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**NAVAL
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MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**STARTING POINT: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE PLANNING**

by

Patrick D. Collins

June 2014

Thesis Advisor:
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**STARTING POINT: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR UNCONVENTIONAL
WARFARE PLANNING**

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requirements for the degree of

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from the

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ABSTRACT

Policy makers and military strategists should understand how to effect regime change in an unconventional warfare (UW) environment. With this understanding, campaign and operational strategies can be more accurately formulated. This thesis uses four historical case studies where successful regime change was implemented through UW and draws conclusions about essential components that can be used for future planning. A UW planning framework was developed, which consists of planning considerations, lines of effort and insurgent imperatives for success. The planning considerations that must be understood are the nature, strengths and vulnerabilities of the target regime, the level of insurgent influence and social ties to the population. The four critical lines of effort for planning and executing UW with the goal of regime change were identified as: psychological operations, intelligence operations, disruption operations and logistical support. These four lines of effort are effective at fostering the insurgent imperatives that are highly correlated with success: motivation and commitment, tangible support, flexibility and adaptability.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE	1
B.	REGIME CHANGE	3
C.	RESEARCH QUESTION	3
D.	IMPERATIVES FOR SUCCESSFUL INSURGENCIES	4
	1. Tangible Support	5
	2. Commitment and Motivation.....	5
	3. Flexibility and Adaptability	6
E.	LINES OF EFFORT.....	7
	1. Psychological Operations	8
	2. Intelligence Operations.....	9
	3. Disruption Operations	9
	4. Logistical Support.....	10
F.	UW PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS.....	10
	1. Insurgent Influence.....	11
	2. Target Regime Strength	13
G.	HYPOTHESIS.....	14
H.	RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	14
I.	ROAD MAP.....	15
II.	CASE STUDY SELECTION	17
A.	OVERVIEW	17
B.	TYOLOGY.....	19
III.	CASE STUDY 1: DETACHMENT 101 IN BURMA, 1942–1945	23
A.	HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.....	23
B.	UW PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS.....	25
	1. Target Regime	25
	2. Insurgent Influence.....	26
C.	LINES OF EFFORT.....	27
	1. Disruption	27
	2. Intelligence.....	29
	3. Logistics	33
	4. Psychological	34
D.	INSURGENT IMPERATIVES FOR SUCCESS.....	36
	1. Commitment and Motivation.....	37
	2. Flexibility and Adaptability	38
	3. Tangible Support	39
E.	ANALYSIS	40
IV.	CASE STUDY II: SOLIDARITY IN POLAND, 1980–1989	43
A.	HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.....	43
B.	UW PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS.....	45
	1. Target Regime	45

	2.	Insurgent Influence.....	47
C.		LINES OF EFFORT.....	49
	1.	Disruption	49
	2.	Intelligence.....	52
	3.	Logistics	54
	4.	Psychological	55
D.		INSURGENT IMPERATIVES FOR SUCCESS	59
	1.	Commitment and Motivation.....	59
	2.	Flexibility and Adaptability	60
	3.	Tangible Support	61
E.		ANALYSIS	61
V.		CASE STUDY III: CONTRAS IN NICARAGUA 1981–1989	65
A.		HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.....	65
B.		UW PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS.....	67
	1.	Target Regime	67
	2.	Insurgent Influence.....	69
C.		LINES OF EFFORT.....	71
	1.	Disruption	71
	2.	Intelligence.....	73
	3.	Logistics	74
	4.	Psychological	78
D.		INSURGENT IMPERATIVES FOR SUCCESS	79
	1.	Commitment and Motivation.....	79
	2.	Flexibility and Adaptability	80
	3.	Tangible Support	81
E.		ANALYSIS	82
VI.		CASE STUDY IV: THE PEOPLE’S POWER REVOLUTION, PHILIPPINES 1986.....	85
A.		HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.....	85
B.		UW PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS.....	88
	1.	Target Regime	88
	2.	Insurgent Influence.....	89
C.		LINES OF EFFORT.....	91
	1.	Disruption	91
	2.	Intelligence.....	93
	3.	Psychological	95
	4.	Logistics	97
D.		INSURGENT IMPERATIVES FOR SUCCESS	98
	1.	Commitment and Motivation.....	98
	2.	Flexibility and Adaptability	99
	3.	Tangible Support	99
E.		ANALYSIS	100
VII.		CONCLUSION	103
A.		UW PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS.....	104

1.	Insurgent Influence.....	104
2.	Target Regime.....	106
B.	LINES OF EFFORT.....	107
1.	Disruption.....	107
2.	Intelligence.....	108
3.	Psychological.....	109
4.	Logistics.....	110
C.	INSURGENT IMPERATIVES:.....	111
1.	Commitment and Motivation.....	111
2.	Flexibility and Adaptability.....	112
3.	Tangible Support.....	112
	LIST OF REFERENCES.....	115
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST.....	121

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Cases separated according to the typology.....	20
Figure 2.	Selected case studies according to the typology.....	21
Figure 3.	U.S. psychological operation product used in Burma.....	35

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Case study empirics: U.S. sponsored resistance, World War II to present.....	17
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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

A6LM	April 6 th Liberation Movement
AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
ARDE	Democratic Revolutionary Alliance
ARSOF	Army Special Operations Forces
BIA	Burmese Independent Army
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COIN	Counter insurgency
DET 101	Detachment 101
DoD	Department of Defense
FDN	Nicaraguan Democratic Force
FSLN	Sandinista Liberation Front
GNP	Gross national product
KOR	Polish Workers Defense Committee
LAFM	Light a fire movement
LOE	Lines of effort
LOO	Lines of operation
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
NPA	National People's Army
OPART	Operational Art
UNIDO	United Nationalist Democratic Organization
UNO	United Nicaraguan Opposition
SF	Special Forces
SOF	Special Operations Forces
UW	Unconventional warfare

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Policy makers and military strategists should understand how to effect regime change in an unconventional warfare (UW) environment. With this understanding, campaign and operational strategies can be more accurately formulated. This thesis uses four historical case studies where successful regime change was implemented through UW and draws conclusions about essential components that can be used for future planning. A UW planning framework was developed, which consists of planning considerations, lines of effort and insurgent imperatives for success. The planning considerations that must be understood are the nature, strengths and vulnerabilities of the target regime, the level of insurgent influence and social ties to the population. The four critical lines of effort for planning and executing UW with the goal of regime change were identified as: psychological operations, intelligence operations, disruption operations and logistical support. These four lines of effort are effective at fostering the insurgent imperatives that are highly correlated with success: motivation and commitment, tangible support, flexibility and adaptability.

The planning considerations of the target regime and insurgent influence are used to assess how the external sponsor can best enable the insurgents. A high degree of insurgent influence and connection to the population is ideal to grow the organization and effectively coordinate operations and strategy. A strong organizational capacity amongst the insurgents suggests that external support will be utilized effectively and reduce the amount of sponsor visibility. The level of target regime strength and control will help determine how the insurgents should focus their efforts and how to employ them. Having a thorough understanding of the target regime will help identify vulnerabilities and fissures within the regime that can be exacerbated to help attrite their control.

The lines of effort are used to develop an operational strategy that grows the insurgency, increases legitimacy and disaggregates the target regime. Psychological, disruption, intelligence and logistics operations are the broad categories used to classify the types of methods that can be used. These four lines give a starting point for operational planning that includes utilizing methods such as: the media, propaganda,

sabotage, subversion, strategic intelligence, tactical intelligence and sanctuary to increase insurgent legitimacy and disaggregate the target regime.

Finally, the external sponsor should be continually assessing and fostering an environment that includes the three imperatives identified as common for successful insurgencies: commitment and motivation, flexibility and adaptability, and tangible support. These attributes will ensure that the insurgency can continue to grow and remain relevant in the face of a much larger, more sophisticated force. By displaying these imperatives the insurgents will attract recruits, and keep the target regime reactive. Additionally, the insurgents will be able to rapidly exploit target regime mistakes or oppressive actions.

These elements are all critical to the successful implementation of a regime-change operation. When the four lines of effort are properly prioritized according to the insurgent or resistance groups' strengths and weaknesses, the goal of regime change can be achieved. This thesis seeks to provide an operational planning framework for regime change in a UW campaign.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The world has recently seen an increase in the number of revolutions attempting to bring about regime change through both violent and non-violent means. The Arab Spring beginning in 2010 saw regime changes in numerous Middle Eastern countries such as; Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. In 2013, Thailand saw uprisings attempting to overthrow the regime in power and Ukraine saw their government toppled. In Syria, a violent insurgency has been ongoing since 2009. Determining when and how to support a resistance or insurgency from outside requires an extensive understanding of the resistance, the target regime, the population and the external sponsor capabilities and limitations. External sponsors can often shift momentum in the insurgents favor, but what framework can sponsors use to best ensure success? This thesis will look at four historical unconventional warfare case studies that resulted in regime change and analyze the effectiveness of the proposed framework for planning an unconventional warfare campaign.

A. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

According to the Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-05 published in 2012, the definition of unconventional warfare (UW) is “activities conducted to enable a resistance group or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with a underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.”¹ The goal of a resistance element or insurgency ranges from effecting a policy change to overthrowing a government or occupying power. When sponsoring an insurgency, the external actor should ensure that their national goals coincide with those of the resistance, whether it is policy change, establishing an independent state or overthrow.

The key component to UW is operating with or through an existing resistance element or insurgent. For this thesis a resistance element will be defined as a movement

¹ Department of the Army, *Special Operations* (Army Doctrinal Publication 3-05) (Washington DC, Department of the Army, 2012), 9.

that seeks to overthrow a puppet regime or occupying power and an insurgency will be defined as a movement that seeks to overthrow an established government that is organic.

It is possible for an external sponsor to create the insurgency or resistance movement, however this takes time. By using an existing resistance organization, the external sponsor can focus on improving the insurgent capabilities. This study will focus on insurgencies and resistance elements that were externally sponsored by the U.S.

Many studies have been conducted that outline the utility of using UW versus conventional warfare. Most often there is less risk and a significant reduction in cost by choosing UW. The nature of UW lends itself to smaller units, thus giving a smaller footprint in the host country and a smaller logistics tail. This approach supports the resistance or insurgency through training, supplies, advice and planning expertise. By allowing the resistance or insurgents to be the primary executors, the desired change often takes longer but can be more effective than a ground invasion by a foreign power. Conventional warfare may be more desirable when a resistance does not exist or does not have the capacity to win or when U.S. vital interests are at stake. That said:

The decision to use unconventional warfare is dependent on a UW capability, influence on policy, and the impracticality of conventional warfare. UW capability is the summation of authority, organization, and mechanism. Influence on policy is a result of UW successes, continuation of inherited courses of action, and council from trusted advisor(s). The impracticality of conventional warfare can be a result of any number of causes.²

Perhaps the most important aspect of determining when UW is the best alternative is identifying the capacity of the insurgent groups. Insurgent goals and U.S. policy must be fairly well aligned and the insurgent groups must have a significant chance of success. Success is determined by the insurgents' ability to influence the population, their organizational capacity to unite disparate groups and their ability to counter the regimes efforts in a timely and effective manner.

² Ryan Agee and Maurice Duclos, "Why UW: Factoring in the Decision Point for Unconventional Warfare" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 147.

Once an external sponsor has agreed to support an insurgent or resistance element, military planning must occur to determine how to best enable the insurgent group. A framework for assessing insurgent viability and external support requirements can be useful. This thesis looks at a potential planning framework for UW campaigns with the goal of regime change.

B. REGIME CHANGE

The goal or objective of regime change may be conducted to seek a “realloca[tion] of power within the country,” or to “cause the withdrawal of an occupying power.”³ This can be accomplished violently or non-violently. The goal of the insurgents must be determined so that the external sponsor can effectively develop strategy.

Regime change can be effected in various ways: forcefully through violent means, through the political process, non-violently through pressure or coercion or a combination. Whether it is an occupying power or illegitimate government, UW is only a useful tool to support the goal of regime change if a thorough understanding of the insurgency and target regime is known early.

C. RESEARCH QUESTION

What framework can military staffs use at the operational level to plan successful UW campaigns with the objective of regime change? This includes determining the operations that are most commonly used and the characteristics that correlate with insurgent success. By analyzing cases where the U.S. has succeeded in supporting insurgent goals, the answer to the secondary question of how this information can be applied to future UW campaigns can be answered.

This thesis has two primary purposes: first to identify the elements that make regime change through a UW campaign successful and second, to demonstrate how the identified factors can be applied to UW campaigns. This thesis will provide the reader

³ Department of Defense, *Unconventional Warfare Operations* (FM 3-05-201) (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2003), 1–4.

with a framework for how to assess potential insurgent organizations, the target regime and how an external sponsor can best support the goal of regime change.

I identified three areas for organizing the planning framework: insurgent influence, target regime and lines of effort (LOE). The three areas are not meant to be all-inclusive, but rather serve as a framework to begin planning external sponsorship of a UW campaign. All three areas contribute significantly to the imperatives identified for successful insurgencies: commitment and motivation, tangible support and flexibility and adaptability. The imperatives for successful insurgencies were obtained from a recent RAND counter insurgency study entitled *Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies*. The insurgent influence and target regime considerations were identified as important planning factors by numerous studies to include “How Insurgencies End” by RAND and current military doctrine. The LOEs were identified from current UW doctrine as well as declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) documents that detailed operational efforts that support the overthrow of a regime.

D. IMPERATIVES FOR SUCCESSFUL INSURGENCIES

Recent RAND counter-insurgency (COIN) studies found that three imperatives characterized the COIN force during all effective COIN operations: commitment and motivation, tangible support and flexibility and adaptability.⁴ Although the RAND publication is a COIN study and focuses on the necessary imperatives for the regime rather than the insurgents, it stands to reason that the same imperatives are relevant to the insurgency or resistance element and must exist in greater quality and quantity for insurgent success. Both COIN and UW are arguably population centric and require a level of passive and active support of the population to succeed. In this study, I will use the three imperatives mentioned above as assessment metrics that must be present for a successful insurgency with the goal of regime change.

⁴ Christopher Paul, Colin Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunnigan, *Paths to Victory: Lessons From Modern Insurgencies* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), 9.

1. Tangible Support

Tangible support includes manpower, funding, materiel, sanctuary, intelligence and tolerance to ensure growth and sustainment of the insurgency.⁵ Ryan defines reducing insurgent tangible support as the center of gravity for the COIN force, which means that it must be secured by the insurgent force in order to be successful. “Although tangible support can come from a supporting population, it can also come from the external supporter.”⁶ Tangible support is perhaps the most important aspect of an insurgency because it keeps the group viable and enhances their ability to organize. Tangible support can come from anywhere, but popular support is still critical for ultimate success. Paul et al. also points out that “if insurgents are meeting their support needs from the population in the area of conflict, then tangible support and popular support would be largely the same thing.”⁷ The external sponsor must be careful not to provide more support than the insurgent organization has the capacity to handle and must also ensure that the level of support does not de-legitimize the insurgent organization. Outcomes for insurgencies can depend on whether the majority of tangible support comes from the population or the external sponsor.⁸ The population does not have to fight for the insurgency, but they cannot fight against it. Tangible support allows the insurgency or resistance element to continue to grow, which must occur to counter the state’s effort.

2. Commitment and Motivation

Commitment and motivation are necessary; without these imperatives the state can easily overwhelm the insurgents through a high operational tempo and constant harassing operations. Commitment must be a common characteristic as the state can

⁵ Christopher Paul, Colin Clarke, and Beth Grill, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers* (New York: Rand National Defense Research Institute, 2010).

⁶ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, xxiv.

⁷ Paul et al., *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers*, 71.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 72.

target non-committed individuals and degrade the insurgent intelligence advantage.⁹ Committed individuals are more likely to resist the efforts of the state that can cause defections and internal rifts. Successfully and routinely conducting disruption operations can increase the morale of the organization thus increasing the commitment of the members. Additionally, exploiting regime repression can induce support for the movement and motivate members to continue to act despite the risks. Money and materiel resources can also increase morale as well as contribute to gaining more specialized recruits that can rapidly counter efforts of the state. If insurgent forces are not working in unity to effect regime change, but rather seeking to “maximiz[e] their personal wealth and power, bilking external supporters by extending the conflict or avoiding combat,”¹⁰ then the insurgency will not be able to succeed. The syphoning of support from insurgent leaders shows a low level of commitment to the cause and higher level of commitment to personal wealth. Understanding the motivations of the insurgents prior to supporting them should be a critical planning consideration. Although selfish motivational factors are often hard to detect, continued growth within a resistance movement or insurgency and a lack of defectors can be used to display the groups’ level of commitment to the cause and their motivation to continue operations.

3. Flexibility and Adaptability

Being able to effectively and decisively counter the states’ efforts must be done to retain the initiative. The insurgency or resistance must be able to adapt to the conditions that the state imposes on them and the population.¹¹ This type of adaptation must happen at both the tactical and operational levels. Tactical innovation and adaptation is necessary to exacerbate social fissures among the populace while increasing the chance of

⁹ The primary advantage that an insurgency has over the state is the ability to remain anonymous and the ability to monitor the regime. This is referred to as the intelligence advantage because the state either lacks the ability to attain the same level of information on the insurgency or their ability is significantly lower than the resistance. The state will usually maintain the force advantage with a professional military and technological equipment so it is imperative that the insurgency exploit their intelligence advantage to the fullest extent possible. Gordon McCormick, “Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare” Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, Jan 15, 2013.

¹⁰ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, xxiv.

¹¹ Ibid., xxv.

government repressive actions. Some governments will use heavy-handed techniques such as declaring martial law or violently breaking up protests. The leadership and underground organization must be able to adapt to these changing conditions and exploit them to increase their popular support and momentum. This characteristic coincides with the ability of the insurgency to rapidly disseminate information and policies to the guerrilla or auxiliary forces as well as organize operations. If the target regime reacts to insurgent operations by offering compromise, the insurgents must be able to shift their strategy from violence or protests to negotiations. The advancement of the cause and achieving the insurgent goal should be the focus. The insurgents should be able to adapt to changing environmental conditions and keep their focus to be effective.

E. LINES OF EFFORT

Under the umbrella of UW campaigns, three specific resistance or insurgent goals were identified: policy change, secession and regime change. Often times, the same lines of effort are used to accomplish all three goals. During military planning, lines of effort must be drawn to determine the best way to achieve the goal. JP 5-0 defines a line of effort as “using the purpose (cause and effect) to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions by linking multiple tasks and missions.”¹² In other words, identifying and prioritizing the methods used to establish the necessary conditions for success. This thesis identifies four common elements that were used in planning prior UW campaigns and will use these as the lines of effort for the case analyses. The UW objective for this thesis will be regime change. The lines of effort identified are: psychological warfare, logistical support, disruption operations and intelligence operations.¹³

Effectively coordinating these lines of effort does not guarantee success. The sequence, priority and emphasis on each line of effort in addition to the target regimes

¹² Department of Defense, *Joint Operation Planning* (JP 5-0) (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2011), GL-12.

¹³ These lines of effort were identified through historical accounts of UW efforts and primarily derived from various CIA and DOD documents pertaining to UW. All regime change operations identified used all or some combination of psychological operations, intelligence operations, disruption operations and logistics support.

vulnerability and the level of insurgent ability to influence the population are likely to determine the level of success. In Iran 1953, these lines of effort existed and the campaign for regime change was incredibly quick and decisive because the target regime was weak and the resistance element had a high ability to influence the population. Conversely, in Cuba during the Bay of Pigs operation, these lines of effort were used, but not optimally and the U.S. failed to overthrow Fidel Castro's regime. The U.S., as an external sponsor in Cuba, failed to correctly assess the will of the population to act against the regime and failed to exploit regime fissures and vulnerabilities. This thesis will concentrate on how the lines of effort and the insurgents' ability to influence the population were prioritized to achieve the goal of regime change. This thesis will also examine which LOE's are more important for a violent campaign versus a non-violent campaign.

As the U.S. seeks to utilize a "light footprint" to achieve policy goals, conducting UW operations more precisely with a higher certainty of success will save effort, money, lives and avoid political fallout for all involved. A planning framework for UW operations will serve as a starting point for campaign development for the purpose of regime change.

1. Psychological Operations

Psychological warfare is the use of propaganda, media and messages to influence a target audience. This is usually directed at the following groups: enemy, enemy sympathizers, uncommitted and resistance sympathizers.¹⁴ The goal of these operations is to incite dissatisfaction within the target regime, stimulate apathetic populations to side with the resistance and increase morale within resistance elements and supporters.¹⁵ Psychological operations can be anything from radio messages that attempt to influence a susceptible population to underground newspapers, flyers, whisper campaigns and attempts to cause defection among the regimes elite. Properly executed military

¹⁴ Department of Defense, *Unconventional Warfare Operations*, 1-1.

¹⁵ Central Intelligence Agency, *Power Moves Involved in the Overthrow of an Unfriendly Government* (Washington DC: CIA, 1970).

operations also have significant psychological impact. These operations seek to create dissatisfaction with the status quo and incite some level of internal disruption within the target state.

2. Intelligence Operations

Intelligence operations consist of three subgroups: psychological, tactical and strategic intelligence. The purpose of psychological intelligence is to monitor the target regime and the people with a focus on local sentiments or attitudes on a daily basis to inform timely operational planning. The purpose of tactical intelligence is to collect physical data on all sabotage targets; mainly low level, visible target data collection. The purpose of strategic intelligence is to gather information from high-level sources such as defectors or people within the target regime itself.¹⁶ Intelligence operations are necessary because they form the basis for action. The greatest advantage a resistance or insurgent group has is the ability to remain anonymous and potentially collect information on the target regime without alerting them to nefarious activity. This can be done overtly through the monitoring of troop movements or clandestinely through high level sources or assets within the regime. Additionally, these operations give the insurgent or resistance group the ability to plan tactical operations that give them a higher chance of success by targeting sympathetic individuals or lightly guarded targets. Maintaining security within the insurgency is also an important aspect of the intelligence LOE. This is linked to the existence of a sanctuary through tangible support and the ability of the insurgents to vet their members and consistently assess their vulnerabilities.

3. Disruption Operations

Disruption is defined in the ADP 3-05 as “degrad[ing] the effectiveness of adversaries and threats. This includes their support networks, shadow governments, infrastructure and financing, through unilateral surgical strike and special warfare in concert with Service or Army conventional, joint, interagency, intergovernmental and

¹⁶ Ibid.

multinational partners.”¹⁷ Disruption involves the destruction of enemy infrastructure through sabotage and deception, focuses on diverting enemy attention away from critical vulnerabilities or areas and seeks to divide enemy forces through subversive actions. Disruption can induce fractures in the upper echelon of the target regime, thus creating more permissive political opportunities. It also creates a sense of cognitive liberation among the resistance or insurgency elements as well as the population. Sabotage operations are focused more on kinetic targeting of infrastructure and other physical targets. Subversion is another form of disruption and instead focuses on targeting individuals in an effort to create fissures within the regime. In this sense, inducing high-ranking defectors from the target regime can be an effective disruption operation.

4. Logistical Support

Logistical support refers to the arms, ammunition, food, clothing and special equipment needed to properly outfit an insurgency or resistance element to enable a regime change campaign.¹⁸ The logistical support forms the basis of tangible support needed for an insurgency to succeed. Tangible support includes manpower, funding, materiel, sanctuary, intelligence and tolerance¹⁹ to ensure growth and sustainment of the insurgency. The logistics support that an external sponsor provides can greatly increase the likelihood of success for an insurgency or resistance movement. This support can be through advice, money or material but in all cases it seeks to motivate the group by properly outfitting them with what they need to succeed. It should also be noted that logistical support can be both internal and external to the operational environment depending on the permissiveness of the target environment.

F. UW PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Operational art in the Army doctrinal publication 3-0 is defined as “the pursuit of strategic objectives in whole or in part through the arrangement of tactical actions in

¹⁷ Department of the Army, Army Doctrinal Publication 3-05, 12.

¹⁸ Central Intelligence Agency, *Power Moves involved in the Overthrow of an Unfriendly Government*.

¹⁹ Paul et al., *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers*.

time, space and purpose.”²⁰ In short, operational art is the process that military planners use to accomplish their goals. In special operations, this process is starting to regain traction as a result of the 2012 publication of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command Planners Handbook for Operational Design. Modifying the process to counter new and complex threats along with the incorporation of tools such as social media platforms is needed. Additional publications like Colonel (COL) Brian Petit’s “*Going Big by Getting Small*,” describes the application of operational art during phase zero or pre-conflict stages.²¹ It is during this time that considerations and contacts for future UW should be developed. The two critical planning considerations that must be considered during the operational art process are the insurgent ability to influence and connect with the population and the target regime strength and vulnerabilities.

Understanding the insurgent’s ability to influence the population and knowing target regime vulnerabilities are critical to the operational art process. These considerations should be continuously updated to provide decision makers with viable options in a timely manner. Trying to gain information on these aspects during later phases may be more difficult as the insurgent or resistance element will typically be operating more clandestinely and more willing to fabricate truths for support. Additionally, if an insurgency gains increased public support, it could be harder and more dangerous to operate within a given country, as security will be tighter. It is necessary to cultivate contacts and collect information as early as possible to formulate a successful plan for external sponsorship.

1. Insurgent Influence

The ability of the resistance element to influence and connect with the populace is a critical factor for success. This refers to the ability of the insurgency to effectively spread its narrative and messages and how well the resistance can “develop relationships

²⁰ Department of the Army, Army Doctrinal Publication 3-05, 9.

²¹ Brian Petit, *Going Big by Getting Small: Operational Art by Special Operations in Phase Zero* (Denver, CO: Outskirts Press, 2013).

with legitimate political action groups, youth groups, trade unions, and other front organizations.”²² This trait can serve to insulate the insurgency from the state and also assist in recruitment and securing resources.²³

A homegrown insurgency is internally and organically able to keep the organization resourced and therefore able to retain and recruit new personnel. This is due to their familial and deep ties to the population. Organic surrogate forces can help reduce the sponsor’s visibility and exposure during regime-change campaigns. Organic surrogate forces already have a certain level of legitimacy and capability amongst the population. This capability allows the external sponsor to be less active in executing operations and play more of an organizational or coordination role. Reducing the sponsor’s visibility can prevent or weaken the target regime’s propaganda claiming that the resistance movement or insurgency is a form of foreign interventionism. With sufficient influence potential, a resistance movement is poised to win.

Connable and Libicki refer to popularity stating, “When the insurgents or groups’ popularity was high, the insurgents lost only one-third of the time.”²⁴ Popularity can be linked to being embedded within the population. In the twenty-first century, popularity may be visible in direct communications via numerous social media sites or cell phones.

A homegrown insurgency is usually well poised to ensure that mechanisms are in place to communicate and disseminate messages. Additionally, leaders are known and unity between the different factions and sub-groups exist. An example of this is the Solidarity movement in Poland where many different trade unions and workers’ organizations were united under one umbrella organization that effectively communicated their plans and information throughout the organization.

²² Department of Defense, FM 3-05-201, 1-7.

²³ Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, *How Insurgencies End* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand National Defense Institute, 2010), 79.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 176.

This is a critical factor considering the level of external support needed to stand up an organization in a semi-permissive or non-permissive environment. Understanding the culture and unifying factors is necessary to determine how to influence the population and support the group that the external sponsor backs.

2. Target Regime Strength

The strength and type of target regime is also an important factor in determining whether or not the insurgency or resistance element will be successful. The level of state control can have a significant effect of insurgent success. Governments that employ autocratic methods can crush insurgencies in the incipient stage.²⁵ Additionally, governments that enact political reform can defeat the insurgency through a participatory democratic process.²⁶ This thesis will assess the levels of government control using an existing RAND study²⁷ to determine how the lines of effort and insurgent social networking ability affect regime control.

The type and level of regime control will help determine which lines of effort will have the priority. In a police state with a high level of state control, overt disruption efforts may result in a disproportionate number of casualties for the resistance or insurgent movement. However, subtle propaganda messages may create fissures within the regime and create opportunities for insurgent or resistance elements.

When planning external sponsorship for an insurgent or resistance element, planners must consider the level of regime control before determining the type of support. A standard template cannot be applied universally. Careful consideration of target regime capabilities, strengths and weaknesses is required.

The lines of effort serve as a starting point for external support based on the insurgent networking ability and the vulnerability of the target regime. These elements

²⁵ Ibid., 114.

²⁶ Ibid., 115.

²⁷ This thesis will utilize the existing RAND studies of *How Insurgencies End* by Connable and Libicki, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers and Paths to Victory* by Paul et al. to assess how internal insurgent dynamics and target regime strength contributed to successful insurgencies.

can form the base that will enable the movement to exploit the imperatives for insurgent success: commitment and motivation, a tangible support base, and flexibility and adaptability.²⁸

G. HYPOTHESIS

Successful UW campaign planning requires a complete understanding of the insurgent imperatives, UW planning considerations and how to properly integrate the four identified LOE's. This thesis will focus on the operational level of war and the specific planning factors that should be considered during UW campaign design. The political objective sought will be regime change, the insurgent imperatives will be: commitment and motivation, tangible support and flexibility and adaptability. UW considerations will be: insurgent influence, target regime oppression and vulnerabilities. The LOE's for planning external support will be: psychological, intelligence, disruption and logistics. Understanding the aspects listed above and their relation to historical examples may be able to help guide future strategy for the military planner.

H. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This thesis will examine regime change campaigns and how the insurgent imperatives, UW planning considerations and LOE's contributed to their success. This thesis will examine four case studies where the U.S. sponsored insurgent or resistance groups for the purpose of regime change.

The case studies selected are based on two criteria. First, the cases will encompass the widest range of violent and non-violent regime change campaigns as possible. Second, they will represent both insurgencies and resistance movements. This thesis will examine the following cases in detail: OSS operations in Burma during World War II, Solidarity movement in Poland during the Cold War, Contra insurgency in Nicaragua during the 1980s and the 1986 Peoples Power revolution in the Philippines.

²⁸ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*.

I. ROAD MAP

Chapter II will describe the case study selection and rationale. Chapter III through VI are the case studies, which identify the UW planning considerations, LOE's and how the insurgents fostered the imperatives needed for success. Each case study will also include an analysis that briefly summarizes the elements that contributed most significantly to the insurgents success. Chapter VII is the conclusion, which includes a summary of the common threads that were noted in all four case studies and how this thesis can contribute to future operations.

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II. CASE STUDY SELECTION

A. OVERVIEW

The insurgencies identified for this study were conflicts that the U.S. sought to support throughout a variety of means. Table 1 depicts the cases that were identified for potential research.

Table 1. Case study empirics: U.S. sponsored resistance, World War II to present²⁹

Resistance Element	Target Regime	Time	PSYOPS	Intel ops	Disruption	Logistics	INS internal support	Target Regime control level	Regime Change?
Philippine Resistance ³⁰	Japan	1942–1945	M	H	M	M	M	M	Y
French ³¹	Germany	1944–1946	H	H	H	M	H	M	Y
Kachin ³²	Japan	1944–1946	M	H	H	M	H	M	Y
Syrian Army	Syrian Gov't	1949	M	M	L	L	H	L	Y (Coup)
Partisans	North Korea	1951–1953	L	L	L	L	L	H	N
Iranian Military/Resistance	Mossadegh Gov't	1953	H	H	H	L	M	L	Y
Anti Communist Army of Liberation	Guatemalan Gov't	1954	M	H	M	L	H	L	Y
Tibet Rebels ³³	China	1955–1970	L	M	H	H	M	M	N
Anti	Indonesian	1956–	L	L	M	M	M	H	N

²⁹ Table legend: Question to identify effective disruption cases within the pool of U.S. sponsored unconventional warfare campaigns.

Psychological operations are assessed as High (H) Medium (M) Low (L) or Unknown (U)

intelligence operations are assessed as High (H) Medium (M) Low (L) or Unknown (U)

Disruption operations are assessed as High (H) Medium (M) Low (L) or Unknown (U)

Logistics operations are assessed as High (H) Medium (M) Low (L) or Unknown (U)

Internal support for the insurgency is assessed as High (H) Medium (M) Low (L) or Unknown (U)

Target regime control of the populace is assessed as High (H) Medium (M) Low (L) or Unknown (U)

Was regime change effected? Yes (Y) or No (N)

³⁰ R. W. Volckmann, *We Remained: Three Years Behind the Enemy Lines in the Philippines* (New York: Norton and Company, 1954).

³¹ John Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II*, 1st ed (New York: W. Morrow, 1986).

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

Resistance Element	Target Regime	Time	PSYOPS	Intel ops	Disruption	Logistics	INS internal support	Target Regime control level	Regime Change?
Communist Forces	Gov't	1958							
Anti Communist Rebels	Pathet Lao	1958–1960	M	M	H	H	H	M	Y
Anti Communist Rebels	Iraqi Communist Party	1960–1963	L	L	L	L	M	L	Y
Anti Trujillo Forces	Dominican Republic Gov't	1961	H	M	M	M	M	M	Y
Cuban Exiles ³⁴	Gov't of Cuba	1962	M	L	H	H	L	M	N
ARVN Military	Vietnamese Gov't	1963	L	M	L	L	M	L	Y (Coup/ Assassination)
National Labor Party	Brazil Labor party	1964	L	M	L	M	M	L	Y (Coup)
Anti Communist Forces	N Vietnamese	1964–1972	L	L	L	L	L	H	N
Special Operations Group ³⁵	N Vietnamese	1967–1972	L	M	H	H	L	H	N
Chilean Military	Chilean Gov't	1970–1973	H	M	H	M	M	L	Y (Coup/ Assassination)
Afghan Mujahedeen ³⁶	Soviet Forces	1979–1989	M	M	M	H	H	M	Y
Solidarity Movement	Polish Government	1980–1989	L	L	L	M	H	M	Y (Ended in Negotiation)
Khmer Peoples National Liberation Front	Vietnamese	1980–1995	M	L	M	L	M	M	Y (Ended in Negotiation)
Nicaraguan Defense Force ³⁷	Sandinista/ Gov't of Nicaragua	1981–1989	M	M	H	H	M	H	Y
Democratic Philippine Forces ³⁸	Philippine Gov't (Marcos)	1986	H	M	L	L	H	L	Y
Iraqi Resistance	Iraqi Gov't	1992–1996	M	L	M	L	L	H	N
Northern Alliance	Taliban Gov't of	2001–2002	M	M	M	H	H	M	Y

34 Ibid.

35 Francis J. Kelly, *U.S Army Special Forces 1961–1971* (CMH Pub 90-23) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973)

36 Robert Michael Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insiders Story of Five Presidents and How they Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

37 Prados, *President's Secret Wars*.

38 Gates, *From the Shadows*.

Resistance Element	Target Regime	Time	PSYOPS	Intel ops	Disruption	Logistics	INS internal support	Target Regime control level	Regime Change?
	Afghanistan								
Kurdish Forces	Gov't of Iraq	2003	M	M	M	H	H	M	Y
Somali Warlords	Islamic Courts Union	2005–2006	U	U	U	U	U	U	N

B. TYPOLOGY

The above cases were further separated using the following characteristics: resistance, insurgency, violent and non-violent. In this thesis resistance movements are movements that sought to overthrow a puppet regime or occupying power. An insurgency, on the other hand, is against an internal or organic adversary or government that is not under any external control or occupation. This is an important distinction because resistance organizations and insurgencies may use different methods to garner public support and also may use different techniques for leverage. For example, resistance organizations may use powerful nationalist narratives to mobilize support against a foreign occupier. Insurgencies may sway the population to fight against a government that they elected or supported by providing essential or basic services that the government does not.

Violent and non-violent refers to the level of lethal activity directed at the target regime. Violent campaigns are armed insurgencies or resistance elements that use lethal force as the primary means of removing the regime from power. Non-violent campaigns may be armed, but primarily use social or international pressure as their means for overthrowing the regime. The following figure shows how the cases were separated using this typology.




Figure 1. Cases separated according to the typology.

The cases were then selected, one from each quadrant to cover as wide of a range as possible and to show variance between cases. Figure 2 shows the case selection.




Figure 2. Selected case studies according to the typology.

DET 101 was selected as the violent, resistance case. Despite being one of the most successful disruption forces of the last century, DET 101 was able to organize a significant native force to support their lethal operations. They were also able to successfully exploit fissures between the occupying Japanese and the indigenous population of Burma through the use of a vast intelligence network. DET 101 was part of a much larger war effort, but their support to the Burmese resistance proved vital to the China-India-Burma theater success. The Solidarity movement in Poland during the 1980s was selected as the non-violent, resistance organization because of their significance at the end of the Cold War and their success in using traditional bases of power and existing organizations to build and coordinate the movements' actions. Solidarity was able to garner international and local support through the extensive use of propaganda, symbols and non-violent demonstrations. Solidarity worked significantly with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to move its cause forward and assist the U.S. in gaining more insight to Soviet intentions. The case of Nicaragua and the Contras was chosen as the violent, insurgency because it shows how difficult it can be to gain public support

through the use of violence. Additionally, the Contra case demonstrates the importance of insurgent unity and how external sponsor actions can have a significant effect on success. The Contra case demonstrates how having the flexibility to amend or revamp operational strategy is key. The 1986 Peoples Power revolution in the Philippines was chosen as the non-violent insurgency because it shows how political pressure can be exerted to enable the success of an insurgency. This case also shows how external support can be minimal when the insurgent force has significant organizational capacity and how co-opting certain pillars of support can greatly increase the insurgent movement's effectiveness. U.S. contribution to the revolution was limited, but the U.S. did assist in removing the leadership during the final days, which resulted in success.

III. CASE STUDY 1: DETACHMENT 101 IN BURMA, 1942–1945

The Burma case occurred during World War II and is an example of a successful violent resistance. The U.S. with the help of indigenous forces waged a UW campaign to expel the Japanese from Burmese territory and facilitate Allied operations throughout the region. To accomplish this, the U.S. and Burmese allies utilized a high level of disruption operations mainly focusing on sabotage while also using a high level of intelligence operations to facilitate their efforts. The U.S. was able to enable the success of the resistance with just over 200 people by properly exploiting the mistakes of the target regime and conducting well-coordinated and planned operations. The intelligence and disruption LOE's were used significantly in this case and should be considered the priority LOE's for a successful violent resistance UW campaign to expel an occupying power.

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In 1937, Chiang Kai Shek, the leader of China and the Chinese Nationalist Party, had joined forces with the communist insurgency inside his country, led by Mao Tse-Tung, to defeat a Japanese threat to their sovereignty. Japan had taken control of many key Chinese ports and was preventing resupply of the Chinese forces. This catalyst forced Chiang to build a road from Kunming, China, to Lashio, Burma, known as the Burma Road, for resupply via the port in Rangoon.³⁹ The Burma Road became a vital logistics link for the Chinese from 1939 to 1941. Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese began their offensive against Burma, bombing the major cities and expanding their control of key areas.

By March 1942, the Japanese controlled the Burma Road cutting off Chinese supplies. Two divisions of Chinese were already working with the U.S. under the command of Major General (MG) Joseph Stilwell. The U.S. re-enforced the Chinese

³⁹ James R. Ward, "Detachment 101: Office of Strategic Services Burma—April 14, 1942 to July 12, 1945, 'The American Kachin Rangers'" accessed October 15, 2013, <http://www.oss-101.com/history.html>.

because they wanted to tie down the Japanese land forces throughout the theater. By May, Burma was firmly under Japanese control and MG Stilwell along with his Chinese divisions were forced north into India to re-group.⁴⁰

It was during this time that MG Stilwell received a proposal that offered to send him a detachment of men from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to help him with intelligence and sabotage missions inside Burma. Reluctantly, MG Stilwell accepted the detachment and Major (MAJ) Carl Eifler was named as the leader.⁴¹ In the summer of 1942, MAJ Eifler and the detachment, known as DET 101, were given the mission by Stilwell to “establish a base camp in northeast India and from there, plan and conduct operations against the roads and railroads leading into Myitkyina in order to deny the Japanese the use of the Myitkyina airfield. Establish liason with the British authorities to effect coordination with their operations.”⁴²

The directive from MG Stilwell was not a UW mission; however, the DET 101 leadership realized that in order to effectively deny the Japanese use of airfields they would need local support and more than 21 men.⁴³ By utilizing indigenous forces and enabling the disaffected portions of the Burmese population to expel the Japanese occupiers, DET 101 executed MG Stilwell’s directive through UW. The force focused on guerrilla warfare operations and on establishing an effective intelligence apparatus and auxiliary.

DET 101 utilized existing sources for recruitment such as Burmese refugees, Burmese sources within the British Army and contacts within the Kachin community to become the key disruption force within Burma.⁴⁴

40 Ibid.

41 William Donovan, the head of the OSS at the time, had to convince MG Stilwell to accept the proposal by allowing Stilwell to pick the leader. MG Stilwell subsequently picked one of his protégés, COL Carl Eifler. Maochun Yu, *OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 25–27.

42 Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101,” September 22, 1993, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol4no3/html/v04i3a11p_0001.htm.

43 Ward, “Detachment 101.”

44 Ibid.

From 1942 to 1945, DET 101 and its counter-parts were able to gather 75 percent of all intelligence acquired throughout the theater.⁴⁵ In addition, it was able to divert and divide enemy forces through sabotage and subversion, rescue a significant number of allied airmen and raise a 10,000-man force to seize Burma from the Japanese.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the integration of the DET 101 operations into the conventional ground force operations allowed for a significant amount of precision air strikes and ground operations that enabled a rather small amount of men to overcome a stronger, well entrenched Japanese force.

DET 101 understood the internal elements of both the target regime and indigenous forces and developed a plan that included all elements that have been proposed in the UW planning framework. Although a significant underground was not established, DET 101's actions can be considered a case of operational UW used to expel an occupying power. DET 101's UW efforts complimented an overall strategy that incorporated conventional and allied air operations. As a result, DET 101 was able to shape the China-India-Burma theater for an Allied victory.

B. UW PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

1. Target Regime

Prior to and during World War II, the Burmese were accustomed to occupation. The British colonized Burma in 1824 as a result of the Anglo-Burmese war and were still in charge of the country prior to the Japanese occupation. Many of the Burmese believed that the Japanese invading force would allow greater autonomy and give the Burmese people the ability to govern themselves and thus supported the invasion. The Japanese had initially infiltrated Burma with 30 subversive agents in April of 1941 who provided information on British strongpoints and spread a damaging narrative throughout much of the country, particularly in the south. These personnel were known as the 30 comrades.⁴⁷ The 30 Comrades were part of the Burmese Independence Army (BIA) and sought to

⁴⁵ Central Intelligence Agency, "Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101."

⁴⁶ Ward, "Detachment 101."

⁴⁷ Ibid.

expel the British from the country. The BIA was able to effectively use race divisions to turn tribes and different ethnic sects of Burmese against one another and the British.⁴⁸ This led the southern half of Burma to be widely pro-Japanese during the invasion.

The Burmese believed that the Japanese would allow more self-government and greater political autonomy than the British. Once the Japanese arrived however, the sentiment among the Burmese people changed as they learned that the Japanese had no intention of involving them in any politics. The Japanese and the BIA committed many crimes against the ethnic Burmese people and alienated them by disregarding their basic rights, such as putting whole communities under arrest.⁴⁹ This led to conditions that were easy for DET 101 to exploit. As Paul et al. explain, COIN efforts focused on destroying threats that often involve atrocities.⁵⁰ In the Burma case, these atrocities initially occurred against the northern Burmese, which alienated the population from the occupiers. As time went on, the Japanese alienated all Burmese, which pushed the Burmese people towards supporting the Allies.

2. Insurgent Influence

The ethnic Kachin tribes of Burma became a large source of Allied support. The Kachins lived in the mountainous regions of the north and were largely untouched by the Japanese during the initial days of occupation because of the difficulty of the terrain.⁵¹ Initial recruitment efforts were focused on the Kachin tribal areas of Burma because it was close to India and much safer to infiltrate than other parts of the country.⁵²

DET 101 used the Kachin seclusion from the Japanese and the BIA atrocities as motivating factors to advance their efforts. Using ethnic Burmese and Chinese personnel, DET 101 infiltrated the northern area of Burma with members of the British “Burma

48 Andrew Selth, “Race and Resistance in Burma, 1942–1945,” *Modern Asian Studies* 20, no. 3 (1986): 483–507.

49 Ibid., 490–491.

50 Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 180.

51 Selth, “Race and Resistance in Burma, 1942–1945,” 493.

52 Tom Moon, *This Grim and Savage Game: OSS and the Beginning of U.S. Covert Operations in World War II* (Los Angeles, CA: Burning Gate Press, 1991), 110.

Rifles” and made contact with the Kachin people. DET 101 personnel quickly integrated into the Kachin society, learning the culture and participating in local customs.⁵³ The Kachin territory in northern Burma became the foothold that DET 101 needed to begin their intelligence operations. By 1943, DET 101 had established six outposts within Burma and began aggressively training the indigenous personnel in sabotage techniques and disseminated intelligence requirements.⁵⁴ According to the CIA, “By the end of the year it was possible to assemble a fairly comprehensive picture of Japanese strengths and dispositions in northern Burma.”⁵⁵

The ability of the resistance to interact with the population relied on the strong tribal and familial connections amongst their force. DET 101 only used ethnic personnel for intelligence operations and capitalized on the Chinese and Kachin familiarity with the terrain to execute reconnaissance and sabotage missions. DET 101 did not initially outline this design formally but rather figured it out in the early months through trial and error.⁵⁶ The decision, whether purposeful or by accident, allowed DET 101 personnel to not be seen as another colonial power or invader and bolstered the resistance’s legitimacy and propaganda efforts.

C. LINES OF EFFORT

1. Disruption

DET 101 personnel conducted an unprecedented number of successful disruption operations during the three years that they were active. Recorded DET 101 effects from 1942–45 include: 57 bridges demolished, nine trains derailed, 272 vehicles captured or destroyed, 15,000 tons of supplies captured or destroyed, 78 Japanese captured and approximately 10,000 Japanese killed.⁵⁷ As indicated by MG Stilwell’s initial mission statement to DET 101 personnel; “plan and conduct operations against the roads and

53 U.S. Army. “Ch-5: History of Special operations in the China-India-Burma Theater,” accessed October 17, 2013, <http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/70-42/70-425.html> ,108–109.

54 Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101.”

55 Ibid.

56 Ward, “Detachment 101.”

57 Ward, “Detachment 101.”

railroads leading into Myitkyina in order to deny the Japanese the use of the Myitkyina airfield.”⁵⁸ Disruption was a key component of the DET 101 mission.

Initially, the main targets selected for sabotage were the railways and roads. While the Kachins and guerrilla force was being trained, DET 101 used Chinese forces to execute the first disruption operations. These operations were against relatively low risk targets and were intended to build the detachment’s confidence.⁵⁹ DET 101 used many tactics that were employed throughout the European theater as well, showing that the force was extremely flexible and adaptable in their approaches.⁶⁰

Once Kachin forces completed their training in India, DET 101’s guerrilla arm grew to 3,000 personnel.⁶¹ The Myitkyina campaign was a highlight of the disruption efforts executed by the Kachin guerrillas and DET 101 when the guerrillas directly coordinated with the Chinese forces to conduct disruption operations against the Japanese enabling the U.S. Army to secure an airfield and drive the Japanese out of Burma.⁶²

The successful disruption operations are directly linked to the integration of the guerrilla efforts with the Allied conventional force operations. Initial disruption efforts were focused on dividing the Japanese forces and delaying the logistics supplies from reaching the front lines. DET 101 focused on attacking railroads and supply convoys. One of their first operations was to destroy railroad bridges that crossed into central and southern Burma, which significantly slowed Japanese supplies into more populated areas of the country.⁶³ These efforts showed that a formidable resistance element existed and it was sufficient enough to warrant Japanese attention.

After Allied forces began more aggressively focusing on the Chinese-Burma-India Theater, guerrilla efforts shifted from sabotage operations to providing direct support for conventional force operations. The guerrillas were used to push the Japanese

58 Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101.”

59 Ibid.

60 Moon, *This Grim and Savage Game*, 88.

61 U.S. Army, “Ch-5: History of Special Operations,” 105.

62 Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101.”

63 U.S. Army, “Ch-5: History of Special Operations,” 104.

out of the jungle areas to make them visible to the Allied air power and conventional forces.⁶⁴ After DET 101 linked up with Merrill's Marauders in late 1943, they began integrating into a large ground offensive, which displayed the guerrilla force effectiveness.⁶⁵

The integration of guerrilla force operations with conventional force operations is the third stage of insurgent warfare, known as War of Movement.⁶⁶ It is during this critical phase that the insurgents win the campaign or fail. DET 101 efforts to disrupt were focused on achieving large gains over time, and their ability to work so effectively with counterparts was critical to their success.

The disruption line of effort became the second priority of the DET 101 campaign as it proved to the people that the Allied forces and native Burmese were willing to fight for the expulsion of Japanese forces and displayed this willingness through action. The actions were successful due to the integration with conventional forces and the accuracy of intelligence that was passed to them. The disruption effort assisted in building the commitment and motivation of the indigenous fighting force as successful operations kept the momentum on their side. Close coordination between the action oriented guerrillas and the intelligence cells proved to be effective in limiting the number of friendly casualties and ensuring that the smaller guerrilla force had the greatest advantage possible.

2. Intelligence

The DET 101 campaign against the occupying Japanese forces placed a significant emphasis on intelligence. Locations, morale, activities and plans of the Japanese forces guided the intelligence efforts throughout the theater. The intelligence networks that were emplaced were extremely effective at passing both tactical and

⁶⁴ Ward, "Detachment 101."

⁶⁵ Moon, *This Grim and Savage Game*, 217–229.

⁶⁶ Department of Defense, *Unconventional Warfare Operations* (FM 3-05-201) (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2003), 1–8.

psychological intelligence to the allies for action against the Japanese forces. This led one of DET 101's leaders and Eifler's successor, W. R Peers, to say:

For Detachment 101 intelligence was an all-pervasive mission. The Detachment did plan and carry out espionage operations specifically to collect both strategic and tactical information, but intelligence was also a by-product of all its other operations, including guerrilla actions, sabotage, and psychological measures. Its intelligence activities were therefore augmented rather than decreased when large-scale guerrilla operations were initiated in the spring of 1944.⁶⁷

Psychological intelligence was focused on knowing the sentiment of the people in the villages and the areas that the native Burmese agents were operating. MAJ Eifler used native Burmese agents "drawn from the Indian Army"⁶⁸ to penetrate where DET 101 personnel could not and gave them the mission to report on Japanese movements, local sentiments and anything they felt was of allied interest. These low-level collectors went through very rigorous training inside India and used their local knowledge to report information back to the outposts that were located throughout Burma and manned by DET 101. The native agents were able to provide the allied forces with the intelligence needed to strike where they could best exacerbate the fissures between the Japanese and the occupied Burmese.⁶⁹

The most significant collection garnered by the native agents was that of Japanese troop movements. This was demonstrated during the Hutkawng-Myitkyina campaign where DET 101 personnel and agents assisted Merrill's Marauders in taking the Myitkyina airfield, which was vital to Japanese logistics. Native agents were inserted into the area weeks before the planned operation and effectively passed detailed troop movements, numbers and locations to the advancing conventional force. During the advance, the agents were able to guide the force through an unknown route to completely surprise the Japanese and seize the airfield.⁷⁰

67 Central Intelligence Agency, "Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101."

68 Douglas Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan* (New York, NY: Free Press, 2011), 215.

69 Selth, "Race and Resistance in Burma, 1942-1945," 491.

70 Central Intelligence Agency, "Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101."

Another reason for this success was that the native personnel were exceedingly effective at gathering the intelligence that the allied forces needed because of their intimate knowledge of the culture, language and social norms that existed in Burma.⁷¹ In one of MAJ Eiflers first trips into Burma, he came upon a Naga tribe that wanted to work for the Americans and informed him that they frequently used women to pass information.⁷² The Japanese did not think of the women as any sort of credible threat and largely dismissed their movements and actions. After a payment arrangement was made between MAJ Eifler and the Naga, the women would pass information on local Japanese movements to the Naga men who would then seek guidance from DET 101 on what to do.⁷³ Being able to train the native agents, gain their trust and effectively give them guidance enabled DET 101 personnel to gather an incredible amount of information to formulate and guide conventional actions in Burma that ultimately defeated the Japanese.

The mission of acquiring tactical intelligence was given primarily to the Kachin forces of DET 101. These forces were used as the strike asset for the allies in Burma, thus it made sense that they should be the ones to reconnoiter their own targets. The Kachin efforts for gathering this intelligence were enabled by the psychological intelligence that was provided by the intelligence agents. The agents would recommend lightly guarded targets or targets that were extremely valuable to the Japanese. The Kachin force, with DET 101 personnel, would then be guided to the objectives by the agents and conduct their own reconnaissance. This gave each element a singular focus that helped make DET 101 successful. As a result, the Kachin forces were able to conduct successful operations sustaining very few friendly casualties.⁷⁴

Kachin forces went through a significant amount of training to help them become adept at gathering tactical intelligence and executing sabotage operations.⁷⁵ Eifler used

71 Moon, *This Grim and Savage Game*, 65–66.

72 Ibid., 82–83.

73 Ibid., 84–85.

74 Ward, “Detachment 101.”

75 Moon, *This Grim and Savage Game*, 107.

the training as a way to earn the Kachin respect by ensuring that the training was difficult, relevant and he reinforced the goal of expelling all Japanese forces.

As the Kachin forces were accustomed to the unforgiving mountainous, jungle environment of north Burma, they were able to move through the jungles very swiftly and assisted the DET 101 personnel by teaching them basic jungle survival skills. These skills allowed DET 101 to accomplish their mission and evade capture by the Japanese on many occasions.⁷⁶ Ultimately, the tactical intelligence mission was a good fit for the Kachin people, as they could not blend in with the local populace, like the native Burmese, but they were willing to fight against the Japanese and provide a sanctuary for DET 101.

The intelligence mission for the OSS Burmese campaign was not directly geared toward any specific strategic place or target. It was extremely broad in scope and mostly enabled the allied conventional forces to drive the Japanese out of Burma. As stated previously, the intelligence efforts focused on “military information, such items as the strength, identity, and movement of Japanese units, details on supply installations, airfields, and equipment, and whatever else was required to provide a continuous, composite picture of the enemy situation.”⁷⁷ The Japanese did not have many defectors that could provide the strategic intelligence that DET 101 required. Although, DET 101 captured 78 enemy personnel, none were high ranking enough to be of strategic value.⁷⁸ The intelligence line of effort during the Burma campaign produced 75–85 percent of the intelligence that was garnered throughout the country.⁷⁹ Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the intelligence line of effort in the Burma campaign was critical to its overall mission. This LOE was successful largely due to the sanctuary, manpower and knowledge that the Kachins provided. It not only enabled the Allies to counter Japanese efforts on the battlefield, but also gave a large amount of legitimacy to the external

76 Selth, “Race and Resistance in Burma, 1942–1945,” 497.

77 Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101.”

78 Ward, “Detachment 101.”

79 Ibid.

sponsors. The British and American efforts were seen as complimentary to helping the Burmese take their country back. This resulted in a large amount of tangible support that was not effectively countered by the Japanese.⁸⁰

3. Logistics

Establishing a logistics infrastructure inside India was necessary due to the extreme terrain and harsh conditions in Burma. This base provided a near sanctuary for the external sponsor to plan and coordinate operations. Initially, the base was established in Assam India, which was the location where the majority of Chinese and British forces had withdrawn during the final months of the Japanese invasion. After a couple of months, MAJ Eifler and MG Stilwell found it important to establish a logistics hub to receive supplies that was closer to the Burma theater and established an office inside Calcutta.⁸¹ Money was deposited into bank accounts for the American soldiers to withdraw as they moved back and forth from the camps in Kachin country to Calcutta for supplies.⁸² Additionally, Calcutta provided an airstrip that was able to receive Army supplies through formal channels. The supplies were then transferred to small planes and dropped at designated drop zones into north Burma for the guerrillas to recover.

The method of delivering logistics supplies to the guerrilla forces and DET 101 outstations was fairly standard. However, it was not easy to continue operations and keep morale high due to a small budget. The DET 101 leadership proved innovative by effectively providing their soldiers and guerrillas with the supplies they needed. One example of this ingenuity was the detachment's ability to overcome the lack of radio communication between the outstation bases and the command headquarters in India. At the time, no radio existed that could transmit the 200 miles needed.⁸³ Using the knowledge they had among the DET 101 personnel, they were able to develop their own radios that would transmit and receive over the 200 mile distance and mountainous

80 Selth, "Race and Resistance in Burma, 1942–1945," 491.

81 Moon, *This Grim and Savage Game*, 71.

82 Ibid.

83 Central Intelligence Agency, "Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101."

terrain of Burma. The equipment was built using aluminum from a crashed C-47 chassis and C-ration cans, but it proved effective and was portable enough for the infiltrating teams to carry.⁸⁴ This ingenuity shows the ability of the DET 101 personnel to overcome obstacles and the commitment of the personnel to the accomplishment of the mission.

Another important factor in gaining the logistics support needed was the commitment of the leadership to ensure that DET 101 was properly outfitted. The Detachment routinely had to wait three to six months for supplies through the Army supply system. During some periods the outstations tried unsuccessfully to live off the land.⁸⁵ The Burma theater was a low priority for theater support assets, but the leadership managed to “beg, borrow and steal” everything they needed for success in the early days.⁸⁶ As the theater rose in priority during 1943, more supplies and support for things like communications equipment started coming into Calcutta more regularly.⁸⁷

The Kachin tribes were all but cut off from the rest of Burma, even though they were responsible for the bulk of disruption efforts and provided a sanctuary and support to the Allied forces. Ensuring that they had the necessary rations, equipment and supplies to conduct their missions was necessary for their effectiveness. Proper logistics operations are necessary for any sort of military operation, however, for an external sponsor, providing material support can show a high level of commitment to the resistance.

4. Psychological

DET 101 personnel did not use psychological operations and propaganda extensively, however, an aspect of messaging still existed. Communications throughout Burma was incredibly difficult due to the terrain and the control the Japanese forces had on the population in the urban areas. Leaflets were deployed throughout the theater in the form of Japanese currency notes and fake surrender notes. It is not clear the effect that

⁸⁴ Moon, *This Grim and Savage Game*, 88.

⁸⁵ U.S. Army, “Ch-5: History of Special Operations,” 110.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 111.

these messages had on the populace as Burmese discontent with Japanese forces was already formed once the leaflets began to be dropped.

Currency notes were also dropped. They were designed to create a fissure between the Japanese and the Kachin people. The currency notes, pictured in Figure 3, indicate that the currency the Japanese are forcing the Burmese to use is worthless and part of a Japanese effort to attain labor and agriculture for free.



Figure 3. U.S. psychological operation product used in Burma

Translation: The Japanese Military Government commanded their troops in Burma to keep the following directives secret. The Military Government is issuing currency notes for your [the Japanese] use in Burma. Spend as much as you like for food and other things, but don't tell the (Kachin) people the secret of the money.

The text at the right of the box is:

Kachin!

The Japanese are making these valueless notes for your use.

It is easy to get these notes but very hard to buy food or other things.

Avoid these notes or you will be cheated!⁸⁸

The dissemination of these and other messages was accomplished through the various intelligence agents that were deployed throughout the country. As a result of these notes, the Kachin forces insisted that they be paid only in Opium, which was of far more valuable currency than the Japanese money notes.⁸⁹ This was morally against most of the Americans' viewpoints; however, they understood that culturally, the Kachins permitted the use of opium.⁹⁰

Psychological operations were incredibly hard to undertake because Burma consists of numerous different ethnic and tribal groups. It would have taken considerable manpower to begin psychological operations in every ethnic area. Additionally, the Detachment lacked the necessary equipment to effectively start a clandestine radio network or leaflet distribution operation. Instead, DET 101 decided to focus on the area where their support was the strongest and their personnel the safest, which was in the Kachin area.

D. INSURGENT IMPERATIVES FOR SUCCESS

By focusing on the four LOEs and considering internal resistance and target regime elements, DET 101 was able to shape the attributes that a resistance element needs to conduct a successful regime change operation. These attributes are: commitment and motivation, tangible support, flexibility and adaptability.⁹¹

⁸⁸ "WWII Allied Propaganda Banknotes," accessed October 10, 2013, <http://www.psywarrior.com/WWIIAlliedBanknotes.html>.

⁸⁹ Gerald Astor, *The Jungle War: Mavericks, Marauders and Madmen in the China-Burma-India Theater of World War II* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2004), 141.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 181–183.

1. Commitment and Motivation

The intelligence agents increased commitment by creating more familial and strong friendship ties to the resistance. The agents were able to do this by delivering more recruits to DET 101 outstations. The indigenous personnel were then able to expand the intelligence operations south of Kachin controlled areas and provide the intelligence back to Allied air assets and conventional commanders. The growth of local agents increased dramatically from 1942–1944 when DET 101's guerrilla force grew from 3,000 personnel to 10,000.⁹² This growth shows that motivation to fight against the Burmese was high.

The psychological line of effort assisted in recruiting and helped solidify the resistance narrative when the messages were backed by disruption and sabotage actions. These efforts were easy in the DET 101 case, because the population was already motivated through the alienation induced by the Japanese. Motivation through messaging was also difficult due to the difficult terrain and limited equipment available.

The Kachin and Chinese base enabled DET 101 to ensure that the goal of expelling the Japanese was an ideological factor of the participants that coincided with the Allied Powers. The deep distrust of the Japanese allowed DET 101 to keep the guerrillas motivated towards expelling them. The British controlled the initial Kachin recruitment base, which they developed through a force that was designed to assist in internal Indian operations. However, the British transformed the group into a fighting force against the Japanese, which DET 101 later used for their operations.⁹³ Recruiting an already established group or organization allowed the detachment to begin operations immediately and allowed them to merely adapt existing infrastructure rather than create it from scratch.

DET 101 and the resistance provided 75–85 percent of the intelligence coming from the theater ⁹⁴ By being socially embedded within the local tribes, the agents were

⁹² Ward, "Detachment 101."

⁹³ Astor, *The Jungle War*, 130.

⁹⁴ Central Intelligence Agency, "Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101."

able to pass information on the Japanese troop movements, which then enabled coalition forces to counter Japanese efforts. The vast amount of intelligence gathered is a metric that demonstrates how committed the DET 101's sources were despite the risks. This trait enabled the operations to be incredibly successful, thus minimizing the risk to the DET 101 personnel and maximizing casualties for the Japanese.

2. Flexibility and Adaptability

The Japanese were able to take Burma very quickly because the population welcomed them under the promise that Japan would help Burma become independent from the British. However, Japan did not intend to fulfill this promise; treating the Burmese inhumanely, thus alienating them from the population.⁹⁵ By ruling the Burmese with an iron fist, the Japanese concentrated on killing the insurgents rather than focusing on the insurgent support, which tends to lead to failed counter insurgent efforts.⁹⁶ This gave the DET 101 personnel an opportunity to capitalize on the distrust and fissures the Japanese created. DET 101 showed flexibility and adaptability by capitalizing on the populations distrust of the Japanese and relied on their knowledgeable local agents to tell them how to best execute operations.

The disruption line of effort showcases the flexibility and adaptability of DET 101 and the guerrillas. The link between the disruption operations and the intelligence operations was well exploited, which greatly contributed to success.

Once the agents reported favorable conditions, combat cells, including Americans, parachuted into the areas and established operating bases to recruit and train guerrilla bands and to undertake a series of hit-and-run attacks against Japanese installations and outposts.⁹⁷

95 Selth, "Race and Resistance in Burma, 1942–1945," 483–507.

96 Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 180.

97 U.S. Army, "Ch-5: History of Special Operations," 106.

The success of the operations increased the men and reduced the “free rider” mentality.⁹⁸ Personnel joined the cause to fight against injustice and expel the Japanese. While the Burmese people may have wanted the Japanese to leave their country, they needed a catalyst to spur action. The disruption efforts by the Kachin forces showed that the Allied efforts were real and convinced the population to provide not just passive support, but active support, which manifested itself in providing information to the Allies.

DET 101 proved that they were able to rapidly innovate both tactically and operationally as conditions changed. This was evident in the Myitkina campaign when the guerrillas facilitated the actions of Merrill's Marauders and shifted from the main effort to a supporting effort. Innovation was evident in the communication and logistics planning ultimately producing more autonomy in supply requisition and communication as a result of geographic isolation.

3. Tangible Support

According to Connable and Libicki, “Insurgent sanctuary correlates with insurgent victory.”⁹⁹ Although, not noted as one of the imperatives for insurgent success, the value of the sanctuary, as tangible support, that the Kachin provided and how it enabled the effective coordination of intelligence, disruption, logistics and psychological operations cannot be overstated. The sanctuary allowed the movement of recruits, weapons, supplies, intelligence and funding to expand the resistance and keep morale high.¹⁰⁰ The support base and sanctuary that the Kachins provided was key because it was ready immediately, which prevented the Japanese from gaining a tactical advantage against the tribes in the north.

⁹⁸ Randy Burkett, “An Alternative Framework for Agent Recruitment: From MICE to RASCLS,” *Studies in Intelligence* 57, no. 1 (March 2013): 7–17, 8. Free rider refers to the portion of the population that does not want to risk supporting the insurgency, even though they believe in the cause and would rather just let others take the risk and await the outcome.

⁹⁹ Connable and Libicki, *How Insurgencies End*, 85.

¹⁰⁰ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 182.

The logistics line of effort enabled the tangible support for DET 101's operations to continue thereby allowing operations to continue. Establishing a logistics base and distribution plan ahead of operations proved necessary in Burma due to the difficulty of the terrain and the non-permissive environment. The base in India provided a safe and accessible location for coordination and planning. Logistics operations also helped develop a surrogate/sponsor co-dependency with the Kachin tribesmen providing necessary knowledge of jungle survival and DET 101 providing necessary equipment and goods.

E. ANALYSIS

DET 101 used both target regime vulnerabilities and insurgent strengths to develop their lines of effort in the Burma campaign. The effective use of disruption, intelligence, logistics and psychological operations all assisted in fostering the imperatives for a successful UW campaign. The use of existing organizations, relying on insurgent knowledge for targeting and providing material support contributed to a high degree of commitment and motivation. The ability to shift from the main effort to a supporting effort during the Myitkyina campaign showed the flexibility and adaptability of the force. Gaining materiel support through standard and non-standard means and developing a strong auxiliary among the populace gave DET 101 the tangible support needed.

As a violent resistance movement, DET 101's operations were mainly focused on sabotage, but they ensured that the effect on the populace was minimal. This gave the resistance legitimacy and gave the population an avenue for action against the Japanese. Most of the population may not have picked up arms, but they provided passive support through the passing of intelligence and by not supporting the target regime.

By exploiting fractures that the regime created, DET 101 was able to appeal to a wide swath of the Burmese population. The detachment started out in the north, but was quickly able to expand south throughout the country. It grew from less than 50 Americans to a force of over 10,000 indigenous personnel in a three-year period.¹⁰¹ They

¹⁰¹ Ward, "Detachment 101."

were able to accomplish this by respecting and adapting to the culture that they were operating in. Additionally, the detachment did not solely focus on the growth of its guerrilla forces, but also put a significant amount of time into developing the auxiliary. This helped them become effective at gaining the tangible support necessary to gain a significant intelligence advantage over the Japanese.

Securing a sanctuary inside India and Burma, gave the detachment a safe place to plan and re-group after operations. This allowed them to plan and prepare more effectively.

DET 101 operations tied up a large number of Japanese forces and kept them away from the other Pacific fronts. Additionally, they enabled the allies to expel a well-entrenched, large Japanese force with limited resources. Through the development of a small auxiliary and focusing on intelligence, a well-trained guerrilla force led by DET 101 was able to create the conditions for the resistance to succeed.

The proposed planning framework is validated by this case of successful violent resistance. Although not all encompassing, it provides the planner with a base to start UW campaign planning.

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IV. CASE STUDY II: SOLIDARITY IN POLAND, 1980–1989

The case of Solidarity in Poland is a non-violent resistance against a Soviet Union backed puppet government. The resistance began with the formation of trade unions to rally for increased workers' rights and wages. Going by the name Solidarity, the resistance became powerful from 1980–1990 and is believed to have significantly helped to dissolve the Soviet Union in 1990. The resistance was backed by the U.S., the Vatican and Israel, which provided significant intelligence and funds to help gain popular support and counter regime actions. Restrictions in Poland were significant after martial law was declared in 1981, so the resistance had to develop sophisticated mechanisms to keep active and receive the external support that was offered. Additionally, Solidarity had to shift tactics from public protest to propaganda as the target regime continued to increase pressure. The organization took nearly ten years from 1971–1980 to build the capacity needed to effectively manage the thousands of supporters and numerous organizations that it entailed. Solidarity is widely considered one of the most successful non-violent resistance movements against a powerful and sometimes ruthless target regime.

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In the port city of Gdansk, Poland in 1970, hundreds of workers gathered to protest the communist governments cost increases for food. As part of the Warsaw Pact, Poland was under heavy communist control and influence from not only the Soviet Union, but also surrounding countries in Eastern Europe. The government was increasing the cost of basic necessities and the food supply to remain solvent. As the leader of Poland, Wladysaw Gomulka, was frightened that the riots in Gdansk would lead to all out unrest within the country. As a result, he ordered the police to fire on the crowds of protestors and to destroy the rebellion using any means necessary. Forty-five people died

and over one thousand were wounded.¹⁰² This event is considered the spark that started the fall of communism in Poland and was the catalyst that begun the Solidarity movement.

After the riots were over in 1970, the workers unions began organizing clandestinely underground in order to form an alliance that could protect their rights. By 1976, the unions were getting strong and at the same time the regime decided again to raise the food prices as it did in 1970. Again riots ensued and the regime relented by lowering the cost of food. Discontent continued to increase throughout the 1970s and the workers unions continued to mobilize, but the regime managed to keep them sufficiently suppressed until 1980.

A series of events led the small workers movement to expand well beyond the thousands to millions of supporters. In 1980, Solidarity was officially adopted as the name for the workers unions, turned resistance element. The regime censored the populace and detained over 6,000 union members, killing nine and officially banning the Solidarity movement.¹⁰³ This continued until 1984 when Mikhail Gorbachev took power in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev brought a more moderate government to the Soviet Union, which created an opening for the Solidarity movement to exploit, as the Kremlin was more reluctant to support Poland's' coercive political control. Ultimately, communism fell in 1989 and Solidarity's success as a resistance movement led to a free election that saw their leader, Lech Walesa, elected as the democratic leader of Poland.

Solidarity formed an extensive underground base and auxiliary before emerging as an overt resistance organization. The Solidarity case is worth examining because it was conducted without the use of a guerrilla force and utilized largely non-violent tactics to overthrow the target regime through the political process. It took Solidarity 10 years to affect this change once it emerged as a recognized group in 1980. By examining the

¹⁰² Libcom, "1970–1971: Uprising in Poland," accessed March 25, 2014, <https://libcom.org/history/1970-71-uprising-poland>.

¹⁰³ Carl Bernstein, "Cover Story: The Holy Alliance," accessed December 2, 2013, http://www.carlbernstein.com/magazine_holy_alliance.php.

operational efforts of the group and the internal dynamics of Poland at the time, this case will illustrate how their efforts generated the attributes of commitment, motivation, flexibility, adaptability and tangible support to succeed.

B. UW PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

1. Target Regime

Poland was partitioned during the eighteenth century and suffered through many uprisings in an effort to gain independence. Finally, by the end of World War I, Poland was an independent nation.¹⁰⁴ The uprisings and struggle of the Polish people left an indelible impression and romanticized resistance against greater powers. It also left a strong sense of nationalism within the people and a desire to live in a sovereign nation.

World War II brought in a new era of oppression with the invasion by German forces. It is estimated that over six million Poles were killed from 1939–1945.¹⁰⁵ In 1941, the Germans broke the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union and took complete control of Poland.¹⁰⁶ The Polish people despised the Nazi government and actually had pro-communist views. However, after the liberation of Poland in 1945 by the Soviet Union, it was clear that the elections were being rigged and by 1947, Poland had become a puppet state of the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁷

Despite an affinity for communism, the Polish people were upset by Soviet control of their country. When Stalin died in 1953, Wladyislaw Gomulka emerged as a leader in Poland. Gomulka was imprisoned under Stalin for his “nationalistic deviations”¹⁰⁸ and upon his release, protests began to occur for fair wages and lower taxes. This led the Soviet apparatus to bring Gomulka into the government in order to quell the uprisings, and, in 1956, Gomulka was named first party secretary.

104 Michael D. Kennedy, *Professionals, Power and Solidarity in Poland: A Critical Sociology of Soviet Type Sociology* (New York, University Press of Cambridge, 1991), 20–22.

105 *Ibid.*, 18.

106 History, “This Day in History: Germans Invade Poland,” accessed December 4, 2013, <http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/germans-invade-poland>.

107 Kennedy, *Professionals, Power and Solidarity in Poland*, 20-22.

108 *Ibid.*, 25.

The Poles romanticized the type of resistance and nationalistic viewpoints that gave Gomulka initial success. However, most Polish people felt that the Soviet Union was using the country to further their own interest with complete disregard for the interest of Poles.¹⁰⁹ This was at the forefront, especially within military circles, when the Soviet Union directed the Poles to focus only on NATO attack plans versus defense of their own country.¹¹⁰ Military personnel and Polish bureaucrats began to see that the Soviet Union was using them for nothing more than the defense of the Soviet Union and considered the Poles expendable. The Poles had a strong tradition of both resistance and nationalism, which were fueled by the revelation that the Soviet Union was using them.¹¹¹

In 1970, the Gdansk riots occurred after the regime raised the price of food and other basic necessities. The workers rioted and 45 people were killed. This marked the first violent reaction by the target regime against the Polish workers. Numerous protests erupted after the regime's heavy-handed tactics and as a concession, the people were allowed to erect a monument honoring the victim's sacrifices. Gomulka was removed from power and Edward Gierek was installed as the new leader. In 1976, the regime raised food prices, once again leading to riots and protests, which were crushed by jailing over 40 people and sentencing them harshly. The 1976 protests marked the second time that the communist regime reacted harshly against the workers and trade unions.

In 1980, the regime once again acted harshly to protests for more workers rights, but due to the economic condition of the country, the regime could not continue to have another workers strike and after 18 days relented to the protestors' demands. This did not last long however and from 1981–1984, the regime declared martial law and began censoring all protests and media and violated human rights within the country. Additionally, it banned the newly formed coalition of workers unions named Solidarity.

¹⁰⁹ Benjamin Weiser, *A Secret Life: The Polish Officer, His Covert Mission and the Price He Paid To Save His Country* (New York, Public Affairs, 2004), 46.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Kennedy, *Professionals, Power and Solidarity in Poland*, 15.

The regime vowed to jail all members of the organization and outlawed its existence. This led to a high level of international scrutiny and further isolated the regime from the people.

The target regime allowed poor economic conditions to overcome the vast majority of Polish people during the 1970s and 80s. The regimes solution was to impose further costs on the people and unions, which resulted in protests and strikes. The regime then overreacted by imposing excessive jail sentences, injuring and killing people. This led many of the people to support regime change and call for reforms within the Soviet bloc.

2. Insurgent Influence

In Poland, 88 percent of the people identify themselves as Catholic.¹¹² This is inconsistent with the tenets of communism, which is very much atheist. The Polish people have continued to strongly identify with the Catholic Church since the tenth century. The Soviets attempted to influence the population and minimize this relationship, however it was unsuccessful. Many of the workers that formed the Solidarity movement found their identity within the Catholic Church.¹¹³

This was most evident in 1978 when Cardinal Karol Wojtyla of Krakow Poland was named Pope John Paul II. It was clear during this period that the Soviet Union would have to allow the Pope to visit Poland to address to the Catholic community. The Soviets attempted to undermine the attendance at the Pope's speech by minimal advertisement, however, over two million people still attended.¹¹⁴

The Pope spread a message that Poland was not a communist state, but rather a "free country saddled by communists."¹¹⁵ In his speech, Pope John Paul II talked about the struggle of the Polish people and the victimization of its citizens at the hands of

112 Centre for Public Opinion Research (Poland) "Cannonisation of Pope John Paul II," accessed December 14, 2013, http://www.cbos.pl/EN/home_en/cbos_en.php

113 Kennedy, *Professionals, Power and Solidarity in Poland*, 22.

114 Peggy Noonan, "We Want God," *Wall Street Journal*, April 7, 2005, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122479408458463941>.

115 Ibid.

oppressors. He emphasized the value of faith and the need to continue the struggle for their national identity. The Pope also spoke for the victims of many of the Soviet crackdowns during the 1970s particularly the Gdansk incident.

We are before the tomb of the Unknown Soldier. In the ancient and contemporary history of Poland this tomb has a special basis, a special reason for its existence. In how many places in our native land has that soldier fallen! In how many places in Europe and the world has he cried with his death that there can be no just Europe without the independence of Poland marked on its map! On how many battlefields has that soldier given witness to the rights of man, indelibly inscribed in the inviolable rights of the people, by falling for “our free-dom and yours”! “Where are their tombs, O Po-land? Where are they not! You know better than anyone—and God knows it in heaven¹¹⁶

During his speech, the Pope never directly referred to the Solidarity movement. However, the unification of the people and the ability of the church to spread the message of resistance were vital to Solidarity’s success. The ability of Solidarity to capitalize on the religious fervor that Pope John Paul II brought to Poland was a critical aspect in how the resistance was able to network and grow as an organization. The church “provided a new cultural foundation of a new self-identification and the organizational experience for mobilizing it.”¹¹⁷

Additionally, after the riots in Gdansk in 1970, it was the workers unions that were credited with pushing the Soviet backed Polish government to concede by lowering the cost of basic supplies. The workers unions used this popularity to build more support. Eventually, by the mid-70s, workers unions throughout the country had a strong base of support. It was the Committee for the Defense of Workers (KOR) that emerged as the organizer to bring these unions together and begin creating an underground network that would monitor regime actions.¹¹⁸

116 John Paul II, “Homily of His Holiness,” accessed November 21, 2013, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/homilies/1979/documents/hf_jpii_hom_19790602_polonia-varsovia_en.html.

117 Kennedy, *Professionals, Power and Solidarity in Poland*, 43.

118 Roman Laba, *The Roots of Solidarity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 3–5.

KOR sought to increase awareness among the working class of activities conducted by the regime that were against their interests. KOR also sought to “provide the workers with an integrated ideology, both socialist and democratic, that was crucial later on in the development of the workers own representative organizations.”¹¹⁹ One of the leaders that emerged in 1980 was Lech Walesa. Walesa would go on to serve as a powerful symbol for Polish independence and a representative of Polish nationalistic values.¹²⁰

The bases of the Church and the trade unions created a strong organizational capacity for the resistance to flourish. Both allowed the leadership to quickly mobilize, inform and recruit for anti-regime efforts and resistance support.

C. LINES OF EFFORT

1. Disruption

The one thing that Solidarity did very well was exploiting the mistakes and mistrust that the regime fomented throughout the 1980s. The primary disruptive acts that Solidarity used were strikes and protests, to accomplish this. The disruption effort of Solidarity is the second most important LOE as the various protests and strikes demonstrated a resolve on behalf of the people of Poland as the regime was failing economically. This effort contributed to the motivation of the resistance, displayed their commitment and helped increase both external and internal tangible support.

Solidarity routinely used strikes, protests, the erecting of monuments and placement of symbols to openly defy and disrupt the regime. This was accomplished through ““the demonstration of courage of those who oppose authoritarian regimes.”¹²¹ The cross has already been mentioned as a powerful symbol that defied the regimes anti-religious views along with several bulletins that had the picture of President Ronald Reagan, which openly symbolized the desire for democracy within the nation. Placing

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 4.

¹²⁰ Michael Dobbs, K.S. Karol, Dossa Trevisan, *Poland: Solidarity: Walesa* (New York, McGraw Hill Book Company, 1981), 86–87.

¹²¹ Helvey, *On Strategic Non-Violent Conflict*, 27.

these various forms of propaganda throughout the cities and on prominent government structures assisted in subverting the regimes authority over the people. The success of Solidarity to gain mass support through these non-violent tactics and propaganda resulted in regime accommodations, or acts conducted by the regime that attempted to reduce social tension.¹²²

These acts gave the resistance element an opportunity to capitalize on regime failures and unkept promises. These protests, which were often followed by accommodations, disrupted the leaders of the regime by continually calling on them to prove their legitimacy and change their method of rule. The regime in Poland became used to granting accommodations to appease the populace. Their first concession occurred in 1956, when they installed Gomulka as their leader due to the social unrest that flowed his imprisonment. This was a concession to reduce the social tension in Poland and give the perception that the Polish people would be well represented. However, Gomulka was carefully handled by the Soviet Union and ultimately fell under their control as evidenced by his policies during the 1970 Gdansk riot that got him removed. Gierek followed him, which was viewed as another accommodation to give the people proper representation.

The reduction of food prices and the approval to erect a monument for the fallen workers killed during the riots in 1970 was another accommodation that resulted from the disruptive strikes and protests. These accommodations empowered the people of Poland by proving that their resistance efforts could work to effect change. The people felt that the regime was punishing those that it purported to serve.¹²³ Solidarity capitalized on this by recruiting new members into the workers unions under the banner of being the defenders of the Polish people. The monument was used many times in the 1970s as a place to strike and show disaffection towards the regime. The 1970 accommodation resulted in the formation of Solidarity.

122 Ibid., 28.

123 Weiser, *A Secret Life*.

Furthermore, 1970 was also significant for the formation of the resistance because it gave the population insight into how brutal the regime could be. With over 40 people dead and more than 1,000 wounded during the strikes, the people saw that the regime truly did not care for their well-being. This gave the resistance a powerful tool for recruitment and enabled them to exploit the target regime's actions. The resistance understood that non-violent protests would often be suppressed using violence and they were able to disrupt the regime by using pictures and narratives of the victims.

In 1976, when the regime attempted to enact the same laws as 1970, the unions were organized and able to remind the Polish people of the promises that were made in 1970 and once again strike. These strikes took place in shipyards and involved over 150,000 people.¹²⁴ The strikes resulted in more heavy-handed tactics by the regime. The regime used force and arrests to dismantle the protests and injured many people. This undermined the effectiveness and trust of the regime even more.

In 1980, after the regime had attempted to enact price increases and strict control over the population for the third time, they were significantly undermined by their own actions. Solidarity capitalized on this opportunity by making 21 demands that included the recognition of the trade union that resulted in the official creation of Solidarity, raise in workers' wages, a day of rest, paid maternity leave and the right to strike.¹²⁵ The measures were accepted by the regime, but were short lived after the declaration of martial law in 1981.

Solidarity made the demands instead of continuing to strike, which would have negatively affected the Polish government even more. Not accepting the demands would have led to the Polish economy being completely bankrupt and might have accelerated the fall of the regime. These reasons compelled the regime to accept the conditions, but led to further mistrust once martial law was declared. This resulted in more support for Solidarity and a loss of support for the regime. The ability of the resistance to coerce the

¹²⁴ Libcom, "1970–71 Uprising in Poland," accessed March 25, 2014, <https://libcom.org/history/1970-71-uprising-poland>.

¹²⁵ Cengage Learning, "The Twenty-One Demands," accessed November 25, 2013, <http://college.cengage.com/history/west/resources/students/primary/solidarity.htm>.

regime into making these concessions was a significant shift in power for Solidarity and the people of Poland. Using the failing economic conditions as leverage led to the temporary concessions and gave Solidarity the ability to undermine the regime.

In the case of Solidarity, the strikes and protests from 1970–1980 were successful disruption operations that resulted in temporary accommodations. From 1981–1990, Solidarity was forced to shift from strikes and protests to propaganda and reliance on international pressure. The dissemination of propaganda signs and narratives kept pressure on the regime to crush the resistance.

The success of Solidarity’s actions was not seen until 1990. Instead of pushing immediately for a regime change during the 1980 riots, Solidarity continued to resist throughout the period of martial law and beyond, continuing to arrest power from the regime and take advantage of a unpopular regime. The opportunity finally came after the collapse of communism in 1989 when Solidarity became the leading political party. In 1990, Lech Walesa was elected the president of the newly freed Poland and oversaw the country’s transformation to democracy.

2. Intelligence

Throughout the Cold War, it was incredibly difficult for the CIA to establish intelligence networks in highly controlled countries such as Poland. The need for a high level, strategic asset was high throughout the period. In 1972, the CIA received a letter from such an asset, COL Ryszard Kuklinski. Kuklinski was tired of the Soviet’s oppressive rule and contradictory policies in Poland and wanted to work with the U.S. to free Poland.¹²⁶ COL Kuklinski was a high ranking Polish Army officer who was serving on the General Staff in charge of Poland’s defense and attack plans against NATO. From 1972 to 1981, Kuklinski provided over 40,000 pages of documents detailing locations of command and control bunkers and the Soviet plans for all stages of nuclear war.¹²⁷

¹²⁶ Weiser, *A Secret Life*.

¹²⁷ Central Intelligence Agency, “Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski,” accessed December 12, 2013, <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-featured-story-archive/colonel-ryszard-kuklinski.html>

Although Kuklinski was a valuable asset, he was forced to defect in 1981 after the Soviets received an indication that a mole existed after Kuklinski passed the Soviet plans for martial law.

The departure of Kuklinski created an intelligence vacuum in Poland at a time when information was at a premium. The CIA wanted desperately to assist the Solidarity movement during the period of martial law because they felt that “A free, noncommunist Poland [they were convinced], would be a dagger to the heart of the Soviet empire; and if Poland became democratic, other East European states would follow.”¹²⁸ Since the CIA lacked the in-country intelligence infrastructure, they sought an alliance with the Vatican.

Through the Vatican assets and Catholic Church infrastructure in Poland, the CIA was able to get the tactical and political intelligence that they needed to provide analysis and advice to the Solidarity underground. The church was instrumental in reassuring the Solidarity leaders and underground that support existed internationally and they encouraged them to continue to resist.¹²⁹ According to Bernstein, “The first objective was to keep Solidarity alive by supplying money, communications and equipment.”¹³⁰

The CIA and the Vatican worked very closely to coordinate their efforts. It was clear that the CIA needed the infrastructure that the Church provided to facilitate their efforts and the Vatican needed the CIA’s expertise.

In the first hours of the crisis, Reagan ordered that the Pope receive as quickly as possible relevant American intelligence, including information from a Polish Deputy Minister of Defense who was secretly reporting to the CIA. Washington also handed over to the Vatican reports and analysis from Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, a senior member of the Polish general staff, who was a CIA informant until November 1981.¹³¹

In addition to the Vatican, the CIA also sought to leverage the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), which is a U.S. umbrella organization that oversees labor unions. The AFL-CIO was present in Poland at the time

128 Bernstein, “Cover Story: A Holy Alliance.”

129 Ibid.

130 Ibid.

131 Ibid.

to help better organize the number of Unions that were popping up as a result of the 1970 and 1976 riots. The AFL-CIO provided an outlet for the CIA to gather and disseminate information throughout the country.¹³²

The intelligence network and external support from both the Vatican and the CIA was the most significant for Solidarity during the period of 1981–1989. The advice and information that these organizations were able to provide to Solidarity assisted in keeping them motivated and committed. By knowing that they had external and international backing, Solidarity was able to increase their tangible support base as well as diminish the government's.

3. Logistics

The U.S. had a strategic interest in the success of Solidarity in Poland. Once Solidarity was recognized in 1980, the CIA saw an opportunity to assist the resistance group in challenging the authority of the Soviet Union in the region. In 1981, CIA Director William Casey sought approval to provide covert support to the group. Due to the institution of martial law and the banning of Solidarity during this time it was incredibly difficult to provide the needed support. The government had a significant amount of control over what came into and out of Poland and the security apparatus was watching the population. During the martial law period it was also incredibly hard to mobilize for any sort of disruptive acts, so Solidarity focused their effort on propaganda.

The CIA wanted to help the group and decided the best way to do so was financially and through communication supplies to help boost Solidarity's propaganda efforts. From 1982–1989, the CIA provided over six million dollars to the group along with printers, copiers and fax machines to help with the production of leaflets and underground newspaper.¹³³

Since the government had tight control of the sea ports in Poland, the CIA had to use an Israeli asset to take the supplies off of the inspection sheets at the ports of entry

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ UK Essays, "Covert Support to Solidarity in Poland," accessed November 29, 2013, <http://www.ukessays.com/essays/history/covert-support-to-solidarity-in-poland-history-essay.php>.

customs checkpoints. The materials were then shipped to various members of the underground for use.¹³⁴ The CIA also used the Catholic Church, by funneling money through the Vatican into Poland and then to the underground. These mechanisms limited the amount of support that the CIA could provide, but proved to be adequate during the intense period of martial law in the country.

Solidarity continued to use the Church and the labor unions as means of financial support as well. However, financially, the people of Poland were not in a position to support the group extensively. During the period of martial law the estimated Solidarity budget was around eight million dollars, only two million were provided internally.¹³⁵

The external sponsorship by the CIA and their ability to provide logistics and financial support to the group was significant. However, its real value was amplified by the success Solidarity's networks. Solidarity had a well-established organization that was able to continue their activities even under martial law. The external support resulted in an increase in the intensity and amount of propaganda activity but did little to assist in recruitment and growing the resistance movement.

4. Psychological

Solidarity's psychological campaign was used to disaggregate the regime support and build their tangible support. The psychological effort by the resistance is the most important LOE, because it provided the resistance a substantial support base, a mechanism for mobilizing and for increasing external support, thus creating pressure on and disaggregating the target regime. Due to the target regime's high control of media outlets and intra-state activities, the propaganda campaign focused on informing through the existing networks of the Church and trade unions as well as publicly conveying information through the use of flyers and underground newspapers. Utilizing broad frames such as self-determination, religion and human rights, the narratives were able to

134 Ibid.

135 Ibid.

target friendly, enemy and neutral audiences in an effort to gain support. Solidarity used three main aspects of psychological operations to motivate and recruit new members: the narrative, media and leadership.

Solidarity was focused on removing all Soviet influence from the government of Poland. Although, Gomulka was removed after the 1970 Gdansk incident as a measure to quell any uprisings and the more moderate Gierek was put into power, Gierek was still very much under the control of the Soviets. The Soviets tried to appease the Poles through merely symbolic changes of power, but by the 1980s, these measures were seen for what they were: an effort by the Soviets to have the Poles perceive change, when change was not at hand.

The Solidarity narrative sought to appeal to a mass audience rather than seeking to pinpoint individuals. The resistance narrative would mention independence from oppression, self-governance and cooperation with other countries, which was enough to appeal to the mass of Poles who were outraged by both the economic and military oppression of the time.

Motivational aspects of narrative were used to spark action among a population that was fearful of Soviet measures. Solidarity focused on nationalistic duty and attempted to invoke a sense of valor among the people. Part of their narrative stated the “duty to continue the work of those who preceded us and to avoid their mistakes and weaknesses.”¹³⁶ This was a tribute to the resistance elements during the Nazi regime and to the Polish Left who made the mistake of accepting the Soviets as liberators. The narrative then mentions the heroics of the underground and resistance against the Soviets during the Gdansk riots of 1970 and other workers riots during 1976.

The narrative effectively invokes that resistance against the Soviet regime is not only possible, but is working. Solidarity had the good fortune of starting out as a workers union and was able to morph into a resistance element with a base of support. The actions of the base during the 1970s provided for good motivation to further expand recruitment, which in turn increased the tangible support base. The fact that the union was able to get

¹³⁶ Kennedy, *Professionals, Power and Solidarity in Poland*, 12.

the food prices reduced after the Gdansk riots and a monument erected to the workers who lost their lives was a victory for Solidarity that made them viable.

Solidarity utilized a significant amount of media forms to portray its message; however, the two that were the most important were the newspaper and television. Walesa's first national message came during the negotiations between the protestors and the regime in 1980. Walesa had only two demands that he sought; the first was "cast-iron guarantees never to repeat the mistakes and repressive policies of the past."¹³⁷ By this statement he was referring to the killing and crackdown of protestors in 1970 and 1976 as well as raising the costs of basic necessities without raising the wages. The second demand that Walesa had was for the workers to realize the importance of unity "in the face of official attempts to divide them."¹³⁸ The demands were soon agreed to and Walesa declared the strike over, however, he soon changed his mind after other, smaller workers organizations were asking for more. This led to a reinstatement of the strike and a list of 21 more demands.¹³⁹

The riots began on August 14, 1980. The KOR and other trade union organizations had already established an underground form of messaging prior to the riots. By August 16, a leaflet, poster and internal public announcement system had been created.¹⁴⁰ The leadership and underground organization of Solidarity used this messaging system to inform the crowds what was happening and increase public support for the protests. The leaflets and flyers would use narratives and symbols that invoked the nationalism and heritage of resistance that the Poles related to.¹⁴¹ The bulletins also served to praise Solidarity and give attention to the political and economic conditions of the country.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 88.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Jan Kubick, *The Power of Symbols Against the Symbols of Power: The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 186.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 187–188.

Catholic Mass was also used outside the shipyards, which sent the message that the Church was behind the protests and the workers unions, thus against the Socialist regime. The church also reinforced the idea that the protests were to be peaceful. The cross was used as “a sign of defiance toward the communist regime,” “a metaphor of national martyrdom” and “a symbol of Poland as a messiah of nations.”¹⁴²

One of the most influential weapons that Solidarity had was outside media outlets. The riots of 1980 let the Eastern Bloc countries and the world know that there were fractures within the communist satellite states. This led to advertisement by western countries of how the resistance elements were exacerbating the fractures. In 1982, a television show was produced in the U.S. called “Let Poland Be Poland.” The show was “beamed across the world”¹⁴³ in an effort to reduce the martial law that the regime enacted in Poland in 1981. During this period, the regime withdrew the freedom to assemble from the people and also began controlling all media outlets and speech. The show was intended to reach an estimated 400 million people; however it only reached about 90 million homes.¹⁴⁴ In the film, Walesa portrayed himself as “the embodiment of the gritty, Catholic, patriotic Polish worker.”¹⁴⁵

Although the success of “Let Poland Be Poland” is up for debate, it did empower Solidarity to know that they had the backing of Democratic countries.¹⁴⁶ With the help of the U.S., a significant amount of anti-Communist propaganda was aimed at Poland to include: Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and underground newspapers. This was key due to restrictive conditions inside Poland. This effect of outside-in influence in heavily controlled areas ensured that Solidarity remained relevant and strong throughout the martial law period.

142 Ibid., 189.

143 “Pro-Solidarity ‘Propaganda’ Show gets Lukewarm Reception,” *Lewiston Journal News*, February 1, 1982, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1899&dat=19820201&id=swcgAAAIBAJ&sjid=BmUFAAAAI BAJ&pg=3605,92967>.

144 Ibid.

145 Nicholas John Cull, David Holbrook Culbert, and David Welch, *Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003), 304.

146 Ibid.

The media primarily used by Solidarity were the underground newspapers and flyers. The flyers focused on symbols that emphasized Polish nationalism, unity and the economic and political conditions that the Soviets had imposed. These elements expanded the Solidarity narrative and helped to grow the movements' active supporters. Nationalism, unity and poor economic conditions were used to incite actions against the regime and gather recruits for the expanding underground and auxiliary elements.

The leadership augmented media efforts by emphasizing unity. Walesa was instrumental in uniting the various workers unions, as was the KOR. Walesa embodied the average Polish worker as he grew up in both the Nazi and Soviet controlled state and was a member of the 1970 and 1976 riots. Walesa served a few terms in jail throughout the 70s for actions against the state, which validated him amongst the people as a resistor.

The Church served to expand the base of support for Solidarity, as religion was extremely important to the Poles. The Pope's speech in 1979 served to unite the people against the Soviet controlled puppet regime and although he did not give explicit backing to Solidarity, it was made clear that an independent Poland should be a shared goal. In 1980, Solidarity used the church to emphasize the principles of non-violence and as a motivating factor for the protestors legitimizing that what they were doing was right.

D. INSURGENT IMPERATIVES FOR SUCCESS

1. Commitment and Motivation

Solidarity was able to maintain their commitment to a free Poland even after martial law was enacted in 1981. The group was forced to move underground and conduct all their operations in a clandestine manner. The regime's control during this time ensured that anyone caught engaging in subversive behavior would be jailed. The church provided the outlet needed to continue to provide motivation to the people of Poland.

Propaganda was used to not only insight dissatisfaction with the regime, but also to show that the leaders of Solidarity were still committed to regime change. External support ensured that the resistance was well resourced helping retain the commitment of the people.

Commitment to the cause can also be seen in the lack of corruption found inside the movement. Initially, there was a struggle for who would represent the group. However, once Walesa was selected, all the trade unions and different factions rallied behind him. There was almost no syphoning off of organization money or materials. This shows that the leadership and the underground members were committed to the cause over personal gain.

The commitment and motivation displayed by the leadership of Solidarity resulted in Lech Walesa being elected as the President in 1991. The election shows that the people trusted the leadership and their commitment to the cause. The goal of Solidarity remained constant throughout its nearly 20-year struggle. By constantly putting themselves at risk against a target regime that was not afraid to use force, or imprisonment, members of the group proved that they had a high level of commitment to a free Poland.

2. Flexibility and Adaptability

The ability of the group to transition from public protest movements to a more clandestine organization showed flexibility. This transition ensured that the group was able to stay viable during a period when the target regime retained a high degree of control. Solidarity also showed adaptability by being able to morph from trade unions and political organizations into a resistance movement with a clear and coherent goal.

The change in tactics showed that the group could coordinate and disseminate its messages effectively. Group members used the Church to do this, while also using the freedom of movement that the clergy had to communicate with third party countries. Rather than risk their own imprisonment, they used the organization that they knew would cause incredible backlash for the target regime if suppressed.

Solidarity rapidly used regime actions to create more propaganda and gather more popular support. After the riots in 1980, Solidarity immediately capitalized on the regimes actions and demanded concessions. Initially, the concessions were granted giving Solidarity an incredible base of support, not just as a resistance group, but as a legitimate political alternative.

3. Tangible Support

Numerous organizations and countries gave external support to Solidarity, which contributed to the development of propaganda pamphlets and underground newspapers creating pressure against the target regime. International involvement immediately gave the group legitimacy as a viable political alternative. Money and intelligence was provided from Israel, the U.S. and the Vatican. This increased the tangible support for Solidarity by providing it with materials that were not attainable through normal supply sources as well as intelligence the regimes expected actions.

The church assisted in rallying thousands of members to the cause over a short period of time. The Catholic Church involvement also served to garner the international support that the resistance eventually received. Having the Pope openly support the cause of a free Poland was a powerful catalyst to gather popular support. Even for the portion of the population that did not want to openly support the resistance, the involvement of the church helped ensure that they would not support the regime.

Due to the restricted freedom of movement in Poland at the time, a sanctuary was not possible. However, Solidarity was able to use existing authorized groups to coordinate their actions. Poland was a communist country that put a great deal of emphasis on the importance of the worker. The regime could not openly oppose workers' unions, so workers' unions were used as the platform to coordinate actions against the regime. The same was true of the church. The church had such an immense support base within Poland that the regime could not directly attack it, so the church was a natural organization to coordinate the resistance.

E. ANALYSIS

Solidarity is truly a case of strategic UW, where non-violent methods were used to enact lasting change. Co-opting and utilizing existing organizations, having the organizational capacity to coordinate and accept external support, developing a resonating narrative and being flexible enough to adapt to the changing environment of martial law were the key factors in Solidarity's success.

The formation of the trade unions after the 1970 Gdansk incident allowed the resistance to organize and recruit from a wide base. The initial group was able to expand after the regime continued to rely on oppressive measures. This was the case in 1976 when protests erupted for the same reasons that they did in 1970. Using the trade unions as a starting point for organizational development allowed the resistance to gain the influence needed amongst the population. The trade unions had significant legitimacy in communist Poland. The unions served as a channel to disseminate information and coordinate operations.

Being organized, having a wide base of support and a communication plan allowed the resistance element to capitalize on the situation in 1980 when socioeconomic conditions were exacerbated by the regime raising food prices and restricting individual freedoms. Solidarity was able to gain concessions from the regime very rapidly, but ultimately, this led to the enactment of martial law from 1981–1984. The martial law policy further deepened the tensions between the populace and the regime, which did nothing to help the economic or political situation in Poland.

The logistics that were provided through external sponsorship increased the amount of propaganda that was produced and distributed throughout the cities and ports. This allowed for increased motivation and commitment as well as tangible support during the period of martial law when operating in the open was very dangerous. The external sponsor was able to call attention to the cause both internally and externally to allow for a very successful propaganda campaign.

Intelligence was passed to the underground through existing networks and was effectively coordinated among the CIA, Vatican and Solidarity underground. The effect of these operations was an increase in international awareness of the conditions in Poland. External sponsorship greatly increased the amount of intelligence that Solidarity received about the regime's planned actions. The intelligence also ensured a level of security for Solidarity inside Poland during martial law. Finding the right external sponsorship for a resistance organization can be a key aspect of successful UW campaigns.

The group used a broadly framed narrative imbued with nationalistic and resistance traditions to appeal to diverse segments of the population. The naming of a Polish Pope in 1978 along with his polarizing speech to the Polish people further allowed the resistance base of support to expand. Additionally, religion was incorporated into the narrative to exacerbate fissures between the populace and the regime.

The psychological efforts for recruitment and disaggregation of the target regime were extremely effective. The use of symbols to convey messages through the church and amongst the workers proved effective as a non-violent means of resistance. Just the existence of public crosses was a small victory for the resistance and portrayed disaffection with the communist regime. Additionally, the actions of Lech Walesa proved to be a motivating factor for the resistance as he was truly seen as a leader that represented the bulk of Polish people. These efforts and the careful framing of the narrative were enough to mobilize a large amount of people to act.

Using protests, strikes and unauthorized assembly, Solidarity was able to capitalize on the principles of non-violent resistance to maintain its moral authority against the Polish communist regime. Using the underground to organize its actions, Solidarity worked to steadily attrite power from the regime. When martial law occurred, Solidarity was outlawed, and many members were jailed. The changing environmental conditions called for a strategy shift, which Solidarity was able to rapidly execute. The organization showed its flexibility and adaptability by moving from protests and strikes to quiet propaganda and psychological operations. Eventually, the regime's oppressive tactics just exacerbated the power shift.

All of these aspects contributed to the success of Solidarity, but the psychological and disruption aspects were the two crucial LOEs used. The extensive use of propaganda and well-organized protests allowed the resistance to convey a clear message, which provided an alternative to the existing government. The ability of the resistance to network effectively with the population as well as external sponsors ensured that the movement was well coordinated and remained viable after the 1981 crackdown.

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V. CASE STUDY III: CONTRAS IN NICARAGUA 1981–1989

The case of the Contra rebels against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua is a violent insurgency that had significant support from the U.S. as an external sponsor. The insurgency took nine years to succeed and had to overcome a fractured insurgent organization and U.S. scandal. From 1981 to 1989, the U.S. supported the Contra rebels with arms, ammunition, training, advice, money, a safe haven and international backing. As a result of the U.S. support, the Contras were able to conduct disruption operations, develop psychological narratives targeting the Sandinista regime's oppressive actions, gather intelligence about regime activities and keep the guerrillas well-armed and equipped. In 1989, the Sandinistas were removed from power following democratic elections, however they remain as one of Nicaragua's leading political powers even today. The Contra insurgency ended through legitimate political means, but used violence throughout its nearly ten-year existence to achieve its goal.

The role of the U.S. in the Contra case cannot be overstated. As an external sponsor, U.S. actions and role in the insurgency were counterproductive in many regards. The failure of the U.S. to develop a sound operational strategy prior to intervening nearly ended the insurgency before it could gain any real ground. It took the unification of the Contra rebel groups and an understanding that insurgent violence must be proportional with or less than state repression for the movement to succeed. Although the insurgency was successful at regime change numerous mistakes were partially responsible for the long duration of the campaign. This case study will examine the connection between the proposed framework and the Contra insurgency.

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

During the late 1970s, the U.S. began competing with the Soviet Union over influence in Nicaragua. At the time, the Sandinista regime had just come to power and the Carter administration had given over 90 million dollars in aid to persuade the Sandinistas to become pro-U.S. Unfortunately, not long after the aid began, the Sandinistas began passing repressive laws that suppressed the freedom of the press and

political organization.¹⁴⁷ The Sandinistas also signed economic, cultural, scientific and technological agreements with the Soviets.¹⁴⁸ As a result, President Carter cancelled all aid to the Sandinistas and ordered the CIA to begin drawing up plans to overthrow the regime. By 1981, President Ronald Reagan was in office and concerted efforts to support the anti-Sandinista movements were rapidly put in place. The Sandinista military wing was known as the Sandinista Liberation Front (FSLN). The FSLN became the main target for the anti-Sandinista movement. The insurgent movement was composed of numerous groups, but primarily was known as the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN). The FDN and the other smaller rebel groups were collectively called the Contras.

The president authorized the CIA to equip, train and fund the Contra rebels to facilitate the overthrow of the Sandinista regime. The CIA and special operations forces (SOF) executed the training in Argentina and set up operating bases for the Contras in Honduras and Costa Rica. Initially, the operations were moderately successful, but in 1982 the U.S. Congress passed the Boland amendment, which prohibited U.S. funding for the purpose of overthrowing a government. The Reagan administration circumvented this law by claiming that the U.S. was not overthrowing the government, the Contras were. To further muddy the waters, the U.S. also began seeking funding from third party donors. The CIA successfully obtained funding from countries such as Israel and through private corporations, but in 1984 a CIA operation to mine the Nicaraguan harbors became public and support for the Contras dwindled in the U.S.¹⁴⁹ In addition to the internal difficulties in the U.S., the Contras were accused of numerous human rights abuses including rape, torture, extortion and terrorist activities.¹⁵⁰ The Contras were not unified and dealt with a lot of internal dissention among commanders. These activities eventually led to the democratic reelection of the Sandinista regime in 1984 despite their repressive laws governing the freedom of the Nicaraguan people.

147 Brown College, "Understanding the Iran-Contra Affairs," accessed January 16, 2014, http://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/about.php.

148 Ibid.

149 Ibid.

150 John Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations From World War II Through the Persian Gulf* (Chicago, IL: Elephant Paperbacks, Ivan R. Dee, 1996), 404.

The Contras continued their violence throughout the mid-1980s, resulting in over 43,000 casualties and \$12 billion in damages.¹⁵¹ The U.S. continued to support the Contras covertly until 1987, when the Iran-Contra scandal was uncovered and Congress convened investigations against members of the National Security Council for illegally funding the rebel group.

By 1989, elections were held again in Nicaragua and the many Contra groups finally acted as a united force distributing leaflets and assembling under the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO). In August of the same year, 50 FSLN members were assassinated and the Contras deployed over 8,000 troops into Nicaragua from camps within Honduras and Costa Rica.¹⁵² The UNO won the election, but the Sandinistas still retained a majority of parliament seats.

B. UW PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

1. Target Regime

The Sandinista movement and FSLN were originally formed in the 1960s and sought to rid Nicaragua of the Somoza dynasty, which it perceived as a puppet government of the U.S.¹⁵³ The group broadly defined itself to the population as democratic; however, in reality, it had socialist leanings.¹⁵⁴ The FSLN recruited heavily within the poor areas and took power from Anastasio Somoza Debayle in 1979.

After coming to power, the Sandinistas nationalized most of the farmland within the country and confiscated the wealth of citizens who had been gone for over six months. The culmination of economic shifts and socialist reforms created some dissention among the Nicaraguan people as they were suffering from poor economic conditions. This caused some defections within the party to include Arturo Cruz and

151 Ellie Klerlein, "ICE Case Studies (Inventory of Casualties and Environment)," accessed February 11, 2014, <http://www1.american.edu/iced/ice/nicaragua.htm>.

152 Ibid.

153 Brown College, "Understanding the Iran-Contra Affairs."

154 Ibid.

Eden Pastora, who declared that they would begin countering the regime. Numerous other military defectors followed bringing a significant number of their troops with them.

In addition to the economic changes, the Sandinistas began a campaign of widespread oppression against religious and Indian groups. The Miskito Indians are the inhabitants of Nicaraguans Atlantic coast and perhaps experienced the worst oppression. The FSLN relocated over 15,000 Miskito Indians and imprisoned, tortured, executed and destroyed the villages of many more.¹⁵⁵

Feeling threatened by the defections and creation of rebel groups, the FSLN declared a state of emergency in 1982 after one of the groups blew up two bridges that were used as a transportation line for the shipment of materials into El-Salvador.¹⁵⁶ Under a state of emergency, the FSLN began restricting more individual freedoms such as: the right to organize a demonstration, freedom of the press, freedom of speech and the freedom to strike.

The FSLN was receiving extensive support from the Soviets at this time, for not only expanding their Marxist-Leninist form of government, but also for facilitating support to rebels in El Salvador. The FSLN underwent significant internal and external pressure to legitimize itself through public elections in the early 1980s and in 1984 finally relented and held democratic elections in Nicaragua. The FSLN won; however, some argue that the elections were rigged.¹⁵⁷

The FSLN began to enact oppressive measures once put into power. The socialist re-distribution of farmland and harsh oppressive measures against religious groups and Indians forced the defection of numerous party officials. These measures along with the state of emergency led to the disaffection of a large portion of the population as well.

When the FSLN won the 1984 election, the Contra groups were in the midst of a human rights scandal that undermined the legitimacy of the insurgents. In addition, the

¹⁵⁵ Heritage Foundation, "War on Human Rights," accessed January 8, 2014
<http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1983/07/the-sandinista-war-on-human-rights>

¹⁵⁶ Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars*, 400-401.

¹⁵⁷ Brown College, "Understanding the Iran-Contra Affairs."

U.S. external support for the Contras was widely publicized and did not help the Contras efforts, as one of the reasons the Sandinistas came to power in the first place was to get rid of U.S. influence. Again, this hindered the insurgents from being a credible alternative to the Sandinistas. Still the FSLN was an oppressive regime that created an environment ripe for an insurgency.

2. Insurgent Influence

Many political and military defectors of the Sandinista regime led the Contra groups, which gave the groups an existing structure and hierarchy to organize. The primary leaders of these organizations were Edgar Chamorro, Adolfo Calero and Enrique Bermudez. Bermudez' group was one of the most controversial. Bermudez was a National Guard leader whom had defected with a large number of his soldiers to Honduras during the revolution that brought the Sandinistas to power. During the early 1980s, Bermudez and his soldiers were accused of numerous human rights violations along the Honduran border including rape, looting, extortion and terrorist activities.¹⁵⁸ This led to the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE), run by Eden Pastora and Alfonso Robelo, to not accept any former National Guardsmen into their ranks.¹⁵⁹ As a result, the Contras remained largely divided. These divisions prevented the insurgency from having a cohesive narrative and led the population to question the true motives of the groups.

The accusations against Bermudez and the fractures amongst the insurgent groups led the U.S. to push for unity under one group. Edgar Chamorro emerged as the spokesman for the insurgents in late 1982; however, Bermudez and his group of soldiers still clearly had the most power amongst rebel groups.¹⁶⁰ Eventually, Bermudez was named as the leader of the military wing of the FDN, with Chamorro as the spokesman and Adolfo Calero as the political leader. However, internal squabbling persisted. The groups continued to feud about their roles, responsibilities and personal issues. The

¹⁵⁸ Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars*, 404.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 403.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 404.

ARDE and FDN refused to work with one another, which led to a failed invasion by the ARDE in 1984.¹⁶¹ It was not until the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) was founded in 1985 that the ARDE and FDN finally began working together under the leadership of Adolfo Calero, Alfonso Robelo and Arturo Cruz.¹⁶² This paved the way for all the disparate groups, who had little influence outside their own factions to work together to achieve their one goal.

A networking success that the insurgents had from the start was their ability to garner international support for their cause. It was routine for members of the FDN and ARDE leadership to visit foreign countries and obtain funding and political support.¹⁶³ This created significant international pressure on the target regime and empowered the insurgents to act. From 1981 to 1984, the Contra groups received over \$80 million in aid, over 200 personnel to assist the Honduran army with training, 114 Green Berets assisting with training the Contras and 150 CIA personnel for planning and intelligence gathering.¹⁶⁴ This high level of external support compelled the Sandinistas to seek aid from external sponsors as well, including the Soviet Union.

The ability of the Contras to gather external support and use existing hierarchies to organize and conduct operations was vital to the quick start in fighting the government. However, the infighting between the insurgent groups had a negative effect on the ability of the organization to conduct operations and win popular support. The infighting, lack of unity and human rights violations along with the election in 1984 set the insurgency back and further legitimized the Sandinista government. Additionally, the insurgents focused their efforts on guerrilla actions and not networking amongst the population. The lack of insurgent influence on the population did not help the insurgents win tangible support.

161 Ibid., 417.

162 Brown College, "Understanding the Iran-Contra Affairs."

163 Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars*, 405.

164 Ibid., 402.

C. LINES OF EFFORT

1. Disruption

The Contra resistance was largely dominated by military actions and is representative of its military leadership and membership. As a result, numerous disruption operations against the Sandinista government occurred. Most of them were an effort to prepare for some sort of large scale offensive that was to be the culminating blow to overthrow the Sandinista regime. This led many to question what the ultimate goal of the Contras was. During a 1987 conference, many experts on the resistance and Central America debated this very point. Was the goal to win the support of the population, disrupt the Nicaraguan economy or to force the regime to change its repressive policies?¹⁶⁵ These questions arose, because although the disruption was vast, it was largely ineffective. The disruption operations gave the perception that the resistance was growing and gaining strength. The reality was that these were not well thought out operations and did nothing to win the support of the population or disrupt the target regime to any real extent. Disruption operations in a UW environment can have a powerful effect if targeted to achieve certain insurgent goals such as: winning tangible support, exploiting or causing oppressive actions by the regime and reactions or exacerbating fractures within the regime. Despite many costly and significant offensive operations conducted by the Contras from 1981–1988, it was not until 1989 when they were united and acting under one coherent strategy that their disruption operations had a significant enough an effect to cripple the Sandinista regime.

The first significant disruption operation was in March of 1982. One of the U.S. and Contra goals during the conflict was to prevent the Sandinistas from reinforcing the El Salvadoran rebels with supplies from across the border.¹⁶⁶ To achieve this, the Contras blew up two bridges that were used heavily to transport supplies across the border. This operation got the regime's attention and made them realize that the Contra insurgency

¹⁶⁵ David Ronfledt and Brian Jenkins. *The Nicaraguan Resistance and U.S. Policy: Report on a May 1987 Conference* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1987), 5–6.

¹⁶⁶ Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars*, 397.

posed a real threat to their power.¹⁶⁷ As a result, the Sandinista regime began restricting individual freedoms and rights. This is what became known as the state of emergency.¹⁶⁸ This operation actually gave the Contras a great opportunity to exploit the regimes heavy-handed actions because blowing up the bridges had very little effect on the population itself, but the regime was severely punishing the population in an effort to root out the insurgents. Unfortunately, this occurred in the midst of the infighting and allegations of human rights abuses by Bermudez, which negated any positive effects that they may have had.¹⁶⁹

The next major disruption operation was conducted to isolate Nicaragua economically by mining the harbors of the country. This operation, which was largely conducted by the U.S. as the external sponsor, had numerous negative consequences. In late 1983, the head of the CIA, William Casey, advocated for an increase in operations and recruitment by the Contras.¹⁷⁰ Casey believed that the pressure was already getting to the Sandinista regime and that by isolating them economically, while conducting a two-front offensive from Costa Rica and Honduras, the regime would fall. The CIA conducted the mining operation and had the FDN take responsibility for it. Unfortunately, not long after the mining occurred, ships from over six other nations began sinking as a result of the mines. Additionally, local fishermen were killed who were just trying to provide for their families.¹⁷¹ This caused the public sentiment to turn on the Contras and domestic pressure began to mount against the CIA to discontinue support. The domestic pressure in the U.S. resulted in the Boland Amendment, which prevented the CIA from providing support to the Contras. External sponsor operations must be carefully coordinated with the resistance elements and directed in a manner that is consistent with

167 Ibid., 400.

168 Brown College, "Understanding the Iran-Contra Affairs."

169 Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars*, 404.

170 Ibid., 411.

171 Ibid., 411–415.

keeping public support while undermining regime support. The mining of the harbors clearly underestimated the effects that it would have on international perception and local sentiment among the population.

As part of the overall operation during the mining fiasco, the Contras also conducted port raids and airport bombings. The intent of these operations was to create economic pressure and insight internal dissatisfaction amongst the populace. Again, the effects on the population were not fully thought out and innocent people died. As a result, the internal dissatisfaction was directed against the insurgency and not the regime. The external sponsor involvement in all these operations de-legitimized the insurgency and led the population to view the movement as a puppet of the U.S. This led to strong feelings among the population who had recently overthrown the Somoza regime in favor of the Sandinistas for the very same reason.

Disruption was the most heavily used line of effort by the Contra insurgency with the U.S. as an external sponsor. However, it was not properly geared toward the elements that make an insurgency successful: tangible support, commitment and motivation, flexibility and adaptability. The insurgency should have known that bombing the airport would further isolate them and not the regime from the populace.

2. Intelligence

The U.S. developed three goals for their external support to the Contras: prevent supplies from flowing into El Salvador, eliminate the Cuban presence and eliminate the Cuban Nicaraguan support structure. To accomplish these goals the U.S. provided significant logistics and military support to the Contras. However, an important part of targeting the Cuban support in Nicaragua was identifying and understanding the dynamics of the support and the regime reliance on this support. To accomplish this, the CIA sought to use 500 agents to train indigenous forces to operate inside of Nicaragua and “carry out political action and paramilitary missions.”¹⁷² The CIA used many existing contacts within Nicaragua to start their campaign, but increasingly began to rely on the Contras for intelligence as restrictions within the country increased.

¹⁷² Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars*, 397.

Intelligence operations were very difficult to conduct by the Americans because freedom of movement within Nicaragua was limited. The CIA relied on the Contras and developed front organizations to assist them in conducting their intelligence operations within Nicaragua. One such organization was the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).

[The NED was designed] for the purpose of promoting foreign democratic institutions. But the NED also created a cover for the United States to funnel money to pro-U.S. groups in hostile countries. And it subsidized Washington's growing community of neoconservatives who wrote op-ed articles in leading newspapers and went on TV news shows advocating an aggressive U.S. foreign policy.¹⁷³

The CIA backed effort focused on swaying media support to the Contras, which would then in turn sway popular support to the Contras. This did not work however because the U.S. was so overt about its support and the people of Nicaragua viewed the rebellion as one controlled by the U.S. By focusing on the domestic and international support for the Contra movement, the Nicaraguan public was neglected.

The reliance on the Contras to provide the psychological and strategic intelligence for the Americans proved to be a mistake in the early years of the insurgency. The military background of the insurgents likely had an impact in the target selection. The target selection focused too much on hurting infrastructure and not enough on the impact it had on the populace. This resulted in the targeting of infrastructure that was valuable to the public versus only being valuable to the regime.

3. Logistics

The logistics provided by the U.S. to the Contra insurgent groups was immense. As mentioned earlier, nearly \$80 million in aid was provided in just the first four years along with over 300 personnel to facilitate training.¹⁷⁴ The majority of U.S. logistics assistance came in the form of weapons, ammunition, clothing and food rations. This assistance was largely overt and occurred in the form of airdrops to not only the insurgent

¹⁷³ Robert Parry, "How Reagans' Propaganda Succeeded."

¹⁷⁴ Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars*, 402.

sanctuaries in Honduras and Costa Rica, but also Nicaragua. The other significant aspect of U.S. logistics support to the Contras was the efforts by the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) to circumvent Congressional oversight and continue to secure funding and support despite the Boland Amendment. Both the overt and covert efforts of the U.S. to keep the Contras supplied and funded contributed to the relevancy of the insurgency; however, it negatively impacted both the Contras and U.S. standing in Nicaragua. The overt support led the populace to believe that the Contras were nothing without U.S. assistance and the covert support, once discovered, led the population of Nicaragua and a large portion of Latin America to believe that the U.S. could not be trusted.

The U.S. began supporting the Contras in December of 1981 with the construction of facilities for the insurgents to operate out of in Honduras along with airstrips and training venues.¹⁷⁵ This support continued unabated until 1982 when the first Boland Amendment was passed. Despite the Boland Amendment saying that any U.S. support to overthrow of the Sandinista regime is outlawed, the CIA and the administration were able to make the case that support to the Contras could still continue as the U.S. was supporting the Contras and not the direct overthrow of the Sandinista regime. After the first Boland Amendment was passed, nearly 19 million dollars was given to the Contras by the U.S. to continue operations.¹⁷⁶ Supplying the Contras with weapons, ammunition and equipment was essential to the U.S. plan as disruption was the priority. From 1981 to 1984, the Contras had sufficient equipment and supplies to continue operations as they saw fit. The U.S. was very responsive to the needs of the group until 1984 when logistics support began to taper off as domestic political pressure mounted due to the human rights accusations and the mining of the harbors.

This domestic pressure eventually led to the second Boland Amendment being passed, which outlawed any support to the Contras. This led the CIA to mount a covert effort to not only secure funds, but also continue to provide logistics support and airdrops via third party cut outs and front companies. This effort was run by then CIA director William Casey and executed by Lieutenant Colonel (LtCol) Oliver North, who was a

¹⁷⁵ Brown College, "Understanding the Iran-Contra Affairs."

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

member of the national security staff. The name of the effort was referred to as “The Enterprise.” North was assigned the tasks of continuing to fund, equip and support the Contras in their efforts to overthrow the Sandinista regime. It was up to North to establish a “mirror image outside the government of what the CIA had done” from 1981–1984.¹⁷⁷ This meant obtaining third party funds, establishing and maintaining logistical supplies, coordination of training, supplying weapons and assisting the Contras with any other necessities that were required. North testified that “I was told not to tell other people, not to talk about it, to keep my operational role very, very secret, that it should not be something that others came to know about.”¹⁷⁸

North continued successfully in this endeavor until the summer of 1986 when a supply plane was shot down over Nicaragua and the pilot was identified as an American. This led to a congressional investigation and the covert support was uncovered along with a monetary link to an Iranian Arms for Hostages operation. The scandal was known as the Iran Contra affair.

Although North was the backbone of the Enterprise, there were many other individuals that contributed significantly to the effort, primarily third party nations and donors. Robert McFarlane, the National Security Advisor, and Casey had already garnered considerable support from other nations since the first Boland Amendment was passed in 1982 and set up many of the funding meetings for North. North would then go meet with the third party nations or donors and ensure them that their anonymity would be kept. North stated “the arrangements I had made with foreign governments to deliver surface-to-air missiles and ammunition, all of those things I had been told to give the commitment of the United States that it wouldn’t be revealed.”¹⁷⁹ The extrinsic motivation of the nations was counted on in order to maintain funding. Knowing that many of the nations wanted to be on the good side of the U.S. enabled much of the funding.

¹⁷⁷ Lawrence E. Walsh, “Iran Contra Report, The U.S. Vs. Oliver North,” 1987, Chapter 2, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_02.htm

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

High-profile businessmen were also solicited, including Joseph Coors, the founder of Coors Brewing Company, who provided \$65,000.00 to the cause.¹⁸⁰ The State Department under George Schultz also reached out to sympathetic governments for assistance to include Saudi Arabia, Israel and Korea. Retired General John Singlaub also was instrumental in the funding effort travelling to Taiwan and securing millions of dollars for support to the Contras.¹⁸¹

Initially, much of the money would be disbursed directly to the Contras who would then use Enterprise approved contacts to purchase whatever they needed. In 1985, Secord and North both agreed that the Enterprise should handle the purchases in order to ensure that the Contras were using the money as Casey and the NSC wanted them to. This showed a level of distrust on the part of the external sponsor indicating that funds were being mismanaged or corruption was occurring in the Contra ranks.

The uncovering of the Contra support in 1986 led to many congressional hearings. However, in 1987, support to the Contras was again allowed, but was restricted to intelligence sharing and logistics support that did not directly enable military and para-military operations. This continued support allowed the Contras to continue to operate after the disparate factions were unified and eventually ousted the Sandinista regime.

Support of an insurgency by an external sponsor should remain covert when possible. Overt support to gain domestic “buy in” along with international pressure on the target regime may de-legitimize the insurgency and portray them as weak to the population, reducing popular support, which in turn reduces tangible support. It was not until the U.S. began scaling back their support for the Contras and acting covertly that the insurgency was forced to unify and began to re-gain some legitimacy after the mining incident and the bombing of Sandino airport.

180 Ibid.

181 Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars*, 426.

4. Psychological

The U.S. executed numerous psychological operations against both the Nicaraguan public and the U.S. public from 1982–1986 in order to garner support. This included exploiting Sandinista actions, trying to underwrite unfavorable Contra actions, distributing leaflets about the evils of Soviet controlled and influenced governments and linking terrorism to the Sandinistas and Soviets.¹⁸² This again shows that the level of U.S. action was too great in the Contra affair and failed to put the insurgent in front and give them more input into operations. However, the insurgency was still able to recover and eventually win.

In Latin America, the U.S. was being linked to many of the atrocities that were occurring in Nicaragua. This resulted in an effort by the U.S. to attach these incidents to the actions of the Soviet Union. In order to facilitate this, the administration had military psychological operations develop a pamphlet for congress and the press that linked “Nicaragua’s leftist Sandinista government as a state sponsor of terrorism... who themselves were infamous for acts of terrorism, including extra-judicial executions and attacks on civilian targets.”¹⁸³ This occurred after the second Boland Amendment and in some ways it eased the apprehension that some members of Congress had toward supporting the insurgency, but it did little to sway support for the U.S. actions in Nicaragua or Latin America.

Much of the propaganda effort was focused on getting third party donations and securing funding for the Contras. In 1982, the administration started this campaign but the “Reagan administration officials soon began crossing lines that separated an overseas propaganda program from a domestic propaganda operation aimed at U.S. public opinion, the American press and congressional Democrats who opposed contra funding.”¹⁸⁴ The focus on U.S. domestic opinion and funding diverted efforts away from what was really important to overthrow the Sandinista regime, which was Nicaraguan public opinion.

182 Parry, “How Reagans’ Propaganda Succeeded.”

183 Ibid

184 Ibid

Nicaraguan public opinion of both the Contras and the U.S. was heavily damaged in 1986 when the U.S. provided the Contras with a manual called *Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare*. The manual “explained how to rationalize killing civilians and also made recommendations like hiring professional killers for some missions.”¹⁸⁵ The manual also detailed how to invoke riots and shootings. The revelation of the manual had very damaging effects because the U.S. continued to deny any involvement in the human rights abuses of the Contras. The manual gave ammunition to the Sandinista government that the U.S. was not only in control of the Contras, but that they were responsible for the human rights abuses that occurred against the population.

By not focusing the propaganda efforts on the Nicaraguan public, the U.S. failed to secure popular support for the Contras and failed to shape the Contras’ public image. The overt support and aid from the U.S. led the public to believe that the Contras were just a puppet of the U.S. rather than a legitimate, self-sufficient insurgent group. The effort to use propaganda to gain funding from third parties was extremely successful, as the U.S. was able to gain \$34 million in funding from 1984–1986.¹⁸⁶ However, the funding should not have been more important than the other aspects of tangible support needed to succeed such as tolerance and intelligence.

D. INSURGENT IMPERATIVES FOR SUCCESS

1. Commitment and Motivation

Commitment and motivation may have been high within the various training camps along the borders, but it was not high among the leadership of the different insurgent organizations who were working toward different and sometimes opposing goals. The infighting among the various leaders within the Contras shows that the commitment to the cause was low. Calero, Cruz and Bermudez all gave up high-ranking military positions within the Sandinista regime to fight. They undertook significant risk, believing that the overthrow of the Sandinistas would be possible. Their individual

¹⁸⁵ University of Texas, “Nicaraguan Contras and the United States,” accessed January 30, 2014, <http://ows.edb.utexas.edu/site/smith-redfield/nicaragua>.

¹⁸⁶ Parry, “How Reagans’ Propaganda Succeeded.”

methods for achieving regime change were different and they could not agree on a coherent operational strategy. This divided the Contras and gave the perception that they were a worse alternative for the people than the Sandinista regime.

The external sponsor had to emplace mechanisms to ensure that the money being provided was used to advance the cause. This distrust of the Contra leadership also shows a low level of commitment. Using support for personal gain or power is an indicator that the insurgent leadership was not committed to the cause. Eventually, the leadership came to understand that they were much stronger together than apart and unified under UNO. Once this occurred and the external U.S. support was reduced, the Contras were able to overthrow the Sandinistas and take control of the country. The initial lack of commitment was overcome to achieve the goal

2. Flexibility and Adaptability

Flexibility and adaptability was not shown during the first five years of the insurgency as the U.S. and Contras both failed to amend their plans to target the regime, rather than seizing terrain. The Contras planned many offensive operations that focused on expanding the physical terrain they controlled. The military leadership that dominated the Contras believed that this was the way to pressure the Sandinista regime, rather than exploiting target regime fissures and expanding popular support. After the 1984 bombing of Sandino Airport, and the mining debacle, the insurgents should have seen that their plan was failing to produce results.

The operational strategy of the Contras stayed the same until U.S. support was rescinded in 1986. From 1986 to 1989, the Contras finally began to show flexibility and shifted their plans to target regime individuals rather than focus on seizing physical terrain. The shift in strategy created more tolerance among the people because the populations land and livelihood were no longer being threatened.

The Contras also showed flexibility by seeking a political solution in 1989 rather than a military coup. By using the political process to seize power they immediately were able to gain legitimacy with the Nicaraguan public and the international community as

well. Even though the Contras used a significant amount of violence to weaken the regime's control, they were able to overcome this by using the political process to oust the Sandinistas.

3. Tangible Support

The insurgency must be seen as legitimate to the population in order to be successful. Overt or excessive external support can actually reduce the tolerance aspect of tangible support that an insurgency needs. Although the U.S. was assisting the insurgency in gaining manpower, funding, materiel and intelligence the insurgents lacked the tolerance of the people. Paul et al. explains that "treating the population as the center of gravity will lead to the desired outcome; that outcome is less certain when insurgents' tangible support does not come from the population."¹⁸⁷ When the U.S. began advertising their support to the Contras to put external pressure on the Sandinista regime, they actually undermined positive perceptions of the insurgency. The people began seeing the insurgents as puppets of the west and reduced their popular support.

This had a negative effect in the insurgents' battle to be seen as a legitimate alternative to the Sandinista government. The Contras responded to this by conducting disruption operations, but they negatively affected the population thus pushing them further towards the Sandinistas.

The external sponsor heavily supplemented other areas of tangible support such as; sanctuary, materials and ammo. The U.S. provided these to the Contras in abundance, which clearly gave the groups an initial advantage and enabled them to start operations much earlier than they would have been able to. The value of the sanctuary gave the Contras an area to plan and coordinate operations in safety. The sanctuaries of Honduras and Costa Rica also allowed the insurgents to attack from two fronts. Many of the offensive operations that were planned utilized the two sanctuaries to push across the border and seize land from both the north and the south.

¹⁸⁷ Paul et al, *Victory has a Thousand Fathers*, 72.

The tangible support provided by the external sponsor was vast, but should have been more focused on building the capabilities of the Contras beyond their guerrilla forces. More emphasis should have been placed on increasing the organizational capacity to be seen as a legitimate alternative to the Sandinistas.

E. ANALYSIS

Many lessons can be learned from the Contra insurgency. Although it was resolved through an election, from 1981–1986 the UW campaign focused too heavily on disruption and material support versus fostering the three attributes that are correlated with insurgent success: commitment and motivation, tangible support and flexibility and adaptability. It was not until the Contra leaders showed the ability to adapt and the FDN and ARDE created UNO that they began to make gains among the populace and grow. Additionally, after 1986 the Contras began to downplay the U.S. support and took more of a lead role in the conflict, which reduced the stigma of being a U.S. puppet organization.

The overt support of an insurgency by an external sponsor should not be used. These efforts, while helpful in the short term de-legitimize the insurgency and portray them as weak to the population, which can actually reduce the tolerance of the population. It was not until the U.S. began scaling back their support for the Contras and acting covertly that the insurgency was forced to unify and began to gain some of their legitimacy back after the mining incident and the bombing of Sandino airport.

Using excessive force was detrimental to the success of the Contras. The use of force and disrupting the populace served to de-legitimize the insurgency over time and alienated them from the population. The disruption operations that the Contras conducted, such as mining the harbors and bombing Sandino Airport, did not disaggregate the target regime and actually alienated the population. This was validated by the results of the 1984 elections.

The ability of the Contras to finally unite in 1986 and shift their focus to regime targets contributed significantly to the ultimate success of UNO through political means. After external support was diminished, the Contra elements were forced to work together.

The elements came together under UNO and the leadership of Calero, Robelo and Cruz. The guerrilla elements then shifted their efforts to targeting Sandinista political leadership. This led to more violence, but the basic services and everyday life for the population was not affected. The insurgents' ability to adapt to the changing environment took time, but eventually was sufficient to enable their success. UW practitioners should ensure objectivity when determining the operational strategy. As the environment changes, so should strategy.

The tangible support provided by the insurgent sanctuaries in Honduras and Argentina was vital for the military force that was conducting operations. Since the Contra insurgency focused their efforts heavily on disruption, it was necessary to have a safe haven for the insurgents to refit and rearm after operations. By using sanctuaries outside the target country, the target regime was unable to engage them directly, therefore the Contras were able to continue operations despite the state of emergency that was declared from 1982–1988. A sanctuary is a vital element of tangible support that can be provided by the external sponsor.

The U.S. helped to gather international support and create pressure on the regime and therefore assisted the Contras with being seen as a legitimate organization. The overt support that the U.S. provided and the human rights abuse accusations somewhat countered these gains. Nevertheless being recognized as a legitimate alternative to the Sandinistas by the international community provided the insurgents with motivational support. Through the use of media and messaging, the U.S. was able to gain monetary support from many third party countries and people for the Contra organization.

The U.S., as an external sponsor, should have made more of an effort to keep their involvement hidden. The Nicaraguan people were already wary of U.S. influence within their government. This aspect should have resulted in more of an effort to keep U.S. support covert. Having knowledge of the popular sentiments within the target country can help the external sponsor understand the psychological impacts of support. The Contras were able to distance themselves from the U.S. after 1986, which helped them gain more popular support.

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VI. CASE STUDY IV: THE PEOPLE'S POWER REVOLUTION, PHILIPPINES 1986

The 1986 Peoples Power revolution in the Philippines was the culmination point of a rising movement against the Ferdinand Marcos regime that had been building since 1972. The movement was largely non-violent and motivated by growing discontent amongst a population that endured corruption, financial and economic mismanagement and the repression of basic democratic freedoms. The movement ended with President Marcos being evacuated from the Manila airport to Hawaii via a U.S. plane. Although, President Reagan and the U.S. were staunch and loyal supporters of Marcos for most of his 20-year reign, the Department of State and U.S. Embassy mission had campaigned for his removal since the assassination of one of his rivals in 1983.¹⁸⁸ The assassination of Benigno Aquino set off a series of events that led to U.S. support for the opposition movement and the decision by the U.S. government to have Marcos step down from power. U.S. external sponsorship was limited, but actions were taken to help the anti-Marcos campaign. These actions included: publicly denouncing the Marcos regime actions inside the Philippines, support for the anti-Marcos military wing through re-fueling and sanctuary inside Clark Air Force base, U.S. sponsored election oversight organizations, investigations and urging Marcos to flee the Philippines. The ability of the anti-Marcos party to induce defections within the top echelons of power and mobilize large gathering enabled the movement's success. The movement was also able to expand their memberships through existing organizations such as the Catholic Church, which helped with coordination and support.¹⁸⁹

A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Ferdinand Marcos was elected as President of the Philippines in 1965 and then again in 1969. During his second term the gap between the rich and the poor inside the Philippines began to grow significantly. This disparity led to the formation of numerous

¹⁸⁸ Mark R. Thompson, *The Anti-Marcos Struggle* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 121.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

separatist groups within the Philippines. The two significant groups were the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the New People's Army (NPA). The MNLF existed mainly in the southern Philippines and sought autonomy based on religious affiliation. The NPA sought to replace the democratic Philippine regime with a communist party system. Marcos was anti-communist and as a result, received significant U.S. support to counter these separatist movements in order to remain a democratic system.

In 1972, Marcos's second term as President was nearing its end. In the Philippine democracy, the President was only allowed to run for two terms so Marcos declared martial law to retain his authority. He immediately began jailing his political rivals, dissolved congress and suppressed the freedom of speech and press.¹⁹⁰ One of his many rivals was Benigno Aquino. Aquino was arrested and spent the next eight years in jail, all the while continuing to denounce Marcos' martial law policies. After suffering a heart attack in jail Aquino was able to seek medical treatment in the U.S. under the agreement that he would stop denouncing Marcos and never return to the Philippines. Aquino sought exile in the U.S., but remained politically active from afar in the Philippine system, still denouncing Marcos and demonstrating to the U.S. that despite being anti-communist, Marcos was not pro-democracy.

In 1983, Marcos's health was starting to deteriorate so Aquino decided he would return to the Philippines to fill any power vacuum that may result. As Aquino was getting off the plane in the Manila airport, he was shot and killed. It was this event that led the Department of State and prominent members of the Reagan administration to withdraw support from Marcos. The anti-Marcos camp included: "Michael H. Armacost, the Under Secretary of State and former Ambassador to the Philippines; Stephen A. Bosworth, his successor in Manila; Morton I. Abramowitz, the head of State Department intelligence, and John Maisto, the Philippine desk officer. They were strengthened by Adm. William J.

¹⁹⁰ Stanley Karnow, "Setting Marcos Adrift," *New York Times*, March 19, 1989, <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/03/19/magazine/reagan-and-the-philippines-setting-marcos-adrift.html?src=pm&pagewanted=1>.

Crowe Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.”¹⁹¹ The group attempted to convince the Reagan administration that Marcos’ health, the declining economy and the growing communist insurgency were all factors of serious concern that could be partially solved by the removal of Marcos. However, President Reagan believed strongly that no good alternative existed to Marcos.¹⁹²

After the assassination of Aquino, an investigation ensued that implicated General Fabian Ver, a high-ranking pro-Marcos official of engineering the assassination. Marcos eventually cleared General Ver of all charges in 1985, which again de-legitimized Marcos with the perception on cronyism.¹⁹³ Demonstrations began shortly after the assassination as well as increased pressure from the U.S. embassy and State Department to intervene in the growing unrest. High-ranking members of the military and business elites began publicly calling for a change. Attempts were made to suppress and jail these individuals, but growing popular support continued to pressure Marcos for a change. This eventually led Marcos to call for elections in 1985 to prove his legitimacy.

The 1985 election was marred with violence and fraud.¹⁹⁴ Marcos seemingly won, however the election outcome led to a series of protests. With the growing discontent, two military leaders shifted their loyalty away from Marcos. Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile and Lieutenant General Fidel Ramos decided to stage a coup. Initially, the coup did not have a significant amount of support and the Marcos military was well on its way to crushing the opposition. The Catholic Church and national radio station, Radio Veritas, rallied the people to support the coup. Thousands of protestors were mobilized and peacefully stopped any efforts by the pro-Marcos military to arrest or kill the defectors.¹⁹⁵ The U.S. embassy began providing the opposition with encrypted radio traffic and refueled Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) helicopters at Clark Air Force base. The Reagan administration could no longer turn a blind eye to the

191 Ibid.

192 George Schultz, “Turmoil and Triumph: The George Schultz Years,” accessed March 4, 2014, http://www.turmoilandtriumph.org/reaganyears/marcos_v_aquino.php.

193 Thompson, *The Anti-Marcos Struggle*, 115.

194 Ibid., 138.

195 Ibid., 157.

situation in the Philippines and calls were made for Marcos to step down peacefully and leave the country. Marcos had to be forced to depart the country under duress by U.S. officials and was given exile in Hawaii.¹⁹⁶

B. UW PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

1. Target Regime

The Marcos regime engaged in numerous actions that created fissures between the administration and the people. Most notably was the widespread corruption that the Marcos regime engaged in, which created economic turmoil. The Marcos regime “granted monopolies to local elite whom he appointed as local political leaders.”¹⁹⁷ Additionally, he misappropriated numerous funds to help get re-elected in 1969. The creation of monopolies under Marcos created vast amounts of wealth within Marcos circle of friends, but left the businesses without political relationships to suffer. After the assassination of Aquino in 1983, the Philippine economy began to fall and the Gross National Product was reduced by 6.8 percent.¹⁹⁸ This led to business elites within the Philippines to call for economic change.

The Marcos regime declared martial law in 1972 to get around a Philippine law that forbid any more than two terms as president. Marcos began to jail his political opponents after the declaration.¹⁹⁹ Marcos also dissolved the Philippine parliament, began to consolidate power and restricted individual rights. Marcos was able to gain a significant amount of international economic aid from the U.S. and other countries, which helped keep the nation solvent until the early 1980s.²⁰⁰

The assassination of Aquino in 1983 was widely attributed to the Marcos regime. Aquino was shot in the head as he exited his plane in Manila. The authorities claimed that

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 161.

¹⁹⁷ Kenji Kushida, “The Political Economy of the Philippines Under Marcos: Property Rights in the Philippines from 1965–1986.” *Stanford Journal of East Asian Studies* 3, no. 1 (2003), 120.

¹⁹⁸ Library of Congress, “From Aquinos Assassination to Peoples Power,” accessed March 10, 2014, <http://countrystudies.us/philippines/29.htm>.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ Kushida, “The Political Economy of the Philippines Under Marcos,” 120.

he was shot by lone gunmen and attributed the act to the growing communist insurgency. Numerous inconsistencies resulted from this story and to sway public opinion, Marcos ordered an investigation. The investigation had General Fabian Ver, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), tried under conspiracy charges for the murder. General Ver was a staunch supporter of the Marcos regime and was acquitted of all charges in 1985. This was seen by the people as another example of Marcos helping his friends and was one of the catalysts that led to the coup d'état and revolution in February of 1986.

The anti-communist struggle that was occurring in the Philippines at the time ensured that the U.S. would continue to support the Marcos regime. The Reagan administration viewed the Philippines as an important ally in the fight against communism during the Cold War. The Reagan administration did not always like Marcos actions but believed that he created stability in the region. After Aquino's death in 1983, the U.S. started to change its views a little, but still believed that if unrest occurred the NPA would use it as an opportunity to usurp power. The U.S. aid that was provided to the Philippines and the economic support that U.S. bases provided kept the Philippines economically viable, but after 1983 the business elites began to view the country as economically failing due to the high unemployment rate and falling GNP.²⁰¹

The Marcos regime was seen as a corrupt dictatorship rather than a democracy. After 20 years of ruling the country, Marcos's economic policies and the restrictions he put on both political rivals and individual freedoms resulted in a disenfranchised majority. This resulted in numerous organizations to call for reforms. The Catholic Church, AFP, student organizations and political parties began calling for the removal of Marcos. These parties were able to use the target regimes oppression to unite and mobilize a revolution that resulted in regime change.

2. Insurgent Influence

The opposition against the Marcos regime was incredibly connected to all aspects of society. The business elites that were disenfranchised with the regimes policies were

²⁰¹ Ibid.

connected to the wealthy segment of the population. The student activists and organizations were connected to the youth segment. RAM and the military movement had connections inside the regime. United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO) sought to gain their base of support from the shrinking middle class and the Church helped connect them all together. Beginning in the late 1970s, these individual groups began making statements that showed their disapproval for the regime. This led to many opposition candidates boycotting the 1981 elections.

The 1981 elections allowed an increase in freedom to criticize the regime. Once the demonstrations against the regime began in 1981 these individual groups began to start uniting. The opposition leader of UNIDO, Salvador Laurel, even reached out to the NPA and the Communist Peoples Party (CPP) to develop alliances.²⁰² Laurel was incredibly effective at getting members of other political parties to join in the opposition against Marcos. In 1981, he was able to get members of both the nationalist and liberal parties to become members of UNIDO.²⁰³

After the Aquino assassination the opposition against Marcos grew even more powerful, as the Church became more vocal. Specifically, Cardinal Jaime Sin, who had always advocated for reforms against Marcos, began being more active and hosting politically oriented events. After Aquino's death, Cardinal Sin made a speech where he spoke of Aquino as a political hero who was "purified by eight years in prison and three years in exile and his death caused a miracle."²⁰⁴ He also stated that the "regime has lost all moral authority."²⁰⁵ This public backing of the opposition by the Church in a heavily Catholic area of the country was powerful to motivate people to act against the regime.

The death of Aquino, coupled with Church endorsements and existing activist organizations led to over 165 rallies taking place between August and September of 1983.²⁰⁶ During the coup d'état in 1986, one of General Enrile's first phone calls was to

202 Thompson. *The Anti-Marcos Struggle*, 105.

203 Ibid., 104.

204 Ibid., 117.

205 Ibid.

206 Ibid., 116.

Cardinal Sin to ask for his help in stopping the regime from crushing the defectors.²⁰⁷ Cardinal Sin was able to use Radio Veritas and his opposition connections to mobilize enough people to protect Enrile and General Ramos forces.

The ability of the opposition to co-opt all the disparate groups of society under Marcos was essential to their success. Without this, coordination amongst the groups would not have been possible. To a large extent, the Church was the connective tissue that banded these groups together and allowed them to act in unison.

C. LINES OF EFFORT

1. Disruption

Although, the Peoples Power Revolution was predominantly non-violent in its overthrow of Marcos, there was a period in its history where violence was a key tenet. When the opposition to Marcos was first starting to organize, they believed that a violent regime change campaign was the only way to be successful. In 1978, in an effort to get more U.S. backing for the removal of Marcos, the Light a Fire Movement (LAFM) was developed.²⁰⁸ The movement was coordinated by a member of the Catholic Church and his brother, who wanted to carry out “symbolic acts of sabotage” and send “non-lethal letter bombs to shock government technocrats.”²⁰⁹ The purpose was to show the Carter administration that there was severe distrust in the Marcos regime and that he was losing his grip on control. Aquino supported the plan from his jail cell in Manila and several prominent buildings were burned. The acts had the opposite intended effect and President Carter increased aide to Marcos and sought for new military base agreements.

Aquino also supported the April 6 Liberation Movement (A6LM) in 1980. The A6LM was more aggressive than the LAFM in their acts against the regime and sought to launch a campaign of “massive urban guerrilla warfare,” with bombs and

²⁰⁷ Monina Allarey Mercado, *People Power: The Greatest Democracy Ever Told* (Manila: The James B. Reuter, S.J. Foundation, 1986), 105.

²⁰⁸ Thompson, *The Anti-Marcos Struggle*, 85.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

assassinations.²¹⁰ By this time, Aquino was in exile, but he still sent a warning to Marcos on behalf of the A6LM warning that Marcos must reform the regime or hostile actions would start taking place.²¹¹ In August of 1980, nine explosions took place in Manila that injured two and coincided with the trial of some LAFM members.²¹² More explosions followed in September and through November to include a travel agent convention. The travel convention target was intended to hurt the tourist industry. The regime began tracking down and arresting many of the members in November and it was soon apparent that the violence was not having the effect that it was intended to.

The bombing campaign failed to ignite the revolution that many hoped. The U.S. declared that it would not hold any talks with opposition members who had anything to do with the insurgent attacks, which hampered Aquino's ability to gain U.S. support. However, the bombing campaign did result in a concession. In December 1980, Marcos' wife Imelda met with Aquino in New York City after Marcos signaled that he was willing to negotiate. Aquino demanded the lifting of martial law, and in January 1981, martial law was rescinded.²¹³

After the failure of the violent disruption operations and the lifting of martial law in 1981, Aquino determined that the revolution must be conducted as a non-violent mass movement. The first non-violent disruption action that was organized was the boycotting of the 1981 elections. The opposition candidate was Salvador Laurel. Laurel understood that Marcos would not allow him to win, but in order to gain legitimacy decided to run anyway. Laurel advocated for a fairer ballot system, which Marcos declined to give him. As a result, Laurel and UNIDO boycotted the elections.²¹⁴ The boycotting further delegitimized the regime. Marcos refusal to allow third party members to the election commission proved that any elections under Marcos were not fair. This gave UNIDO more legitimacy and also gave the people a viable alternative.

210 Ibid., 90.

211 Ibid., 90.

212 Ibid.

213 Ibid., 92.

214 Ibid., 105–106.

The disruption campaign truly started taking off after the assassination Aquino in 1983. The funeral for Aquino was especially disruptive as it served as a rally for all the anti-Marcos groups. Protests and rallies were held monthly against the Marcos regime and included a variety of topics. Everything from human rights violations, economics, anniversaries of Aquinos death and even women's rights.²¹⁵

After the 1986 elections, when once again widespread voter fraud was suspected, the coup by Enrile and Ramos occurred. General Ramos and Enrile took their RAM force to Camp Aguinaldo and barricaded themselves inside the Ministry of National Defense.²¹⁶ Cardinal Sin called on the people to help protect them and thousands of protestors showed up to help prevent General Ver's forces from overtaking the compound. The protestors utilized non-violent methods and tactics to stop the force. The protests grew over the course of three days and eventually led to Marcos fleeing.

The disruption LOE in the Philippine case was significant. The non-violent protests served as catalysts to gain strength and de-legitimize the regime. The more non-violent protests that occurred, the more the regime acted out to suppress them. This led more powerful members of society like business elites and politicians to call for change. Such loyalty shifts empowered more protests that garnered international attention.

2. Intelligence

Intelligence was prominent throughout this campaign for both the target regime and the opposition. The target regime, having endured numerous protests and threats from 1978–1986 tried to insert sources amongst all the opposition groups. This effort was largely successful, as Marcos knew most of the insurgents plans to include the attempted coup.²¹⁷ The opposition did not have as much penetration as the regime did, however they were able to successfully plan their operations by understanding the regimes reactions. The opposition also had the U.S. embassy under Ambassador Stephen

²¹⁵ Mercado, *People Power*, 31–41.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 101.

²¹⁷ Gemma Nemenzo, "Positively Filipino." February 20, 2013, <http://positivelyfilipino.com/magazine/2013/2/77-hours-the-behind-the-scenes-at-the-1986-edsa-people-power-revolution>.

Bosworth, who was instrumental in providing intelligence to both the Reagan administration and the opposition about Marcos' actions and intent during the revolution.

When the coup occurred on February 22, 1986, Ambassador Bosworth sent numerous cables to Washington urging President Reagan to demand that Marcos not take any repressive action against citizens of the Philippines. In addition to this, Bosworth was tapping the radio traffic from Marcos forces and passing it to Enrile and Ramos.²¹⁸ This gave Enrile and Ramos the opportunity to notify Cardinal Sin in enough time to mobilize the populace. Bosworth was a staunch supporter of pushing the Marcos regime out and tried for a number of years to convince the Reagan administration to do so. Bosworth was able to convince many members of the cabinet to include the Under Secretary of State, Michael Armacost, and the Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff, Adm William Crowe.²¹⁹ This support was guided by the intelligence that the U.S. Embassy was passing back to Washington detailing Marcos possible role in the assassination of Aquino and the human rights abuses that were taking place.

Since the opposition movement's main objective was a non-violent regime change, the tactical intelligence that mattered most was how to best protect the Coup participants and further de-legitimize the regime. The information that Bosworth passed to Enrile and Ramos about Marcos troop movement and initiatives was relayed through Radio Veritas, so that the protestors knew where to intercept pro-Marcos forces. The protestors were able to slow and prevent Marcos troops from being able to mobilize against the Coup. Additionally, President Reagan and the State Department were quietly urging Marcos to avoid any violent confrontation with Enrile and Ramos. Between February 22 and February 26, the Reagan administration finally agreed with Bosworth that Marcos had to go. Reagan offered to provide safety for Marcos if he were to leave the country peacefully and have Cory Aquino installed as President. Marcos reluctantly agreed and Bosworth then coordinated for Marcos departure on February 26.²²⁰

218 Karnow, "Setting Marcos Adrift."

219 Ibid.

220 Ibid.

The opposition forces against Marcos were at a distinct disadvantage when it came to intelligence. They were able to overcome this hurdle by keeping the movement non-violent and using the intelligence that the U.S. Embassy provided to coordinate their protests and keep the population motivated to overthrow Marcos. Additionally, the intelligence that Ambassador Bosworth provided after 1983, helped gather enough internal U.S. support to push the Reagan administration into forcing Marcos out.

3. Psychological

The opposition leadership that advocated for the overthrow of Marcos was largely based in the U.S. Aquino lived in the U.S. for three years while organizing efforts to overthrow the regime. Additionally, numerous Filipino American groups staged protests against U.S. support of the Marcos regime and to induce U.S. administration support for their effort, these groups published many propaganda items to both rally the American people and force policy change. Underground newspapers and radio stations used these propaganda items within the Philippines to mobilize support.²²¹

In 1982, Marcos made his first state visit to the U.S. to meet with President Reagan. The visit gave the anti-Marcos opposition groups in the U.S. an opportunity to de-legitimize him and gain some support. The stated goal of the opposition during this visit was to “expose the abuses and excesses of the Marcos regime, embarrass the president in front of the U.S. government and the American people and by consequence call into question his political legitimacy.”²²² The opposition set to achieve these goals by calling into question Marcos mental stability, his health and by relating him to historical villains.²²³ They then took these attributes and related them to current presidential policies and portrayed them as “eratic, irrational and dangerous.”²²⁴

The *Philippine News* published the following statement as an example:

221 Joseph P. McCallus, “The Celebration of The Devil: Degradation Rhetoric in the Propaganda of the Anti-Marcos Movement in America.” *Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society* 17, no. 1 (March 1989): 90–103,

222 Ibid., 94.

223 Ibid., 95.

224 Ibid.

You can't kill all of us. There will be some left to finish you!" ... This is the enraged confirmation by the Philippine ruler Ferdinand E. Marcos that democratic revolutionary forces in the Philippines are pursuing in their destabilization program against his regime. ... To counteract the bold plan of his enemies, Marcos announced that he has formed a secret police of some 1,000 plainclothes men to cover metro Manila.²²⁵

This shows how the opposition wanted to paint Marcos in the American public as a dictator that was bent on holding onto his power at all costs.

Inside the Philippines, the Church was often used as a place to print and make anti-Marcos propaganda for distribution. Signs were made that called the Marcos regime a dictatorship; leaflets were printed with damaging narratives, as well as underground newspapers. From the time that martial law was enacted in 1972, these newspapers were active.²²⁶ The newspapers focused on detailing the actions of the Marcos regime and also urging citizens to act in organized protests. The success of these newspapers was limited from 1972–1983, since Marcos had such a high degree of control over the media, but after the Aquino assassination the newspapers were a high demand item for the people.

Radio Veritas was the Church owned radio station in the Philippines. It was highly censored once the Church began openly supporting the anti-Marcos movement. The radio station could not be completely stopped however, because Marcos understood that the Church had a wide band of popular support. Marcos attempted to censor the radio station as much as he could, but ultimately Radio Veritas was able to broadcast anti-Marcos propaganda on occasion. The Church used this platform to call on protestors to remain non-violent and served as a coordination mechanism for many of the opposition organizations. The use of the radio station made it clear to listeners that they would not be alone in their efforts to protest against the regime. This gave many a sense of empowerment and helped enable such a large mass of people to protest. As mentioned earlier, after Aquino's death, there were over 150 protests within a two-month span. This

225 Ibid. 96.

226 Caroline S. Malay, "Heroes of Press, Freedom and Underground in the Time of Marcos," Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility, December 27, 2006, <http://www.cmfr-phil.org/2006/12/27/heroes-of-press-freedom-the-underground-press-in-the-time-of-marcos/>.

high degree of opposition can be attributed to the support the movement got from Radio Veritas, which served as a powerful medium.

4. Logistics

Many organizations provided for the insurgency inside the Philippines. The Catholic Church provided a safe place for organizers to mobilize and coordinate their groups. The Church also was able to use their donation funds to keep the group resourced. UNIDO provided an outlet for the group to campaign against Marcos and more openly oppose him. The RAM also allowed for logistics to be funneled from the military to help support the protests. All of these groups assisted in ensuring that the revolutionary protests were well resourced. In addition to the internal groups, the U.S. also supported the movement by re-fueling Enrile and Ramos' helicopters and ensured that mechanisms were in place to bring Marcos out of the Philippines.²²⁷ Diaspora groups within the U.S. also helped support the insurgency. Many Filipino American groups provided money to the insurgency in an effort to support the cause. Most of this money was spent in the production of the underground newspapers and different propaganda.

It is difficult to track all of the money that was provided to the opposition to help with propaganda, campaign finance and materiel support because it came from so many different channels. Since the movement was non-violent, most of the funds were used to produce the propaganda and underground newspapers as well as keep the political group, UNIDO, active. The Church would urge parishioners to donate to the political nominees, such as Laurel and Aquino and use the Church funds to finance Radio Veritas and different propaganda items.

RAM brought a significant amount of materiel support to the insurgency. When Ramos and Enrile defected, they brought their troops and equipment with them. Although they did not use it, the equipment was available as a contingency. The decision to keep the insurgency non-violent eliminated much of the need for excessive materiel support that is seen in many violent insurgencies.

²²⁷ Karnow, "Setting Marcos Adrift."

D. INSURGENT IMPERATIVES FOR SUCCESS

1. Commitment and Motivation

The many groups that protested and lobbied against the Marcos regime showed a high level of commitment and motivation despite the regimes frequent attempts to dissuade them. After martial law was declared in 1972, Marcos jailed many of his opponents, but still through a jail cell, Aquino was able to sponsor movements like the LAFM and the A6LM. Laurel continued to campaign against the regime even though he knew that the elections in 1981 and 1985 would be rigged and fraudulently counted. The opposition continued their efforts, despite these occurrences, which shows a high level of commitment and motivation.

Many of the opposition groups believed that without the U.S support, their efforts would never result in regime change. The groups continually tried to sway the administration's support away from Marcos. In this sense, the opposition worked hard to undermine the legitimacy of the target regime. Although, the administration did not shift its support until the final protests and coup, many within the U.S. government expressed their support for the ouster of Marcos. This helped assure the opposition that the U.S. was wavering in their support for Marcos. At one point Ambassador Bosworth was upset that President Reagan was accusing both sides of fraud in the 1985 election and he told a crowd that "wasn't the full U.S. position you heard. Be patient."²²⁸

The defections of Enrile and Ramos also helped motivate the protests. They were two high-ranking officials who denounced Marcos's policy. This helped reaffirm the oppositions already held beliefs. RAM members showed a high level of commitment during the coup, at one point believing that death was inevitable, Enrile phoned Cardinal Sin stating that he was ready to die for his country if that is what needed to happen.²²⁹

228 Ibid.

229 Mercado, *People Power*, 107

2. Flexibility and Adaptability

The opposition showed a high level of flexibility by shifting from violent to non-violent tactics early on and by quickly mobilizing under the direction of the Church after the coup began. After Aquino was jailed in 1972, he was convinced that the only way Marcos could be removed was through force. In a sense, he was right as Marcos began making his first concessions after the A6LM bombing in 1980 by lifting martial law. The Church consistently took the stance that the regime change campaign should be non-violent. Many members still supported the violent movements, but Cardinal Sin's position and the official Church position was always non-violence. Aquino realized after the failures of LAFM and the cost of conducting a violent campaign with A6LM that non-violent protests could be more effective. Additionally, with the support of the church, the opposition movement could grow exponentially. By taking this stance, Aquino was able to unite the many disparate groups by not using the more risky violent tactics that they initially used.

After the coup took place, the church was able to quickly mobilize its support to help the defectors. The protestors with local leaders were able to rapidly move people to prevent the slaughter of the RAM forces. By using Radio Veritas, the church was able to rapidly disseminate information and move its forces. This shows that the opposition used its flexibility to counter the regimes tactics and was agile enough to change its strategy when certain operations failed.

The anti-Marcos opposition consistently showed its flexibility and adaptability by changing strategy, quickly countering regime actions and gaining popular support. The opposition leaders were able to coordinate their efforts and work well together to synchronize both messages and operations. The church, UNIDO, RAM and the business elites displayed this through a vast amount of disruption protests and their ability to garner international support.

3. Tangible Support

The opposition was able to get most of its manpower through existing organizations, such as the church and student organizations. It also sought to co-opt the

disenfranchised business elites who were dissatisfied with economic conditions and RAM military members. The ability of the political leaders like Aquino and Laurel to unite these groups was key to building the tangible support base needed to effect regime change. Materiel support was provided by many diaspora organizations in the U.S. as well as campaign contributions to UNIDO and donations to the Church. These all served to keep the protestors well resourced.

The dissatisfaction with the regime was high and spanned across many social groups. The dissatisfaction created an environmental condition that was easy for the opposition to exploit. By co-opting already established protest groups, the opposition was able to build its base of support without having to spend a lot of time recruiting. Aquino had a huge base of support while he was in jail and in exile. He used his influence to garner support from these different groups and unite them under one political organization, UNIDO. UNIDO's tangible support only grew when Aquino was martyred in 1983.

The development of UNIDO gave all the opposition parties an outlet to more openly speak against the regime. Prior to 1981, Marcos could easily suppress any political efforts that spoke against him. Once the elections were boycotted, Marcos was forced to increase his legitimacy by allowing the existence of UNIDO. The opposition leaders that were exiled no longer needed a sanctuary to speak against the regime. The sanctuary aspect of tangible support was not needed in the Philippines after 1981, because UNIDO was allowed into the political system, even though they were prevented from winning any seats.

E. ANALYSIS

The target regime created a situation within the country that made it ripe for an insurgency. The economic disparity in the Philippines under Marcos disenfranchised too many segments of society. Surrounding countries, without economic international backing, were growing their GDP, while the Philippines was stagnating. This led the business elites to call for reforms in order to keep their businesses safe. The gap between

the rich and the poor was widening, which created political opportunities for opposition reformists to act.

The many groups that opposed the target regime were representative of many segments of society. This allowed the opposition to co-opt all the different groups without having to spend time and resources to recruit. From 1972 on, the opposition was able to have a sizable portion of Marcos pillars of support.²³⁰ The opposition was able to co-opt the business elites, military and some government workers almost immediately.

The use of the church to coordinate and mobilize support was a key aspect of the non-violent protests. The church, using intelligence provided by the U.S. Embassy was able to rapidly mobilize large groups of people to act in a coordinated fashion. This coordination and mobilization mechanism was key to putting enough pressure on the Marcos regime for the U.S. to shift support. Additionally, the church provided common ground for the organizations to come together and made it difficult for the target regime to counter.

This insurgency was homegrown and was seen as an internally led organization, which gave it an immense amount of legitimacy among the people. Official external sponsorship of the insurgency did not come until the final few days, which prevented the insurgency from being seen as a puppet organization. The legitimacy of its leaders helped propel most of them to sitting congressional positions or presidencies. Cory Aquino and Fidel Ramos were both presidents of the Philippines while Juan Enrile still sits in the Philippine Congress today. Their actions were seen as brave and key to the overthrow of Marcos. U.S. external sponsorship was minimal, but it is still enough to consider this a case of UW. U.S. support provided the pressure needed to overthrow Marcos and prevent a violent clash between the target regime and protestors.

²³⁰ Robert Helvey, *On Strategic Non-Violent Conflict: Thinking About the Fundamentals* (Boston MA: The Albert Einstein Institution, 2004)

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VII. CONCLUSION

To effectively sponsor an insurgent movement, time and effort must be taken to understand both the target regime and the insurgent organization. This should serve as a starting point for strategy development and prioritization of LOE's. The planning considerations of insurgent influence and target regime assessment outlined in this framework can help the planner determine what elements of the resistance can be augmented and offer potential fissures to exploit. The proposed LOE's operationalize how to grow and advance the insurgency to achieve intermediate goals and contribute to the insurgent imperatives. The insurgent imperatives of commitment and motivation, flexibility and adaptability and tangible support were identified through a recent RAND study as common traits that successful COIN forces displayed.²³¹ By examining the four case studies, these traits were also displayed by successful insurgencies. Continually assessing these imperatives can give the external sponsor the ability to ensure that the resistance is on the right path to success.

The four case studies utilized a variety of different methods to achieve their goals. Lethal targeting dominated the Burma and Nicaragua cases with varying levels of success. The disruption operations conducted by DET 101 tied up a vast number of Japanese forces and aided in the growth of surrogate forces from 3,000 to 10,000 in less than two years.²³² The disruption operations in Nicaragua had the opposite effect and alienated the insurgents from the population for the first five years of the insurgency. This forced a strategy shift where the Contras eventually reduced the negative impact of their operations on the populace resulting in a regime change. This suggests that violence may be more useful when fighting against an external or occupying force in a resistance rather than against an internal organic government or adversary.

Non-violent tactics were used in the Solidarity case and the Philippine revolution to achieve regime change. These two organizations were able to effectively co-opt

²³¹ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 181.

²³² Ward, "Detachment 101."

numerous anti-regime groups and unite them to force regime change. Additionally, both groups effectively used target regime actions to induce popular support for the resistance. Whether using violent or non-violent tactics, all four cases show how an external sponsor can support the resistance by following the proposed framework. This chapter will outline the common characteristics that enabled success throughout the four case studies.

A. UW PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

1. Insurgent Influence

The insurgent movement must have the organizational capacity to be able to accept external support.²³³ This includes the ability to accept new recruits into their network, the ability to move supplies and the ability to effectively coordinate among networks or cells. The insurgent movement cannot grow too quickly or the command structure can be overwhelmed and lose control. In the Contra case, the resistance was too immature and proper assessments were not done on the leaders before external support was given. This led to misuse of the sponsor's support and money. In the Burma case, the insurgent organization had the capacity to grow as a result of external sponsor efforts and leadership.

External support of the insurgency cannot overtake the indigenous organization. Efforts must be made by the external sponsor to keep their support as clandestine as possible. This serves to further legitimize the insurgency and reduce perceptions of a U.S. puppet resistance. When external support is well known, the sponsor becomes accountable for all insurgent actions, both good and bad. When in fact, "the external sponsor cannot control most of the causal factors leading to end state."²³⁴ Keeping the support clandestine can reduce the stigma associated with such groups as the Contras during their repeated instances of human rights abuses.

²³³ In "Social Movements and Networks," Ch-3 by Helmut Anheier, the rise of the Nazi Movement is examined and he concludes that a significant organizational development occurred before the party began rising in influence. Anheier, Helmut. "Social Movements and Networks," in *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 51.

²³⁴ Connable and Libicki, *How Insurgencies End*, 73.

A resonating narrative is an important aspect of insurgent networking. The narrative should be broad based and appeal to a wide swath of the population. It should effectively condemn or vilify the target regime and offer a prognostic solution to the problem.²³⁵ The Solidarity narrative used these aspects to gain support for their cause. Solidarity focused their narrative on Polish nationalism, which was extremely important to the population. Even though the resistance wanted a democracy, they understood that many Polish people still believed in socialism, so they steered away from a specific form of government and focused on the negative features of the target regime. Additionally, they adapted their narrative as conditions changed, tailoring it to uncovered regime atrocities and new public sentiment.

Co-opting existing organizations is an effective way to rapidly gain a large amount of support and mechanisms for aiding the resistance organization.²³⁶ This method of bloc recruitment helps the organization appeal to large swaths of the population who are sympathetic to not only the insurgents' plight, but the co-opted organization as well. This was used extensively in all the cases. Solidarity spent nearly 10 years gaining the support and trust of many different groups that the target regime trusted and advocated for. By co-opting the workers and trade unions that the government supported, Solidarity was able to effectively subvert the regime and recruit new members. In Burma, DET 101 used existing military forces under British control to augment and help recruit their guerrilla force. This led to the recruitment of the Kachin people and the securing of a sanctuary inside Burma.

Penetration of the target regimes' pillars of support can also increase insurgent influence. The pillars of support include: military, police, business elites, government bureaucrats, politicians and media.²³⁷ Penetration of these pillars can allow the insurgents to integrate them into the resistance organization and facilitate a more peaceful turnover of power once regime change is affected. Of the case studies, this was most prevalent in

²³⁵ The three elements that make up a narrative were identified as diagnostic, prognostic and motivational. This was derived from an Unconventional Warfare seminar delivered by Professor Doowan Lee, at the Naval Postgraduate School on November 15, 2013.

²³⁶ Anheier, "Social Movements."

²³⁷ Helvey, *On Strategic Non-Violent Conflict*, 9-19.

the Philippine revolution, where military, politicians, business elites and the media were all advocating for the overthrow of Marcos. In countries where diverse segments and traditional pillars of support are all looking for change, external sponsorship should be heavily considered if insurgent and sponsor goals align.

2. Target Regime

Identifying both the strengths and weaknesses of the target regime is important during the assessment phase. This cannot be done effectively in a condensed timeframe. Pre-conflict stages should focus on accurate and complete assessments of the target regime. This should include identifying the actions that make the police or security forces overreact and the level of commitment by regional and local powerbrokers. Identifying the actions that make the security forces overreact gives the insurgent organization the knowledge to plan future events to induce recruitment and support for their organization while undermining the regime.²³⁸

Decision points, sequels and branches must be developed during pre-UW stages to exploit the regime when they are most vulnerable. This should include the use of media to garner both internal and international support if the regime commits atrocities. Additionally, tactical level contingencies should be considered such as: what should the organization do, when its people are jailed? Or how should we respond to overwhelming police or military force? Identifying the responses to these scenarios and putting mechanisms in place for timely execution gives the insurgents assurance that actions will be taken on their behalf if they get hurt or jailed thus lowering the risk to support.

Identifying the people who have a high commitment to the regime and those who have a low commitment to the regime can assist the insurgent organization in identifying whom to target for subversion and what to target for sabotage. Personnel with a high commitment are unlikely to be phased by psychological measures and may be better targeted for sabotage. Those with a wavering sense of loyalty or people who show

²³⁸ Ibid., 74-75.

sympathy to the insurgent cause may be able to be co-opted for future use.²³⁹ In any event, this takes time. A persistent presence in vulnerable countries or regions where regime change is probable will assist planners in getting a fuller picture of the problem.

Persistent presence will help to foment the relationships needed to build an effective organization and develop the knowledge needed to counter the target regime. Persistent presence in target locations will help to ensure the successful integration of the external sponsor and a better understanding by planners how to best support the insurgent organization. The relationships formed during the pre-UW phases can greatly enhance the sponsor's knowledge base and ensure that mechanisms are in place prior to official sponsorship.

B. LINES OF EFFORT

The integration of these broadly framed LOEs will help military planners develop successful regime change campaigns. Understanding when and how to use the different LOE's will be situation dependent. The uniqueness of the target regime and the capacity of the insurgency should help the planner determine how to best prioritize the LOE's.

1. Disruption

Sabotage and subversion should be used on a persistent basis during a UW campaign to continuously attrite the target regime of support. This can be done in numerous ways. In Poland, nationalist and religious sentiments were promulgated through the use of symbols and strikes. In the Philippines, underground newspapers and flyers were used along with protests. In Burma and Nicaragua, attrition came through lethal targeting of both officials and government offices. Disruption operations must display the capabilities of the resistance and the ineptness of the target regime.

Kinetic disruption operations can often be counter-productive for the insurgent organization.²⁴⁰ Determining when to use violence must be based on the insurgent

²³⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, *Power Moves*, 25. Suggests that an effective tactic is to implicate a member of the regime in an overthrow plot to create fissures from within.

²⁴⁰ Connable and Libicki refer to the use of terror by insurgencies, but note that the definition of terrorism is muddled. Connable and Libicki, *How Insurgencies End*, 99–113.

organizations' ability to handle the regime response and how the population will be affected. Using violence too early for the Peoples Power movement resulted in very little popular support and a harsh regime reaction that jailed a large portion of the LAFM and A6LM forces. The insurgency should be very careful with the use of violence to not incite regime crackdowns or impose penalties on the population.

Any force the insurgents use must be viewed as more legitimate than that of the target regime.²⁴¹ It is important for the population to feel as if the insurgent group is a better alternative to the current regime. In Nicaragua, the Contras made the mistake of directing their operations against the regime and the population. This resulted in delegitimizing the insurgents and alienating them from the population. Non-violent protests are potentially incredibly effective. When the target regime reacts violently to these protests out of frustration, the population perceives it as unnecessary oppression. When force is used, it must be strictly aimed against the target regime and have little effect on the lives of the population.

2. Intelligence

Intelligence operations are vital to regime change campaigns to protect the insurgent force and develop methods to disaggregate the target regime. When engaging in kinetic and violent acts it is important to know how the regime will react and the methods they will use to find the perpetrators. This intelligence can then be used to maximize recruitment and propaganda efforts. Understanding the target population and local sentiments will drive the disruption and psychological LOEs. Intelligence must be used persistently throughout the UW campaign to focus tactical operations and strategy.

In Poland, during the martial law period, there was a high degree of control over the population. Intelligence operations focused mostly on future regime actions to protect the underground printing and propaganda operations. Knowledge of regime actions from internal sources or assets can be extremely beneficial in protecting the insurgent force. Using the intelligence LOE as a primary means for maintaining and developing

²⁴¹ Paul et al. explain that “iron fist” methods of COIN push the population towards the insurgents, the reverse is also true. Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 169.

operational security is paramount. Intelligence networks can be used to feed the regime disinformation on the intentions of the insurgents.²⁴²

An early presence in the target country should be a pre-requisite for a UW campaign to develop intelligence networks. The external sponsor can gain valuable insight into the target regime and the insurgent organization to better craft future plans to ensure success.

Additionally, the insurgent's intelligence gathering capability must be developed. Paul et al. explains that COIN forces should develop intelligence mechanisms to support kill/capture missions.²⁴³ This suggests that the insurgents must develop internal intelligence sources to protect themselves and stay ahead of the regime. Enabling the insurgents to gather both tactical and psychological intelligence puts the external sponsor at less risk and lowers their signature. The insurgents are better suited to gather this intelligence because they have both access and placement within the target country and are likely to get more reliable information from the populace. This was evident in the Burma campaign. Once a substantial base of support is developed insurgents should be trusted to provide local intelligence for the organization and sponsors.

3. Psychological

Psychological operations are important to incorporate into any UW campaign to gain popular and international support. The use of propaganda and narratives can aid the insurgent organization in growth and motivation. The psychological LOE can be exploited through the media, leaflets, radio and underground newspapers, or through any means that can reach large portions of the population. The psychological aspect must be able to tap into deeply rooted beliefs, traditions or culture to have great effect.

Psychological propaganda should be developed in concert with the resistance organization. It is extremely difficult for someone outside the target countries to understand what will resonate with the local population. In Burma, the psychological

²⁴² Helvey, *On Strategic Non-Violent Conflict*, 68.

²⁴³ Paul et al, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers*, 72

propaganda employed did not have much of an effect on the local population because the Psychological operations messages that were printed on the Japanese currency were not widely read. Much of the population utilized opium or other goods for currency. In Poland, the narrative used for psychological propaganda was extremely effective because it invoked a high sense of nationalism and history of Polish resistance. In both cases, the employment of psychological propaganda required a high degree of knowledge of local customs and traditions. This knowledge can be developed through persistent presence operations in target countries and with strong local and regional partnerships.

The target audience and political goal must be identified prior to beginning any psychological effort. One form of media may be effective to use against neutral elements, but may not be effective when used against enemy elements.²⁴⁴ The message and means of delivery must be tailored to the audience and resonate with the particular target. Understanding the target country specifics such as literacy levels, media footprints and dominant forms of communication can help in developing the dissemination strategy.

4. Logistics

The external sponsor should utilize insurgent mechanisms for logistics when possible. This serves to build the insurgents organizational capacity and lower the external sponsor's visibility. This was perhaps most prevalent in Poland, where the U.S. provided the insurgents with money and equipment through a very disparate logistics network in a heavily controlled country during the martial law period. The external sponsor had to use existing mechanisms to get Solidarity equipment and money because building a new infrastructure would have been too risky and time consuming. Utilizing existing networks that have organic, natural concealment from the target regime to support logistics operations is useful. Organic concealment means utilizing existing networks that are risky for the target regime to penetrate or oppress. A good example of this is the RAM in the Philippines and the trade unions in Poland. Both of these

²⁴⁴ Department of the Army, *Unconventional Warfare Operations*, 1-19-1-20.

organizations were politically sensitive to the target regime and oppressing these organizations would have resulted in second and third order effects that the regime was not willing to endure.

The external sponsor must be careful to not give the insurgent organization more material support than they can properly handle or distribute.²⁴⁵ In Nicaragua, the U.S. inundated the insurgent organization with arms, money and materials. This led to mismanagement of the goods within the Contra organization. As a result, the U.S. was forced to control money distribution and spending, thus increasing their visibility and risk. As the insurgent organization grows in capability and capacity, logistics assistance can increase.

The use of a sanctuary greatly increases the insurgent chance for success.²⁴⁶ This can help lower both the insurgent and external sponsor risk levels. Having a sanctuary provides both elements an outlet to more effectively coordinate, plan and distribute logistics. Additionally, a safe haven helps increase the capabilities of the insurgent organization as it provides a venue for training. In Burma and Nicaragua, safe havens were utilized and provided both insurgencies with a training venue and mechanism for logistics support.

C. INSURGENT IMPERATIVES:

1. Commitment and Motivation

The commitment and motivation of the insurgents is a critical factor to their success. This is enabled by the LOEs mentioned above and serves to prevent penetration by the regime and increases insurgent legitimacy. If the insurgent organization is perceived as corrupt then popular support will wane. It will be difficult for a corrupt insurgent organization to recruit because they will not be seen as a viable political alternative to the regime.

²⁴⁵ Connable and Libicki, *How Insurgencies End*, 73.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 34–35.

Emphasizing the need for commitment and motivation throughout the insurgent organization will assist in raising their legitimacy and recruitment. Additionally, it helps protect the insurgent organization from regime penetration and targeting. Committed and motivated groups will practice better operational security than forces that are looking to enhance their personal wealth or status. Solidarity was able to remain clandestine throughout the martial law period despite incredibly high membership. This is because the individuals and leadership were committed and motivated to advance the insurgent cause and did not seek to advance their personal wealth or status.

2. Flexibility and Adaptability

Displaying flexibility and adaptability keeps the regime in a reactive mode and increases the chance that the regime will act in a repressive fashion. When the state acts in a heavy handed manner, the insurgency has the opportunity to exacerbate social fissures and exploit the action to gain support. The target regime will generally have the force advantage and superior technology to target the insurgent efforts. The insurgent organization should be more flexible because it is smaller and should not have the bureaucratic barriers that the regime has. Flexibility must be used and displayed to win.

Solidarity displayed their flexibility by exploiting regime oppression to gain concessions. Solidarity was able to get a monument built and union demands met in both 1970 and 1980. The Peoples Power revolution showed their flexibility by exploiting Marcos corruption through the organization of protests after Aquino's death. Peoples Power used Aquino's death to rally hundreds of thousands of protestors to show their disaffection to the regime.

3. Tangible Support

Increasing the manpower, intelligence, sanctuary, material, funding and promoting tolerance of the insurgent organization are all aspects of tangible support.²⁴⁷ These should be the goals of the insurgent organization and the external sponsor during

²⁴⁷ Paul et al., *Paths to Victory*, 182.

the latent and incipient phase of the insurgency. Building substantial tangible support is necessary to effectively execute the LOE's and reduce the risk to the insurgent organization.

Tangible support was extremely high in the Nicaragua case, but the insurgency still faltered in the early years because the external sponsor primarily provided it. The insurgent group must have the capacity to build its own tangible support. The external sponsor must be able to augment the insurgency and fill the capabilities gaps. It is possible that the Contras failed initially, because they began executing their disruption operations well before their internal tangible support base was adequately developed. Notably, Paul et al. explains that outcomes are "less certain when insurgents' tangible support does not come from the population."²⁴⁸

The case studies serve to show how the proposed planning framework for UW regime change campaigns may be used. This framework is meant to serve as a starting point for operational level staffs who may be asked to develop plans for UW campaigns. The framework can be used to develop an initial plan and identifies the key elements that have made past insurgencies successful. Understanding the target regime and level of insurgent influence are necessary before contemplating UW. The LOE's should be based on the target regime and insurgent influence assessments. Successful regime change through a UW campaign is possible. Identifying the movements that align with U.S. interests is a military priority.

This thesis used four case studies to test the proposed framework as a starting point for operational staffs to plan UW campaigns. The framework is not meant to be a rigid solution as every insurgent organization and target regime is unique. However, there are common threads that exist in all the successful insurgencies and these commonalities should be used to inform future efforts.

²⁴⁸ Paul et al., *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers*, 72.

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