The problem is not necessarily that they fell under JUSPAO as much as larger questions over the conduct of the war. H.R. McMaster pointed to the foundation of the problem in Dereliction of Duty by noting the propensity of the Johnson administration to lie, which undercut information activities at all levels of the war.

Kodosky admits there may have been tactical successes for PSYOP, but these were overshadowed by the negatives associated with the loss of truth. “Any advantages that officials hoped to gain in the ‘war for hearts and minds’ by using these agencies clearly became eclipsed … by providing critics of the American effort with legitimate questions concerning United States credibility.” The major metric of success was the amount of product delivered rather than effects generated. He states that PSYOP was “reduced to a numbers game.” This is in line with the American way of war, which focuses on using overwhelming force and technological means to defeat an enemy.

In addition to organizational problems, Kodosky argues cultural chauvinism left the PSYOP effort with little chance for success. He points to surveys and memoirs to show that Americans had a poor understanding of the Vietnamese culture, which led to many mistakes. He is on solid ground with this, and it is a lesson that can never be too strongly emphasized. However, Kodosky then points out the “simplistic” nature of the pamphlets and training materials used to help soldiers learn about Vietnam. JUSPAO spent much effort producing analyses of Vietnamese and tribal cultures. However, Kodosky presents no counter evidence that the pamphlets were in fact wrong besides a vague multicultural assumption that they must have been wrong because they were incomplete.

Kadosky’s narrative is heavily weighted toward the beginning of the JUSPAO period, which does not allow for an adequate assessment of change over time. Although the U.S. had been engaged in Vietnam for roughly a decade by 1965, the number of Americans who had experience in the country was very low. That was even more the case for those involved with trying to influence behaviors. The troop buildup in 1965 exponentially increased the number of troops and the need for tactical PSYOP support. Ending the book in 1968 ignores the Vietnamization phase and overplays the mistakes made when large numbers of foreign soldiers, new to Vietnam, tried to learn a new culture and operate in it at the same time. Many mistakes could be expected in a situation like that.

The book is at its weakest in its assessment of the current war. Kodosky is writing from the outside and is dependent on highly biased news accounts. It is clearly far too soon to make some of the assertions he does. Because much of what PSYOP is doing is classified, he cannot be faulted too heavily on this point though.

Psychological Operations American Style is well-sourced with primary documents and the sparse secondary works available. Papers come from all the archives one would expect from a book like this, including the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, the Vietnam archives at Texas Tech, and the Military History Institute. The book contains a bibliography and end notes, and each chapter is preceded with an outline essay describing what is to be covered. In fact, one could quickly scan all the chapter overviews to gain a quick understanding of the author’s thesis and major arguments. The chapters are organized topically rather than chronologically.

Despite its limitations, this book should be required reading for all personnel involved with PSYOP. Vietnam was the testing ground for many of the concepts currently used in PSYOP, and the mission of influencing a foreign culture over a long period is similar to what the U.S. faces today. Psychological Operations American Style brings up many issues that will help PSYOP professionals learn the lessons from Vietnam. As a study of the PSYOP conducted during the Americanization phase of the war, Kodosky’s book adds a great deal to the historiography. In spite of the problems noted, this book is well worth reading, both for understanding how PSYOP was conducted in Vietnam and for informing the reader of potential pitfalls in conducting effective PSYOP in the current war.>Top