ARTICLES

07 Leveraging SOF Capacity: Fusing Components, TSOCs, and Academics

10 Information and Revolution in Egypt: Assessing the Role of New Media in Contemporary and Future Operating Environments

15 An Unconventional Role for Civil Affairs

27 A Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare

DEPARTMENTS

04 From the Commandant

05 Updates

33 Foreign SOF

34 Career Notes

36 Fitness

37 Book Review

39 Memorial Page

Cover Story

20 Crossing the Red Line: Social Media and Social Network Analysis for Unconventional Campaign Planning

Left: Reading newspapers and chatting on the cell phone over a burnt-out vehicle in Tahrir Square during the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. Wiki Creative Commons photo.
Special Warfare welcomes submissions of scholarly, independent research from members of the armed forces, security policy-makers and -shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists and civilians from the United States and abroad.

Manuscripts should be 2,500 to 3,000 words in length. Include a cover letter. Submit a complete biography with author contact information (i.e., complete mailing address, telephone, fax, e-mail address).


Submit graphics, tables and charts with source references in separate files from the manuscript (no embedded graphics). Special Warfare may accept high-resolution (300 dpi or greater) digital photos; be sure to include a caption and photographer's credit. Prints and 35 mm transparencies are also acceptable. Photos will be returned, if possible.

All submissions will be reviewed in a timely manner. Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all contributions. Special Warfare will attempt to afford authors an opportunity to review the final edited version; requests for changes must be received by the given deadline.

Articles that require security clearance should be cleared by the author's chain of command prior to submission. No payment or honorarium is authorized for publication of articles. Material appearing in Special Warfare is considered to be in the public domain and is not protected by copyright unless it is accompanied by the author's copyright notice. Published works may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and the authors.

Submit articles for consideration to:
Editor, Special Warfare;
Attn: AOJK-PAO; USAJFKSWCS,
3004 Ardennes St., Stop A, Fort Bragg, NC 28310
or e-mail them to SpecialWarfare@ahqb.soc.mil

For additional information:
Contact: Special Warfare
Commercial: (910) 432-5703
DSN: 239-5703

Visit Special Warfare Online
Scan the QR code with your mobile phone barcode reader application or alternatively type the below URL into your browser to view Special Warfare online and to download pdf archives of the magazine.
http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly publication of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, N.C. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special-operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas.

Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and should be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare, USAJFKSWCS, 3004 Ardennes St., Stop A, Fort Bragg, NC 28310. Telephone: DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax 432-6950 or send e-mail to SpecialWarfare@ahqb.soc.mil. Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material.

Published works may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and the authors.

Official distribution is limited to active and reserve special-operations units. Individuals desiring private subscriptions should forward their requests to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Special Warfare is also available on the Internet (http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/).

By order of the Secretary of the Army:
Raymond T. Odierno
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:

Joyce E. Morrow
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
1317103
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Five years before the Arab Spring burned like a wildfire, fanned by the flames of social media, conventional forces on the ground in Iraq learned the importance of social media and the impact it has on securing the support of the populace. Enterprising commanders put the power of social media to work and the face of the conflict changed.

Five years later, with the onslaught of the Arab Spring, the world watched in real-time while bloggers, and posts on Facebook and Tweets on Twitter changed the political landscape of one of the most volatile areas of the world.

For many of us who practice the ancient art of unconventional warfare, it was a wake up call.

We Quiet Professionals must delve into these new realms and learn not only how to understand, but more importantly use this powerful tool in our kit bag.

Leading the charge in exploring this new form of warfare is the Unconventional Warfare Fusion Cell at the Naval Post Graduate School. The cell, which is housed in the CORE Lab in the Defense Analysis Department at NPS, has as its mission the advancement of SOF’s UW capability through the exploration of new ideas and technologies. It goes without saying that an integral part of their analysis revolves around the rise of social media and its impact on unconventional warfare. In this issue, the Soldiers at the UW Fusion Cell share their research on using social movement theory while developing and executing UW mission; crafting social media collection plans to inform UW; using UW to influence dark networks; and the ability of UW planners to use Dynamic Twitter Network Analysis to assist in identifying high-level resistance movement leaders, emerging leaders and gatekeepers. You may be surprised and a bit in awe of the information that can be gathered through the use of social media.

Twelve years ago, our force lead the way into Afghanistan on horseback. Today we are leading the way by harnessing this growing capability to let us know our enemy. This is not Sun Tzu's unconventional warfare, and it is not the version of UW that most of us cut our teeth on, but it is the future, and it is up to each of us to adapt and embrace this new form of warfare.

Veritas et Libertas

Major General Edward M. Reeder Jr.
Night Stalkers awarded for Valor

Several members of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) were presented with valorous awards in a small ceremony Feb. 22, at Hunter Army Airfield, highlighting the expertise and skill of the aviators and crewmen within the regiment.

"Today we get to recognize a number of Night Stalkers whose actions embody the values that have established the legacy of this organization," said Lt. Col. Bill Golden, commander, 3rd Battalion, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne). He described to the audience the circumstances of each mission in which the awards were earned.

On each occasion, the crews were required to react to dynamic combat environments in extremely challenging terrain, Golden said. With complete disregard for their own safety, they each provided precise rotary wing support to the troops on the ground despite a determined and tenacious enemy.

Lt. Gen. Charles T. Cleveland, commanding general, United States Army Special Operations Command, presented the valorous awards to each Night Stalker as their family members and friends looked on.

The Silver Star Medal, the military’s third highest award for valor, was presented to: Maj. Robert K. Beale, CW4 Douglas M. Englen, CW2 Ryan T. Grant, CW2 Brian A. Tallent, Staff Sgt. Jeremy B. Thibodeaux, Staff Sgt. David F. Parkhurst and Cpl. Nicholas L. Arzamendi.

The Distinguished Flying Cross Medal, awarded for heroism or extraordinary achievement while participating in aerial flight, was presented to: Staff Sgt. Wilfred O. Browne, Sgt. Bobby W. Buchanan, Sgt. Aaron L. Green, Sgt. Christopher G. Harmon, Sgt. Andrew P. Hayes and Sgt. Bryan L. Johnson. — by Maj. Mike Burns, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment Public Affairs.

Soldier’s Medal Awarded

Staff Sgt. Tyrone A. Mitchell, a Soldier in the 8th Military Information Support Battalion was awarded the Soldier’s Medal on Feb. 13 during a ceremony hosted by Lt. Gen. Charles T. Cleveland in Kennedy Auditorium, on the campus of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.

Mitchell was awarded the medal for his actions on May 20, 2012, in removing an unconscious passenger from an overturned vehicle. Mitchell, who stopped to assist with the accident, noticed that the passenger was unconscious and that there was smoke in the cabin of the overturned vehicle. After directing another individual to call for help, Mitchell broke the rear glass out of the vehicle, climbed in and pulled the driver to safety.

Mitchell was humbled by the award and said it was just something that any Soldier would do in that situation.

“At the end of the day, any service member, if they were in the same situation, would’ve done the exact same thing,” he added. “You feel as if you’re a public servant; you serve the people of the United States. If you see someone in trouble, either in uniform or out of uniform, you feel that you have to try to do something to help them or keep them out of harm’s way.”

The Soldier’s Medal was introduced in 1926, and is awarded to any person of the Armed Forces of the United States or of a friendly foreign nation who, while serving in any capacity with the Army of the United States, distinguishes himself or herself by heroism not involving actual conflict with an enemy. It is the highest honor a Soldier can receive for an act of valor in a non-combat situation and is equal to the Distinguished Service Cross. — by Andrew Tate, USASOC Public Affairs.
Rangers receive awards for bravery in Afghanistan

Rangers from the 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, stood proudly at an awards ceremony in front of the Ranger Memorial at Hunter Army Airfield, Oct. 26, as Gen. Raymond Odierno, chief of staff for the United States Army, gave remarks. Afterwards, Odierno presented the Presidential Unit Citation (Army) for Extraordinary Heroism to the battalion for combat actions in Afghanistan, in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, May 15 to Oct. 20, 2010.

The citation stated, “...during that period, the battalion and its subordinate units displayed conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action while conducting combat operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. It displayed extraordinary heroism, combat achievement and unwavering fidelity while executing numerous and diverse missions. It conducted time-sensitive raids and deliberate movements to contact operations in enemy-held terrain, out of reach by other friendly forces.”

Sgt. Craig Warfle, of Charlie Company, was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, the Army’s second most prestigious award of valor. Three Silver Star Medals, three Bronze Star Medals for Valor and nine Joint Service Commendation Medals for Valor were also awarded. — by Nancy Gould, Hunter Army Airfield.

Ranger named USASOC Medic of the Year

Staff Sgt. Christopher Hutchison, company senior medic, Company A, 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment has been named U.S. Army Special Operations Command Medic of the Year. This is the fourth year in a row that a combat medic from the 75th Ranger Regiment has been awarded this prestigious honor.

“It is so surreal. I don’t think I did anything at all to deserve this award,” said Hutchison. “It’s humbling to even be considered for such a significant award.”

Hutchison has provided medical coverage on more than 275 combat missions and has demonstrated excellence on every single one of them, according to his nomination letter.

“Hutch has always been assiduous with training and his combat medic skills,” said Cpt. Andrew Fisher, battalion physician assistant, 1st Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment. “He takes the extra time to ensure his subordinate medics are trained to the best of their ability.”

Hutchison was the first combat medic to administer TXA, which is a clotting agent that until recently had been authorized for use in the pre-hospital environment by special-operation forces medics.

“The patient was evacuated to the nearest medical treatment facility, where he underwent multiple surgeries and made a complete recovery,” said Fisher. “Staff Sgt. Hutchison received accolades from the medical providers for his assertive and accurate treatments. Staff Sgt. Hutchison is a devoted and extraordinary Ranger Medic. He possesses all the moral qualities and maturity needed to excel both personally and professionally. He is an immeasurable asset to our organization and his moral compass and discipline are beyond reproach.” — by Tracy A. Bailey, 75th Ranger Regiment Public Affairs.

Green Berets Pay Tribute to JFK’s vision of elite counterinsurgency force

The U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) held a commemorative President John F. Kennedy Wreath Laying Ceremony Oct. 18 at the JFK grave site at Arlington National Cemetery. The event paid tribute to JFK’s vision of building a dedicated counterinsurgency force, a vision that helped bring the Green Berets into an elite force recognized around the world.

Brig. Gen. Christopher Haas, the commanding general of USASFCA (Airborne), was joined by Jean Kennedy Smith and Michael Sheehan in presenting a Green Beret-shaped wreath during the ceremony. Smith, who served as the U.S. Ambassador to Ireland from 1993 until 1998, said later that it was an honor to take part in the ceremony recognizing her late brother’s patronage for the Green Berets.

Sheehan, a Green Beret who retired from the Army in 1997, is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. For much of his military and civilian careers, Sheehan has been involved in counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, peacekeeping and law-enforcement operations.

In October 1961, JFK commended the men of the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, N.C., on their efforts to prepare a force of unconventional warriors to combat growing threats to our nation.

“’The challenge of this old but new form of operations is a real one and I know that you and the members of your command will carry on for us and the free world in a manner which is both worthy and inspiring,” Kennedy wrote. “I am sure that the Green Beret will be a mark of distinction in the trying times ahead.” — by Staff Sgt. Marcus Butler, USASFC Public Affairs.

3rd SFG(A) Soldier named Army’s 2012 Soldier of the Year

Sgt. Saral Shrestha was named the Army’s 2012 Soldier of the Year during the Association of the United States Army’s Sergeant Major of the Army Awards Luncheon in Washington, D.C. They earned the titles after proving their mettle earlier this month at the Best Warrior Competition at Fort Lee, Va.

“It was about the total Soldier concept,” said Sergeant Major of the Army Raymond F. Chandler III. “We stressed them mentally as well as physically. We challenged them on their creative and critical thinking skills while under pressure. Each one (who competed) should be very proud of what they achieved to get to this place.”

Shrestha began his Soldier of the Year quest when he was a specialist, but has since been promoted. He came to the United States from Nepal when he was 17 and joined the Army at age 21. Shrestha, a power generation equipment repairer, is assigned to Group Service Support Co., Group Support Bn., 3rd Special Forces Group. He has served for three years in the Army and has deployed to Afghanistan. He has a bachelor’s degree in computer information science and wants to earn a master’s degree in computer engineering and become an Army officer. — by David Vergun, Army News.
LEVERAGING SOF CAPACITY:
FUSING COMPONENTS, TSOCS, AND ACADEMICS

BY CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER 4 BRUCE DEFEYTER

“Humans are more important than hardware.” — SOF Truth

The Problem

In Army special operations, our greatest investments and resources are arguably our people as opposed to technology, platforms or systems. These people provide our various commands capability through their capacity to learn, train, analyze, plan and lead our forces globally. While our capability is almost certainly unmatched, our capacity is finite. Our force’s capacity is limited by literally the hours in a day and the tasks we are pitted against. Our enemy is not only the shifting non-state actors, or nimble terrorist networks, it is often time itself. It is the proverbial axiom of 150 pounds being shoved in a 100-pound rucksack. Whether SOF personnel are assigned to a component command or belong to a theater special operations command, we try to perform a myriad of tasks ranging from routine training events, conducting inventory inspections, participating in staff briefings, analyzing plans, providing feedback to policy and doctrine, conducting mission analysis, preparing for deployment and at the same time, trying to balance a personal life — and that is while we are not actively deployed.

Given the increasing demands placed on SOF, its most limiting factor is almost unquestionably time. This constraint is understood at all levels of command and was recently highlighted by Admiral Bill McRaven, commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, in 2012 when he identified a “…demanding operational tempo” (McRaven, USSOCOM Posture Statement 2012) as one of the two major stressors to the force. Reinforcing the message, the USSOCOM Command Sergeant Major Chris Faris, stated in a USA Today article, that even with large ground-combat operations winding down, SOF will be “…expected to continue playing a crucial role, fighting at a high tempo” (Zoroya 2012). Therefore, with inadequate time to commit our finite capacity to conduct quality detailed planning and mission analysis, why are we ignoring our greatest untouched reservoir of strength — the untouched capacity of people?

Background

While the Department of Defense has multiple venues and settings for professional military education, this article will focus on the Naval Postgraduate School, and more specifically, the Defense Analysis Department. The Direct Action Department is unique in that it is a joint SOF institution heavily focused on the irregular-warfare environment. This 18-24 month program, founded in 1992 by Dr. Gordon McCormick and then-Commander Bill McRaven, was designed to “…develop critical thinkers and capable operators, planners and commanders for the rigors of irregular warfare” (Naval Postgraduate School 2013). Today, Professor Dr. John Arquilla, the department chair, describes the DA mission as “…to arm select U.S. military professionals with the critical thinking skills and specialized knowledge that they will need for waging and prevailing in the complex conflicts under way — and those to come.”

A unique feature to this duty, in stark contrast to a USSOCOM component or Theater Special Operations Command assignment, is that personnel have the time to read, think and plan. Combined with routine access to SIPR, JWICs and JIANT, state-of-the-art analytical tools, recognized subject-matter experts and proven operational practitioners, the NPS students have an unparalleled opportunity for rigorous operational research. One example of the analytical tools available would be the Common Operational Research Environmental Laboratory. The CORE lab “…prepares military officers to return to the force armed with the ability to apply advanced analytical technologies and theories to real-world situations, as well as articulate the appropriate requirements and manage similar efforts for the warfighter.”

Probably for the first time in a SOF career, the service member has academic instruction, capability and capacity to effectively analyze and plan. What the NPS student lacks is routine access to prioritized “real-world” operational missions and relevant force data to plan future operations, activi-
ties and programs. In other words, what the students learn and acquire at NPS is not fully aligned or synchronized with the planning needs of operational missions. It is this juxtaposition of capability and capacity that this article highlights the creation of the NPS UW Fusion Cell to build a nexus between the components, the TSOCs and NPS.

Concept

As depicted in Figure 1, the UW Fusion Cell will serve as an intellectual catalyst; strengthening the relationship between component, TSOC and NPS without fundamentally altering any entity of this three-sided equation. Each partner in this intellectual equation brings its own specific skill sets and operational requirements to the fusion cell to combine them in ways each organization could not do. The component brings to the table, true force capabilities and readiness issues, while the TSOC holds the real-world operational realities and requirements; NPS has the analytical capability and capacity to coordinate the two conditions into a seamless product that all sides can readily consume. The end result is a more agile, flexible and robust entity, capable of confronting the challenges faced by the TSOC or component. In order to make the fusion cell a functioning entity, several key things have to occur.

First, designated project officers from each of the components, TSOCs and NPS have been identified and empowered to speak and work actions on behalf of their commands. The forum for discussion would likely be a quarterly meeting conducted in person at NPS. Additionally, the project officers would need to have some level of operational flexibility to travel in order to work around one of the major constraints NPS has: the student course schedule. While face-to-face coordination is the most desirable and useful form of communication, VTCs and emails can be used to conduct in-progress reviews or course corrections. Ultimately, the project officer would need to have some level of continuity to be able to see the various tasks through to the end to prevent project drift or creep.

Second, a synchronization point would have to be designated; a likely candidate would be the SOF chair at NPS. While the fusion cell will not likely require a traditional “line-and-block chart” to articulate authority, resources and requirements will need to be balanced. The SOF chair is occupied by an active-duty SOF O6, designated by USSOCOM, who could provide coordination and deconfliction between the components, TSOCs and the academic facilities. Furthermore, the SOF Chair would also have the insight as to which projects would be able to be synchronized with relevant academic courses. Furthermore, the USSOCOM representation theoretically provides the group a neutral point of view, favoring any component or any TSOC.

Finally, clear and concise proposals would have to be scoped in a collaborative and cooperative manner between all parties prior to start to ensure, academic goals were met and customer expectations were managed. It also needs to be understood that not every project will be able to be answered. The time constraints will range from a short three-month analytical analysis to a two-year capstone project.

Micro Modeling

While the above concept is in the early stages of implementation, experimental micro-modeling has occurred successfully in several ad-hoc venues. Currently, there exists a collaborative effort between NPS and the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School’s Unconventional Warfare Operational Design Course and the unconventional Warfare Network Design Course with material and limited instructor exchanges. A few instructors from NPS have also participated in UW mobile training teams organized by the USAJFJKSWCS empowering Special Forces groups with regional focus. At the same time, student feedback from the UWODC and UWNDC has helped the DA Department refine its courses on UW.

Another example has occurred between the USASOC G3X, the Warrant Officer Institute and the Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate, formerly known as Directorate of Training and Doctrine. As a matter of routine, several key field manuals, a security-classification guide and USSOCOM directives were put into staffing at the ARSOF level. Each of the publications dealt with complex subjects, interrelated topics, consisting of multiple lengthy chapters and nearly all written in a classified venue — all of which make this sort of detailed analysis difficult by the various component service commands under the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

The Special Forces Warrant Officer Advanced Course is a 10-week PME located at Fort Bragg, N.C. The course prepares company-grade warrant officers for duties of increasing responsibility after serving on a Special Forces operational detachment-alpha. Students spend the course perfecting five competencies: unconventional warfare, operations/intelligence fusion, planning, training management and operating in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational environment. It was the operations/intelligence fusion, planning and training management analysis that sparked the original concept: If students are required to write, could that analysis be coordinated and synchronized with existing analytical requirements? On an informal basis, coordinated between the commandant of the Warrant Officer Institute and the USASOC G3X, the SFWOAC incorporated these routine reviews.
The feedback received by the CDID was insightful and accurate, due in large part to the students having the time to actually break down and digest, question and review the materials in a methodical manner. The average SFWOAC consists of 20-24 students, from across the Special Forces Regiment, each of whom spent an hour a day for four weeks working on the review. The cumulative man hours from the class easily exceeded 480 hours of analysis.

Advantages and Disadvantages

A more mature and robust fusion cell has several obvious advantages. First, NPS offers a good representative cross sampling of Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine SOF of various MOSs, regional affiliations and operational experiences. This will provide the TSOCs and the components a diverse level of experiences upon which to draw. Second, the introduction of real-world operational requirements or component readiness issues provides tangible data for NPS students and faculty to manipulate and analyze, with state-of-the-art analytics, as opposed to working with canned data. Third, by leveraging NPS analytical capacity, the components and TSOCs will actually be able to have important or complex problem sets worked on more closely by dedicated personnel that are now freed up from the routine distractions of operational assignments. Fourth, by doing the analysis and spending time with the problem sets, students will develop an authentic subject-matter expertise that, with the appropriate talent management, will bring genuine credibility to the next assignment; TSOC or component. Finally, with today’s constrained budgets and monetary concerns, the proposal is essentially free, aside from some minor T&D. At its core, the fusion cell simply leverages existing capacity, and utilizes project officers to scope and monitor various projects under the tutelage of world-class academics.

As with any new effort, certain disadvantages should be noted. First, as referenced above, NPS is a PME that is designed to educate SOF leaders for future assignments. The curriculum cannot be redirected to support component or TSOC projects alone. The intent is to find synergy where it is applicable and leverage it where possible. Second, while NPS does offer a good cross sampling of SOF expertise, not all classes are equal. Third, because this fusion cell will operate in the gaps and seams between NPS, the components and the TSOCs it will require a cooperative and collaborative approach as opposed to a traditional military hierarchy. Fourth, it needs to be understood by the customer that while NPS facilities, staff and students are producing world-class academic instruction and analysis, final project fidelity will need to be managed by the project officer.

The Future

The evolutionary phase of growing the UW Fusion Cell is to develop a small pilot project between one or two TSOCs, components and NPS to prototype the fusion cell process with the focus on an existing operational problem sets being paired with current curriculum. For instance, pairing the current requirement by a selected TSOC, with a national priority, to develop specific UW campaign plans and synchronizing this project with NPS’s courses. During this pilot project it will be important to establish ground rules and project scopes to set expectations and conditions for success on all sides. The goal should be to build habitual, programmatic, elastic and systematic relationships between Naval Postgraduate School, the TSOCs and the USOOCOM component commands.

Conclusion

In the March 2013 USSOCOM posture statement, Adm. McRaven noted “the goal is to increase capacity and capabilities of the TSOC and their assigned forces to the GCCs to conduct full spectrum special operations.” (McRaven, USSOCOM Posture Statement 2013). If humans are SOFs most important resource, the community should look for ways to leverage that advantage where ever it exists. As demonstrated in the micro model, the concept works. The intent of the fusion cell is not to shrug off responsibility, or transfer the preponderance of staff analysis every command requires, but rather to balance the analytical capacity of the force.

The endstate of the fusion cell is a cooperative and collaborative group of academics, students and operational planners working in a synergistic manner, leveraging state-of-the art analytics, facilities and subject-matter expertise focused on a common set of problems that affect the entire SOF community.
Assessing the Role of New Media in Contemporary and Future Operating Environments

BY SERGEANT FIRST CLASS PHILLIP THORPE

“The advent and power of connection technologies — tools that connect people to vast amounts of information and to one another — will make the 21st century all about surprises. Governments will be caught off guard when large numbers of their citizens, armed with virtually nothing but cellphones, take part in mini-rebellions that challenge their authority.”

— Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen, “The Digital Disruption”

Introduction

Recognizing the impact of web-based social media on the events of the Arab Spring in 2011, the special-operations community has dedicated a considerable amount of time and effort to understanding the value and potential effects of new media in contemporary and future operating environments. One must assume that the primary concern of this effort seeks to understand how the realities of rapid information flow in the 21st century affects future planning at all levels. Efforts toward understanding the role of new media in current and future operations have produced a body of knowledge — some of which this publication has recorded for the consideration of current and future practitioners — that will inform and inspire future thinking about continued efforts toward that end.

There is no doubt of the importance of new media’s role, specifically Web-based social media, in some of the successes of the Arab Spring. Therefore, there is value in examining specific cases from that series of historic events to develop an appreciation for the inherent complexities of contemporary operating environments. A brief examination of the conditions that led to the mass protests turned revolution in Egypt and an analysis of the state of information freedom in post-revolution Egypt provides a lens through which one can expand thinking about the utility of employing new media in irregular-warfare operations, including unconventional warfare. However, the value of considering all available media when planning operations must not be understated.

Creating the Conditions for Revolution

Following the 1981 assassination of President Anwar Sadat, the Egyptian parliament invoked an emergency law, created during the presidency of Gamal Nasser in 1958, and declared a state of emergency. Hosni Mubarak used the emergency law in varying degrees over the course of his presidency, ostensibly as a means to fight domestic terrorism but more often to quell domestic social and political dissent. In 2006, Mubarak pushed for the parliament to renew the emergency law while promising to replace it in the future with a counter-terrorism law that would limit the power of the executive to censor media and detain citizens indefinitely. Abuse of the emergency law over the first 20 years of Mubarak’s presidency increased the power of the executive to the detriment of the other branches of government. This unrivaled power of the executive effectively limited real freedom of the press in Egypt.
In 1993, Egypt connected to the Internet through a link between the Egyptian Universities Network and French Internet providers.\(^3\) Egypt privatized the Internet in 1996 with the introduction of 12 commercial Internet service providers.\(^4\) With the privatization of the Internet came increased access for the Egyptian public to the networked world and all of the information that was consequently accessible. Internet access within Egypt since the turn of the 21st century increased at a high rate. In 2000, less than 1 percent of Egyptians had access to the Internet; by 2011, the percentage of Egyptians with access to the Internet grew to more than 38 percent.\(^5\) These figures do not account for the unknown number of Egyptians that connect to the Internet in cyber cafés and at friends’ homes or while at work.

The number of Internet users in Egypt increased exponentially over the course of the last decade, increasing the potential for citizens anonymously to express their criticism of the government and its institutions. Mubarak’s security apparatus detained bloggers that posted criticism of the government on the Web, persecuting the increasing inclination of connected Egyptians to question government policies and actions.\(^6\)

The Egyptian government’s push to make Egypt the hub of information and communications-technology development in the region had unintended effects for the Mubarak regime. A grassroots movement of social and political protest emerged, calling for change in Egypt. The reality of Internet proliferation and the subsequent diffusion of information between network-connected members of Egyptian society unintentionally promoted the protests against Mubarak’s government that started on January 25, 2011, culminating in the dictator’s resignation on February 11, 2011.\(^7\)
Information and Revolution

The development of modern ICT infrastructure in Egypt during the 1990s and the boom of Internet users in the first decade of the 21st century bolstered economic and government development efforts. However, the proliferation of computers and Internet access increased the flow of “free information” to Egyptians, complicating the government’s efforts to control discourse in the country.

The Egyptian government wielded considerable control over Egypt’s terrestrial television networks and used them as a platform for dissemination of pro-government news stories. Access to private satellite television networks, such as Al Jazeera, flourished in Egypt, however providing alternative perspectives for those Egyptians able to afford the subscription costs. Despite the government’s tight control of state-run television networks, the Egyptian news media “was relatively free, giving vent to popular frustrations.” This allowed for a degree of dialogue on sensitive political, social and economic issues in the news media and through public demonstrations. However, the Egyptian Ministry of Information and the state security police paid close attention to the level of government criticism in the news media and had experience dealing with public demonstrations, ensuring that they did not escalate to an uncontrollable size.

Egypt’s emergency law legalized government censorship and allowed state security to imprison citizens for lengthy periods without formal charges or court trial. Abuse of the emergency law, as well as a myriad of other political, social and economic grievances commonly led to widespread protests against the government throughout the decade, providing Egyptians with practice at combating the containment efforts of security police. Whereas issues that concerned distinct elements of the population usually motivated protests in the years prior to the revolution, the January 25, 2011 protests brought these seemingly different interest groups together in a way in which the security police and the government were not accustomed.

The convergence of political, economic and social-interest groups in a mass protest, kept informed by access to free information via the Internet and other new media platforms, was not something that Egypt’s security police had planned for or were adequately prepared to deal with. Initially, the Egyptian government did not officially recognize the protests as a threat and, as such, made no mention of them in the state-run news media.

The government narrative of the protestors as intransigent elements of the population echoed across state-run news media for days. State-run television news programs showed video footage purporting to be of pro-Mubarak protestors and aired interviews with “protestors,” their faces covered and voices disguised, claiming to have trained in Israel. However, the government very likely hired these “protestors” to act in a manner that reinforced the government narrative of the actual protestors as thugs attempting to destabilize the country. The regime’s narrative espoused the idea that the protestors were agents of foreign powers seeking to destabilize Egyptian society and Egypt’s economy, imploring protestors to end their uprising for the ‘good’ of the country and the Egyptian people.

Both regular citizens and veteran activists used web-based social media, such as Facebook, to promote the protest narrative while the government used state-run television news media to promote its own narrative. The protestors’ narrative focused on the desire for rule of law and justice in Egypt, as well as the resignation of the president and the conduct of fair and democratic elections.

In response to the rising tide of protests, Egyptian government officials ordered ISPs to sever links to Internet gateways, effectively shutting off the Internet. Protestors used face-to-face communication as their primary method of communication following the Egyptian government’s Internet shutdown. The move by the Egyptian government to shut down the Internet was unprecedented at the time and caused observers outside of Egypt to increase criticism of the Mubarak’s regime authoritarian abuses. Technology-savvy Egyptians were able to use proxy networks to circumvent the government Internet shutdown and Twitter had its technicians upload to Twitter.com leave voice messages that were translated into ‘Tweets’ and then translated into ‘Tweets’ and then upload to Twitter.com.

The regime finally relented and ordered the reconnection of Egyptian ISPs to the Internet on February 1, 2011. Nevertheless, the protests continued and on February 11, President Mubarak ceded control of the government to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. In less than a month, Egyptian protestors achieved what they thought was impossible, using global communications technology to mobilize seemingly disparate interests within the population into action to pursue regime change and an end to government abuses. Over the course of the next year, the SCAF maintained control of the government, eventually submitting to popular appeals for a democratic, multi-party election.

A “New” Egypt

In the year following the Egyptian revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood, through its Freedom and Justice Party, campaigned for and won enough seats in the Egyptian parliament to give them a major stake in the formation of a parliamentary coalition and the
ability to nominate a serious candidate for the presidency. In June 2012, Egyptians elected Mohamed Morsi, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, as their new president. However, his win was not without objection from liberal elements within Egyptian public and political spheres.

President Morsi faces opposition to the newly adopted constitution and he is dealing with a push by many Egyptians to balance the powers of the executive with those of the other branches of government, such as parliament and the judiciary. Furthermore, President Morsi reenacted emergency law to deal with domestic security concerns created by the continuation of protests in the most problematic areas of the country. His actions raise important questions about the future of information in Egypt. If President Morsi adopts Mubarak-style tactics to deal with domestic issues, what is the potential outcome in Egypt for the freedoms that the population sought to gain from the revolution?

The Future of Information in Egypt

In Mubarak's Egypt, citizens had little to no voice in politics. The revolution empowered Egyptians and now the power of protest pervades the whole country. Although average Egyptians feel empowered and willing to criticize moves by the government that they find objectionable, public opinion is not a strong enough force in Egypt to stop the president from making decisions that may serve to benefit his party and others in his political bloc.

In November 2012, President Morsi asserted his power over the judiciary by making a constitutional declaration that shielded the president's decisions from judicial oversight, citing a mandate from the ideals of the Egyptian revolution, such as routing out remnants of the Mubarak regime. This move found Morsi at the receiving end of a lot of criticism, within and outside of Egypt. One may argue that Morsi is attempting to stifle criticism by shielding himself from judicial oversight, effectively becoming Egypt's newest dictator.

Moreover, Morsi invoked emergency law in January 2013 to quell protests in the cities of Port Said, Suez and Ismailia. Again, this action only served to increase the level of protests against him and his government. The legacy of Morsi's predecessors lives on in Egypt through the inclination of the new president to make executive decisions with little regard for public opinion or for the separation of government powers.

What, then, will be the future of the Internet and the free flow of information in the “new” Egypt? It is true that Egyptians are freer today to express publicly their dissatisfaction with the government and its institutions. However, there is evidence that this trend toward greater freedom of expression is slowing due to the pervasive influence of the conservative agenda of some of the more ardently Islamist elements within the new government. Web-based social media continues to thrive in Egypt, providing the public with an outlet to express sentiment and for the government to gauge public opinion. President Morsi's government is aware of the new methods of communication for the younger generation of Egyptians. Whereas Mubarak used state television to address Egyptians, Morsi is using Twitter to communicate with the population and to respond to their inquiries in a limited fashion. Many young Egyptians view the state-run media as a corrupt arm of the government, biased toward the regime. On Twitter, however, one may comment freely, providing instant praise or criticism for the government as well as private citizens. Morsi’s use of Twitter as a communications medium may be an attempt to appear more in tune with Egyptians than his predecessor was.

However free and democratic many Egyptians want their country to be, they must still contend with the state's sovereign power, its monopoly on violence. On March 24, 2013, President Morsi, while providing remarks at a conference, issued a warning to Egyptians against using media to “incite violence” in Egypt. Just a day later, on March 25, Egypt's prosecutor general issued arrest warrants for five
prominent activists, including a blogger, citing their complicity in the violence that erupted outside of the Muslim Brotherhood headquarters building in Cairo the previous Friday.

Previous authoritarian regimes in Egypt paid little attention to public opinion, asserted tight control over the media and created policy despite the concerns of either of the other two elements in the media, public opinion and policy relationship, namely, the media and the public. Morsi’s government has yet to spiral completely into such an authoritarian model.

Employing New Media in Operations

Egypt offers one example of a complex contemporary operating environment with multiple and competing narratives. Disparate interests work alongside one another and often in contrast to one another. This is a familiar scenario for Army special-operations forces, but it serves as a reminder of the numerous complexities present in contemporary operating environments and is a sample of what ARSOF will face in the future.

Employing new media to reach target audiences is beneficial when planning operations in areas that have a moderate or high level of Internet access. For instance, a relatively moderate level of Internet access in Egypt fostered an environment where information crossed enough social and political boundaries that it promoted awareness of the impending protests of January 2011. Traditional media in Egypt — often controlled by the state — and word-of-mouth never produced the type of inter-group coherence necessary to promote a large-scale protest, such as the one that forced the resignation of Mubarak.

Every operating environment is different and it is necessary to treat each as dissimilar until proven otherwise. Planning for irregular-warfare operations, including unconventional warfare, requires robust analysis of information environments. Despite the persistent attention paid today to web-based social-media platforms as a vehicle for message dissemination, it is ill advised to focus myopically on a single medium when planning inform and influence activities. Military Information Support Operations practitioners must always consider the full range of available media in any given information environment and be prepared to offer candid assessments to commanders, whose decisions are based on their analysis of the information environment and the potential psychological effects of IIA.

Sergeant First Class Phillip Thorpe is a recent graduate of National Defense University’s Master of Arts in Strategic Security Studies program at Fort Bragg, N.C. Additionally, he holds a Bachelor of Science in Marketing from Southern New Hampshire University. Thorpe attended the Psychological Operations Sergeant reclassification course in 2005. He has served in various positions within the 8th Military Information Support Battalion (Airborne). Prior to attending the NDU MASS program, he was a small group leader for the Psychological Operations Senior Leaders Course at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School’s Noncommissioned Officer Academy.

Notes

10. Ibid., 56.
12. Ibid., 23-25
13. Ibid., 26-27
14. Ibid., 33
Introduction

Unconventional warfare is one of the eight core activities of U.S. Army special-operations forces. ARSOF units are responsible for understanding their potential role and requirements in a UW campaign. Unconventional Warfare is defined as "activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area." The U.S. military's role in a UW campaign is to work with an indigenous organization to facilitate changes in the behavior or structure of a regime unfriendly to the U.S. An organized insurgency is a struggle to wrest legitimacy and influence within a population away from the state by using political mobilization, violence and insurgency. ARSOF Civil Affairs, with the mission to engage the population and civil institutions, can play a critical role in a UW campaign.

The Nature of Unconventional Warfare

Indigenous organizations that seek to alter or replace a regime start from a position of weakness as they have a deficit in terms of military power and material resources. To overcome their initial weakness the challengers must create alternative sources of power. The population is the source of this power; it has the potential to supply the nascent insurgency with members, resources and political power with which to challenge the regime. In order to leverage this potential source of power the insurgency may use a mixture of violence, non-violent protest and civil unrest, propaganda and other information operations, subversion, economic manipulation and political mobilization. The insurgents seek to "seize, nullify or challenge political control of a region." An insurgency must design and execute a campaign that combines a variety of political, social, informational, economic and military activities that allow it to gain influence and legitimacy over a population. It is then the role of the U.S. unconventional warfare joint and interagency adviser force (UW JTF) to advise and assist the insurgency as it develops and executes this campaign. Within this complex environment, all elements of SOF must understand their specific roles and how they can support the designated UW commander.

U.S. Army Special Operations Forces Civil Affairs

Soldiers working within SOF CA units are specially trained and organized and are assigned to the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne), which is part of the U.S. Army's Special Operations Command. CA Soldiers establish, maintain, influence or exploit relations between the military and the population and civilian institutions. CA Soldiers also conduct analysis of the civil and social systems within an area to determine the weaknesses and vulnerabilities within those systems. Since September 2001, CA forces have been deployed to a variety of unstable regions and have gained considerable experience working with partner nations to identify and mitigate civil vulnerabilities. In a UW environment CA can apply the same skills and experience in support of the insurgency.

Members of a CA team can execute four essential tasks: 1) conduct tailored civil reconnaissance, 2) advise and assist the insurgency on the development of a parallel or shadow civil government, 3) support the insurgency's ability to achieve a high level of political mobilization within the population and 4) assist the insurgency in the facilitation of civil unrest and non-violent protests.
Civil Reconnaisance

Civil Affairs operators are masters of mapping the human and physical domain of an operational area. In a UW environment the understanding and articulation of the Human Domain is essential to a successful campaign design and remains critical throughout the execution of the campaign.16

Civil reconnaissance has been an essential element of most successful insurgencies. Mao's civil reconnaissance and social system analysis in China led him to select a rural peasant-based insurgent organization as opposed to a Leninist urban-based insurgency.17 Between 1959 and 1964, the Communist insurgency in South Vietnam and the North Vietnamese Army devoted considerable resources to civil reconnaissance and mapping of the civil systems in South Vietnam. The NVA helped the VC send teams to villages with the specific task of mapping the social system, influential leaders and civil vulnerabilities within that village. This information was used later as the VC leveraged the identified civil vulnerabilities to create causes for political mobilization.18

a. Map the civil and social system that supports the regime19 and identify civil weaknesses which can be used against the system.20 In most cases the regime is supported by a strong and loyal security apparatus and a powerful group of pro-regime elites. However the majority of the population does not enjoy the privileges of elite status and is the source of the regime's power and resources.21 During the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Islamist Movement influenced oil-industry workers to strike because they understood the oil industry was essential to the regime's survival; however, the oil workers did not enjoy any improved status.22 The regime is dependent on the continued participation of the non-elites in this system in order to keep its society stable and maintain its power. In a UW environment, SOF CA can help the UW JTF as well as insurgency leadership understand the civil/social system and its weaknesses.23

Mao called these weaknesses “political problems” and “unsolved contradictions” and claimed they were essential to crafting a successful insurgency.24 Professor Doug McAdam describes these weaknesses as opportunities that exist within the broader sociopolitical environment of which the insurgency may be able to take advantage.25 These opportunities are described as civil vulnerabilities by CA doctrine and SOF CA teams are experienced in identifying civil vulnerabilities within the target society.26

The Vietcong were masters at using the frustrations of landless peasants attempting to gain land ownership and converting those frustrations into political mobilization.27 The resistance movement in Tunisia leveraged popular frustration due to the corruption of the Ben Ali government and their inability to seek redress for government imposed injustice to mobilize mass protests that lead to the government's collapse.28 Civil vulnerabilities are powerful tools but they must be understood to be used.

b. Social group analysis. Within a regime there exists a variety of non-official groups that emerge in response to social issues. These groups may not be overt supporters of the insurgency but their organization can contribute valuable resources. The New People’s Army, a Communist insurgency active in the Philippines for more than 40 years, leverages a relationship with sympathetic social groups such as PISTON (transportation workers), Gabriela (women’s group) and the League of Filipino Students as a tool to recruit members, collect information and resources and to create social pressure through protests and work stoppages.29 A thorough understanding of the social groups that are active within the UW environment is essential to the UW JTF.30

Governance

Renowned insurgency expert Dr. Bernard Fall noted a government that is being beaten by an insurgency is not being out fought, rather it is being out-administered.31 Thus resistance movements that understand the political necessities of the conflict and seek to gain support from the population must be able to legitimately administer the population.32

Shadow governments are usually associated with insurgent movements that seek to overthrow the regime or create a breakaway state such as the very well developed shadow state created by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in northern Sri Lanka. The Tamil Tigers had a sophisticated civilian infrastructure from mayors to healthcare professionals to a banking system, all functioning as if they were already an independent Tamil state.33 However other insurgent groups have created parallel governance structures as a tool to pressure the state or to improve the resiliency of the resistance. In Poland, in the late 1970s and 1980s, the Solidarity Movement created parallel orga-
nizations to provide social services and support to its members and increase their capacity to withstand state repression. The goal of this parallel government “was not to seize state power, but rather to forge an autonomous civil society so that the opposition could subsequently engage the state from a stronger position.”

Based on SOF CA training and experience working with, advising and mentoring local governments throughout the world, CA teams are uniquely qualified to mentor shadow civil governments. The principles of good governance and legitimacy remain the same whether dealing with the standing government or a shadow government challenging the regime, and SOF CA teams have the requisite training and education, that allows them to draw on appropriate institutional knowledge to assist a shadow government.

A functioning and legitimate shadow government can play a significant role in the success of an insurgency. Some specific shadow-government functions are: establishment of insurgent legitimacy and influence/displacement of regime legitimacy and influence; management of community resources in support of the insurgent organization; and preparation for the transition to post-regime governance.

The seventh and final phase of a UW campaign is the transition phase. In this phase the UW JTF assists the victorious insurgent movement in transitioning into a legitimate government. The Vietcong’s construction of a functioning shadow government that satisfied all the functions of governance is the best documented. Other examples include the sophisticated governance and social-assistance organizations created by Hezbollah, Hamas and the Tamil Tigers, all of which led to substantial legitimacy and influence for their parent insurgent organization.

Political Mobilization

The support of the population is an essential element of a successful insurgency; however, support is not simply gaining the sympathy or the hearts and minds of the population. It is imperative that the insurgents move the population to take action. The process of converting inactive individuals into an active organization is mobilization. This is the core problem for the insurgency “to mobilize the people in a struggle for political control and legitimacy.”

The insurgency must organize the population in order to gain advantage from their support. Thus the process for political mobilization is a) leverage civil vulnerabilities to create collective grievances b) raise the “insurgent” conscientious of the population and c) organize the population.

a. Leverage Civil Vulnerabilities to create collective grievances. Individual problems are not sufficient to mobilize support for the insurgency. The resistance movement has to identify potential causes (information gained through the civil-reconnaissance process) that can be transformed into collective grievances.

b. Raise the “insurgent” conscientious of the population and help the people understand that change is possible. Mao called this raising the insurgent conscientiousness and Professor McAdam refers to this as cognitive liberation — some oppressed populations have accepted their role in the regime’s social system and do not see the potential for social change that would offer them greater opportunities. This can be defined as a type of fatalism in which the population accepts the unjust behavior of the regime. This can be a significant hurdle for the resistance movement, but through the skilled combination of strategic messaging and actions that establish the resistance movement’s legitimacy, the people will begin to accept that the potential for change is possible. The resistance movement must engineer a “diminution of fatalism coupled with a perception that conditions are unjust, yet subject to change through collective action.”

c. Organize the population. An organized population is the tool that will create change in a society. McAdams calls this the mobilizing structure of his political-process model. Civil vulnerabilities and the creation of strategic frames only create potential, it is the insurgents organization that converts that potential to desired change. Successful insurgencies leverage existing social groups and expand and synergize existing organizations and networks to create a broad organization. Successful insurgencies such as the Vietcong and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua synchronized a variety of social groups to create mass appeal and a strong organization. CA teams can become that “connective tissue” that links disparate social groups together to support the insurgency.

Civil unrest/non-violent protest

Civil unrest and non-violent protest activities can be a valuable tool for the insurgency to pressure the regime. Civil-unrest activities, like all other potential lines of effort for the insurgency, need to be planned and organized to ensure that they are integrated with other lines of effort. Events during the Arab Spring demonstrated the tremendous utility of civil unrest to an insurgency. The regimes in Tunisia and Egypt fell as a result of a mostly non-violent campaign, whereas Libya and Syria are examples of armed conflict with a significant civil-unrest component. The insurgency will benefit from dedicated advice and assistance of CA advisers in the planning and execution of civil unrest and non-violent protest activities.
that can, as part of a coordinated effort, ensure coordinated and sustained pressure on the regime. The use of civil unrest can benefit the insurgency in several ways:

a. **Expand the appeal of the movement.** Non-violent protests tend to draw in a larger group of recruits who are willing to protest but prefer not to engage in violence or military operations. Non-violent protest also tends to draw in other social organizations (such as the church) that are willing to support the movement but not violence. A broader base of support for the insurgency increases the pressure on the regime and offers the insurgency a greater chance of success.

b. **Improve the legitimacy of the resistance and undermine the legitimacy of the regime.** Non-violent protests that are made public tend to garner local and international support for the protesters’ cause. If the regime uses violence to repress a non-violent protest then the regime loses legitimacy for its over reaction both in the eyes of its own population and the international community.

c. **Create opportunities to fragment the ruling elites.** Some ruling elites may be reluctant to use violence to repress a non-violent protest. Non-violent protests can generate an internal disagreement within the ruling elites; some may be willing to compromise with the protesters where as some elites will favor severe repression. This internal fracturing can disrupt the harmony of the elites and offer opportunities for the insurgency to gain supporters within the elites.

d. **Create opportunities to disrupt the regimes system.** The regime is ruled by the elites, but the non-elites make the system run: bus drivers, factory workers, donut makers, street sweepers. One worker can be easily replaced but a mass strike or walkout is difficult to manage. Collective action taken by non-elites can make the potential to severely disrupt the regime and place considerable pressure on the state. Kurt Schock observes, “In any society, the state directly depends on segments of its own populace to rule. If any of these segments, such as military personnel, police officers, administrators or workers in energy supply, transportation, communications, commerce or other key sectors refuse or threaten to refuse to carry out their duties the state’s power is significantly undermined.”

**Conclusion**

Unconventional Warfare is a complex and risky political-military endeavor and the U.S. Government has rarely considered UW as a viable policy option to achieve its geopolitical goals. However the risk and rarity of UW does not abrogate the responsibility of all SOF elements to maintain a basic understanding and appropriate capacity for UW. The U.S. support for the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan as a tool to defeat the Taliban in 2001 and the support for insurgent political organizations in Eastern Europe during the Cold War demonstrate the utility of UW. To ensure that SOF CA can play a role in UW campaigns in the future, it must be prepared.

SOF CA must continue to develop appropriate concepts and doctrine for its employment. It must develop appropriate tactics, techniques and procedures for its operational teams and it must develop the campaign design and planning abilities of its planners and leaders. Further, the command must train and educate some portion of SOF CA to ensure it has the ability, understanding and skills to successfully plan and execute a UW campaign as part of a UW JTF.

**Notes**

1. Headquarters, United States Army, Field Manual 3-05, Army Special Operations Forces, December 2010, 2-1. This document references US Code Title 10 sec 164 & 167
2. ibid, 2-1
5. SOF CA is currently represented by the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) see http://www.soc.mil/
9. A thorough UW campaign plan would synchronize all of these factors. See The Three Circles of War by Heather Gregg, Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla.


13. Civil vulnerabilities is a term used to represent potential weaknesses with a society that may be exacerbated by non-state actors in order to subvert state order and stability, to build influence and challenge state influence and legitimacy over relevant populations. See current edition of FM 3-57.


26. Field Manual 3-57: Civil Affairs Operations lists one of the principle task of the COA Brigade as "Provide in-depth, operational- and strategic-level research and analysis of civil information and the civil vulnerabilities of indigenous populations by means of an organic research and analysis team."


32. David Kilcullen makes a similar argument and draws upon two other classical counterinsurgent theorists - Thompson and Galula to make the same argument that the winning side is the side that is best at "governing." Kilcullen created his Theory of Competitive Control which states, "the local actor that a given population perceives as most able to establish a normative system for resilient, full spectrum control over violence, economic activity, and human security is most likely to prevail within that populations residential area." Kilcullen, David, Counterinsurgency, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012 see chapter 5.
CROSSING THE RED LINE

SOCIAL MEDIA AND SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS FOR UNCONVENTIONAL CAMPAIGN PLANNING

BY MAJOR SETH LUCENTE AND COLONEL GREG WILSON
US President Barack Obama said, “Any attempt by the Syrian government to employ or strategically field biological or chemical weapons would cross a ‘red line’ that could lead the United States to change its posture in dealing with the Assad regime’s attempt to remain in power.” In order to achieve U.S. policy goals related to monitoring and/or securing Syria’s missile stockpiles, chemical weapons and clandestine nuclear activities, this report identifies four courses of action for consideration.

Introduction
The outbreak of rebellion and conflict against the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad in March 2011 has raised questions in the United States and Europe about the security of Syria’s chemical weapons sites and potential use or transfer of such weapons. In the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Syria sought to acquire and maintain an arsenal of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction with the help of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. U.S. policy toward Syria since the 1980s has ranged from confrontation, containment and cautious engagement dealing with its clandestine WMD activities. On August 20, 2012, President Barack Obama cautioned Syria on the use of WMD saying, “Any attempt by the Syrian government to employ or strategically field biological or chemical weapons would cross a ‘red line’ that could lead the United States to change its posture in dealing with the Assad regime’s attempt to remain in power.” However, with the American public war-weary and U.S. resources stretched to the breaking point from more than 10 years of protracted conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, a ground invasion is clearly an unattractive option.

Developing unconventional intervention strategies that achieve U.S. policy objectives and limit the expenditure of U.S. blood and treasure are increasingly in demand. Unconventional warfare or assisting an ongoing rebellion offers U.S. policy makers one such economy-of-force option to consider. However, UW requires in-depth knowledge of a country’s socio-cultural dynamics, social structure, resistance potential and how those willing to take up arms against their government might align with U.S. policy objectives. Developing the intelligence picture to provide this level of insight typically takes years to build and normally requires an extensive human intelligence network. Using the Syrian Rebellion as a case study, this essay examines the utility of leveraging open-source social media (YouTube, Twitter and Facebook) along with advanced analytical methodologies like social-network analysis to increase our understanding of both the political and armed opposition. Expanding our analytical tools for illuminating dark networks, such as resistance forces operating in denied areas, is a critical requirement for SOF planners to develop a UW intervention strategy.

Methodology
CORE Lab research associates at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif., conducted this study. The CORE Lab is an Office of the Secretary of Defense sponsored research activity that serves as the center of gravity for teaching and research on irregular warfare analytical methods. Three visual analytic methodologies are emphasized in our courses and research projects: geospatial, temporal and relational or social network analysis. The application of these methodologies, and the analytical software tools associated with them, enables operators to collect, manage and fuse data in order to create a more complete picture of the common operational environment.

This study fuses open source, social media, temporal records, geospatial data and relational analysis to create a common operational picture from which policymakers and SOF military commanders can make informed decisions. Geospatial data facilitated the visualization of both Syrian geography and the distribution of armed opposition forces and WMD sites located throughout the country. Social-network analysis examines relational data associated with more than 290 individual, political and military opposition entities identified through open-source research.

The research team developed a detailed research plan that included the construction of ontologies and codebooks that standardize data collection and entry into analytical packages. Network visualizations were conducted using various analytical packages. Additionally, a network-visualization package developed in the CORE lab, called Dynamic Tweet Network Analysis (D’Tna), was used to scrape Twitter data and social-media content in select Syrian cities based on keyword search terms.

Syrian opposition Network Anatomy
Identifying the key stakeholders entangled in the Syrian rebellion is job one for UW campaign planners and is no easy task. Social-network analysis has much to offer planners seeking to
illuminate or map these dark networks. Social-network analysis guru Valdis Krebs defines SNA as “the mapping and measuring of relationships and flows between people, groups, organizations and other connected information/knowledge entities. The nodes in the network are the people and groups while the links show relationships or flows between the nodes.”

Social-network analysis can provide key insights into the overall topography and structure of social networks. Utilizing SNA, we examined the political and armed opposition’s network topography and in particular looked at the network’s density and centralization. Network density gives planners a feel for how sparse or connected the network is, while centralization helps provide insights on whether the network is centralized around a few key actors. These measures confirmed our hypothesis that the opposition network is far from a formal, centralized hierarchy; in fact, it is an ad-hoc umbrella of interconnected, multi-relational, sub-organizations geographically dispersed throughout Syria that connect primarily through various social-media applications.

The most common network structure utilized by a revolutionary opposition force, whose units are spread geographically throughout the operational battlefield, is the federated model. In a federation, the core network serves as the hub of multiple, relatively autonomous hubs.” For example the American Revolutionary War was a federation of numerous state militias combined to field the American Continental Army. Network centralization and variance are measures that capture the hierarchical dimension of network topography. They help researchers determine how hierarchical (or non-hierarchical) a network is. Centralization uses the variation in actor centrality within the network to measure the level of centralization. Figure 1 highlights the federated nature of the Syrian opposition network.

Social-network visualizations (sociograms), like the one in Figure 2, provide key insights into the network’s social structure. Planners can gain valuable insights by examining the structural position of key actors within the network. Here we can see that there is a group of actors (circled) who are in brokerage positions between the rebellion’s political and armed opposition. If it is in the U.S. interest to facilitate closer coordination between the political and armed opposition, then we would want to further examine these actors located in structurally advantageous positions. SNA was also used to identify central actors and cohesive subgroups within the network.

In fact, one such subgroup detected was a Syrian homegrown Salafi-jihadist group — Jabhat Nusra. This jihadist opposition sub-network is depicted in the lower right of Figure 1. A Syrian analyst argues “Jabhat Nusra is far more dangerous to the long-term stability of the Syrian state than foreign jihadist groups because it represents a metamorphosis of a Salafi-jihadist ideology into a domestic platform that is able to achieve popular resonance.”
FSA Communications Network (Social Media)

“We use Facebook to schedule the protests, Twitter to coordinate and YouTube to tell the world.” - Anonymous Cairo activist.

Social media has become a valuable political tool. “It is an unparalleled instrument for the purpose of mobilization, denouncing state violence and other human-rights abuses, as well as enabling democratization.” Applications such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube allow users to interact, participate or collaborate nearly real-time with one another. The proliferation of the smartphone and nearly universal access to wireless Internet technologies has enabled social-media users to rapidly mobilize social protests, document a humanitarian crisis as it unfolds and disseminate information globally simply by pushing “send” on their wireless device.

The FSA’s communication network is a unique “Web-based community” that expects to be notified via social media (Twitter, Facebook, YouTube). The FSA utilizes social media for disseminating information, monitoring current operations, logistics and consolidating battle damage assessments — all critical for follow-on missions. This investigation found that nearly 90 percent of the primary data sources originated from the three most widely and effectively used social-media sources — Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. These social-media sites provided a window into the armed opposition units and were leveraged to assess organizational structure, operational activities, unit strengths/weakness, combat effectiveness and to determine if unit leadership might align with U.S. policy objectives.

Analysis of the FSA’s authoritative (command and control) network combined with social-media information highlights the fact that only 27 of the 42 opposition units claiming to support FSA operations actually did so. The remaining 15 units are simply uncooperative rogue elements that undermine civil leaders and threaten any prospects for a viable post-Assad government. Further, research on the 27 FSA units using Facebook, Twitter and YouTube revealed that only four of the 27 units had demonstrated proficiency in offensive combat operations against Assad’s regime force, were closely aligned with the FSA at the strategic, operational and tactical level and appeared to have the motivation and potential to align with U.S. policy objectives. Figure 3 provides a visualization of these selected opposition units and their support networks.

Geospatial Analysis: Risk Terrain Model

Arguably, the best way to assess risk and predict future areas of conflict is to use past behavior, either in terms of actual incidents or as a collection of incidents (i.e. hotspots) as indicators of future behavior. Hotspot mapping is the use of cartographic techniques to create and visualize cluster density or the intensity of events over a geographic area. As better data and more advanced mapping techniques become available, opportunities emerge to move beyond historically based hotspot and density mapping to a near real-time evidence-based, predictive risk-assessment strategy.

Risk terrain modeling is an approach to spatial risk assessment that utilizes geographic information systems and remote sensing to visualize, measure and analyze geospatial data. RTM is a combination of separate map layers that once overlaid together highlight the presence, absence or intensity of numerous factors geospatially on a terrain map. A concise RTM is designed to be predictive and, as such, can illuminate which of Syria’s WMD sites are at the greatest risk of compromise. This RTM examines (1) the disposition of the Syrian regime, FSA and Jihadist armed forces, (2) the locations that experienced the greatest level of conflict and (3) identifies Syria’s
WMD sites. As expected, it found that most of the armed clashes have taken place inside villages and cities along the country’s main north-south highway.

The strategic position of the City of Homs at the intersection of Syria’s main east-west and primary north-south highways has exposed it to the greatest level of conflict in Syria. The RTM highlighted Homs as the greatest concern based on its strategic location and high frequency of combat operations, as well as other at-risk WMD locations. We then overlaid the identified opposition units who were in close proximity and determined to have the highest potential of supporting U.S. policy objectives.

Opportunities and Challenges

This research project clearly demonstrates the usefulness of leveraging open-source social-media information (YouTube, Twitter, Facebook) and advanced analytical methodologies like social network analysis to increase our understanding of dark networks like the Syrian opposition. The insights provided by social-media exploitation, social-network analysis and the geospatial risk-terrain model received high marks from both military planners and leaders exposed to the project. Intelligence professionals marveled at how quickly three researchers could illuminate and map elements of the Syrian political and armed opposition with open source information. One officer familiar with the project said “This would have taken an entire intelligence section numerous months to develop the analytical products and potentially years for the intelligence community to develop the sources and contacts with access to this type of information”.

Of course open-source social media information and advanced analytical methodologies are not a panacea. Some wonder if we can really trust or verify the veracity of information posted using social-media sources. Researchers involved in this study shared this same skepticism but were surprised at the overall accuracy of posted information. Much of the information, such as pictures, videos and Tweets, were geo-tagged and could be quickly verified geospatially. Researchers found one website that was crowd-sourcing pictures of Syrian military installations and uploading the information into a visual map display. Leveraging this type of geo-tagged information can greatly expand our knowledge into denied areas where human intelligence sources are lacking. Additionally, some information can actually be self-correcting, in that the wisdom of the crowd can squash false statements. That being said, information gleaned from open-sources should still be verified and cross-checked with other information sources.
Additionally, leveraging advanced analytical methodologies like social-network analysis will require the development of highly skilled analysts with the proper education and training. Defining network boundaries and capturing complete relational data on networks is difficult work. Analysts must be capable of developing detailed ontologies and codebooks that standardize data collection and entry into analytical packages. Keeping social-network analysis information current is also a challenge as resistance networks are constantly in flux as they recruit new members and suffer losses. However, in doing so analysts have the opportunity to glean insights on how the network is changing over time. Additional challenges include access to open-source information as many military networks restrict access to social-media sites and most of the analytical software packages used in this study are currently not approved to be loaded on military networks.

Conclusion

Maj. Gen. Michael T. Flynn recently noted that after 10 years of continuous U.S. combat operations America’s “intelligence apparatus still finds itself unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which we [DoD] operate and the people we are trying to protect and persuade.”21 Both Maj. Gen. Flynn and Gen. Stanley McChrystal emphasized the need for U.S. intelligence collection efforts to continuously evolve as the asymmetrical conflicts in the future “will be won by persuading the population, not by destroying the enemy.”22

This is particularly true for developing UW-intervention strategies that rely on deep socio-cultural understanding and seek to illuminate resistance elements that are often operating in denied areas. This essay demonstrates that by combining open-source social media information and advanced analytical methodologies such as social-network analysis and geospatial risk-terrain modeling, researchers can provide insights and analytical products that can inform the crafting of UW intervention strategies. As we saw in this paper, researchers were able to leverage social-media exploitation of open-source content (YouTube, Facebook, Twitter) and SNA to first examine the Syrian political and armed opposition network’s topography which included the identification of central actors and actors with brokerage potential based on their structural position within the social network as well as cohesive subgroups within the network. These techniques enhance our understanding of complex networks and move well beyond traditional link analysis. Next, through social-media exploitation they identify key FSA entities/individuals who appear “cooperative” and potentially could be
leveraged in support U.S. policy objectives. Finally, through risk-terrain modeling they mapped Syrian WMD sites and determined which sites were at greatest risk of compromise and which opposition units were in proximity to potentially assist given a change in the U.S. posture towards the Assad regime. It is this type analysis that informs the development of UW-intervention strategies designed to provide U.S. policy makers options to leverage indigenous resistance potential when appropriate.

In closing, given the unprecedented amounts of raw information today’s analyst must ingest, Maj. Gen. Flynn highlighted four critical elements: “analysts must absorb information with the thoroughness of historians, organize it with the skill of librarians and disseminate it with the zeal of a journalist … [an analyst] must embrace open-source, population-centric information [social media] as the lifeblood of their analytical work.” While each conflict is unique, one thing is clear, social media will continue to be leveraged to effect political change. With this in mind, future UW campaign planners will need to embrace open source social media information and the advanced analytical methodologies required to better understand the complex operational environment.

Major Seth Lucente is a Naval Postgraduate School student and CORE Lab SOF Intelligence Research Analyst Intern (stlucent@nps.edu. 831-656-3519). Active Army Military Intelligence (3SC/D/G) Officer Seth.lucente@us.army.mil. COL Wilson, Army Special Forces, the SOCOM Chair and Co-director of the CORE Lab at the Naval Postgraduate School. The research associates who worked tirelessly on this study are Mr. Rob Schroeder and Mr. Gregory Freeman.

Notes
1. I would like to thank CORE Lab Research Assistants Greg Freeman, Rob Schroeder, Seth Gray, Alexander Creasey, Daniel LeRoy, Daniel Cunningham, Professor Sean Everest and Patrick Dudas for their insight.
2. Note. While the exact location of serious chemical weapons storage and production sites remain unknown, the August 2012 Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIIS) report provides a great start point. The www.nti.org Syrian country-profile identifies many of the biological, chemical, production, storage and nuclear material sites.
4. A dark network is typically defined as a covert and illegal network, essentially “any group that seeks to conceal itself and its activities from authorities” Sean F. Everest Disrupting Dark Networks (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press), p. xxv. The term was initially coined by Jörg Raab and Brint Milward, “Dark Networks as Problems,” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 13(4):413-39.
5. Relational social media sources were harvested from Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube websites utilized by Syrian civil-military opposition elements. Temporal social media data sources included the Institute Study for War (ISW), Syrian Conflict, Middle East Security Reports 2-6 and Syria: Unrest and US Policy, Congressional Service Report (CRS), May 24, 2012. Geospatial mapping included fusion social media crowdsourcing data aggregators: Syria tracker, Syria Uprising 2011, and Ushahida. Unclassified National Geospatial Agency (NGA) products based on social media provided an approximate (+/-10KM) operational disposition of Syrian opposition forces. Finally the Strategic Research and Communication Center, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), provided the general location and description of Syria’s WMD sites.
6. The creation of comprehensive research ontology prior to coding and tagging related documents, videos, and audio maintained the integrity, quality, and consistency of the data used in this analysis. Ontology defines a common vocabulary for researchers who need to share definitions of basic concepts and relational data. The research data included 290 entities, 128 persons, 71 political organizations, and 42 military organizations using Palantir. Palantir is a suite of software applications for integrating, visualizing and analyzing relational, temporal and geospatial information from both structured and unstructured data. Palantir Technologies Website. www.palantir.com/about. Palantir products are built for real analysis with a focus on security, scalability, ease of use and collaboration. They are broadly deployed in the intelligence, defense, law enforcement and financial communities. Accessed December 28, 2012.
7. Analytical software packages include Palantir, ORA, and Gephi.
8. Dynamic Tweet Network Analysis was developed by Patrick Dudas and Russell Shepard.
11. Anklam, Net Work, 58.
16. Crowsourse Mapping. Geospatial work on military conflict hotspots has generated a great deal of interest in the application of spatial analysis to an unconventional warfare environment in which Special Operations Forces (SOF) operate. Specifically, it is applied in ways scholars and practitioners consider the origin and dispersion of armed conflict.
19. COL Michelle Schmidt, NPS Senior Service College Fellow, and Senior Intelligence Advisor to the CORE Lab
20. Goolsby, Rebecca, and Carley, Kathleen, “Twitter in Troubled Times: Understanding Social Media from a Social Science Theoretical Base.” SMA Speaker Teleconference, Pentagon, January 15, 2013. The wisdom of the crowd often prevails on the web meaning that there are enough ethical social media users to squash false rumors.
A SOCIAL MOVEMENT APPROACH TO UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

BY DOOWAN LEE

Introduction

Events in the Arab Spring have underscored the importance of mass social mobilization in disrupting or even toppling regimes. In this paper, I argue that we can enhance the operational flexibility and strategic utility of unconventional warfare by incorporating the logic of social mobilization and understanding of how to leverage existing social infrastructure. Empirically, UW-relevant lessons from the Arab Spring and other resistance movements are distilled to support the main argument.

This paper will define key definitions of social movement, social revolution and unconventional warfare to illustrate why incorporating social mobilization can give UW more operational flexibility. It will also synthesize the three concepts to identify the strengths and drawbacks of a social movement approach to UW. Finally, we will delineate major components of social-movement theory to inform UW planners on how to foment a resistance movement capable of garnering popular support as well as waging guerrilla warfare, and illustrating how the social-movement approach can be operationalized for UW campaigns.

Conceptual Synthesis

Social movement can be defined as “collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interactions with elites, opponents and authorities.” Note that the definition underscores the organizational and ideological (common purpose and solidarity) aspects of collective action. On the other hand, social revolution can be defined as “rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures, accompanied and in part accomplished through popular revolts from below.” The American Revolution, the Bolshevik Revolution, the Chinese Revolution, the Cuban Revolution and the Iranian Revolution are good examples of this definition. While social movements shed light on potential forms of mobilization, the definition of social revolution highlights what types of outcomes are possible through collective action.

The current approved definition of UW is “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying power or government by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in
A SOCIAL MOVEMENT APPROACH TO UW

Some of the examples that fit this definition include the Tibetan resistance movement in the ‘50s and ‘60s, Operation Ajax, the White Tigers, regime-change campaigns in South America and the anti-Soviet movement in Afghanistan.

While these definitions may indicate conceptually separate domains, overlaying them provides an illustrative framework to examine how social movement, social revolution and UW relate to one another.

Figure 1 illustrates how the three concepts relate to one another with mutually exclusive and overlapping sections. What happened in Tunisia and Egypt would fall in the intersection of social movement and social revolution where an indigenous social movement led to a fundamental regime change, akin to social revolution (E). Historical examples for the intersection between UW and social revolution include Operation Ajax, the 1963 South Vietnamese Coup, 1974 Chilean Coup, 1976 Argentine Coup and Che Guevara in Bolivia (F). The center area is where social movement, social revolution and UW all overlap (G). Conceptually, this intersection represents UW campaigns that mobilize indigenous social movements in order to overthrow a regime or government.

Approximate examples that fall in the intersection of the three definitions include the solidarity movement in Poland, Hezbollah and Tibet from 1955 through the 1970s.

Prevailing Approaches

The utility of social-movement theory stems from strategic drawbacks associated with externally sponsored insurgencies or coup d’états, or what I call the prevailing approaches. Figure 2 depicts the dynamics of the social-movement approach compared to the prevailing models.

First, the prevailing approaches tend to have a poor track record in terms of the durable influence of the U.S. One of the most cited examples of a U.S.-sponsored coup is Operation Ajax. In some ways, Operation Ajax in Iran can be considered operationally successful. After all, it gave the U.S. a relatively stable partner for 26 years. However, the coup proved costly in terms of strategic durability. The coup caused long-lasting damage to the U.S. reputation as its ties to the U.S. and the U.K. quickly became a rally point for anti-West sentiments. The Shah’s limited political legitimacy and social pen-
etration ultimately led to the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Considering the impact of the revolution on the region and the prevalence of anti-colonialist narrative that undergirds the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, it is hard to consider it a strategic success.\textsuperscript{6} It should be noted that this trade-off between operational and strategic consequences was not unique to Operation Ajax. The 1973 Chilean Coup and the Contras of the ’80s shared similar strategic complications and long-term consequences.

Second, U.S.-sponsored military coups have often led to mobilized and unified opposition “social movements” like those found in Latin America, which still maintain a multitude of policies that are not entirely compatible with U.S. national interest. In other words, military coups have resulted in unfavorable long-term geopolitical consequences.\textsuperscript{7}

Third, the prevailing approaches often result in diminished indigenous legitimacy. Transitional governments do not fully consider the role of indigenous networks or broad popular support, and are often marred with excessive political repression, which in turn further undermines the legitimacy of UW partners. As the U.S. partners are rarely based on a popular constituency, it requires the U.S. to provide costly financial and political support.\textsuperscript{8}

**Social Movement Approach**

Now consider the social-movement approach to UW. When applied to UW, it has a number of unique operational and strategic advantages. Empirically, a great many successful UW campaigns are characterized by their active mobilization of social-movement components. Hamas and Hezbollah are prime examples of this advantage. How does a social movement enhance the robustness of an irregular force? First, it can enhance the legitimacy of an indigenous movement by heavily leveraging and incorporating existing organic social infrastructure. Second, it is ideally equipped to accomplish “bloc recruitment”\textsuperscript{9} because it relies on existing networks. Bloc recruitment is a process where a single recruiter can effectively mobilize existing groups bound by trust and solidarity as opposed to having to convince individuals to join his cause.\textsuperscript{10} Third, because it relies on locally influential networks, it can promote a more institutionalized form of demobilization at Phase 7 of UW. In turn, this transitional government can easily be tasked with provision of essential services fostering post-conflict stability. A great example of this transformation is the Solidarity movement in Poland that orchestrated a relatively stable political transition from the former Communist regime. Finally, because social-embedded partners rely on local reputations to maintain and increase their influence, they are unlikely to divulge their collaboration with the U.S.

The Solidarity Movement in Poland clearly illustrates these advantages. Initially, the free labor-union movement was secondary to the Catholic and student movements’ central position in the composition of the opposition in the ’70s and early ’80s.\textsuperscript{11} However, the free labor-union movement began to exert more influence during the early ’70s. The Solidarity Movement was able to assume a central leadership role in the broad opposition field partly due to clandestine support from the U.S.\textsuperscript{12} The former Director of Central Intelligence and former Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, states that the CIA was operationally active in Poland during the ’80s providing clandestine support to Solidarity such as printing equipment and other means of communication to the underground.\textsuperscript{13} Incidentally, The CIA’s support in money and equipment to the Polish underground to set up a “clandestine television” station was partially responsible for Solidarity’s increasing centrality in the narrative of the opposition movement.\textsuperscript{14} In many ways, the Solidarity Movement was a successful UW campaign both operationally and strategically. Operationally, Solidarity was critical in bringing down the Polish Communist government with a smooth transition to a democracy. Strategically, Poland has been a staunch ally of the U.S. since the collapse of the Soviet Block without the typical negative consequences associated with U.S.-sponsored insurgencies or coups.

UW planners should also take into account a few inherent drawbacks when using social-movement theory to condition a UW campaign. First, special considerations must be made for security. When utilizing indigenous social groups, security can be compromised due to the internal diversity that is characteristic of a mass movement. Second, because of this internal diversity and the necessity of a coalition to foment a robust resistance movement, political outcomes are not always controllable despite historical support. In addition, the resistance narrative can lack coherence due to the need to keep heterogeneous groups in a broad coalition. Operationally, it necessitates that a great deal of information about local cultures and social networks is not only known, but more importantly understood.

**Operationalizing the Social Movement Approach**

Social-movement theory is predicated upon the notion that four broad factors are often highly correlated with successful resistance or insurgent movements: broad socio-economic processes, political opportunity, indigenous organizational strength and insurgent consciousness.\textsuperscript{20} Broad

---

**FIGURE 3 Social Movement Model of Unconventional Warfare.**
socio-economic processes include systemic strains that can either weaken or fracture an existing political authority. Some of the examples found include economic downturns, poverty, ethnic division, demographic pressures and associated issues. Figure 3 illustrates how social-movement theory can be synthesized with UW.

Applied to UW, these broad socio-economic conditions can create a permissive environment to elevate the perception of injustice and the necessity of rebellion. In turn, once an unstable economic condition is established, it can aid the formation of insurgent consciousness that can be utilized to unite a variety of opposition groups. Targeted sanctions that can undermine the regime’s ability to placate popular grievances can also induce a permissive environment for rebellion. When the regime’s resources are reduced, it can also activate latent elite fractures.

People Power Movement in the Philippines, where the Philippine Army decided to stay neutral and refused to fire on protesters. These examples highlight how fractured civil-military relations can modulate the pace and scope of resistance movements.

How does a UW planner utilize political opportunities? First, one must start by identifying potential factions within the target regime and its social constituencies. Having defectors from the target regime can substantially increase the perceived success of collective action and weakness of the governing elite. For instance, continued defections from the Syrian regime have provided the Free Syrian Army with much needed internal and external support despite its military setbacks.

Mobilizing structures are defined as formal and informal collective vehicles through which people mobilize and engage in collective action. Examples include influential dissidents, social networks, traditional networks, social institutions, social media, etc.

Key functions of mobilizing structures include recruitment, internal resource generation (human, information and material), connectivity and coordination, and control mechanisms. For instance, it is no coincidence that the church played a critical role in the Civil Rights Movement and the mosque in the Islamist movements. Even when Mubarak tried to shut down social media, the protesters regrouped after Friday prayer at numerous religious institutions.

An effective resistance network is typically characterized by three layers: grassroots, leadership structures and connective tissues. Grass-roots networks represent how the movement is organized at the point of contact against its target regime. Typically, the more socially embedded, the more resilient they tend to be. This is where strong ties such as kinship, tribe and friendship networks often accelerate the pace of mobilization. Leadership structures are responsible for providing ideological and operational guidance. They can promote unified and coordinated action toward a common goal. While centralized leadership can be effective for efficient coordination and control, it is also vulnerable to decapitation. Many centralized movements quickly succumbed to leadership targeting such as the Shining Path in Peru and Aum Shinrikyo in Japan. On the other hand, decentralized leadership often characterized by a council or Shura structure obfuscates individual leaders and deflects state repression.

Connective tissues are the channels through which leadership structures communicate, coordinate and control grassroots networks. This middle layer is what completes a cluster-bridge configuration. This specific configuration is characterized by compartmentalized operational cells, redundant connective tissues and decentralized leadership.

“Incorporating social-movement theory with UW introduces doctrinal modifications and extensions that may require a new way of thinking about pursuing disruption, coercion and regime change.”

Political opportunities are defined as consistent, but not necessarily formal or permanent signals to social or political actors that either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form collective action. They represent broader sets of political constraints and opportunities that condition the cost/benefit calculation of collective action. Some of their indicators include elite cohesion/division, influential dissidents, repression capacity and civil-military relations, which are all good examples of political opportunities.

For instance, the fractured relations between Egyptian President Mubarak and the Egyptian army were a critical point that emboldened and galvanized the opposition movement. When the Egyptian army declared its neutrality to the uprising, it dramatically increased the breadth of mobilization as the possibility of a brutal crackdown was diminished. A similarly fractured civil-military relationship was also critical to the success of the 1986
and desired forms of action to rectify the identified problem. Typically, an effective prognostic frame stems from some success or glory experienced in the past in order to suggest repeatability and achievability. It is no surprise that the Taliban call themselves Mujahidin, thereby invoking the defeat of the Soviet occupation in the ‘80s.

Motivational frames compel individuals to participate in collective action. Another essential task for strategic framing is alignment where key frames are intentionally linked with other groups in order to broaden the breadth of resistance movements. Typically, a political issue will be nested in a broader norm such as human rights, nationalism and religion in order to connect with a greater variety of groups. Naturally, the type of frame alignment will depend on what “master” or “identity” frames are locally available. This is why a great many insurgent groups use religion to appear broader than their political goals.

How does strategic framing aid UW campaigns? A sound narrative that synthesizes all three frames can help UW planners nest its objectives in locally resonating frames. Economic hardship can be framed as a failure of governance. In Tunisia, street vendor Bouazizi’s self-immolation was framed as a damning testament to Ben Ali’s corruption and cronyism. Targeted vilification helps unite different factions into a broad coalition. In Tunisia, the main goal was blaming Ben Ali’s cronyism for the deteriorating economy. In Egypt, it was ousting Mubarak. It was Gadhafi in Libya. In short, most successful resistance movements rely on some sort of targeted vilification to broaden opposition movements and marginalize regime sympathizers. Moreover, acts of resistance can be framed as a social or religious obligation. The myth of martyrdom is a good example of a powerful motivational frame. Overthrowing a regime can be framed as restoring the country’s rightful place in history. For instance, economic difficulties and political grievances in Iran can be captured in a narrative that the true intent of the revolution has been betrayed by Ali Khamenei’s personal greed for power.

**Conclusion**

In light of the Arab Spring, social-movement theory can indeed enhance the operational flexibility of UW by leveraging existing social-movement networks and dissident narratives. It should be noted that the social-movement approach should be applied only when two conditions are met. First, the approach is relevant when some resistance movements already exists. Starting a new movement is inherently costly both in terms of time and money. This explains why successful movements tend to emerge from pre-existing social networks. Second, the social-movement approach becomes relevant when existing social movements are sufficiently malleable with UW objectives. Put differently, cultural knowledge and understanding normative dynamics is critical for the social-movement approach to work. For instance, al-Qaeda in Iraq eventually lost popular support despite exploiting indigenous social networks and tribal relations because it failed to align its strategic and cultural framing with that of the al-Anbar tribes.

Figure 4 illustrates the operational flexibility of the social-movement approach. Once embedded in a broad social movement, a UW campaign can modulate its objectives and methods depending on how the regime responds. In fact, this is precisely how Hezbollah has maintained its popular support. When attacked militarily, it quickly turned itself into a resistance irregular force during the 2006 Lebanon War (radicalization/militancy). It also relied on mass-mobilization to put political pressures on Israel to withdraw (unarmed insurrection). When faced with economic blockades, it mobilized its social-movement organizations to collect and distribute resources and essential services (grass-roots mobilization). When presented with political opportunities, it quickly seized them through its social organizations to gain access to the electoral process (moderation). Integrating this type of operational flexibility into a UW campaign can yield tremendous strategic benefits.

Incorporating social-movement theory with UW introduces doctrinal modifications and extensions that may require a new way of thinking about pursuing disruption, coercion and regime change. However, if we approach UW as a strategic tool, long-term consequences must be taken into account. It is precisely the operational flexibility and grass-roots foundation of the social-movement approach that can afford UW such strategic benefits. In short, social-movement theory can enhance the strategic flexibility and social support of UW by tapping into existing political fractures, informal social networks and locally resonating frames.

---

**FIGURE 4** Operational Flexibility of Social Movement Model.

**Doowan Lee** is a lecturer in the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, where he teaches Social Revolution and Unconventional Warfare.
A SOCIAL MOVEMENT APPROACH TO UW

Notes

1. Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 4. The civil rights movement, the tea party movement, the Nazi movement, the Tiananmen Square movement, and the Arab Spring are well known examples of social movements.


4. Indigenous regime changes without social movements from recent history include the 1979 military coup in South Korea, the 1988 coup in Burma, and the 1991 Thai coup (Area C).

5. For a detailed discussion on the strategic consequences of Operation Ajax, see Malcolm Byrne, Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Syracuse University Press, 2004.

6. Ibid

7. Ironically, it is the counter-movements to U.S. sponsored regime changes that enjoy a long-term legitimacy benefit.

8. One of the benefits of the prevailing model is security as it often worked through “tight” homogenous networks and hierarchical organizations such as military units or political associations.


10. Mario Diani & Doug McAdam, eds., Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action, Oxford University Press, 2003. Most effective resistance movements have relied on this type of recruitment for rapid mobilization and expansion.


14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., p. 451. In one instance, Walesa’s people used the station to “take over the airwaves [...], overriding Warsaw’s evening television news on the eve of the Pope’s visit with a message urging Solidarity activists to participate in public demonstrations.”

16. Ibid., p. 450. The source of the assistance was not revealed to Solidarity operatives.

17. For a detailed account of how the IRGC has controlled Hezbollah, see Robert Baer, The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower, Random House, 2008.

18. Ibid.

19. For a detailed analysis of how Hezbollah has managed to garner popular support can be found in Reuven Erlich and Yoram Kahati, Hezbollah as a Case Study of the Battle for Hearts and Minds, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, June 2007. On how Hezbollah utilized networks to overcome its military inferiority to the Israeli Defense Forces, see John Arquilla, “It Takes a Network: On Countering Terrorism While Reforming the Military,” Testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, presented 18 September 2008.


21. Ibid., pp. 50-52.


25. The ongoing crisis in Syria can be partially attributed to the loyalty of the Syrian Army to Assad.


27. Stefaan Walgrave et al., “Multiple Engagements and Network Bridging in Contentious Politics: Digital Media Use of Protest Participants,” Mobilization, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2011, pp. 317-320. While social media was heralded as a new form of collective action during the Arab Spring, recent research indicates that virtual coordination is effective only when combined with physical interaction among core activists in order to accelerate the pace of mobilization.


30. Ibid.

31. It is no coincidence that Hamas and Hezbollah maintain a decentralized leadership structure in order to deflect relentless Israeli leadership targeting.


34. Ibid.

35. Betweenness centrality measures the degree to which an actor is on the path that connects structurally separate networks. Brokers often have a high degree of betweenness centrality that can mediate relationships between different groups. Closeness centrality measures the distance of an actor to all other nodes in a network. The shorter the average path, the higher the closeness centrality. For a more detailed discussion of network centrality, see Christopher Ansell, “Community Embeddedness and Collaborative Governance in the San Francisco Bay Area Environmental Movement,” Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action, Oxford University Press, 2003, Pp. 125-127.


42. Ibid.

43. Ibid. In the Civil Rights Movement, political enfranchisement was nestled in civil rights in order to attract more white progressives.


46. Mohammed M. Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq, Institute of Peace Press, 2007, pp. 118-138


In March of 2013, Special Forces doctrine writers at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School hosted a week-long working group with the Mexican Special Warfare Center, the Centro de Adiestramiento de las Fuerzas Especiales. The event was an opportunity to advise and collaborate with the Mexican Army in a center-to-center venue to enhance regional partnership and understanding. The mutual exchange produced a comprehensive Mexican Special Forces doctrine plan. Both centers will continue to work together based on this established relationship.

Plans for the working group began in the fall of 2012 when the Mexican Special Forces command visited SWCS. Brig. Gen. Carlos Cesar Gomez, commander of the Mexican Army Special Forces, along with the C.A.F.E. commander Lt. Col. Gallegos identified a gap in their doctrine in regards to special operations and expressed a desire to conduct further dialogue on the topic. The U.S. Army Northern Command Special Operations Directorate representative CW3 Jose Villareal and SF Doctrine Developer CW2 Mark Roland worked together to plan the exchange.

Prior to the visit, the Mexican Army had no Special Forces doctrine for policy makers, strategic planners, operational and tactical units. This left Lt. Col. Gallegos, the commander of the C.A.F.E., with a difficult challenge. As the proponent for various Mexican SOF activities, and the point of responsibility for developing the techniques, tactics and procedures for SF units and the greater army, the commander did not have manuals showing what “right looks like” for the force to instruct, train and employ.

Through three days of discussions and exchanges of ideas that lead to mutual understanding, the working group drafted a system that will provide Mexican Special Forces the doctrine to inform policy makers, sister services and the force. At the operational and tactical level there will be common language and concepts for all to use and reference when educating, training and employing the force. For the tactical-level operator there will be established TTP’s to refer to when necessary.

There is a wealth of SOF experience, cultural and language capabilities that can be applied to regional activities. ARSOF 2022 directs the force to “develop CONUS-based capabilities to develop partner-nation SOF doctrine, training and education institutions.” Utilizing these skills develops and maintains the capability of our force as we are building partnerships and achieving this goal.

The U.S. national defense paradigm is partnership; this is clear in the guidance given from the 2012 Defense Guidance, SOF 2020 and ARSOF 2022 visions. This partnership is the history and roots of our force, and the way we help others meet their growing security and defense needs. Center-to-center partnership is an efficient way to provide our partners with the concepts and mechanisms to cement tactical gains with operational concepts in order to achieve mutual strategic success.

The doctrine exchange between Mexico’s C.A.F.E. and the USAJFKSWCS concluded with two SOF training centers coming away with a completed product, mutual understanding and long-term commitments for continued exchanges. For those who participated, it was an opportunity to use regional focus, language and partnership to validate current AR-SOF goals.
First-quarter FY14 Boards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>BOARD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21 Oct 13</td>
<td>Major, ARMY / ILE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Oct 13</td>
<td>Army Reserve MSG Promotion / SFC GSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Oct 13</td>
<td>Active MSG Promotion / SFC GSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Nov 13</td>
<td>ARSOF CSM CSL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Dec 13</td>
<td>Nominative CSM / SGM CSL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Soldiers whose records are pending review by a selection board need to validate their Official Military Personnel File, Enlisted Record Brief or Officer Record Brief to make sure the documentation is current and up-to-date. Also, make sure your Department of the Army Photo is not older than two years old. You can review/update your records by going to HRC Tools for Soldiers, https://www.hrc.army.mil/PERSINSND/Tools%20and%20Applications%20Directory.

Professor of Military Science

Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations officers will not be allowed to compete for Professor of Military Science positions for the upcoming board to be held in August 2013 (reference MILPER Message 13-096).

REGULATIONS

DA Pam 600-25

Individuals who possess a 37F MOS (Psychological Operations), lead 37F Soldiers or who wish to become a 37F, should become familiar with AR 614-200, Enlisted Assignments and Utilization Management and DA Pam 600-25, U.S. Army Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide. Even if you are already familiar with these documents, you should review them as they both have recently been updated.

AR 614-200

The Civil Affairs Proponent updated AR 614-200 (Enlisted Assignments and Utilization Management) in order to shape CMF 38 for Army 2020.

Most notably, AR 614-200 will require a minimum GT score of 100 on the ASVAB for reclassification to active-duty 38B Civil Affairs Specialist. AR 614-200 currently requires a GT score of 100 to serve within USASOC. The addition of the GT requirement will increase interoperability between formations for MOS 38B. The updated regulation will also eliminate SFCs from CMF 38 reclassification criteria. SSG in a promotable status will be able to apply for a waiver through the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion, to the Civil Affairs Commandant, USAIFKSWCS.

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

CA Officer Non Branch Opportunities

Within the officer professional-development model there are two windows for Civil Affairs officers to participate in fellowships, nominative broadening assignments and other special programs. These are between 24 months key-developmental team leader time and Intermediate Level Education and post KD major time. The CA Branch will not approve release of officers for these opportunities who cannot complete the desired assignment within available windows. Officers approaching these windows should ensure they apply with enough lead time to complete training and payback within the professional development model.

Advanced Civil Schooling

Year Group 2005 CA officers are highly encouraged to complete advanced civil schooling and military education during or subsequent to ILE. There are multiple funded opportunities open to compete for during your year groups’ ILE window: National Defense University, Naval Postgraduate School, Interagency Studies Program and Advanced Military Studies Program.

Voluntary Transfer Incentive Program

The Voluntary Transfer Incentive Program Board convenes three times a year by Human Resources Command. The board considers eligible officer volunteers for service in another branch or functional area. The VTIP provides experienced Special Forces officers the opportunity to become subject-matter experts in another career field. There are several functional areas that have these authorizations on Special Operations Headquarters force structure documents. An experienced Special Forces officer serving in one of these functional areas assigned to a Special Operations Headquarters benefits both the command and the officer. Below are the Functional Areas that have positions assigned in a SOF unit.

- Public Affairs (FA 46)
- Strategic Intelligence (FA 34)
- Foreign Area Officer (FA 48)
- Strategic Plans and Policy (FA 59)
- Force Management (FA 50)
- Operations Research/Systems Analysis (FA 49)
- Army Acquisition Corps (FA 51)
- Electronic Warfare (FA 29)
- Information Operations (FA 30)
- Information Systems Management (FA 53)

Officers interested in VTIP must be accepted through the application process. For more information on VTIP, you can contact the HRC subject matter expert at www.knox.hrc.mbx.opmd-retention@mail.mil.

PROMOTIONS

Civil Affairs

The FY13 Sgt. 1st Class Board results were posted April 2013. One hundred and eleven out of 114 SSGs were promoted to the rank of SFC. On average CA continues to perform better than the Army average for promotion to SFC. The average age for FY13 SFC promotions across all three Special Forces/Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations CMFs is 32-years-old, time in service is 10 years and time-in-grade is five years.
RECRUITING INITIATIVES

CMF 18 Prior Service Accessions
Former enlisted Special Forces Soldiers have an opportunity to rejoin the Special Forces Regiment in an active-duty status through the Prior Service Accessions program.

GENERAL INFORMATION: All Special Forces-qualified enlisted Soldiers not currently serving on active duty in Special Forces require screening, assessment and revalidation prior to acceptance into active duty SF. This includes prior-service personnel, personnel currently serving in the National Guard and SF-qualified personnel on active duty who are not serving in a CMF 18 skill. This screening and revalidation is conducted at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg, N.C. Revalidation training focuses on MOS and language proficiency. CMF 18 Soldiers are not required to repeat Special Forces Assessment and Selection.

Volunteers are accessed onto active duty under a conditional contract in accordance with U.S. Army Recruiting Command policy. Conditions of their contract specify that, upon successful completion of an assessment and review board appearance, Soldiers will serve on active duty in CMF 18. Soldiers who do not meet assessment prerequisites or board criteria are reclassified to another MOS as directed by Army Human Resource Command in accordance with the needs of the Army and could be considered for reevaluation into SF after a period of 12 months. Assessment of the Soldier’s military records including performance evaluations, academic evaluations and administrative actions are conducted by the Commander, USAJFKSWCS and executed through a review board chaired by the Command Sergeant Major, USAJFKSWCS. Volunteers personally appear before the review board with completed application packets. Prior Service Accession Soldiers accepted into CMF 18 are assigned to active-duty groups. An exception to this policy is at the discretion of the CSM, USAJFKSWCS.

From fiscal year 2008 to 2012, a total of 61 enlisted PSAs were evaluated and boarded; of those, 57 were accepted and processed for active-duty service. The other four were reclassified to another MOS in the AD Army.

For more information, contact Master Sgt. Pope at popeb@soc.mil or commercial 910-432-7359, DSN 239-7359.

CMF 37 Prior Service Accessions
The Prior Service Accession program is open to Psychological Operations Career Management Field (CMF) 37-qualified noncommissioned officers who previously served in the active or reserve components, or are currently serving in the reserve component and want to return to active duty.

GENERAL INFORMATION: The program applies to all PSYOP Soldiers who previously served in the active component, Active Guard Reserve or reserve component and desire active-duty service in CMF 37, or active-duty Soldiers requesting reclassification back to CMF 37. The United States Army Special Operations Command and the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School will follow the procedures outlined below to screen, process and assign PSA volunteers into Psychological Operations.

Applicants will be accessed into the active component in accordance with the U.S. Army Recruiting Command policy. All accession applicants must be pre-approved by the Personnel Proponent Chief, PSYOP Commandant and the USAJFKSWCS, including verification of MOS qualification during previous term of service. All previous NCOERs/OERs and DA 1059s must be submitted. Assessment of the applicant’s military records, including performance evaluations, academic evaluations, airborne completion certificate, current airborne physical, proof of security clearance, DUPT/DLAB score and administrative actions, will be conducted by the Commander, PSYOP Commandant. Upon acceptance to active duty, volunteers will personally appear before the review board. Conditions of contract will specify that upon successful completion of assessment and a review board appearance, applicants may be required to attend all, or a portion of, MOS training prior to serving on active duty in CMF 37. Applicants who do not meet assessment prerequisites or board criteria will be reclassified into another MOS as directed by Army Human Resources Command policy in accordance with the needs of the Army. Prior-service volunteers accepted into CMF 37 will be assigned directly to active-duty units in order to provide the most beneficial enhancement to operating inventory and operational readiness. Applicants who are Army Reserve (RC and AGR) must be released from their units for transition to active duty, prior to volunteering.

For more information contact, MSG Vernon, at (910) 396-4349, DSN 236 or carrie.vernon@soc.mil.

Civil Affairs Recruiting
If you are interested in becoming a Civil Affairs Soldier and are an E4 who meets all of the prerequisites to volunteer for CA except time in service and time in grade, can apply for a waiver for one or both. The CA Commandant will consider waivers for E4s with up to five years time in service and no more than four years time in grade. For E5s, waivers will be considered for those meeting prerequisites that have up to nine years time in service and four years time in grade if the Soldier was recommended for promotion in their current MOS. When submitting a CA packet with the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion, include a memorandum for a Request a Waiver for Time in Service or Time in Grade.

For further information, contact the CA recruiters at (910) 432-9697 or http://www.sorrecruiting.com/CA.htm.

Call for Active Duty
Reserve component Civil Affairs officers interested in becoming active-component CA officers should contact Human Resources Command (502) 613-613-6287/6288 for application requirements.

SKILL IDENTIFIERS

Officer Skill Identifier (SI) K9, Special Operations Support
Effective May 1 the requirements for awarding the K9 changed. The significant changes include: the completion of unit assignment changed from 12 to 22 months or a 12 month SOF deployment; added must be airborne qualified; must have a current Army Physical Fitness Test and meet Army height/weight standards. The approval authority changed from the first O5/LTC commander in the chain of command to the first ARSOF O6/COL in the chain of command or O6/COL commander assigned to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command.

Personnel Developmental Skill Identifier (PDSI) for Special Operations Military Deception Planner
DA G1 approved USAJFKSWCS request to create a PDSI for Special Forces and Psychological Operations, majors and lieutenant colonels, CW3 - CW4s, and SFC - SGM who successfully complete Special Operations Military Deception Planning Course. This PDSI became effective June 1 and will identify all course graduates.
Assisted Overhead Squat to Improve Functional Posture

BY JAY MERLINO

The overhead squat is a widely accepted functional assessment tool in human-performance training. Joint mobility and stability ability (M/S ability) is required for completing this movement. One limiting factor can be an individual's deficiencies in thoracic M/S ability. More specifically in the instance of the overhead squat, an inability to produce adequate thoracic extension due to posterior upper-back weakness. And in the case of returning from injury, balance can also limit this movement pattern due to decreased neuromuscular activity, loss of flexibility or muscle weakening.

Training the Movement Pattern

Assisted movement patterns are one way to train specific dysfunctional patterns. This is accomplished by creating enough assistance to perform the movement pattern properly without taking emphasis away from intended prime muscle movers. The challenge is to progressively retrain the central nervous system without compromising exercise form.

Proper Technique

Using a suspension-strap device is an inexpensive way for Soldiers to work on the overhead-squat pattern on base or while deployed. There are several postural keys that the performance specialist should watch for:

- **Arms**
  - Fully extended and slightly adducted
- **Knees**
  - Over the toes and fully flexed
- **Core**
  - Lumbar spine and lower-abdominal muscles contracted for postural bracing
- **Shoulder Blades**
  - “Pack them in” by retraction (pinched together) and depression (pulled downward)

Make sure that the thighs break parallel to the floor when lowering. One cue commonly given is: “Sit on to your calves.” Allow the knees to shift forward over the top of the toes. Keep the muscles of the upper back, lower core engaged throughout. Focus on control of the downward lowering motion, attempting to increase depth slightly on each repetition.

Typically once the suspension-strap assisted-movement pattern is successfully mastered, a progression to a non-assisted version can be implemented. Only perform as many reps as can be done with perfect form. Once technique breaks, the set must be stopped as with most movement-correction exercises.

Jay Merlino is a contracted THOR3 Program Strength and Conditioning Specialist for 3rd Battalion, 160th S.O.A.R. (A).
YOU’RE STEPPING ON MY CLOAK AND DAGGER

Editor’s Note: The following book review ran in September 2005. The renewed focus on Special Warfare puts a focus back on the historical roots of our special-operations forces and their unique abilities to survive behind enemy lines.

You’re Stepping On My Cloak and Dagger is a highly entertaining and engaging account of one man’s uncommon experiences in the Office of Strategic Services, or OSS, during World War II. It is a tale of courage, danger and wit, with a clever turn of phrase on nearly every page. The book appeals to the patriot, the thrill-seeker and the rebel, easily capturing the imagination within each of us.

The author, Roger Hall, writes about his experiences as a young Army lieutenant recruited into the OSS. Hall, raised in Annapolis, had little awe for authority, so the excitement offered by the OSS seemed a perfect fit for him.

Not fully understanding the scope of the assignment, Hall reported for OSS duties almost as an exercise in intestinal fortitude. Greeted by a colonel who regarded him with a mix of awe and pity, he was mournfully told that none of the young OSS officers who processed through were married, nor had they ever returned. With a sense of impending doom, he began to question his decision to volunteer.

After his initial training, Hall was saddled with instructor duty, which was designed to fill his time while he waited for the unlikely arrival of 28 Danes who were to complete the formation of his Danish operational group. After four months and the realization that a Danish operational group was not feasible, Hall was volunteered for parachute school at Fort Benning, Ga., which was followed by an assessment phase in which Hall began the “cloak” portion of his “cloak and dagger training.” He recounts the students’ attempts to create and maintain cover stories that backed up their phony identities, as well as the cadre’s often-successful attempts to crack their cover stories and break them down mentally. Hall later obtained orders to the “spy school,” which was designed to provide operational training in undercover activities.

From the spy school, students were sent out to perform “espionage missions.” Each student was given the task of infiltrating various factories or other places of interest. Hall elected to present himself as a wounded war veteran in search of a job. After catching the eye of a secretary, who happened to be the boss’ daughter, Hall was invited to a war bond rally in the company’s cafeteria, where he made an impassioned plea for support. He performed so well that his impromptu speech appeared that next day in the local newspaper.

Having effectively demonstrated his ability to maintain cover and to improvise, Hall shipped out to London, but instead of hitting the battlefield, he received a five-day crash course at the British Parachute School. Upon completion of the course, he learned that his first assignment was to perform a high-risk, night-time parachute drop behind enemy lines to join the French maquis groups. After nerve-racking preparation for the jump, Hall landed safely on to discover that the lines had shifted and that he had landed behind American lines.

On his next assignment, he was chosen to accompany seven German officers through parachute school before dropping them back behind German lines as spies. His job – to determine which one was really a double agent.

Fearing he would never see action, Hall finally found himself in an operational role toward the end of the war, when he was assigned to head a Norwegian operational group and to oversee the surrender of seven German battalions.

You’re Stepping On My Cloak and Dagger is well written and reads like a popular spy novel, causing the reader to sometimes forget that this is a true account rather than a work of fiction. Hall’s sense of humor and irreverence keep the mood light without detracting from the danger and importance of his experiences. Instead, they highlight the humility and unassuming courage with which these unsung heroes fought. SW
BOOK REVIEW

COUNTERSTRIKE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA’S SECRET CAMPAIGN AGAINST AL QAEDA

By Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker
$27.00 (hard cover).

Reviewed by: Major Benjamin L. Tipton, Defense Analysis student at the Naval Postgraduate School

The story is a modern propaganda piece initiated in the Bush administration, finalized in the Obama administration and written for profit by two talented correspondents of The New York Times. Oh, what strange bedfellows come about at the intersection of power, politics and war.

The narrative crafted by Schmitt and Shanker is well written and compelling. The authors present a good story, one that is easy to read, and hard to put down. It is, however, just that, a story based upon a collusion of some facts, disinformation and artistic license.

The majority of the story revolves around building the new policy of deterrence (and all the associated politics of resistance to new things) that attempts to effectively deal with international non-state actors versus the old policy of deterrence that was utilized against the Soviets and their Communist allies during the Cold War.

The authors then take a journey through our relationship with Pakistan, a discussion on countering the message of al-Qaeda (the purpose for which this book is designed), the Obama Strategy (which was simply a continuation of the Bush Strategy, but to the victor goes the spoils) and ends with the elimination of Osama bin Laden.

There is some speculation that the authors may have exceeded the limits of their artistic licenses. At least one of the characters, I mean people, stated to have been involved with the events leading up to bin Laden’s demise last year has said it was not as written. To wit, Barry Pavel has himself publically stated that his role as outlined in the story is exaggerated by Schmitt and Shanker.

All in all, I quite enjoyed the book. Clint Eastwood said, “…just don’t bore me!” in the movie Heartbreak Ridge, and this book is anything but boring. However, it is a literary piece better suited to those with no idea of the Global War on Terror than it is to military professionals. I suggest to anyone who enjoys reading a fine tale of daring-do while sipping upon a refined spirit pick this book up from their local library or buy it used from a local book reseller. If you aren’t into read-

Call for Articles

The editorial calendar for the next four issues has been set. Anyone wishing to submit an article for one of these issues should send the article to specialwarfare@ahqb.soc.mil

October-December 2013
This issue will focus on changes within ARSOF including missions, organizations and training. Deadline for submitting articles is July 16, 2013.

January-March 2014
This issue is focused on operations in the PACOM/ SOCPAC area of operations. Deadline for submitting articles is Sept. 16, 2013.

April –June 2014
This is the annual academic handbook and will also be the publication that announces the winners of the ARSOF Writing Competition. The topic for the competition will be announced in the October issue of Special Warfare. Deadline for submitting articles is Dec. 15, 2013.

July-September 2014
This issue will focus on Afghanistan as the U.S. presence begins to draw down. Deadline for submitting articles is March 15, 2014.

All articles should be approved through the author’s chain of command prior to submission, which includes a security clearance. All articles should be in plain text, double-spaced and in a digital file. End notes should be used in lieu of embedded footnotes. Graphics should not be embedded, but should be sent in their native file.
2012

Operation Enduring Freedom

1ST SPECIAL FORCES GROUP
SSG Jeremie Shane Border
SFC James Floyd Grissom

3RD SPECIAL FORCES GROUP
CW2 Michael Stephen Duskin
WO1 Joseph Lee Schiro
CPT Andrew Michael Pedersen-Keel
SFC Riley Gene Stephens
SSG Justin Cameron Marquez
SFC Brian Wise Benjamin
CPT William Schultz Joseph
SFC Ramon Apolinar Martin
SGT Joseph Blasjo Aaron
SSG Brandon Forrest Eggleston
SSG Brandon Robert Pepper
MSG Gregory Ray Trent

5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP
SFC Aaron Arthur Henderson

7TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP
SSG Andrew Trevorbritton-Mihalo

USASOC HEADQUARTERS
SFC Ryan James Savard
MSG Allen Stevenson Benjamin

8TH MILITARY INFORMATION SUPPORT GROUP
SGT Clinton Keith Ruiz

95TH CIVIL AFFAIRS BRIGADE
SSG Kashif Mohammed Memon

75TH RANGER REGIMENT
SGT Tanner Stone Higgins
SSG Jeremy Andrew Katzenberger
SGT Thomas Raymond Macpherson
SPC Cerros Ricardo Jr
SGT Holtz Tyler Nicholas
SFC Domej Kristoffer Bryan

We Remember
CIVIL AFFAIRS ASSESSMENT AND SELECTION

U.S. ARMY PHOTO BY STAFF SERGEANT SPENCER SHELMAN | PIN: 103591-000