fair elections—or unfavorable—such as a return to bloody civil war. By understanding where the trends are pointing, ARSOF operators can better advise leaders toward favorable outcomes and away from unfavorable ones.

Similarly, TSOC planners and pilot teams can apply the same approach on the early stages of a resistance—during the preliminary and incipient stages. This is the period in which the United States and her allies develop policy and strategy regarding a country’s government and the resistance movements. In general, the United States seeks to support resistance movements against tyrannical or dangerous governments, and those resistance movements that can best align with American policy objectives. Likewise, the United States is interested in supporting resistance movements that are likely to succeed and, once successful, are likely to create free democratic states with market economies. By using the information in this report, leaders, planners, and policy makers can base their estimates on substantial historical research.

The findings in this report provide the ARSOF soldier leverage in understanding and predicting the course of the insurgency and the political outcomes after it is successful. During Phases I through III of a successful insurgency, policy makers, commanders, and planners can form an understanding of how the subject country is organized and how the government and resistance behaves (or is likely to behave.) During Phases IV through VI, the ARSOF soldier is focused on organizing, building up, and employing the insurgents, but s/he is also advising and shaping the leadership with an eye toward what happens after the insurgency is successful. It is during these phases that SOF leaders and soldiers can best discern the factors (independent variables) described in this report and estimate how those variables are likely to correlate with political outcomes after a revolution. During Phase VII, the SOF soldier uses this information to guide resistance leaders and the new government away from negative outcomes and toward positive ones.
The Day After Overthrow

With your chute now packed and you moving to the assembly area, you are confident that this report has provided the information you will use to be best prepared for your present deployment. You know the findings here apply specifically to two types of state overthrow: forced constitutional reform and forced removal of the head of government. You know to look carefully at characteristics of the overthrown state and the resistance movement. Your observations will help you make informed predictions about the type of post-transition governance that will emerge.

You think about it being the nature of dogs to chase cars. But, when you observe this curious behavior, you often ask “What will he do if he catches it?” Resistance movements likewise chase overthrow. Insurgencies often take years or even decades to unfold, and in the heat of battle and political struggle, leaders can easily lose sight of the end state. Achieving a successful overthrow—destroying the existing order—becomes the overriding priority. But if they are not wise, they neglect to formulate timely and effective strategies for what to do after that success is achieved. Transition to new governance is volatile and dangerous.

The findings presented in this report directly address the problem by providing you insights about trends and likely outcomes. Like a master chess player, you must not only attend to the next move, but also to what is likely to happen eight moves from now. Ultimately, that chess player aims for a checkmate. For resistance movements, the end of the game is not a successful overthrow, but what form of governance is erected after it. The analytical approach offered here can help you shape and summon those desired outcomes.
APPENDIX A: GENERAL METHODS

Once the sponsor posed the question, i.e., “What resistance movement and state characteristics impact the nature of post-conflict governance?” the following approach was implemented, which consists of six steps.

**Step 1: Identify relevant historical cases.**

As already mentioned, the sponsor was interested in post-World War II cases of overthrow. To identify cases, the study team turned to the Polity IV dataset. This dataset allowed us to identify changes in regime type. We selected cases coded as “interregnum” and “transition.” Interregnum cases are characterized by a complete collapse of central political authority. According to Polity, interregnum periods are equated with the collapse, or failure, of central state authority, whether or not that failure is followed by a radical transformation, or revolution, in the mode of governance.

Transition cases are those in which authority patterns are changing. The patterns do not represent serious challenges to these changes and the results tend to be a mixture of old and new regime elements.

**Step 2: Develop a “Magnitude of Overthrow” scale.**

Identification of cases in Polity IV yielded cases with many different types of overthrow. In identifying and learning about these cases, we created a scale of overthrow (from low magnitude to high magnitude) to help the sponsor conceptualize and categorize types of overthrow. Once developing the scale, we worked with the sponsor to determine which rungs were of most interest and settled on “forced removal of head of government” and “forced constitutional reform.”

**Step 3: Conduct a literature review and identify variables.**

The literature review for this study included examination of over seventy articles and books in the political science and sociology literatures. See the bibliography for more information. Based on our substantive expertise, we identified authors and publications who write on topics concerning social movements, regime change, and post-conflict governance. This literature review enabled us to identify resistance movement and state characteristics (independent variables) that should be measured and assessed in our analysis. The literature review
also enabled us to identify measures of post-conflict governance, our dependent variable. Figure 6 provides a summary of the dependent and independent variables.

**Figure 6. Summary of dependent and independent variables.**

**Step 4: Operationalize variables.**

After identifying the independent and dependent variables of interest, we had to identify how to operationalize (measure) them. Some publications we reviewed offered operationalizations of these variables, whereas others did not. In both instances, we had to ensure that the operationalization resonated with us and could be implemented given available data. When operationalization of the variables was not provided, we developed those as a team. In total, we examined fifty variables that measured aspects of the state, the resistance, and the post-conflict governance.
Step 5: Code the variables.

After identifying and operationalizing independent and dependent variables, we set about coding them. It must be noted that none of the coding came from an extant dataset. Rather, each variable for each case was researched by the study team by searching newspapers, reputable internet sources such as BBC news, and academic journal articles. At the outset of the coding effort, the study team coded the same variables to ensure that team members were getting the same results and coding in the same way. Once this was established, the team members were responsible for coding different cases.

Step 6: Conduct a statistical analysis.

Factors (resistance and state characteristics pre-overthrow event) and outcomes (post-overthrow governance) were analyzed for correlation using Fisher’s Exact Test. Initially, testing began with a Chi-squared analysis of independence, which tests whether or not two categorical variables are related. This test works by looking at a contingency table of characteristics to determine whether the level of a variable can be used to predict the level of a different variable. Chi-squared testing requires more than five observations in any cell on the contingency table, but many of the tables contained cells with a count of less than five in this analysis. Because Chi-squared testing is not appropriate when there are fewer than five observations in a cell, the Fisher’s Exact Test, which was designed to handle this special case of Chi-squared testing, was more appropriate for this analysis.

Correlations were considered significant if the p-value, a measure of the probability of getting the observed outcome by chance, was less than 0.05. If the p-value was less than 0.05, the conclusion is that there is less than a 5 percent probability the outcome was reached by chance. The 0.05 value is a commonly accepted threshold for significance. In Fisher’s Exact Test, the p-value is right-tailed, left-tailed, or two-tailed. A two-tailed p-value shows that a factor and outcome are associated without indication directionality; whereas a significant right-tailed value says they are positively correlated and a significant left-tailed value indicates negative correlation.

The original analysis plan included logistic regressions to evaluate the changes in odds and to examine the interactive effects of predictors but, due to the small sample sizes, the models did not converge. Fisher’s Exact Tests were stratified by forced removal of the head of government and forced constitutional reform. Results from the stratified analysis
are discussed here but a pooled analysis was run and the results are available in Appendix F.

Some factors were initially explored for analysis but were removed due to correlation with other factors. Where predictor variables are correlated, there is a concern that they are both measuring the same factor or an additional, unknown factor that is somehow casually related to the outcome. Removing one factor in each pair ensures that the same phenomenon is not being measured and accounted for twice. The variables removed were urbanization, substantive social policies, changing international alliances, issue positions, jus sanguinis state, locality development, and the objective of the government. Factors that were correlated were removed on two criteria. The first was frequency—factors that were correlated with multiple other predictors were removed. In cases where pairs were not correlated with any additional factors outside of that pair, the factor hypothesized to be intermediate in the causal pathway was removed.

Analysis was conducted in STATA/SE 15.1 and SAS 9.4. STATA was used for data cleaning and initial data exploration. Fisher’s Exact Tests were run in STATA. Graphs and figures for the reports were created in SAS.
The cases and parameters provided in this appendix were selected using the Polity IV dataset. This study identified transitions in polity since 1945 coded by the Polity dataset as –77 (Complete Collapse of Central Political Authority) or –88 (Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition). If a coup was involved in the transition, it was identified as a variable in the transition. Cases with less than five years post transition were excluded (2014 on). Cases without the conclusive establishment of governance were excluded.

**Complete Overthrow of Government**

Table B-1 lists case studies for the complete overthrow of the government, with a result where the whole of government is removed and replaced.

**Table B-1. Complete overthrow of government.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Polity IV Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1952–1955</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>-77</td>
<td>Complete Collapse of Central Political Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>-77</td>
<td>Complete Collapse of Central Political Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>-77</td>
<td>Complete Collapse of Central Political Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Case Study</td>
<td>Time Period</td>
<td>Polity IV Score</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>-77</td>
<td>Complete Collapse of Central Political Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1953–1954</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1979–1981</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>-77</td>
<td>Complete Collapse of Central Political Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>-77</td>
<td>Complete Collapse of Central Political Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1979–1980</td>
<td>-77</td>
<td>Complete Collapse of Central Political Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2011–2013</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Forced Removal of the Head of Government**

Table B-2 lists case studies for the forced removal of the head of government, with a result where the chief executive is removed, but the other branches remain. One case was considered but ultimately was excluded from this study. The Haiti 2004–2005 case was excluded due
to inconclusive governance that overlapped with efforts by the United Nations to stabilize the country.

Table B-2. Forced removal of the head of government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Polity IV Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1955–1956</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1970–1971</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-77</td>
<td>Complete Collapse of Central Political Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Case Study</td>
<td>Time Period</td>
<td>Polity IV Score</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1946–1949</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Case Study</td>
<td>Time Period</td>
<td>Polity IV Score</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Forced Constitutional Reform**

Table B-3 lists case studies for forced constitutional reform, with a result where the resistance compels desired changes to the Constitution. Four cases were considered but ultimately were excluded from this study. The exclusion of the Mali 2012 case was due to inconclusive governance overlapping with United Nations Security Council resolutions, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) involvement, and a resulting government with unclear ties to the resistance/rebels. The Nepal 1957–1958 case was excluded due to insufficient data. The Niger 1991 and 1994 cases were excluded due to overlapping, complex interests with transnational, cross-border rebel groups and competing internal dynamics.

**Table B-3. Forced constitutional reform.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Polity IV Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Case Study</td>
<td>Time Period</td>
<td>Polity IV Score</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Congo Kinshasa</td>
<td>1992–2002</td>
<td>-77</td>
<td>Complete Collapse of Central Political Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Congo Kinshasa</td>
<td>2003–2005</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>-77</td>
<td>Complete Collapse of Central Political Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Germany East</td>
<td>1989–1990</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>-77</td>
<td>Complete Collapse of Central Political Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Case Study</td>
<td>Time Period</td>
<td>Polity IV</td>
<td>Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1978–1979</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Case Study</td>
<td>Time Period</td>
<td>Polity IV Score</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Institutional Disruption

Table B-4 lists case studies for institutional disruption, with a result where the government functions are dramatically revised due to resistance demands.

**Table B-4. Institutional disruption.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Polity IV Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1991–2010</td>
<td>-77</td>
<td>Complete Collapse of Central Political Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Case Study</td>
<td>Time Period</td>
<td>Polity IV Score</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----------------</td>
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<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Forced Electoral Reform**

Table B-5 lists case studies for forced electoral reform, with a result where election laws are changed to allow resistance-friendly candidates.

**Table B-5. Forced electoral reform.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Polity IV Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1946–1947</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Congo Brazzaville</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1948–1949</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Judicial Review

Table B-6 lists case studies for judicial review, with a result where a law or election result is reviewed or revised. Note that the lowest rungs of the Magnitude of Overthrow scale are not explicitly represented in the Polity IV dataset. The Polity IV project examines a spectrum of democratic and autocratic authorities, but it does not scrutinize granular levels of institutional revisions such as judicial review or multiparty elections within an interregnum period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Polity IV Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>-88</td>
<td>Transition Period of Executive Recruitment, Independence of Executive Authority, Political Competition and Opposition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Dramatic Multiparty Shift

No case studies were applicable to the dramatic multiparty shift, with a result where resistance activities lead to significant shifts in political balance of power.
APPENDIX C: VARIABLES

Dependent Variables – General

Citizen Security Elements

Citizen security elements refer to civilians banding together to protect themselves and provide order. Their presence tends to suggest that the government is unable to provide security, deter crime, or combat violence. As such, they are often a harbinger of government instability.

Modified Flag or Currency

Governments convey authority and unity to citizens and to other sovereign nations in many ways, but particularly through their flag and currency. A government’s flag and currency are considered to be examples of symbolic messaging. A new government must engage in this symbolic messaging by creating a new or modified flag or currency. Doing so institutionalizes the government’s new identity, helping to strengthen it.

Civil War Recurrence

A government seeks to provide security for its citizens. Civil war recurrence is at odds with providing security. Its occurrence within two years of overthrow suggests that the new government has failed to ameliorate tensions between groups and failed to put policies into place to ensure or promote peace and stability.

Elections Early in the Transition

This variable asks if the new government holds elections within five years of the overthrow. Holding elections tends to be a recommended approach because it creates buy-in among many factions in the population, demonstrates the capacity of the new government to embrace differing opinions in a constructive way, and in some cases, signals that peace is assured.
Popular Counter-Resistance

This type of activity can negatively impact government stability and may be indicative of problems, such as policies that exclude or penalize a particular group.\textsuperscript{93}

Rebel Diplomacy

When a resistance movement overthrows a state, the new government it creates must have the ability to conduct diplomacy, representing itself in interactions with other sovereign states. There are a number of different ways for the resistance movement to conduct this diplomacy. Political scientist Bridget L. Coggins has categorized different approaches to rebel diplomacy. These approaches include being a warrior diplomat (external communication is an extension of fighting) or a shopkeeper (seek joint advantage for a negotiated settlement).\textsuperscript{94}

Political scientist Reyko Huang describes forms of rebel diplomacy that can be characterized as being spin doctors (leverage diplomacy to create public relations external messaging and to frame issues and images).\textsuperscript{95} In this sense, diplomacy is like “rebelcraft.” As resistance groups seek to consolidate popular support, they will use the role of diplomat to spin messaging that will garner external support for legitimacy. As resistance groups seek to consolidate popular support, they will use the role of diplomat to cultivate support for the movement internally.

Social Services: Health Services

One function of a government is to provide services. This can take the form of the government providing health services, which we define as increased access to hospitals and clinics, medical education, immunizations, and the like.\textsuperscript{96}

Use of Coercion

Ideally, a government does not need to rely on coercion, or force, to ensure that citizens abide by the laws. Some states, however, must rely on coercion to maintain order and peace. Such an approach generally indicates popular dissent and state fragility.\textsuperscript{97}
Expungement

This variable concerns whether or not the new resistance government expunges former military or policy within five years of overthrow. This approach to forming a new government cleans the slate but can foster insurgencies as we saw in Iraq with de-Baathification in 2003.98

Popular Peaceful Protests

This variable assesses whether there are popular peaceful protests or demonstrations within two years of the overthrow.99 While it can be encouraging that such protests are peaceful, it is worrisome that dissent must erupt in protests and not be dealt with in other ways, i.e., through formal government channels.

Social Services: Cultural/Religious

This variable is concerned with the resistance government promoting religious or cultural infrastructure or facilities improvements within five years of the overthrow.100 This can include the construction or refurbishment of places of worship and museums, for example.

Independent Variables – General

Military Coup

A military coup is a seizure of power from within the state that is orchestrated by the state’s military.101 Military coups can be limited or expansive in strength, ranging from a handful of persons to an organized unit/division. This variable assesses whether or not the initial state overthrow was in any way associated with a coup by the military. It should be noted that paramilitary forces or even the police can enact a coup, but if the coup d’état was tied to military officers then it is considered a military coup.
Independent Variables Associated with the State the Resistance Movement is Trying to Overthrow

Regime Type

The regime type of the overthrown state can be any of the following: monarchy; totalitarian; authoritarian; oligarchic; or democratic. A monarchy is ruled by a single leader. A totalitarian system has a one-party system and includes a cohesive ideology, control over the economy, control over the media, and control of the population through policing. An authoritarian regime is non-democratic. An oligarchy is the rule of a few, by council or junta, for example. A democracy is a polyarchy. According to Robert Dahl, polyarchy is “the acquisition of democratic institutions within a political system that leads to the participation of a plurality of actors.”

The impact of regime type on myriad factors, from state capacity and the outbreak of violence to relations between states, is richly discussed and debated in the political science literature.

Span of Control

The span of control variable has multiple components to address the following questions: (1) what is the size of the territory, (2) what is the concentration of citizens in the territory that the state is responsible for protecting and policing, and (3) is land ownership, private, state leased, or local customary land rights?

Intuitively, the size of the territory and the population density can determine, or at the very least shape, how difficult it is for the state to govern. Some have theorized that the size of the territory, the population density, and the factors related to it (urban versus rural), impact the incidence and nature of insurgencies.

This variable is also salient in the literature because issues concerning land ownership and, specifically land reform, are discussed in relation to political changes, violence, and social unrest.

Citizenship of Colonized

Citizenship can be defined in one of two ways: jus soli and jus sanguinis. Jus soli is Latin for “right of the soil” and means that citizenship is a birthright. In contrast, jus sanguinis is Latin for “right of blood” and is typically granted to children born to a national of that country.
Jus sanguinis policies can lead to exclusion and ultimately create or reinforce divisions in society.¹⁰⁸

**Recent Inter- or Intra-state War**

Recent inter- or intra-state war is a type of “shifting political opportunity,” a phrase coined in the sociology literature.¹⁰⁹ Events like war transform the structure of power and collective action.¹¹⁰ Sociologist Doug McAdam defines a shifting political opportunity as: any event or broad social process that serves to undermine the calculations and assumptions on which the political establishment is structured occasions a shift in political opportunities. Among the events and processes likely to prove disruptive of the political status quo are wars, industrialization, international political realignments, prolonged unemployment, and widespread demographic change.¹¹¹

War can profoundly shape the nature and quality of governance and overall development.¹¹²

**Industrialization**

Industrialization is another shifting political opportunity. Industrialization is the process by which nonindustrial sectors evolve into industries. This process occasions a transformation in the socioeconomic order. In the sociology literature, it is also considered a shifting political opportunity. Industrialization has been found to promote the rise of social movements.¹¹³

**Changing International Alliances**

Another shifting political opportunity is a change in international alliances.¹¹⁴ During the Cold War, for example, a state might shift alliances between the Soviet Union and the United States. Either alliance came with access to resources and geo-political opportunities.

**State’s Goal in Dealing with Resistance**

The state can seek to repress the resistance by coercion, intimidation, and force. It is also possible for the state to try to appease the resistance through a spectrum of concessions. Finally, the state could simply ignore the existence and influence of the resistance. The state can have an expressly articulated policy on how it will address a resistance, but sometimes an implied goal of how the state wishes to handle
a resistance movement will be in a state’s media spin, in the speeches of government officials, or in budget allocations to security and policing measures.\textsuperscript{115}

\textbf{Issue Positions}

This variable assesses the degree to which the party controlling the overthrown state was defined by one issue position or more than one.

The literature suggests that party systems with higher amounts of issue positions on a political party’s agenda or manifesto increases structured party diversity, coalition formation, and party competitiveness.\textsuperscript{116} Political parties with limited issue positions are associated with one-party states and limited-party competition.

\textbf{Independent Variables Associated with the Resistance Movement}

\textbf{Movement Structure}

Resistance movements can be coded as any of the following: (1) hegemonic (one significant group), (2) united (two or more significant groups that are in alliance), or (3) fragmented (two or more significant groups that are not in alliance). Movement structure theory seeks to explain the success of movements and does so by considering the number of significant groups in a resistance and the extent to which they are aligned. Movement structure is based on the work of political scientist Peter Krause and comes closest to explaining the outcome that we seek to explain here.\textsuperscript{117}

\textbf{Strategy}

Resistance movements can adopt one of five dominant strategies to achieve its goal.\textsuperscript{118} These strategies consist of the following: (1) attrition (taking action to persuade the state that the movement is strong and sufficiently resolute to inflict serious costs); (2) spoiling (taking action to ensure that any agreements between the government and another party fail); (3) intimidation (demonstrate that the resistance movement has the power to punish those who disobey them and that the government is powerless to stop them); (4) outbidding (attempts to outdo, through whatever means, a rival faction of the resistance movement);
and (5) provocation (persuade domestic audience that the government is immoral and that there is no option but to resist it).

**External Support**

External support to the resistance movement can take the form of financial contributions, training, tactics, arms, propaganda, and fighters. The role of external support in shaping conflict outcomes has been widely discussed in the literature.\(^{119}\)

**Education Level of Resistance Leaders**

This variable captures the education level of the resistance movement’s leader or leaders. For the main group, the leadership’s education level can be considered: primary, secondary, educated elite/post-secondary, professional/post graduate.\(^{120}\)

**Community Change – Local Development**

This variable measures the extent to which the resistance movement seeks out and take opportunities to engage with the local population in activities that create positive social change. This can include development of indigenous leadership, local initiative, self-help, and participation by large numbers of community members.
APPENDIX D: CODING

Table D-1 contains the variables examined by the study team. Two general variables concerning the geographic location of the state and the phenomenon of a military coup d’etat are shaded in green. Variables concerning the state government are grouped in blue, while variables measuring the resistance itself are in purple. Finally, features of the resistance governance are colored orange.

Table D-1. Variables examined by the study team

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Number</th>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Coding</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gen_1</td>
<td>Geographic Region</td>
<td>What is appropriate geographic coding for the regional location of the case?</td>
<td>CHOOSE 1:</td>
<td><a href="http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/english/htmain.htm">http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/english/htmain.htm</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1) North America</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Latin America</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Western Europe</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4) Eastern Europe</td>
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<td>(5) Africa</td>
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<td>(6) Middle East/Persian Gulf</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(7) South Asia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(8) East and Central Asia</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(9) Southeast Asia and Oceania</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>gen_2</td>
<td>Military Coup</td>
<td>Does the case in question involve a military coup?</td>
<td>CHOOSE 1:</td>
<td>Polity IV data; Case study research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No OR Yes</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable Number</td>
<td>Variable Name</td>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Coding</td>
<td>References</td>
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<td></td>
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<td><strong>Totalitarian</strong> – a strong, clear ideology that operates by, with, and through a one party system, has control over economy, controls media and mass communications, features a brutal police system.</td>
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<td><strong>Authoritarian</strong> – a non democratic form of government with strong executive power as the head of government. A totalitarian government is always authoritarian, but few authoritarians are actually totalitarian.</td>
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<td><strong>Democratic</strong> – see polyarchy (participatory democracy, consensus).</td>
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<td><strong>Oligarchy</strong> – a government where there is a rule of a few; also known as a junta or military council.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A strategy of <strong>repress</strong> is where the state seeks to subdue the resistance by force.</td>
<td>Repress;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A strategy of <strong>appease</strong> is where the state seeks to pacify the resistance through a spectrum of limited to full concessions.</td>
<td>Appease;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A strategy of <strong>ignore</strong> is where the state seeks to ignore the existence and influence of the resistance.</td>
<td>Ignore</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state_3</td>
<td>Shifting Political Opportunities (SPO)---Inter or Intra-state war</td>
<td>Was there <strong>inter or intra-state war</strong> in the five years leading up to the year of the transition identified by Polity?</td>
<td>CHOOSE 1:</td>
<td>McAdam, 1982.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No OR Yes</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| state_4 | SPO—Industrialization | Was there **industrialization** in the ten years leading up to the year of the transition identified by Polity? **Industrialization** is defined as the process by which nonindustrial sectors (agriculture, health, education) evolve into industries involving an extensive transformation in socioeconomic order. | CHOOSE 1:  
No OR Yes | Kruger, 2007.  
World Bank data  
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| state_5 | SPO—Urbanization | Was there **urbanization** in the ten years leading up to the year of the transition identified by Polity? **Urbanization** is defined as the process by which rural populations shift to concentrated, urban centers. | CHOOSE 1:  
No OR Yes | Kruger, 2017.  
| state_6 | SPO—Changing International Alliances | Was there a **change in international alliances** in the five years leading up to the year of the transition identified by Polity? Examples of **changing international alliances** would include alliances with the Soviet Union or US in the Cold War or establishing new diplomatic relations with a country. | CHOOSE 1:  
No OR Yes | Matanock, 2017. |
| state_7a | SPO—Social Policies | Were **social policies** substantially changed in the five years leading up to the year of the transition identified by Polity? | CHOOSE 1:  
No OR Yes | Arjona, 2015. |
### Assessing Revolutionary and Insurgent Strategies

| **state_7b** | **SPO—Social Policies** | **Examples of substantive social policies** changes would include universal education, nationalizing health care, unionizing a labor force.  
Social services – includes education, healthcare, employment  
Institutions – includes finance, military, elections, constitution, corruption, industry (railroads, energy)  
Civil liberties – freedoms, rights  
Land – land reform, land rights | **If Yes**, capture the policy in one of the following bins:  
Social services;  
Institutions;  
Civil liberties;  
Land  
If No, code as 9999. | **Arjona, 2015.** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **state_8c** | **Institutional Strength—Freedom Ratings** | **The institutional strength** of freedom is derived using Freedom House data whereby a measurement at the first year of the Polity transition minus a measurement five years post Polity transition equals Free, Partially Free, or Not Free with a + or – to indicate the direction of the shift in the freedom ranking post transition.  
Negative (-) is democratic movement;  
Positive (+) is autocratic movement) since the higher the number on the scale indicates the more non-democratic/not free. | **CHOOSE 1:**  
NF = Not Free  
PF = Partially Free  
F = Free  
Then indicate:  
− = positive democratic movement  
OR  
+ = negative autocratic movement | **Kruger, 2007.**  
[https://freedom-house.org/report-types/freedom-world](https://freedom-house.org/report-types/freedom-world) |
| **state_9a** | **Span of Control—Size of Territory** | **Broadcast of power impacted by span of control** and infrastructure.  
A state must broadcast its power through the administrative span of control, and broadcasted power.  
**Size of territory** is measured in square kilometers. | **Number of square kilometers** | **Herbst, 2000.** |
| state_9b | Span of Control—Population Density | **Span of control** includes the administration of areas that are densely and sparsely populated. Population density is measured at the year of the Polity transition. **Population density** is measured by the number of people per sq. km of land area. | **Number of people per sq. km of land area** | [https://www.population-pyramid.net/](https://www.population-pyramid.net/) |
| state_9c | Span of Control—Land Ownership | **Span of control** includes the categorization of land rights as primarily **private ownership, state leasehold,** or explicitly recognizes local **customary tenure** in the year preceding the Polity transition. | CHOOSE 1: Private; State; Customary | Herbst, 2000. Case study research |
| state_10a | Citizenship—Jus Soli | Does the state have **jus soli** or **restricted jus soli** citizenship? **Jus soli** is often referred to as birthright citizenship. States that have jus soli citizenship or have restrictive jus soli rights are considered more permissive citizenship states. | CHOOSE 1: No OR Yes | Herbst, 2000. |
| state_10b | Citizenship—Jus Sanguinis | Does the state have **jus sanguinis** citizenship? **Jus sanguinis** states can make citizenship hard to achieve, labeling people as others, and creating/reinforcing cleavages. | CHOOSE 1: No OR Yes | Herbst, 2000. |
| state_10c | Citizenship—Colonizer | A state that has been colonized can choose to redefine **citizenship laws post-decolonization.** This can signal either an expansion or constriction of who “we” are versus “they” as the former colonizer’s citizens. | CHOOSE 1: If colonized in the past fifty years, No OR Yes If NOT colonized in the past fifty years, code as 9999 | Herbst, 2000. |
### state_11a

**Structured Diversity—Political Parties**

What is the magnitude of **structured diversity** in the political parties in the state at the first year of the Polity transition?

A plurality of issue positions (structured party positions) and issue salience (which issues receive the most interest by the party) is a hallmark of democracy and democratic transition.

**One party dominant system** – a one party state; constitutionally prohibited party competition;

**Two party system** – party competition allowed but institutionally enshrined two party dominance;

**Two party plus system** – constitutionally allowed party competition with minor third parties that influence party platform diversification and ideological choice;

**Multiparty system** – parties often serve in coalition governments and balance party positions in policy.

CHOOSE 1:  
- One party dominant system;  
- Two party system;  
- Two party plus system;  
- Multiparty system  

Rohrschneider, 2009.  
Sartori, 1976.

### state_11b

**Structured Diversity—Issues**

How diversified was the state’s party system on **party issues**?

The higher the number of issues that a party takes positions on, the less features of a one party state or totalitarian system.

**One:**  
Issue positions – issue based parties (1 topic);

**One Plus:**  
platform based parties (more than one topic)

CHOOSE 1:  
- One;  
- One Plus  

Rohrschneider 2009.  
Sartori 1976.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Number</th>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Coding</th>
<th>Reference(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>resist_1</td>
<td>Resistance Type</td>
<td>Drawing on social movement theory, what is the resistance type, characterized as one of the following? Anarchist; Anti-globalization; Communist; Socialist; Environmental; Leftist (includes democratic socialist); Nationalist; Nationalist/separatist; Racist; Religious; Right-wing conservative; Right-wing reactionary</td>
<td>CHOOSE 1: Communist; Socialist; Leftist (includes democratic socialist); Nationalist; Nationalist/separatist; Religious; Right-wing conservative; Right-wing reactionary</td>
<td>Horowitz, 2010. Tilly, 1999.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resist_2</td>
<td>Resistance Objectives</td>
<td>What were the <strong>resistance objectives</strong>, characterized as one of the following for the time period of the Polity transition? <strong>Limited objectives</strong> would be when a resistance seeks to satisfy demands over territory e.g., evicting foreign military from occupying another country or to win control over piece of territory for purpose of national self-determination. <strong>Maximalist objectives</strong> would be when a resistance seeks to satisfy demands over ideology e.g., transform political system, to Marxist or Islamist or annihilate state because of its values. <strong>Ambiguous objectives</strong> would be when a resistance puts forth contradictory claims about its objectives. <strong>Idiosyncratic objectives</strong> would be when a resistance aims to eliminate other militant groups or sever relations between states.</td>
<td>CHOOSE 1: Limited; Maximalist; Ambiguous; Idiosyncratic</td>
<td>Abrahms, 2006.</td>
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<tr>
<td>resist_3</td>
<td>Resistance Movement Structure</td>
<td>Using social movement structure theory, what is the <strong>resistance structure</strong>, categorized as one of the following for the duration of the Polity transition? A resistance is said to have a <strong>hegemonic structure</strong> when the resistance is comprised of one significant group. A resistance is said to have a <strong>united structure</strong> when there are two or more significant groups and they are in alliance. A resistance is said to have a <strong>fragmented structure</strong> when there are two or more significant groups and they are not in alliance.</td>
<td>CHOOSE 1: Hegemonic; United; Fragmented</td>
<td>Krause, 2013. Lawrence, 2010. Worsnop, 2017.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistant Strategy</td>
<td>What was the <strong>resistance strategy</strong> is characterized as one of the following for the time period of the Polity transition? The <strong>attrition</strong> strategy is when the resistance movement takes action to persuade the state that it is strong and sufficiently resolute to inflict serious costs. The goal is for the state to yield to resistance movement’s demands. The <strong>spoiling</strong> strategy is when the resistance movement takes action to ensure that any agreements between the government and another party fail. Note: this is generally used when there are three parties involved: the government, the resistance movement, and another movement that is making overtures to the government. The <strong>intimidation</strong> strategy occurs when the resistance movement seeks to demonstrate that they have power to punish whoever disobeys them and that the government is powerless to stop them. The <strong>outbidding</strong> strategy occurs when the resistance movement is divided and the population is unsure of which faction to support. The <strong>provocation</strong> strategy is when the resistance movement seeks to persuade the domestic audience that the government is morally bad and that the domestic population has no option but to resist it.</td>
<td>CHOOSE 1: Attrition; Spoiling; Intimidation; Outbidding; Provocation</td>
<td>Kydd and Walter, 2016.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resist_5</td>
<td>Use of Violence</td>
<td>Which best characterizes the resistance movement’s use of violence during the Polity transition?</td>
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<td><strong>Ideological</strong> commitment is when the resistance is committed to the use of violence as a means to accomplish its objectives.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Episodic</strong> is when the resistance is willing to use violence, in a limited or occasional manner. Episodic also includes when a resistance is unwilling to denounce violence and has been associated with a violent coalition.</td>
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<td><strong>Non-violent</strong> is when a resistance movement is committed to the use of non-violent ideologies and strategies. Non-violent movements leverage marches, demonstrations, advocacy campaigns, and so on – with non-violent tactics.</td>
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<td><strong>CHOOSE 1:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Ideological;</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Episodic;</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Non-violent</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>resist_6</th>
<th>External Support</th>
<th>Does the resistance movement receive external support five years prior to the case and during the case?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CHOOSE 1:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>No OR Yes</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>resist_7a</th>
<th>Community Change—Local Development</th>
<th>Is there evidence of the resistance engaging in locality development during the Polity transition?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>LOCALITY DEVELOPMENT</strong> characteristics include development of indigenous leadership, local initiative, self-help, and participation by large numbers of community members.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td><strong>CHOOSE 1:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>No OR Yes</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>resist_7b</th>
<th>Community Change—Social Change</th>
<th>Is there evidence of the resistance engaging in social change during the Polity transition?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>SOCIAL CHANGE</strong> characteristics include the use of contest strategies and change agent roles such as the activist-advocate, agitator, broker, negotiator, and partisan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>CHOOSE 1:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>No OR Yes</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>|          | Abrahms, 2006.  |
|          | De Mesquita, 2013.  |
|          | Fearon, 2011.  |
|          | Matanock, 2017.  |
|          | Roth, 1974.  |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resist_8</th>
<th>Education—Proxy for Socio-demographic levels</th>
<th>For the primary group in the resistance (if more than one, what is the leadership’s education level? &lt;br&gt;<strong>Primary level</strong> (limited education); <strong>secondary level</strong> (high school equivalent); <strong>educated elite/post-secondary</strong> (college/university); <strong>professional/postgraduate</strong> (law school, medical school, graduate school).</th>
<th>Choose 1: Primary; Secondary; Educated elite; Professional.</th>
<th>Kruger, 2007.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resist_9a</td>
<td>Age of Resistance</td>
<td>From documented origin of resistance activities until the change in Polity, what is the number of months (wounded to the nearest whole number) that indicates the age of the resistance movement?</td>
<td>Number of months</td>
<td>Case study research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resist_9b</td>
<td>Length of Coup</td>
<td>If there was a coup d’état, what is the number of days of the coup? If no coup d’état, then code as 9999.</td>
<td>Number of days</td>
<td>Case study research</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Resistance Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Number</th>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Coding</th>
<th>Reference(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resgov_1</td>
<td>Blank Slate</td>
<td>Did the resistance expunge most (60%+) of the former government from positions of power post “victory”?</td>
<td>Choose 1: No OR Yes</td>
<td>Hazelton 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resgov_2</td>
<td>Taxation</td>
<td>Did the resistance enact taxation measures during the Polity transition, post-Polity transition, or both during and after the Polity transition? Early signs of effective governance include the resistance engaging with citizens in three areas: making political decisions, providing public goods, and organizing civilians for the production of income (taxation).</td>
<td>Choose 1: During; Post; Both</td>
<td>Arjona, 2015. Shearing and Wood, 2003.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| resgov_3a | Social Services—Health Services | Did the resistance enact **health services** improvements within five years post “victory”?  
**Health services** improvements would include increased access to hospitals and clinics, medical education, immunizations, and so on. | CHOOSE 1: No OR Yes | Arjona, 2015. |
| resgov_3b | Social Services—Education | Did the resistance enact **education** improvements within five years post “victory”?  
**Education** improvements would include increased access to primary, secondary, and/or college-level educational programming. | CHOOSE 1: No OR Yes | Arjona, 2015. |
| resgov_3c | Social Services—Infrastructure | Did the resistance enact **infrastructure** improvements within five years post “victory”?  
**Infrastructure** improvements would include expanded roads, road development, airport improvements, ports improvements, new airports, new ports, telecommunications/internet expansion and so on. | CHOOSE 1: No OR Yes | Arjona, 2015. |
| resgov_3d | Social Services—Cultural/Religious | Did the resistance enact **cultural/religious** programming, infrastructure, or facilities improvements within five years post “victory”? | CHOOSE 1: No OR Yes | Arjona, 2015. |
| resgov_4 | Symbols | Did the resistance create a new or modified flag or currency post “victory”?  
**Symbolic Messaging** is important for a resistance movement who have to communicate with different audiences so they can employ “mut livocality” of symbols. | CHOOSE 1: No OR Yes | Arjona, 2015. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>resgov_5a</td>
<td>Rebel Diplomacy—Warriors</td>
<td>Did the resistance movement establish <em>diplomacy as warriors</em>? Resistance movements must establish communication among sovereign states or the formal organization of the state. This diplomacy can be characterized as being <em>Warriors</em> where external communication is an extension of fighting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resgov_5b</td>
<td>Rebel Diplomacy—Shopkeepers</td>
<td>Did the resistance movement establish <em>diplomacy as shopkeepers</em>? <em>Shopkeepers</em> seek joint advantage for a negotiated settlement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resgov_5c</td>
<td>Rebel Diplomacy—Spin doctors</td>
<td>Did the resistance movement establish <em>diplomacy as spin-doctors</em>? <em>Spin doctors</em> leverage diplomacy to create PR for external messaging and to frame issues and images.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resgov_5d</td>
<td>Rebel Diplomacy—Cultivators</td>
<td>Did the resistance movement establish <em>diplomacy as cultivators</em>? <em>Cultivators</em> employ diplomacy to manage internal messaging.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resgov_6</td>
<td>Use of Coercion</td>
<td>Within five years post-Polity transition, was the police force militarized (as a proxy for <em>coercion</em>)? Evidence of <em>coercion</em> would be how a new resistance government could rely on violence to provide order by militarizing the police force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resgov_7</td>
<td>Patronage</td>
<td>What level of <strong>patronage</strong> did the resistance movement place into the post-Polity transition governance? <strong>Patronage</strong> is measured in terms of low, medium, and high levels of patronage in the new governing structures. <strong>High</strong> is defined as more than 60% members of new government are from movement. <strong>Medium</strong> is defined as between 30-59% members of new government are from movement. <strong>Low</strong> is defined as less than 30% members of new government are from movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resgov_8</td>
<td>Citizen Security</td>
<td>Are there groups that are providing <strong>citizen security</strong> other than the resistance group/state?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resgov_10</td>
<td>Disarmament</td>
<td>Did the resistance <strong>disarm</strong> themselves or others within five years post-Polity transition?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resgov_11</td>
<td>Expungement</td>
<td>Did the resistance <strong>expunge former military or police</strong> within five years post-Polity transition?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resgov_13a</td>
<td>Civil Unrest/Counter-resistance</td>
<td>Was there <strong>civil unrest</strong> or a <strong>counter-resistance</strong> within two years of the Polity transition?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>resgov_13b</td>
<td>Protests/Demonstrations</td>
<td>Are there peaceful popular <strong>protests or demonstrations</strong> within two years of the Polity transition?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX E: FINDINGS

Characteristics of the countries that experienced forced constitutional reform or forced removal of the head of government are shown in Table E1.

Table E-1. Characteristics of states.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By Country</th>
<th>Constitutional Reform</th>
<th>Forced Removal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East and Central Asia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia and Oceania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East/Persian Gulf</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average State Size (St Dev) in sq Km: 1,010,782 (2,062,179), 698,375 (841,677), 834,552 (1,455,492)

Average Span Density (St Dev) in people/sq Km: 53 (46), 81 (90), 69 (75)

Results for forced constitutional reform and forced removal of the head of the government are discussed for factors that were statistically significantly associated with two or more resistance government characteristics, because these were thought to be the most important for further exploration. Tables showing the breakdown of cases by category for each significant factor-outcome pair are included in Appendix G for further reading.

Constitutional Reform

See Table E-2 for a correlation matrix and Table E-3 for a word map of statistical significance.

State's goal in dealing with resistance associated with:
- rebel diplomacy being seen as cultivators (p = 0.008)

Type of land ownership associated with:
- civil war recurrence (p = 0.023)
- rebel diplomacy being seen as spin doctors (p = 0.043)
Jus Soli state is associated with:
- rebel diplomacy as spin doctors (p = 0.036)
- rebel diplomacy as shopkeepers (p = 0.039)

Movement structure was associated with:
- rebel diplomacy as cultivators (p = 0.010)
- rebel diplomacy as shopkeepers (p = 0.026)
- rebel diplomacy as warriors (p = 0.038)
- use of coercion (p = 0.010)

Strategy associated with:
- elections early in the transition (p = 0.013)

External support was associated with:
- presence of citizen security elements (p = 0.043)
- rebel diplomacy being seen as cultivators (p = 0.004)
- existence of a popular counter resistance (p = 0.031)
- rebels developing a new or modified flag or currency (p = 0.008)
- rebels providing health services (p = 0.043)
- use of coercion (p = 0.043)

Education level was correlated with:
- with recurrence of civil war (p = 0.031)
- presence of a popular counter-resistance (p = 0.049)
- elections early in the transition (p = 0.046)
Table E-2. Statistical significance for forced constitutional reform.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constitutional Reform</th>
<th>0.000</th>
<th>0.041</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use of Coercion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebels Provide Rights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebels Provide Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebels Provide Infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebels Provide Health Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Group has Name or Modified Flag or Currency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Diplomacy Characterized as Warriors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Diplomacy Characterized as Spin Doctors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Diplomacy Characterized as Shopkeepers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel Diplomacy Characterized as Cultivators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Counter Resistance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful Popular Protests</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patronage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empowerment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections Early in the Transition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War Recurrence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Security Elements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank State</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Factors**
- Military Coup
- State’s Goal in Dealing with Resistance
- Recession or Indo-Soviet War
- Industrialization
- Sign of Control - Land Ownership
- Job Side Sales
- Monarchic Structure
- Stratagy
- External Support
- Education Level
Table E-3. Word map for statistical significance for forced constitutional reform.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Forced Constitutional Reform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resistance Governance Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State’s Goal in Dealing with</td>
<td>State’s goal of repressing is negatively associated with Rebel Diplomacy Characterized as Cultivators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance</td>
<td>State’s goal of assuaging is positively associated with Rebel Diplomacy Characterized as Cultivators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Span of Control - Land Ownership</td>
<td>Private land ownership is positively associated with Rebel Diplomacy Characterized as Shopkeepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private land ownership is associated with Rebel Diplomacy Characterized as Spin Doctors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jus Soli State</td>
<td>Jus Soli State is negatively associated with Rebel Diplomacy Characterized as Shopkeepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jus Soli State is positively associated with Rebel Diplomacy Characterized as Spin Doctors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement Structure</td>
<td>Hegemony is negatively associated with Rebel Diplomacy Characterized as Cultivators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hegemony is positively associated with Rebel Diplomacy Characterized as Cultivators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hegemony is negatively associated with Rebel Diplomacy Characterized as Worriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hegemony is positively associated with Rebel Diplomacy Characterized as Worriers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy</td>
<td>Outbidding is negatively associated with Elections Early in the Transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Support</td>
<td>External Support is positively associated with Citizen Security Elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External Support is positively associated with Rebel Diplomacy Characterized as Cultivators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Level</td>
<td>Educated Elite is negatively associated with Civil War Recurrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Educated Elite is positively associated with Elections Early in the Transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Educated Elite is negatively associated with Popular Counter Resistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sample size insufficient to determine directionality of association

Forced Removal of the Head of Government

See Table E-4 for a correlation matrix and Table E-5 for a word map of statistical significance.

Military coup was associated with:

- rebels provide or restore culture or religion ($p = 0.026$)

Recent inter- or intra-state war was associated with:

- civil war recurrence ($p = 0.015$)

Industrialization was associated with:

- expungement ($p = 0.044$)

Type of land ownership associated with:

- rebel diplomacy as cultivators ($p = 0.026$)

Jus Soli state was associated with:

- rebel diplomacy as spin doctors ($p = 0.05$)

Movement structure was associated with:

- citizen security elements ($p = 0.007$)
- rebel diplomacy warriors ($p = 0.0036$)

Strategy was associated with:

- rebels developing a new or modified flag or currency ($p = 0.036$)
Table E-4. Statistical significance forced removal of the head of government.

Table E-5. Word map for statistical significance for forced removal of the head of government.
APPENDIX F: POOLED ANALYSIS

Combining forced removal of the head of the government and forced constitutional reform resulted in a considerable number of statistically significant associations. This is likely due to the statistical power granted by the increased sample size.

The most common predictors were regime type, movement structure, and external support. Locality development, military coup, and strategy were also associated with multiple outcomes. The most common outcomes were the rebel group having a new or modified flag or currency, rebel diplomacy characterized as shopkeepers, and rebel diplomacy characterized as cultivators.

While this analysis was not the focus of the project, looking at what is significant across multiple types of overthrow events may shed light on the factors and outcomes of these events as a whole.
Table F-1. Statistical significance across multiple types of overthrow events.
APPENDIX G: HISTOGRAMS FOR SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATIONS

In cases with forced constitutional reform, the goal of appeasing was associated with the rebel diplomacy being characterized as cultivators and the goal of repressing was associated with not having cultivators. The association for forced removal of the head of government was not significant.

In cases with forced constitutional reform, private-land ownership was associated with civil war recurrence and customary-land ownership was associated with civil war not recurring. The association for forced removal of the head of government was not significant.
In cases with forced constitutional reform, private-land ownership was associated with rebel diplomacy characterized as shopkeepers but the sample size was too small to determine the direction of the association. The association for forced removal of the head of government was not significant.

In cases with forced constitutional reform, private-land ownership was associated with rebel diplomacy characterized as spin doctors. The association for forced removal of the head of government was not significant.
In cases with forced constitutional reform, a jus soli state was associated with rebel diplomacy not being characterized as shopkeepers. The association for forced removal of the head of government was not significant.

In cases with forced constitutional reform, lacking a jus soli state was associated with rebel diplomacy not being characterized as spin doctors. In cases with forced removal of the head of government, it was associated with rebel diplomacy not being characterized as spin doctors.
In cases with forced constitutional reform, hegemony as a movement structure was associated with rebel diplomacy not being characterized as cultivators. Fragmented was associated with rebel diplomacy being characterized as cultivators. The association for forced removal of the head of government was not significant.

In cases with forced constitutional reform, fragmented was associated with rebel diplomacy not being characterized as shopkeepers. The association for forced removal of the head of government was not significant.
For cases forced constitutional reform and cases with forced removal, fragmented was associated with rebel diplomacy being characterized as warriors.

In cases with forced constitutional reform, fragmented was associated with use of coercion and hegemony was associated with no use of coercion. The association for forced removal of the head of government was not significant.
In cases with forced constitutional reform, the association was not significant. For forced removal of the head of government, a unified movement structure was associated with the presence of citizen security elements.

In cases with forced constitutional reform, outbidding as a strategy was associated with a lack of elections early in the transition. The association for forced removal of the head of government was not significant.
In cases with forced constitutional reform, external support was associated with the presence of citizen security elements. The association for forced removal of the head of government was not significant.

In cases with forced constitutional reform, external support was associated with the presence of a popular counter-resistance. The association for forced removal of the head of government was not significant.
In cases with forced constitutional reform, external support was associated with rebel diplomacy being characterized as cultivators. The association for forced removal of the head of government was not significant.

In cases with forced constitutional reform, external support was associated with the rebel group having new or modified flag or currency. The association for forced removal of the head of government was not significant.
In cases with forced constitutional reform, external support was associated with the rebel group not providing health services. The association for forced removal of the head of government was not significant.

In cases with forced constitutional reform, external support was associated with the use of coercion. The association for forced removal of the head of government was not significant.
In cases with forced constitutional reform, the presence of the educated elite was associated with no recurrence of civil war. The association for forced removal of the head of government was not significant.

In cases with forced constitutional reform, the presence of the educated elite was associated with elections early in the transition. The association for forced removal of the head of government was not significant.
In cases with forced constitutional reform, the presence of the educated elite was associated with an absence of a popular counter-resistance. The association for forced removal of the head of government was not significant.

In cases with forced constitutional reform, this was not significant. For forced removal of the head of government, not experiencing a military coup was associated with rebels providing or restoring culture or religion.
In cases with forced constitutional reform, this was not significant. For forced removal of the head of government, a recent inter- or intra-state was associated with civil war recurrence.

In cases with forced constitutional reform, this was not significant. For forced removal of the head of government, industrialization was associated with a lack of expungement.
In cases with forced constitutional reform, this was not significant. For forced removal of the head of government, strategy was associated with the rebel group developing a new or modified flag or currency but the sample size was not large enough to determine the directionality.

END NOTES

1 We also ensure that five years have passed since the state overthrow. Doing this ensures that we have the opportunity to examine characteristics of the post-transition government. Polity IV is managed by the Center for Systemic Peace and is available here: http://www.systemicpeace.org/index.html. The Polity IV database is a comparative, quantitative dataset, covering 1800–2015, with annual cross-national and time-series data. This data allows us to clearly identify marked transitions in “polity” along an authority spectrum within a state. Political theorists ranging from Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke may disagree on the central nature of man in a polity, but it is commonly understood that a “polity” refers to the organization of men (sic) using resources through institutional mechanisms to perform functions of governance. In the modern international system, polity takes the form of a nation-state along the authoritarian to democratic spectrum.

2 The Polity IV dataset was not designed to capture this type of micro-shift. Although there were no cases of dramatic multiparty shift in the sixty-nine cases we identified in the Polity IV dataset, we know that this is a category that should be explored in further research.

3 EDSA refers to the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue where over two million protesters and demonstrators gathered in Manila, Philippines to call for the president’s resignation.


5 While correlation studies can indicate the size and direction of association among variables, causation studies would seek to identify one outcome (an effect) as a direct result of a variable (a cause). A correlation result does not indicate causation. Causation is difficult to clearly establish in social science because there are many potential hidden intervening variables.


16 Income disparity as a driver and socioeconomic disenfranchisement can attenuate relations of reciprocity between those citizens and the government. In such circumstances, actions to address the causes of unrest may, as noted herein “ameliorate tensions.” For more information on this topic, see David M. Malone and Mats Berdal, eds., *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000). The operator through proximity to the population may glean a detailed local picture of the complexities of land usage. This will be of fundamental import in informing policy decisions.


Another element to examine is captured in political scientist James Worrall’s article “(Re-emergent orders: understanding the negotiation(s) of rebel governance,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 28, issue 4-5 (2017): 709–733. He discusses three different dimensions of order: internal, other agents and structures of order, and external.


Note that terrorists tend to be well educated and those in higher paying jobs with better educations are more likely to be radicalized. See Alan B. Kruger, *What Makes a Terrorist? Economics and the Roots of Terrorism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

It is worth noting that the effectiveness of that dominant group may rise and fall, as in the case of Fiji (2000) where businessman George Speight led the initial movement’s activities but was jailed for treason at the hands of some of his one-time coalition-based supporters. In such situations, the education level of the new dominant group should be reevaluated.


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Ibid.


Figure 4 depicts the five stages of resistance put forth in the 2018 ARIS publication, *Understanding States of Resistance*.
This dataset is publicly available and is produced and maintained by the Center for Systemic Peace, a not-for-profit corporation.


The government is concerned about its ability to hold onto power. It uses force to mask this concern and intimidate the population. See Bruce Baker, Security in Post-Conflict Africa: The Role of Nonstate Policing (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2010); Charles T. Call, ed., Constructing Justice and Security After War (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007).


Note that terrorists tend to be well educated and those in higher paying jobs with better educations are more likely to be radicalized. See Alan B. Kruger, *What Makes a Terrorist? Economics and the Roots of Terrorism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).
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