

Fighting the Global War on Terror Tolerably:

Augmenting the Global Counter Insurgency Strategy with Surrogates

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

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There is a long historical precedent of great powers utilizing surrogate forces as an economy of force measure in the pursuit of their objectives. The lessons learned during the ideological brush fire conflicts of the Cold War are relevant to the current ideological struggles of the GWOT. The two case studies chosen for this paper are the French in Algeria 1954-1962 and the British in Oman/Dhofar 1965-1975. The scope of this study reviews three themes that run through the French and British utilization of surrogates and the potential applications for the US in the GWOT. The three themes are the recruitment of surrogates, their employment and the moral implications of adopting a surrogate based strategy.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

“The best way to win the war is to train troops that are indigenous forces, that are capable forces...ultimately you need to get away from these very, very large number of occupation forces in the region.”¹ General John Abizaid, Central Command Commander.

US Army Field Manual (FM) 7-100 describes the contemporary operational environment (COE) “as the composite of the conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander today and into the clearly foreseeable future.”² The COE the United States (US) military is currently operating in is dominated by the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and barring the emergence of a hostile military peer competitor or other dire development, the GWOT will continue to dominate the COE. In December 2006 Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker testified that the Army active component does not have sufficient resources to maintain the current operations tempo of the COE.³ The National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT) describes the GWOT as predominantly focused on combating violent Islamist extremists who exploit Islam and use terrorism to further their ideological ends.⁴ The current American strategy in the GWOT has stretched her manpower resources to the breaking point, has drawn criticism

¹ General John Abizaid. Interview by Ted Koppel, “Surveying the Spread of the War on Terror” <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7793142> Accessed March 2007.

² Department of the Army. “FM 7-100 Opposing Force Doctrinal Framework and Strategy.” May 2003, Introduction, iv

³ General Schoomaker. December 14, 2006 testimony to Commission on National Guard and Reserves. <http://www.army.mil/-speeches/2006/12/14/989-statement-by-general-peter-schoomaker-chief-of-staff-united-states-army-before-the-commission-on-national-guard-and-reserves/> Accessed March 2007

⁴ U.S. Department of Defense. “*National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*” NMSP-WOT (CJCS Washington, DC 1 February 2006),4

from traditionally friendly countries and played into the Jihadi propaganda, evoking images of the Crusades and Western Neo-colonialism.⁵

The US could alleviate some of the manpower and international opinion issues by adopting an indirect strategy that utilizes surrogates to lower US profile and exploit the regional, ideological or sectarian cleavages in the Islamic terrorist networks. World powers have historically resorted to utilizing surrogates as an economy of force measure to augment their overstretched militaries ability to police their far flung national interests. Enlisting, training and supporting indigenous surrogates in the GWOT, especially in areas of diverse cultural and religious expression, has the potential to advance American interests and influence with an economy of force operation, preserving the preponderance of her military assets for any conventional threat that might arise.

The primary aim of this paper is to review the potential use of surrogates as a lower profile and more effective approach to achieving the American objectives in the GWOT objectives. It does not purport to discover the solution to the counter insurgency (COIN) Gordian knot, but rather to reexamine an existing tool of the counter insurgent and determine its applicability to the GWOT. In order to accomplish this, this paper will examine two case studies of Western European powers that conducted COIN operations in Islamic Arab countries, the French in Algeria (1954-62) and the British in Oman (1968-1976). Through a comparative analysis of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the French and British in utilizing surrogate

⁵ Pew Global Attitudes Project, America's Image Slips, but allies share US concerns over Iran, Hamas. <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=252> Accessed March 2007; PBS Bin Laden's Fatwa August 1996. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html Accessed March 2007

forces in Algeria and Oman respectively, this paper will attempt to demonstrate how these lessons could be applied to the GWOT. First, however, the definition of what constitutes a surrogate force is in order.

The definition of surrogate force was adapted from the definitions of Surrogate, Coalition and guerrilla force as taken from the Special Forces Operations Field Manual 3-05.20:

2-13. The term indigenous means native, originating in, or intrinsic to an area or region. The term surrogate refers to someone who takes the place of or acts for another.

2-16. ...A coalition can politically enhance the legitimacy of U.S. military operations and secure international support. Tangible evidence that other affected nations are willing to commit their forces...strengthens domestic support. Like resistance forces described previously, these coalition forces have their own interests, goals, and objectives, but are united with the United States to achieve a specific purpose. From a US point of view these coalition forces and resources are surrogates and act as substitutes for U.S. troops and resources, reducing U.S. commitment.”

Glossary-12. Guerrilla force= A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy held, hostile or denied territory.⁶

For the purpose of this paper the definition of a surrogate force will be: *A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel who have a recognized stake in the outcome of the situation and are organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in conjunction with or in place of the forces of the employing power.*

This definition provides a clear set of boundaries for surrogate forces as well as minimal criteria for their selection and employment. Ideally, an indigenous surrogate would provide the employing power with a force that possesses a base level of familiarity with the physical and

⁶ U.S. Department of the Army. “*Special Forces Operations Field Manual 3-05.20*” (January 2004) Pages 2-5,2-6, Glossary-12

human terrain in the area of employment.⁷ A surrogate with a recognized legitimate stake in the situation could have a positive impact on the local, domestic and international reception of the operation transforming the perception of the employing power from meddling instigator to facilitator.

The term Strategic Communications (SC) will generally be used through this paper in lieu of Information Operations (IO) or Civil Military Operations (CMO). SC encompasses an employing power's focused efforts to engage a target audience in the hope of creating favorable conditions for achieving the employing powers objectives, through the synchronized use of all elements of national power. IO deals with exploiting or protecting information in order to influence the adversaries' decision making. While the intent of CMO is similar to SC it does not incorporate the elements of national power.⁸ The ability of the Employing Power to conduct effective SC to advance his ideas will be the key factor in achieving decisive results in an ideological struggle.

There are numerous similarities between the two case studies that make them particularly applicable for comparison and adaptation to the present US role in the GWOT. Both studies involve western European powers engaged in shoring up apathetic domestic support, while utilizing surrogates to wage a counterinsurgency operation among Arab Muslim populations. The fractious political climate in France and the war wary British public greatly affected the ability to prosecute their respective wars. Numerous French coalition governments were dissolved over

⁷ Jacob Kipp, Lester Grau, Karl Prinslow and Don Smith, "The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century." *Military Review* Vol LXXXVI (September October 2006): 9.

⁸ Department of Defense. Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary and Associated Terms. 12 April 2001 (As amended through 5 January 2007), 88, 257, 509.

their inability to resolve the Algerian crisis, which eventually led to the scrapping of the constitution to establish a stronger 5th Republic. One of the reasons for the paucity of literature on the Oman-Dhofar campaign is both the Omani Sultan and British government wanted to minimize the public view of the conflict. These powers were faced with overcoming cultural differences that are very similar to the issues facing US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan today, and will likely continue to face in the ongoing prosecution of the GWOT in the COE.

A major underpinning of this monograph is the idea that the GWOT is more akin to the ideological struggle of the Cold War model than to the more conventional World War II. While the ideological aspects of WWII can not be ignored, it was a relatively short and kinetically decided conflict with conventional theaters and static nation state combatants (Italy and France excluded). The Cold War was contested over decades between two opposing ideological views that confronted each other in disparate regions of the globe through multiple proxies. In its simplest form, the Cold War boiled down to Western free market democracies against Eastern communist totalitarian states. Barring the entrance of a non-religious terrorist threat of global reach, the current GWOT is defined by the NMSP-WOT as a struggle between a community of partner nations and a movement of violent Islamist extremists who use terror for ideological means.⁹ It is the ideological disposition of the two case studies that creates a common thread between them and their relevance to the GWOT. It is this common ideological nature of the struggles that permits the lessons learned during the Cold War to be adapted and applied to the current ideological struggle in the GWOT.

⁹ NMSP-WOT, 4

The French campaign in Algeria was an ideological struggle between the French and Islamic Algerian nationalists. The nation state of France was founded on the principles of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. The traumatic birth and subsequent history of France have fused those principles with French self-identity; a conflict with France is seen as a conflict with those principles.¹⁰ It was the French failure to extend these founding principles to the Algerian Muslims that led to the Algerian rejection of French ideology and to embrace Islamic Algerian nationalism and ultimately to revolution.¹¹

The Oman-Dhofar campaign was set against a backdrop of over 150 years of inter-ethnic disagreement and sporadic violence between the rule of the coastal Omani Sultanate and his interior mountain dwelling Dhofari “subjects.” In 1968 a tribal revolt against the repressive rule of the sultan was co-opted by externally organized and supported communists.¹² The revolting Dhofari tribes consented to these revolutionaries imposing their Marxist ideology on the struggle as a means of achieving their goals. A timely coup by the Crown Prince and Marxist repression of devout Dhofari Muslims turned the conflict into an ideological struggle over who could best meet the needs and desires of the Dhofari population, the Western backed newly crowned Sultan and traditional Islam versus atheistic Marxists.¹³

While there are significant similarities between these two case studies it is their stark contrasts that truly underscore the utility of a properly executed surrogate strategy. The French

¹⁰ Raymond Rudorff, *The Myth of France*, (. New York, NY: Coward-McCann Inc, 1970.) 226-7

¹¹ Alistair Horne. *A Savage War of Peace Algeria 1954-1962*. (New York, New York: Viking Press, 1977),42-43

¹² Charles Allen. *The Savage Wars of Peace*. (London: Michael Joseph Ltd.. 1990),181-2

¹³ Tony Jeapes, “SAS: *Operation Oman*”, (Nashville, TN: The Battery Press Inc. 1980),28

and British methods of employing surrogates in the two case studies provide positive and negative arguments on how to properly employ surrogate forces. The two case studies act as foils to each other by demonstrating how they succeeded or failed at merging the surrogate aspirations with a coherent COIN surrogate policy and their over all strategic objectives. The French in Algeria demonstrate how a secondary surrogate effort unevenly employed can have dramatic operational results, but still ultimately fail if the underlying strategy is flawed. The British in Oman demonstrate how a properly organized and employed surrogate force can be more than just a competent military proxy, but also an indispensable strategic communications tool.

The scope of this study will be confined to reviewing three themes that run through the utilization of surrogates in the two case studies and their potential application to the GWOT. The employing powers utilized all three themes to create and exploit seams in the insurgent organizations. These themes are the recruitment of surrogates, their employment and the moral implications of adopting a surrogate based strategy.

Recruitment of Surrogates

The previous definition of surrogate force provided general criteria for the selection of surrogates. The degree of ideological overlap between the agendas of the potential surrogate force and the would-be employing power is a major factor in determining the suitability of the relationship. However a surrogate force will rarely enter such a relationship with an employing power out of purely altruistic motivations, the employing power must convince the surrogate

force of a “convergence of aims”¹⁴ between them. The greater the perception of this convergence of aims increases the potential for voluntary assistance to and loyalty for the employing power. Conversely the smaller the degree of overlap or resorting to the use of compulsion the less loyal the surrogate would be. One indicator of the degree of ideological overlap between the employing power and surrogate is the method of recruitment. In the two case studies the counter insurgent forces used three methods to recruit surrogates: enlightened self interest, self preservation and coercion.

Enlightened self-interest describes a member of the target population deciding with minimal persuasion that it is in their best interests to actively support the employing power.¹⁵ Enlightened self-interest was the most prevalent and preferred recruitment method utilized in the two case studies. The absence of compulsion indicated a positive affirmation of ideological overlap and generally corresponded to a greater degree of loyalty towards the agenda of the employing power. This positive affirmation of mutual goals also makes enlightened self interest a better tool for gaining the support of the local population and isolating them from the adversary. The remaining two recruitment methods utilize different forms and degrees of compulsion to ensure surrogate obedience.

In self-preservation, the employing power utilizes a passive form of coercion, by offering or refusing protection. Self-preservation describes the recruitment of individuals who did not necessarily have significant ideological overlap with the employing force, but were targeted for execution by the insurgents. These individuals were left with the choice of defection to the

¹⁴ IBID, 100

¹⁵ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*. (Penguin Putnam Inc. New York NY, 2004),411

employing power for protection or being killed by the insurgents. While the threat generally precluded the defection of the surrogate to the insurgents it was also a constant reminder to the employing power of the surrogates suspect loyalty.

The final technique of recruitment was coercion either through threat or use of torture. The subject either agreed to become an agent for the employing power or was killed. If necessary their loyalty was secured through both the ever present threat of torture and their fear of their complicity with the employing power being revealed. However, in the Battle of Algiers the defection of an informant back to the FLN often created more confusion for the insurgents than consternation for the French.¹⁶ While multiple examples demonstrate coercion to be an effective means of infiltrating and reducing a threat organization, the success has proven to be largely tactical and transient.

The three methods form a continuum ranging from voluntary recruitment to coercion through use of torture. The greater the degree of coercion applied to the surrogate, lowered the degree of trust the employing power had in them, which in turn impacted the effectiveness and ability of the employing power to employ the surrogates.

Employment (Kinetic and Non-Kinetic)

Current US military practice generally places CMO as a supporting effort to kinetic operations. Any change to a surrogate based GWOT strategy would advocate an inversion of that paradigm. The unrivaled combat power of the US military ensures that there is not a surrogate

¹⁶ Peter Harclerode, *Fighting Dirty the Inside Story of Covert Operations from Ho Chi Minh to Osama Bin Laden*. (London: Cassell & Co 2001),246

force capable of replacing US forces without a significant degree of lost combat power and efficiency. In the COE the most important advantages an appropriate surrogate force would provide to US strategists are not additional firepower, but their non-kinetic operational multipliers. T.E. Lawrence's admonition that, "better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly" has grown even more applicable in the COE.¹⁷ The indigenous surrogate with a stake in the outcome brings to the table invaluable intelligence on the human and physical terrain that non-indigenous soldiers do not inherently possess and would spend precious time and blood becoming familiar with. The use of an appropriate surrogate force can provide a legitimizing voice to the operation and provide for lowering the profile of the Employing Power. When kinetic operations are unavoidable, the presence of indigenous troops can provide some protection from enemy propaganda. Alf Heggoy describes the double standard in the COE:

Counter-insurgency forces in formerly colonial areas will probably always be foreigners who are blamed for offenses that are more quickly forgiven when perpetrated by insurgents who are racially and culturally the same as the victims.¹⁸

Moral Implications

The final theme to be explored will be the moral aspect of employing surrogates. The two employing powers in the case studies saw morality as a tool and made a conscious decision to conduct operations in a manner that either conformed to or diverged from the generally held western societal belief that it is unacceptable for their military forces to engage in torture. France

¹⁷ T.E. Lawrence, "the 27 Articles", <http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/1917/27arts.html>, accessed March 2007

¹⁸ Alf Andrew Heggoy *"Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria"*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.) Page 265

chose to ignore the moral obstacles to achieving rapid tactical and operational success and adopted the weapons of the terrorist. Conversely the British choice to abstain from coercive measures and torture was a calculated decision based on the specific situation of Oman. They realized in an Arabic tribal based society and Dhofari culture in particular such tactics would be counter productive in achieving the support of the population.¹⁹

The two case studies demonstrate the affect past actions have on current operations. “The Past Actions Theory posits that the credibility of a country depends on its history of fulfilling, or breaking, its commitments.”²⁰ There is an academic discussion on the actual validity of the past actions theory as an instrument to predict future actions of a state. Whether the theory is truly an accurate predictor of states actions is irrelevant, what is relevant is that the current adversary in the GWOT appears to applying the theory to predict US resolve. Jihadist propaganda routinely cites Vietnam, Somalia and Beirut as proof of American aversion to casualties.²¹ This perceived aversion to casualties and the ensuing failure to fulfill obligations provides the Jihadis with a sense of hope and empowers them to attempt to out last the US in a nonlinear struggle.

- The GWOT COE will remain largely as it currently is, the primary adversary will remain violent Islamist extremists.
- The world community (especially the Arab street) will remain skeptical of US unilateral or large scale operations.
- (LIMITATION) The GWOT COE is larger than the scope of this paper therefore my basic assumption is that the GWOT is more like the Cold War than WWII.

¹⁹ Tony Jeapes, “SAS: *Operation Oman*.”, 37

²⁰ Daryl G. Press. “Credibility of Power” *International Security* Vol 29, No 3 (Winter 2004-5),140

²¹ Letter from Al-Zawahiri to al Zarqawi, Globalsecurity.org, “Letter from Al-Zawahiri to al Zarqawi” http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2005/zawahiri-zarqawi-letter_9jul2005.htm Accessed March 2007

FRANCE IN ALGERIA

King Charles X of France invaded Algeria in 1830 in a failed attempt to divert attention from domestic dissatisfaction with his rule. While King Charles X was removed from power within months of the invasion, France spent the next 17 years pacifying their newly acquired North African possession. In 1848 France declared Algeria was no longer a French colony, but legally a part of metropolitan France. While this change in status was mostly meaningless to the majority of Algerian Muslims, who fell under a separate legal and administrative system for indigenous peoples, it was very beneficial for the Pied Noir (Algerians of European descent). This status granted the Pied Noir the same standing as any citizen in mainland France even providing for elected representation in the national assembly.²²

This special status differentiated Algeria from France's other colonies, in the minds of the French if not in practice. Over time the French began to believe the myth that formed around Algeria and ignored the chauvinistic segregated reality that relegated Muslim Algerians to second class citizens to the benefit of the Pied Noir. The paternalistic outlook of the French also contributed to the tenacity of their resistance to calls for Algerian independence. The French military's poor performance in World War II stripped away any lingering colonial perception of French invulnerability.²³ This revelation coincided with the re-emergence of Algerian nationalism.

²² Alistair Horne. *"A Savage War of Peace"*.29, 30,33,35

²³ Peter Harclerode, *Fighting Dirty*, 214

In late 1954 two competing insurgent groups with the stated goal of independence from France were formed in Algeria.²⁴ The *Front de Liberation National* (FLN) ultimately emerged as the primary nationalist organization in the struggle for Algerian independence as it convinced or coerced the majority of smaller nationalist groups to merge under its umbrella organization. The FLN established an Algerian government in exile to garner international support and organized Algeria into 6 autonomous regional commands, called *wilayas*, to facilitate conducting military operations. The *Mouvement National Algerien* (MNA) was the largest nationalist group to remain outside of the FLN's umbrella.²⁵ In order to consolidate their position as the primary nationalist group, the destruction of the MNA became the primary goal of the FLN.²⁶

On 1 November 1954 the FLN bombed 70 targets across Algeria in the hopes that the spark of terrorism would ignite the latent resentment against French rule into an uprising under FLN leadership. However when the anticipated revolt did not occur, the FLN conducted further terrorist attacks, resorting to hit and run guerrilla operations against government targets and high profile assassinations of loyalist Muslims and Pied Noir.²⁷

The French response to the FLN terrorist attacks was to institute a "pacification campaign" to address both the needed social reforms and the military defeat of the insurgency.²⁸ However, the military objective of destroying the insurgent organization not only took precedence over the social reforms, but often worked counter to them. Many months of progress

²⁴ John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN. 1992),159, 164

²⁵ Alistair Horne. "A Savage War of Peace",135-41

²⁶ Ibid, 135.

²⁷ David Galula. *Pacification of Algeria 1956-58*. (Santa Monica CA, The Rand Corporation, 1963),15-6

²⁸ Robinson, Donald, *The Dirty Wars*, (Delacorte Press, New York. 1968) p.93

on the social front could be erased in moments by heavy handed military operations or arbitrary collective punishment meted out on the local populace.²⁹

On the social front, the French were faced with the enormous task of addressing over a century of neglect and improving the lot of the native Algerians. This task was made more difficult by the absence of a political system capable of driving such changes. The rampant partisan environment in Paris resulted in a string of weak coalition governments that did not have the political will or power to overcome Pied Noir resistance to implementing the necessary reforms.³⁰

In addition to the political environment frustrating social reforms, still other factors contributed to their losing priority to military operations. The colonial government lacked sufficient numbers of willing civilian administrators to fill isolated posts leaving the manning of these positions to the military. The Governor General of Algeria authorized the creation of the *Section Administrative Specialisee* (SAS), to deal with this shortage.³¹ Operating in the neglected hinterlands of Algeria the SAS quickly became the primary French weapon in the struggle to win the support of the native population. The success of the SAS program varied widely depending entirely on the abilities of the various individual SAS administrators. The lack of sufficiently qualified and willing personnel to fill the billets was the primary weakness of the program.³²

Furthermore, the military administrators were placed in the difficult position of falling between civilian and military superiors. The institutional military dismissed the results of

²⁹ Alistair Horne. "A Savage War of Peace", 173

³⁰ Ian E.W. Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter Insurgencies* (),162

³¹ Alistair Horne. "A Savage War of Peace", 108-9

³² Ibid, 109,225

successful pacification of an area by a SAS or similar administrator as being less noteworthy than combat pacification operations. Body counts were tangible measures and the French military distributed promotions and awards accordingly.³³ This disparity created a disincentive for capable and qualified officers and soldiers to volunteer for such billets, further exasperating the existing shortage.

The military front was conducted in two main phases: Quadrillage and the Challe Plan. Quadrillage was instituted in 1957 by General Salan who sought to raise the profile of the French military to reassure the Pied Noir and overwhelm both the loyalist and nationalist Muslim Algerian population.³⁴ He began the process by establishing garrisons in cities, towns and villages through out Algeria; each garrison was responsible for securing the population centers and the surrounding territory. The completion of the Morice line and its counterpart on the Moroccan border further enhanced the Quadrillage strategy, effectively cutting the FLN off from any meaningful external support³⁵. However, the continued existence of the FLN in Tunisian and Moroccan sanctuaries denied the French the decisive military victory they craved, yet continued to tie up hundreds of thousands of troops.³⁶

In 1958 the French adopted the Challe Plan, it adapted Quadrillage tactics to become more enemy focused, called for increasing the number of *Harkis* units and for their offensive

³³ David Galula. *Pacification of Algeria 1956-58.*, 65

³⁴ Martin S. Alexander and JFV Keiger, *France and the Algerian War 1954-62 Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy.* (Frank Cass, London. 2002),9-10

³⁵ Ian E.W. Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter Insurgencies*, 164

³⁶ Martin S. Alexander and JFV Keiger, *France and the Algerian War 1954-62 Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy*,9-10

employment.³⁷ These *Harkis* units were used to great affect as hunter-killer teams in Challe's more offensive oriented operations.³⁸ French Intelligence also employed small *Harkis* units in pseudo-operations, which wreaked havoc with the FLN and their underground support networks.³⁹

Despite the tangible successes of the Challe plan, de Gaulle weakened his stance against Algerian independence due to mounting international pressure and domestic sentiment against the war.⁴⁰ When de Gaulle began to publicly imply a non-French Algeria was a distinct possibility the Pied Noir and the French military began to actively resist his policies.⁴¹ This resistance culminated with a coup d'état attempt in April 1961. Following the failed putsch De Gaulle began to aggressively pursue negotiations with the FLN. On 18 March 1962 the Evian accords were signed and the cease fire went into affect, Algerian independence was recognized in July 1962.⁴²

Surrogates

The French paternalistic view towards Arabs and the fantastic failures of some of their early attempts at raising Algerian led surrogate forces (Force K and Khobus) cast a dark cloud over the utility of surrogates in the minds of the French command.⁴³ It was not until the Challe

³⁷ Edgar O'Balance. *The Algerian Insurrection 1954-1962* (Archon Books. Hamden Connecticut),132

³⁸ Ian E.W. Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter Insurgencies*, 164

³⁹ Alistair Horne. "A Savage War of Peace", 336

⁴⁰ Martin S. Alexander and JFV Keiger, *France and the Algerian War 1954-62 Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy*,20

⁴¹ Ian E.W. Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter Insurgencies*, 163

⁴² Ibid, 167

⁴³ Force K was a French attempt to stand up a Berber counter guerrilla unit. The unit was infiltrated by the FLN and after receiving training and rifles the entire unit defected to the FLN en masse.

Plan was implemented in 1958 that surrogates became a primary effort in French pacification operations. This failure to have a consistent policy for employment of surrogates in counter insurgency is puzzling given the relatively large pool of resident subject matter experts the French Army had at its disposal. The French also lacked an over-arching counter insurgency policy, which contributed to a situation where the local sector commander implemented policies based on his experience or doctrinal disposition. David Galula described this continuum of commanders ranging from the “warriors” to the “psychologists.” The former eschewed any means but military action to defeat the rebels and the latter saw psychological action as the universal answer to every issue. Galula laments that neither extreme addressed the situation holistically or effectively.⁴⁴

One aspect of French surrogate operations was with a few exceptions the surrogates were employed under direct control of French officers or NCOs.⁴⁵ This highlighted the subservient role of the Muslim Harkis soldiers and when coupled with the increased French profile due to the quadrillage policy undercut the French IO theme of *Harkis* leading the fight for a French Algeria.

The very nature of the French occupation of Algeria placed their surrogate operations at a distinct disadvantage. The first issue the French had to overcome was how to convince Algerian Muslims to fight for a regime that systematically denied them a full share of citizenship.

Potential Algerian loyalists also had to consider France’s less than optimal performance in World

Khobus was the alias of an MNA commander who defected to the French. The FLN were able to frame Khobus and convince the French to disband his unit. Prior to the French disbanding the unit, insurgents approached Khobus’ lieutenants with the option of defecting to the FLN, for the low price of Khobus’ head. The Lieutenants beheaded Khobus and defected to the FLN. Unfortunately the FLN reneged on their defection offer and executed the lieutenants. Alistair Horne. “*A Savage War of Peace*” 256-7

⁴⁴ David Galula. *Pacification of Algeria 1956-58*, 64-65

⁴⁵ Lawrence E. Cline, *Pseudo operations and Counter Insurgency: Lessons from other countries*, Strategic Studies Institute. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB607.pdf>, 7. Access March 2007

War II and its retreat from other colonial holdings (Indochina, Tunisia, Morocco).⁴⁶ Despite these set backs the French were still able to recruit and field more Algerian *Harkis* troops than the FLN.

Recruitment

The French employed all three of the previously mentioned recruiting methods in Algeria. The French tailored the recruitment method employed for the population targeted, those population pools more favorably disposed towards serving the French received less coercion than those that actively resisted French advances.

Enlightened self interest was the most prevalent method employed by the French to recruit Algerian *Harkis* to fight the insurgents. French efforts focused on recruiting local leaders and militias to openly support the Government, in the hopes of creating a segment in the population that was invested in continued French rule. Whether as draftees that heeded the government's call to service or enlistees who actively demonstrated their support for the government, these loyalist Algerians demonstrated their support for continued French rule. The number of *Harkis* soldiers that willingly fought for France and the FLN's continued use of terror to sway the Muslim population demonstrate that the FLN did not have the overwhelming popular support they claimed.⁴⁷ In spite the glaring inequalities inherent in French rule, Algerian popular opinion did not enthusiastically shift support towards the FLN until de Gaulle began negotiations with the insurgents. Only after de Gaulle signaled his intention to support Algerian independence and a de facto FLN victory did Algerians see the writing on the wall and begin to publicly support

⁴⁶ David Galula. *Pacification of Algeria 1956-58*, 16-17

⁴⁷ Alistair Horne. "A Savage War of Peace", 134

the impending victors.⁴⁸ However, despite the large number of voluntarily recruited *Harkis* the French were unable to operationalize the necessary trust to exploit the full potential of their *Harkis* it also created a seam the FLN was able to exploit.

The French utilized the self preservation method of recruitment primarily on estranged insurgents from both the MNA and FLN ranks, using the proclivity of the FLN to exact gruesome “justice” on perceived collaborators to keep them loyal to the French.⁴⁹ The French offered MNA units an alternative to continuing a hopeless struggle against the ruthless FLN, defection. However it was the French inability to establish an operational level of trust that left them vulnerable to FLN efforts to drive a wedge between France and her surrogates. The FLN exploited the lack of trust and were able to influence the French decision to disband a MNA unit that had defected and was serving the French. The result was the execution of the unit’s Algerian commander Khobus by his lieutenants and the defection of a number of the MNA soldiers to the FLN.⁵⁰

The final technique of recruitment was coercion through either the threat or use of torture. During the Battle for Algiers the French achieved a decisive military victory by turning FLN operatives through torture to work for France. The benefits of the victory were short lived, when word of their employment of torture was revealed France’s credibility in the international community and support on the home front were critically damaged.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Alf Andrew Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Algeria*. (Bloomington, IN. Indiana University Press, 1972),139

⁴⁹ Alistair Horne. “*A Savage War of Peace*”, 134-135

⁵⁰ *Ibid*,257

⁵¹ JFV Keiger, *IBID*,6-10

Non kinetic Operations

While the French were less than successful in positively affecting the international and domestic opinion, they successfully utilized surrogates in their offensive IO campaign against the FLN. The clandestine nature of insurgencies requires a base level of trust among the insurgents in order to operate effectively. It was this seam that the French surrogate efforts attacked with substantial success through pseudo operations and misinformation campaigns.

During the Battle of Algiers the French were able to exploit the fractious nature of the FLN. The French infiltrated the insurgent organization, by turning FLN operatives with varying degrees of coercion. The French achieved stunning success at exaggerating that infiltration and playing on the resulting paranoia.⁵² Using their turned FLN agents and orchestrated “careless” control of forged documents around known informants the French were able to fuel bloody FLN purges.⁵³ The French successfully turned an upper level operative inside the Algiers *wilayas*; operations eventually “removed” the FLN operatives above him, placing a French informant as the FLN commander of Algiers. Their informant ordered operations that further compromised much of the FLN apparatus in Algiers and neighboring districts.⁵⁴ This campaign exploited the environment within the insurgent organization and left the FLN broken in Algiers and greatly disrupted their operations through out the neighboring *wilayas*.⁵⁵

The intensity of the intra-FLN purges created an environment that led many committed guerrillas to decide between self preservation and their commitment to the cause of independence.

⁵² JFV Keiger, IBID 67

⁵³ Peter Harclerode, *Fighting Dirty*, 245-6

⁵⁴ Ibid, 245

⁵⁵ Alistair Horne. “*A Savage War of Peace*”,260

The toll on the moral of the FLN membership is also demonstrated by the increase of FLN insurgents surrendering. The 1958 proportion of insurgents that surrendered to those that were killed was 27%, in 1959 that proportion increased to 42%.⁵⁶

Under the Challe Plan French veterans from counter guerrilla operations in Indochina created platoon sized *Harkis* units to conduct pseudo operations in the back country of Algeria. These *Harkis* units would enter villages masquerading as FLN units and request support. If a village provided support to the faux insurgents, the French would levy harsh sanctions on them. These pseudo operations units were so pervasive and sanctions were so severe that villages began to refuse to provide support to the FLN rather than risk the French wrath. These operations effectively robbed the insurgents of their auxiliary and underground support network. The effects of this program complemented the Morice line and began to take serious tolls on the ability of the FLN to support an internal insurgency. The loss of support was so effective there are reports of FLN soldiers starving to death due to lack of supplies.⁵⁷

The French excelled at anti-FLN IO and successfully exploited various insurgent seams, but were never able to produce a positive pro-French SC campaign that generated the popular support for the government. The French also failed to protect themselves from FLN IO that exploited the seams between the French and their *Harkis*.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 337

⁵⁷ Ibid, P.336

Kinetic Operations

The French achieved similar split results with their use of surrogates in a kinetic role. The most high profile failure was heavily influenced by inter departmental competition in the French Government. The Groupement de Marche (GM) was the forward element of the Action Service (French Intelligence Service) in Algeria and was the lead agency in surrogate operations. The *Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire* (DST) was the prewar entity responsible for internal security and had watched its duties taken over by GM. DST created a surrogate counter-guerrilla force along the lines of the French Groupes de Commandos Mixte Aeroportes (GCMA) program from Indochina.⁵⁸ However, DST failed to request any GCMA veterans to assist them.⁵⁹ Accounts differ on when the unit was infiltrated by the FLN, ranging from the founding member to later recruits, but the results are the same. DST armed and funded Force K, but failed to properly vet the soldiers at any point and actively ignored warning signs.

Captain Hentic, a CGMA veteran, was assigned to GM when he learned of the existence of Force K. Hentic became suspicious at the ability of DST to run a complex program with out assistance from subject matter experts. Hentic arranged a meeting with members of Force K. Hentic and brought along a noted anthropologist to surreptitiously interview the Force K fighters. The anthropologist spoke to the members of Force K in Arabic and determined through linguistic analysis that they lied about where they were from and suspected they were FLN infiltrators. DST ignored this warning and gave Force K carte blanche to operate within its assigned sector. In collaboration with Force K, the FLN slowed down its anti French operations in their area and

⁵⁸ Lawrence E. Cline, *Pseudo operations and Counter Insurgency*, 7

⁵⁹ Peter Harclerode, *Fighting Dirty*, 231

even provided Force K with bodies of rival MNA insurgents to pass off as proof of their success. Captain Hentic's one man crusade to expose Force K met with disbelief and irritation by the unit's French supervisors.⁶⁰ The FLN *wilayas* commander became nervous and decided to end the deception before they were discovered to retain as many weapons as possible. Only after the Force K commander sent a letter announcing their defection to the FLN and thanking the French for their arms and training, did the DST realize their mistake.⁶¹ Over an entire Division and two paratroop units were required to attempt to track down and destroy the deserters; however the majority of Force K was able to desert to the FLN with their arms.⁶²

The Force K debacle and other high profile failures of French surrogate operations tend to taint their over all use of surrogates, but not all were abject failures.⁶³ A primary part of the Challe Plan was to move away from a terrain based strategy to a more enemy focused campaign that incorporated highly mobile strike force units, such as the Harkis Commando de Chasse units. The commandos operated in company sized units and were either made up entirely or led by surrendered enemy personnel. The commandos would go on long range patrols in FLN controlled territory in order to determine the location of FLN units. Once identification was established the commandos would call in air strikes or a mobile strike team to engage and pursue the enemy until destroyed or sufficiently disrupted.⁶⁴ The interdiction of supplies and the success of the surrogate forces in conducting pseudo and Commando de Chasse operations helped to effectively destroy

⁶⁰ Peter Harclerode, *Fighting Dirty*, 235

⁶¹ Alistair Horne. "A Savage War of Peace", 256

⁶² Peter Harclerode, *Fighting Dirty*, 236

⁶³ Alistair Horne. "A Savage War of Peace" 258

⁶⁴ Ian E.W. Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter Insurgencies*, 164-165

the FLN as a functional insurgent force inside of Algeria.⁶⁵ France's inability to destroy the FLN in their cross border sanctuaries in Tunisia and Morocco denied the French their decisive military victory.

Morals and Ethical implications

The French made a conscious decision to "...make use of all the weapons the enemy employs" in their pacification operations in Algeria.⁶⁶ This decision was a conscious choice to fight fire with fire in the hopes that by prevailing as rapidly as possible through ruthless measures they would destroy the will to resist and save more innocent lives in the process.⁶⁷ The French stunning tactical achievements, especially in Algiers, demonstrate the potency of these tactics. But the French abdication of the moral high ground, resulted in the loss of domestic and international support and eventually to de Gaulle ceding victory and Algeria to the militarily vanquished FLN.⁶⁸ The strategic ramifications the French endured for adopting the weapon of the terrorists demonstrate the futility of a western state employing terror.

At his court marshal, General Challe claimed one of the conditions for raising additional Harkis units in 1958 was de Gaulle's implicit promise to not abandon them.⁶⁹ While the French did make an attempt to insure that the matter of post independence retribution against the *Harkis* was prohibited according to the Evian Accords they did not attempt to ensure the prohibitions

⁶⁵ Alistair Horne. "A Savage War of Peace" 337

⁶⁶ Roger Trinquier, "Modern warfare, A French View of Counterinsurgency." Page 113 (Page 16)

⁶⁷ Paul Aussaresses, *Battle for the Casbah, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria 1955-1957*, (New York: Enigma Books, 2002), 17

⁶⁸ Ian E.W. Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter Insurgencies*, 165

⁶⁹ Alistair Horne. "A Savage War of Peace", 333

were followed. On 5 June 1962 a *Harkis* leader, Bachaga Boualem, appealed to the French parliament to save loyalist Algerians from FLN reprisals.⁷⁰ The French government not only ignored his pleas, but took active measures to prevent the mass migration of *Harkis* into France.⁷¹ On 3 July 1962 France recognized Algerian independence. FLN operatives began a massive wave of retribution killings, which resulted in the executions of more than 150,000 *Harkis* soldiers and their families.⁷²

While the French tried to stem the tide of the post World War II movement of colonies seeking independence, the British responded differently. The French attempted to maintain strict control of their holdings and generally opposed colonial self rule. The mercantile oriented British had long sought to minimize the subsidizing of her colonial holdings, a practice which generally led to colonial control over local issues.

BRITAIN IN OMAN

A recurring theme through the history of Oman and Dhofar is the tension between the coastal Omani Sultanate and the interior mountain dwelling Dhofari Imamate. In the mid 1700s Ahmed bin Said established the Albu Said tribe as dynastic rulers of Oman.⁷³ In 1798 the sultan's successor formalized the economic relations with the East India Company in exchange for the protection of the British navy by signing the first of several treaties of friendship between the two

⁷⁰ Martin S. Alexander and JFV Keiger, *France and the Algerian War 1954-62 Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy*, Time line Introduction

⁷¹ University of San Francisco Algerian War Reading, Chapter 8, The Terrible End of War (1962), <http://www.usfca.edu/fac/webberm/algeria.htm>, Accessed March 2007

⁷² Alistair Horne. "A Savage War of Peace" 537-8

⁷³ Wendell Phillips, "Oman a History Page" 62

empires.⁷⁴ Through out the 1800s Great Britain expanded her influence over the Sultan's affairs resulting in a growing dependence on British protection and support. By the close of the century this dependence had grown to a level which left Oman as a de facto British protectorate.⁷⁵

In the 1950s the British assisted Sultan Sa'id bin Taimur in putting down an Imamate lead tribal rebellion in the province of Dhofar. After decades of exploration oil deposits were discovered in Oman and Dhofar in the early 1960s. Despite the unrest and relative poverty in Oman, Sultan Sa'id was hesitant to spend this new found revenue on bringing what he perceived to be the dubious benefits of modernization to his country. Sa'id associated the decadence he witnessed in neighboring oil rich Gulf States to modernization and so he chose to isolate the population from such influences as hospitals, schools and travel abroad.⁷⁶ As in Algeria a remote repressive regime exacerbated the chronic dissatisfaction of the population and in 1962 Dhofari tribes revolted.⁷⁷

In 1965 the leaders of the revolt formed the Dhofari Liberation Front (DLF) their platform stressed the traditional role of the tribe, conservative adherence to Islam and Dhofari control over Dhofar's resources.⁷⁸ The revolt was primarily relegated to harassing attacks against vehicles from the oil company or the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF), as well as sabotaging the aqueducts that led to Sa'id's palace.⁷⁹ The revolt did not rise to the level of threatening the

⁷⁴ Ibid, 70

⁷⁵ Calvin Allen. "*Oman Modernization of the Sultanate*", 56

⁷⁶ John Akehurst. "*We Won a War, the campaign in Oman, 1965-1975.*" (South Hampton, Great Britain: The Camelot Press LTD, 1982),12

⁷⁷ Calvin Allen. "*Oman Modernization of the Sultanate*", 69

⁷⁸ Tony Jeapes, "*SAS: Operation Oman.*", 25

⁷⁹ Ibid,24

integrity of Oman or the rule of the Sultan, in 1967 events in the neighboring British colony of Aden changed that.

In 1967 a Marxist organization seized control of Aden and forced the premature departure of British forces. Aden formed the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen and became a sponsor of Marxist agitation through out the region. The Popular Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) was a Yemeni backed Marxist insurgent group intent on fomenting revolution, beginning with the neighboring Omani province of Dhofar. PFLOAG made numerous overtures towards the DLF to join forces in the revolt against Sultan Sa'id, but the traditional devoutly Islamic insurgent leaders of the DLF rebuffed the initial advances primarily out of distaste for the organization's atheism. However after years of minimal progress in their revolt against the Sultan the superior training, equipment and money of PFLOAG finally enticed the DLF join forces.⁸⁰

This merger allowed the proverbial camel's nose into the tent and the better organized and equipped Marxists quickly overwhelmed the DLF. PFLOAG gained control over key leadership positions and organizations.⁸¹ PFLOAG implemented a reeducation program that sought to promote Marxism and deemphasize the role of the tribe. This program included sending Dhofari children to Yemen to attend Leninist schools as well as reorganizing the guerrilla units away from tribal lines.⁸² PFLOAG began to actively repress the practice of Islam and

⁸⁰ Ibid, 25

⁸¹ Calvin Allen. "*Oman Modernization of the Sultanate*", 70

⁸² Coizart, Victor J. Col. 1975, *Oman and the Dhofar Rebellion*. Marine Corps Gazette. Volume 59, No 2 (February), 20

troublesome tribal leaders who resisted these policies were publicly executed as examples to deter their followers.⁸³

Over the next three years PFLOAG gained control of the Dhofari highlands, or “djebel,” and began to squeeze the SAF into three coastal cities.⁸⁴ This shift of momentum against the Sultan and the introduction of Soviet and Chinese sponsored insurgents captured the attention of the British government. The British feared a communist victory in Oman would leave the Straits of Hormuz under communist influence, but was wary of becoming involved in another Middle East conflict so soon after Aden and the Suez crisis. They offered the Sultan discreet assistance and sent an assessment team to determine potential strategies. The assessment team recognized the dissatisfaction of former DLF members as a seam ripe for exploitation; however Sultan Sa’id dismissed their findings.

The stakes were too high for Britain to idly accept Sa’ids refusal to change a failing strategy. And British agents began to unofficially encourage Crown Prince Qaboos bin Sa’id to seize power.⁸⁵ Qaboos had numerous British contacts from his six years of study abroad; graduating from Sandhurst and serving a tour in a British Regiment. These western links tainted the Crown Prince in Sa’id’s eyes and resulted in Qaboos being placed under house arrest upon his return to Oman. Sa’id was not vigilant enough in enforcing Qaboo’s isolation and the Omani

⁸³ Tony Jeapes, “SAS: *Operation Oman*,” 25 & 28

⁸⁴ Ibid,25

⁸⁵ Peter Harclerode, *Fighting Dirty*,413

counselors and British advisors acted as intermediaries between Qaboos and disaffected exiles through out the Gulf region.⁸⁶ In July 1970 Qaboos seized power in a largely bloodless coup.⁸⁷

Unlike the faltering coalition governments of France, Sultan Qaboos acted decisively. Within days of seizing power he declared a general amnesty for any rebel that laid down their arms, announced several social reforms and plans to spend oil revenue on civic enhancement projects through out the neglected areas of Oman. The Omani population responded favorably to these developments and a number of the former DLF insurgents accepted the amnesty offer, causing a rift in the PFLOAG ranks when they tried to prevent the defection of the former.⁸⁸ These defectors were led by Salim Mubarak and they became the core of the first irregular Dhofari units, which were to be called *Firqat*.⁸⁹

The British rapidly deployed a troop of the Special Air Service (SAS) to Oman under the guise of British Army Training Teams (BATT), this designation allow the British to publicly deny the presence of British combat troops in Oman.⁹⁰ At times the Omani forces were also augmented by contingents from Jordan and Iran.

In early 1971 the Sultan's forces seized the initiative and began the process of retaking Dhofar from the PFLOAG. The *Firqat* simplified the Marxist alphabet soup calling the insurgents the Adoo.⁹¹ Unlike the French the Omani strategy was directed at securing the support of the

⁸⁶ Calvin Allen. "Oman Modernization of the Sultanate", 72-3

⁸⁷ Tony Jeapes, "SAS: Operation Oman.", 27 Two men were shot during the coup, both by the Sultan Taimur. He grazed a rebelling minister and shot himself in the foot.

⁸⁸ Peter Harclerode, "Fighting Dirty", 414

⁸⁹ Tony Jeapes, "SAS: Operation Oman.", 28, 30

⁹⁰ Craig Philip and Alex Taylor, *Inside the SAS*. (Bloomsburg Publishers Limited, London, England. 2002), 49

⁹¹ John Akehurst. "We Won a War, 25 (Adoo is Arabic word for enemy)

population not just the terrain, the only reason to clear the djebel was to conduct civil military operations to improve the lot of the inhabitants.⁹² They implemented this strategy by establishing a presence in the inland portion of Dhofar and spreading government control westwards towards the Yemen border. The plan called for slowly cutting off Adoo supplies and clearing the area of insurgents through attrition, starvation or assimilation of SEPs.⁹³ In Operation JAGUAR the Sultan's forces demonstrated their ability to seize and hold a position in Adoo territory, ceding control only due to the monsoons. Every such government success strengthened the viability and credibility of the *Firqat*, SAF and Sultan, which in turn increased the number of Adoo defectors.⁹⁴

The Adoo's inability to push SAF off the djebel and the increasing popularity of Qaboos' policies, forced them to launch the largest assault of the war in an effort to recover the initiative. The resulting Battle of Mirabat was not only the largest action of the war and a decisive defeat of the Adoo, but was considered to be the turning point of the war.⁹⁵

In the following four years the Omani forces conducted operations to establish five successive defensive lines progressively further west.⁹⁶ The Sultan did not have sufficient man power to completely seal the lines from all movement, but was able to decrease the amount of supplies that could be delivered to the Adoo.⁹⁷

⁹² Tony Jeapes, "SAS: *Operation Oman*," 228

⁹³ Calvin Allen, *Oman Modernizing the sultanate*, Page 72

⁹⁴ Douglas S. Blaufarb and George K. Tanham. *Who Will Win? A Key to the Puzzle of Revolutionary War*. (New York, NY: Crane Russake, 1989),59

⁹⁵ Tony Jeapes, "SAS: *Operation Oman*." 157

⁹⁶ John Akehurst. "We Won a War,20

⁹⁷ Ian E.W. Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter Insurgencies*, 228

In 1974 the Sultan began to consolidate the territorial gains through conducting CMO and transferring responsibility of tribal land to the *Firqat*.⁹⁸ The government built and maintained wells and public structures for the tribes with the caveat that the *Firqat* would prevent the return of the Adoo. None of the areas turned over to a tribal *Firqat* were retaken by the Adoo.⁹⁹ The SAF and *Firqat* continued to push the Adoo west and in December 1975 the Sultan declared the conflict over, though border skirmishes continued into 1976.¹⁰⁰

Surrogates

The British realized from experience in multiple counter insurgencies that indigenous surrogates were a force multiplier, providing accurate intelligence on both the culture and terrain. The two primary characteristics of the surrogate forces in the Oman-Dhofar campaign were that the *Firqat* were composed almost entirely of SEPs. And the second was in contrast to French the *Firqat* were commanded by Dhofaris, with the BATTs acting entirely in an advisory capacity. The surrogates were a major element in the defeat of the Adoo, in both their employment as well as by underscoring the legitimacy of the regime of the young Sultan Qaboos.

Recruitment

Sultan Qaboos used the self enlightened method as his sole recruiting method to lure SEPs to join the *Firqats*.¹⁰¹ The Omanis and BATTs accomplished this by driving a wedge into

⁹⁸ Blaufarb, Douglas S. and George K. Tanham, *Who Will Win?*,61

⁹⁹ Charles Allen, “*Savage Wars of Peace*”,199

¹⁰⁰ IBID,93

¹⁰¹ J. Paul de b. Taillon, *The Evolution of Special Forces in Counter Terrorism: the British and American Experience*. (Praeger publishers, Westport, Connecticut, 2001),34-35

the multiple seams of the Adoo organization. Qaboos aggressive civil infrastructure programs demonstrated the material benefits of aligning with the sultan and contrasted sharply with the failure of the Adoo to produce similar results in the areas under their control. The repressive anti Islamic policies of the Adoo allowed the moderate Islamic Sultan to appear as a defender of the faith. The negative reinforcement techniques of self preservation and coercion were not utilized by the BATTs. The British realized that such coercive techniques could only backfire in a tribal culture such as Dhofar, whose history was riddled with blood feuds some going back decades and even centuries. The Dhofari you mistreat was bound to have tribal members on both sides of the conflict; it would undermine the loyalty of *Firqat* members and solidify the resolve of the Adoo.

The appeal of Qaboos' amnesty program was magnified by the over zealous execution of PFLOAG's anti Islamic policies, and resulted in a number of insurgent defectors. These defectors were formally designated Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEP) and they were to become a constant source of manpower and intelligence, as well as a recurring theme in the Sultan's strategic communications campaign.¹⁰² Salim Mubarak, had been a PFLOAG deputy sector commander, before he defected to the Sultan. He raised and commanded *Firqat* Saladin the first Dhofari *Firqat* to fight for the Sultan. In sharp contrast to French operations in Algiers, the most coercive incident of recruitment in the Oman-Dhofar campaign ended in negotiations.

In one of the *Firqat Saladin's* first operations, they seized an enemy held village. The *Firqat* commander Mubarak began negotiating with the local Adoo commander, Ahmed Mohammed Qartoob. These negotiations were carried out through couriers. During the

¹⁰² Tony Jeapes, "*SAS: Operation Oman.*",37

negotiations Qartoob's messenger inadvertently revealed the rebels hide out. Mubarak immediately surrounded the hiding place with his *Firqat* and gave Qartoob an ultimatum, negotiate or die. Qartoob chose the former and negotiated with Mubarak for two days before eventually defecting to the sultan's service.¹⁰³

One incredible aspect of the SEP program was the absence of any recorded instances of the type of perfidy among the *Firqats* that haunted the French Harkis program. This seems to validate the British process utilized to recruit and vet the prospective SEPs. The recruitment process entailed a very active SC program, but the actual point of defection was a very low pressure event. The interested Adoo would be allowed to enter into camp and be left alone for an initial cooling off period. During this time the potential SEP would speak to current members of the *Firqat* and would not be approached by the BATT personnel. After a period of time the Adoo would lay down his arms and request amnesty. At this point the BATT or a British intelligence specialist would question the individual for any intelligence on the Adoo. This deliberate paced process provided two benefits; first it allowed the potential SEP to retain his dignity, a major concern in Arabic culture¹⁰⁴. Second it gave the members of the *Firqat* time to determine if the potential SEP was truly committed to amnesty. It was after all their lives at stake if they accepted an Adoo agent. In this manner the tribe acted as the first layer of vetting SEPs, while the British intelligence specialists could still act as a control measure on the tribe's judgment.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ Peter Harclerode, "*Fighting Dirty*", 419

¹⁰⁴ Tony Jeapes, "*SAS: Operation Oman*.", 37; Rapheal Pattai, *The Arab Mind*, () 108

¹⁰⁵ Terry White. *Swords of Lightning, Special Forces and the Changing Face of Warfare*. (London: Brassy's, 1992.), 130

The recruitment of SEPs had a larger operational impact than merely manning irregular units on the Sultans ledger. When a recruit is drawn from the general population he strengthens his respective side, but does not immediately adversely impact the enemy. However the recruitment of SEPs is a zero sum game, for every Adoo recruited to the sultan both increased the ranks of the *Firqats*, but his departure also weakened the dwindling ranks of the Adoo.¹⁰⁶

Employment

It was the *Firqats'* non-kinetic operations that undoubtedly marked their greatest contributions to achieving the ultimate outcome. In General Tony Jeapes' memoirs he quotes the reason an Adoo gave for his defection to the Sultan.

“Because you (the SAS) are here- and you could not be here in the West unless the loyal *Firqats* were with you. You would have not have any *Firqats* unless the people supported them and you would only have that support if the rumors of progress and development I have heard are true. If they are true, then the Front has told me lies. If they lied on that, they have probably lied on other things. Therefore I have surrendered to you.” ...He had fought for progress and since progress seemed to have arrived, he could see no point in continuing the fight.¹⁰⁷

Through the *Firqats* mere existence the BATT achieved what had eluded the French, the transfer of surrogate's legitimacy to the employing power. In the minds of a growing number of Dhofaris and Adoo, the *Firqat* support of the Sultan demonstrated the support of the population and testified to the veracity his policies.

The success at generating considerable response to the Sultan's amnesty program was due in part to the policies described in the recruitment process as well as a vigorous and

¹⁰⁶ Tony Jeapes, “SAS: *Operation Oman*.”, 37

¹⁰⁷ Ibid,234-235

coordinated SC campaign. One such program utilized SEPs to conduct announcements on the Sultan's radio station, stating they had been pardoned and received their promised reward. These broadcasts targeted members of the SEPs former unit, who would be able to recognize his voice and be confronted by a former comrade vouching for the Sultan's policies. Bulletin boards at village entrance check points provided another source of information distribution.¹⁰⁸

While the radio and bulletin boards provided one outlet of news on the djebel, they did not have the same status as information coming from a trusted source.¹⁰⁹ Word of mouth and face to face communications remained the primary method of distributing of the Sultan's message in the Dhofari tribal territory. This low tech method was more comprehensive and effective than radio. Tribal members on opposing sides of the conflict would correspond via mutual family members or in some cases directly with each other. Even if a *Firqat* member did not actively recruit other tribal members to fight for the Sultan, his membership still testified to the validity of the government's reforms and amnesty offer.

The BATT realized that the vast differences between British and Dhofari culture could easily be injected into any Strategic Communication product they produced and have detrimental affects. So the BATT used Dhofari's to establish and vet SC themes and products. This increased the likelihood the wording achieved an indigenous authenticity that would resonate with the Dhofaris.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ Blaufarb, Douglas S. and George K. Tanham, *Who Will Win?*, 62

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, 63

¹¹⁰ Tony Jeapes, "*SAS: Operation Oman.*", 234

Kinetic

While the *Firqat* was commonly used as a mobile strike force, their irregular status precluded them from effectively conducting sustained unilateral operations.¹¹¹ When a permanent presence was required to hold a position the *Firqat* would be reinforced or relieved by a SAF unit. The BATTs were able to overcome a great deal of mutual mistrust during early joint *Firqat*-SAF operations. The SAF distrusted the *Firqat* because of their irregular nature and for their association with the Adoo as well as their cultural background of resistance to the Sultan. After an operational level of trust was established through BATT mediation, a synergistic affect was created through the *Firqat* providing the more conventionally capable SAF with intelligence and intimate knowledge of the terrain, the local tribes and Adoo operations.¹¹²

As mentioned above the SAF concern over the irregular nature of the *Firqats* was a valid one. The Dhofari culture that bred indomitable brave warriors also produced a fierce independence that did not lend itself to soldierly discipline. Consequently, a *Firqat* would fight tenaciously when they desired to, but when they did not, no amount of threats or cajoling from the BATT could get them to fight. There are numerous examples of this fickle behavior impacting operations. A *Firqat* demanded to see proof of the promised indirect fire and close air support (CAS) before they agreed to continue movement.¹¹³ Another *Firqat* refused to fight during Ramadan despite receiving and accepting special dispensation from the Sultan and their Imam to do so. While a third *Firqat* refused to fight again until they were provided access to markets for

¹¹¹ Ibid, 231

¹¹² Ibid, 227

¹¹³ Charles Allen. *The Savage Wars of Peace*, 186, 198

their cattle.¹¹⁴ It was left to the BATT to determine how to overcome these predicaments; from forgoing the element of surprise and demonstrating the CAS to planning and executing what might be the first cattle drive to be conducted with CAS and artillery providing security. For all these issues, the BATT realized that when used within their constraints, the *Firqat* proved to be a very effective counter insurgent force.¹¹⁵

Prior to 1974 the BATTs were concerned that garrisoning *Firqat* in their traditional tribal areas would act as a disincentive for their continued willingness to fight. However after 1974 the Sultan's Forces had achieved sufficient gains against the Adoo the BATT saw an opportunity to consolidate their achievements. The BATTs began to encourage *Firqat* commanders to request garrison duty in their tribal territories.¹¹⁶ The *Firqat* would designate a location in their territory for their settlement. A joint operation with SAF would clear the area of Adoo presence, after the area was secure the government would send heavy equipment to drill wells, build hospitals, schools and mosques. These amenities would lure the Dhofari tribes to a consolidated area, making infiltration by the Adoo more difficult. The government largesse was given with the proviso that any Adoo presence or activity in the area would result in the tribe losing these facilities.¹¹⁷ The arrangement worked and no tribal area turned over to a *Firqat* was ever retaken by the Adoo.

¹¹⁴ Blaufarb, Douglas S. and George K. Tanham, *Who Will Win?*, 59 & 64

¹¹⁵ Tony Jeapes, "SAS: *Operation Oman*.", 231 // John Akehurst. "We Won a War", 43

¹¹⁶ Charles Allen. *The Savage Wars of Peace*., 199

¹¹⁷ *Ibid*, 199

Morality

In stark contrast to the French, the British made a deliberate decision to avoid coercive tactics, torture and indiscriminate use of force in their operations in the Oman-Dhofar campaign. They also concluded the use of black propaganda and booby traps were not in their interest.¹¹⁸ The ramifications of such tactics in the tribal Dhofari culture would alienate the population and set back the cause of the sultan.

The *Firqat* corroborated the policy with their insistence on extremely light treatment of prisoners of war (POW). Initially the BATT members were inclined to truss up Adoo POWs and send them to the rear for interrogation. The *Firqat* objected to this and instead would treat the Adoo with dignity and respect.¹¹⁹ In a small scale inter tribal war it was very likely that the prisoner you mistreat has a large amount of relatives on both sides of the conflict. Mistreatment of POWs not only alienates current SEPs, but will strengthen the will of the Adoo fighters as well. The Omani's humane treatment of POWs contrasted sharply with PFLOAG's harsh treatment of the population that fell under their control, further increasing the allure of the Sultan's amnesty.

The British were able to be a moderating influence on what was turning into a bitter inter ethnic struggle.¹²⁰ The SAF was made up of Baluchi (Pakistani) soldiers who did not speak Arabic and were largely led by British seconded officers. The Dhofari tribes looked at SAF as an "army of occupation." During the initial stages of the conflict the SAF did little to dispel that

¹¹⁸ Tony Jeapes, "SAS: *Operation Oman*.", 233

¹¹⁹ Ibid,37

¹²⁰ Charles Allen, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, 201

perception, conducting reprisal raids into the djebel for attacks against the Sultan in a policy of collective responsibility much like that of the French in Algeria.¹²¹

COMPARISON

Despite some glaring difference in approach, conduct and results contrasting the surrogate operations of the British and French is not a clear cut case. It is too easy to focus on the more palatable tactics of the British and their more favorable strategic outcome and ignore the impressive achievements the French were able to attain in the face of major obstacles.

Surrogates

Both employing powers targeted indigenous populations to recruit their surrogates from, seeking to capitalize on the cultural knowledge and potential legitimacy such an indigenous force could provide. The French and British were able to successfully recruit from populations that had long-standing grievances against their respective governments. The BATTs appealed to the Dhofari tribes using the coup to demonstrate a tangible break from the repressive past regime and promised a new era of enlightened rule under Qaboos. Qaboos reinforced this message with CMO projects that benefited the Dhofari tribes; demonstrating progress essentially co-opted the cause of the insurgency. The French used the promise of reform and progress as well as varying degrees of coercion to overcome the substantial obstacles to recruitment. Due to political paralysis the French were unable to implement sufficient reforms to eliminate the appeal of the insurgents and so embarked on a kinetic based approach to destroy them.

¹²¹ Tony Jeapes, “SAS: *Operation Oman*.”, 29

Due to the nature of French rule in Algeria they were unable to achieve the same level of success in exploiting the benefits of an indigenous surrogate force as the British. This lack of success is partly traced to French failure to establish a consistent surrogate policy as well as their inability to establish trust at an operational level. The French achieved great success employing *Harkis* units in counter FLN operations (both kinetic and non-kinetic), but were unable to translate that success into achieving, sustaining or expanding the support of the Algerian population towards France. Conversely, the British were able to expand on the initial ideological appeal of Sultan Qaboos' reforms and build on the resulting convergence of goals. While the Sultan's hearts and minds campaign was directed at the Dhofari population, his recruitment efforts targeted almost exclusively SEPs. The BATT used the *Firqat* to exploit cracks among the Adoo factions and create a steady stream of defectors.

Another aspect that greatly impacted the efficacy of the respective surrogates in the two case studies was their command and control structure. The two powers approached the issue from opposing views. With few notable exceptions *Harkis* units were lead by French officers and NCOs, while the *Firqat* were commanded by a Dhofari tribal leader who was advised by a BATT (both of whom fell under the Sultan). The fact that the BATT soldiers were there in an advisory capacity only was demonstrated on numerous occasions by the *Firqat* boycotts of operations. This is generally not a desired practice for a functional association, but it aptly demonstrated that the *Firqat* were not pawns of the British. The relegation of the *Harkis* to a constant subordinate role effectively castrated them in the eyes of the Algerian population and undermined the French claim of having raised more Algerians to arms than the FLN. The *Harkis* were often regarded more as an Algerian mask over a French operation than an Algerian face.

Recruitment

Even though both powers succeeded in recruiting sufficient numbers of surrogates to man their respective forces primarily utilizing the self enlightened method, only the British were able

to expand the basic ideological overlap and establish an operational level of trust with their surrogates. The British were able to reinforce and expand the ideological overlap demonstrated by the voluntary enlistment of the *Firqats*. Sultan Qaboos began to carry out the reforms he had announced when he came to power demonstrating to the many former DLF members that the progress they began the revolt for was now occurring. The Sultan was able to position himself as a champion of Islam, contrasting himself against the atheist oppression of the Adoo. The Adoo oppression was in stark contrast to the British who made a calculated decision to avoid coercion or torture. The employment of such coercive measures by the British would have robbed them of the moral high ground and ceded legitimacy to the Adoo.

As the *Firqat* demonstrated they were a competent fighting force, the population began to perceive the *Firqat* as legitimate representatives of the Dhofari interests. The legitimacy of the *Firqat* provided additional weight to the authority of the Sultan. This created a self-perpetuating cycle that reinforced the ideological overlap and common goals between the Dhofari tribes, the British and the Sultan. This degree of ideological overlap and convergence of Dhofari and Omani goals prevented the Adoo from being able to operationally impact the trust between the BATT and the *Firqat*. The vetting system established for the SEP program was effective enough to prevent infiltration of the Force K variety. The Adoo conducted numerous kinetic attempts at destroying BATTs, but were unable to attack the base relationship that underpinned the British success.

The French were not as restrained in their recruitment methods and employed coercive measures in turning agents. These coercive recruiting methods and the pervasive chauvinistic attitude towards the Algerians prevented the French from expanding on what ideological overlap they shared with their surrogates. The French Government attempted to address the second class status of Algerians to co-opt the FLN cause, but was unable to overcome the Pied Noir vehement resistance to such reforms. While some tactical level commanders were able to establish a rapport

with their Algerian surrogates and local population, the French high command was unable to operationalize that trust to a theater level.

The FLN exploited French chauvinistic attitudes by facilitating high profile defections of *Harkis* units (Force K) as well as the occasional grisly murder of an SAS officer at the hands of his guerrillas or the local militia. These isolated events had a great impact on French morale and attitude towards the Algerian population as a whole, setting the stage for brutal reprisals that continued to feed the cycle.

Application to the GWOT

The French in Algeria amply demonstrates that even a blatantly racist regime can overcome immense tangible obstacles and recruit sufficient native troops to prosecute their military operations. That the French were able to achieve such results bodes well for the US who does not have the same colonial baggage. The negative perception of the US in many parts of the world does not preclude the US from pursuing a surrogate based policy.¹²² The French example implies that given resources and a target population the US would be able to recruit surrogates for their operation. This use of surrogates would lower the US profile and ultimately increase the US ability to expand surrogate operations into other theaters.

The two case studies demonstrated the utility of indigenous surrogates. The indigenous requirement in the definition used for surrogate through out this paper implies there is no single surrogate force that meets the criteria for the entire GWOT. Each theater of operations should consider the availability and suitability of using a surrogate force.

¹²² <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=247>

The two case studies demonstrated that full exploitation of surrogates is best achieved through the realizing a level of operational trust between the employing power and the surrogate force. French efforts in Algeria demonstrate that surrogates can be coerced into supporting the employing power; however the ramifications of such policies can be severe. The methods the British utilized to achieve that trust were the use of self enlightened recruitment, the avoidance of coercion, the proper vetting of surrogates and co-opting the cause of the insurgency. Non-coercive recruitment demonstrates a base level of convergence of goals and ideology between the parties. The implementation of a multi-phase vetting process addresses some of the security concerns inherent in employing surrogates.

The case studies demonstrated how the employing power can reduce the vulnerable seams between themselves and the surrogate force by proactively addressing potential elements of friction and demonstrating to the surrogate the tangible benefits of cooperation. The British success in Oman clearly demonstrated the positive linkage between the Dhofari support for the Sultan and their improved living conditions. The French failure to effectively address the underlying cause of the revolt or provide tangible improvement in the conditions of the Algerian population was directly related with their inability to effectively rally popular opinion to actively support French rule.

Employment

Irregular indigenous forces will not provide the same over all level of efficiency as a professional western military; therefore the non-kinetic benefits gained by the surrogates must outweigh that loss of efficiency. The utilization of indigenous forces and SEPs by the employing powers in the two case studies demonstrated both benefits as well as some pitfalls. The employing powers were able to exploit the intelligence value of their SEPs to disrupt the operations of the respective insurgents, but only the British were able to further exploit the surrogates for cultural intelligence and win the support of the population. French utilization of

Harkis soldiers to conduct odorous tasks such as intrusive searches of Algerian villages did little to lower the over all French profile or blunt the perception the *Harkis* were puppets of the French government. Conversely the British role as advisors minimized their profile enough to escape the effective exploitation by the Adoo. Furthermore the degree of independence enjoyed by the *Firqat* commanders and the tangible improvements experienced by the Dhofari tribes provided a defense against the charges of being puppets for Britain.

A major benefit of SEPs is the intelligence they provide; however, against an adaptable enemy that intelligence has a short duration. In order to maintain the benefits of current intelligence from a SEP operation, a steady stream of new defectors must be recruited. The active British strategic communications campaign was able to achieve a sustainable flow of SEPs, while the French were not.

The French and British both realized that the insurgent organizations they faced were not monolithic and sought to use their surrogate forces to exploit the seams of the insurgent camps, but to different ends. The French sought to destroy the FLN, while the British sought to co-opt the Adoo. They utilized different techniques to accomplish their objective. The French sought to ignite bloody purges in the FLN ranks by exploiting the atmosphere of rampant mistrust and petty rivalries. They accomplished this by infiltrating the FLN through coercing members to become French agents. The French then conducted misinformation programs to exaggerate the degree of infiltration and cast dispersions on the loyalty of devoted nationalists. The FLN then did the dirty work for the French, purging their ranks and greatly impacting their ability to conduct effective operations in Algeria. However the resulting blowback for their coercive techniques greatly damaged French international standing and domestic support for the war. The British realized the type of ramifications such tactics would have in a tribal based society as Dhofar and did not adopt them. The British instead preferred to bleed the Adoo through aggressively recruiting SEPs. Through comprehensive redressing of the basic causes of the Dhofari revolt Sultan Qaboos

effectively removed the fuel for the insurgency and drove an effective wedge between the former DLF insurgents and the Yemeni backed hard core Marxists.

Kinetic

As discussed previously, a surrogates' most important contributions to the overall effort are intangible and non-kinetic, however the surrogate force must meet a threshold of combat operational credibility before it can fully provide these non- kinetic benefits. Despite the *Harkis* being by far the more operationally capable of the two surrogate forces, the *Firqat* with all their operational limitations proved to be the more legitimate and strategically effective force. The disparity of the two case studies casts doubt on the existence of a universal standard to quantify what constitutes an operationally credible surrogate force, leaving us to apply a paraphrase of Justice Stewart's judicial wisdom: the population will know a credible force when they see it.¹²³

The adoption of FLN highly mobile tactics by the *Commando de Chasse* provided the French with an effective counter guerrilla capability they did not have previously. This coupled with disrupting the FLN's supplies effectively eliminated the capacity of the FLN to function inside Algeria in an operationally significant way. However, because the French were unable to capitalize on the intangible benefits of their surrogates they could not translate their military successes into consolidating political achievements. The continued survival of the FLN in its cross border sanctuaries practically negated the value of French military gains inside of Algeria. Conversely the *Firqat* were not utilized as replacements for the SAF, but rather as a means to

¹²³ Justice J. Stewart's consenting opinion in *Jacobellis v. Ohio*. March 26, 1963.
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0184_ZC1.html Accessed March 2007

complement them. The cultural information and intelligence on the enemy provided by the *Firqat* greatly enhanced the SAFs ability to close with and destroy the Adoo.

Employment Application to the GWOT

Both case studies established that the adversary was not monolithic and also demonstrate the utility of surrogates in exploiting the cleavages among the insurgents. The British in Oman focused on using surrogates to peel support and manpower from the insurgents, while the French used surrogates in an attempt to destroy them. While both achieved a degree of success, the British were able to translate tactical achievements to a beneficial strategic outcome. The US and partner nations must begin to identify and exploit the seams of the international and regional terrorist organizations.

The case studies demonstrated the affect of public opinion on the ability of the employing power to prosecute a war. The Sultan was able to restrict access of journalists into Oman and prevent coverage from affecting the British domestic opinion. That option is not available to the US as the press has become a part of the COE. In addition to the traditional press, the internet is now intruding into the battlefield. The ubiquitous nature of the new internet media was demonstrated by the profusion of blog websites with video footage from the 2006 Israeli Hezbollah conflict in southern Lebanon. The pervasive nature of the media and its affect on domestic public opinion further supports the adoption of a surrogate based strategy that will lower the profile of US involvement.

This increase in media directly affects the importance of the perception of legitimacy in US operations. The case studies demonstrate the benefit of lowering the profile of the employing force and stressing the role of the surrogates. Where possible the employing power should utilize advisors, to promote the perception that surrogates are a legitimate participant in the operation rather than a tool of a foreign employing power. The perception of the US as a supporting effort to a legitimate stake holder could bolster public support longer than the perception of the US as

global police officer. If a surrogate is perceived as a stooge of the employing power, the transfer of legitimacy does not occur; rather there is a transfer of illegitimacy. The public airing of minor disagreements could possibly assuage some of these perceptions.

The two case studies demonstrated the utility of subject matter experts. The British practice of using Arabs to create or vet strategic communications themes paid dividends in the effectiveness of their products as well as lowering the profile of the British. The French failure to heed the warnings of a noted anthropologist with Force K demonstrates the dangers of well intentioned amateurs attempting delicate operations.

Moral Implications

A mutual fund prospectus informs the reader, past performance is not a guarantee of future results, but often it is the only available indicator for predictions. This principle can also apply to nation states. The willingness of surrogates to collaborate with an employing power is often influenced by the past actions of that power. The French and British had to overcome the perceptions their surrogates and adversaries had from their conduct in neighboring colonies. The French performance in WWII and withdrawal from several colonies created an impression of a lack of commitment that became an obstacle to recruitment and encouragement to the FLN.¹²⁴ Unfortunately for the *Harkis* the French proved consistent in that lack of commitment. Likewise the British withdrawal from Yemen in 1967 created a cloud of doubt in the minds of the *Firqat* as

¹²⁴ David Galula. "*Pacification of Algeria 1956-58.*",Page 17

to whether the British would have the stomach to see the Dhofar operation to its conclusion. The *Firqat* were surprised when the BATT did not quit, as were the Adoo.¹²⁵

In ideological struggles current actions are not conducted in a vacuum and decisions involving moral issues have long lasting repercussions. The starkest contrast between the two employing powers was their respective conscious decisions with regards to employing coercive techniques like torture and collective punishment. The French liberally employed both as a means of turning FLN agents and maintaining “control” over the country side. . The French used torture to immense tactical and operation effect throughout the Algerian pacification, but most notoriously and effectively during the Battle of Algiers. General Aussaresses provides a frank and unapologetic account of how the French euphemistically “liberated” three thousand of the twenty four thousand suspected insurgents detained during the Battle of Algiers.¹²⁶ Torture is unacceptable to modern western society, by adopting the “weapon” of the adversary the French lost the moral high ground in international and domestic opinion. This loss of French standing in world affairs contributed more to their eventual withdrawal from Algeria than the FLN’s nonexistent military achievements.

Conversely, the British did not employ coercion or black propaganda during their operations in Oman as this ran counter to their recognized goals of securing the support of the population.¹²⁷ The British demonstrated during the Mau Mau Rebellion in Kenya they were more than capable of conducting ruthless operations as a counter-insurgency weapon, but the

¹²⁵ Charles Allen, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, 185-6

¹²⁶ Paul Aussaresses, *Battle for the Casbah*, 163

¹²⁷ Tony Jeapes, “SAS: *Operation Oman*.”, 34

recognition of the impact such tactics would have and the realization that the population was the true objective prevented the British from employing such measures.

The post conflict actions of the British and French are also stark contrasts. The French did not just abandon the *Harkis* to slaughter, they disarmed them and passed legislation to prevent their mass migration to France. Some estimates place the death toll at over 150,000 *Harkis* and their families killed by the FLN in reprisals. The Sultan's reforms continued and Oman remains under his rule, while not flush with oil revenue there is sufficient to maintain progress.

Moral implications Application to the GWOT

The two case studies demonstrated that there is a long history of a moral double standard between accepted conduct of western armies and insurgents. That double standard is alive and well today in the COE and the US must learn to successfully operate with that constraint. The depravity of the enemy is no longer front page news, however alleged, isolated and unauthorized US mistreatment of insurgents will be. This double standard must be acknowledged and incorporated into planning and execution. The Alf Heggoy quote echoes in the silence of the Arab street to numerous human rights abuses occurring at the hands of Arab governments.

The temptation to follow France's footsteps and resort to using the tools of the enemy to expedite the eradication of the insurgent is strong, but sinking to the level of the terrorists debases the US and legitimizes the terrorist tactics. In a recent interview General Abazaïd warned "If we decide to fight this war by walking away from our values, we lose the fight."¹²⁸ The active

¹²⁸ General John Abizaïd. Interview by Ted Koppel, "Our Children's, Children's War." Air March 2007

targeting of US domestic opinion by the enemy has raised public perception of the conflicts to an even more important role. Combined with the pervasive nature of media on the battlefield isolated incidents and mistakes on the battlefield can be catapulted into prime time news war crimes.

The enemy is watching our actions. The FLN and PFLOAG both saw France and Britain's abandonment of previous colonial holdings as an indication of weakness and predicted that they lacked the required fortitude to expend the effort required to retain Algeria and Oman respectively. The enemy continues to draw on the past actions of the US to influence their operations; their leaders have referenced the failure of American will power to sustain operations in Vietnam, Beirut and Somalia as proof of their eventual victory in Afghanistan, Iraq and eventually the GWOT. By learning from the success and failures of other nations the US could adapt her GWOT strategy to include a more robust use of surrogates. By utilizing surrogates the US would alleviate some of the current manpower issues and lower her profile in contentious areas of the international arena. The adoption and consistent long term application of a surrogate policy would provide some protection against the flagging will of the US population and change the calculations of our adversaries.

APPENDIX

Complete Doctrinal Definitions from Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary and Associated Terms. 12 April 2001 (As amended through 5 January 2007), 88, 257, 509

Information Operations (IO) = The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence,

disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. JP 1-02 Page 88.

Strategic Communication: (SC)= Focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. JP 1-02 Page 257.

Civil-military operations (CMO) The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military force, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces or by combination of civil affairs and other forces. JP 1-02 Page 509.

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