OEF Philippines

OEF Philippines: Thinking COIN, Practicing FID

by Lieutenant Colonel Brian Petit

Counterinsurgency is the formative mission of today’s military. The dominant missions of the past seven years — Iraq and Afghanistan — have inexorably shaped a new force. Our leaders, equipment, tactics, logistics, and doctrine all bear the traumatic discoveries learned from the Iraq and Afghanistan counterinsurgency campaigns. Reasonably, the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts will continue as the primary shaping experience for U.S. forces in counterinsurgency (COIN) and for the practice and theory of stability operations. Given the dominant hold of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom-Afghanistan (OEF-A) on our military culture, what then, does Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines (OEF-P) contribute to the expanding aperture of U.S. military counterinsurgency study?

OEF-P is more relevant to the broader COIN conversation now than ever before. The OEF-P operating environment is characterized by strict — yet prudent — constraints executed by a strikingly small U.S. Task Force. Similar constraints are now in place in Iraq and Afghanistan. Legal prohibitions, strict operational directives, host-nation caveats, and reduced U.S. forces are all constraints that force a revision of operational thinking, a reconsideration of tactics, and increasingly disciplined force application. The existing and forthcoming constraints in Iraq are similar in nature to the constraints imposed upon U.S. forces deployed to Southern Philippines since 2001. Under such constraints, U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines apply an operational approach and tactical methodology that has applicability to current and future U.S. counterinsurgency and stability endeavors. The U.S. involvement in the Philippines (2001 – 2009) can be examined as a preview of the way U.S. counterinsurgency and stability strategies and tactics might look in other theaters as governments stabilize and security responsibility shifts primarily to the host nation. This article presents three tactical vignettes illustrative of the way U.S. forces in the Southern Philippines operate effectively within confined parameters.

OEF-P Background
Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines (OEF-P) has quietly entered its eighth year. OEF-P bears little resemblance to OIF or OEF-A; the contrasts are stark, the comparisons few. Initiated in 2001, OEF-P targeted al-Qaeda affiliates nested in insurgent interior lines in the southern Philippines, bordering Malaysia and Indonesia. The principal targets, the Abu Sayaaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), demonstrated both the skill and the will to plan and execute effective acts of terror. These acts ranged from kidnapping for ransom (the kidnapping of missionaries Martin and Gracia Burnham in 2001) to sophisticated and highly lethal terror attacks (the Bali bombing in 2002). OEF-P was planned and began execution within weeks after the U.S. unconventional-warfare campaign in Afghanistan began in October 2001. The mission earned the “OEF” moniker based on the national objective to contain, and ultimately defeat, Al Qaeda’s Asia-Pacific affiliates based in the Southern Philippines.

However, OEF-P, unlike OIF and OEF-A, was not a cold start. OEF-P drew on the historical engagement that the U.S. forces shared with the Government of the Philippines, or GRP. The mission was planned in conjunction with, and enabled by, a willing and cooperative sovereign nation. That cooperation, however, came with caveats. The U.S. and Philippine Forces operate under specific restrictions levied by both the Government of the Philippines and the U.S. Pacific Command. In short, U.S. forces would be prohibited from direct combat roles or direct engagements with enemy forces. While this key restriction neutralized the efficacy of U.S. joint-force operational power and reach, it also generated a campaign design and operational culture that centers on Philippines forces and institutions. Dubbed the “indirect approach,” U.S. force application in the Philippines continues to adhere to the FID and COIN principles adopted at the inception of OEF-P.

The Philippine Struggle
The Armed Forces of the Philippines are in a lethal and sustained struggle against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, or MILF. The MILF is an Islamic based separatist group with an organized military arm estimated at between 6,000 to 8,000 strong. The MILF is a splinter group of the Moro National Liberation Front, or MNLF. The MNLF entered into a peace agreement with the GRP in 1996. The MILF, dissatisfied with the terms and implementation of the 1996 agreement, shifted emphasis to an Islamic vs. ethnic focus, and took up the mantle of armed struggle for an independent or expanded autonomous region for the southern Philippines Moros. The MILF continue to seek an expanded autonomous region in the southern Philippines.

The GRP, contending with both MNLF and MILF agendas, brokered the 1996 peace agreement with the MNLF and agreed in 2003 to a cease-fire with the MILF. This tenuous peace prevented large-scale warfare but allowed undergoverned regions to wittingly and unwittingly host transnational actors like Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayaaf.

The southern Philippines COIN environment is familiar to OIF or OEF-A practitioners: regionally focused insurgent organizations that collaborate with transnational, ideologically driven and lethally capable, violent extremists.

Indirect Approach
OEF-P is unique in that it was conceptualized and implemented by a small nucleus of Special Operations Forces. Special Operations Command Pacific, and the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) implemented the “indirect approach” methodology, applying U.S. capacity strictly “through or with” the Armed Forces of the Philippines against the enemy and for the population. The indirect approach is both a philosophy and a method that is inculcated into all practitioners. The heart of the strategy is based on building relationships, reinforcing legitimate institutions, building security-force capabilities, sharing intelligence and information, developing focused civil-military programs, and aggressively promoting local acts of good governance. The indirect approach requires the discreet application of U.S. influence and assistance. Leaders continually calibrate the political implications of their actions, and quickly implement adjustments at the local level. The U.S. mission is led by the Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines.

OEF-P focuses on the Sulu Archipelago, a vast island chain that stretches from the southern Philippines to Malaysia. The enemy is ASG, JI, and violent Islamic ideologues whose actions are often more criminal than religious. These operatives and affiliates nest within supportive or neutral populations, complicating the Philippine mission to identify, capture and incarcerate them. Currently, the mission focuses on three lines of operation: (1) gathering and sharing information, (2) building capacity and (3) Targeted Civil Military Operations.

OEF-P is essentially a branch plan, developed from an existing foundation of mutual cooperation and defense, theater-security cooperation, and U.S.-Philippine military relations. OEF-P was uniquely designed to accomplish U.S. and Philippine counterterrorism objectives immediately following 9/11, thus cultivating a new dimension in U.S.-Philippine relationships. The U.S. and Philippine governments shared the view that the terror groups had to be reduced. However, exactly how the U.S. would apply its capabilities against terrorist groups, given the political considerations, was unclear at the inception. >Top

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