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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

THESIS

STREET SMARTS: UNCONVENTIONAL WARRIORS IN CONTEMPORARY JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS

by

Edward J. Amato

June 2001

Thesis Advisor:	David Tucker
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U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) has historically conducted Unconventional Warfare (UW) in the remote, rural, under-developed regions of the world. This thesis analyzes the relevance of UW to contemporary joint urban operations (JUO) during Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and Stability and Support Operations (SASO). America's pre-eminence on the conventional battlefield, and the asymmetric advantages cities offer, should compel adversaries to engage us on urban terrain. Despite this observation, current doctrine inadequately prepares our forces for MOOTW or SASO in cities. Modernization efforts focus predominantly on improving high-intensity combat skills, and developing technological combat-multipliers. During MOOTW and SASO casualties, collateral damage, and political consequences can rapidly erode public support; conventional combat operations may entail excessive political risk. Forces trained for unit maneuver warfare are not sufficient for stabilizing politically charged conflicts short of war. Unique capabilities, training, and experience conducting UW makes SF ideally suited for conducting JUO in this arena. A case study of U.S. involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrates the unique capabilities SF provides commanders, not otherwise available in the extant force structure. This thesis advocates using UW to counter urban, asymmetric threats, and concludes with a recommendation for developing amplifying doctrine for conducting UW in urban areas.

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STREET SMARTS: UNCONVENTIONAL WARRIORS IN CONTEMPORARY JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS

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Major, United States Army
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

from the

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ABSTRACT

U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) has historically conducted Unconventional Warfare (UW) in the remote, rural, under-developed regions of the world. This thesis analyzes the relevance of UW to contemporary joint urban operations (JUO) during Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and Stability and Support Operations (SASO). America's pre-eminence on the conventional battlefield, and the asymmetric advantages cities offer, should compel adversaries to engage us on urban terrain. Despite this observation, current doctrine inadequately prepares our forces for MOOTW or SASO in cities. Modernization efforts focus predominantly on improving high-intensity combat skills, and developing technological combat-multipliers. During MOOTW and SASO casualties, collateral damage, and political consequences can rapidly erode public support; conventional combat operations may entail excessive political risk. Forces trained for unit maneuver warfare are not sufficient for stabilizing politically charged conflicts short of war. Unique capabilities, training, and experience conducting UW makes SF ideally suited for conducting JUO in this arena. A case study of U.S. involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrates the unique capabilities SF provides commanders, not otherwise available in the extant force structure. This thesis advocates using UW to counter urban, asymmetric threats, and concludes with a recommendation for developing amplifying doctrine for conducting UW in urban areas.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Resort to assaulting walled cities only when there is no other choice.[1]

- Sun Tzu

A. WHY CITIES?

1. Overview

To prepare to conduct urban operations it is important to understand why "there is no other choice," why military forces will be required to operate in such an environment. Demographic trends alone are not a sufficient explanation; asymmetric threats, and America's National Security Strategy explain why it is reasonable to assume increased involvement in Joint Urban Operations (JUO) will be unavoidable for American military forces in the future.

Nations seldom enjoy the luxury of choosing where their armies fight. Were it so, they would strive to honor Sun Tzu's maxim, safeguarding their forces from slow, difficult, manpower intensive operations in cities. Unfortunately, urban areas have historically been lodestones for important military operations. Nations rely on the industrial, transportation, and communication hubs that cities provide. During Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and Stability and Support Operations (SASO) in cities, military forces are overwhelmed by the myriad responsibilities of urban infrastructure maintenance, the presence of noncombatants, and the potential for escalation to combat operations at any time, as evidenced in Mogadishu. Where combat operations occur, fighting is particularly brutal and costly. Denied the maneuver and

[1] Ames, Roger T. (trans.), Sun-Tzu: The Art of Warfare, New York: Ballantine Books, 1993, p. 111.

decisive battle western armies are organized for, engagements are reduced to the fierce small-unit actions epitomized at Stalingrad, Aachen, and Berlin.

Demographics are often debated, and do not exclusively explain why JUO will become increasingly important. Statistics fluctuate depending on where the geographic boundaries of cities are set, which changes population densities within cities, and what is or is not defined as an urban area. Undeniably, the world's urban populations are growing. From 1975 to 1995, the percentage of the world's population living in cities increased from 38 to 45 percent, with a projected 61 percent by 2025. Of the 369 cities worldwide with a population greater than 750,000, 189 are in the less or least developed nations of Africa and Asia.[2] In each of these instances, the percentage of people living in absolute poverty in rural areas far exceeds the impoverishment of city-dwellers, magnifying the allure of urban migration. By 2005, it is estimated that developing countries will account for 95 percent of the world's population growth.[3] Even if these projections are not reached, population momentum in these nations will ensure high absolute increases for many years, exacerbating the extreme poverty extant in rural

---

[2] The United Nations identifies the following regions as less developed: Africa, Latin America, Asia (excluding Japan), Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia. A sub-category identifies least-developed nations, including: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Buina-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zaire, and Zambia. "The Urban Environment," World Resources 1996-97: A Guide to the Global Environment, World Resources Institute, 1709 New York Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20006. Downloaded from http://www.wri.org/wri/wr-96-97/96tocful.html, on 28 September 2000, p. 150-151.

[3] World Urbanization Prospects: The 1994 Revision, Population Information Network Gopher of the United Nations Population Division, New York, 1995, p. 1.

areas.[4] As economic incentives in the rural sector are further eroded, urbanization will continue to increase.

Eyeing global demographic trends provides only a partial picture. Regionally, Europe's population is expected to be 85 percent urbanized by 2025, while Africa may only attain 54 percent urbanization. Even the low African figures can be misleading; Libya's 93 percent urbanization projection contrasts starkly with Rwanda's 15 percent prediction. North and Central American urbanization is expected to rise to 79 percent by 2025, and South America to a projected 88 percent. In contrast to the Americas, Asia is predicted to reach only 55 percent by 2025, ranging from Bhutan's 19 percent to Singapore's 100 percent, Kuwait's 99 percent, and Israel's 94 percent projections.[5] Even within nations, urbanization densities vary widely. Consider the United States, where urban agglomeration of the Northeast greatly exceeds that in the Midwest. Within many nations, high levels of urbanization do not adequately illustrate a population divided between an enormous capital city and vast rural areas.

It is unclear that these demographic trends alone favor a shift to JUO over operations in rural areas. As urban infrastructures become strained or overwhelmed, rural regions are also becoming increasingly impoverished. Furthermore, it is not clear that the

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[4] Demographers use the term population momentum to describe why population increase remains high even after fertility rates exhibit decline. The phenomenon is usually the result of the youthful age structure found in populations of developing nations.

[5] "The Urban Environment," World Resources 1996-97: A Guide to the Global Environment, World Resources Institute, 1709 New York Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20006. Downloaded from http://www.wri.org/wri/wr-96-97/96tocful.html, on 28 September 2000, p. 150-151.

burdens of over-urbanization result in political conflict.[6] Two other factors, however, illustrate why JUO will become increasingly critical to America in the future.

2. Asymmetric Threats

So 'ere's to you fuzzy-wuzzy, at your 'ome in the Soudan; You're a pore benighted 'eathen, but a first class fightin' man.[7]

- Rudyard Kipling

Similar to Kipling's "fightin' man of the Soudan," many potential adversaries today are easily overlooked and underestimated. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-53.3 cites the rebels of Grozny as a "small, relatively primitive" fighting force during the 1995 conflict.[8] Even in hindsight, cultural differences and unfamiliar war fighting paradigms are often incorrectly viewed as weaknesses. In perspective, the nature of Chechen clan warfare provided a distinct advantage for the rebels, particularly on their home turf of Grozny. Their method of organization was certainly effective for them, and well adapted to the city they fought in. The Russians, facing an opponent using an entirely different operational approach, were slow to adapt to the Chechen methods. The Chechens used an asymmetric approach, tactically and strategically suited to their urban environment, to achieve success against a numerically superior Russian conventional force, even in this high-intensity conflict.

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[6] See Denoeux, Guilain, Urban Unrest in the Middle East: A Comparative Study of Informal Networks in Egypt, Iran, and Lebanon, Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1993. Denoeux posits that informal social networks contribute greatly to political stability in the Middle East, where urban infrastructures have otherwise failed to provide necessary services for their citizens.

[7] Kipling, Rudyard, "Fuzzy-Wuzzy." Downloaded from Rudyard Kipling -- The Bard of British Imperialism, http://www.zeitcom.com/majgen/09kipling.html, on 28 September 2000.

[8] U.S. Department of Defense, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-35.3, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), Department of the Navy, April 1998, p. J-1.

To a great extent, poor Russian preparation, and a culturally naive expectation that the Chechens would not fight, is to blame for the 1995 Russian defeat. By the January 2000 Grozny campaign, Russian leadership had learned valuable tactical lessons; using artillery and airpower instead of only tanks and infantry, fielding three times the manpower of their previous operations, and razing Grozny to the ground has denied the Chechen rebels the success they enjoyed in the 1995 conflict.[9] It is unlikely that similar techniques would be politically palatable to American politicians in a MOOTW or SASO scenario. For this reason, an adversary like the Chechen rebels is highly problematic for U.S. commanders in an urban setting.

America's national security strategy warns, "the U.S. must be prepared to fight and win under conditions where an adversary may use asymmetric means...unconventional approaches that avoid or undermine our strengths while exploiting our vulnerabilities."[10] The U.S., and our potential adversaries, knows the great advantage of American strength lies in our supreme excellence on the high-intensity, maneuver battlefield, as recently demonstrated in the Gulf War. Urban terrain denies America this advantage; therefore, our enemies should try to compel us to fight in cities.

During the 1998 Army After Next (AAN) Spring Wargame, disturbing evidence arose that U.S. forces are still not prepared to meet this challenge. The Wargame was set in the year 2021, with Red enemy forces attacking states on the south shore of the Persian Gulf. The United States, already engaged in peacekeeping in Indonesia, and facing

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[9] Thomas, LTC Timothy L., USA, "Grozny 2000: Urban Combat Lessons Learned." Military Review, July-August 2000. Downloaded from http://www-cgsc.army.mil/milrev/English/JulAug00/thomas.htm, on 28 September 2000.

[10] A National Security Strategy for a New Century, The White House, Washington, D.C., December 1999, p. 19.

escalating border conflict between Pakistan and India, faced a tough test of its new, rapidly deployable Battle Force. Not surprisingly, our opponents sought to quickly nullify the Battle Forces maneuver and firepower advantages by "going to ground" in cities. A subsequent RAND report concluded:

> The decision by Red to enter and hold poorly defended [by friendly forces] urban areas became a key aspect of the game. As a result, the most modernized U.S. units, which were specifically designed to exploit the effects of long-range precision fires through operational maneuver, had little utility, and the urban areas had to be cleared by coalition forces, U.S. Marine Corps units, and Army XXI units. This enemy move proved to be an effective asymmetric counter to significant U.S. technological superiority.[11]

The Red commander regarded his network of occupied cities as the main means for defending the homeland against American or allied ground attack. A corollary to this recognition was the unfortunate conclusion that, "AAN Battle Forces were clearly unsuited for urban operations."[12] It is this asymmetric threat that ensures our future involvement in what is the ultimate enemy sanctuary.

3. National Security Strategy

America is not likely to revert to isolationism, or to idly sit-out conflicts around the globe that fall short of war. While the primary mission of American armed forces remains "to deter and, if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which our vital interests are threatened," our military will also be employed to support MOOTW and SASO due to its "unique capabilities and resources." One of the core objectives of our National

---

[11] Perry, Walter L., Pirnie, Bruce R., and Gordon, John V., IV, Issues Raised During the Army After Next Spring Wargame, RAND, MR-1023-A, Santa Monica, 1999, p. 10.

[12] Ibid., p. xi.

Security Strategy is "to promote democracy and human rights abroad." [13] This strategy envisions a leadership role abroad for the United States.

To implement our security strategy, the U.S. has identified "effective global power projection" as an essential capability for "responding to potential crises and conflicts, even when we have no permanent presence or a limited infrastructure in the region."[14] Given recent reductions in the size of America's military forces, and overseas presence, U.S. power projection capabilities are increasingly important. Although these capabilities are expanding dramatically, America's current power projection strategy is dependent on the use of specialized theater arrival facilities: seaports, airports, and railway or road networks typically available only in large urban areas.[15] During a force projection operation, up to ninety percent of the total tonnage -- fuel, ammunition, and supplies -- will travel by sealift. The majority of all personnel necessary will fly into theater on commercial passenger airlines. [16] The requirement for secure ports and airfields increases the need for unopposed force projection capability. The denial of these necessary facilities to U.S. forces will dramatically curtail our ability to implement our National Security Strategy. As power projection gains importance, involvement in JUO will increase. Recent operational evidence validates this observation: 237 of the last 250 U.S. Marine Corps overseas deployments involved urban operations.[17]

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[13] Ibid., pp. 11, 20, iii.

[14] Ibid., p. 11.

[15] Frank R. Boynton, Power Projection Operations and Urban Combat: An Avoidable Combination?, (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army CGSC School of Advanced Military Studies, 1995) p. 1.

[16] Ibid., p. 2.

[17] Russell W. Glenn, Marching Under Darkening Skies: The American Military and the Impending Urban Operations Threat, RAND, MR-1007-A, Santa Monica, 1998, p. 3.

B. PURPOSE

This thesis analyzes the relevance of the UW mission to contemporary JUO during MOOTW and SASO. The modernization and transformation efforts of policy-makers and senior decision-makers in the U.S. military focus on improving high-intensity combat skills, and developing technological combat-multipliers -- an approach that ignores important realities of JUO during peacetime or conflict, where MOOTW and SASO predominate. During MOOTW and SASO, casualties, collateral damage, and political consequences can rapidly erode public support; conventional combat operations may entail excessive political risk. Traditional war fighting missions alone are not sufficient for stabilizing politically charged conflicts short of war. Operations during peacetime and conflict, particularly where less than vital national interests are at stake, may make it difficult to justify the level of destruction and bloodshed often associated with urban combat.

This analysis addresses the question: what is the role of today's unconventional warrior in the contemporary urban arena? The answer illustrates to today's Joint Force Commanders (JFC) the effectiveness of using politically and culturally attuned unconventional forces, trained and experienced in irregular warfare methods, to counter urban threats. We must not limit commanders to operational methods designed for high-intensity, maneuver warfare. Providing commanders with another option -- Unconventional Warfare (UW) -- to counter asymmetric threats will ensure deployed forces have the requisite capabilities for operating in the unique urban environment. Without such capabilities, doctrinal, training, and technological improvements may be wasted.

C. METHODOLOGY

It is intriguing to suggest that small numbers of specially trained personnel, normally associated with UW in the remote jungles of Laos and Vietnam, can fill an operational void in today's most technologically advanced, joint, multinational urban task forces. But America's unconventional forces trace their origins to the Jedburg teams of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II, originally trained, organized, and employed to conduct partisan support and UW in populated German-occupied Europe. To focus my study, I have limited my analysis to JUO during MOOTW and SASO, which occur during peacetime and conflict.[18] Wartime missions are doctrinally well defined, but contemporary JUO increasingly occur during peacetime and conflict, operational environments far more ambiguous, challenging, and less rigorously examined.

Given that it is reasonable to assume American forces will increasingly operate in cities in the future, I examined the nature of contemporary JUO. Chapter II details characteristics of the contemporary urban operational environment, as outlined by Joint Publication (JP) 3-06 Joint Doctrine for Urban Operations (First Draft). This chapter also identifies elements of urban operations that are becoming more significant than in the past: the presence of noncombatants, the presence of media, civil affairs (CA), and information operations (IO).

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[18] According to JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, war, conflict, and peacetime define the three environments in which the range of military operations may be conducted. FM 100-20 Stability and Support Operations defines conflict as, "a range of political conditions that are neither peace nor war. Conflict is characterized by the introduction of organized violence into the political process; yet groups in conflict remain willing to resolve their problems primarily by political means, with limited military support. The lower range of conflict is peaceful, punctuated by occasional acts of political violence. At the upper levels, conflict is very close to war, except for its combination of political and military means."

In light of these characteristics, I evaluate the suitability of Unconventional Warfare for this environment in Chapter III. A literature review of U.S. doctrine reveals that conventional forces are not oriented on JUO during MOOTW or SASO. Even DoD doctrine developed for MOOTW and SASO gives scant attention to the unique characteristics of cities. Doctrine for our unconventional forces, however, indicates these forces may possess attributes and capabilities far better suited to this unique environment. Specifically, Unconventional Warfare conducted by SF may be uniquely suited to address the important, overlooked elements of JUO during peacetime and conflict.

Chapter IV relates the experiences of SF during JUO in Bosnia. The objective of this case study is not to provide an exhaustive historical narrative, but to highlight the UW capabilities SF provided to commanders. These capabilities fulfilled an unforeseen requirement, or were capabilities not available to commanders in their extant force structure. I selected this example for three reasons: 1) the military operation occurred within the past decade and is ongoing, thus is representative of contemporary U.S. military operations; 2) a significant amount of the operational activity for this mission was conducted in urban areas; 3) the case illustrates the complex multinational, joint nature of such missions, a significantly tougher test than observation of unilateral operations.

Although it can be argued I have limited the general validity of my observations by presenting only one case, and one that is ethnically and culturally unique to the Balkans, my focus is not on specific cultural characteristics, geographic peculiarities, or regional populations. This analysis addresses characteristics common to all built-up areas, and the operational strengths UW provides commanders to address these

characteristics. Further research might well illustrate the applicability of these findings to all geographic areas, throughout the full spectrum of military operations.

Ultimately, this study concludes that UW is uniquely suited to address the requirements of the contemporary urban arena – requirements currently unfulfilled by other forces. Furthermore, it concludes that current UW doctrine is inadequate to best exploit the unique capabilities unconventional warriors can bring to modern JUO. Developing amplifying doctrine for urban UW would best utilize extant capabilities.

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II. THE NATURE OF CONTEMPORARY URBAN OPERATIONS

In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees - providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart - conducting peacekeeping operations. Finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle. All on the same day, all within three city blocks. It will be what we call the three block war.[19]

- General Charles Krulak, 31st Commandant, USMC

A. OVERVIEW

Joint Urban Operations (JUO) during Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and Stability and Support Operations (SASO) bear little resemblance to the pitched street fighting of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. Small unit combat effectiveness remains essential, because even JUO during peacetime and conflict can be punctuated by lethal, high-intensity combat actions. Measures of effectiveness (MOE), however, do not typically revolve around enemy forces killed or destroyed. The large-scale employment of military forces into a permissive or uncertain environment often risks further escalation to an unacceptable level, and can reduce the diplomatic flexibility of the United States and its allies once forces have been committed.

This chapter details characteristics of the urban operational landscape as identified by Joint Publication (JP) 3-06 (Draft) Joint Urban Operations, identifies factors gaining increased prominence in recent JUO, and highlights the significance of these characteristics to MOOTW and SASO.

B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

To them the jungle seemed predominately hostile, being full of man-eating tigers, deadly fevers, venomous snakes and scorpions, natives with

[19] Krulak, Charles C., "The Three Block War: Fighting in Urban Areas," presented at National Press Club, Washinton, D.C., 10 October 1997, Vital Speeches of the Day, 15 December 1997, p. 139.

poisonous darts, and a host of half-imagined nameless terrors. They were unable to adapt themselves to a new way of life and a diet of rice and vegetables. In this green hell they expected to be dead within a few weeks – and as a rule they were...The truth is that the jungle is neutral. It provides any amount of fresh water, and unlimited cover for friend as well as foe – an armed neutrality, if you like, but neutrality nevertheless. It is the attitude of mind that determines whether you go under or survive. There is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so. The jungle itself is neutral.[20]

- F. Spencer Chapman

Strangely, the city shares many characteristics with the jungle environment. Upton Sinclair's The Urban Jungle alluded to this commonality at the turn of the century, but the symbolism has military implications, as well. Both terrain types share greatly reduced observation and detection distance, making engagements sudden and at short-range. Maneuverability is significantly degraded in both, limiting the capabilities of armor and mechanized forces, and reducing the size of effective maneuver elements. Logistic demands also share some similarity, including difficulty of casualty evacuation, and limited resupply routes and methods. The metaphor need not be carried too far; more important is the observation that the 'jungle is neutral.' The difficulties and advantages posed by the urban environment apply equally to friend and foe, if both are astute and flexible enough to exploit them. The "nameless terrors" of the urban jungle are operational hurdles for all. If our enemies have better learned to surmount the city's challenges, and exploit the unique nature of this environment, we had best rapidly adapt to a "diet of rice and vegetables," that we may meet our opponents on equal footing.

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[20] U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), Unconventional Warfare: Summary Sheet Packet, Special Forces Officer Qualification Course Material, November 1991, p. 19.

U.S. doctrine for JUO is sorely inadequate and badly dated; it rarely addresses urban areas in the context of MOOTW or SASO.[21] Fortunately, proposed doctrine provides a framework for discussing characteristics of this operational environment. JP 3-06 (Draft) defines joint urban operations as, "all joint operations planned and conducted across the range of military operations on, or against objectives on a topographical complex and its adjacent terrain where manmade construction and the density of noncombatants are the dominant features."[22] Doctrine approaches the city as an environment, not a mission. JUO are the set of missions undertaken in this environment, and they have distinct characteristics when executed in cities because of the unique nature of the environment. The character of this environment has gained attention and generated debate. Indeed, the degree of difficulty these characteristics impose on the conduct of military operations is the reason for Sun-Tzu's age-old dictum, "Resort to assaulting walled cities only when there is no other choice." Condensed from JP 3-06 (Draft) Joint Urban Operations, these characteristics of the operational environment include: reduced technological advantages; increased demands for manpower; decentralization; increased demands for time; unique constraints; alteration by terrain of weapons and munitions effects; unique and demanding logistics requirements; and unique advantages for defenders, insurgents, and terrorists.[23]

This list is not meant to be all-inclusive, but provides a doctrinal framework for assessing this environment. Observations drawn from Marine Corps Warfighting

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[21] For a more complete literature review of U.S. urban doctrine, see Appendix A.

[22] U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Doctrine for Urban Operations (First Draft), JP 3-06, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 2000, p. I-1.

[23] Ibid., pp. I-11 - I-13.

Publication (MCWP) 3-53.3 Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, and Field Manual (FM) 90-10-1 An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-up Areas, reinforce some of the eight operational characteristics listed.

1. Reduced Technological Advantages

America's military is accustomed to technological superiority. Urban terrain blunts this edge, and compels U.S. forces to develop new technologies, or find low-technology alternatives to accomplish the mission. Residential and industrial power lines, electric trains and trolleys, phone lines, and the existence of man-made structures in urban terrain interfere with the normal way our forces operate. Our reliance on UHF and VHF communications, electronic sensors, long-range precision optics, and aviation assets ensures that blunting this technological edge will have far-reaching impacts on our capabilities and operational methods.

Perhaps the single most important capability that will be hampered is the intelligence collection effort. In many instances, as technology improves, human sources of intelligence (HUMINT) have been replaced with sensors and other technological means (IMINT, SIGINT, COMINT, and MASINT). These tradeoffs are not without costs, however. Some analysts feel America's over-reliance on technological collection methods has resulted in a critical shortcoming not easily remedied. In The Art of Darkness, author Scott Gerwehr notes that, "sensors and communications operate less reliably and at reduced power in urban terrain...HUMINT sources may in fact be multiplied greatly in the urban environment."[24] Without the ability to capitalize on this resource, U.S. urban collection efforts are significantly handicapped. One conclusion of

[24] Gerwehr, Scott and Glenn, Russell W., The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Operations,

an Aberdeen Proving Ground historical study (commonly known as the McLaurin Study), is reflected in Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-35.3:

> Intelligence is imperative to success in urban warfare...Few tactical changes can overcome the far-reaching impact of a major intelligence error...of the battles studied, battles lost were attributed to errors in initial intelligence.[25]

An Associated Press release on February 28, 2000, described the government's General Accounting Office (GAO) as being equally critical of urban intelligence methods. Reporter David Ho cited GAO investigators as stating; "U.S. forces currently do not have adequate information...due to the lower priority the intelligence community has afforded urban warfare in its collection efforts."[26] The GAO noted that poor intelligence about local conditions in recent conflicts such as Kosovo, Bosnia, and Rwanda could lead to greater risks for U.S. forces and civilians.

Reduced intelligence is not the only result of degraded technology in JUO. During MOOTW and SASO, degraded capabilities can combine to produce tenuous operational situations. Insufficient intelligence prohibits the Joint Force Commander (JFC) from anticipating threats; debilitated communications reduce the commander's ability to synchronize coalition and multinational efforts; without responsive

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RAND, MR-1132-A, Santa Monica, 2000, p. 48

[25] p. 1-12. See also R. D. McLaurin, et. al., Modern Experience in City Combat, (Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland: U.S. Army Engineering Laboratory, 1987). Literature mentioning the uniquely critical role of intelligence to success in urban operations includes: MCWP 3-35.5 Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, p. 1-12; LTC T. R. Milton, Jr., "Urban Operations: Future War," Military Review, Vol. 74, No. 2, February 1994, pp. 37-46; Scott Gerwehr and Russell W. Glenn, The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Operations, RAND, MR-1132-A, Santa Monica, 2000, pp. 37, 54; and Russell W. Glenn, ...We Band of Brothers: The Call for Joint Urban Operations Doctrine, RAND, Santa Monica, 1999, pp. 28-31.

[26] Ho, David, "U.S. Urban Intelligence Criticized," Associated Press, 28 February 2000. Downloaded from AOL News website, 28 February 2000.

communications, force protection is also jeopardized, and isolated forces may react inappropriately to perceived threats in the absence of guidance. The resultant lack of command and control (C2) can cause minor crises to quickly escalate, jeopardizing operational and strategic objectives.

2. Increased Demands for Manpower

The extent of three-dimensional battlespace in cities is greater than in other terrain types. Urban forces must consider not only the surface battle, but also the operational impact of supersurface and subsurface environments, airspace, and the external and internal space of structures. During combat operations, time-consuming, infantry-intensive engagements at extremely close range become the norm. While close combat is generally the least favored technique of prosecuting ground operations, tactical urban battles have proven particularly lethal, historically generating fifty percent casualty rates.[27] Although combined arms operations are still most effective, they are much more difficult to execute.

During MOOTW and SASO, civil-military concerns have the potential for diverting significant manpower from operational missions. In addition, political realities suggest that such JUO will include coalition or multinational forces, greatly increasing the number of units and personnel in the operational area. The dispersed, mobile nature of non-traditional threats to friendly military forces pose added manpower demands for force protection. Despite these realities, the large-scale employment of military force can heighten existing tensions in an uncertain environment, actually exacerbating efforts to

[27] LTC John Holcomb, presentation during RAND conference: "Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the Twenty-First Century." Author attended at RAND Arroyo Center, 1700 Main Street, Santa Monica, CA 90401, 22-23 March 2000.

restore or maintain order and stability. The JFC must balance the vast requirements for manpower with the need to avoid escalation.

3. Decentralization

In JUO, the ability of U.S. forces to identify, influence, manipulate, or target threat forces in urban environments is hindered by our opponents' dispersed and decentralized nature. Lecturing on insurgency and sub-state conflict, Professor Gordon McCormick calls this the "see-hit dichotomy."[28] Irregular forces depend on their stealth and invisibility for survival, while American forces are often overly reliant on technological means of detection. We must see (identify/understand) our target to hit (influence/destroy) it. In an urban setting the terrain negates our technological edge, and masks the dispersed actions of our adversaries.

Maneuver restrictions dramatically decentralize ground operations. Labyrinths of narrow, unfamiliar streets hinder navigation, decentralizing command and control of units forced to disperse. In Mogadishu, the inability of dispersed relief columns to aid the beleaguered Task Force Ranger jeopardized mission success. The delays and confusion caused by dispersed and decentralized elements also subjected friendly forces to repeated ambush along the alleys and passageways of the city. Eighteenth Century military theorist Colonel Charles Ardant du Picq recognized the debilitating effects of dispersion and increasing technological sophistication on the morale and cohesion of units.[29] Modern-day theorists have also posited that the more expanded and decentralized the

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[28] McCormick, Gordon. SO3802 (Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare) class lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School, 1999.

[29] Jacobs, William M., "The Human Element of Battle," Special Warfare, Vol. 9, No. 2, May 1996, p. 36.

battlefield becomes, the greater the risk cohesion will disintegrate.[30] In the urban landscape, where irregular threats add to the stress of an already decentralized operational environment, effectiveness is at risk.

During JUO, the linkage of tactical, operational, and strategic objectives means national policy goals can be achieved or thwarted even at the tactical level.[31] The nature of street fighting entails the decentralization of already small tactical units. The dispersion of these small maneuver elements further frustrates effective C2. The fog of urban battle, combined with rapid operational tempo (OPTEMPO), often overtakes the ability of senior leaders to control and direct unfolding events. Clausewitz describes this phenomenon: "effort is increasingly dispersed; friction everywhere increases and greater scope is left for chance...dragging the commander down, frustrating him more and more."[32] Junior leaders and individuals quickly find themselves making decisions formerly left to battalion-level or brigade-level leadership. This observation is not new. In the battle for Stalingrad, Soviet Marshal Vasili I. Chuikov recognized the power of small, ably led, independent units. He wrote of his 64th Army:

> In our counter-attacks we abandoned attacks by entire units and even sections of units. Towards the end of September storm groups appeared in all regiments; these were small but strong groups, as wily as a snake and

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[30] James J. Schneider, "The Theory of Operational Art," Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, March 1988.

[31] U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Doctrine for Urban Operations (First Draft), JP 3-06, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 2000, p. I-14, -2. See also U.S. Department of Defense, Marine Corps War fighting Publication (MCWP) 3-35.3, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), Department of the Navy, April 1998, p. 1-19 - 1-20; and Glenn, Russell W., Steeb, Randall, and Matsumura, John, Corralling the Trojan Horse: A Proposal for Improving U.S. Urban Operations Preparedness in the Period 2000-2025, RAND, Santa Monica, 2001, p. 10.

[32] Howard, Michael, and Paret, Peter, Carl von Clausewitz: On War, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 612.

irrepressible in action.[33]

This characteristic of street fighting underscores the need for well-trained, experienced leadership at the lowest levels of tactical maneuver, even during operations short of war. During MOOTW and SASO, it is similarly critical that isolated junior leaders do not allow minor crises to escalate, jeopardizing national or coalition efforts.

Further adding to the challenge of decentralized leadership is the multinational nature of JUO. Units requiring medical assistance, logistical support, or help in a crisis, must contend with interoperability issues as a major concern. Once only a problem for Army-level leadership, today small-unit leaders are frustrated at their attempts to communicate with multinational and joint partners. The inability to communicate isolates many smaller units from the larger tactical and operational picture, multiplying the strain of leadership. In Mogadishu, for the few weeks U.S. Navy ships were offshore, the Army hospital in the city was unable to communicate with them. While the Army and Marines used the same tactical radio system, problems arose because of differing service-specific modernization and upgrade cycles.[34] In 1999, preparedness assessments carried out by the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J7) pointed out that "Command, control, communications, and computer (C4) architectures were not fully integrated, but were overburdened and vulnerable to kinetic or computer attack. Moreover, systems were seldom fully interoperable with coalition partners, and at times were incapable of being linked to national or CINC support systems."[35]

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[33] Chuikov, Vasili I., The Battle for Stalingrad, New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964, p. 146.

[34] Allard, Kenneth C., "Lessons Unlearned: Somalia and Joint Doctrine," Joint Forces Quarterly," Autumn 1995, p. 106.

[35] "Lessons Learned: Joint Exercises," Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 1999-2000, p. 106.

4. Increased Demands for Time

America's military is primarily designed to destroy the military might of its enemies. Although power projection to remote locales can be a slight delay to accomplishing this goal, the fundamental orientation of our forces remains the same. To accomplish this goal, our leaders have been trained to identify the military centers of gravity of their adversaries, and to focus their efforts at a decisive point to quickly conclude operations on successful terms. This war-fighting paradigm can be problematic during MOOTW or SASO, where non-traditional roles are often required of our military forces. Many of these non-traditional roles, such as maintaining stability to facilitate diplomatic efforts, do not offer the promise of quick, decisive engagement, and this can be very frustrating for commanders. Likewise, the daunting task of planning and preparing for JUO can be more complex and time-consuming than operations in other areas. As demonstrated by contemporary JUO in Bosnia and Kosovo, time is necessary for consensus building among nations, and the formation of multinational coalitions.

JUO conducted amidst ongoing political tension and ethnic friction can escalate without warning. Should political violence necessitate combat operations, the sheer volume and complexity of the urban battlespace is intimidating for even the largest forces. For these reasons, JUO during MOOTW and SASO demand time, and often deny policy-makers a clear exit strategy, or the swift conclusion of the maneuver battlefield.

5. Unique Constraints

The presence of noncombatants is a defining characteristic of JUO, and constrains the application of military force. America's apparent sensitivity to noncombatant casualties, and desire to limit collateral damage, has prompted restrictive Rules of

Engagement (ROE) that our forces are not habitually trained to operate under. U.S. forces can quickly find themselves on a level playing field with their less capable or less sophisticated opponents, who harbor no reservations about the indiscriminate use of force at their disposal. American military planners are likewise not habituated to the presence of noncombatants in the operational area. This reality during many JUO can hinder C2 by complicating planning efforts, or diverting resources from their primary mission to care for unexpected civilian presence. Prior to Operation Just Cause in Panama, planners coordinated Operation Klondike Key to secure and evacuate tens of thousands of American citizens from Panama City. While securing the Torrijos International Airport in Panama, Rangers unexpectedly encountered 376 civilian airline passengers. The resulting hostage crisis precipitated by PDF gunmen significantly slowed the accomplishment of the Rangers' mission.[36]

The presence of refugees and noncombatants often result in ROE that restrict the application of firepower, taking commanders beyond the normal parameters of their traditional war-fighting paradigm. A recent RAND study analyzed several recent urban conflicts and concluded:

> For the MOUT [Military Operations On Urban Terrain] commander, an ROE tradeoff always existed: either restrict the use of airpower, artillery, and armor and accept higher infantry casualties as a result, or allow heavier weapons to inflict collateral damage and noncombatant casualties.[37]

During the initial fighting in Grozny in 1994, Russian forces obeyed orders not to kill civilians. Russian forces, burdened with restrictive and confusing ROE, without non-

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[36] Sean J. A. Edwards, Mars Unmasked: The Changing Face of Urban Operations, RAND, MR-1173-A, Santa Monica, 2000, p. 62.

lethal means of force, and with little training for such situations, were impotent before Chechen civilian crowds that set fire to vehicular columns and blocked re-supply convoys. Ultimately, these noncombatants were able to halt the advance of all three armored columns approaching Grozny.[38] In Panama, U.S. troops were slightly more successful in the residential areas surrounding Albrook Air Station. Psychological operations units used loudspeakers to entice defenders away from areas occupied by noncombatants. Coupled with a display of AC-130 precision firepower nearby, these efforts were successful at avoiding collateral damage and loss of life.[39] Presented with such scenarios, sensitivity to friendly and noncombatant casualties can become a dangerous Achilles' heel for U.S. forces. Precision-guided munitions (PGM) offer commanders some relief, but technological limitations continue to make this tradeoff a reality. For the JFC during MOOTW or SASO, this means greatly increased concern for the safety of noncombatants, as well as force protection measures for organic assets. To do otherwise might risk collateral loss of life and property, along with friendly public and political support.

6. Alteration by Terrain of Weapons and Munitions Effects

Buildings and other manmade structures limit or alter the anticipated effects of current weapons systems. Smaller caliber projectiles may be ineffective against hardened construction materials, while explosive weapons may cause rubbling that hinders friendly maneuver. In Grozny, Chechen rebels used "hugging" -- utilizing urban terrain to move

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[37] Ibid., p. 63.

[38] Sean J. A. Edwards, Mars Unmasked: The Changing Face of Urban Operations, RAND, MR-1173-A, Santa Monica, 2000, p. 58.

[39] Arquilla, John.. SO3102 (Psychological Operations and Deception) class lecture at the Naval

close enough to Russian forces to make the use of artillery untenable -- to negate the firepower advantage of their opponents.[40] Armored forces often cannot elevate weapon systems sufficiently to address threats from upper stories of buildings at close range. The firepower advantages normally enjoyed by U.S. forces from artillery and close air support are severely reduced by tall structures, as well. During combat operations, American forces can quickly find themselves engaged in close-quarters infantry engagements, with little support other than organic small arms. Often, the most effective fire support weapons are mortars, because of their high ballistic trajectory, and direct-fire antitank weaponry.

For the JFC during operations short of war, these altered effects mean fewer options to respond to force protection threats. In contrast, the non-traditional adversary can expect greater payoff from unsophisticated weaponry due to secondary effects, and the benefit of striking at American public opinion through collateral damage.

7. Unique and Demanding Logistics Requirements

Logistical support must also adapt to the potentially austere urban environment. During combat operations, a support system must be responsive to dramatic increases in Class IV (construction materials), Class V (ammunition), and Class VIII (medical material) requirements. At Stalingrad, the most critical of these supply shortfalls was water. Dispersed and decentralized troop units were unable to carry sufficient quantities to support themselves for extended periods in isolation. Many fell into the hands of the enemy simply because they were too dehydrated to withdraw in good order. Marshal

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Postgraduate School, 2000.

[40] Glenn, Russell W., The City's Many Faces: Proceedings of the RAND Arroyo-MCWL-J8 UWG

Chuikov tells of a battalion commander who reported that his men had taken to firing machineguns at drainpipes to see if any water dripped out.[41]

Manpower-intensive urban combat will likely see a sharp increase in friendly casualties, straining military medical support. Construction materials often amplify the weapons effects in cities, and angular surfaces of the manmade environment result in increased blunt-trauma injuries. Past MOUT involving combat have consistently incurred casualty rates of fifty percent.[42] Recent operations in Somalia reflect these averages, including the fact that the U.S. died of wounds (DOW) rate has not improved since Vietnam. At a recent RAND Urban Operations conference, U.S. Army surgeon LTC John Holcomb expressed disbelief that despite these statistics, American forces still rely on direct pressure dressings, a two thousand year old technique, to prevent death from hemorrhage. Improving this one technique could impact on fifty percent of battlefield deaths, and twenty-five percent of all operating room deaths.[43] Intense, sustained, close-quarter combat has also resulted in considerable psychological casualties during urban battles of this century. Russian experiences in Grozny show that their health support system was unprepared to deal with this contingency.[44]

Urban Operations Conference April 13-14, 1999, RAND, Santa Monica, 2000, p. 612.

[41] Chuikov, Vasili I., The Battle for Stalingrad, New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964, p. 123.

[42] LTC John Holcomb, presentation during RAND conference: "Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the Twenty-First Century." Author attended at RAND Arroyo Center, 1700 Main Street, Santa Monica, CA 90401, 22-23 March 2000.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Glenn, Russell W., The City's Many Faces: Proceedings of the RAND Arroyo-MCWL-J8 UWG Urban Operations Conference April 13-14, 1999, RAND, Santa Monica, 2000, p. 645.

Finally, the urban environment uniquely challenges casualty evacuation. The non-linear nature of the urban battlefield makes safe evacuation of casualties extremely difficult. Casualties within structures are often invisible to engaged friendly forces, which may not even be aware of the need for evacuation. When casualties can be successfully extracted from battle, air evacuation is often not an option for even the most serious casualties due to structures, power lines, or confined spaces. Obviously, during non-combat JUO, the specter of urban battle casualties presents a daunting prospect for the JFC.

Perhaps the most significant logistic strain for the JFC conducting MOOTW or SASO in cities is the simple presence of noncombatants. Military logistics are designed to support their own organizations, and have only recently begun to consider the ramifications of treating civilian casualties; feeding, caring, and sheltering scores of refugees; or supplying the logistical needs of a damaged urban infrastructure. The requirements for such contingencies place exponentially higher demands on our military support structure.

8. Unique Advantages for Defenders, Insurgents, and Terrorists

In cities, Clausewitz's maxim, "the defensive form of warfare is intrinsically stronger than the offensive," holds true.[45] In combat, attacking a prepared urban defense can be brutally costly. Reinforcing manmade obstacles exacerbate the restrictions urban terrain places on maneuver units. The time and manpower necessary to wrest control of a city from a determined defender can make attacking very undesirable. Consider the earlier example of the Red Force Commander in the 1998 Army After Next Wargame,

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[45] Howard, Michael, and Paret, Peter, Carl von Clausewitz: On War, Princeton, New Jersey:

who sought to quickly nullify the Battle Forces maneuver and firepower advantages by "going to ground" in cities. A defender aware of the vagaries of U.S. public support may be able to succeed against U.S. forces simply by avoiding defeat. Beyond this realization, however, JP 3-06 Joint Doctrine for Urban Operations (First Draft) loses clarity by combining these three very different threats without further explanation.

Particularly in MOOTW or SASO, insurgents, terrorists, and other non-traditional threats are not concerned with the advantages they can accrue as conventional defenders. Familiar with the terrain, able to blend with the populace, and often with a robust local support structure, this opponent can be difficult to identify, let alone neutralize. For this reason, the insurgent or terrorist threat becomes first and foremost an intelligence challenge. During JUO, the environment drives acute differences in intelligence requirements, collection methods, and processes. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) differs significantly from traditional doctrinal approaches. Conventional forces often still follow processes developed in the Cold War-era to determine threat order of battle estimates, and to template opponents' most likely or most dangerous courses of action. Urban threats do not always fit neatly into these templates, because they include regular and irregular threats. There is little in the way of doctrine to guide urban task force staffs in producing intelligence estimates for paramilitary, criminal, terrorist, and burgeoning insurgent threats. One Defense Intelligence Agency officer noted that the J2 Intelligence Officer, early in the 1992-93 Somalia crisis, attempted to apply the same techniques used to portray Iraqi order of battle during the Gulf War. He states:

Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 358.

> When we entered Somalia in December 1992, we had a one-line database on the military forces there. Our attempt to use standard collection means and strategies was only partially successful because these conventional means could not deliver the kind of specific information we wanted. There were no Somali motorized rifle or tank divisions, no air defense system, no navy, and no air force.[46]

He further concludes that military intelligence must pay more attention to geography, ecology, history, ethnicity, religion, and politics in their assessments of urban threats. Until our forces become more adept at processing and using this unconventional intelligence, we will be unable to remove the veil of anonymity that lends terrorists and insurgents these advantages. A revealing report on the success of HUMINT and CI (Counterintelligence) in Bosnia by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence recognized:

> It [Bosnia] was an environment of terrorists, criminals, and elements of the three former warring factions, all of whom were hard to identify but were well-armed and had significant intelligence collection capabilities including HUMINT. To describe this as a complex and challenging environment is an understatement.[47]

The report cited several lessons learned that accentuate intelligence differences in urban environments. Aside from technological intelligence systems, the Task Force Commander was allocated twenty-five CI and tactical HUMINT teams, Defense HUMINT Service assets, multinational CI and HUMINT teams, and national agency assets. This unprecedented capability increased the need for commanders trained in the use of such assets. "Recent contingency operations, especially OOTW…have brought CI

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[46] White, Jeffrey B., "A Different Kind of Threat: Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare." Originally published in Studies in Intelligence, Volume 39, Number 5, 1996. Downloaded from http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/96unclass/index.htm, on 15 October 2000.

[47] Perkins, LTC. "HUMINT/CI," CI and HUMINT Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army. Downloaded from http://call.army.mil/call/spc_prod/humint/humint.htm, on 29 September 2000, p. 9.

and HUMINT out of the backseat and to the table with other intelligence disciplines."[48] During MOOTW and SASO, JUO force the JFC to consider non-traditional threats, and collection methods that task force staffs may be unaccustomed to dealing with. The advantages that accrue to these adversaries in cities multiply the threat they pose to friendly forces.

C. EVOLUTION OF URBAN OPERATIONS

Urban operations are changing because the manner in which the American military conducts all operations is evolving. This evolution is important because it may ultimately alter the JP 3-06 characteristics of the operational environment identified earlier in the chapter. New technologies have dramatically expanded the capabilities of military forces. As a result, military planners and commanders envision missions of far greater scope and depth than ever before. Military effectiveness increased as operations evolved from unilateral efforts to habitual combined arms, then joint operations. Today, mission parameters frequently include alliances, coalitions, and multinational efforts, leveraging the political power of such agreements. Operationally, commanders are no longer limited to the combat power their forces project. The modern-day prominence of civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOP), public affairs (PA), and information operations (IO) allow military commanders an unprecedented ability to influence perceptions in the area of operations (AO). These capabilities provide military leaders with an ever-expanding tool bag for shaping the AO to their advantage. In the past, the importance of influencing perceptions to war fighting was secondary, at best.

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[48] Perkins, LTC. "HUMINT/CI," CI and HUMINT Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army. Downloaded from http://call.army.mil/call/spc_prod/humint/humint.htm, on 29 September 2000, p. 2.

Nearly one hundred years of American military experience creates a powerful paradigm, however; one that may be particularly difficult to expand or modify.

For the better part of a century, conventional maneuver warfare served the military forces of America rather well. In World War II, leaders such as Patton, Hodges, Bradley, and Truscott, bolstered by overwhelming superiority in air and firepower, became highly proficient practitioners of this military art. This preference was also demonstrated in the U.S. urban operations conducted throughout this period. A state of war justified the use of any and all military means to destroy the enemy, even in civilian population centers. As expected, where large numbers of noncombatants were present, gross collateral loss of civilian lives was the result. Yet the desire to apply speed, maneuver, and firepower to quickly overwhelm the enemy was often blunted in the urban environment. At the port of Cherbourg, in June 1944, U.S. and allied forces struggled to carve a lodgment area from their D-Day beachhead. The Germans had prepared field and permanent fortifications in depth to defend the city. The defenses were bombarded with massive air strikes from the IX Bomber Command, and naval gunfire from three battleships, four cruisers, and eleven destroyers. Enjoying an attacker to defender force ratio of 3 to 1, the entire U.S. VII Corps was launched against the main defensive belt. Due largely to assistance from local French Resistance forces, and after six days of street fighting, with casualties in the thousands, the city was secured.[49]

In 1944, at Aachen, the American army first breached the Siegfried Line in bitter house-to-house fighting. Streetcars filled with dynamite -- and painted with the number

[49] Buell, Thomas B., et. al., The West Point Military History Series: The Second World War (Europe and the Mediterranean), Wayne, New Jersey: Avery Publishing Group, Inc, p. 312.

13 for effect -- were rolled down hills into the city in attempts to dislodge the stalwart defenders. The German commander commented, "When the Americans start using 155s as sniper weapons, it is time to give up."[50] Between October 2 and 21, General Hodges' First Army sustained nearly 10,000 casualties in urban combat at Aachen.[51] Even in the Pacific, in February 1945, American forces met fanatical urban defenders at Manila, in the Philippines. Attacking the ancient walled garrison of Intramuros, U.S. forces met the withering fire of depressed anti-aircraft and naval guns, as well as roads and streets laced with naval mines. When the city was finally taken, 16,665 of its roughly 18,000 Japanese defenders lay dead.[52]

The conflicts following World War II saw no significant change in the techniques of urban warfare. When American and South Korean forces liberated Seoul in September 1950, slow fighting and 2,383 Marine casualties, in addition to thousands of civilian casualties, stood in contrast to MacArthur's bold strike at Inchon.[53] In 1968 Hue, Vietnam, U.S. Marines reversed the gains of the Tet offensive only after nearly a month of brutal house-to-house, block-by-block combat. For all of these battles, U.S. forces were able to rely on America's full conventional military might. Despite consequent gross collateral damage to life and property, high-intensity, unrestricted warfare afforded U.S. forces some measure of success.

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[50] Ibid., p. 362.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Bradley, John H., The West Point Military History Series: The Second World War (Asia and the Pacific), Wayne, New Jersey: Avery Publishing Group, Inc, p. 200.

[53] U.S. Department of Defense, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-35.3, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), Department of the Navy, April 1998, p. 1-10.

Today, more and more frequently, the U.S. is exercising its military might in support of MOOTW, or SASO. Since 1979, when the Army's Field Manual (FM) 90-10 Military Operations on Urban Terrain was published, new doctrine has increasingly been produced that appears to supplant FM 90-10's Cold War-era, combat-only approach to urban operations.[54] This is not to suggest that traditional urban combat is any less of a threat. On the contrary, this potentiality is even more insidious because it may not be anticipated. However, the involvement of the U.S. military in MOOTW demonstrates that the threat of combat coexists with other mission requirements during peace or conflict. Recent deployments to Haiti, Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, and Kosovo not only illustrate the dangerous potential for lethal urban violence, but also the requirement for military capabilities outside traditional combat roles. Inherent in MOOTW is the need for, and understanding of, political-military strategy. In a recent RAND study, Mars Unmasked, author Sean Edwards contrasts a successfully executed American political-military strategy during Operation Just Cause, with a mismatched U.S. strategy in Somalia. For the Panama operation, the President's use of the media to rally support, in concert with detailed coordination between the military, National Security Council, and Department of State, succeeded in responding to political-military issues as they arose.

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[54] Among existing joint publications that have a significant stake in urban operations, and take an alternative approach to high-intensity combat, are: JP 3-07 Military Operations Other Than War, JP 3-07.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Foreign Internal Defense (FID), JP 3-07.2 JTTP for Antiterrorism, JP 3-07.3 JTTP for Peace Operations, JP 3-07.4 Joint Counterdrug Operations, and JP 3-07.5 JTTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. Still under development are JP 3-06 Urban Operations, JP 3-07.6 JTTP for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, and JP 3-07.7 JTTP for Domestic Support Operations. In addition, the Army maintains FM 5-114 Engineer Operations Short of War, FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations, FM 90-29 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, FM 100-6 Information Operations, FM 100-19 Domestic Support Operations, FM 100-20 Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, FM 100-23 Peace Operations (Draft), and FM 100-23-1 HA Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian Assistance Operations (Draft).

This was not the case in Mogadishu, where media images of dead Americans were combined with the absence of clear national interests. The result was an inability to respond to the crisis as it developed, and ultimately a foreign policy failure.[55]

The American public's seeming intolerance for friendly and noncombatant loss of life also plays an important role in contemporary JUO. Where the vital interests of the United States are not at stake, political leadership may be less willing to accept casualties for mission success. RAND analyst Eric Larson's study, Casualties and Consensus, suggests this is not entirely accurate. His findings suggest that the public is as willing as ever to accept even severe casualties if the need truly exists, and America's political leaders have adequately justified the need for such commitment and sacrifice.[56] Nevertheless, in the conduct of MOOTW, where national interests may be vague, leaders may have difficulty providing convincing justification. Robert B. Oakley, U.S. Ambassador to Somalia during the Rangers' 1993 firefight in Mogadishu, has stated that forces were operating under an "excessive no-casualty edict" from the White House.[57] The result was an asymmetry of commitment, where U.S. forces are deployed in support of secondary or tertiary national interests, but the target populace is wholly committed, fighting for existence, and far more willing to accept sacrifice.

It is understandable that, given political sensitivity to casualties and collateral damage during operations short of war, our military would seek new means to exert its

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[55] Edwards, Sean J. A., Mars Unmasked: The Changing Face of Urban Operations, RAND, MR-1173-A, Santa Monica, 2000, p. 76.

[56] Larson, Eric V., Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations, RAND, Santa Monica, 1996, p. 100-102.

[57] Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, presentation during RAND conference: "Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the Twenty-First Century." Author attended at RAND Arroyo Center,

influence and affect desired outcomes. RAND identifies the presence of media, civil affairs, and information operations as factors that have undergone significant change, and increased importance, in modern JUO.[58] With the advent of portable satellite communications (SATCOM), video, and powerful personal computers, media representatives can flock to the world's hot spots on a moments notice, and at negligible cost. This unprecedented access makes cities natural gathering points for migrating media pools. In Chechnya, journalist Carlotta Gall was able to travel with little hindrance around the environs of Grozny, twice interviewing Dudayev, the Chechen resistance leader, in his secret hideouts.[59] As a result, urban military activity of any type often receives a disproportionate amount of attention from the press. Not only can such close proximity to the cameras result in swift transmission of bad news, evidence suggests it can also shape events. Working with the Chief Joint Implementation Commission for the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in 1999, Brigadier Jonathan B.A. Bailey noted an almost "symbiotic" relationship between the media and rioters during civil disturbances -- few ever made the effort to riot if no press were present to take their picture.[60]

1700 Main Street, Santa Monica, CA 90401, 22-23 March 2000.

[58] Ibid., p. 58.

[59] Gall, C. and DeWaal, T., Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus, New York: New York University Press, 1998, p. xiii.

[60] Brigadier J.B.A. Bailey, presentation during RAND conference: "Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the Twenty-First Century." Author attended at RAND Arroyo Center, 1700 Main Street, Santa Monica, CA 90401, 22-23 March 2000.

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III. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE AND URBAN OPERATIONS

Conventional warfare is a method designed for an empty battlefield, populated only by the professional soldiers of the contesting armies. Unconventional warfare, by contrast, not only recognizes the presence of a civil population; by nature, it occurs in the midst of the people. Its terrain is symbolic and lies in the minds of the population.[61]

- Thomas K. Adams

A. OVERVIEW

Ordinarily, America's military is not predisposed toward unconventional approaches to warfare. In The American Way of War, Russell Weigley portrays Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz as the principal influence on American military strategy.[62] Clausewitz's ubiquitous influence helps to explain why U.S. doctrine overwhelmingly seeks to destroy our enemy's military forces by concentrating our firepower and combat forces in decisive battle. His maxim, "The fighting forces [of the enemy] must be destroyed: that is, they must be put in such a condition that they can no longer carry on the fight," has been the guiding principle for American maneuver warfare for over a century.[63] Blitzkrieg, the Arab-Israeli Wars, AirLand Battle, and Desert Storm have all validated Clausewitzian theory – although "other means" may be important, they are subordinate to military means. Indeed, in the insightful book The Western Way of War, Victor Hanson argues that our concept of decisive battle is inextricably enmeshed with our Western democratic heritage. Many military leaders see this "pitched battle" concept as "the only way to defeat an enemy," where superior mass and firepower "find and

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[61] Adams, Thomas K., U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare, Portland: Frank Cass, 1998, p. 22.

[62] Weigley, Rrrussell, The American Way of War, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1973, pp. 210-212.

[63] Howard, Michael, and Paret, Peter, Carl von Clausewitz: On War, Princeton, New Jersey:

engage [the enemy] in order to end the entire business as quickly as possible."[64] This approach was evident in Vietnam, as American forces – denied the clear-cut certainty of decisive battle – used body count to gauge when enemy forces would be "put in such a condition that they [could] no longer carry on the fight." When faced with an opponent that refuses to meet our conventionally superior forces on equal terms, but seeks to attack them indirectly, we react with distaste. We neatly label such enemies guerrillas, irregulars, or unconventional. Our predisposition for overwhelming conventional might is apparent.

Regardless of America's superiority on the conventional maneuver battlefield, unconventional threats may still threaten our forces asymmetrically if we are not vigilant. B.H. Liddell Hart's seminal work, Strategy, cautions that consistently successful commanders never directly attack an enemy firmly in position. Hart's "indirect approach" prescribes that, "instead of seeking to upset the enemy's equilibrium by one's attack, it must be upset before a real attack is, or can be successfully launched."[65] This flexibility is precisely the component the unconventional warrior brings to the asymmetry, complexity, and uncertainty of today's urban environment. By examining the Unconventional Warfare (UW) mission, in relation to the eight operational environment characteristics presented in Chapter II, this chapter illustrates the unique suitability of UW for contemporary Joint Urban Operations (JUO).

Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 90.

[64] Hanson, Victor, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989, p. 19, xv, xvi.

[65] Hart, B.H. Liddell, Strategy, London: Faber & Faber Ltd., 1954, p. 147.

Unconventional warfare generally describes those ill defined, shifting forms of conflict that do not follow the conventions of military thought. According to JP 1-02, UW is defined as:

> A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape.[66]

The responsibility for UW falls not to Department of Defense (DoD) general-purpose forces, but to U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) units of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). SF units may be assisted or facilitated in conducting UW by Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) units, which also fall under USSOCOM.

B. THE MISSION AND MEN

> *When I took a decision, or adopted an alternative, it was after studying every relevant - and many an irrelevant - factor. Geography, tribal structure, religion, social customs, language, appetites, standards – all were at my finger-ends. The enemy I knew almost like my own side.*[67]
>
> *- T.E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia)*

1. Reduced Technological Advantages

When U.S forces enter an environment that seriously degrades the performance of technology that those forces depend on, mission accomplishment is at risk. Most important to U.S. forces is reduced intelligence, where conventional forces are reliant on

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[66] U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JP 1-02, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 23 March 1994 (as amended through 1 September 2000), p. 481.

[67] Mack, John E., A Prince of Our Disorder: The Life of T. E. Lawrence, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975, p. 200.

technical collection methods. UW offers a low-technology alternative, relying on SF personnel, and indigenous or surrogate forces, to build influence and achieve objectives. UW intelligence activities are not as vulnerable to the debilitating effects of urban terrain; UW methods focus on human sources of intelligence (HUMINT), which cannot be collected by space-age overhead platforms. This focus is ideal for urban contingencies, where HUMINT plays a greater role than is the norm in other operations. In 1993 Mogadishu, a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) representative noted that the existing J2 capabilities were not sufficient to meet the commander's demands: "Someone was needed to locate and count them [clan vehicles] from the ground and to find out if they were operable. Eventually, we got this information, and even better intelligence on the clan forces' capabilities, from U.S. Special Forces (SF) units."[68]

Another example highlights the different focus of UW intelligence activities. Prior to the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Riyadh, tactical HUMINT, with operational and strategic implications, is precisely what was lacking. Secretary of Defense William Perry's DoD report to the President confirmed that the intelligence community in Saudia Arabia was providing 24-hour estimates and updates, and that this information was widely and effectively distributed. Despite this, the intelligence architecture was "lacking in at least one key area -- that of providing tactical seaming [sic] of impending attack."[69] With a cross-cultural capability lacking in general-purpose forces, and training

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[68] White, Jeffrey B., "A Different Kind of Threat: Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare." Originally published in Studies in Intelligence, Volume 39, Number 5, 1996.

[69] Perry, William, DOD Report To The President On Khobar Towers Bombing, September 18, 1996. Retrieved from the WWW (http://www.usis-israel.org.il/publish/press/defence/archive/septmbr/dd1_9-19.htm) on 2 September 2000).

in HUMINT collection methods, SF units might have bolstered the force protection effort in Riyadh.

The tools of the trade and skills required of conventional combat maneuver units are less germane during Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and Stability and Support (SASO), a fact acknowledged by then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shalikashvili in excerpts from Joint Vision 2010 and the 1995 National Military Strategy.[70] The set of skills possessed by our unconventional warriors, however, is germane. The mission focus of UW is primarily on political-military objectives: existing or potential insurgent, secessionist, religious, or other resistance movements. Dissident elements are the key to UW potential in any region. As long as dissident factions exist in cities, there will be UW potential to support U.S. national interests. SF skills are applied toward UW objectives such as: undermining the domestic and international legitimacy of a target authority; neutralizing, or shifting the target authority's power to the dissident element; undermining the confidence and will of the target authority's leadership; isolating the target authority from external sources of diplomatic or physical support, while facilitating such support for the dissident element; and obtaining either the support or the neutrality of various other segments of the society.[71] In the struggle for influence, and building rapport, SF competencies in understanding the human elements of conflict far exceed the value of technical means. For this reason, UW in cities is not hampered by incapacitated technology.

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[70] Phillips, Ed., "Army SOF: Right Tool for OOTW." Special Warfare, Vol. 10, No. 3, Summer 1997, p. 5.

[71] "ARSOF XXI: Operational Concept for the 21st Century," Special Warfare, Vol. 10, No. 4, Fall 1997, p. 30.

2. Increased Demands for Manpower

During MOOTW and SASO, it may be desirable to avoid the impression that coalition forces are occupying forces, in order to avoid heightening existing tensions with a very large conventional ground force deployment. UW does not present the immense "footprint" that large-scale conventional troop deployments do. Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alphas (SFODAs) -- the SF elements responsible for conducting UW -- are twelve-man teams. In addition, though SFODAs are capable of conducting UW unilaterally, UW is "predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces...and directed in varying degrees by an external source." This operational method further reduces the signature of U.S. involvement. In an uncertain environment, where tensions are already high, a low-visibility method of achieving operational objectives reduces the risk of incident. If even greater anonymity is required, SFODAs can conduct or direct covert and clandestine operations in support of their UW objectives. As an economy of force measure, UW would also free manpower for force protection and other operational missions.

Manpower intensive operations also put more personnel in harm's way. The risk of incident, and impact on American public support, rises commensurately. Minimizing the risk of incident is important to policymakers for this reason. Some postulate that an "offset" method of employing troops will minimize or eliminate contact between our troops and the indigenous populace. In Denying the Widow-Maker: Summary of Proceedings; RAND-DBBL Conference on MOUT, Dr. Russell Glenn discusses "offset operations":

> Operations in which friendly forces engage the enemy or interact with noncombatants from remote locations. The offset acts to reduce the

> exposure of friendly forces to enemy action or other threats. Engaging from offset positions requires accurate, timely intelligence and precision munitions.[72]

As proposed by Dr. Glenn, the "offset" method focuses on technological reconnaissance and surveillance, and precision guided munitions (PGM). By keeping friendly forces far off in a remote location, threat forces can be engaged without risk of American casualties. While the technology required may currently be problematic, and PGM are hopefully unnecessary during MOOTW or SASO, the concept of limited exposure is attractive. UW can provide a similar offset benefit to friendly forces, albeit with a slightly greater degree of exposure and risk. Acting from a secure, neutral location, SF units can train, organize, and equip surrogate forces to further U.S. policy objectives. Friendly exposure is minimized, and U.S. commanders can actively influence or manipulate the informal power hierarchies in the target location. Particularly during MOOTW, Psychological Operations (PSYOP) units that help shape the perceptions of the target populace, and Civil Affairs (CA) units -- indispensable during post-conflict resolution, can support SF efforts.

3. Decentralization

In cities during MOOTW, decentralized ground operations become problematic for U.S. commanders. Conventional maneuver units are trained to accomplish war-fighting missions. Squads achieve objectives in support of platoon objectives, which in turn achieve their objectives in support of company, battalion and brigade missions. SF units are not designed to replace the missions these units accomplish. However, these units do not habitually operate in isolation from parent units, and seldom -- if ever -- do

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[72]Glenn, Russell W., Steeb, Randall, et. al., Denying the Widow-Maker: Summary of Proceedings;

their tactical combat missions have operational or strategic intent. When JUO, particularly combat operations, devolve into squad-level actions and below, junior leadership rarely has the training to smoothly assume such responsibility. Command and control (C2) is severely strained by dispersion -- conventional forces must adapt and alter standard operating procedures (SOP). This is not the case in the conduct of UW. The SFODA is the operational element for UW, and it is SOP for the team to split into two six-man elements, or four three-man elements, in the performance of its mission. Most importantly, the primary focus of UW is on political-military objectives, and is in support of U.S. national security objectives.[73]

Certain unique capabilities and attributes of the SF operators that conduct UW facilitate their success in a highly decentralized, uncertain environment. Field Manual (FM) 100-25 (1999) describes the SF soldier as a "mature, innovative, culturally aware, self-assured, self-reliant" professional.[74] These attributes are a product of a very competitive selection process that yields high-quality soldiers, advanced technological training and education, and experience gained through the unique profiles of the missions these professionals execute.

A recent Special Forces Pipeline Review, conducted by a team of psychologists, studied whether the selection and training process for Army SF candidates continues to produce soldiers who possess the attributes required for success in their operational

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RAND-DBBL Conference on MOUT, RAND, DB-270-JS/A, Santa Monica, 1998. p. 84.

[73] U.S. Department of Defense, Special Forces Operations Doctrine, FM 3-05.20 (FD), Department of the Army, 8 December 2000, p. 2-2.

[74] U.S. Department of Defense, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, FM 100-25, Department of the Army, August 1999, p. 1-7.

environment. The answer was a resounding yes. The researchers, along with SF subject matter experts, identified 29 "critical performance attributes," all of which were linked to job requirements.[75] Of these attributes, the ten most critical were identified as: team player, maturity, judgment and decision-making ability, dependability, adaptability, cultural/interpersonal adaptability, physical endurance, initiative, perseverance, and autonomy. In 1999, the annual Special Forces Branch Conference included a symposium to determine how selection and training must evolve to ensure that these individual qualities are best identified and cultivated.[76] SF's periodic reassessments illustrate a continuing dedication to fielding a force of professionals exemplifying these attributes, and ensure a force that remains organized and trained for success. Specifically, SF has fostered attributes most desirable for urban practitioners of UW.

An adjunct to decentralized operations is the coalition or multinational nature of many contemporary JUO during MOOTW. SF is accustomed to working with militaries of other nations. Their linguistic capability, as well as cross-cultural training and experience, assist SFODAs in coordinating with foreign military personnel, civilian leadership, and coalition partners. In peacetime, deployed SFODAs routinely hone their UW skills by exercising America's engagement strategies around the globe.

4. Increased Demands for Time

Conventional force commanders seek swift, decisive conclusions to ground operations; during MOOTW, this expectation may not be feasible. Though policymakers might favor scheduled, near-term exit strategies, the complexities of peace operations,

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[75] Zazanis, Michelle M., et. al., "Special Forces Selection and Training: Meeting the Needs of the Force in 2020," Special Warfare, Vol. 12, No. 3, Summer 1999, p. 24.

[76] Ibid., p. 28.

and our experiences in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, prove this an unlikely possibility. Fortunately, the expectation for executing UW is "normally of long duration," as well. Many of the complexities that make MOOTW so time consuming (coalition building, diplomatic initiatives, reducing ethnic friction, etc.) are familiar conditions to UW practitioners. SFODAs conducting UW as part of coalition support operations are known as Special Forces Liaison Elements (SFLEs). SFLEs can assess, equip, and advise coalition forces.[77]

The small operational footprint of UW can also make the long-duration nature of JUO more palatable. Less media exposure, less contact between combat troops and noncombatants, and less operational cost, might make longer operational commitments more feasible and politically tolerable.

5. Unique Constraints

Combat and combat support units in the military rarely train on noncombatant scenarios. The restrictive urban rules of engagement (ROE) imposed on such conventional forces can significantly impact or alter the SOPs those forces are habituated to in training. In contrast, SF is always operationally employed among, or in close proximity to, noncombatants of many cultures worldwide. UW demands proficiency in rapport building, winning allegiance, and cross-cultural communication. SFODAs often coordinate with foreign military leadership, civilian authorities, non-governmental organizations (NGO), other government agencies (OGA), and international organizations during interagency operations. Many times relationships fostered between SFODAs and foreign officials during peacetime deployments create operational leverage during crisis.

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[77] U.S. Department of Defense, Special Forces Operations Doctrine, FM 3-05.20 (FD), Department of

These relationships, especially when SF are directing indigenous or surrogate forces to influence a target authority, prove invaluable in avoiding direct friction between U.S. troops and local civilians. UW can actually serve to reduce the potential for noncombatant casualties and collateral damage. Finally, by acting through indigenous or surrogate forces, ROE necessary for large units of conventional troops are no longer needed.

6. Alteration by Terrain of Weapons and Munitions Effects

Obviously, combat operations should be used as means of last resort during MOOTW or SASO. Mogadishu and recent experiences in the Balkans, however, illustrate that the potential for lethal military or political violence exists anytime, anywhere. Urban terrain, particularly where a large troop presence is in close proximity to the civilian populace, also increases the likelihood that such violence will cause collateral damage and loss of life for noncombatants.

UW avoids the large troop presence. In addition, surrogate forces might be more inclined to avoid situations that would cause collateral loss of life to the indigenous population. If U.S. direct action becomes necessary, the presence of a highly trained SFODA conducting UW provides the JFC a responsive option. This combat capability would be the least desirable way of employing a UW element, but might preclude a costly, politically untenable, less responsive, conventional force deployment.

7. Unique and Demanding Logistics Requirements

UW avoids the massive logistical needs of conventional force deployments. Though UW could conceivably replace a conventional force mission in an exceptional

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the Army, 8 December 2000, p. 2-7.

instance, the SF mission is better suited as a combat-multiplier for the JFC, freeing conventional manpower for force protection and other vital Joint Task Force (JTF) concerns.

Operational units have been known to require ten support personnel for every one operationally employed soldier, meaning a very large and costly projection to the area of operations (AO). SF is not self-supporting; however, they do require far less organizational support than other units. While influencing a particular social group in the indigenous society, and in tandem with surrogate forces, SFODAs can utilize an Auxiliary. This organization acts as the internal support organization of the social group or dissident element. Its operation is both covert and clandestine in nature, and its members are not openly associated with the dissident element. In a more permissive environment, SFODAs are comfortable existing off the local economy, and require minimal external support. Doctrinally, UW maximizes the logistic potential of the AO to meet the supply needs of the SFODA. Each team member conducts an independent assessment of existing logistical sources within the AO. These assessments include a thorough review of indigenous medical personnel and facilities, existing communications architecture, and local sources of food, water, and resupply. This standard planning process ensures SF soldiers are best prepared to adapt to any contingency, without relying on external sources of supply.

SFODAs do possess certain unique capabilities lacking in smaller conventional units. SFODA medical sergeants deploy with significant amounts of Class VIII (medical material), prescription medication, and trauma, dental, and veterinary kits. Portable x-ray machines and advanced medical equipment are available if the mission requires it.

Communications sergeants not only possess organic FM, VHF, and SATCOM, but mechanical and solar generators to replenish power sources for these systems. All personnel carry water purifiers, and survival gear not issued to conventional troops.

8. Unique Advantages for Defenders, Insurgents, and Terrorists

That the prominence of SF, CA, and PSYOP has increased during recent urban operations should not be surprising. Conventional forces have proven very vulnerable to non-traditional threats, and asymmetric attacks can rapidly undermine American public support for MOOTW and SASO. CA units address one of the characteristics most distinguishing cities from other terrain types: the populace. These inhabitants comprise the workforce that mans the complex urban infrastructure. They have the potential to become divided along political, ethnic, religious, and economic lines, and they become the refugees when political conflict turns violent. According to FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations, Civil Affairs (CA) personnel are responsible for minimizing civilian interference with military operations and the impact of military operations on the populace; coordinating military operations with civilian agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs); and providing expertise in civil-sector functions normally associated with civilian authorities, in order to implement U. S. policy.[78] In Panama City, after Operation Just Cause, CA units restored basic infrastructure services, established a police force, and supervised food distribution during Operation Promote Liberty.[79] CA efforts reinforced by Psychological Operations, helped shape the perceptions of the populace, in order to quell further resistance. Where military forces

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[78] U.S. Department of Defense, Civil Affairs Operations, FM 41-10, Department of the Army, February 2000, p. 2-1.

[79] Sean J. A. Edwards, Mars Unmasked: The Changing Face of Urban Operations, RAND, MR-1173-

are employed in close proximity to noncombatants, and particularly during post-conflict resolution, CA will continue to play a prominent role.

In Mars Unmasked, the author states that his recent case studies reflect a trend favoring low-intensity forces.[80] Edwards notes such conflicts usually involve increased political constraints on the use of force, and opponents who generally seek to avoid warfare on open ground, where the U.S. can bring its firepower and maneuver superiority to bear. Such a strategy entails a higher risk of protracted conflict, and targets the will of the American public, rather than American military forces. He states, "all of these political, technological, and social developments increase the importance of information operations (and related activities) during urban operations. Information operations (IO) focus on the perception and will of the people fighting the war, the support of the domestic population at home, as well as the support of the indigenous population in the urban operations theater. More opportunities exist than ever before to subdue the will of the enemy through information manipulation."[81] Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations units can all support an integrated information strategy. The significance of the ubiquitous media on domestic U.S. support can never be overemphasized. A well-integrated information strategy can effectively sell American policy objectives, and show military success stories in their best light during MOOTW or

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A, Santa Monica, 2000, p. 72.

[80] This view is reflected by other authors. Martin Van Crevald argues that war by major states has become less and less viable for attaining political ends because of the presence of nuclear weapons (see Van Crevald, Martin, The Transformation of War, New York: The Free Press, 1991). See also Alexander, Bevin, The Future of Warfare, New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1995; and Arquilla, John, and Ronfeldt, David, In Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age, RAND, MR-880-OSD, Santa Monica, 1997.

[81] Sean J. A. Edwards, Mars Unmasked: The Changing Face of Urban Operations, RAND, MR-1173-

SASO. In combat, psychological operations can undermine the will and cohesiveness of our adversaries, and civil affairs personnel can address the many needs of the indigenous population, building rapport and garnering local support for U.S. military forces. Additionally, these forces are frequently more culturally attuned to foreign societies, and accustomed to dealing with the obstacles of unfamiliar languages and customs.

What is clear is that asymmetric attacks on conventional forces alone enjoy certain advantages. During MOOTW in cities, American forces are far more likely to face these non-traditional adversaries than conventional, symmetric attacks. In this arena, SF possesses a conceptual understanding of insurgency and asymmetric threats, and is ideally suited to counter them in the urban environment.

A, Santa Monica, 2000, p. 47.

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IV. BOSNIA - HERZEGOVINA

There is for a commander nothing more oppressive than a situation which is not clear, nothing more trying than bands of armed irregular troops, aided by the population and the nature of the county and relying for support on a strong army in the neighborhood.[82]

- Prince Charles (1870)

A. BACKGROUND

The following case illustrates how Army Special Forces were used to fill an operational void during Operation Allied Force in Bosnia - Herzegovina. This example details, from December 1996 to April 1999, the scope of activities performed by deployed SFODAs of Second Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), in Brcko, and the Joint Paramilitary Commission. The intent is not to give an exhaustive historical account of the conflict, but to highlight how UW skills were employed to understand, shape, and engage in this area of urban operations. Teams initially provided tactical intelligence otherwise unavailable, and later, leveraged rapport and relationships to achieve military and policy objectives.

On November 21, 1995, in Dayton, Ohio, the warring parties of the former Yugoslavia signed a peace agreement that brought to a halt three years of interethnic civil strife. The Dayton Agreement divides Bosnia and Herzegovina roughly equally between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb Republika Srpska. In 1995-96, a NATO-led international peacekeeping force (IFOR) of 60,000 troops served in Bosnia to implement and monitor the military aspects of the agreement. IFOR was

[82] U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), Unconventional Warfare: Summary Sheet Packet, Special Forces Officer Qualification Course Material, November 1991, p. 16.

succeeded by a smaller, NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) whose mission was to deter renewed hostilities. As part of Operation Joint Endeavor, deployed U.S. forces within this multinational setting established a doctrinal Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF Eagle), and subordinate Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). In 1997, the mission was renamed Operation Joint Guard.

B. UNCONVENTIONAL WARRIORS IN BOSNIA

Although Army SF units were among the first U.S. forces to deploy to Bosnia, few of their activities fit neatly into the doctrinal missions of FM 100-25 Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, or FM 31-20 Doctrine for Special Forces Operations. The closest doctrinal description of these activities was "Coalition Support," an SF Collateral Activity FM 100-25 describes Coalition Support as encompassing the training of coalition partners, providing them communications, integrating them into the coalition C2 and intelligence structure, and providing liaison elements to facilitate the JFC's C2.[83] Coalition Support Teams (CSTs) provided such assistance during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and were renamed Liaison Coordination Elements (LCEs) prior to Bosnia. The responsibilities of these teams expanded, but no doctrine existed for the LCE, so the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) created the LCE Handbook to "lay out the critical areas of responsibility," and establish the following definition:

> An LCE is a joint special operations element which conducts liaison and coordination between a division level headquarters and its subordinate brigades/battalions, when those elements do not have common communications equipment or architecture, or may not share common operational procedures, or when a significant language barrier exists. It is employed when a senior headquarters has subordinate elements of

[83] U.S. Department of Defense, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, FM 100-25, Department of the Army, August 1999, p. 2-13.

differing national origins who do not have a habitual relationship.[84]

The Mission Essential Task List (METL) for the LCE allowed the SFODAs to develop the missions flexibly. Teams were tasked to deploy; build rapport; provide command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I); conduct TGO; maintain mobility; and redeploy/recover. An example would be the SFODA that acted as the Hungarian Engineer Battalion (HUBAT) LCE. This element provided the communications link between HUBAT and all SFOR elements, ensured communications connectivity, and conducted liaison between HUBAT and SFOR headquarters. The team also assisted and advised HUBAT command and staff in the preparation of their operations orders. During this period, SFODAs were primarily facilitating understanding of the operational environment.[85]

In subsequent rotations to Bosnia, SF units assumed the Joint Commission Observer (JCO) mission from British forces. JCO teams were tasked with "providing ground truth" for the JTF Commander. This was also not a U.S. doctrinal mission, so the SF elements adopted the name from the British and established mission parameters themselves. An Operations Officer in 10th SFG(A), refining the METL established for LCEs, published a JCO Handbook. This document outlined the METL in task, condition, standard format, and contained tactics, techniques, and procedures for employment. These tasks included: objectively represent political views between entities; coordinate PSYOP to support the political posture of the JCO team and SFOR; conduct area

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[84] First Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), LCE Handbook, 21 November 1995, Stuttgart, Germany, p. 5.

[85] JCO information was related to the author during interviews conducted with SFODA Commanders from 2/10 SFG(A) in November 2000.

assessment/assess host nation forces; develop/maintain rapport; develop and maintain an auxiliary; assess reliable, accurate, and honest contacts; develop and maintain a network; and synchronize NGO/IO efforts with IFOR. These responsibilities far exceed those originally envisioned by collateral activities doctrine. Most notably, many of these mission parameters are extremely similar to SF's UW mission. During UW, SFODAs establish rapport; conduct area assessments, and assess existing resistance organizations; and establish intelligence, operational, and support networks, including an auxiliary. The JCO Handbook even urges units to "use the Unconventional Warfare area assessment format because it fits the mission the best."[86] SFODAs were now shaping the AO to facilitate meeting the requirements of the JTF.

In Multinational Division-North (MND-N), the Brcko JCO frequently responded to demonstrations and bombings to provide rapid assessments to JTF headquarters, and to establish a visible presence to prevent further violence. The team was effective at preventing escalation because of the local rapport they had established, and the inter-personal relationships they had fostered over time. The JCO team's network of contacts was extensive, and included: the Brcko Mayor; local religious leaders (Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Muslim mufti); Presidents and Vice-Presidents of local labor organizations; local police, Specialist Police, and paramilitary officials, including the Brcko Police Chief, Internal Division Chief, criminal investigators, and the Grahic Police Chief; local government ministers; Chetnik party leadership; local media representatives; the Ambassador of the Office of the UN High Representative; non-governmental organization (NGO) representatives including the Red Cross, United Nations Office of

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[86] First Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), LCE Handbook, 21 November 1995,

the High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), and I-PTF; local residents and business owners and many others. Multiple patrols daily, and such liaison contacts allowed the JCO team access to local officials, as well as a certain amount of status and authority in the community. In some instances, this enabled the early warning necessary for the team to defuse potential trouble.

Because of the SFODA's organic satellite communications (SATCOM) capability, another MND-North JCO in Serbrenik was often tasked to report updates on freedom of movement within the area of operations (AO), and actions of political personalities. At the time, the team's ability to communicate tactical intelligence to higher headquarters quickly was unique. This capability also enabled the team to accomplish the unusual task of informing targeted individuals of death threats that had been intercepted within the community. Timely response was often the only method of preventing the escalation of political violence.

This JCO team was able to use its contacts to report how well multiethnic organizations monitored by the Joint Task Force (JTF) were actually integrated. Frequently, black-marketers and other criminal elements would attempt to associate with members of the JCO team in order to bolster their own status in the community, and ostensibly to gather any intelligence on SFOR intentions that they could. This allowed the SFODA to report on local individuals attempting to buy or sell small arms and other weapons. Information on black marketers was so good, the team was able to create a personality matrix linking many local operators.

Stuttgart, Germany, p. 10.

Two particular organizations, the Regular Police and Specialist Police, wielded significant formal and informal authority over the local inhabitants. Despite the prominent status and role of these police forces, the normal JTF staff was not organized to handle this direct liaison effectively. The JTF intelligence infrastructure was organized to execute doctrinal processes, analyzing inputs from a large pool of reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence sources, and providing timely estimates to the commander. Major General (MG) David L. Grange, TF Eagle Commander, was conspicuous in his "on the scene" style of command, frequently on the ground throughout his entire AOR to get a personal feel for the operational situation. In his estimation, the normal staff processes were not providing him the leverage he needed; his existing traditional intelligence infrastructure was not adequate.[87] Grange wanted solid intelligence on the paramilitary and non-traditional groups in his AOR to learn their disposition and intentions, which groups might pose serious threats to friendly forces, and how these groups might be influenced to contribute to stability and his mission objectives. [88]

As early as July 1997, Specialist Police (SP) leadership began to threaten JCO teams in the AO following SFOR actions they felt undermined their authority. MG Grange attempted to engage in dialog with these leaders, but was unable devote the time

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[87] The details of this example were related to the author in a phone interview with COL Tim Heinemann on September 19, 2000, and e-mail with the author on November 8, 2000. COL Heinemann, an Army Special Forces officer, is currently the Dean of Academics, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. In 1997, COL Heinemann was asked by MG Grange to come to Bosnia to fill what he saw as a critical intelligence gap in TF Eagle's area of responsibility. From August 1997 to January 1998, COL Heinemann and one senior Army Special Forces NCO acted as the Joint Paramilitary Commission, establishing critical liaison with irregular and paramilitary forces in the region. Their actions during this period provided the CJTF with critical and responsive intelligence not provided by the traditional infrastructure of the organization.

[88] Phone interview with MG Grange, 19 March 2001.

and effort personally to establish a negotiation strategy with concrete objectives. MG Grange requested Colonel (COL) Tim Heinemann from 10th SFG(A), and chartered him to develop a strategy that leveraged Regular Police and SP influence, in order to facilitate MND-N's role in executing the Dayton Accords. His intent was also to ensure COL Heinemann was engaged prior to the conventional force transition from the 1st Infantry Division to the 1st Armored Division, in order to maintain rapport with these local leaders. Subsequently, COL Heinemann established the Joint Paramilitary Commission (JPC). This organization and its objectives maximized the potential of the JCOs, and moved SF into the realm of active engagement within the AOR.

MG Grange described COL Heinemann as was more than successful in his liaison with General Borovcanin of the Regular Police, and General Goran Saric of the SP. Grange felt the JCOs and JPC were no less than invaluable to him, and "gave [him] the pulse of what was going on" in and around Brcko.[89] Heinemann was able to gain the personal assurances of Saric that there would be no targeting of TF Eagle personnel. He sold Saric on the concept of shaping the future of his Specialist Police by cooperating with MND-N. COL Heinemann based his leverage on the prospect of Saric developing habitual relations with 10th SFG(A) as a springboard for getting his organization back into the business of professional counter-terrorism. Saric feared his local competitors -- Muslim and Croat paramilitary groups -- would get ahead of him in this goal. COL Heinemann quickly determined that Saric was his priority target; "first among equals." Traveling constantly between the towns of Brcko, Bijeljna, Janja, and throughout Republika Srpska, COL Heinemann kept his finger on the pulse of the urban community.

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[89] Phone interview with MG Grange, 19 March 2001.

Because of the relationships, rapport, and personal credibility COL Heinemann built with these and other paramilitary leaders, he was able to provide an unparalleled intelligence picture to the commander.

COL Heinemann found himself simultaneously coaching Saric, promoting his interests, and often protecting him from SFOR and MND-N players who wished to shut down his police organization. COL Heinemann saw Saric's organization as MG Grange's 5th Brigade; a "rogue" brigade that could be leveraged for effects without committing U.S. forces. Heinemann was able to sell Grange on this "economy of force measure," but did not feel his successor (MG Ellis) really exploited its potential.

Constant contact with local personalities, and understanding the hierarchy of power they fit into, was crucial for predicting ethnic friction, leveraging local popular support, and pre-empting crisis when necessary.

One crisis occurred at Doboj in October 1997, when evidence suggested five officers of an SP detachment had violated the law by protecting wanted Serb political figures. Based on General Shinseki's decision, MND-N was poised to take the SP detachment down by force. On 9 October, Heinemann met in Sarajevo with Shinseki, his staff, and MND-N Commanding General (CG), MG Ellis. Heinemann openly disagreed with the decision to punish the five officers, and instead proposed to reconstitute the entire SP detachment as the first detachment to re-certify as part of the new police force in Republic Srpska -- a major military and policy objective for SFOR. Shinseki agreed with this approach.

On 11 October, the day the operation was to be executed, MG Ellis was unable to secure Saric's cooperation, so the order was given to launch the Danish Battalion in

Doboj to take down the detachment by force. Heinemann stayed with Saric in Janja, and was able to convince him to give in at the last moment. The JPC's SATCOM link allowed Heinemann to contact Ellis directly, who aborted the operation just in time. Saric later confided to Heinemann that together they had averted an extended Serb UW campaign. Had his detachment been attacked, he felt his position would have afforded him no other choice but to support a Bosnia-wide retaliation.

Heinemann was subsequently successful in convincing the senior U.S. chain of command to embrace General Saric and his organization. Eventually enlisting the support of General Shinseki, COL Heinemann brokered a meeting between General Shelton and Saric. More than pleased with his status among the Americans and his relationship with COL Heinemann, Saric, and later Borovcanin, was instrumental in establishing the new Srpska Police Force, and supporting the "new order" that paved the way for legitimate elections.

As a result of his experiences in Bosnia, COL Heinemann offered valuable insights. In his estimation, the current JTF structure is inadequate to the task of large, multinational urban operations. Two Deputy JTF Commanders would be better suited to the task, one presiding over operations, the other orchestrating support. In addition, he feels a single Chief of Staff is also inadequate for the heavy administrative burden of such urban operations. A Chief of Staff cell, or directorate, could better preside over the myriad infrastructure, bureaucratic, and staff-intensive complexities of a multinational urban operation. Lastly, in the specific case of the JPC, he recommends a comprehensive "targeting board" be established at the TF level. This unconventional intelligence targeting board would not cover traditional, conventional strike objectives. Instead, it

would synthesize and track operations to identify, influence, exploit, and interdict key players and relationships in any given local power hierarchy. Such methods are used by other intelligence agencies, as well as law enforcement organizations, but this approach should be tactically oriented, and responsive to the local JTF commander's requirements. Civil Affairs (CA) personnel currently utilize such information (as provided by other intelligence sources), but do not possess the capabilities to generate such products. Additionally, such capabilities would label CA personnel as intelligence gatherers, making them anathema to many suspicious regimes, severely limiting their access and ability to do their jobs.

Personnel specially trained in unconventional warfare methods, and experienced in foreign internal defense missions would be ideally suited to managing such an unconventional targeting cell. SF personnel possess much of the training and cross-cultural experience desirable for such a group. COL Heinemann insists, however, that a cell in the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) would not provide the status necessary for such a group, or sufficient access to the information produced, for a JTF commander. He recommends such an organization be integrated into the extant Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) intelligence architecture. Most importantly, the relationships and rapport COL Heinemann was so successful in cultivating take time to establish. He notes:

> Many...did not grasp some of the very basics in dealing with the human dimension of complex battlespace. SF's experience in the field puts them in the position of living by their wits keenly attuned to all players at all levels of battlespace, where frequently it is the apparently minor player, who in the end may have a major impact on operations. It takes time to develop these instincts...the fact that our chains of command are repeatedly and institutionally predisposed to accept risk in allowing independent operators under mission-type orders to go forth and do their

> best, provides the environment in which these instincts are best developed.[90]

This leverage cannot be created in an ad-hoc manner, or applied only when the best-laid plans go awry. These capabilities must be fostered from the outset of any urban operation. Urban operations reveal a host of new complexities and costs to military planners, much in the way expanding warfare to the undersea and space environments add new dimensions to conflict.

[90] 8 November 2000 e-mail from COL Heinemann to the author.

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V. CONCLUSIONS

You [Special Forces] only traverse the physical terrain to get to the human terrain.[91]

- COL(Ret) August G. Jannarone

A. OVERVIEW

This analysis addresses the relevance of the Unconventional Warfare (UW) mission to contemporary Joint Urban Operations (JUO) during Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and Stability and Support (SASO). In 1994, a Defense Science Board report concluded that America's ability to conduct military operations in built-up areas was inadequate.[92] Since that finding, progress has been far too slow. True, rewrites are in the works, and experimentation is gaining momentum, yet our military still references urban doctrine as outdated as 1979.[93] Advances in technology, renewed interest in JUO, and recent operational examples – from Mogadishu and Grozny, to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo – should catalyze the development of better operational methods for cities. It is apparent that U.S. forces can expect to be committed increasingly to urban areas. The appealing nature of the asymmetric advantages offered by cities, and our current national security strategy, contributes to this realization. Unfortunately, our current doctrine seldom addresses this unique environment; when it does, its predominant focus is on conventional, high-intensity, unrestricted maneuver warfare. This approach simply does not acknowledge the realities of contemporary JUO. During MOOTW and

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[91] U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), "Special Forces Branch Conference," Author attended at John F. Kennedy Auditorium, Ardennes St., Ft. Bragg, NC, 3-5 April 2001.

[92] Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Military Operations in Built-up Areas (MOBA), (November 1994) 1.

SASO, casualties, collateral damage, and political consequences can rapidly erode public support; conventional combat operations may entail excessive political risk. Forces trained for unit maneuver warfare are not sufficient for stabilizing politically charged conflicts short of war. Operations during peacetime and conflict, particularly where less than vital national interests are at stake, may make it difficult to justify the level of destruction and bloodshed often associated with urban combat. This doctrinal shortcoming is detrimental to how we train, and the methods by which we task organize our joint task forces. If not rectified, U.S. military leaders hazard continuously creating ad-hoc forces ill-prepared to confront the complexities of modern JUO.

One answer is the effectiveness of using politically and culturally attuned SF, trained and experienced in irregular methods, to conduct UW to counter urban threats. We must not limit today's JFC to forces designed for high-intensity, maneuver warfare. Providing commanders with the proper tools to counter asymmetric threats will ensure deployed forces have the requisite capabilities for operating in cities.

B. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

The freedom from reliance on high-technology systems, minimal operational footprint through use of surrogate forces, and unique applicability for countering asymmetric adversaries, make UW eminently suitable for today's MOOTW or SASO in an urban environment. As illustrated by U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) actions in Bosnia, UW skills provide invaluable tools to the commander for understanding, shaping, and engaging the urban area of operations (AO). On a more critical note, SF experiences in the Balkans reveal an alarming lack of doctrinal guidance for the missions they

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[93] See Appendix A.

accomplished. Although this is a credit to the flexibility, adaptability, and value of these unconventional warriors, it is an unnecessary handicap. Doctrinal updates are necessary now to provide the legitimacy for new training initiatives and experimentation. Because advisors, liaison elements, staff, and commanders rely on doctrine to guide their efforts, SF risk re-inventing the UW wheel for every contingency operation. Without an authoritative reference that delineates the parameters of UW in the urban environment, valuable assets may be underutilized or misutilized.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

Policymakers must find the political will to conduct UW during peacetime and conflict. The anachronistic image of U.S.-supported guerillas overthrowing a constituted regime to the horror of a global audience must be erased. UW in the urban arena provides decision-makers low-visibility options for obtaining either the support or neutrality of various elements of the society. It minimizes cost, and the potential for escalation to hostilities in close proximity to noncombatants, while matching the most suitable U.S. force to the most likely threats to be encountered during MOOTW or SASO.

Current UW doctrine is sound, but not sufficient. Neither FM 31-20 Doctrine for Special Forces Operations (1990), nor the final draft of FM 3-05.20 Doctrine for Special Forces Operations (2000), include more than passing reference to conducting UW in an urban environment. The scope and complexity of this mission require more guidance. The contemporary likelihood that UW forces will share the battlespace with conventional and multinational forces during MOOTW demands rethinking the command and control relationships in the SF Unconventional Warfare Area of Operations (UWAO). Early

forward engagement, and continuous employment – pre-conflict, during conflict, and post-conflict – are the keys to successfully building the rapport and relationships necessary to successfully conduct UW. If policymakers are serious about implementing UW options, the transition from peacetime engagement strategy to UW operational employment should be better defined.

The debate over different definitions of UW is essentially one of degree. The current joint definition is entirely adequate; semantics should not detract from the need for definitive amplifying doctrine. This should be accomplished by providing detailed input to the upcoming publication of JP 3-06 Joint Urban Operations, and the publication of (or next revision of) FM 3-05.20 Doctrine for Special Forces Operations. This is preferable to creating a mission subset for urban operations, or urban UW, which would further compartmentalize and isolate this knowledge. It is critical that a mission with the scope of UW be fully integrated into the operational concepts established by joint doctrine. By ensuring integration, a larger audience will be reached.

Lastly, if military leaders are successful in addressing the complexities of JUO, and in laying the foundation for using UW in cities, improved UW training will ensure optimal results are achieved during future mission execution. SF operators exercise their UW skills during peacetime missions on a daily basis, but some skills go underutilized, and there is little outlet for comprehensive training exercises or institutional feedback. In the area of intelligence collection, Training in Low Level Source Operations (LLSO) and other Advanced Special Operations Techniques (ASOT) should be expanded to enhance the operational capabilities of SFODAs. Advanced education about urban infrastructure, and urban social networks, should be made available to UW operators. At the

institutional level, the SF Qualification Course capstone UW exercise, Robin Sage, could easily be modified to provide an initial immersion in the urban environment. If resources permit, the exercise could be expanded to incorporate periodic rotations by SFODAs for comprehensive urban UW refresher training. This venue could provide an opportunity for evaluation, or institutional feedback on performance.

With regard to the U.S. military's approach to urban operations during peace and conflict, the current state of affairs is unacceptable. Much of our best urban doctrine is based on analysis of battles that occurred two or more decades ago. For the most part, our tactics, techniques, and procedures for approaching urban operations were derived from World War II operational experience, and have changed little since then. The existence of doctrinal guidance for urban operations during MOOTW or SASO is virtually non-existent. More lessons need to be drawn from a full range of historical experiences other than the standard references to Stalingrad, Hue, and more recently, Mogadishu and Grozny. A wealth of potential knowledge exists in the collective experiences of the British in Cyprus, the French in Algiers, and the Israelis in Jerusalem. Unconventional Warfare provides an alternative, though not new, approach to the anachronistic "superior firepower" paradigm that inevitably entails the large-scale commitment of conventional soldiers to urban areas.

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APPENDIX A

Doctrine provides, "fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives."[94] A literature review of this doctrine reveals how forces organize, plan, and conduct operations. This information can then be used to identify what force capabilities might be assets, given the characteristics of urban operations. My review is focused on urban operations doctrine, and doctrinal references of significant importance to contemporary operations in urban areas.

In 1994, a Defense Science Board report concluded that America's ability to conduct military operations in built-up areas was inadequate.[95] While response to this overdue insight has been painstakingly slow, certain concerned policy-makers and senior decision-makers in the U.S. military have implemented several initiatives over the past decade to address this shortcoming. National-level interest resulted in creation of the J8 Urban Working Group, and intense simulation and experimentation efforts on the part of the United States Marine Corps' Urban Warrior program. Efforts to update doctrine should shortly result in the Army's first revision of Field Manual (FM) 90-10 Military Operations on Urban Terrain since 1979. Perhaps more anticipated is JP 3-06 Joint Urban Operations, still in draft form. The experimentation efforts of the Urban Warrior program continue to yield invaluable lessons in tactics, techniques, and procedures, and contributed to publication of a benchmark manual, Marine Corps War fighting

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[94] FM 101-5-1 Operational Terms and Graphics, p. 1-55.

[95] Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Military Operations in Built-up Areas

Publication (MCWP) 3-35.5 Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain. Several monographs published by RAND have identified this USMC manual as the best U.S. doctrine available for the urban environment, even recommending adopting the publication as interim joint doctrine for U.S. forces until a more comprehensive product becomes available.[96]

The unfortunate reality is that today's body of doctrine for urban operations is inadequate in three respects: it is not current, relying on historical examples such as Stalingrad, Berlin, and Beirut to guide soldiers through the complexities of the modern urban battlefield; it focuses predominantly on high-intensity combat operations, ignoring the political and cultural realities of contemporary operations; and it persists in following a terrain-based approach, resulting in doctrine that does not address the city's integrated "system of systems."

MCWP 3-35.3 -- our most comprehensive urban doctrine -- is partially based on historical cases that occurred seventeen or more years in the past, and could not possibly address recent changes in U.S. strategy adequately.[97] For today's operations other than

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(MOBA), (November 1994) 1.

[96] See Russell W. Glenn, Marching Under Darkening Skies: The American Military and the Impending Urban Operations Threat, RAND, MR-1007-A, Santa Monica, 1998, for this recommendation. Other RAND studies have previously identified MCWP 3-35.3 as the best U.S. doctrine available, citing Army publications as too hopelessly out of date (1979, for instance) to be relevant to today's strategic environment. They include: Russell W. Glenn, Combat in Hell: A Consideration of Constrained Urban Warfare, RAND, MR-780-A, Santa Monica, 1996; Russell W. Glenn, ...We Band of Brothers: The Call for Joint Urban Operations Doctrine, RAND, Santa Monica, 1999; and, Russell W. Glenn, Randall Steeb, et. al., Denying the Widow-Maker: Summary of Proceedings, RAND-DBBL Conference on MOUT, RAND, DB-270-JS/A, Santa Monica, 1998.

[97] In Chapter 1, MCWP 3-35.3 cites R. D. McLaurin, et. al., Modern Experience in City Combat, (Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland: U.S. Army Engineering Laboratory, 1987), as its source for illustrating the trends, dominant factors, and principles of combat in urbanized areas discussed in the manual.

war, heightened political sensitivity to American casualties, increased concern for the welfare of non-combatants, and new technological capabilities has made traditional measures of military success obsolete. The influential study that provides the foundation for the USMC manual's historical examples, Modern Experience in City Combat, identifies 22 MOUT battles that occurred between 1942 and 1982.[98] Of these examples, only five include constraints or limitations on the forces involved that would classify the conflict as limited in nature: Jerusalem, Beirut I, Tel Zaatar, Ashrafiyeh, and Zahle. All of these battles occurred nineteen or more years ago, and all included predominantly high-intensity combat. Arguably, since the groups in conflict in these five battles were no longer willing to resolve their grievances primarily through political means, none fall within the realm U.S. doctrine identifies as "conflict."[99]

In contrast to this sampling, consider the fact that the United States participated in only two deployments for peace, humanitarian assistance, or disaster relief between 1945 and 1989: the Dominican Republic, and Egypt. Since 1989, America has participated in at least six such operations: Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Macedonia, Bosnia, and the Sinai. As noted, for many reasons these operations frequently take place in cities and towns, often to a very large extent.[100] Despite this, MCWP 3-35.3 provides little guidance for

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[98] These battles are identified as: Stalingrad, Ortona, Aachen, Arnem, Cherbourg, Berlin, Manila, Seoul, Jerusalem, Hue, Quang Tri I, Quang Tri II, Suez City, Ban Me Thout, Beirut I, Tel Zaatar, Ashrafiyeh, Khorramshahr, Zahle, Beirut II, Sidon, and Tyre.

[99] FM 100-20 Stability and Support Operations defines conflict as, "a range of political conditions that are neither peace nor war. Conflict is characterized by the introduction of organized violence into the political process; yet groups in conflict remain willing to resolve their problems primarily by political means, with limited military support. The lower range of conflict is peaceful, punctuated by occasional acts of political violence. At the upper levels, conflict is very close to war, except for its combination of political and military means."

[100] A recent RAND study also queried whether this statistic pointed to a trend in future warfare, noting that, "lessons from urban operations that predate the early 1980s may be irrelevant or less important today." See Sean J. A. Edwards, Mars Unmasked: The Changing Face of Urban Operations, RAND, MR-1173-A,

conducting operations under the strict rules of engagement (ROE) that were hallmarks of these missions. Although it was written from the perspective of a Marine air-ground task force, little attention is devoted to operational aspects of MOUT, and there is no coverage of operations other than combat. These non-combat operations are precisely those most frequently conducted by American forces in the last ten years.

In fairness to MCWP 3-35.3, the manual's coverage of urban operations is far superior to current Army doctrine. As of this writing, the Army's FM 90-10 was last revised in 1979. The manual makes no connection between tactical and operational or strategic considerations, virtually ignores the consequences of the presence of noncombatants, and fails to consider the many implications and limitations of strict ROE. Presenting motorized rifle formations of the former Soviet Union as the likely MOUT opponent, FM 90-10 overemphasizes European terrain considerations. No mention is made of the irregular forces and Third World shantytowns encountered by American military personnel in operations in Panama, Haiti, or Mogadishu.

The 1993 FM 90-10-1, An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-up Areas, is published by the Army's Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. This manual is meant to serve as a more detailed guide for the individual infantryman on urban tactics, techniques, and procedures. In fact, it is superior in many respects to its parent manual, FM 90-10. Combined arms operations are discussed in detail, the concept of constrained operations in an urban environment is introduced, and a differentiation is made between "precision MOUT" and "surgical MOUT" to reflect operations conducted under stringent

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Santa Monica, 2000, p. 1-4.

ROE. Unfortunately, FM 90-10-1 does not sufficiently discuss the impact of noncombatants on military operations. The manual succeeds in its design as a good guide for the individual infantryman's techniques, but it does not provide the comprehensive MOUT doctrine needed for military operations today. The preponderance of its content deals with tactics, techniques, and procedures of the small-unit battle, devoting limited attention to operational-level aspects. The strategic component to MOUT is virtually ignored. This is particularly disturbing, given that tactical, operational, and strategic implications converge and reinforce each other as much as they do in the urban environment, as U.S. involvement in Hue and Mogadishu proved.[101]

The current joint doctrine library is similarly inadequate. The 1993 JP 3.0 Doctrine for Joint Operations makes no mention of urban operations. JP 3-10.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense also accomplishes little more than recognizing that urban areas present unique difficulties for military forces.[102] Nowhere do joint publications consider multinational urban operations, although coalition and allied operations are a reality on today's global stage. Finally, although effective

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[101] During the 1968 Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War, U.S. forces were initially overrun in the city of Hue. While the offensive overall resulted in a devastating tactical defeat for the North Vietnamese, Americans were able to view the desperate combat in Hue live, on television. American astonishment over the resilience of an enemy the American government had pronounced nearly defeated caused a lack of confidence in U.S. political leadership, and is credited with significantly hastening U.S. troop withdrawal from Vietnam. On the night of October 3, 1993, Special Operations Task Force Ranger suffered 18 Americans killed and 84 wounded in action with Somali militia - the worst U.S. firefight since the Vietnam War. As a direct result of this tactical action, political handling of the situation, and pressure by the disenfranchised U.S. public, President Clinton ordered the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Operation Restore Hope, and Somalia, on November 19, 1993. See Rick Atkinson, "*Night of a Thousand Casualties; Battle Triggered U.S. Decision to Withdraw from Somalia*," Washington Post, January 31, 1994, p. A11.

[102] Only cursory mention of the urban environment is made in the following Joint Publications: JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, JP 3-08 Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, JP 3-53 Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations, JP 4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support in Joint Operations, and JP 4-04 Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support.

intelligence is considered imperative to success in modern urban operations, JP 2-0 Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations makes no mention of the many considerations unique to intelligence preparation of urban battlespace.[103] These shortcomings in doctrine are certain to lead to inadequacies in the composition and organization of forces deployed in the future.

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[103] Literature mentioning the uniquely critical role of intelligence to success in urban operations includes: MCWP 3-35.5 Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, p. 1-12; LTC T. R. Milton, Jr., "Urban Operations: Future War," Military Review, Vol. 74, No. 2, February 1994, pp. 37-46; Scott Gerwehr and Russell W. Glenn, The Art of Darkness: Deception and Urban Operations, RAND, MR-1132-A, Santa Monica, 2000, pp. 37, 54; and Russell W. Glenn, ...We Band of Brothers: The Call for Joint Urban Operations Doctrine, RAND, Santa Monica, 1999, pp. 28-31.

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