The JFK Special Warfare Museum

United States Army Special Operations Command United States Army Special Forces Command United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center 75th Ranger Regiment 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment Special Operations Support Command 4th Psychological Operations Group 95th Civil Affairs Brigade
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Museum Storyline Museum Concept Special Operations has played a pivotal role in the U.S. military experience. Prior to World War II, partisans performed what we call Special Operations, irregular militia, civilians and retrained conventional soldiers not formally and permanently attached to the U.S. Army. Instead units were organized for a specific purpose at a specific time as necessary adjuncts to the overall conventional military structure. The constants, however, transcend time and operations Museum Themes Special operations include such disparate disciplines as guerilla warfare, counter-insurgency, foreign internal defense (nation building), civil affairs, strategic and special reconnaissance, direct action strikes and psychological operations. Additional missions evolve in response to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directives. Special operations aviation is a vital part of the schematic ensuring insertion and exertion capabilities. Special operations have provided, and continue to provide unique assets and options to a battlefield commander. Special operations soldiers are unique in that they: Train in the use of the minimum amount of force to accomplish the mission. Are highly trained in a primary and cross-trained in a myriad of skills. Are culturally sensitive and astute. Are language and regionally orientated. Are combat multipliers by their ability to generate large numbers of irregular forces with minimal support. Seek maximum results by subtle pressure against enemy key targets both physical and psychological. Have a high value and are heavily utilized during peacetime due not only to their ability to maintain a low-key presence worldwide on a daily basis, but also because they are a supremely flexible force in war, peace or levels in between. Are self-reliant officers and NCOs. Are mature members of a team of professionals. Provide the Army a deep penetration reconnaissance or seizure capability. Maintain the expertise to rebuild and pacify, not just destroy. Museum Schematic Story line concentrates on special warfare in the U.S. Army, encompassing guerilla, unconventional and counter-insurgency operations. Pre- and Revolutionary America French and Indian War John and Joseph Gorham “Gorham’s Indian Rangers of the Deep Woods” 1745 – 1762 First employment of joint operations between militia and naval services Rogers Rangers. [1] 1755 - 1763 Rogers Rules of Order American Revolutionary War Psychological Warfare and Civil Affairs.[2] Printing Press. Thomas Paine and Common Sense.[3] Visual demonstrations (i.e. Boston Tea Party) Tory atrocities, especially in the Carolinas and Georgia[4] Military Actions. Colonial Militia “The Minute Men”[5] George Washington’s use of Strategic Reconnaissance for Intelligence Gathering purposes.[6] Ethan Allen and the Green Mountain Boys[7] Carolina Guerilla Leaders Daniel Morgan[8] Francis “Swamp Fox” Marion[9] Thomas “Gamecock” Sumter[10] Andrew Pickens Whisky Rebellion to War of 1812 Whisky Rebellion Disgruntled farmers in PA rebelled over whiskey tax. First use of federal troops to quell problem[11] War of 1812 “Baltimore Riots” British burning the White House propaganda mistake[12] Battle of New Orleans[13] After war’s end – Treaty of Ghent signed Propaganda coup that US had matured to a position of power 1820 – 1860s. Change in Attitude toward Unconventional Warfare before Civil War. Unconventional warfare became synonymous with terrorism used by Nat Turner, the Kansas Riots and John Brown to advance freedom for slaves.[14] Creeks and Seminoles. Force used to stop guerilla warfare used by Indians to save their lands.[15] Underground Railroad.[16] Tactics used by civilians in the Underground Railroad are akin to those taught by the Survival, Escape, Resistance and Evasion course, USAJFKSWCS. Use of safe houses, signals and codes are not unlike those employed later by the various resistance groups in Europe in World War II. Civil War and Reconstruction Guerilla Actions. During the Civil War, most guerilla actions were Confederate. Their actions’ effectiveness on the overall war is often debated. The conventional military leadership’s opinion of such operations still impacts on how special operations is viewed today.[17] John Mosby and Mosby’s Rangers[RM1] .[18] John Morgan and Morgan’s Raiders.[19] Quantrilll’s Bushwhackers.[20] Andrew’s Raiders and the Chattanooga Campaign (Federal troops) Psychological Warfare. Burning of the South by Sherman.[21] Reconstruction. Civil-military administration of the South.[22] 1865 – World War I Indian Scouts[RM2] [23] Spanish-American War & Philippine Insurrection[24] Winning Hearts and Minds of People GEN Funston, MOH Recipient World War I WWI Propaganda Initiative Propaganda Posters[25] Sir Gilbert Parker and Wellington House[26] Use of Invasion of Belgium, execution of Edith Cavell and sinking of the Lusitania to get America to join war effort [27] Impact on Adolph Hitler[28] Development of Desert Irregular Warfare – T.E. Lawrence[29] World War II[30] Fifth Column Scare Military Units Office of Strategic Services OSS[RM3] . First established by William Donovon [RM4] as Coordinator of Information, a civilian organization, the Office of Strategic Services, a military organization, evolved and was activated in 1942. It had numerous directorates including Special Operations, employing Operational Groups (OG), Jedburgs in Europe (joint inter-allied operations); Detachment 101 in the China-Burma-India Theater; Morale Operations (MO) and Maritime Units (MU) throughout the Theaters of Operation. There also was a large Research & Development Unit (R&D) operating back stateside. [31] Training. Camp X[32] England[33] Equipment Research and Development[34] SOE[35] Special Operations Jedburgs[RM5] [36] OGs[37] Maritime Unit[RM6] [38] Detachment 101 - CBI[RM7] [39] Detachment 202, 303 and 404[40] Morale Operations[41] Air Ops 8th Air Force[42] 01st Bomb Group (Prov.) The Carpetbaggers 1st Air Commando - CBI[43] Fixed wing Rotary Wing[44] First Special Service Force. Activated in 1942 at Fort William Henry Harrison, Montana, the unit, the First Special Service Force was a joint[RM8] US-Canadian unit composed of American volunteers and Canadian airborne soldiers. Originally recruited for Operation Plough, a suicide mission into Norway, the unit instead spearheaded actions in Italy and Southern France.[45] Training [46] Equipment [47] Campaigns Kiska[RM9] [48] Italy Monte la Difensa Anzio[RM10] [49] Rome[RM11] [50] Southern France PSYWAR. There are three PSYWAR fronts in a war atmosphere. The first is Home Front. Galvanizing public support behind the cause is paramount. The second thrust is against the enemy, destroying morale and creating discord between the allies; world opinion composes the third front. In 1933, Hitler asked Hermann Rauschning, president of the Danzig Senate, "What is war, but cunning, deception, delusion, attack and surprise? What is the object of war? To make the enemy capitulate. Why should I demoralize him by military means if I can do so better and more cheaply in other ways?"[51] Home Front activities[52] Against Enemy Lines[53] World Opinion[54] RANGERS[55] Originally formed under the command of Maj William Orlando Darby [RM12] in [RM13] England, Rangers were the "cream of the Infantry." Over the course of World War II, a total of six Ranger Battalions were formed. Other Ranger battalions, assigned to conventional units such as the 29th Infantry Division, were also utilized. Recruitment and Establishment Dieppe Raid[56] 2d Ranger Bn.[57] 6th Ranger Bn[58] PHILLIPINE GUERILLAS.[59] Even before GEN MacArthur's departure in March 1942 to Australia, counterintelligence was active in combating the Japanese threat. After the war, many American and Filipino soldiers went into the hills to join and direct guerilla warfare instead of surrendering. Filipino[60] American[61] Russell Volckmann, Wendell Fertig, Donald Blackburn Use of Nisei MERRILL’S MARAUDERS[RM14] [62]. ALAMO SCOUTS[RM15] [63]. CIVIL-MILITARY GOVERNMENT (CAMG[RM16] ) TEAMS[64] The Civil Affairs/Military Government (CA/MG) teams were established in 1942. The first course was taught at the University of Virginia. During the war, the CA/MG primary functions were to ensure battle was in accordance with the Geneva Accords and to reestablish governmental functions in liberated areas. From the end of the hostilities in 1944 and 1945 until 1954, the CA/MG were responsible for the governing of the occupation of the various impacted nations placed in their sectors of control. Civil Affairs School Post War Occupation Forces[65] Marshall Plan Treatment of POWs.[66] Nelson Rockefeller and Latin America[67] 512th Signal Bn. Established as part of the 1st Airborne Task Force in Southern France under GEN Frederick. POST WORLD WAR II ERA & KOREA. Korea Psychological Warfare. The success of psychological warfare in the Korean War was instrumental in providing a conduit for unconventional warfare to be reestablished in the US Army.[68] Leaflet Campaign. Radio and loudspeaker units Equipment United Nations Partisan Force Korea (UNPFK) [69] Task Force 8240 Island Operations. Airborne Ranger Companies. Rangers were activated in 1950 as an airborne unit. Members were volunteers. Composed of 17 companies: seven of these served in Korea. Inactivated in 1952. [70] Military Operations Unconventional warfare activity. [71] U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Center and School. Part of 5th Army in Fort Riley, Kansas, the PSYWAR School was moved to Fort Bragg, NC after the recommendations on unconventional operations drafted by BG Robert A. McClure was accepted by the U.S. Army[72] History of special warfare training from 1952 to present.[73] Commanders of U.S. Army Special Warfare Center from 1952 to present. Lodge Act recruitment.[74] Activation of 10th Special Forces in 1952[75] Bad Toelz garrison and German service. COL Aaron Bank, 1st Commander[76] Response to Berlin Blockade and later the Russian threat from Eastern Block countries. 77th SFG(A) Remain in Fort Bragg after splitting with 10th SFG(A) Operation Lodestar and FTX in Louisiana. Elements from 77th SFG(A) form 1st SFG(A) activated 1957 and moved to Okinawa[77] U.S. Army Civil Affairs School Activation at Fort Gordon, GA. Training and unit activities MG William Marquat, first commander. VIETNAM ERA Special Forces Build-up 3d SFG(A), Fort Bragg, NC, 5 December 1963[78] 5th SFG(A), Fort Bragg, NC, 21 September 1961[79] 6th SFG(A), Fort Bragg, NC 1 May 1963[80] 77th SFG(A), redesignated 7th SFG(A), 6 June 1960[81] 8th SFG(A), Panama, 1 April 1963[82] 46th SF Company (Abn), Thailand, 12 October 1966[83] National Guard and Reserve units. [84] US Army Center for Special Warfare/US Army Special Warfare School[85] Commanders New building – JFK Hall, Bryant Hall and JFK Chapel John F. Kennedy and Special Forces.[86] Inauguration Speech and involvement in Southeast Asia. JFK’s visit to Fort Bragg in October 1962 and presidential order for wearing the green beret, September 1962[RM17] . Vietnam OSS[87] Special Forces[88] 1st and 7th SFG(A) TDY Equipment and Weapons Medal of Honor Recipients Special Teams Mike Force Studies and Observation Group (SOG)[89] Australian Army Training Team - Vietnam[90] Victoria Cross recipients Mike Force Rangers[91] Evolvement from LRRPS to Rangers Medal of Honor recipients CIDG camps[92] Prisoners of War[93] Montagnards.[94] US Army Military Assistance Training Advisors (MATA) Recondo School, Vietnam Helicopter Support Son Tay Raid[95] Psychological Operations.[96] American and NVA Leaflets Chieu Hoa Program Loudspeaker, radio and educational programming. Modern Use and Development of Special Operations[97] Continued Mission and Training. Command Development Split of US Army JFK Center for Military Assistance and US Army Institute for Military Asssistance. Activation of 1st Special Operations Command (Provisional) (1st SOCOM)(Prov) October 1982 and 1st SOCOM(ABN) October 1983. Reorganization and realignment of Ranger Battalions and activation of 75ht Ranger Regiment and 3d Ranger Bn. October 1983. Establishment of Special Forces Branch 21 April 1986. Activation of the Major Army Command for Special Operations - US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) November 1990. Activation of two major subordinate commands (MSCs) November 1990 U.S. Army Special Forces Command U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command Inactivation of the 11th and 12th SFG(A) Reserves Operation Desert One[98] Operations Urgent Fury First Use of Unified Command – 1st SOCOM Rangers PSYOP Civil Affairs Operation Just Cause Special Forces PSYOP leaflet and loudspeaker campaign. Rangers Civil Affairs and reestablishing government infrastructure Desert Shield/Storm Special Forces PSYOP leaflet campaign Operation Provide Comfort – Kurdish Refugee operation Operation Uphold Democracy[99] Operation Restore Hope. Ranger Task Force Mogadishu[100] Medal of Honor recipients - Shughart and Gordon Operation Enduring Freedom Ongoing Missions [1] John B. Coneo, Robert Rogers of the Rangers. (London: Oxford University Press, 1959). [2] Phillip Davidson, Propaganda and the American Revolution. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941.); Paul M. A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare. (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pierce, 1954.) [3]Paine, Thomas: Common Sense ; (Edit. Isaac Kramnick) (New York: Penguin, 1982.). [4]Joes, Anthony James. America and Guerilla Warfare. (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kenturcky, 2000), pp. 5 – 49. [5] Galvin, John R. The Minute Men: The First Fight – Myths and Realities of the American Revolution. (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s Press, 1996) [6] Robert K. Wright. The Continental Army (Washington, D.C.: US Army Center of Military History, 1983), p. 175. Fleming, Thomas. “George Washington, Spymaster.” American Heritage (New York: Forbes, Inc.) February/March 2000, pp. 46 – 51. The first Purple Hearts were given to three NCOs who went behind enemy lines to gather information. [7] Bird, Harrison. Attack on Quebec: The American Invasion of Canada 1775 – 1776. (New York: Oxford Press, 1968.) [8] Higgenbotham, Don. Daniel Morgan: Revolutionary Rifleman (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1961.) [9] Bass, Robert B. Swamp Fox: The Life and Campaigns of General Francis Marion. (Orangeburg, South Carolina: Sandlapper Publishing Co., 1982) [10] Bass, Robert, Gamecock: The Life and Times of General Thomas Sumter. (New York: Holt, Rhinehart, and Winston, 1961). [11] [12] Linebarger, pp. [13] [14] Chowder, Ken. “The Father of American Terrorism” American Heritage. (New York: Forbes, Inc.) February/March 2000, pp. 81 – 91. [15] Maurics Matloff, Ed., American Military History (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1969) pp. 151-161. [16] Kilbourne, Jimmy W. Escape and Evasion. (New York: Macmillan, 1973); James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Ballantine Books, 1988), pp. 79 – 89. [17] Joes, pp. 50 – 101. [18] Ramage, James A. Gray Ghost: The Life of COL John Singleton Mosby (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1999; Virgil C. Jones. Ranger Mosby (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1944). [19] Cecil Fletcher Holland, Morgan and His Raiders, A Biography of the Confederate General; Noel, Lois, John Hunt Morgan; and Swiggett, Howard, Rebel Raider: A Life of John Hunt Morgan On several of his raids, Morgan took a small field press to print such proclamations, "The Gen. Commanding, takes this means of informing the people that he has not come among them to disturb them in the enjoyment of their rights, either of person or property. The Home Guards are required to come in at once and deliver up their arms, those who fail to do so will be regarded as enemies of the Government and treated accordingly. Those who comply will be treated as non-combatants, and private citizens. Private citizens who seek opportunity to ambush our soldiers commonly known as "Bushwhack- ers" will be regarded as outlaws, and orders will be issued to shoot them wherever found. If any of our men are fired on while passing through the country, I will [sic] lay waste the entire surrounding neighborhood." [20] Richard S. Brownlee. Grey Ghosts of the Confederacy: Guerilla Warfare in the West 1861-1865. (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University, 1984.) The lawlessness of Quantrill’s Bushwhackers is not condoned or considered an example of accepted guerilla warfare tactics, but it prompted the passage of the Partisan Ranger Act by the Confederate States of America on April 28, 1861. [21] Linebarger, p.21. McPherson, p. 808. The burning of the South had the opposite effect of the Burning of the White House by the British in the War of 1812. Whereas the British burning of the newly completed home to the President aided to incite undecided Americans to fight the British, the Burning of the South by Sherman sounded as a visible deathblow to the people of the South that the Confederacy would not survive. Sherman understood the implications of his march through Georgia timed to coincide with the 1864 Presidential campaign stating, “If we march a well-appointed army right through [Jefferson Davis’s] territory, it is a demonstration to the world, foreign and domestic, that we have a power which Davis cannot resist…I can make the march, and make Georgia howl!” [22] J.G. Randall and David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction (Lexington, MA: D.D. Heath and Company, 1969). [23] Kennth W. Porter. The Black Seminoles: History of a Freedom-Seeking People. (Gainsville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1996); Jacques Noel Jacobsen, Jr. and Fairfax Downey. The Red/Bluecoats: The Indian Scouts, U.S. Army. (Fort Collins, Old Army Press, 1973); Thomas W. Dunlay: Wolves for the Blue Soldiers. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1987). [24] Brian McAllister Linn, The US Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War 1899 – 1902 (Chapel Hill, NC: University North Carolina Press, 1989). Joes, pp. 102 – 129. [25] Linebarger, pp. 62 – 77; George Theofiles. American Posters of World War I. (New York: Dafran House Publishers, Inc., 1973); Walton Rawls. Wake up, America! World War I and the American Poster (Abbeyville,1988). [26] Harold Lavine and James Wechsler. War Propaganda and the United States. Institute for Propaganda Analysis, 1942, pp. 18 - 52. [27] Ibid. pp. 24-31. Peter Paret, Beth Irwin Lewis, Paul Paret. Persuasive Images: Poster of War and Revolution from the Hoover Institution Archives. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 21 & 26-27. [28] Ibid. pp. 2 - 10. Adolph Hitler called propaganda "a weapon of the first class." [29] T.E. Lawrence. “The Evolution of a Revolt” Army Quarterly and Defense Journal. October 1920. Reprint by Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, n.d.; and Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (New York: Doubleday, 1926, 1935). [30] David W. Hogan, Jr. US Army Special Operations in World War II (Washington, D.C.: US Army Center for Military History, 1992). [31] Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins 1941 – 1952. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Press, 1982.) pp. 23 –37; Richard Harris Smith, OSS: Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley, CA: University of Chicago Press, 1981); Kermit Roosevelt, War Report of the O.S.S. (Office of Strategic Services), (New York: Walker And Company, 1976), pp. 1 - 50; Elizabeth P. McIntosh, Sisterhood of Spies The Women of the OSS. (Annapolis, MD Naval Institute Press 1998.) Francis Russell and the editors of Time-Life Books. The Secret War. (Chicago: Time-Life Books, 1981) pp. 96 - 135. COL Jerry Sage. Sage: The Man They Called :Dagger” of the OSS. Wayne, PA; Tobey Publishing, Co., Inc., 1985. Pp. 9 – 35. [32] David Stafford. Camp X: Training Camp for Secret Agents, 1941-45. New York, NY Dodd, Mead & Co. 1987. [33] Ben Parnell, Carpetbaggers: America's Secret War in Europe (Austin, TX: Eakin Press, 1987); William B. Dreux, No Bridges Blown. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), pp. 28-49, [34] Stanley P Lovell. Of Spies & Strategems. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1967); Barry M. Katz. Foreign Intelligence: Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services, 1942 - 1945. (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1989) [35] H.R.D. Foote, SOE: An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive: 1940-46. (New York: University Publishers of America, 1986). [36] Aaron Bank, From the OSS to the Green Berets. (Novato, Calif: Presidio Press, 1986.); Dreux, pp. 49 - 130; MG John P. Singlaub, Hazardous Duty (New York: Summit Books, 1991.) [37] Thomas Gallagher. Assault in Norway: Sabotaging the Nazi Nuclear Bomb (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace Jovanich, 1975; Franklin Lindsay, Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisans in Wartime Yugoslavia. (Stanford, University 1993); Roosevelt, pp. ; . [38] Edwin P. Hoyt, Seals at War : The Story of U. S. Navy Special Warfare from the Frogmen to the SEALs. (New York, NY, U.S.A.: Dell Publishing, 1993. [39] Richard Dunlop. Behind Japanese Lines : With the OSS in Burma (New York, NY: Rand McNally, 1979; Roger Hilsman, American Guerilla: My War Behind Japanese Lines (New York: Brassey's Pess, 1990); Thomas Moon The Grim and Savage Game: OSS and the Beginning of U. S. Covert Operations in World War II. (Burning Gate, 1991); William R. Peers and Dean Breslis, Behind the Burma Road: The Story of America's Most Successful Guerilla Force. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963). [40] Bank, pp. 131 - 140. [41] Daniel Lerner, (Ed.) Propaganda in War and Crisis: Materials for American Policy. (New York, NY: Arno Press - New York Times, 1972); Lawrence C. Soley. Radio Warfare OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda. (New York, NY Praeger Publishers 1989). [42] Roger A. Freeman, Mighty Eighth War Manual. (London: Jane's Publishing, 1987), pp. 94-97, 107-13); Ben Parnell, Carpetbaggers: America's Secret War in Europe. (Austin, TX: Eakin Press, 1987). [43] Shelford Bidwell The Chindit War: Stilwell, Wingate, and the Campaign in Burma: 1944 (New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Co, Inc. 1969), pp 52 - 55, 62; Peers and Brelis. Behind the Burma Road. [44] Herbert A. Mason, Randy G. Bergeron, James A. Renfrow, "Operation Thursday: Birth of the Air Commandos," Wright Patterson AFB, OH: US Air Force Museum Publications Program, 1994. p.17 [45] Robert D. Burhans. The First Special Service Force, A War History of the North Americans 1942 - 1944. (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947). [46] MG Kenneth G. Wickham. An Adjutant General Remembers. (Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN: The Adjutant General Corps Regimental Association, 1991) pp. 5 – 7; COL Adna H. Underhill (ret). The Force. Tucson, AZ: Arizona Monographs, Inc., 1994, pp. 1-92. [47] Todd Ross. The Supercommandos: First Special Service Force- 1942-1944; An Illustrated History. (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2000). [48] Peter Hill Cottingham. Once Upon A Wartime: A Canadian Who Survived the Devil’s Brigade.. (Brandon, Canada: Leech Printing, 1996; Underhill, pp. 93 – 103. [49] Fred Sheehan. Anzio: Epic of Bravery. (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964) pp. 109 - 178. [50] Robert H. Adleman anc COL George Walton. Rome Fell Today. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), pp. 252-55. [51] Lavine and Wechsler, War Propaganda and the United States. pp. 5 - 36. [52] Ronald Bailey and the editors of Time-Life Books. Home Front: USA. . (Chicago: Time-Life Books, 1981); Roy Douglas. The World War 1939-1945: The Cartoonists' Vision. London: Routledge. 1990. Peter Paret, Beth Irwin Lewis, Paul Paret. Persuasive Images: Poster of War and Revolution from the Hoover Institution Archives. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 182 – 202; Anthony Rhodes, Propaganda: The Art of Persuasion. World War II: An Allied and Axis Visual Record, 1933 - 1945. (Secaucus, NJ: The Wellfleet Press, 1987); Russell and the editors of Time-Life Books. The Secret War. pp. 5 – 15; Zbymek Zemen. Selling the War: Art and Propaganda in World War II. (London: Orbis Press, 1978. Pp. 31- 80. [53] Leo J. Margolin, Paper Bullets: A Brief Story of Psychological Warfare in World War II. (New York: Froben Press 1946; Russell W. Howe, The Hunt for Tokyo Rose. (Lanham, MD: Madison Books, Incorporated, 1993). [54] Zemen, p. [55] James J. Altieri. The First, Third and Fourth Ranger Battalions: Darby's Rangers - An Illustrate Portrayal of the Original Rangers World War II. ( Durham, NC: Fisher-Harrison Corporation, 1977); William O. Darby, William H. Baumer. Darby's Rangers: We Led the Way (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press 1980); Robert W. Black. Rangers in World War II. (New York: Ivy Books, 1992). [56] Altieri, The First, Third and Fourth Ranger Battalions: Darby's Rangers - An Illustrate Portrayal of the Original Rangers World War II. Pp. 16-31; Black. pp. 27 - 48. [57] Ronald Lane Rudder’s Rangers. (Manassas, VA: Ranger Associates, 1979); Black. Rangers in World War II. Pp. 177, 199-213. [58] Black. Rangers in World War II. pp. 233-234 and 284-298; Hampton Sides. Ghost Soldiers: The Forgotten Epic Story of World War II's Most Dramatic Mission. (New York: Doubleday, 2001). [59] William B. Breuer. MacArthur's Undercover War: Spies, Saboteurs, Guerrillas, and Secret Missions. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995). [60] COL Gamaliel L. Manikan (ret). Guerilla Warfare on Panay Isaland in the Phillipines. (Manila, PI: Sixth Military District Veteran's Foundation, Inc., 1977); Sides, pp. 60 - 278. [61] Eugene C. Jacobs. "A Medical Memoir of MacArthur's First Guerrilla Regiment." Military Medicine. 144:6. 6 June 1979; John Keats. They Fought Alone (Philadelphia: J.P. Lippincott Company, 1963). Louise Reid Spencer. Guerilla Wife. (Chicago: Peoples Book Club, Inc. no date; Ira Wolfert . American Guerrilla in the Philippines. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945). [62] Charlton Ogburn Jr., Merrill’s Marauders. (New York: Harper & Brothers 1959); G Bjorge. Merrill's Marauders: Combined Operations in Northern Burma in 1944. (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1996); Charles N Hunter. Galahad. (San Antonio, Texas: Naylor Press, 1963). [63] Forrest Bryant Johnson. Hour of Redemption: The Ranger Raid on Cabanatuan. (New York: Manor Books, 1978); Sides. [64] William E. Daugherty and Marshall Andrews. A Review of U.S. Historical Experience with Civil Affairs 1776 - 1954. (Bethesda, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961).. [65] Ibid.; Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1964); Robert Wolfe, ed., Americans as Proconsuls: US Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944 - 52 (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984); Franklin M. Davis, Come as a Conqueror. (New York: MacMillan. 1967). [66] Lewis Carlson. We Were Each Other's Prisoners. (New York: Basic Books, 1997); Eugene Jacobs. Blood Brothers - A Medic's Sketch Book. (New York: Carlton Press, 1989). Sides. [67] Joe Alex Morris. Nelson Rockefeller: A Biography. (New York Harper & Brothers, 1960). [68] Linebarger, pp. 301-308. [69] Paddock, pp. 100-09. [70] Robert W. Black. Rangers In Korea. (New York: Ivy Books. 1989). [71] Linebarger; Paddock, pp. 83-100. [72] Paddock, pp. 143-159; Ian Sutherland, Special Forces of the U.S. Army: 1952-1982. (San Jose, California: Bender Press, 1990). pp. 206-214. [73] Sutherland. pp. 36-245. [74] M.R. Blair. “Toughest Outfit in the Army.” Saturday Evening Post. 12 May 1956. 228:40-1 passim. [75] Paddock, pp. 143-154; "Trough Triple Volunteers of Army's 10th Special Forces Unit Are Ready to Lead Freedom Fighters Behind the Iron Curtain." Army Navy Air Force Journal. 1 Aug 1959, 96:3. [76] Bank, Aaron. From OSS to Green Berets. (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1986). pp. 155 – 204. [77] Sutherland, pp. 263 – 269; Richard O. Sutton. Operation White Star. (Canton, Ohio: Daring Publishing Co., 1990). [78] Sutherland, pp. 297 - 298. [79] Ibid. pp. 270 – 271; Colonel Francis J Kelly,. Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army.) [80] Sutherland. pp. 293 – 294. [81] Ibid., pp. 255 – 256. [82] Ibid. pp. 292-293. [83] Ibid., pp. 300 – 302. [84] Ibid., pp. 310 – 315. [85] Ibid., pp. 206 – 214; Veritas newspapers, US Army JFK Center for Special Warfare/US Army Special Warfare School and later US Army JFK Center for Military Assistance/US Army Institute for Military Assistance newspaper 1964 –1 1973. [86] Hilsman, pp. 253 – 288. [87] Bank, pp. 105 – 129. [88] Shelby Stanton. Green Berets At War: US Army Special Forces In Southeast Asia 1956-1975 (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1985.) Shelby Stanton. Special Forces At War. [89] Drew Dix. The Rescue of River City. (Alaska: Drew Dix Publishing, 2000); Franklin D. Miller. Reflections of A Warrior. Self-printed. 1999.; John L. Plaster. SOG: A Photo History of the Secret Wars. (Paladin Press, 2000); John L. Plaster. SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.); Richard H., Schultz, Jr. The Secret War Against Hanoi : Kennedy & Johnson's Use of Spies, Saboteurs & Covert Warriors in the War. (New York.: Harper Collins Publishers, 1999). [90] Ian McNeill. The Team: Australian Advisers in Vietnam: 1962 – 1972. (Canberaa: Australian War Memorial, 1984). Ian McNeill. The Team In Pictures. (Canberaa: Australian War Memorial, 1984). [91] Shelby Stanton. Rangers At War: Combat Recon In Vietnam. (New York: Orion Books, 1992). Henry G. Gale. “Bring Back the LRRP.” Military Review. October 1981. 61:2-10; James R. Arnold. Rangers. (New York: Bantam Books, 1988.) [92] Maynard W. Dow. Nation Building in Southeast Asia. (Boulder, Co.: Pruett Press, 1966.) [93] James N. “Nick” Rowe. Five Years to Freedom. (New York: Little, Brown & Co., 1971.); Tom Philpott. Glory Denied: America's Longest-Held Prisoner of War. (New York: Norton, W. W. & Company, Inc. 2001). [94] E. Duguet. Les Montagnards du Tonkin. (Paris: Libraire Maritime and Coloniale,, 1908; Robert L. Mole. The Montagnards of South Vietnam: A Study of Nine Tribes. (Rutland, VT; Charles F. Tuttle Co. Publishers, 1970); US Army Special Warfare School. Montagnard Tibal Groups of the Republic of South Vietnam. (Fayetteville, NC. 1964.) [95] Benjamin Schemmer. The Raid. (New York: Harper & Row, Inc., 1976.) [96] Robert W. Chandler. War of Ideas: The U.S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam. (Boulder Co.: Westview Press. 1981.) [97] Annual Historical Reviews. USAJFKSWCS Historian; USASOC Historical Files.; Rod Lenahan. A Historical Perspective of U.S. Special Operations 1976 – 1996. (Charleston: Narwhal Press, 1998). [98] Lenahan, pp. 23 – 298. [99] Bob Shachochis. The Immaculate Invasion. ( New York: Viking Press. 1999). [100] Mark Bowden. Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (Grove/Atlantic Books, 1999); Videotape. Somalia: Good Intentions, Deadly Results (Black Hawk Down), 1999. [RM1] John Singleton Mosby Born on December 6, 1833 in Edgemont, Virginia. In December 1862, Brigadier General Jeb Stuart sent one of his scouts, John Singleton Mosby, along with nine men on a mission deep into the enemy's rear areas. Mosby and his men were to provide the nucleus for a guerrilla movement aimed at Union forces operating in or near the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia. Eventually designated the 43rd Battalion of Partisan Rangers, Mosby's men, never numbering over 400, proved a continuous thorn in the side of Union commanders. Mosby’s Confederacy extended primarily in Loudon and Faquier counties of Virginia, although he effected raids as far as West Virginia. Following Lee's defeat at Gettysburg, Lincoln and his generals once again sent the Army of the Potomac southward toward Richmond. Mosby responded by harassing Union garrisons along his foe's ever lengthening line of communication wrecking trains and tracks in an attempt to cripple Union logistics. Mosby's efforts proved so successful that General Franz Sigel found it necessary in the spring of 1864 to dedicate 22,000 troops to the task of securing Union supply lines in the Shenandoah Valley. One Union officer, frustrated with his unsuccessful efforts to destroy the partisans, compared the challenge to that of shooting mosquitoes with a rifle--"very smashing to the insect, if you hit him." Union forces never brought Mosby to heal. When Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia surrendered on 9 April 1865, Mosby, now nicknamed the Gray Ghost, elected to dissolve his command rather than accede to a formal surrender. After the war, he practiced law. In 1872, he was forced into exile, forced to leave Virginia when he actively supported U.S. Grant and the Republican party in Grant’s bid for the presidency. He served with the Consul in Hong Kong and later with the U.S. Land Office in Colorado and Nebraska. At both places, he exposed graft and illegal practices. He died at May 30th , 1916 at 83. [RM2] The Indian Scouts Understanding the limitations of conventional infantry and cavalry units in pacifying the American West, Congress authorized the establishment of the Indian Scouts in 1866. The new law essentially provided official sanction to a practice already well established among Army officers performing constabulary duty west of the Mississippi River. Initially, the scouts provided protection to survey parties and construction crews laboring to build the nation's first transcontinental railway, the Union Pacific. Later, as the Indian wars intensified, the Scouts served as the eyes and ears of the Army, providing timely intelligence to an Army frequently inhibited by unfamiliar terrain and an illusive foe. Indian Scouts participated in the campaign against the Sioux and Cheyenne on the plains and later against the Apache in the Southwest and the Camancheros along the Pecos River in Texas. !4 Indian Scouts received the Medals of Honor. Their official uniform was the cavalry blouse over leggins. The insignia was crossed arrows (arrows up) and the bar U.S.S. Their colors were red and white. These arrows would later become the insignia for the First Special Service Force in World War II and the U.S. Army Special Forces today. The Army kept entry standards for the Scouts exceptionally high. Prospective scouts had to demonstrate knowledge of the language, customs and history of the Native American peoples of the West. They had to know the nuances of tracking as well as be an expert in all other aspects of field craft. Skill in horsemanship was a must, but all scouts were expected to hold their own on foot marches as well. Scouts had to provide their own mounts. The closing of the American frontier in the West as well as the changing nature of warfare signaled an end to the need for the Scouts. In 1891, the Congress cut their authorized strength to 150 men. Officially inactivated in 1939, the Scouts had been relegated to riding patrol along the border in Arizona. The Army finally disbanded the last scout detachment in 1943 at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. [RM3] OSS As World War II was being fought in Europe, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was concerned about American deficient intelligence gathering capability. He asked his fellow Columbia University classmate New York lawyer William J. Donovan, to draft a plan. , For the most part, the Army viewed raids and partisan operations with indifference. American military planners were much more concerned with the transformation of a small peacetime conventional force into a mass army capable of waging a global war. From the beginning Donovan's concept of the new organization's role went far beyond the field of intelligence, for he saw the agency as a tool to soften the occupied areas for eventual invasion. Regarding propaganda as an initial "arrow of penetration," he planned to help resistance movements undertake a campaign of sabotage, subversion, and, assisted by commandos, small-unit guerrilla warfare. In June 1942, the Coordinator of Information was established in June 1942 with a mandate to collect and analyze strategic information required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to conduct special operations not assigned to other agencies. Drawing on British advice and the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) model, he formed separate branches. Special Operations (SO) Branch (SEE 226.11) established in OCOI, January 1942, implementing JCS directive JCS 155/4/D, December 23, 1941, which authorized OSS to conduct undercover operations in support of planned military operations. Technical Development Section removed from SO Branch, redesignated OR&D, and made into a staff office in ODSS, effective October 19, 1942, by General Order 1, OSS, October 17, 1942. Responsible for developing weapons, equipment, and agent cover items used in clandestine warfare. Despite military suspicion and organizational rivalries, the agency survived, officially becoming the Office of Strategic Services in June 1942. But the OSS never received complete jurisdiction over all foreign intelligence activities. Since the early 1930s the FBI had been responsible for intelligence work in Latin America, and the military services protected their areas of responsibility. During the War, the OSS supplied policy-makers with essential facts and intelligence estimates and often played an important role in directly aiding military campaigns. As a new agency, the Office of Strategic Services was able to take a fresh look at the entire field of special operations. A rather haphazard administrator, Donovan, according to one associate, ran his agency like a country store, but he did demonstrate an eagerness to try new ideas, ranging from plans to establish air bases behind Japanese lines in China to a plot to kidnap German Air Force chief Hermann Goering. Visitors to OSS headquarters were struck by the casual atmosphere, lack of formal lines of authority, and the wide range of personalities on the staff, ranging from Communists to well-connected socialites whom Donovan recruited at cocktail parties, board-rooms, and campuses. Many of the military personnel in the OSS served in the agency's airborne commando teams, known as operational groups (OGs). In July 1942 Donovan obtained the approval of General George C. Marshall, the Army's chief of staff, to form units of bilingual volunteers that would organize and supply guerrilla bands, gather intelligence, and carry out commando operations behind enemy lines. Recruiting teams canvassed posts and training areas for volunteers who spoke a foreign language and expressed a willingness to perform hazardous duty. These men formed cells, each containing two sections of two officers and thirteen enlisted men, although the actual size of the teams in the field would vary greatly. Primarily infantrymen and demolitions experts, they also contained medical technicians and radio operators. As was generally the case with Donovan's agency, they had their share of romantics and eccentrics, including veterans of the Spanish Civil War, a Czarist Army officer who had fled Russia after the Revolution, and "tough little boys from New York and Chicago," whose main desire, according to an instructor, "was to get over to the old country and start throwing knives." The first stop for many OSS OG recruits was the incongruously plush surroundings of the Congressional Country Club outside Washington. Jedburghs were trained principally in Harrington, England as well as the Scottish moors around Jedburgh where they took their moniker. The China-Burma-India Detachment 101 trained many of its personnel off of Catalina Island where the OSS Maritime Unit also trained as well as the Bahamas. In October 1, 1945, the OSS was abolished and its functions transferred to the State and War Departments. But the need for a postwar, centralized intelligence system was clearly recognized. Eleven months earlier, Donovan, by then a major general, had submitted to President Roosevelt a proposal calling for the separation of OSS from the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the new organization having direct Presidential supervision. This would become what we now know as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). [RM4] MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM “Wild Bill” J. DONOVON William Donovon was born on New Year’s Day 1883 in Buffalo, NY. Although he started to study for the priesthood at Niagara University, his advisor, Father Egan, convinced him to study law at Columbia University instead. At Columbia, he earned his nickname “Wild Bill” as their star quarterback. In 1905, graduating along side Franklin D. Roosevelt. He joined the National Guard Cavalry Unit, Troop I, 1st New York Cavalry in May of 1912 and quickly rose through the ranks from a private to a Captain. When the US entered World War I in 1917, Father Duffy, chaplain of the New York 69th Infantry (“The Fighting Irish”), lobbied to get Donovan assigned as a Major in command of 1st Battalion, 69th Infantry. During the Argonne offensive, on October 14 and 15, 1918, LTC Donovon’s unit was caught off-guard. The armor support that had been promised had failed to materialize, leaving the unit to fight against an unexpected stronger German force. At daybreak, Donovan, wounded, his leg shattered, refused evacuation, instead staying with his men, directing the battle from a shell hole. When informed that the Germans were directing a counterattack, he ordered a mortar barrage, thereby stopping the enemy cold. After his unit was relieved, he allowed himself to be treated. For this action, he received the Medal of Honor. Between wars, Donovan served as a lawyer and a public servant. Although very popular with his constituents, he was Republican. Roosevelt often said of him “If he had been a Democrat, he would have been elected the first Catholic President of the United States.” Becoming personal friends with people such as the Dulles brothers, Frank Knox and David Bruce, Donovan used these contacts when he established the Coordinator of Information (COI) of which he was the head. The COI evolved into the OSS, a multi-faceted operation that Donovan ran with charisma and zeal. Donovan had a canny sense of recruiting the best people for the job, whether it be socially prominent people (earning OSS the nickname “Oh So Social”) or scientists. It was not uncommon to find a Walt Disney cartoonist working alongside a nationally ranked rodeo cowboy or a Czarist army officer working hand-in-hand with a recent graduate of Yale. The OSS not only gathered intelligence, but was active in propaganda, behind-the-lines operations, and research and development. After the war, Major General Donovan served as the Ambassador to Thailand from 1953 – 1954. For his service, President Eisenhower awarded him the National Security Medal, making him the first American to win the top four military and civilian honors: the Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service Cross, the Distinguished Service Medal and the National Security Medal. Donovan died in his New York City home February 8, 1959. [RM5] The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Jedburgh Teams The OSS created 93 three man Jedburgh teams in late 1943 to provide special operations support for the Allied invasions of France and six additional teams to support subsequent operations in the Netherlands. By early 1944 some 230 French, British, American, Belgian, Dutch, Canadian, and South African volunteers had assembled in Cambridgeshire north of London for training in behind-the-lines operations. British officers headed the project, with their headquarters and main training facility at Milton Hall, outside the city of Peterborough. A typical three man team consisted of a French officer, an American or British officer and an enlisted radio operator. They received training in close combat, infiltration and exfiltration techniques, small unit tactics, light weapons, demolitions and a host of skills necessary for survival behind German lines. Approximately half of the Jed teams deployed from England to Northern France at or shortly after the Normandy landings (Operation OVERLORD) while the rest staged out of Algeria for the invasion of Southern France (Operation DRAGOON). Typically, Jeds arrived by parachute, dropping through the open bomb-bay doors of bombers specially equipped for night operations. Others teams infiltrated by glider, cargo plane, or by boat. Ideally, members of the French Resistance met the teams on the landing zones. On occasion, however, German gestapo agents supported by the French milice (French collaborators) provided the welcoming party, ending an operation almost before it began. Even after link-up with the Resistance, the Jeds occasionally ran afoul of the tangled political disputes between Gaullist and Communist partisans. Because the Jeds offered the surest means for partisans to receive air-dropped supplies, rival groups occasionally fought each other to secure the team and their all important radio. Besides for access to equipment, the Jeds provided the means to organize and direct partisan operations in support of Allied armies driving east and north toward the Rhine. Jedburgh led partisan groups destroyed rail lines, ambushed German convoys, cut telephone wires and blew up bridges. When German resistance began to crumble, the Jeds found themselves hard-pressed to keep an ever growing number of partisans armed with weapons. Despite the occasional betrayal of the teams and the inevitable casualties, the Jeds and their bands of French partisans harassed the Germans unmercifully. As a result of their efforts, the Germans found it necessary to dedicate thousands of soldiers to the task of rear area security. The last Jedburgh team completed their mission in January 1945. [RM6] OSS Maritime Unit The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) conceived by William “Wild Bill” Donovon, was established to conduct special intelligence and operations missions during World War II. A Maritime Unit (MU), under the auspices of the Special Operations Branch of OSS, was created and tasked with the waterborne transfer of agents, operatives and materials to and from enemy territory; the Research and Development of special maritime equipment; the training of agents and operatives in operational maritime techniques; and the planning and execution of special maritime operations utilizing the Operational Swimmer Groups. The OSS eagerly recruited Dr. Lambertsen, a young medical student and the creator of the Lambertsen Underwater Rebreather Unit (LARU), to implement the Operational Swimmer program. They then recruiting other qualified swimmers from all branches of the armed forces. Ranging in size from 12 to 36 operatives, the Operational Swimmers provided the US with an operational maritime capability to include maritime sabotage, clandestine hydrographic and inland reconnaissance and the instruction of indigenous personnel in resistance warfare. Preliminary training, focusing on waterborne skills and small unit tactics, was conducted at the OSS West Coast Training Center at Camp Pendleton and Catalina Island, CA. Advanced training in clandestine underwater operations was conducted on a secluded island in the Bahamas. Equipped with the LARU, swim fins, a depth gauge, waterproof watch, compass and an assortment of specialized small arms and ordnance, the operational swimmers had an unprecedented ability to maneuver, swimming underwater over extended periods of time and distance to conduct actions on objectives and exfil without a trace. Between 1943 and the summer of 1945, a total of five operational units were trained and fielded in the three main theaters of World War II. In the European Theater, OSS Field Base London raised a provisional group, code named L-Unit, to perform sabotage of submarine pens and block ships in the Port of Lorient, Keroman, France. The mission was cancelled due to equipment difficulties. L-Unit, however, represents the first OSS effort to field operational swimmers in combat. In addition, major strides were accomplished in the planning and conduct of cold water swimmer operations. Operational Swimmer Group I was placed on temporary duty with the US Navy in the Central Pacific. Providing the nucleus for an Underwater Demolition Team, the unit cleared the way for the amphibious landings at Peleliu, Anguar, Ulithi, Zambales and Luzon. Five operational swimmers from Group I served with a Special Reconnaissance Detachment, reconnoitering islands in the Western Carolinas for the 3d Amphibious Force. In August 1944, during a reconnaissance sortie on the Island of Yap, two operational swimmers and a Navy Chief were captured and executed. In September 1944, Operational Swimmer Group II conducted a successful submarine borne harbor infiltration exercise at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Negotiating through net and boom defenses, the group sank an old 500-ton lighter. The men then proceeded to their combat assignment off the Arakan coast of Burma. Attached to the British 14th Army, the unit performed clandestine hydrographic reconnaissance. Operational Group III, stationed in Ceylon, was the first US unit equipped with a swimmer delivery vehicle known as “Sleeping Beauty #72”. The “Sleeping Beauty” was a submersible canoe designed by the British. Although a joint mission with the SOE Force 136 was planned, it was never executed. In July 1945, one member from this unit conducted a hydrographic reconnaissance mission of Weichow Island, China. In the following month three operational swimmers supported the search and rescue of seven OSS agents from the enemy controlled Batu Islands off Sumatra. On October 1, 1945, the OSS as a whole was disbanded. The capabilities, lessons learned and history of many of the units live on in today’s Special Forces. [RM7] China-Burma-India Theater The China-Burma-India theater had become a backwater of the war effort as early as 1942, but the need to keep China in the war against Japan made nominal support for the theater a necessity. LTG “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell, no supporter of guerilla operations, reluctantly accepted OSS Director William “Wild Bill” Donovon’s offer a small unit of highly trained soldiers dedicated to the mission of special reconnaissance and guerilla warfare. Under the command of CPT Carl Eifler, whom Stilwell personally recruited, Detachment 101, as the unit would be called, deployed to India before year’s end. Eifler faced many challenges, lacking nearly everything that makes operations possible. He was short of men, money, supplies, current intelligence, some semblance of direction from OSS headquarters in Washington, and Stilwell’s skepticism, referring to guerilla operations were “illegal actions” and “shadow boxing”, and impatience. The unit built a supply base in Northern India before the summer was out and had agents in the field by the end of the year. Thanks, in part to cruel population control measures, Japanese forces in Burma generated considerable animosity among the upland, non-Burmese peoples. The Kachins were particularly incensed by Japanese atrocities and eagerly joined Detachment 101’s ranks. Having little success with infiltrating agents by land, Eifler became a proponent of parachute infiltration but found the Army Air Force reluctant to assist. Unwilling to accept “no” for an answer, Eifler promised to develop an escape and evasion network for downed airmen in exchange for air support. BG Edward H. Alexander, the chief of Air Transport Command accepted Eifler's offer in January 1943. Det 101 eventually recovered over 400 airmen simultaneous to becoming the beneficiary of an aerial resupply system that daily provided his soldiers with tons of supplies. In addition, the Kachins proved to be excellent guerillas and became particularly good at locating and marking Japanese targets for air attack by the Tenth Air Force. Eight percent of its bombing targets were based on Det 101 intelligence reports. Stilwell became a supporter of Detachment 101 after initial operations began to bring results. By the end of 1943, Det 101 had 700 guerillas in the field and a network of agents, one of whom was the general contractor to the Japanese in the critically important airbase at Mytikyina. Eleven Det 101 radio stations provided a daily supply of information from behind Japanese lines. Det 101’s Pigeon Operations, using homing pigeons, ensured the allies had a steady flow of information on Japanese troop movements. A war of ambushes and sabotage made the roads and trails increasingly unsafe for Japanese units. The factors married with Det 101’s Morale Operations’ psywar campaign deflated the Japanese soldiers’ morale. The success of Det 101 in 1943 brought newfound support from Stilwell’s headquarters. When Eifler returned stateside in December 1943 for health reasons, Ray Peers assumed command. His mandate from Stilwell was to increase the size of his guerilla force to 3,000 soldiers and broaden his scope of operations. Peers responded by creating four area commands to direct guerilla forces. Stilwell also tasked Det 101 to provide support for Operation Galahad, an allied offensive spearheaded by the 5307th Composite Group (Provisional), known as “Merrill’s Marauders”. The Kachin Rangers served as guides and fought alongside the Marauders at Mytikyina. This campaign resulted in the seizure of the airfield and the town. Throughout the rest of 1944, Det 101 continued to assist in the general allied offensive across Burma. Although numbering only .8 percent of the allied strength operating in Burma, the Kachin Rangers under Det 101 direction, inflicted 29 percent of all Japanese casualties. By all accounts, Det 101’s operations proved the most successful American directed guerilla warfare campaign of World War II and did much to solidify the role of unconventional operations would come to play in future US Army Special Operations doctrine. [RM8] The Wickham-Williamson Agreement: C O P Y Washington, D.C. 15 Jul 42. To: D.S.D. From: Williamson. Certainly hope the enclosed "agreement" will meet with approval. It gives us a definite working basis. A copy has also gone forward to General Marshall for his approval. It looks, at the moment, as though I would be leaving Washington Sunday for Helena, Montana. I will confirm this later. The project is moving ahead by leaps and bounds here, and from my observations is in very capable hands. Col. Frederick is most anxious that the Canadian personnel arrive in Helena by August 1, as all training schedules have been drawn up on that date, and believe me they are plenty tough. Col. Frederick mentioned to me that mail moved very lowly via our Diplomatic Bag -- he cited the case of a letter written by you or Col. Anderson to him on July 3, which was not in his hands until July 11. The necessary information re our troops’ date of departure, port of entry, expected time of entry, numbers, etc., will be necessary in good time to make the necessary arrangements re customs and Immigration. This is being written in haste in long hand, as no one is available to type it. Your comments are awaited. HEADQUARTERS, 1ST SPECIAL SERVICE FORCE Washington, D.C. July 15, 1942. MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF STAFF DUTIES, GENERAL STAFF, OTTAWA, CANADA: The following proposals have been agreed upon by Major Kenneth G. Wickham, U.S. Army, and Major D.D. Williamson, Canadian Army, and approved by Colonel Robert T. Frederick, U.S. Army, as a system of handling Canadian personnel of the 1st Special Service (official U.S. War Department designation), in relation to discipline, records, pay, allowances, rations, quarters, clothing and equipment, travel, hospitalization and dental care, and men for various reasons found unfit for service with this force and returned for duty in Canada. The Canadian members of the force having enlisted in the Canadian Army and taken the oath of allegiance will not be required to take the American oath of allegiance. Discipline for all members of the force will be in accordance with U.S. regulations as laid down in the 1928 "Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. Army". Records of Canadian personnel will be maintained and posted in accordance with the existing Canadian system. This entails the addition to the force of a Canadian paymaster, pay sergeant, and records sergeant, who, along with their other routine duties in connection with the force, would be responsible for this work. The paymaster would also provide a valuable link with the Canadian Pay Corps for accounting purposes and be available to the Canadian personnel to aid in straightening out dependents allowance difficulties, etc. Pay for all members of the force will be in accordance with Bulletin No. 28 (June 25th, 1942), U.S. War Department, 3 (three) copies of which are enclosed. Inasmuch as it is the intention of the Canadian Government to reimburse the U.S. Government in this respect, and that the force will be homogenous, a simple system has been defined and has received the tentative approval of Colonel E.W. McLarren, Office, Chief of Finance, U.S. Army, Advisory and Regulations Division. Dependents allowances for the Canadian members of the force will be subject to the same regulations and system of payment as is in use in Canada under P & A regulations. This has also been taken into consideration in the system mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Rations - Standard U.S. Army rations will be used for the force and the Canadian Government will be billed for the value of these rations by the Finance Department, U.S. Army. The pay vouchers and ration accounts will be submitted together from the above-mentioned office. Quarters will be furnished to Canadian personnel on the same basis as to American personnel. (See Sec. 6, page 3 of enclosed Bulletin No. 28.) Clothing and Equipment will be furnished to all members of the force at the expense of the U.S. Government. Canadian personnel, on receiving their instructions to report at the location chosen for their concentration, should be instructed to bring the following articles ONLY: Summer drill with long trousers and black tie. This is to be worn, as it means puttees can be turned in before departure from the man’s station. 1 pair boots. 3 pair socks. 2 complete sets summer underwear. 2 summer shirts (short sleeves). Personal toilet articles. 1 pair shorts. the summer drill, black ties, and boots will be returned to the nearest Canadian Ordnance Corps Depot at the expense of the Canadian Government. Travel - The total cost of the original movement of the Canadian personnel to HELENA, MONTANA, to be borne by the Canadian Government. Subsequent traveling costs for all personnel to be borne by the U.S. Government. Hospitalization and Dental Care will be provided at the expense of the U.S. Government, but Canadian personnel hospitalized and found unfit for further service with the force will be returned to Canada when capable of traveling. Their further care will then be the responsibility of the Canadian Government. Pensions - The U.S. Government assumes no liability for pensions liable owing to injury or death of Canadian personnel while members of this force. Canadian personnel found unfit owing to physical or temperamental reason, etc., will be S.O.S. this force and returned for duty in Canada at the discretion of the Commanding Officer. Travel warrant will be issued and paid for by the U.S. Government to the nearest Canadian Depot. In the event of any death while in the United States among the Canadian personnel, either by accident or through natural causes, the agreement recently reached by the United Nations will be adhered to. Respectfully submitted, KENNETH G. WICKHAM, Major, CAC D.D. WILLIAMSON, Major, 1st Bn, Dufferin & Haldimand Rifles, Canadian Army. Approval: Robert T. Frederick, [RM9] Operation Cottage - Kiska Landings As the Kiska Task Force was assembling in California, the Force was training for combat beach landings at Camp Bradford, Virginia. Upon GEN George Marshall’s request, the Force, by then in Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont, was shipped back to Angel Island, San Francisco to join the Amphibious Training Force No. 9. The Force’s combined strength had grown by July 24, 1942 to 211 officers, eight warrants and 2,835 enlisted men. The invasion of Kiska began with the landing of the First Regiment. 3d Regiment landed the second day in the northern part of the island with the mission of securing the beachhead prior to the landing of the main task force. Instead of meeting resistance as thought, they found empty huts and fortifications. The enemy was nowhere to be seen, having made a hasty retreat. The 2d Regiment, waiting to jump on Kiska, looking out on the well-lit moonlit night, did not realize what had happened, but had surmised that when they jumped, they would make excellent targets. None regretted not making the jump “The men of the First Special Service Force had proved themselves to be more than reliable, precise in detail and their combat efficiency was of the highest order.” - LTG Corlett and GEN DeWitt, commanders of the Kiska Task Force [RM10] Anzio After proving themselves at Monte la Difensa, the Force moved to Santa Maria, using the time to recuperate and train replacements. Simultaneously, in Ottawa, Roosevelt and Churchill were discussing whether or not to continue the Italian Campaign. They finally decided it was best to front a two-pronged fight, thereby pulling German resources away from the anticipated Normandy invasion. By the time the decision had been made, the Hermann Goering Division, the Reichsfuhrer (SS) Division, the 35th Panzer Grenadier (SS) and numerous Italian units entrenched themselves around Anzio. The 1st and 3d Ranger Battalions were disseminated early in the Anzio campaign when they found themselves surrounded by the Hermann Goering Panzer Division at the Cisterna Canal. GEN Mark Clark requested the Force be sent to Anzio. Most of the First Special Service Force took position along the Pontine Marshes, a flat and barren stretch of land broken only by the Mussolini Canal, a large drainage ditch. (Service Company set up in Nettuno, south of Anzio.) Using the canal as protection, the Force penetrated German defenses nightly, sometimes as much as 1500 yards without detection, forcing Field Marshall Kesslering to pull back his lines almost a half a mile and support the area with more troops than he had originally planned. During one of their nightly forays, the Forcemen established “Gusville, ” making headlines in the Stars and Stripes. A story about a captured German diary reference (later proved to be unfounded) to the Force as “The Black Devils” inspired GEN Frederick to publish decals with the patch and “The Worse Is Yet To Come” in German. Recon teams blackened their faces and left the cards on the bodies of dead Germans or momentarily vacated German observation posts. These nightly raids as well as the daily dropping of “popcorn bombs” by German artillery resulted in numerous Force casualties. As with all things, GEN Frederick was intimately involved. It was not surprising for the men to find General Frederick in a forward position that a patrol was checking out. Once, while removing casualties from battle, one of the litter bearers was hit, dropping the litter. The other bearers, seeing a soldier nearby, ordered him to help, which he did. When they arrived at the rear, the others realized the new litter bearer was GEN Frederick. Toward the end of March and into early April, after being reinforced with what was left of the 4th Ranger Battalion (the remnants from the original “Darby’s Rangers”), Frederick stepped up the harassment of the German outposts and defense lines. The 2d Regiment, borrowing tanks from 1st Armored Division, extended their outposts and gave support by eliminating machine gun emplacements at the Litoranea fortifications. Over 60 prisoners were taken. The Force received its heaviest losses in the area between Sessuno and Borgo-Piave, receiving intense battering from both German machine gun nests and Flakwagons. In May, the Germans had pulled back in order to block the passage to Rome. On the 9th of May, the Force was relieved by the 36th Combat Engineers Regiment. During the campaign, they had been responsible for approximately 2/3ds of the beachhead. [RM11] The Breakout After Anzio, the Force were strengthened with replacements from the Rangers and the Canadian Forces. Training began to include half-tracks and tanks that would lend support to the unit on the Breakout to Rome. The Force, spearheading the assault of seven divisions, including an armored division, penetrated enemy defenses at such a rapid pace that it left the other units, including its much needed logistical support, behind. When 1st Regiment arrived at the outskirts of Cisterna, they were hit hard by the German 88s and German Mark IV tanks located on the Ninfa Road. The shelling cut off retreat routes, isolated many without communication and little ammunition and inflicted heavy casualties. When the 1st Armored Forces and the 3d Division supported by Allied fighters and bombers finally relieved the Force at Cisterna area, forcing the Germans to retreat toward the Velletri Gap, the Force began to once again move rapidly toward the Lepini Mountains and cut off the German retreat. They then pressed on toward Aretna, known as the Gateway to Rome. The Germans, not electing to protect their rear action of retreat, did not offer much resistance. Instead, they waited at Aretna, staging a counter-attack, centering their 88’s and Neblewerfer on the town. Additionally, they had set their tanks and Flakwagons along the railroads north of Aretna, massed snipers along the major roadways, and set all remaining weapons to fire as soon as the Allies came into range. Setting up his headquarters in the Palace of Princess Margharita Borghese, GEN Frederick ordered patrols to probe the enemy lines, blow all the bridges in the Colle-Ferro area, set demolitions on the railhead and make hit-and-run contact with the enemy. It was not until the end of May, and, once again after sustaining severe casualties, however, that they could continue toward Rome. Generals Keyes and Mark Clark chose Frederick and the First Special Service Force to lead the way into Rome, but were pushing Frederick hard to take the city prior to June 6th. (No reason was given, and it was not until after the city was taken that Frederick would learn about the Normandy Invasion.) Clark was also determined that the Force should be the first unit to enter the Eternal City; however, the other Allied commanders had other ideas and were pushing hard to usurp this honor for themselves. The Force entered the city at 6:20 am on June 4th. When the signal was passed that the city had been breached, the Germans began firing their heavy anti-tank guns, knocking out two of the lead tanks, stopping any further movement. The Germans continued to display heavy resistance throughout the day, covering their retreat. One by one, the Force neutralized pockets of German resistance. Furthermore, they secured eight out of the 16 bridges crossing the Tiber River. As with Anzio, the Force, although one of the smallest units, was relied on heavily to neutralize the enemy’s resistance and accomplish the mission [RM12] Colonel William O. Darby Credited with being the founding father of the modern Rangers, Major William O. Darby organized the 1st Ranger Battalion in June 1942, then led it into combat in Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of North Africa. Darby's Rangers set an unmatched standard for excellence in light infantry combat operations in North Africa, culminating in the highly successful attack against superior enemy forces at El Guettar in Tunisia. As a result of his successes, Darby received permission to activate two additional battalions of Rangers for service in Italy. Attached to 1st Infantry Division, Darby led his Rangers in the invasion of Sicily in July 1943. Darby's Rangers would continue to turn in a nearly unbroken string of successes until their defeat at Cisterna, near Anzio. There mechanized elements of the German Fourteenth Army cut off and eventually forced the surrender of all but six members of the 1st and 3rd Ranger Battalions and badly mauled the 4th Ranger Battalion that had attempted to come to their rescue. Darby blamed himself for the debacle, although evidence indicates that poor intelligence on the part of the VIth Corps staff was more likely to blame. Darby went back to the United States following Cisterna but returned to the Italian theater in April 1945 where he was killed during an artillery bombardment. He was promoted to Brigadier General posthumously. [RM13] Office of Strategic Services Operational Groups On 23 December 1942, at the urging of William J. Donovan, Director of the OSS, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the creation of Italian, Greek, Yugoslavian, French, Norwegian, and German Operational Groups (OGs) consisting of specially selected, trained, and physically hardened U.S. Army soldiers capable of waging war behind enemy lines. The forerunners of today's Special Forces Operational Detachments, each OG consisted of thirty enlisted soldiers and four officers however, most OGs deployed as fifteen man teams. OSS recruiters made every effort to select team members fluent in the language of the country in which they would be operating. All volunteered for exceptionally hazardous duty and were highly trained in special operations techniques. The self-sufficient OGs possessed the ability to train and coordinate guerrilla operations, conduct acts of direct sabotage, rescue downed pilots, and collect intelligence. With the exception of the German group which deployed into Italy, the OGs saw action in their respective areas of operations. With the defeat of Germany, some OG soldiers returned to the United States for additional training before redeploying to the China-Burma-India theater where they undertook the task of training Chinese guerrillas for combat against the Japanese. At this time, the OGs numbered 1,100 soldiers. Making their most significant contributions in Europe, OGs turned in an exemplary performance far out of proportion to their numbers. OGs organized and directed Italian partisans in combat actions aimed at disrupting enemy supply lines and forcing the Germans to divert combat units to rear area security missions. They performed similar operations in Yugoslavia and Greece. Here the intention was to deceive the German High Command into believing that the Allies seriously intended to mount an offensive through the Balkans. In the process, OGs killed or wounded several thousand German soldiers and destroyed key rail and highway bridges as well as extensive sections of railroad track. In Norway, another OG tied down significant numbers of German soldiers in a series of hit and run strikes culminating in the destruction of the critically important Tangen railway bridge. OGs deployed into France where they rendered their most important service in preparing the way for Operation Anvil, the invasion of southern France. With the assistance of French Maquis, these groups produced over 1,000 German casualties, took 10,000 prisoners, and destroyed 32 bridges. As German resistance began to crumble, the OGs also performed a valuable role in preventing the German army from destroying transportation facilities crucial to the Allied pursuit. The effectiveness of the OGs can be measured by the severity of the German response to their presence. Despite deploying for combat dressed in American army uniforms, an illegal Wehrmacht order directed that they, as well as other special forces operatives, be "slaughtered to the last man" if captured. The OSS was disbanded in 1945. Much of the OG's team structure as well their mission capabilities eventually transferred to the U.S. Army with the activation of Tenth Special Forces Group in June 1952. [RM14] Merrill’s Marauders Merrill’s Marauders, the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), officially activated in October 1943. Commanded by BG Frank D. Merrill, the 3,000 man unit trained in India for long range operations into Burma. From February to May 1944, Merrill’s Marauders carried the war to the Japanese on foot and by mule through 150 miles of dense jungle, engaging the enemy over 30 times. Almost two-thirds of the Marauders were killed, wounded or lost to disease, fatigue, and malnutrition. Each man lost an average of 35 pounds, bringing them close to collapse. Merrill himself had to be evacuated twice after suffering heart attacks. THE FIRST MISSION, NORTH CENTRAL BURMA Merrill and his battalions set out on February 24, 1944 from Ningbyen to Walawbum in the Hukawng Valley, where the Japanese had a forward command post. Guided by native Kachins, they took little used trails. By March 3, they had successfully outflanked the Japanese at Walawbum, blocking their major supply route along the Kamaing Road. When LTG Joseph “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell, the theater commander, and his Chinese units arrived on March 7, the found the Marauders still hanging on against the superior reinforced Japanese. THE SECOND MISSION, THE BATTLE FOR MOGUANG VALLEY With Walawbum in Allied hands, Stilwell pushed south. Merrill took a circuitous and difficult route behind Japanese lines. The conditions were arduous with monsoon rains and the blood sucking leeches. Additionally, many supply air drops did not reach them. The Marauders and their mules were often exhausted and bloody from the knees down. Despite protests by Merrill, Stilwell then ordered him to split his unit and send each element along a different route to hit the rest of the Japanese at two points along the Kamaing Road. The 1st battalion, with Chinese troops and artillery, soon ran into the enemy. To avoid a costly battle, they were forced to cut through dense jungle which slowed their progress to only a few miles a day. The 2d and 3d battalions reached their destination almost four days early. When Stilwell arrived, he ordered Merrill, still unaware as to why the 1st battalion had been delayed, to attack. 2d Battalion, having already marched 80 miles, backtracked to Nhpum Ga. For 10 days, they fought the Japanese, sustained only by “K” rations and stagnant water. Merrill’s 3d battalion, nearly five miles away, was also pinned down by enemy artillery fire. When 1st battalion finally arrived on the 28th, they rested for three hours, then attacked and took Shaduzup. Immediately Stilwell sent the 1st battalion on a four-day forced march to reinforce the 2d and 3d battalions. Out of 800 men, only 250 were combat effective when they arrived at Nhpum Ga on April 9. They still managed to drive off the Japanese, but at a cost of more than 700 men killed, wounded or incapacitated. THE THIRD MISSION, TAKING THE AIRSTRIP AT MYITKYINA Stilwell’s mission was to drive the Japanese forces south to the Irrawaddy Valley. British General Orde Wingate’s “Chindit” force cut all rail links south of Myitkyina. Detachment 101 of the OSS and their Kachin allies constantly harassed the Japanese. After only two weeks rest, the Marauders were reorganized to spearhead the push on Myitkyina, the last Japanese strong-hold in Northern Burma. If they took the air base and town, the Allies could launch attacks throughout Burma. The Marauders, energized by GEN Merrill’s pronouncement “This will be your last mission”, set out on the 112 mile march towards Myitkyina on April 22d, 1st and 3d battalions, now called the “H” and “K” Forces, headed over the 3,000 ft. Kumon Range, so steep in places that they had to cut steps in the trail for the mules who often fell over the sides to their death. Once over the top, the “K” Force marched south to Retpong, which they captured on May 9th. Meanwhile, COL Hunter’s “H” Force marched through dense jungle led by a 13 year old Kachin boy. On the 18th of May, Hunter’s men were at the outskirts of Mytikyina undetected by the Japanese. The attack on the Myitkyina airstrip, on 17 May, totally took th Japanese y surprise and by noon, the Marauders held the airstrip. However, between the 17th and the 22d of May, the Allied offensive faltered. Stilwell wanted the Chinese to take the city, thus giving the Japanese time to reinforce. The Marauders were down to about one-third strength and had to shift to the defense just to hold on. It would take another two months and thousands of reinforcements to finally take Myitkyina. Only about 200 of the original Marauders stayed through to the end. By May, Myitkyina was won and the Japanese were retreating out of Burma. The 5307th’s magnificent achievements won them the Distinguished Unit Citation before they disbanded in August 1944. The 474th Infantry was formed from what was left of the 5307th. Later, the unit became the 475th Infantry which would ultimately be redesignated the 75th Infantry Regiment (Ranger). [RM15] The Alamo Scouts United States Army commanders in the Southwest Pacific theater of the war realized at the conclusion of the hard won Buna-Gona campaign in Papua New Guinea that the long march back to the Philippines would be excessively bloody unless improvements could be made in the army's intelligence gathering apparatus. Aerial reconnaissance had proven unable to provide a clear picture of what lay beneath the triple canopy jungles of the area. General Walter Krueger, Commanding General of the Sixth U.S. Army, in an effort to gather accurate and timely intelligence, created his own organization. Recruiting highly skilled soldiers in November 1943, he established training that enabled the newly created Alamo Scouts to infiltrate Japanese held islands, locate enemy defensive positions, and then report the locations to American ground, sea, and air forces for subsequent destruction. Prospective scouts had to first volunteer for the organization then survive a screening process designed to eliminate all be the most intelligent and physically fit candidates. The survivors underwent a grueling six-week course in land navigation, communications, survival, small boat operations, and advanced patrolling techniques. Graduation from the school was not, however, assurance of acceptance into the Scouts. Final selection on an eight-man team, however, depended on the results of a peer evaluation conducted at the completion of the course. Working directly for General Krueger, the Scouts were formed into teams consisting of a 1st Lieutenant and six or seven enlisted men. Navy PT boats usually moved the teams to the vicinity of their target with the final move to shore being accomplished in an inflatable rubber boat. Teams normally remained ashore only as long as it took to get a fix on the enemy's strength and location. The first Alamo Scout mission was performed in support of the 1st Cavalry Division's landing on Los Negros on 27-28 February 1944. When American forces finally made their way back to the Philippines, Alamo Scouts led the way albeit with a different mission emphasis. In the Philippines, the Scouts continued to perform deep reconnaissance missions up to 250 miles in advance of American ground forces, but in addition, the teams found themselves coordinating the activities of guerrilla units as well as establishing intelligence networks among the local peoples. The most famous operation involved the raid on the Japanese prison camp at Cabanatuan City near Manilla. Two Alamo Scout teams along with Philippine guerrillas established surveillance of the camp prior to dispatching guides to lead Company C and a platoon of Company F of the 6th Ranger battalion back to the camp. In the evening hours of 30 January 1945, the combined force rescued 511 prisoners, many of them survivors of the Bataan death march. Over the course of their existence, the Alamo Scouts conducted nearly eighty missions. Although primarily designed as an intelligence gathering organization, they killed 84 enemy soldiers and captured 24 without losing a man. Although always few in numbers, Alamo Scouts received 44 Silver Stars, 33 Bronze Stars, and 4 Soldier's Medals. [RM16] For the first time in combat, military government was planned before the enemy was defeated. The Military Government and Civil Affairs also had to deal with another first, governments in exile. President Roosevelt, however, was adamant against the Army telling civilians, even foreigners, what to do. The establishment of a civil military unit came only when Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War, had thoroughly convinced President Roosevelt of the need. Using examples from previous wars, Stimson showed that only the Army could efficiently manage the millions of civilians which the Allied troops would encounter. On 1 March 1943, the U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division (CAD) was activated and given a far reaching mission. The Division purged the military and individual elite from local governments and set up new local governments with properly elected officials. The also supervised food distribution, school systems, restoration of public utilities, including sewage and power, and those missions related to municipal operation. They produced their own radio broadcasts and newsreels as well as broadsides to best communicate the principles of democracy to a people who had lived in fascism for so long. At its peak, MG Robert Hilldring commanded 11,400 personnel (900 of whom were civilians). His organization supervised the affairs of no fewer than 80 million allied, enemy and co-belligerent civilians. To assist in this effort, after the war, many units awaiting transfer back Stateside served as Constabulary troops. Responsible for maintaining the dictates published and posted by the Civil-Military Allied Government located in that area of operation, the Constabulary disarmed teenaged partisan bands, maintained law and order, guarded enemy prisoners of war and cleared areas of mines, unexploded shells and bombs. [RM17]Upon receiving authorization from President Kennedy on wearing the green beret, the question then arose on the colors of flashes. There were four active Special Forces Groups, the US Army Special Warfare Center and School and the Reserves and National Guard to consider. The TWX, dated 27 OCT 1962, designated Yellow for 1st SFGA(); Red for 7th; Green for 10th SFG(A); Black for 5th; and Teal blue for the National Guard and Reserve units. 1st SFG(A) Gold was one of the colors originally assigned to Special Forces in 1952. Additionally, the yellow was appropriate to its area of operation - the Orient. After President Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, the inner black border was added. 3d SFG(A) When the 3d SFG(A) was stood up, Special Forces personnel were taken from the Special Forces school, 1st, 5th and 7th SFG(A). The flashes of the four units were mirrored in the “Checkerboard Square of “Smoke Bomb Hill” The unit was inactivated in 1968. When reactivated in 1988, the broken colors of the border were made a solid black evoking the manufacture of the unit principally from the 5th SFG(A) who was leaving Fort Bragg and moving to Fort Campbell, Kentucky. 5th SFG(A) The black flash has changed four times since its original configuration. In 1963, after President Kennedy’s assassination, the unit added a white outer border in memory. In 1965, seven thin diagonal stripes signifying the 1st and 7th SFG(A) personnel who served numerous TDYs with the US Army Special Forces Vietnam were approved by Institute of Heraldry. In 1988, the diagonal was removed and the flash reverted to its black and white configuration. 6th SFG(A) The 6th SFG(A) flash colors were taken from the units it fits between: the 5th and the 7th. 7th SFG(A) The scarlet color was the color of both the US Army Indian Scouts (1969 - 1939) and more recently the 1st Special Service Force of World War II fame. 8th SFG(A) The teal blue and gold were the colors reserved for unassigned units which is what Special Forces was until 1989 with the creation of the Special Forces Branch. 10th SFG(A) The green color was only appropriate for the 1st Special Forces group activated. The unit was the only group to consistently wear their berets from 1953 until its authorization. Originally, they wore a Trojan Horse insignia on the left side of the beret in the fashion of the British commandos. The first beret flashes were cut from a pool table felt inthe Bad Toelz NCO Club. 11th SFG(A) One of the two Reserve units, the 11th SFG(A) took the color teal blue which had been assigned for the Reserves and National Guard units and added the red striker bar for “the eastern section of the United States where the sun rises.” The red was chosen to represent all the subordinate companies of the unit which were located east of the Mississippi River. 12th SFG(A) The other Reserve unit, the 12th SFG(A) had the most complicated flash of all the groups. The lightning bolts on the dark teal blue background were for the three methods of insertion and extraction used by Special Forces. The black bar beneath the lightning bolts was for the Remagen Bridge. 19th SFG(A) The 19th SFG(A) maintained the original flash designator of teal blue as it was assigned in 1963. 20th SFG(A) The 20th SFG(A) added the red and white diagonal to the teal blue evoking the national colors of red, white and blue.

Museum Storyline

Museum Concept

Special Operations has played a pivotal role in the U.S. military experience. Prior to World War II, partisans performed what we call Special Operations, irregular militia, civilians and retrained conventional soldiers not formally and permanently attached to the U.S. Army. Instead units were organized for a specific purpose at a specific time as necessary adjuncts to the overall conventional military structure. The constants, however, transcend time and operations

Museum Themes

Special operations include such disparate disciplines as guerilla warfare, counter-insurgency, foreign internal defense (nation building), civil affairs, strategic and special reconnaissance, direct action strikes and psychological operations. Additional missions evolve in response to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directives. Special operations aviation is a vital part of the schematic ensuring insertion and exertion capabilities. Special operations have provided, and continue to provide unique assets and options to a battlefield commander.

Special operations soldiers are unique in that they:

Train in the use of the minimum amount of force to accomplish the mission.
Are highly trained in a primary and cross-trained in a myriad of skills.
Are culturally sensitive and astute.
Are language and regionally orientated.
Are combat multipliers by their ability to generate large numbers of irregular forces with minimal support.
Seek maximum results by subtle pressure against enemy key targets both physical and psychological.
Have a high value and are heavily utilized during peacetime due not only to their ability to maintain a low-key presence worldwide on a daily basis, but also because they are a supremely flexible force in war, peace or levels in between.
Are self-reliant officers and NCOs.
Are mature members of a team of professionals.
Provide the Army a deep penetration reconnaissance or seizure capability.
Maintain the expertise to rebuild and pacify, not just destroy.

Museum Schematic

Story line concentrates on special warfare in the U.S. Army, encompassing guerilla, unconventional and counter-insurgency operations.

Pre- and Revolutionary America

French and Indian War

John and Joseph Gorham “Gorham’s Indian Rangers of the Deep Woods”

1745 – 1762
First employment of joint operations between militia and naval services

Rogers Rangers. [1]

1755 - 1763
Rogers Rules of Order

American Revolutionary War

Psychological Warfare and Civil Affairs.[2]

Printing Press.
Thomas Paine and Common Sense.[3]
Visual demonstrations (i.e. Boston Tea Party)
Tory atrocities, especially in the Carolinas and Georgia[4]

Military Actions.

Colonial Militia “The Minute Men”[5]
George Washington’s use of Strategic Reconnaissance for Intelligence Gathering purposes.[6]
Ethan Allen and the Green Mountain Boys[7]
Carolina Guerilla Leaders

Daniel Morgan[8]
Francis “Swamp Fox” Marion[9]
Thomas “Gamecock” Sumter[10]
Andrew Pickens

Whisky Rebellion to War of 1812

Whisky Rebellion

Disgruntled farmers in PA rebelled over whiskey tax. First use of federal troops to quell problem[11]

War of 1812

“Baltimore Riots”
British burning the White House propaganda mistake[12]
Battle of New Orleans[13]

After war’s end – Treaty of Ghent signed
Propaganda coup that US had matured to a position of power

1820 – 1860s.

Change in Attitude toward Unconventional Warfare before Civil War. Unconventional warfare became synonymous with terrorism used by Nat Turner, the Kansas Riots and John Brown to advance freedom for slaves.[14]
Creeks and Seminoles. Force used to stop guerilla warfare used by Indians to save their lands.[15]
Underground Railroad.[16]

Tactics used by civilians in the Underground Railroad are akin to those taught by the Survival, Escape, Resistance and Evasion course, USAJFKSWCS.
Use of safe houses, signals and codes are not unlike those employed later by the various resistance groups in Europe in World War II.

Civil War and Reconstruction

Guerilla Actions. During the Civil War, most guerilla actions were Confederate. Their actions’ effectiveness on the overall war is often debated. The conventional military leadership’s opinion of such operations still impacts on how special operations is viewed today.[17]
1. John Mosby and Mosby’s Rangers[RM1] .[18]
2. John Morgan and Morgan’s Raiders.[19]
3. Quantrilll’s Bushwhackers.[20]
4. Andrew’s Raiders and the Chattanooga Campaign (Federal troops)
Psychological Warfare. Burning of the South by Sherman.[21]
Reconstruction. Civil-military administration of the South.[22]

1865 – World War I

Indian Scouts[RM2] [23]
Spanish-American War & Philippine Insurrection[24]

Winning Hearts and Minds of People
GEN Funston, MOH Recipient

World War I

WWI Propaganda Initiative

Propaganda Posters[25]
Sir Gilbert Parker and Wellington House[26]

Use of Invasion of Belgium, execution of Edith Cavell and sinking of the Lusitania to get America to join war effort [27]
Impact on Adolph Hitler[28]

Development of Desert Irregular Warfare – T.E. Lawrence[29]

World War II[30]

Fifth Column Scare
Military Units

Office of Strategic Services OSS[RM3] . First established by William Donovon [RM4] as Coordinator of Information, a civilian organization, the Office of Strategic Services, a military organization, evolved and was activated in 1942. It had numerous directorates including Special Operations, employing Operational Groups (OG), Jedburgs in Europe (joint inter-allied operations); Detachment 101 in the China-Burma-India Theater; Morale Operations (MO) and Maritime Units (MU) throughout the Theaters of Operation. There also was a large Research & Development Unit (R&D) operating back stateside. [31]

Training.

Camp X[32]
England[33]

Equipment

Research and Development[34]
SOE[35]

Special Operations

Jedburgs[RM5] [36]
OGs[37]
Maritime Unit[RM6] [38]
Detachment 101 - CBI[RM7] [39]
Detachment 202, 303 and 404[40]

Morale Operations[41]

Air Ops

8th Air Force[42]

01st Bomb Group (Prov.)
The Carpetbaggers

1st Air Commando - CBI[43]

Fixed wing
Rotary Wing[44]

First Special Service Force. Activated in 1942 at Fort William Henry Harrison, Montana, the unit, the First Special Service Force was a joint[RM8] US-Canadian unit composed of American volunteers and Canadian airborne soldiers. Originally recruited for Operation Plough, a suicide mission into Norway, the unit instead spearheaded actions in Italy and Southern France.[45]

Training [46]
Equipment [47]
Campaigns

Kiska[RM9] [48]
Italy

Monte la Difensa
Anzio[RM10] [49]
Rome[RM11] [50]

Southern France

PSYWAR. There are three PSYWAR fronts in a war atmosphere. The first is Home Front. Galvanizing public support behind the cause is paramount. The second thrust is against the enemy, destroying morale and creating discord between the allies; world opinion composes the third front. In 1933, Hitler asked Hermann Rauschning, president of the Danzig Senate, "What is war, but cunning, deception, delusion, attack and surprise? What is the object of war? To make the enemy capitulate. Why should I demoralize him by military means if I can do so better and more cheaply in other ways?"[51]

Home Front activities[52]
Against Enemy Lines[53]
World Opinion[54]

RANGERS[55] Originally formed under the command of Maj William Orlando Darby [RM12] in [RM13] England, Rangers were the "cream of the Infantry." Over the course of World War II, a total of six Ranger Battalions were formed. Other Ranger battalions, assigned to conventional units such as the 29th Infantry Division, were also utilized.

Recruitment and Establishment
Dieppe Raid[56]
2d Ranger Bn.[57]
6th Ranger Bn[58]

PHILLIPINE GUERILLAS.[59] Even before GEN MacArthur's departure in March 1942 to Australia, counterintelligence was active in combating the Japanese threat. After the war, many American and Filipino soldiers went into the hills to join and direct guerilla warfare instead of surrendering.

Filipino[60]
American[61]

Russell Volckmann, Wendell Fertig, Donald Blackburn
Use of Nisei

MERRILL’S MARAUDERS[RM14] [62].
ALAMO SCOUTS[RM15] [63].
CIVIL-MILITARY GOVERNMENT (CAMG[RM16] ) TEAMS[64] The Civil Affairs/Military Government (CA/MG) teams were established in 1942. The first course was taught at the University of Virginia. During the war, the CA/MG primary functions were to ensure battle was in accordance with the Geneva Accords and to reestablish governmental functions in liberated areas. From the end of the hostilities in 1944 and 1945 until 1954, the CA/MG were responsible for the governing of the occupation of the various impacted nations placed in their sectors of control.

Civil Affairs School
Post War Occupation Forces[65]
Marshall Plan
Treatment of POWs.[66]
Nelson Rockefeller and Latin America[67]

512th Signal Bn. Established as part of the 1st Airborne Task Force in Southern France under GEN Frederick.

POST WORLD WAR II ERA & KOREA.

Korea

Psychological Warfare. The success of psychological warfare in the Korean War was instrumental in providing a conduit for unconventional warfare to be reestablished in the US Army.[68]

Leaflet Campaign.
Radio and loudspeaker units
Equipment

United Nations Partisan Force Korea (UNPFK) [69]

Task Force 8240
Island Operations.

Airborne Ranger Companies. Rangers were activated in 1950 as an airborne unit. Members were volunteers. Composed of 17 companies: seven of these served in Korea. Inactivated in 1952. [70]

Military Operations
Unconventional warfare activity. [71]

U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Center and School. Part of 5th Army in Fort Riley, Kansas, the PSYWAR School was moved to Fort Bragg, NC after the recommendations on unconventional operations drafted by BG Robert A. McClure was accepted by the U.S. Army[72]

History of special warfare training from 1952 to present.[73]
Commanders of U.S. Army Special Warfare Center from 1952 to present.
Lodge Act recruitment.[74]
Activation of 10th Special Forces in 1952[75]

Bad Toelz garrison and German service.
COL Aaron Bank, 1st Commander[76]
Response to Berlin Blockade and later the Russian threat from Eastern Block countries.

77th SFG(A)

Remain in Fort Bragg after splitting with 10th SFG(A)
Operation Lodestar and FTX in Louisiana.
Elements from 77th SFG(A) form 1st SFG(A) activated 1957 and moved to Okinawa[77]

U.S. Army Civil Affairs School

Activation at Fort Gordon, GA.
Training and unit activities
MG William Marquat, first commander.

VIETNAM ERA

Special Forces Build-up

3d SFG(A), Fort Bragg, NC, 5 December 1963[78]
5th SFG(A), Fort Bragg, NC, 21 September 1961[79]
6th SFG(A), Fort Bragg, NC 1 May 1963[80]
77th SFG(A), redesignated 7th SFG(A), 6 June 1960[81]
8th SFG(A), Panama, 1 April 1963[82]
46th SF Company (Abn), Thailand, 12 October 1966[83]
National Guard and Reserve units. [84]

US Army Center for Special Warfare/US Army Special Warfare School[85]

Commanders
New building – JFK Hall, Bryant Hall and JFK Chapel

John F. Kennedy and Special Forces.[86]

Inauguration Speech and involvement in Southeast Asia.
JFK’s visit to Fort Bragg in October 1962 and presidential order for wearing the green beret, September 1962[RM17] .

Vietnam

OSS[87]
Special Forces[88]

1st and 7th SFG(A) TDY
Equipment and Weapons
Medal of Honor Recipients
Special Teams

Mike Force
Studies and Observation Group (SOG)[89]

Australian Army Training Team - Vietnam[90]

Victoria Cross recipients
Mike Force

Rangers[91]

Evolvement from LRRPS to Rangers
Medal of Honor recipients

CIDG camps[92]
Prisoners of War[93]
Montagnards.[94]
US Army Military Assistance Training Advisors (MATA)
Recondo School, Vietnam
Helicopter Support
Son Tay Raid[95]
Psychological Operations.[96]

American and NVA Leaflets
Chieu Hoa Program
Loudspeaker, radio and educational programming.

Modern Use and Development of Special Operations[97]

Continued Mission and Training.
Command Development

Split of US Army JFK Center for Military Assistance and US Army Institute for Military Asssistance.
Activation of 1st Special Operations Command (Provisional) (1st SOCOM)(Prov) October 1982 and 1st SOCOM(ABN) October 1983.
Reorganization and realignment of Ranger Battalions and activation of 75ht Ranger Regiment and 3d Ranger Bn. October 1983.
Establishment of Special Forces Branch 21 April 1986.
Activation of the Major Army Command for Special Operations - US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) November 1990.
Activation of two major subordinate commands (MSCs) November 1990

U.S. Army Special Forces Command
U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command

Inactivation of the 11th and 12th SFG(A) Reserves

Operation Desert One[98]
Operations Urgent Fury

First Use of Unified Command – 1st SOCOM
Rangers
PSYOP
Civil Affairs

Operation Just Cause

Special Forces
PSYOP leaflet and loudspeaker campaign.
Rangers
Civil Affairs and reestablishing government infrastructure

Desert Shield/Storm

Special Forces
PSYOP leaflet campaign

Operation Provide Comfort – Kurdish Refugee operation
Operation Uphold Democracy[99]
Operation Restore Hope.

Ranger Task Force Mogadishu[100]
Medal of Honor recipients - Shughart and Gordon

Operation Enduring Freedom
Ongoing Missions

[1] John B. Coneo, Robert Rogers of the Rangers. (London: Oxford University Press, 1959).
[2] Phillip Davidson, Propaganda and the American Revolution. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941.); Paul M. A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare. (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pierce, 1954.)
[3]Paine, Thomas: Common Sense ; (Edit. Isaac Kramnick) (New York: Penguin, 1982.).
[4]Joes, Anthony James. America and Guerilla Warfare. (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kenturcky, 2000), pp. 5 – 49.
[5] Galvin, John R. The Minute Men: The First Fight – Myths and Realities of the American Revolution. (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s Press, 1996)
[6] Robert K. Wright. The Continental Army (Washington, D.C.: US Army Center of Military History, 1983), p. 175. Fleming, Thomas. “George Washington, Spymaster.” American Heritage (New York: Forbes, Inc.) February/March 2000, pp. 46 – 51. The first Purple Hearts were given to three NCOs who went behind enemy lines to gather information.
[7] Bird, Harrison. Attack on Quebec: The American Invasion of Canada 1775 – 1776. (New York: Oxford Press, 1968.)
[8] Higgenbotham, Don. Daniel Morgan: Revolutionary Rifleman (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1961.)
[9] Bass, Robert B. Swamp Fox: The Life and Campaigns of General Francis Marion. (Orangeburg, South Carolina: Sandlapper Publishing Co., 1982)
[10] Bass, Robert, Gamecock: The Life and Times of General Thomas Sumter. (New York: Holt, Rhinehart, and Winston, 1961).
[11]
[12] Linebarger, pp.
[13]
[14] Chowder, Ken. “The Father of American Terrorism” American Heritage. (New York: Forbes, Inc.) February/March 2000, pp. 81 – 91.
[15] Maurics Matloff, Ed., American Military History (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1969) pp. 151-161.
[16] Kilbourne, Jimmy W. Escape and Evasion. (New York: Macmillan, 1973); James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Ballantine Books, 1988), pp. 79 – 89.
[17] Joes, pp. 50 – 101.
[18] Ramage, James A. Gray Ghost: The Life of COL John Singleton Mosby (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1999; Virgil C. Jones. Ranger Mosby (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1944).
[19] Cecil Fletcher Holland, Morgan and His Raiders, A Biography of the Confederate General; Noel, Lois, John Hunt Morgan; and Swiggett, Howard, Rebel Raider: A Life of John Hunt Morgan On several of his raids, Morgan took a small field press to print such proclamations, "The Gen. Commanding, takes this means of informing the people that he has not come among them to disturb them in the enjoyment of their rights, either of person or property. The Home Guards are required to come in at once and deliver up their arms, those who fail to do so will be regarded as enemies of the Government and treated accordingly. Those who comply will be treated as non-combatants, and private citizens. Private citizens who seek opportunity to ambush our soldiers commonly known as "Bushwhack- ers" will be regarded as outlaws, and orders will be issued to shoot them wherever found. If any of our men are fired on while passing through the country, I will [sic] lay waste the entire surrounding neighborhood."
[20] Richard S. Brownlee. Grey Ghosts of the Confederacy: Guerilla Warfare in the West 1861-1865. (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University, 1984.) The lawlessness of Quantrill’s Bushwhackers is not condoned or considered an example of accepted guerilla warfare tactics, but it prompted the passage of the Partisan Ranger Act by the Confederate States of America on April 28, 1861.
[21] Linebarger, p.21. McPherson, p. 808. The burning of the South had the opposite effect of the Burning of the White House by the British in the War of 1812. Whereas the British burning of the newly completed home to the President aided to incite undecided Americans to fight the British, the Burning of the South by Sherman sounded as a visible deathblow to the people of the South that the Confederacy would not survive. Sherman understood the implications of his march through Georgia timed to coincide with the 1864 Presidential campaign stating, “If we march a well-appointed army right through [Jefferson Davis’s] territory, it is a demonstration to the world, foreign and domestic, that we have a power which Davis cannot resist…I can make the march, and make Georgia howl!”
[22] J.G. Randall and David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction (Lexington, MA: D.D. Heath and Company, 1969).
[23] Kennth W. Porter. The Black Seminoles: History of a Freedom-Seeking People. (Gainsville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1996); Jacques Noel Jacobsen, Jr. and Fairfax Downey. The Red/Bluecoats: The Indian Scouts, U.S. Army. (Fort Collins, Old Army Press, 1973); Thomas W. Dunlay: Wolves for the Blue Soldiers. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1987).
[24] Brian McAllister Linn, The US Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War 1899 – 1902 (Chapel Hill, NC: University North Carolina Press, 1989). Joes, pp. 102 – 129.
[25] Linebarger, pp. 62 – 77; George Theofiles. American Posters of World War I. (New York: Dafran House Publishers, Inc., 1973); Walton Rawls. Wake up, America! World War I and the American Poster (Abbeyville,1988).
[26] Harold Lavine and James Wechsler. War Propaganda and the United States. Institute for Propaganda Analysis, 1942, pp. 18 - 52.
[27] Ibid. pp. 24-31. Peter Paret, Beth Irwin Lewis, Paul Paret. Persuasive Images: Poster of War and Revolution from the Hoover Institution Archives. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 21 & 26-27.
[28] Ibid. pp. 2 - 10. Adolph Hitler called propaganda "a weapon of the first class."
[29] T.E. Lawrence. “The Evolution of a Revolt” Army Quarterly and Defense Journal. October 1920. Reprint by Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, n.d.; and Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (New York: Doubleday, 1926, 1935).
[30] David W. Hogan, Jr. US Army Special Operations in World War II (Washington, D.C.: US Army Center for Military History, 1992).
[31] Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins 1941 – 1952. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Press, 1982.) pp. 23 –37; Richard Harris Smith, OSS: Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley, CA: University of Chicago Press, 1981); Kermit Roosevelt, War Report of the O.S.S. (Office of Strategic Services), (New York: Walker And Company, 1976), pp. 1 - 50; Elizabeth P. McIntosh, Sisterhood of Spies The Women of the OSS. (Annapolis, MD Naval Institute Press 1998.) Francis Russell and the editors of Time-Life Books. The Secret War. (Chicago: Time-Life Books, 1981) pp. 96 - 135. COL Jerry Sage. Sage: The Man They Called :Dagger” of the OSS. Wayne, PA; Tobey Publishing, Co., Inc., 1985. Pp. 9 – 35.
[32] David Stafford. Camp X: Training Camp for Secret Agents, 1941-45. New York, NY Dodd, Mead & Co. 1987.
[33] Ben Parnell, Carpetbaggers: America's Secret War in Europe (Austin, TX: Eakin Press, 1987); William B. Dreux, No Bridges Blown. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), pp. 28-49,
[34] Stanley P Lovell. Of Spies & Strategems. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1967); Barry M. Katz. Foreign Intelligence: Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services, 1942 - 1945. (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1989)
[35] H.R.D. Foote, SOE: An Outline History of the Special Operations Executive: 1940-46. (New York: University Publishers of America, 1986).
[36] Aaron Bank, From the OSS to the Green Berets. (Novato, Calif: Presidio Press, 1986.); Dreux, pp. 49 - 130; MG John P. Singlaub, Hazardous Duty (New York: Summit Books, 1991.)
[37] Thomas Gallagher. Assault in Norway: Sabotaging the Nazi Nuclear Bomb (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace Jovanich, 1975; Franklin Lindsay, Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisans in Wartime Yugoslavia. (Stanford, University 1993); Roosevelt, pp. ; .
[38] Edwin P. Hoyt, Seals at War : The Story of U. S. Navy Special Warfare from the Frogmen to the SEALs. (New York, NY, U.S.A.: Dell Publishing, 1993.
[39] Richard Dunlop. Behind Japanese Lines : With the OSS in Burma (New York, NY: Rand McNally, 1979; Roger Hilsman, American Guerilla: My War Behind Japanese Lines (New York: Brassey's Pess, 1990); Thomas Moon The Grim and Savage Game: OSS and the Beginning of U. S. Covert Operations in World War II. (Burning Gate, 1991); William R. Peers and Dean Breslis, Behind the Burma Road: The Story of America's Most Successful Guerilla Force. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963).
[40] Bank, pp. 131 - 140.
[41] Daniel Lerner, (Ed.) Propaganda in War and Crisis: Materials for American Policy. (New York, NY: Arno Press - New York Times, 1972); Lawrence C. Soley. Radio Warfare OSS and CIA Subversive Propaganda. (New York, NY Praeger Publishers 1989).
[42] Roger A. Freeman, Mighty Eighth War Manual. (London: Jane's Publishing, 1987), pp. 94-97, 107-13); Ben Parnell, Carpetbaggers: America's Secret War in Europe. (Austin, TX: Eakin Press, 1987).
[43] Shelford Bidwell The Chindit War: Stilwell, Wingate, and the Campaign in Burma: 1944 (New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Co, Inc. 1969), pp 52 - 55, 62; Peers and Brelis. Behind the Burma Road.
[44] Herbert A. Mason, Randy G. Bergeron, James A. Renfrow, "Operation Thursday: Birth of the Air Commandos," Wright Patterson AFB, OH: US Air Force Museum Publications Program, 1994. p.17
[45] Robert D. Burhans. The First Special Service Force, A War History of the North Americans 1942 - 1944. (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947).
[46] MG Kenneth G. Wickham. An Adjutant General Remembers. (Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN: The Adjutant General Corps Regimental Association, 1991) pp. 5 – 7; COL Adna H. Underhill (ret). The Force. Tucson, AZ: Arizona Monographs, Inc., 1994, pp. 1-92.
[47] Todd Ross. The Supercommandos: First Special Service Force- 1942-1944; An Illustrated History. (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 2000).
[48] Peter Hill Cottingham. Once Upon A Wartime: A Canadian Who Survived the Devil’s Brigade.. (Brandon, Canada: Leech Printing, 1996; Underhill, pp. 93 – 103.
[49] Fred Sheehan. Anzio: Epic of Bravery. (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964) pp. 109 - 178.
[50] Robert H. Adleman anc COL George Walton. Rome Fell Today. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), pp. 252-55.
[51] Lavine and Wechsler, War Propaganda and the United States. pp. 5 - 36.
[52] Ronald Bailey and the editors of Time-Life Books. Home Front: USA. . (Chicago: Time-Life Books, 1981); Roy Douglas. The World War 1939-1945: The Cartoonists' Vision. London: Routledge. 1990. Peter Paret, Beth Irwin Lewis, Paul Paret. Persuasive Images: Poster of War and Revolution from the Hoover Institution Archives. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 182 – 202; Anthony Rhodes, Propaganda: The Art of Persuasion. World War II: An Allied and Axis Visual Record, 1933 - 1945. (Secaucus, NJ: The Wellfleet Press, 1987); Russell and the editors of Time-Life Books. The Secret War. pp. 5 – 15; Zbymek Zemen. Selling the War: Art and Propaganda in World War II. (London: Orbis Press, 1978. Pp. 31- 80.
[53] Leo J. Margolin, Paper Bullets: A Brief Story of Psychological Warfare in World War II. (New York: Froben Press 1946; Russell W. Howe, The Hunt for Tokyo Rose. (Lanham, MD: Madison Books, Incorporated, 1993).
[54] Zemen, p.
[55] James J. Altieri. The First, Third and Fourth Ranger Battalions: Darby's Rangers - An Illustrate Portrayal of the Original Rangers World War II. ( Durham, NC: Fisher-Harrison Corporation, 1977); William O. Darby, William H. Baumer. Darby's Rangers: We Led the Way (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press 1980); Robert W. Black. Rangers in World War II. (New York: Ivy Books, 1992).
[56] Altieri, The First, Third and Fourth Ranger Battalions: Darby's Rangers - An Illustrate Portrayal of the Original Rangers World War II. Pp. 16-31; Black. pp. 27 - 48.
[57] Ronald Lane Rudder’s Rangers. (Manassas, VA: Ranger Associates, 1979); Black. Rangers in World War II. Pp. 177, 199-213.
[58] Black. Rangers in World War II. pp. 233-234 and 284-298; Hampton Sides. Ghost Soldiers: The Forgotten Epic Story of World War II's Most Dramatic Mission. (New York: Doubleday, 2001).
[59] William B. Breuer. MacArthur's Undercover War: Spies, Saboteurs, Guerrillas, and Secret Missions. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1995).
[60] COL Gamaliel L. Manikan (ret). Guerilla Warfare on Panay Isaland in the Phillipines. (Manila, PI: Sixth Military District Veteran's Foundation, Inc., 1977); Sides, pp. 60 - 278.
[61] Eugene C. Jacobs. "A Medical Memoir of MacArthur's First Guerrilla Regiment." Military Medicine. 144:6. 6 June 1979; John Keats. They Fought Alone (Philadelphia: J.P. Lippincott Company, 1963). Louise Reid Spencer. Guerilla Wife. (Chicago: Peoples Book Club, Inc. no date; Ira Wolfert . American Guerrilla in the Philippines. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945).
[62] Charlton Ogburn Jr., Merrill’s Marauders. (New York: Harper & Brothers 1959); G Bjorge. Merrill's Marauders: Combined Operations in Northern Burma in 1944. (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1996); Charles N Hunter. Galahad. (San Antonio, Texas: Naylor Press, 1963).
[63] Forrest Bryant Johnson. Hour of Redemption: The Ranger Raid on Cabanatuan. (New York: Manor Books, 1978); Sides.
[64] William E. Daugherty and Marshall Andrews. A Review of U.S. Historical Experience with Civil Affairs 1776 - 1954. (Bethesda, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961)..
[65] Ibid.; Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1964); Robert Wolfe, ed., Americans as Proconsuls: US Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944 - 52 (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984); Franklin M. Davis, Come as a Conqueror. (New York: MacMillan. 1967).
[66] Lewis Carlson. We Were Each Other's Prisoners. (New York: Basic Books, 1997); Eugene Jacobs. Blood Brothers - A Medic's Sketch Book. (New York: Carlton Press, 1989). Sides.
[67] Joe Alex Morris. Nelson Rockefeller: A Biography. (New York Harper & Brothers, 1960).
[68] Linebarger, pp. 301-308.
[69] Paddock, pp. 100-09.
[70] Robert W. Black. Rangers In Korea. (New York: Ivy Books. 1989).
[71] Linebarger; Paddock, pp. 83-100.
[72] Paddock, pp. 143-159; Ian Sutherland, Special Forces of the U.S. Army: 1952-1982. (San Jose, California: Bender Press, 1990). pp. 206-214.
[73] Sutherland. pp. 36-245.
[74] M.R. Blair. “Toughest Outfit in the Army.” Saturday Evening Post. 12 May 1956. 228:40-1 passim.
[75] Paddock, pp. 143-154; "Trough Triple Volunteers of Army's 10th Special Forces Unit Are Ready to Lead Freedom Fighters Behind the Iron Curtain." Army Navy Air Force Journal. 1 Aug 1959, 96:3.
[76] Bank, Aaron. From OSS to Green Berets. (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1986). pp. 155 – 204.
[77] Sutherland, pp. 263 – 269; Richard O. Sutton. Operation White Star. (Canton, Ohio: Daring Publishing Co., 1990).
[78] Sutherland, pp. 297 - 298.
[79] Ibid. pp. 270 – 271; Colonel Francis J Kelly,. Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army.)
[80] Sutherland. pp. 293 – 294.
[81] Ibid., pp. 255 – 256.
[82] Ibid. pp. 292-293.
[83] Ibid., pp. 300 – 302.
[84] Ibid., pp. 310 – 315.
[85] Ibid., pp. 206 – 214; Veritas newspapers, US Army JFK Center for Special Warfare/US Army Special Warfare School and later US Army JFK Center for Military Assistance/US Army Institute for Military Assistance newspaper 1964 –1 1973.
[86] Hilsman, pp. 253 – 288.
[87] Bank, pp. 105 – 129.
[88] Shelby Stanton. Green Berets At War: US Army Special Forces In Southeast Asia 1956-1975 (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1985.) Shelby Stanton. Special Forces At War.
[89] Drew Dix. The Rescue of River City. (Alaska: Drew Dix Publishing, 2000); Franklin D. Miller. Reflections of A Warrior. Self-printed. 1999.; John L. Plaster. SOG: A Photo History of the Secret Wars. (Paladin Press, 2000); John L. Plaster. SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.); Richard H., Schultz, Jr. The Secret War Against Hanoi : Kennedy & Johnson's Use of Spies, Saboteurs & Covert Warriors in the War. (New York.: Harper Collins Publishers, 1999).
[90] Ian McNeill. The Team: Australian Advisers in Vietnam: 1962 – 1972. (Canberaa: Australian War Memorial, 1984). Ian McNeill. The Team In Pictures. (Canberaa: Australian War Memorial, 1984).
[91] Shelby Stanton. Rangers At War: Combat Recon In Vietnam. (New York: Orion Books, 1992). Henry G. Gale. “Bring Back the LRRP.” Military Review. October 1981. 61:2-10; James R. Arnold. Rangers. (New York: Bantam Books, 1988.)
[92] Maynard W. Dow. Nation Building in Southeast Asia. (Boulder, Co.: Pruett Press, 1966.)
[93] James N. “Nick” Rowe. Five Years to Freedom. (New York: Little, Brown & Co., 1971.); Tom Philpott. Glory Denied: America's Longest-Held Prisoner of War. (New York: Norton, W. W. & Company, Inc. 2001).
[94] E. Duguet. Les Montagnards du Tonkin. (Paris: Libraire Maritime and Coloniale,, 1908; Robert L. Mole. The Montagnards of South Vietnam: A Study of Nine Tribes. (Rutland, VT; Charles F. Tuttle Co. Publishers, 1970); US Army Special Warfare School. Montagnard Tibal Groups of the Republic of South Vietnam. (Fayetteville, NC. 1964.)
[95] Benjamin Schemmer. The Raid. (New York: Harper & Row, Inc., 1976.)
[96] Robert W. Chandler. War of Ideas: The U.S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam. (Boulder Co.: Westview Press. 1981.)
[97] Annual Historical Reviews. USAJFKSWCS Historian; USASOC Historical Files.; Rod Lenahan. A Historical Perspective of U.S. Special Operations 1976 – 1996. (Charleston: Narwhal Press, 1998).
[98] Lenahan, pp. 23 – 298.
[99] Bob Shachochis. The Immaculate Invasion. ( New York: Viking Press. 1999).
[100] Mark Bowden. Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War (Grove/Atlantic Books, 1999); Videotape. Somalia: Good Intentions, Deadly Results (Black Hawk Down), 1999.

[RM1]

John Singleton Mosby

Born on December 6, 1833 in Edgemont, Virginia. In December 1862, Brigadier General Jeb Stuart sent one of his scouts, John Singleton Mosby, along with nine men on a mission deep into the enemy's rear areas. Mosby and his men were to provide the nucleus for a guerrilla movement aimed at Union forces operating in or near the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia. Eventually designated the 43rd Battalion of Partisan Rangers, Mosby's men, never numbering over 400, proved a continuous thorn in the side of Union commanders. Mosby’s Confederacy extended primarily in Loudon and Faquier counties of Virginia, although he effected raids as far as West Virginia. Following Lee's defeat at Gettysburg, Lincoln and his generals once again sent the Army of the Potomac southward toward Richmond. Mosby responded by harassing Union garrisons along his foe's ever lengthening line of communication wrecking trains and tracks in an attempt to cripple Union logistics. Mosby's efforts proved so successful that General Franz Sigel found it necessary in the spring of 1864 to dedicate 22,000 troops to the task of securing Union supply lines in the Shenandoah Valley. One Union officer, frustrated with his unsuccessful efforts to destroy the partisans, compared the challenge to that of shooting mosquitoes with a rifle--"very smashing to the insect, if you hit him." Union forces never brought Mosby to heal. When Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia surrendered on 9 April 1865, Mosby, now nicknamed the Gray Ghost, elected to dissolve his command rather than accede to a formal surrender. After the war, he practiced law. In 1872, he was forced into exile, forced to leave Virginia when he actively supported U.S. Grant and the Republican party in Grant’s bid for the presidency. He served with the Consul in Hong Kong and later with the U.S. Land Office in Colorado and Nebraska. At both places, he exposed graft and illegal practices. He died at May 30th , 1916 at 83.

[RM2]

The Indian Scouts

Understanding the limitations of conventional infantry and cavalry units in pacifying the American West, Congress authorized the establishment of the Indian Scouts in 1866. The new law essentially provided official sanction to a practice already well established among Army officers performing constabulary duty west of the Mississippi River. Initially, the scouts provided protection to survey parties and construction crews laboring to build the nation's first transcontinental railway, the Union Pacific. Later, as the Indian wars intensified, the Scouts served as the eyes and ears of the Army, providing timely intelligence to an Army frequently inhibited by unfamiliar terrain and an illusive foe. Indian Scouts participated in the campaign against the Sioux and Cheyenne on the plains and later against the Apache in the Southwest and the Camancheros along the Pecos River in Texas. !4 Indian Scouts received the Medals of Honor. Their official uniform was the cavalry blouse over leggins. The insignia was crossed arrows (arrows up) and the bar U.S.S. Their colors were red and white. These arrows would later become the insignia for the First Special Service Force in World War II and the U.S. Army Special Forces today. The Army kept entry standards for the Scouts exceptionally high. Prospective scouts had to demonstrate knowledge of the language, customs and history of the Native American peoples of the West. They had to know the nuances of tracking as well as be an expert in all other aspects of field craft. Skill in horsemanship was a must, but all scouts were expected to hold their own on foot marches as well. Scouts had to provide their own mounts. The closing of the American frontier in the West as well as the changing nature of warfare signaled an end to the need for the Scouts. In 1891, the Congress cut their authorized strength to 150 men. Officially inactivated in 1939, the Scouts had been relegated to riding patrol along the border in Arizona. The Army finally disbanded the last scout detachment in 1943 at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

[RM3]

OSS

As World War II was being fought in Europe, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was concerned about American deficient intelligence gathering capability. He asked his fellow Columbia University classmate New York lawyer William J. Donovan, to draft a plan. , For the most part, the Army viewed raids and partisan operations with indifference. American military planners were much more concerned with the transformation of a small peacetime conventional force into a mass army capable of waging a global war. From the beginning Donovan's concept of the new organization's role went far beyond the field of intelligence, for he saw the agency as a tool to soften the occupied areas for eventual invasion. Regarding propaganda as an initial "arrow of penetration," he planned to help resistance movements undertake a campaign of sabotage, subversion, and, assisted by commandos, small-unit guerrilla warfare. In June 1942, the Coordinator of Information was established in June 1942 with a mandate to collect and analyze strategic information required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to conduct special operations not assigned to other agencies. Drawing on British advice and the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) model, he formed separate branches. Special Operations (SO) Branch (SEE 226.11) established in OCOI, January 1942, implementing JCS directive JCS 155/4/D, December 23, 1941, which authorized OSS to conduct undercover operations in support of planned military operations. Technical Development Section removed from SO Branch, redesignated OR&D, and made into a staff office in ODSS, effective October 19, 1942, by General Order 1, OSS, October 17, 1942. Responsible for developing weapons, equipment, and agent cover items used in clandestine warfare. Despite military suspicion and organizational rivalries, the agency survived, officially becoming the Office of Strategic Services in June 1942. But the OSS never received complete jurisdiction over all foreign intelligence activities. Since the early 1930s the FBI had been responsible for intelligence work in Latin America, and the military services protected their areas of responsibility. During the War, the OSS supplied policy-makers with essential facts and intelligence estimates and often played an important role in directly aiding military campaigns. As a new agency, the Office of Strategic Services was able to take a fresh look at the entire field of special operations. A rather haphazard administrator, Donovan, according to one associate, ran his agency like a country store, but he did demonstrate an eagerness to try new ideas, ranging from plans to establish air bases behind Japanese lines in China to a plot to kidnap German Air Force chief Hermann Goering. Visitors to OSS headquarters were struck by the casual atmosphere, lack of formal lines of authority, and the wide range of personalities on the staff, ranging from Communists to well-connected socialites whom Donovan recruited at cocktail parties, board-rooms, and campuses. Many of the military personnel in the OSS served in the agency's airborne commando teams, known as operational groups (OGs). In July 1942 Donovan obtained the approval of General George C. Marshall, the Army's chief of staff, to form units of bilingual volunteers that would organize and supply guerrilla bands, gather intelligence, and carry out commando operations behind enemy lines. Recruiting teams canvassed posts and training areas for volunteers who spoke a foreign language and expressed a willingness to perform hazardous duty. These men formed cells, each containing two sections of two officers and thirteen enlisted men, although the actual size of the teams in the field would vary greatly. Primarily infantrymen and demolitions experts, they also contained medical technicians and radio operators. As was generally the case with Donovan's agency, they had their share of romantics and eccentrics, including veterans of the Spanish Civil War, a Czarist Army officer who had fled Russia after the Revolution, and "tough little boys from New York and Chicago," whose main desire, according to an instructor, "was to get over to the old country and start throwing knives." The first stop for many OSS OG recruits was the incongruously plush surroundings of the Congressional Country Club outside Washington. Jedburghs were trained principally in Harrington, England as well as the Scottish moors around Jedburgh where they took their moniker. The China-Burma-India Detachment 101 trained many of its personnel off of Catalina Island where the OSS Maritime Unit also trained as well as the Bahamas. In October 1, 1945, the OSS was abolished and its functions transferred to the State and War Departments. But the need for a postwar, centralized intelligence system was clearly recognized. Eleven months earlier, Donovan, by then a major general, had submitted to President Roosevelt a proposal calling for the separation of OSS from the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the new organization having direct Presidential supervision. This would become what we now know as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

[RM4]

MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM “Wild Bill” J. DONOVON

William Donovon was born on New Year’s Day 1883 in Buffalo, NY. Although he started to study for the priesthood at Niagara University, his advisor, Father Egan, convinced him to study law at Columbia University instead. At Columbia, he earned his nickname “Wild Bill” as their star quarterback. In 1905, graduating along side Franklin D. Roosevelt. He joined the National Guard Cavalry Unit, Troop I, 1st New York Cavalry in May of 1912 and quickly rose through the ranks from a private to a Captain. When the US entered World War I in 1917, Father Duffy, chaplain of the New York 69th Infantry (“The Fighting Irish”), lobbied to get Donovan assigned as a Major in command of 1st Battalion, 69th Infantry. During the Argonne offensive, on October 14 and 15, 1918, LTC Donovon’s unit was caught off-guard. The armor support that had been promised had failed to materialize, leaving the unit to fight against an unexpected stronger German force. At daybreak, Donovan, wounded, his leg shattered, refused evacuation, instead staying with his men, directing the battle from a shell hole. When informed that the Germans were directing a counterattack, he ordered a mortar barrage, thereby stopping the enemy cold. After his unit was relieved, he allowed himself to be treated. For this action, he received the Medal of Honor. Between wars, Donovan served as a lawyer and a public servant. Although very popular with his constituents, he was Republican. Roosevelt often said of him “If he had been a Democrat, he would have been elected the first Catholic President of the United States.” Becoming personal friends with people such as the Dulles brothers, Frank Knox and David Bruce, Donovan used these contacts when he established the Coordinator of Information (COI) of which he was the head. The COI evolved into the OSS, a multi-faceted operation that Donovan ran with charisma and zeal. Donovan had a canny sense of recruiting the best people for the job, whether it be socially prominent people (earning OSS the nickname “Oh So Social”) or scientists. It was not uncommon to find a Walt Disney cartoonist working alongside a nationally ranked rodeo cowboy or a Czarist army officer working hand-in-hand with a recent graduate of Yale. The OSS not only gathered intelligence, but was active in propaganda, behind-the-lines operations, and research and development. After the war, Major General Donovan served as the Ambassador to Thailand from 1953 – 1954. For his service, President Eisenhower awarded him the National Security Medal, making him the first American to win the top four military and civilian honors: the Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service Cross, the Distinguished Service Medal and the National Security Medal. Donovan died in his New York City home February 8, 1959.

[RM5]

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Jedburgh Teams

The OSS created 93 three man Jedburgh teams in late 1943 to provide special operations support for the Allied invasions of France and six additional teams to support subsequent operations in the Netherlands. By early 1944 some 230 French, British, American, Belgian, Dutch, Canadian, and South African volunteers had assembled in Cambridgeshire north of London for training in behind-the-lines operations. British officers headed the project, with their headquarters and main training facility at Milton Hall, outside the city of Peterborough. A typical three man team consisted of a French officer, an American or British officer and an enlisted radio operator. They received training in close combat, infiltration and exfiltration techniques, small unit tactics, light weapons, demolitions and a host of skills necessary for survival behind German lines. Approximately half of the Jed teams deployed from England to Northern France at or shortly after the Normandy landings (Operation OVERLORD) while the rest staged out of Algeria for the invasion of Southern France (Operation DRAGOON). Typically, Jeds arrived by parachute, dropping through the open bomb-bay doors of bombers specially equipped for night operations. Others teams infiltrated by glider, cargo plane, or by boat. Ideally, members of the French Resistance met the teams on the landing zones. On occasion, however, German gestapo agents supported by the French milice (French collaborators) provided the welcoming party, ending an operation almost before it began. Even after link-up with the Resistance, the Jeds occasionally ran afoul of the tangled political disputes between Gaullist and Communist partisans. Because the Jeds offered the surest means for partisans to receive air-dropped supplies, rival groups occasionally fought each other to secure the team and their all important radio. Besides for access to equipment, the Jeds provided the means to organize and direct partisan operations in support of Allied armies driving east and north toward the Rhine. Jedburgh led partisan groups destroyed rail lines, ambushed German convoys, cut telephone wires and blew up bridges. When German resistance began to crumble, the Jeds found themselves hard-pressed to keep an ever growing number of partisans armed with weapons. Despite the occasional betrayal of the teams and the inevitable casualties, the Jeds and their bands of French partisans harassed the Germans unmercifully. As a result of their efforts, the Germans found it necessary to dedicate thousands of soldiers to the task of rear area security. The last Jedburgh team completed their mission in January 1945.

[RM6]

OSS Maritime Unit

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) conceived by William “Wild Bill” Donovon, was established to conduct special intelligence and operations missions during World War II. A Maritime Unit (MU), under the auspices of the Special Operations Branch of OSS, was created and tasked with the waterborne transfer of agents, operatives and materials to and from enemy territory; the Research and Development of special maritime equipment; the training of agents and operatives in operational maritime techniques; and the planning and execution of special maritime operations utilizing the Operational Swimmer Groups. The OSS eagerly recruited Dr. Lambertsen, a young medical student and the creator of the Lambertsen Underwater Rebreather Unit (LARU), to implement the Operational Swimmer program. They then recruiting other qualified swimmers from all branches of the armed forces. Ranging in size from 12 to 36 operatives, the Operational Swimmers provided the US with an operational maritime capability to include maritime sabotage, clandestine hydrographic and inland reconnaissance and the instruction of indigenous personnel in resistance warfare. Preliminary training, focusing on waterborne skills and small unit tactics, was conducted at the OSS West Coast Training Center at Camp Pendleton and Catalina Island, CA. Advanced training in clandestine underwater operations was conducted on a secluded island in the Bahamas. Equipped with the LARU, swim fins, a depth gauge, waterproof watch, compass and an assortment of specialized small arms and ordnance, the operational swimmers had an unprecedented ability to maneuver, swimming underwater over extended periods of time and distance to conduct actions on objectives and exfil without a trace. Between 1943 and the summer of 1945, a total of five operational units were trained and fielded in the three main theaters of World War II. In the European Theater, OSS Field Base London raised a provisional group, code named L-Unit, to perform sabotage of submarine pens and block ships in the Port of Lorient, Keroman, France. The mission was cancelled due to equipment difficulties. L-Unit, however, represents the first OSS effort to field operational swimmers in combat. In addition, major strides were accomplished in the planning and conduct of cold water swimmer operations. Operational Swimmer Group I was placed on temporary duty with the US Navy in the Central Pacific. Providing the nucleus for an Underwater Demolition Team, the unit cleared the way for the amphibious landings at Peleliu, Anguar, Ulithi, Zambales and Luzon. Five operational swimmers from Group I served with a Special Reconnaissance Detachment, reconnoitering islands in the Western Carolinas for the 3d Amphibious Force. In August 1944, during a reconnaissance sortie on the Island of Yap, two operational swimmers and a Navy Chief were captured and executed. In September 1944, Operational Swimmer Group II conducted a successful submarine borne harbor infiltration exercise at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Negotiating through net and boom defenses, the group sank an old 500-ton lighter. The men then proceeded to their combat assignment off the Arakan coast of Burma. Attached to the British 14th Army, the unit performed clandestine hydrographic reconnaissance. Operational Group III, stationed in Ceylon, was the first US unit equipped with a swimmer delivery vehicle known as “Sleeping Beauty #72”. The “Sleeping Beauty” was a submersible canoe designed by the British. Although a joint mission with the SOE Force 136 was planned, it was never executed. In July 1945, one member from this unit conducted a hydrographic reconnaissance mission of Weichow Island, China. In the following month three operational swimmers supported the search and rescue of seven OSS agents from the enemy controlled Batu Islands off Sumatra. On October 1, 1945, the OSS as a whole was disbanded. The capabilities, lessons learned and history of many of the units live on in today’s Special Forces.

[RM7]

China-Burma-India Theater

The China-Burma-India theater had become a backwater of the war effort as early as 1942, but the need to keep China in the war against Japan made nominal support for the theater a necessity. LTG “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell, no supporter of guerilla operations, reluctantly accepted OSS Director William “Wild Bill” Donovon’s offer a small unit of highly trained soldiers dedicated to the mission of special reconnaissance and guerilla warfare. Under the command of CPT Carl Eifler, whom Stilwell personally recruited, Detachment 101, as the unit would be called, deployed to India before year’s end. Eifler faced many challenges, lacking nearly everything that makes operations possible. He was short of men, money, supplies, current intelligence, some semblance of direction from OSS headquarters in Washington, and Stilwell’s skepticism, referring to guerilla operations were “illegal actions” and “shadow boxing”, and impatience. The unit built a supply base in Northern India before the summer was out and had agents in the field by the end of the year. Thanks, in part to cruel population control measures, Japanese forces in Burma generated considerable animosity among the upland, non-Burmese peoples. The Kachins were particularly incensed by Japanese atrocities and eagerly joined Detachment 101’s ranks. Having little success with infiltrating agents by land, Eifler became a proponent of parachute infiltration but found the Army Air Force reluctant to assist. Unwilling to accept “no” for an answer, Eifler promised to develop an escape and evasion network for downed airmen in exchange for air support. BG Edward H. Alexander, the chief of Air Transport Command accepted Eifler's offer in January 1943. Det 101 eventually recovered over 400 airmen simultaneous to becoming the beneficiary of an aerial resupply system that daily provided his soldiers with tons of supplies. In addition, the Kachins proved to be excellent guerillas and became particularly good at locating and marking Japanese targets for air attack by the Tenth Air Force. Eight percent of its bombing targets were based on Det 101 intelligence reports. Stilwell became a supporter of Detachment 101 after initial operations began to bring results. By the end of 1943, Det 101 had 700 guerillas in the field and a network of agents, one of whom was the general contractor to the Japanese in the critically important airbase at Mytikyina. Eleven Det 101 radio stations provided a daily supply of information from behind Japanese lines. Det 101’s Pigeon Operations, using homing pigeons, ensured the allies had a steady flow of information on Japanese troop movements. A war of ambushes and sabotage made the roads and trails increasingly unsafe for Japanese units. The factors married with Det 101’s Morale Operations’ psywar campaign deflated the Japanese soldiers’ morale. The success of Det 101 in 1943 brought newfound support from Stilwell’s headquarters. When Eifler returned stateside in December 1943 for health reasons, Ray Peers assumed command. His mandate from Stilwell was to increase the size of his guerilla force to 3,000 soldiers and broaden his scope of operations. Peers responded by creating four area commands to direct guerilla forces. Stilwell also tasked Det 101 to provide support for Operation Galahad, an allied offensive spearheaded by the 5307th Composite Group (Provisional), known as “Merrill’s Marauders”. The Kachin Rangers served as guides and fought alongside the Marauders at Mytikyina. This campaign resulted in the seizure of the airfield and the town. Throughout the rest of 1944, Det 101 continued to assist in the general allied offensive across Burma. Although numbering only .8 percent of the allied strength operating in Burma, the Kachin Rangers under Det 101 direction, inflicted 29 percent of all Japanese casualties. By all accounts, Det 101’s operations proved the most successful American directed guerilla warfare campaign of World War II and did much to solidify the role of unconventional operations would come to play in future US Army Special Operations doctrine.

[RM8]

The Wickham-Williamson Agreement:

C
O
P
Y

Washington, D.C.

15 Jul 42.

To: D.S.D.

From: Williamson.

Certainly hope the enclosed "agreement" will meet with approval. It gives us a definite working basis. A copy has also gone forward to General Marshall for his approval. It looks, at the moment, as though I would be leaving Washington Sunday for Helena, Montana. I will confirm this later. The project is moving ahead by leaps and bounds here, and from my observations is in very capable hands. Col. Frederick is most anxious that the Canadian personnel arrive in Helena by August 1, as all training schedules have been drawn up on that date, and believe me they are plenty tough.
Col. Frederick mentioned to me that mail moved very lowly via our Diplomatic Bag -- he cited the case of a letter written by you or Col. Anderson to him on July 3, which was not in his hands until July 11.
The necessary information re our troops’ date of departure, port of entry, expected time of entry, numbers, etc., will be necessary in good time to make the necessary arrangements re customs and Immigration.
This is being written in haste in long hand, as no one is available to type it. Your comments are awaited.

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST SPECIAL SERVICE FORCE

Washington, D.C.
July 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF STAFF DUTIES,
GENERAL STAFF, OTTAWA, CANADA:

The following proposals have been agreed upon by Major Kenneth G. Wickham, U.S. Army, and Major D.D. Williamson, Canadian Army, and approved by Colonel Robert T. Frederick, U.S. Army, as a system of handling Canadian personnel of the 1st Special Service (official U.S. War Department designation), in relation to discipline, records, pay, allowances, rations, quarters, clothing and equipment, travel, hospitalization and dental care, and men for various reasons found unfit for service with this force and returned for duty in Canada.

The Canadian members of the force having enlisted in the Canadian Army and taken the oath of allegiance will not be required to take the American oath of allegiance.
Discipline for all members of the force will be in accordance with U.S. regulations as laid down in the 1928 "Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. Army".
Records of Canadian personnel will be maintained and posted in accordance with the existing Canadian system. This entails the addition to the force of a Canadian paymaster, pay sergeant, and records sergeant, who, along with their other routine duties in connection with the force, would be responsible for this work. The paymaster would also provide a valuable link with the Canadian Pay Corps for accounting purposes and be available to the Canadian personnel to aid in straightening out dependents allowance difficulties, etc.
Pay for all members of the force will be in accordance with Bulletin No. 28 (June 25th, 1942), U.S. War Department, 3 (three) copies of which are enclosed. Inasmuch as it is the intention of the Canadian Government to reimburse the U.S. Government in this respect, and that the force will be homogenous, a simple system has been defined and has received the tentative approval of Colonel E.W. McLarren, Office, Chief of Finance, U.S. Army, Advisory and Regulations Division.
Dependents allowances for the Canadian members of the force will be subject to the same regulations and system of payment as is in use in Canada under P & A regulations. This has also been taken into consideration in the system mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
Rations - Standard U.S. Army rations will be used for the force and the Canadian Government will be billed for the value of these rations by the Finance Department, U.S. Army. The pay vouchers and ration accounts will be submitted together from the above-mentioned office.
Quarters will be furnished to Canadian personnel on the same basis as to American personnel. (See Sec. 6, page 3 of enclosed Bulletin No. 28.)
Clothing and Equipment will be furnished to all members of the force at the expense of the U.S. Government. Canadian personnel, on receiving their instructions to report at the location chosen for their concentration, should be instructed to bring the following articles ONLY:
1. Summer drill with long trousers and black tie. This is to be worn, as it means puttees can be turned in before departure from the man’s station.
2. 1 pair boots.
3. 3 pair socks.
4. 2 complete sets summer underwear.
5. 2 summer shirts (short sleeves).
6. Personal toilet articles.
7. 1 pair shorts.
the summer drill, black ties, and boots will be returned to the nearest Canadian Ordnance Corps Depot at the expense of the Canadian Government.
Travel - The total cost of the original movement of the Canadian personnel to HELENA, MONTANA, to be borne by the Canadian Government. Subsequent traveling costs for all personnel to be borne by the U.S. Government.
Hospitalization and Dental Care will be provided at the expense of the U.S. Government, but Canadian personnel hospitalized and found unfit for further service with the force will be returned to Canada when capable of traveling. Their further care will then be the responsibility of the Canadian Government.
Pensions - The U.S. Government assumes no liability for pensions liable owing to injury or death of Canadian personnel while members of this force.
Canadian personnel found unfit owing to physical or temperamental reason, etc., will be S.O.S. this force and returned for duty in Canada at the discretion of the Commanding Officer. Travel warrant will be issued and paid for by the U.S. Government to the nearest Canadian Depot.
In the event of any death while in the United States among the Canadian personnel, either by accident or through natural causes, the agreement recently reached by the United Nations will be adhered to.

Respectfully submitted,

KENNETH G. WICKHAM, Major, CAC

D.D. WILLIAMSON, Major,
1st Bn, Dufferin & Haldimand Rifles,
Canadian Army.

Approval:

Robert T. Frederick,

[RM9]

Operation Cottage - Kiska Landings

As the Kiska Task Force was assembling in California, the Force was training for combat beach landings at Camp Bradford, Virginia. Upon GEN George Marshall’s request, the Force, by then in Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont, was shipped back to Angel Island, San Francisco to join the Amphibious Training Force No. 9. The Force’s combined strength had grown by July 24, 1942 to 211 officers, eight warrants and 2,835 enlisted men. The invasion of Kiska began with the landing of the First Regiment. 3d Regiment landed the second day in the northern part of the island with the mission of securing the beachhead prior to the landing of the main task force. Instead of meeting resistance as thought, they found empty huts and fortifications. The enemy was nowhere to be seen, having made a hasty retreat. The 2d Regiment, waiting to jump on Kiska, looking out on the well-lit moonlit night, did not realize what had happened, but had surmised that when they jumped, they would make excellent targets. None regretted not making the jump “The men of the First Special Service Force had proved themselves to be more than reliable, precise in detail and their combat efficiency was of the highest order.” - LTG Corlett and GEN DeWitt, commanders of the Kiska Task Force

[RM10]

Anzio

After proving themselves at Monte la Difensa, the Force moved to Santa Maria, using the time to recuperate and train replacements. Simultaneously, in Ottawa, Roosevelt and Churchill were discussing whether or not to continue the Italian Campaign. They finally decided it was best to front a two-pronged fight, thereby pulling German resources away from the anticipated Normandy invasion. By the time the decision had been made, the Hermann Goering Division, the Reichsfuhrer (SS) Division, the 35th Panzer Grenadier (SS) and numerous Italian units entrenched themselves around Anzio. The 1st and 3d Ranger Battalions were disseminated early in the Anzio campaign when they found themselves surrounded by the Hermann Goering Panzer Division at the Cisterna Canal. GEN Mark Clark requested the Force be sent to Anzio. Most of the First Special Service Force took position along the Pontine Marshes, a flat and barren stretch of land broken only by the Mussolini Canal, a large drainage ditch. (Service Company set up in Nettuno, south of Anzio.) Using the canal as protection, the Force penetrated German defenses nightly, sometimes as much as 1500 yards without detection, forcing Field Marshall Kesslering to pull back his lines almost a half a mile and support the area with more troops than he had originally planned. During one of their nightly forays, the Forcemen established “Gusville, ” making headlines in the Stars and Stripes. A story about a captured German diary reference (later proved to be unfounded) to the Force as “The Black Devils” inspired GEN Frederick to publish decals with the patch and “The Worse Is Yet To Come” in German. Recon teams blackened their faces and left the cards on the bodies of dead Germans or momentarily vacated German observation posts. These nightly raids as well as the daily dropping of “popcorn bombs” by German artillery resulted in numerous Force casualties. As with all things, GEN Frederick was intimately involved. It was not surprising for the men to find General Frederick in a forward position that a patrol was checking out. Once, while removing casualties from battle, one of the litter bearers was hit, dropping the litter. The other bearers, seeing a soldier nearby, ordered him to help, which he did. When they arrived at the rear, the others realized the new litter bearer was GEN Frederick. Toward the end of March and into early April, after being reinforced with what was left of the 4th Ranger Battalion (the remnants from the original “Darby’s Rangers”), Frederick stepped up the harassment of the German outposts and defense lines. The 2d Regiment, borrowing tanks from 1st Armored Division, extended their outposts and gave support by eliminating machine gun emplacements at the Litoranea fortifications. Over 60 prisoners were taken. The Force received its heaviest losses in the area between Sessuno and Borgo-Piave, receiving intense battering from both German machine gun nests and Flakwagons. In May, the Germans had pulled back in order to block the passage to Rome. On the 9th of May, the Force was relieved by the 36th Combat Engineers Regiment. During the campaign, they had been responsible for approximately 2/3ds of the beachhead.

[RM11]

The Breakout

After Anzio, the Force were strengthened with replacements from the Rangers and the Canadian Forces. Training began to include half-tracks and tanks that would lend support to the unit on the Breakout to Rome. The Force, spearheading the assault of seven divisions, including an armored division, penetrated enemy defenses at such a rapid pace that it left the other units, including its much needed logistical support, behind. When 1st Regiment arrived at the outskirts of Cisterna, they were hit hard by the German 88s and German Mark IV tanks located on the Ninfa Road. The shelling cut off retreat routes, isolated many without communication and little ammunition and inflicted heavy casualties. When the 1st Armored Forces and the 3d Division supported by Allied fighters and bombers finally relieved the Force at Cisterna area, forcing the Germans to retreat toward the Velletri Gap, the Force began to once again move rapidly toward the Lepini Mountains and cut off the German retreat. They then pressed on toward Aretna, known as the Gateway to Rome. The Germans, not electing to protect their rear action of retreat, did not offer much resistance. Instead, they waited at Aretna, staging a counter-attack, centering their 88’s and Neblewerfer on the town. Additionally, they had set their tanks and Flakwagons along the railroads north of Aretna, massed snipers along the major roadways, and set all remaining weapons to fire as soon as the Allies came into range. Setting up his headquarters in the Palace of Princess Margharita Borghese, GEN Frederick ordered patrols to probe the enemy lines, blow all the bridges in the Colle-Ferro area, set demolitions on the railhead and make hit-and-run contact with the enemy. It was not until the end of May, and, once again after sustaining severe casualties, however, that they could continue toward Rome. Generals Keyes and Mark Clark chose Frederick and the First Special Service Force to lead the way into Rome, but were pushing Frederick hard to take the city prior to June 6th. (No reason was given, and it was not until after the city was taken that Frederick would learn about the Normandy Invasion.) Clark was also determined that the Force should be the first unit to enter the Eternal City; however, the other Allied commanders had other ideas and were pushing hard to usurp this honor for themselves. The Force entered the city at 6:20 am on June 4th. When the signal was passed that the city had been breached, the Germans began firing their heavy anti-tank guns, knocking out two of the lead tanks, stopping any further movement. The Germans continued to display heavy resistance throughout the day, covering their retreat. One by one, the Force neutralized pockets of German resistance. Furthermore, they secured eight out of the 16 bridges crossing the Tiber River. As with Anzio, the Force, although one of the smallest units, was relied on heavily to neutralize the enemy’s resistance and accomplish the mission

[RM12]

Colonel William O. Darby

Credited with being the founding father of the modern Rangers, Major William O. Darby organized the 1st Ranger Battalion in June 1942, then led it into combat in Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of North Africa. Darby's Rangers set an unmatched standard for excellence in light infantry combat operations in North Africa, culminating in the highly successful attack against superior enemy forces at El Guettar in Tunisia. As a result of his successes, Darby received permission to activate two additional battalions of Rangers for service in Italy. Attached to 1st Infantry Division, Darby led his Rangers in the invasion of Sicily in July 1943. Darby's Rangers would continue to turn in a nearly unbroken string of successes until their defeat at Cisterna, near Anzio. There mechanized elements of the German Fourteenth Army cut off and eventually forced the surrender of all but six members of the 1st and 3rd Ranger Battalions and badly mauled the 4th Ranger Battalion that had attempted to come to their rescue. Darby blamed himself for the debacle, although evidence indicates that poor intelligence on the part of the VIth Corps staff was more likely to blame. Darby went back to the United States following Cisterna but returned to the Italian theater in April 1945 where he was killed during an artillery bombardment. He was promoted to Brigadier General posthumously.

[RM13]

Office of Strategic Services Operational Groups

On 23 December 1942, at the urging of William J. Donovan, Director of the OSS, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the creation of Italian, Greek, Yugoslavian, French, Norwegian, and German Operational Groups (OGs) consisting of specially selected, trained, and physically hardened U.S. Army soldiers capable of waging war behind enemy lines. The forerunners of today's Special Forces Operational Detachments, each OG consisted of thirty enlisted soldiers and four officers however, most OGs deployed as fifteen man teams. OSS recruiters made every effort to select team members fluent in the language of the country in which they would be operating. All volunteered for exceptionally hazardous duty and were highly trained in special operations techniques. The self-sufficient OGs possessed the ability to train and coordinate guerrilla operations, conduct acts of direct sabotage, rescue downed pilots, and collect intelligence. With the exception of the German group which deployed into Italy, the OGs saw action in their respective areas of operations. With the defeat of Germany, some OG soldiers returned to the United States for additional training before redeploying to the China-Burma-India theater where they undertook the task of training Chinese guerrillas for combat against the Japanese. At this time, the OGs numbered 1,100 soldiers. Making their most significant contributions in Europe, OGs turned in an exemplary performance far out of proportion to their numbers. OGs organized and directed Italian partisans in combat actions aimed at disrupting enemy supply lines and forcing the Germans to divert combat units to rear area security missions. They performed similar operations in Yugoslavia and Greece. Here the intention was to deceive the German High Command into believing that the Allies seriously intended to mount an offensive through the Balkans. In the process, OGs killed or wounded several thousand German soldiers and destroyed key rail and highway bridges as well as extensive sections of railroad track. In Norway, another OG tied down significant numbers of German soldiers in a series of hit and run strikes culminating in the destruction of the critically important Tangen railway bridge. OGs deployed into France where they rendered their most important service in preparing the way for Operation Anvil, the invasion of southern France. With the assistance of French Maquis, these groups produced over 1,000 German casualties, took 10,000 prisoners, and destroyed 32 bridges. As German resistance began to crumble, the OGs also performed a valuable role in preventing the German army from destroying transportation facilities crucial to the Allied pursuit. The effectiveness of the OGs can be measured by the severity of the German response to their presence. Despite deploying for combat dressed in American army uniforms, an illegal Wehrmacht order directed that they, as well as other special forces operatives, be "slaughtered to the last man" if captured. The OSS was disbanded in 1945. Much of the OG's team structure as well their mission capabilities eventually transferred to the U.S. Army with the activation of Tenth Special Forces Group in June 1952.

[RM14]

Merrill’s Marauders

Merrill’s Marauders, the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), officially activated in October 1943. Commanded by BG Frank D. Merrill, the 3,000 man unit trained in India for long range operations into Burma. From February to May 1944, Merrill’s Marauders carried the war to the Japanese on foot and by mule through 150 miles of dense jungle, engaging the enemy over 30 times. Almost two-thirds of the Marauders were killed, wounded or lost to disease, fatigue, and malnutrition. Each man lost an average of 35 pounds, bringing them close to collapse. Merrill himself had to be evacuated twice after suffering heart attacks.

THE FIRST MISSION, NORTH CENTRAL BURMA

Merrill and his battalions set out on February 24, 1944 from Ningbyen to Walawbum in the Hukawng Valley, where the Japanese had a forward command post. Guided by native Kachins, they took little used trails. By March 3, they had successfully outflanked the Japanese at Walawbum, blocking their major supply route along the Kamaing Road. When LTG Joseph “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell, the theater commander, and his Chinese units arrived on March 7, the found the Marauders still hanging on against the superior reinforced Japanese.

THE SECOND MISSION, THE BATTLE FOR MOGUANG VALLEY

With Walawbum in Allied hands, Stilwell pushed south. Merrill took a circuitous and difficult route behind Japanese lines. The conditions were arduous with monsoon rains and the blood sucking leeches. Additionally, many supply air drops did not reach them. The Marauders and their mules were often exhausted and bloody from the knees down. Despite protests by Merrill, Stilwell then ordered him to split his unit and send each element along a different route to hit the rest of the Japanese at two points along the Kamaing Road. The 1st battalion, with Chinese troops and artillery, soon ran into the enemy. To avoid a costly battle, they were forced to cut through dense jungle which slowed their progress to only a few miles a day. The 2d and 3d battalions reached their destination almost four days early. When Stilwell arrived, he ordered Merrill, still unaware as to why the 1st battalion had been delayed, to attack. 2d Battalion, having already marched 80 miles, backtracked to Nhpum Ga. For 10 days, they fought the Japanese, sustained only by “K” rations and stagnant water. Merrill’s 3d battalion, nearly five miles away, was also pinned down by enemy artillery fire. When 1st battalion finally arrived on the 28th, they rested for three hours, then attacked and took Shaduzup. Immediately Stilwell sent the 1st battalion on a four-day forced march to reinforce the 2d and 3d battalions. Out of 800 men, only 250 were combat effective when they arrived at Nhpum Ga on April 9. They still managed to drive off the Japanese, but at a cost of more than 700 men killed, wounded or incapacitated.

THE THIRD MISSION, TAKING THE AIRSTRIP AT MYITKYINA

Stilwell’s mission was to drive the Japanese forces south to the Irrawaddy Valley. British General Orde Wingate’s “Chindit” force cut all rail links south of Myitkyina. Detachment 101 of the OSS and their Kachin allies constantly harassed the Japanese. After only two weeks rest, the Marauders were reorganized to spearhead the push on Myitkyina, the last Japanese strong-hold in Northern Burma. If they took the air base and town, the Allies could launch attacks throughout Burma. The Marauders, energized by GEN Merrill’s pronouncement “This will be your last mission”, set out on the 112 mile march towards Myitkyina on April 22d, 1st and 3d battalions, now called the “H” and “K” Forces, headed over the 3,000 ft. Kumon Range, so steep in places that they had to cut steps in the trail for the mules who often fell over the sides to their death. Once over the top, the “K” Force marched south to Retpong, which they captured on May 9th. Meanwhile, COL Hunter’s “H” Force marched through dense jungle led by a 13 year old Kachin boy. On the 18th of May, Hunter’s men were at the outskirts of Mytikyina undetected by the Japanese. The attack on the Myitkyina airstrip, on 17 May, totally took th Japanese y surprise and by noon, the Marauders held the airstrip. However, between the 17th and the 22d of May, the Allied offensive faltered. Stilwell wanted the Chinese to take the city, thus giving the Japanese time to reinforce. The Marauders were down to about one-third strength and had to shift to the defense just to hold on. It would take another two months and thousands of reinforcements to finally take Myitkyina. Only about 200 of the original Marauders stayed through to the end. By May, Myitkyina was won and the Japanese were retreating out of Burma. The 5307th’s magnificent achievements won them the Distinguished Unit Citation before they disbanded in August 1944. The 474th Infantry was formed from what was left of the 5307th. Later, the unit became the 475th Infantry which would ultimately be redesignated the 75th Infantry Regiment (Ranger).

[RM15]

The Alamo Scouts

United States Army commanders in the Southwest Pacific theater of the war realized at the conclusion of the hard won Buna-Gona campaign in Papua New Guinea that the long march back to the Philippines would be excessively bloody unless improvements could be made in the army's intelligence gathering apparatus. Aerial reconnaissance had proven unable to provide a clear picture of what lay beneath the triple canopy jungles of the area. General Walter Krueger, Commanding General of the Sixth U.S. Army, in an effort to gather accurate and timely intelligence, created his own organization. Recruiting highly skilled soldiers in November 1943, he established training that enabled the newly created Alamo Scouts to infiltrate Japanese held islands, locate enemy defensive positions, and then report the locations to American ground, sea, and air forces for subsequent destruction. Prospective scouts had to first volunteer for the organization then survive a screening process designed to eliminate all be the most intelligent and physically fit candidates. The survivors underwent a grueling six-week course in land navigation, communications, survival, small boat operations, and advanced patrolling techniques. Graduation from the school was not, however, assurance of acceptance into the Scouts. Final selection on an eight-man team, however, depended on the results of a peer evaluation conducted at the completion of the course. Working directly for General Krueger, the Scouts were formed into teams consisting of a 1st Lieutenant and six or seven enlisted men. Navy PT boats usually moved the teams to the vicinity of their target with the final move to shore being accomplished in an inflatable rubber boat. Teams normally remained ashore only as long as it took to get a fix on the enemy's strength and location. The first Alamo Scout mission was performed in support of the 1st Cavalry Division's landing on Los Negros on 27-28 February 1944. When American forces finally made their way back to the Philippines, Alamo Scouts led the way albeit with a different mission emphasis. In the Philippines, the Scouts continued to perform deep reconnaissance missions up to 250 miles in advance of American ground forces, but in addition, the teams found themselves coordinating the activities of guerrilla units as well as establishing intelligence networks among the local peoples. The most famous operation involved the raid on the Japanese prison camp at Cabanatuan City near Manilla. Two Alamo Scout teams along with Philippine guerrillas established surveillance of the camp prior to dispatching guides to lead Company C and a platoon of Company F of the 6th Ranger battalion back to the camp. In the evening hours of 30 January 1945, the combined force rescued 511 prisoners, many of them survivors of the Bataan death march. Over the course of their existence, the Alamo Scouts conducted nearly eighty missions. Although primarily designed as an intelligence gathering organization, they killed 84 enemy soldiers and captured 24 without losing a man. Although always few in numbers, Alamo Scouts received 44 Silver Stars, 33 Bronze Stars, and 4 Soldier's Medals.

[RM16] For the first time in combat, military government was planned before the enemy was defeated. The Military Government and Civil Affairs also had to deal with another first, governments in exile. President Roosevelt, however, was adamant against the Army telling civilians, even foreigners, what to do. The establishment of a civil military unit came only when Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War, had thoroughly convinced President Roosevelt of the need. Using examples from previous wars, Stimson showed that only the Army could efficiently manage the millions of civilians which the Allied troops would encounter.
On 1 March 1943, the U.S. Army Civil Affairs Division (CAD) was activated and given a far reaching mission. The Division purged the military and individual elite from local governments and set up new local governments with properly elected officials. The also supervised food distribution, school systems, restoration of public utilities, including sewage and power, and those missions related to municipal operation. They produced their own radio broadcasts and newsreels as well as broadsides to best communicate the principles of democracy to a people who had lived in fascism for so long.
At its peak, MG Robert Hilldring commanded 11,400 personnel (900 of whom were civilians). His organization supervised the affairs of no fewer than 80 million allied, enemy and co-belligerent civilians. To assist in this effort, after the war, many units awaiting transfer back Stateside served as Constabulary troops. Responsible for maintaining the dictates published and posted by the Civil-Military Allied Government located in that area of operation, the Constabulary disarmed teenaged partisan bands, maintained law and order, guarded enemy prisoners of war and cleared areas of mines, unexploded shells and bombs.

[RM17]Upon receiving authorization from President Kennedy on wearing the green beret, the question then arose on the colors of flashes. There were four active Special Forces Groups, the US Army Special Warfare Center and School and the Reserves and National Guard to consider. The TWX, dated 27 OCT 1962, designated Yellow for 1st SFGA(); Red for 7th; Green for 10th SFG(A); Black for 5th; and Teal blue for the National Guard and Reserve units.

1st SFG(A)
1. Gold was one of the colors originally assigned to Special Forces in 1952. Additionally, the yellow was appropriate to its area of operation - the Orient. After President Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, the inner black border was added.
3d SFG(A)
1. When the 3d SFG(A) was stood up, Special Forces personnel were taken from the Special Forces school, 1st, 5th and 7th SFG(A). The flashes of the four units were mirrored in the “Checkerboard Square of “Smoke Bomb Hill” The unit was inactivated in 1968. When reactivated in 1988, the broken colors of the border were made a solid black evoking the manufacture of the unit principally from the 5th SFG(A) who was leaving Fort Bragg and moving to Fort Campbell, Kentucky.
5th SFG(A)
1. The black flash has changed four times since its original configuration. In 1963, after President Kennedy’s assassination, the unit added a white outer border in memory. In 1965, seven thin diagonal stripes signifying the 1st and 7th SFG(A) personnel who served numerous TDYs with the US Army Special Forces Vietnam were approved by Institute of Heraldry. In 1988, the diagonal was removed and the flash reverted to its black and white configuration.
6th SFG(A)
1. The 6th SFG(A) flash colors were taken from the units it fits between: the 5th and the 7th.
7th SFG(A)
1. The scarlet color was the color of both the US Army Indian Scouts (1969 - 1939) and more recently the 1st Special Service Force of World War II fame.
8th SFG(A)
1. The teal blue and gold were the colors reserved for unassigned units which is what Special Forces was until 1989 with the creation of the Special Forces Branch.
10th SFG(A)
1. The green color was only appropriate for the 1st Special Forces group activated. The unit was the only group to consistently wear their berets from 1953 until its authorization. Originally, they wore a Trojan Horse insignia on the left side of the beret in the fashion of the British commandos. The first beret flashes were cut from a pool table felt inthe Bad Toelz NCO Club.
11th SFG(A)
1. One of the two Reserve units, the 11th SFG(A) took the color teal blue which had been assigned for the Reserves and National Guard units and added the red striker bar for “the eastern section of the United States where the sun rises.” The red was chosen to represent all the subordinate companies of the unit which were located east of the Mississippi River.
12th SFG(A)
1. The other Reserve unit, the 12th SFG(A) had the most complicated flash of all the groups. The lightning bolts on the dark teal blue background were for the three methods of insertion and extraction used by Special Forces. The black bar beneath the lightning bolts was for the Remagen Bridge.
19th SFG(A)
1. The 19th SFG(A) maintained the original flash designator of teal blue as it was assigned in 1963.
20th SFG(A)
1. The 20th SFG(A) added the red and white diagonal to the teal blue evoking the national colors of red, white and blue.