

Jan. 11 from 1950's files
Many copies of this paper still
remain here

2002
State 0.95

LECTURE
BY WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
ON
PARTISAN WARFARE
ARMY WAR COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

See also
reference by 1/11/51

JANUARY 11, 1951

Let us commence with definitions -- The Oxford Dictionary is the authority for the following:
PARTISAN - A member of a party of light or irregular troops employed in scouring the country, making forays, etc.; a member of a volunteer force similarly employed; a guerrilla.

GUERRILLA - An irregular war carried on by armed bodies of men acting independently.

IRREGULAR - A soldier not of the regular army - in ancient and medieval history we find irregular bodies attached to the regular forces which, having neither pay nor position are permitted to pillage.

In his pamphlet on "Guerrilla Parties" written in 1862 at the request of General Halleck, then General-in-Chief of the Army of the United States, Francis Lieber recognized authority in the usage and customs of war at that time defined the word "guerrilla."

He said a "guerrilla" means an irregular band of armed men carrying on an irregular war, not being able,

according to their character as a guerrilla party, to carry on what the law terms a regular war.

The irregularity consists in its origin, because it comes into existence at the call of a single individual -- and not by a national levy nor conscription nor call for volunteers; in the fact that it is not connected with the army as to its pay, provisions and movements; further, it is irregular as to its permanent status since the band can be dismissed and then be called back again.

He points out that many persons associate with the term "guerrilla" the notion of pillage, of murder and of robbery. History confirms this association, but the law of war as well as of peace, has dealt with many of such acts and determined their justification or their criminality under other accepted terms namely:- the Freebooter - the Marauder - the Brigand - the Partisan - the Free-corps - the Robber - and the Rising en Masse or the Arming of the Peasants.

A brief examination will help us better to understand the subject of discussion.

General Halleck in his International Law or Rules regulating the intercourse of States in Peace and War (1861 - Vol. I) considers partisan troops and guerrillas as the same. He regards "self-constitution" a characteristic of the partisan. He describes both partisans and

guerrillas as self-organized and self-controlled who carry on war against the public enemy without being under the direct authority of the State.

If, however, they are authorized and employed by the State they become a portion of its troops and the State is as much responsible for their acts as for the acts of any other part of the army. In 1870, the Prussians required each Franc-tireur (one of a corps of light infantry, originating in the wars of the French Revolution, and having an organization distinct from that of the ~~regular army~~) to wear a uniform recognizable at gun-shot distance in which case he would be treated as an enemy of war.

Placed under army command, they no longer are regarded as partisans and guerrillas in the accepted sense for they are under the direction and authority of the State.

Partisan and guerrilla bands who commit hostile acts as individuals and not as legitimate acts of war, are regarded as outlaws, and when captured may be punished the same as free-booters and banditti.

The freebooter or Filibuster was a term still in common use at no remote period. He was a pirate. At times he became a privateer through receiving from his sovereign letters of marque which licensed him to fit out an armed vessel to use in the capture of enemy shipping.

(Abolished in European nations by Congress of Paris in 1856.)

The bandit or brigand is an armed irregular soldier who lives by pillage and robbery particularly in Italy, Spain and Turkey. Brigand derives from "briguer" to beg - it originally meant beggar but came to mean armed wanderers, a class of men which appeared in all countries in the middle ages. But military terminology even in the time of our Civil War gave it a wider meaning -- as one who without or against the authority of his own government assails the enemy, thereby (though his object is free from intention to pillage) would be branded a brigand subject to execution if captured.

The terms Partisans and Free Corps are vaguely used. Apart from the use of the word partisan as interchangeable with guerrilla, the term has been employed to designate a corps whose mission it is to strike the enemy by action distinctive from that of the corps' main army. Since its duty is to support the main effort it is an integral part of the army and as such entitled to the privileges of the laws of war. It generally acts against the enemy's line of communication and beyond the lines of operation of his own army in the rear and on the flanks of the enemy.

Free-corps on the other hand, are troops not belonging to the regular army, consisting of volunteers, generally raised by local leaders under government authorization, used for the "little war" and not incorporated in the order of battle.

In a recent book by Ferdinand Lot, a Professor of History at the Sorbonne, on Military Art and Armies of the Middle Ages, there are many references to such troops during that period.

Of course in the 18th century there were free-corps in Germany, ~~opposed to Napoleon who received the~~ benefits of belligerents when taken as prisoners of war.

During the Philippine insurrection, it should be noted that the United States recognized the legitimacy of the Philippine guerrillas which operated after the Philippine forces had been defeated by the United States in March 1899. In November of that year the Philippine Government adopted a resolution to the effect that the insurgent forces which had waged war on the United States following the defeat of Spain and the cession of the Philippines to the United States were incapable of further resistance in the field and it was decided to disband the Army. According to the resolution the officers and men were to return to their own provinces and were to organize the people for general resistance by means of guerrilla warfare.

Many of these guerrilla forces were recognized as lawful belligerents by the United States. The distinction between guerrillas who were and were not recognized as lawful was emphasized in a trial which took place of Gumban, a Philippine citizen, for murdering a Philippine citizen. Gumban was a Captain in the insurgent army and had the rank of First Official Guerillero in command of a group of volunteers from Pavia. Pursuant to orders from his superior officers, Gumban led thirty villagers to Pavia for the purpose of attacking seventeen American soldiers stationed there. In attempting to take a Philippine citizen prisoner, the latter was fatally stabbed. In disapproving the conviction for murder, the Commanding General, Division of the Philippines, ruled that Gumban was a lawful belligerent who killed the citizen while attacking the enemy under orders of his superior officers.

During World War II it should be noted that the United States recognized the lawful belligerency of the FFI forces in France. This was evidenced by the announcement of General Eisenhower on July 15, 1944 that the FFI were a combatant force commanded by Major General Koenig, formed an integral part of the Allied Expeditionary Force, bore arms openly against the enemy, and wore distinctive emblems.

The "rise en masse" or "the arming of peasants" as it used to be called is closely allied to the matter of

guerrilla warfare. Austria armed the people as militia in 1805 -- Russia in 1812 -- Prussia in 1813.

Formerly, a member of a "levee en masse" was not generally recognized as a lawful belligerent, but this has changed since the Declaration of Brussels, 1874, defined "levee en masse" as 'The Population of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy, of their own accord take up arms to resist invading troops,' without having had time to organize. Such combatants, if captured, now have status of prisoners of war.

When we come to the Hague Convention of 1907 on the Laws and Customs of War, we see that if partisan and guerrilla forces can meet the test laid down in Article I, they would be entitled to the privileges of belligerents.

ARTICLE I. - 1. The laws, rights and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:-

1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;
3. To carry arms openly; and
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.

In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army or form part of it, they are included under the denomination "Army."

ARTICLE II:-

The inhabitants of a territory which has not been occupied, who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having had time to organize themselves in accordance with ARTICLE I, shall be regarded as belligerents if they carry arms openly and if they respect the laws and customs of war.

ARTICLE III:-

The armed forces of the belligerent parties may consist of combatants and non-combatants. In the case of capture by the enemy, both have a right to be treated as prisoners of war.

If there is one certain deduction to be drawn from past experience, it is that guerrilla tactics, when carried out by a resourceful and persistent enemy, have generally resulted in prolonged warfare, especially against invading armies.

Irregulars appeared in a series of wars between the British and the French in North America, which went on at intervals from 1689 to 1763. Irregular warfare has been employed in the wars of every age -- ancient, medieval and modern. It was carried on in each of the wars of the

United States prior to 1900. Frontiersmen, in defense of their homesteads, formed irregular bands. They called themselves and were by others called "Rangers."

In the American Revolution, partisan bands appeared, among them the Green Mountain Boys in the North and the followers of Pickens, Marion and Sumter in the South.

Bands of guerrillas and irregular cavalry who operated chiefly in the "Neutral Ground" of Westchester County, New York, during the American Revolution:

Westchester Light Horse (sometimes called "De Lancey's Green Jackets" because of their uniform) was organized in 1777 and was an irregular unit of the British Army until the end of the war, taking part in some of the principal battles.

In the Civil War partisan corps like "Mosby's Rangers" were active. Smaller bands existed in Kentucky, Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas and the Indian territory. Of these, Albert Pike's band of Confederates composed largely of Indians, was possibly the most significant.

The line which divides regular warfare from guerrilla or partisan warfare -- war from "little war" -- is not always easily drawn. That difficulty arises in instances of an enemy like the Boers, who never had a definite military organization in the European sense of the term. Their military genius was peculiarly adapted to partisan warfare. When after Lord Roberts' arrival in South Africa, the British moved

against them in overwhelming force, they turned to guerrilla tactics.

Napoleon is reported as saying that the secret of war is "to preserve one's own communications while threatening those of the enemy." The Boers, after the fall of Pretoria, had practically no communications to preserve. The whole country afforded them their base of operations. They were tied down to no particular spot or region, for on every side they found the people friendly and ready to help. Their obvious policy was to attack the British lines of communication and cut up isolated detachments and convoys. This was carried out successfully until Britain finally learned how to counter Boer tactics and with her superior strength finally won.

But Spain, throughout her long history, has always been recognized as the country most ideally suited for guerrilla tactics. There is no region in Europe in which it is more difficult to wage successful war. It has been said "if the army of invasion is small, it is defeated; if it is large, it starves."

Even in Livy's time the truth of this was appreciated by the Romans. The remnant of the Carthaginians who had taken refuge there after the fall of Carthage had defied the Roman power with great persistency, while the Spanish insurrection of Quintus Sertorius in 80 - 72 B.C. had seriously

shaken the stability of the Republic itself. His irregulars were the native tribes and the pirates of the Mediterranean, employing all the techniques of unorthodox warfare. But guerrilla tactics alone have never expelled a resolute invader so that after Sertorius held out for 8 years Roman persistence finally won.

History repeated itself in the Peninsula during the long struggle with the Moors, and again at the beginning of the 19th century, when the Spanish guerrillas drew upon themselves the attention of the world.

~~Rebellion against the invader or the soldier of~~ occupation is a natural occurrence at any time. What distinguishes guerrilla warfare is the consistent strategy, of the refusal to fight a pitched battle, the refusal of any combat which can be avoided, sticking to the order to attack the isolated soldier, the small group, the convoy. To set fire to one's house rather than see an enemy soldier spend the night there.

Napoleon had the experience on two occasions to encounter determined, ruthless and tenacious guerrilla forces. First in the rising of the armed peasants in 1809 when the whole of Spain was in the hands of the French. Then the bands of armed peasants -- the Partidas or partisans as they were called by the Spaniards -- appeared on the scene. Their operations were spread over the whole country. It was estimated

that they kept 50,000 French troops employed in guarding the line. Napoleon rebuked his generals for failing to cut the guerrilla off the English supply ships. So cut off, they were impotent. Nevertheless, they had contributed greatly in bringing about the dissolution of Napoleon's power.

In his Russian campaign, he again ran into trouble with guerrilla operations.

The role of the Russian guerrillas during the campaign of 1812 was tied more clearly to the Russian army than that of the Spanish guerrillas to Wellington.

In Russia the difficulties of supply for Napoleon which lost for him one after another, his convoys, his cavalry and finally his infantry, which he could not even feed, were much more due to the partisans than to the army of Kutuzov.

Russian historians of the campaign of 1812, particularly the later ones, have showed perfectly the guerrilla's role and his methods.

"It was the Russian peasant," writes Tarle, "who wiped out the magnificent cavalry of Murat. He killed the horses by burning the hay and straw which the foragers went to hunt for, sometimes throwing into the fire the foragers themselves. The peasants, who hated their slavery under the Czars, who protested against it by revolt and by the assassination of their masters, who had, 37 years before, put

in danger the whole regime of serfdom, these same peasants treated Napoleon like their worst enemy, burnt the wheat, the hay, the fodder, burned their own isbas (wooden huts) to kill the French quartermasters inside."

One can imagine how Napoleon judged it advisable to hasten to return to France, leaving to Murat the care of bringing back the debris of his army.

Why, at the dawn of the 19th century, this explosion of guerrilla warfare, and its success?

The "patriotism" of the Russian or Spanish people ~~is the reason generally given by the historian.~~ The Peninsular War, like the Russian campaign of 1812, bears the name of a "patriotic war."

The cause of the guerrilla warfare in Spain as in Russia was attributed to patriotism or fanaticism.

However, another explanation is more practical. It was no coincidence that this guerrilla resistance appeared in the interior of Spain in 1807 and five years later in the desolate marshy forests of White Russia.

In each of these places, the soldiers of the Grand Armee had been guilty of pillage. In each place this meant the reaction first of the Spanish then of the Russian peasant who has his cow taken from him without payment. Relations became strained between the soldier who was starving and the peasant who would starve himself if he feeds the soldier.

Added to these facts is the fact that vulnerability to guerrilla warfare is a malady peculiar to modern armies. The root of this vulnerability was the importance of material by Napoleon's increase in artillery, and the increased number of effectives through Carnot's conscripts of the Revolution.

Napoleon suffered from the inconvenience of being unable to find anything to buy in Spain and in Russia. Clausewitz who was with the Russian army through the Napoleonic operations, criticized in his History of the Russian campaign of 1812, the lack of foresight of Napoleon in failing to warehouse provisions along the route of his attack. This lack of such provision made his army a direct danger to the life and property of the peasants -- thus began the real "patriotic war." Alison in his History of Europe says: "During the first three weeks of October the partisans around Moscow made prisoners of no less than 4,180 French soldiers; and the reports from Murat announced the alarming intelligence that one-half of the whole surviving cavalry had perished in these countries."

From the historical facts, it would seem that against a victorious army of invasion, guerrillas alone have effected no permanent victory. Against such a foe they may hamper and harass and delay but they cannot destroy.

France took 30 years to bring Algeria to complete subjection; Russia took the same length of time to gain control of the Caucasus where Schamyl had resisted -- Andreas Hofer in the Tyrol with his peasant army elected to fight pitched battles against the Franco-Bavarian armies. Guerrilla tactics might have enabled him to last longer than he did.

A small state when invaded by an enemy in overwhelming strength naturally resorts to guerrilla methods. In 1864 Denmark was invaded by the Austrian-Prussian armies ~~and was able to delay them for a time by surprise attacks upon their lines of communication.~~

During the Franco-Prussian war companies of Francs-tireurs were secretly formed, which carried out daring and successful exploits against Russian troop trains and small German detachments. Hardly a day passed without a German sentry being found shot, strangled or bayonnetted at his post. There were strong reprisals against these acts. When the railroad bridge at Fontenay was blown up by the Chasseurs des Vosges, the Germans burnt down every house and levied a fine of ten million francs upon the entire population of Lorraine.

In June 1938, the German General Alexander von Falkenhausen, military adviser to General Chiang-Kai-Shek, together with his military mission, were recalled to Berlin. This was reported as being done at the insistence of the

Japanese government.

For 7 years, the Chinese had had the assistance of a German military mission in building an army.

German literature on the subject of "Kleiner Krieg" or "little war" discloses German belief in the principles generally held as to the means of sustaining by minor secondary actions the conduct of friendly operations and of hampering those of the enemy. Certainly, for 7 years, the Chinese were effective in limiting the Japanese occupation forces to the territory contiguous to the rivers and railways ~~with the rest of the country under the rule of Chiang-Kai-Shek~~ and the war lords.

Let us examine certain incidents during the period of World War II and the manner in which guerrilla forces were used.

After Dunkirk in 1940, Hitler had overrun Western Europe from the North Cape of Norway to the Pyrenees and was then poised for what seemed a coup-de-grace -- the destruction of Great Britain as the final obstacle to German world domination at that moment.

In all of the countries taken over by the Nazis, there were hundreds of thousands of individuals who remained spiritually uncrushed, and who refused to accept defeat.

While waiting for their armed forces to be restored and strengthened, the British decided by the use of unorthodox

means to strike the enemy's war potential wherever exposed, to drain his strength, disperse his forces, and generally to weaken his war effort, while helping secret forces get armed and trained.

The British realized that maximum results could be obtained only by cooperation with the various allied governments which had sought and found refuge in England. Accordingly, British liaison groups were set up to help organize and work with resistance elements in each of those countries. United States forces were called upon to cooperate with the British in this phase of warfare.

This was done through the Office of Strategic Services, established as an operating agency of the Government under the direction and supervision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was charged with the collection of secret intelligence and its evaluation, secret operations within enemy countries and enemy-occupied or controlled countries. It was also responsible for the execution of all forms of morale and physical subversion. This included the organization and support of fifth column activities, sabotage, organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare, and direct contact and support of underground resistance groups.

The British and the French used to say to us:-
Because of your many minority groups you are especially subject to penetration. We said we'll show you that what you consider

a liability, we can turn into an asset.

So, we took men of the racial origin and the language of the countries we were seeking to liberate. In addition to sending such men into the various countries as intelligence agents, organizers, saboteurs, we developed a para military unit.

This was in the nature of an officers' patrol of 5 officers and 30 men. We Americans called our units "Operational Groups" and used them as activating nuclei of resistance groups in the different theatres. The British had similar groups without the language and racial qualifications.

The final military conclusions as expressed by General Eisenhower will show that through these groups with knowledge of the language, working behind the enemy lines, giving leadership to partisans and guerrilla parties, assistance was given to the main operation.

The report of General Eisenhower stated that militarily, organized resistance helped the main operations of the Allied Expeditionary Force as follows:

- a) by sapping the enemy's confidence in his own security and flexibility of internal movement;
- b) by diverting enemy troops to internal security duties and keeping troops thus employed dispersed;

c) by causing delay to the movement of enemy troops: (1) concentrating against Normandy beach-head; (2) regrouping after the Allied break-out from the beach-head;

d) by enabling Allied formations to advance with greater speed through being able to dispense with many normal military precautions, e.g., flank protection and mopping up.

e) by furnishing military intelligence.

The British did not operate in the same way as we did since they had no language groups.

Before we finished, we had such groups with so-called guerrillas or partisans, working behind the lines living and working with the resistance people, speaking their language, instructing leaders, furnishing supplies and ammunition and food, helping in the training of recruits and having available cargo planes for the transportation of personnel and supplies by means of radio sets maintaining contact with and transmitting orders for the allied invasion forces.

We sent such groups into Norway and Denmark, Belgium and Holland, France and Germany, Italy, Greece and Yugoslavia, Hungary, Siam, China and Burma.

I quote from citations of General Eisenhower as illustrative of the manner in which O.S.S. units carried on successful guerrilla operations in various theatres.

"In Italy from 15 April to 1 May 1945. OSS officers and enlisted men volunteered for extra-hazardous duty behind enemy lines, under the direction of the 15th Army Group Headquarters. These men, organized into small operational groups, were infiltrated behind the enemy lines by parachute and maintaining contact with their headquarters by radio, organized extensive partisan forces. In the final phase of the offensive of the 15th Army Group they led these partisan forces in all-out attacks."

"In southern France from 1 to 15 August 1944. Assigned the mission to parachute into central and southern France in strategic areas in advance of the invasion forces, OSS officers and enlisted men, contacted French forces of the Interior, arranged for their supply by parachute drops of arms, ammunition and other supplies, and led them in operations as directed by Allied Force Headquarters. These men, along with French Forces of the Interior, established road blocks, mined roads, ambushed columns, attacked enemy installations, and received the surrender of over 10,000 German troops."

"In action against the enemy in Greece from 15 August to September 1944. A total of 15 OSS officers and 159 enlisted men were parachuted into strategic areas of Greece, or entered it by sea, and organized and led the Greek partisans in a campaign to cut off the lines of retreat of the German forces. They destroyed many bridges, blocked roads, attacked German convoys and caused severe loss in enemy personnel and equipment."

"SERVICE UNIT DETACHMENT NO. 101, OSS From 8 May to 15 June 1945 captured the strategic enemy strong points of Lawksawk, Pangtara and Loilem in the Central Shan States, Burma. This unit, composed of approximately 300 Americans - officers and men, volunteered to clear the enemy from an area of 10,000 square miles. Its subsequent activities deprived the Japanese 15th Army of the only East escape route and secured the Stilwell Road against enemy counterattack. Although Detachment No. 101 had been engaged primarily in intelligence and guerrilla activities, it set about the infantry mission of ousting a determined enemy from a sector long fortified and strategically prepared. These American officers and men recruited, organized, and trained 3,200 Burmese natives entirely within enemy territory. They then undertook and concluded successfully a coordinated 4-battalion

offensive against important strategic objectives through an area containing approximately 10,000 battle-seasoned Japanese troops."

"From 15 September 1943 until the surrender of the enemy forces in May 1945 OSS uniformed Officers and enlisted men by parachute deep behind enemy lines in areas of strategic importance. Their mission was to contact Italian Partisan and resistance groups and to organize them, arrange for their supply of arms and clothing by parachute drops and then lead them in operations against the enemy forces as directed by radio by the Special Operations Section of G-3 of these headquarters. In all 29 officers and 118 enlisted men were parachuted behind the lines many of them remaining there for several months. The role of the Italian partisans in supplementing the operations of the Allied Armies in Italy has been a most important one. Their attacks on enemy supply lines, dumps, convoys and similar targets during the fall of 1944 and winter of 1945 were a constant and serious harassing problem for the enemy. During the final offensive in April and May 1945 these Partisans caused great damage to enemy installations, troop convoys and other targets and were successful in blocking many of the escape routes. The Partisans liberated many important cities and towns and successfully

prevented the enemy from destroying public utilities and industrial installations."

SIGNED -- MARK W. CLARK

Mark W. Clark
General, U.S. Army
Commanding

The effectiveness of the operation of the Italian Partisans is found in telegrams from General Kesselring to his superiors asking for help: I quote: -

"Activity of partisan bands in the Western Appennines, and along the Via Emilia, particularly in the areas of Modena, Reggio and Parma, and southwest of them, as well as near the neighborhood of Piacenza, has spread like lightning in the last ten days. The concentration of the partisan groups of varying political tendencies into one organization, so ordered by the Allied High Command, is beginning to show clear results. The execution of partisan operations shows considerably more commanding leadership. Up to now it has been possible for us, with a few exceptions, to keep our vital rear lines of communications open by means of our slight protective forces, but this situation threatens to change considerably for the worse in the immediate future. Speedy and radical counter-measures must anticipate this development.

"Wide areas are occupied, or endangered by partisan bands, particularly in the Western Appennines and in the Western Alps. A large number of vital supply routes are now only useable in convoy, and are to some extent completely in partisan hands. In addition to these numerical increases, it is easy to see that there has been a reorganization of the Italian partisan heads, which are grouping themselves into military formation taking military titles and uniforms and appearing as formed bodies of troops.

"It is clear to me that the only remedy, and the one which is unavoidably necessary to meet the situation, is the concentration of all available forces, even if this means temporary weakening in other places. I request you therefore to combine with the 14th Army and Army of Liguria, in carrying out several large scale operations which will nip in the bud the increasing activity of the partisan bands in Northern Italy. Please let me have your proposals as to when these measures can be carried out and with what forces.

Kesselring."

In the Soviet Union, guerrilla warfare neither took an exclusive role as in Yugoslavia nor even a preponderant role as in China; the decisive part was played at the front. But the action on the rear contributed powerfully to the wearing down and the immobilization of the enemy forces. Wide zones, especially in marshy forests, remained practically forbidden territory to the German troops. The Russian partisan corps which established itself in that area multiplied its expeditions against the neighboring routes of communication, which ranged from a surprise attack executed by a few civilians to an expedition conducted by important effectives of the regular army. At the beginning of February 1943, a communique relating the return to the Soviet lines of a group of cavalry which had left in November under the command of Colonel Koursakov, attributed to it 4,000 German soldiers killed, 40 wagons, 6 aeroplanes, 47 pieces of artillery, 40 cannon, 300 trucks and motorcycles and a large amount of material of war destroyed.

Raids of this strength forced the Nazis to release their forces of weak effective strength, and to maintain in the East more men in the occupied regions than there were at the front. The Hitlerian war machine in that area wore itself out because it had to place in every train an armed detachment and it had to transform every station into a fortress.

Since the formal ending of World War II, under the threat of the Red Army, the Soviet Union by use of penetration, domination of political groups, economic pressures, has in 5 years without firing a shot, set up between itself and the West, a bulwark of satellite South Eastern States which can be of great military and economic importance.

The Soviets sought to bring Greece within that group through proxy military invasion. Under the guise of civil war organized guerrilla forces under Soviet trained leaders were placed in the mountains with light detachments sent out to burn, to pillage and to terrorize.

In Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria, schools, hospitals, and supply dumps were established for replacements, indoctrination and training. In each of the countries, but especially Albania, were places of refuge for the Communist guerrillas when hard pressed.

The impression sought to be created by Soviet propaganda was that the war was an internal war fought by true democratic elements against reactionary forces. As the war lengthened, however, investigations by the Greek Security Police disclosed that the great number of attacking troops were not Greek citizens but bodies of Communist guerrillas based in adjacent countries, equipped and led by Soviet-trained leaders.

I was in Greece periodically during 1948 in respect to the trial of the Communist murderers of Polk, the American

correspondent. The Attorney General showed me the interrogation of hundreds of captured Communist guerrillas. Investigation showed that they were not Greek residents but men of foreign origin who had joined up outside the Greek borders.

What I shall say now is a brief paraphrase of the memorandum prepared for me by General Van Fleet when I told him I had been invited to be with you today.

In substance, among other things he said that in early operations against these Communist bands, the Greek army made only piecemeal attacks, conducted no night operations and were careless in their efforts at entrapment. After some months of failure, they finally accepted a basic plan whereby the Greek Army units echeloned in depth by the distance of a night's march carried on operations against guerrilla formations by encircling enemy pockets simultaneously over a wide area. These echeloned troops would march toward the center of that area. If the enemy infiltrated the inner circle, he would run into the next hemming force.

To supplement these ground tactics, it was also necessary to have simultaneous counter-measures against Communist intelligence networks.

All known suspects in a wide area were arrested prior to the start of the field operations. They were detained and denied outside contacts until the operations were completed or until positive proof of each individual's innocence had

been asserted beyond any doubt.

Accordingly, Communist leaders in the hills were unable to receive reliable information regarding the location and plans of the Greek Army forces. As a consequence the guerrillas were obliged to operate without detailed information about the enemy, were at a loss where to run, and usually ran straight into the arms of one of the encircling forces.

General Van Fleet described the cleanup of the Pelopennese Campaign as an excellent example of this anti-guerrilla operation.

By the same type of widescale operations with deployment in depth, prior arrest of collaborators, thorough search and subsequent adequate policing, cleared up Central Greece by June 1949 and Northern Greece along the border, in August.

In his words "The method is the approved solution as evolved in Greece."

In Korea we see how guerrilla action was used by Soviet satellites to support orthodox operations of the regular forces.

All sources agree that guerrilla activity in that theatre is for the United States a problem of major proportion.

The American command has made clear that long-range planning and careful implementation of such plans was carried

on for more than two and one-half years prior to the Korean war. In South Korea civilian sympathizers were cultivated and opportunities created for the eventual utilization of guerrilla forces. One of the major tools in this effort was the establishment of the South Korean Labor Party -- a Communist-inspired and Communist-directed group which had as a major function the support of the guerrilla operations. These partisans are of two categories: (1) those who actively assist the rebels in skirmishes and attacks and are constantly in the rebel areas; and (2) those who recruit personnel and supplies from South Korean villages and wage a ceaseless propaganda program. This latter group plays an important part as intelligence agents in passing on information of American and South Korean Army strength, locations, and plans.

Guerrilla activity has been intensified since the Chinese intervention. Air force commanders say that Communist irregulars figure heavily in their aerial offensive. Now intelligence spokesmen estimate that there are 6,000 to 7,000 armed guerrillas behind the United Nations lines in centrally directed, organized groups. It is said that they will be able to carry on their activities throughout the winter.

General Van Fleet has shown us how necessary he found it in Greece to work out a plan for counter guerrilla action. I assume that the command in Korea has undertaken to do this. Viewing it from the outside it would seem to require drastic action and a hard hand.

I have given this brief review of partisan action. One cannot help but be struck with the recurring fact that the common demoninator of that action throughout the centuries has been rapidity and surprise.

Certain principles we should keep in mind. Among these are the following--

I. In the usage and custom of war the basic distinction between a regular army and an irregular force is this. The regular army comes into being by State authority through conscription or by national levy or a call for volunteers and this army is controlled by the State. The irregular forces are self-constituted or self-contained and are created through some local leaders like Mikhallovich of Serbia or Tito from Croatia contending as much against each other as against the common enemy. However, if they became employed by the State or are given recognition by and are under the control of the theatre commander (as did happen to both these leaders) then the State is responsible for their acts.

II. The terms Guerrillas, Partisans, and Rangers apart from their special significance may sometimes be applied to certain regular forces whose mission is to attack the enemy by action distinctive from that used by the main body of the army to which they are attached. The principles of war to which they become entitled are determined not through the term

applied to them but by the character of the duties they perform. It should be remembered that a ruthless enemy may well ignore the wages of war and execute such groups as Hitler did in World War II.

III. Past experience establishes that guerrilla tactics carried out by a resourceful and persistent enemy have generally prolonged a war especially against invading armies.

IV. The special characteristic of guerrilla warfare is not that it is "the poor man's war" but that it has the ~~consistent strategy in refusing to fight a pitched battle.~~

V. Modern armies by reason of their lines of communication, their equipment, and their numbers of service troops in rear echelons are vulnerable to guerrilla warfare.

VI. Our new experiences in this phase of war should stimulate us to explore the possibilities of creating counter guerrilla units for attack and defense which could cooperate with the para military units charged with organizing resistance movements in the various countries. Such a study would enable us to develop a body of doctrine in the whole field of subversive war of which partisan warfare is only a part. The attack is made with ideas as well as with men and weapons. We have seen that the tactics and strategy of guerrilla action is not new - neither is subversive action against spiritual and moral defenses.

Generally nations make use of two methods for reaching the goal of their policies. The employment of skill in diplomacy and the use of violence in conventional warfare.

Hitler and Mussolini took subversion, modernized its propaganda and fifth column activities and used them as an auxiliary in support of their main operations.

Stalin took a more revolutionary step - Beginning with the end of World War II the Soviets have been waging a war in which subversive methods constitute the main means of attack under cover of the threat of the Red Army.

The pattern of that program can be found in its purges in S.E. Europe, its pressures upon France and Italy, its activities in Africa and the Middle East.

In Germany, less violent than Korea, but more vivid as an example of moral subversion, we see the attempted breakdown of loyalties. West Germany shows us the devices and techniques by which a nation is sought to be subdued - East Germany gives us an insight into the making of a new satellite by applying pressures to all phases of life, of all social classes, groups and individuals.

The Soviets have perfected the art of breaking the will of their victims to resist. It seeks its end by political and economic attack (as in Yugoslavia) fifth column penetration and terroristic tactics (as in Germany, Italy and France) with periodic violence by proxy as in Greece and Korea.

But her war of maneuver by subversive means begins to disclose weaknesses which cannot be entirely concealed by diversionary methods.

The Chinese Communists under Soviet guidance sought to exploit the conquest of China.

As the invasion gained momentum moving from the North to the South the Communist leaders began to pay less attention to patient political inducements and concentrated more on rigid military control. As a result, anti-communist guerrilla forces have been increasing in the coal mining districts in the Shantung provinces and in the area south of the Yangtze River.

Here is a chance for us to give aid and assistance to that movement.

Another weakness is already apparent -- Disaffected elements within the population of the Soviet Union are already running great risks to escape into the American Zone. They take these risks even though unsure they will not be turned back.

It was a great loss to us in this respect that as a result of the Yalta Agreement a great mass of Soviet Prisoners of War and forced laborers in Western Europe numbering two million were sent back to Russia in many cases over their violent objections.

To date the United States had done little to persuade people to leave Soviet control. We know that dissatisfaction is widespread in the ranks of Soviet occupation forces in Germany and Austria and among the population of the Soviet Union itself.

An Inducement Program would lead them to come to the Americans with assurance of good treatment, protection and the opportunity to participate in Anti-Soviet work. This would not necessarily result in an organized attack upon the Soviet Union. It could result in disaffection and resistance to internal order. This could make Stalin keep looking over his own shoulder until we are able to build and strengthen our regular and orthodox military position.

By such positive and affirmative action we must help buy time to strengthen our regular forces and prevent Stalin from the further consolidation of his position until those forces are ready.