

DEVELOPING CAPACITY OR A CULTURE OF DEPENDENCY: ARE
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROJECTS INITIATED BY THE
PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS REINFORCING
DEPENDENCY OR TRUE CAPACITY IN THE PAKTIA-KHOST
PROVINCES OF AFGHANISTAN?

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General Studies

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

DEVELOPING CAPACITY OR A CULTURE OF DEPENDENCY: DID PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM PROJECTS IN PAKTIA AND KHOST PROVINCES BUILD AFGHAN CAPACITY OR DID THEY RESULT IN A DEEPENING DEPENDENCY ON FURTHER AID?, by Major Rosemary M. Reed, 127 pages.

The purpose of this paper is to examine PRT project management practices to determine if those practices resulted in increased dependency of GIROA on PRTs in Khost and Paktia provinces. Since 2003, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) conducted major reconstruction and governance capacity building projects. The projects assisted the Afghan government to regain territory and credibility with the local population, as part of the Counter-Insurgency (COIN) strategy of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Historical implications and project management practices are examined to identify indicators that contribute to dependency of GIROA on the PRTs. The relevancy of dependency theory to the effects achieved by the PRTs to legitimize GIROA with the local populace is examined in addition to the GIROA and ISAF aid strategies. Three methods of evaluation were utilized to determine dependency trends: Evaluation of the provincial development plans, and analysis of PRT CERP project data and PRT United States Agency for International Development (USAID) capacity building programs. The analysis demonstrated there was a relationship between the level of government and village involvement with the level of complexity of the project that increased dependency on the PRTs.

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ACRONYMS

ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
ASGP	Afghan CBSG
BCTs	Brigade Combat Teams
CA	Civil Affairs
CAAT	Counter-Insurgency Advisory and Assist Team
CDCs	Community Development Councils
CDP	Community Development Program
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Fund
CIDNE	Combined Information Data Network Exchange
CMIC	Civil Military Integration Center
CMO	Civil Military Operation
CMOC	Civil Military Operations Center
COIN	Counter-Insurgency
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
DSF	District Stability Framework
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
FACT	Forward Advanced Civilian Teams
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HDM	Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief, and Mine Action
HHI	Harvard Humanitarian Studies Initiative
HN	Host Nation
IGO	Inter-Government Organizations

ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
LGCD	Local Governance and Community Development Program
MAAWS-A	Money as a Weapons System, Afghanistan
MRRD	Minister for Rural and Rehabilitation Development
NGOs	Non-Government Organizations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OGA	Other Government Agencies
OHDACA	Overseas Humanitarian Disaster Assistance and Civic Aid
OPCON	Operational Control
PBGF	Performance Based Governor's Fund
PBGF	Performance Based Governor's Fund
PDC	Provincial Development Council
PDP	Provincial Development Plan
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RAMP-UP	Rural Afghan Municipalities Program for Urban Populations Program
SFA	Security Force Assistance Teams
SOI	Source of Instability
TACON	Tactical Control
TCAPF	Tactical Conflict Assessment Planning Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

We live in a culture in which those who are better off subscribe—both mentally and financially—to the notion that giving alms to the poor is the right thing to do . . . Deep in every liberal sensibility is a profound sense that in a world of moral uncertainty one idea is sacred, one belief cannot be compromised: the rich should help the poor, and the form of this help should be aid.

— Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa*

Foreign Aid and a Culture of Dependency

It is often the case that when one discusses foreign aid, what first comes to one's mind are the physical, tangible goods known as humanitarian assistance, or HA for short as it has come to be known in the military.¹ The physical distribution of humanitarian aid² being off-loaded from a US naval vessel to be distributed in a developing country is the most popular mental model of winning hearts and minds. The construction of a new school in Afghanistan immediately becomes the foreign policy public relations campaign for winning the counter-insurgency war in Afghanistan. US soldiers distributing school supplies to bare-foot, Afghan children held by *burka* clad women come to symbolize that the international community is committed to the fight for women's rights and education, in complete contrast to the former fundamentalist regime of the Taliban. The original reasons for conducting development activity in Afghanistan were to further national security purposes and to honor agreements for reconstruction following combat

¹United States Government Global Development Policy, <http://foreignassistance.gov/Default.aspx> (accessed February 20, 2013).

²United Nations, "Humanitarian Assistance and Assistance to Refugees," <http://www.un.org/ha/general.htm> (accessed February 25, 2013).

operations; however, the images of post-conflict stability operations do not change. Political leaders need those images to visibly validate the effectiveness of foreign aid to the public. It comes as no surprise that upon their inception, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) became the military and interagency representation of what the US was doing right in Afghanistan.

With the best intentions in mind, the PRTs were founded in 2003³ with the mission to rebuild the infrastructure and governance of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan following the year long fight against the Taliban. PRTs were the first combined civil-military organizations created to provide subject-matter expertise on post-conflict development operations. The members of the PRTs represented all facets of the US Government; they were led by a US military officer and advised by experienced representatives from the Department of State (DoS), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and US Department of Agriculture (USDA). One would believe that with the “dream team” of interagency personnel, PRTs were destined to become the model for post-conflict for reconstruction and development for the transition of Afghanistan after initial combat operations took place in October 2001.⁴ The intent of this transition was to develop the rudimentary functions of local governments in

³Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), Chapter 2, Section 51.

⁴Center for Military History, Publication 70-83-1, *The United States Army in Afghanistan: Operation Enduring Freedom*, “Initial invasion of Afghanistan October 2001 to May 2003,” March 17, 2006, <http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/Afghanistan/Operation%20Enduring%20Freedom.htm#p8> (accessed April 15, 2013).

accordance to the Constitution of Afghanistan approved following the Bonn Agreement in January 2003.⁵

In the Afghan theater of operations, counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine became the military doctrinal guide for US PRTs as they conducted stability operations. COIN doctrine is based on the population as the primary vulnerability and source of exploitation by insurgent forces.⁶ In this view, an insurgency develops out of a grievance against the government because it is perceived as incapable of not providing basic services and needs to the people. It is with this premise, and the paradigm of the American moral obligation to take care of those less fortunate, that the fallacy in nation building strategy began. The Taliban represented the very repression that independent loving Americans fought against. The Maslow⁷ hierarchy of needs influenced the development principles behind the conflict stability framework used to win hearts and minds and determine what the

⁵Civil Military Fusion Center, *Afghanistan Agreements: A Collection of Official Texts 2001-2011* (Norfolk, VA: June 1, 2012).

⁶Department of the Army, FM 3-24.

⁷A. H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Evolution," *Psychological Review* 50 (1943): 370-396, <http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Maslow/motivation.htm> (accessed February 28, 2012). Maslow's hierarchy of needs pyramid is utilized to understand local populations when conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations, as mentioned in appendix E, of FM 3-07 and this statement extracted from COIN doctrine, FM 3-24, appendix A: A-45. COIN operations can be characterized as armed social work. It includes attempts to redress basic social and political problems while being shot at. This makes CMO a central COIN activity, not an afterthought. Civil-military operations are one means of restructuring the environment to displace the enemy from it. They must focus on meeting *basic needs* first. A series of village or neighborhood surveys, regularly updated, are invaluable to understanding what the populace needs and tracking progress in meeting them.

new PRT project would be. Ten years and 100 billion⁸ dollars later, Afghanistan still not self-sufficient, without a sustainable economy, and lacking a revenue generating system to maintain such projects without external support from Western countries. This is reinforced by the Inspector General for Afghanistan in the January 2013 quarterly report to Congress, “All of these funds will require good stewardship and robust oversight to ensure they are not wasted on projects that the Afghans do not need or cannot sustain, or that simply do not work.”⁹

Thesis Statement

Development projects with little or no acceptance by the local populace or government are catalysts of instability in the already fragile security environment in Afghanistan. Despite the millions of dollars invested in project development and capacity building programs, the provincial governments of Khost and Paktia will remain dependent on external, international organizations or donor governments to provide basic services, infrastructure, and governing support after December 2014. The provincial governments of Khost and Paktia demonstrated trends in dependency as it pertained to project planning, technical expertise, implementation, and quality assurance maintenance. This was largely a result of a highly bureaucratic, and centralized budgeting process developed by the central Government of Afghanistan, with little flexibility to distribute funds when priorities for development changed during the fiscal year. Instead of

⁸Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, *Quarterly Report to Congress*, January 30, 2013, <http://www.sigar.mil/quarterlyreports/fundingtables/governance-development.html> (accessed April 15, 2013).

⁹Ibid.

reinforcing legitimacy, the PRTs efforts contributed to undermine the fragile linkages between the Afghan central government and outlying provinces. This situation indirectly contributed to the corruption of the provincial and district governments, despite the desperate attempts of PRTs to provide basic services to the populations in Khost and Paktia.

Khost and Paktia, also known collectively as Loya Paktia,¹⁰ have undergone significant changes in program development with the support of the interagency representation within PRTs, such as USAID, DoS, and the civil engineering capacity provided by US Army Corps of Engineers. From 2010 to 2013, Paktia and Khost provinces made significant improvements to security sector development, despite their proximity to the Pakistani border. The security improvements can be credited to the surge of US troops in the region that began in 2010.¹¹ The use of Commander's Emergency Response Funding (CERP) increased beginning in 2009 and peaked by the end of 2010, with an increase of project activity for both Khost and Paktia provinces during this period.¹² US PRTs have operated in Paktia and Khost provinces for ten years at the time of the publication of this thesis, with the Paktia PRT. The period of US responsibility for stability operations concluded with the dissolution of the PRT and handover of operations

¹⁰Loya Paktia is often referred to the ethnic and tribal regions that combine Paktia and Khost provinces. A map of Loya Paktia is as shown in figure 1.

¹¹"Payoff Seen in Afghan Surge," *The Washington Times*, October 11, 2010, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/11/payoff-seen-in-afghan-surge/?page=all> (accessed April 15, 2013).

¹²Regional Command-East (RC-E), International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), "RC-E CERP Projects as of August 2010" (Presentation, Bagram, Afghanistan, September 2010).

to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) on April 3, 2013.¹³

Although the true long-term effects are yet to be known, what is certain is that development activity by international and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) will continue to test the capacity of local governance to provide humanitarian and reconstruction support to the provincial and district level governments in Khost and Paktia provinces after the departure of a majority of US forces in 2014.¹⁴

This study will examine the project management and development processes of Khost and Paktia provinces between 2008 and 2012, and evaluate trends in CERP funded PRT projects and USAID implemented programs. Data will be analyzed to determine if there are trends in increased GIROA dependency on PRTs in Khost and Paktia. Interviews were conducted to support evidence of processes and behavior of GIROA officials to support evidence of dependency trends demonstrated in the analysis of data.

Problem Statement

With the impending draw-down in Afghanistan, the US Army will transition to operations with an emphasis on shorter duration deployments focusing on security assistance, stability operations, and foreign disaster assistance. PRTs were the US

¹³United States Department of State (DoS), “Closure of First US PRT in Afghanistan Marks Success,” April 3, 2013, http://kabul.usembassy.gov/pr_041413.html (accessed April 15, 2013).

¹⁴Department of Defense, *Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, January 2012), http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf (accessed April 15, 2013), 6. Strategic guidance signed by the President and the Secretary of Defense in 2012 noted that “In the aftermath of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation” to curtail the need for major US force commitments. Furthermore, the guidance adds, “US forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.”

Government's best effort to develop an organization that exemplified interagency cooperation and civil-military partnerships to execute the "build" phase of counter insurgency doctrine.¹⁵ Since their inception in Afghanistan in 2003,¹⁶ PRTs have evolved from military-centric organizations to more civilian managed teams with expertise in governance and development.

In 2008, the 10th Mountain Division, 3BCT, 3rd Battalion initiated several government works projects in order to quickly regain territory and credibility with the local population based on the Counter-Insurgency (COIN) strategy as applied in Iraq. "Clear-Hold-Build" was the broad concept of the operation intended to gain the credibility of the local populace.¹⁷ The article, "Holding Popular Support and Buying Time"¹⁸ the author stated that USAID, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and implementing non-government organizations were not capable of operating in combat, or non-permissive environments, and that International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) elements were best suited to conduct post-conflict

¹⁵Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Tactics, Techniques and Procedures in Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009).

¹⁶Peter Runge, *The Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Role Model for Civil-Military Relations?* 2009. <http://www.bicc.de/publications/publicationpage/publication/the-provincial-reconstruction-teams-in-afghanistan-role-model-for-civil-military-relations-268/> (accessed October 15, 2012).

¹⁷Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006).

¹⁸Christopher Toner, COL, US Army, "Holding Popular Support and Buying Time-Why ISAF Must Assume the Lead from USAID Implementing Partners and NGOs in Major Reconstruction in the Contested Areas of Afghanistan" (Master's Thesis, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2008).

reconstruction until the security situation improved to the point it would allow USAID, UNAMA, and NGOs to operate without fear of hostile attacks.¹⁹ Despite the well-intentioned efforts of the PRTs the question remains: Are humanitarian assistance activities initiated by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams reinforcing dependency or formulating independence and true capacity in the Loya Paktia provinces of Afghanistan?



Figure 1. Loya Paktia

Source: Afghan RONNA Harmonie Web, 2010, <https://ronna-afghan.harmonieweb.org/Pages/Default.aspx> (accessed April 1, 2013).

Post-conflict operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were the first opportunity most Army leaders at Brigade level and below had to work with personnel from other agencies, such as USAID or DoS. Some Brigade headquarters had interagency representation integrated with the Brigade staff, and referred to this integration of

¹⁹Ibid.

leadership as a Board of Directors.²⁰ The PRT leadership was modeled after this integration of the senior representatives of USAID, DoS, and the military commander. The purpose of this civil-military integration was to improve civil-military operational planning and synchronize the lines of effort of COIN operations. Ideally, all humanitarian projects would be reviewed with the expertise of the Board of Directors, demonstrating a unified effort of civil-military decision making.

In 2008, when the article “Holding Popular Support and Buying Time” was written, Khost and Paktia were known havens for insurgent activity.²¹ The US Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) became the lead elements for COIN in their respective Areas of Operation (AO), or the security sectors as recognized by ISAF. Those elements were in command of their sector and known as “battle space owners.” Their responsibilities included security of all personnel in their security sector: US government, non-government, and Afghan. The relevance of this relationship to PRT stabilization operations is that PRTs were under tactical control (TACON) of the BCTs for security purposes. This means all operational planning from 2008 onward was required to be synchronized with the BCTs to include the approval of PRT funded projects in their security sector. Therefore, BCTs did leverage project planning and development for purposes in support of COIN operations for short-term stability in contrast to the PRT mission, which focuses on long-term development of GIRoA.

²⁰Sean W. McCaffrey, COL US Army, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams In Regional Command-East (Operation Enduring Freedom-VIII)” (Strategy Research Project, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2009).

²¹Ibid., 3.

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to evaluate capacity building as it pertains to developing independence in the capabilities of the recipient, in this case, the provincial Afghan government. Dependency is a negative condition that does not produce lasting results and does not improve the capacity to the host nation partner to conduct competent and independent governance operations without significant help from a military partner. This study will examine trends based on analysis of existing reports by Department of Defense (DoD) and USAID leaders in the period 2008 to 2012 in the provinces of Khost and Paktia.

The conclusions from this study could help military leaders, and US Government personnel develop integrated planning strategies as they pertain to stability operations in Eastern Afghanistan. The study could also help Security Force Assistance Teams integrate development strategies into security assistance plans with Afghan National Security Forces and local government leaders. This study also could assist those who are interested in evaluating the effects of stability operations, interagency development teams, such as PRTs, and the impacts of provincial government transition leading to the drawdown of US coalition forces in 2014. In addition, this study could also assist Civil Affairs Operations planners by providing planning resources and lessons learned to plan sustainable solutions in a persistent stability operations environment, which includes civil affairs, engineer, and medical personnel.

Assumptions

There are three assumptions accepted in this paper. The first one is the Afghan provincial government processes and programs described in this paper will continue in accordance to the constitution of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA). Although there is data to support a lack of transparency in government processes, the provincial development plan and provincial councils are Afghan-led processes developed from the Bonn agreement in 2003. There is an assumption that lack of transparency in government processes is an indicator of dependency. This was a method of evaluating provincial key leaders in Khost and Paktia provinces by ISAF. The transparency of provincial governors was evaluated based on their support for coalition force operations. The governor of Khost was more supportive of military combat operations than the governor of Paktia province. Therefore, it can be assumed that Paktia shows indications of greater dependency. However, the analysis conducted in chapter 4 will utilize additional evaluation criteria to evaluate functional transparency relative to government involvement in development projects.

The second assumption is that there will be biases by government and NGOs in regards to best practices for development projects in Afghanistan. NGOs tend to be biased against the military-supported projects and their criteria to evaluate data will focus on capacity building, program planning, and sustainability. Coalition forces will also be biased against NGOs as their operations are not based on the ISAF counter-insurgency operations framework and the goals of the GIROA. These biases will be taken into account when conducting the analysis of existing literature and USAID PRT programs. The assumption used in this thesis is that the PRTs are in a position to foster dependency

based on their extensive resources and technical expertise. On the other hand, the PRTs also recognize GIRoA as the legitimate authority; whereas NGOs work in what, to them, is an impartial manner to support needs based the requirements of the local populace.

The third assumption used in this paper is that capacity building programs increase capacity as opposed to infrastructure development projects. Capacity building consists of those projects focused on training special skills to individuals, such as teachers for schools, midwives, or civil engineers. USAID traditionally utilizes capacity building programs through implementing NGO partners in Afghanistan. This paper assumes that capacity building programs decrease dependency because the effects support Afghan infrastructure usage and maintenance beyond the deployment tenure of the PRT.

The assumptions will be addressed in the conclusions of this paper to determine if they remained consistent or changed based on the analysis conducted in chapter 4. The intent of the analysis is to provide a fair evaluation of PRTs and indicators of dependency. The scope of this paper is to evaluate programs as they pertain to developing capacity or dependency in Khost and Paktia provinces in Afghanistan.

Limitations

Continuity in the PRTs remains a challenge, due to differences in the operations and administration of the various services assigned to them. No two services are on the same deployment schedule, nor are they assigned to the same units upon return to the United States. As a result, many after-action reports and most of the recent statistical data remain in the Afghan theater. Web sources with unclassified and releasable information were utilized in this study, specifically CERP project data prior to 2011. DoS and USAID

personnel, in contrast, tend to work on the same PRT for a longer period of time, often longer than the military rotations for continuity of information purposes. The interviews conducted for the purposes of research consist of the varying actors involved with PRT related projects during their tenure in Khost and Paktia provinces. With the pending draw down of military personnel in Afghanistan, the PRTs are currently undergoing a transition of responsibilities, which includes the rapid transfer of legacy projects to the Afghan provincial government. This study is limited to using published data of those programs funded within the PRT provincial development plan framework. The programs evaluated for this study focus on development and governance capacity building projects managed by USAID with support from PRTs. For the purpose of this paper, any development programs executed by military units will be described as “stability operations.” These programs will be described in chapter 3.

Delimitations

This thesis will evaluate the Provincial Development Projects (PDP) of Khost and Paktia and analyze PRT-supported USAID governance capacity building programs. Statistical data provided by the Civil Military Integration Center (CMIC) Afghanistan web portal will be utilized to assess project management practices against data indicators that support dependency. The data sources are a compilation provided by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and UN Development Program (UNDP). CMIC web is a civil military integration center developed by NATO member countries to serve as a centralized civil information repository for stability and civil affairs operations conducted around the world. Additional statistical data from RONNA, a non-profit organization charged with managing development project activity and NGOs

in Afghanistan and the Afghan government for official uses and education. Although no NGOs accepted interviews to provide first-hand sources of information, much of the data provided in CMIC, RONNA, and the Khost and Paktia PDPs include a summary NGO activities. NGOs will be referred to as “implementing partners” as USAID describes such organizations who are awarded grants to execute various USAID development programs.

Significance

The results of this study will provide unit level commanders at the Brigade level and below a better understanding of how to evaluate vulnerabilities, trends of past projects in the region, and better integrate USAID development personnel and programs into their Civil Military planning process for future security assistance operations in Afghanistan. Civil Affairs practitioners will also benefit because the results will provide insight into the trends and indicators of governance capacity and understanding the impacts of development projects.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Overview

This section will be divided into four sections to discuss literature relevant to this study. The first section will outline roles and responsibilities of the appropriate actors conducting stability operations within the Khost and Paktia area of operations. Then, it will provide a brief introduction to Dependency theory as it applies to Afghanistan. The second part will provide a review and assessment of pertinent studies to determine trends in whether they emphasize capacity or stability. The third section of the literature review will list the key USAID provincial level and below programs involving governance and development capacity building, as well as highlights from those programs in the Khost and Paktia provinces. In the fourth section, the District Stability Assessment Tool will be described to discuss the evaluation criteria to be utilized in this paper.

Primary Actors, Roles and Responsibilities

In this section the responsibilities of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) will be described in the context of their relationships with the PRTs at national, provincial, and district levels. Then, the activities of the BCT, the PRT, and USAID will be briefly described, following highlights of development projects focused on relevant to governance capacity building of GIROA at the district and provincial levels. The importance of the overview is to understand the roles and responsibilities of GIROA and their role in the project nomination, development, and evaluation process. The level of involvement of GIROA versus the involvement of

outside organizations, such as elements within the PRT or NGO implementing partners, allows for the evaluation of external influence on GIRoA planning processes. The reason that the PDP and provincial council guidelines established by the GIRoA are important is because they were created by the people who are at risk of becoming dependent. The processes of development project nominations at the Provincial Development Council (PDC) meetings and subsequent PRT project nominations will be further examined in chapter 4. This analysis will evaluate the extent of PRT involvement during the PDP process. Secondly, the PRT USAID capacity-building programs will be defined and evaluated using the USAID development project planning principles.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

For the purpose of this paper, GIRoA denotes all national, provincial and district governors and ministerial line directors as defined by their authorized *tashkil*,²² or authorized government slots per each provincial development plan that is developed and approved every five years.²³ The focus for describing GIRoA will be on the Provincial Government systems, to describe and distinguish between the provincial line ministers appointed by the central government and the Provincial Council Members. Members of

²²Tashkil: *Tashkil* means ‘organization’ or ‘structure,’ it comes from the Arabic root *sh-k-l*, and *shakl* means ‘shape,’ ‘form’ or ‘figure.’ *Tashkil* was adopted for describing the personnel chart of the ANP and the ANA. Afghan Analysts Network, <http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1523> (accessed March 15, 2013).

²³Islamic Republic Of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy: 1387-1391 (2008-2013). The source document for provincial development plans as determined by GIRoA and approved by the Afghan parliament. Kabul, Afghanistan, 2007, <https://ronna-afghan.harmonieweb.org/PDP/.../Khost%20PDP.pdf> (accessed March 15, 2013).

the PDC, elected by their districts come to that position with the immediate support of the local populace, as opposed to provincial line directors who are appointed at the national level. Provincial Council members are also the most knowledgeable of their district's vulnerabilities and the opinions of the local populace.

Afghanistan National Development Strategy

The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) is the source document describing the national level policy and priorities for security, governance, economic growth and poverty reduction over a six year period. The most recent ANDS published in 2007 for the 1387 to 1391 strategy (or 2008 to 2013 in Western calendar terms).²⁴ The ANDS establishes the baseline guidance for analysis of each of the four national level policy categories, their development priorities, and what measures will be used to evaluate success. Essentially, this serves as the base document for the national level plans for each government ministry in those areas. A good example of such a base document is the National Solidarity Program²⁵ developed by the Minister for Rural and Rehabilitation and Development. It also serves as the source document for Provincial level government leaders to develop their provincial level development plans.

²⁴The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 1387-1391 (2008-2013), http://www.undp.org.af/publications/KeyDocuments/ANDS_Full_Eng.pdf (accessed March 15, 2012).

²⁵The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Rural and Rehabilitation and Development, "National Solidarity Program," <http://www.nspafghanistan.org/> (accessed February 28, 2013).

The National Solidarity Program

The National Solidarity Program was initially developed in 2003 from a nationwide program administered by the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development that establishes Community Development Councils in order to fund aid projects.²⁶ What is unique about the program is its decentralized governance approach, unlike that of the line ministries. Communities elect their leaders and representatives to form voluntary Community Development Councils (CDCs) through a democratic-like process. At the provincial level, these community leaders attend the monthly PDC meetings to lobby for their district project requests. PDC or CDC members are very influential, and because they are not required to have a degree or formal education, it is much easier for the positions to be filled.

The Provincial Development Plan

The Provincial Development Plan (PDP) is the source document from the provincial level of GIROA that outlines the strategy for development of that province. Provincial development plans exist for Khost and Paktia; the most recent plans were developed in 2011. For the purposes of this paper plans developed in 2007 with implementation intended for 2008-2012 will be analyzed. The provincial development plans are derived from the most recently published ANDS guidance, but the provincial governor and local line ministers have more influence on how the strategy is interpreted, implemented, and funded. The ANDS provides broad program implementation guidance, allowing increased flexibility for provincial leaders to develop their PDPs. District

²⁶Ibid.

Development Plans, or DDPs, were beginning to be developed and implemented in 2013, as noted in the most recent United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report.²⁷ The DDPs are the next phase of increasing accountability for district level development activities. In the following chapter both Khost and Paktia PDPs will be analyzed and compared in order to assess the provincial government's priorities for development in each sector and the level of integration and influence of the PRTs on the PDPs. The study will also assess the trends in project proposals that resulted as ISAF mandated that PRTs conduct operations in adherence to the Provincial Development Plans within the constraints of the security situation that existed in 2008. Although the PDPs were led by both provincial governments, PRTs were also influential during the initial planning process in 2007.²⁸

Provincial Development Council

The PDC is a quarterly or monthly meeting where the Provincial Governor, provincial minister line directors and representatives from the provincial council assess, evaluate and nominate development projects to be funded. It is the only provincial forum for donor coordination and development planning but it is lacking budget authority. In

²⁷United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Afghanistan, Report For the First Time in Afghanistan, 163 Annual District Development Plans Completed by District Development Assemblies for First Time in 1391 Across the Country, http://www.undp.org.af/undp/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=218:-for-the-first-time-in-afghanistan-163-annual-district-development-plans-completed-by-district-development-assemblies-for-the-year-1391-across-the-country&catid=37:poverty-reduction&Itemid=53 (accessed March 1, 2013).

²⁸RONNA Khost and Paktia Provincial Development Plans 2008-2012, <https://ronnaafghan.harmonieweb.org/Lists/Submitted%20Content/DispForm.aspx?ID=1136> (accessed March 1, 2013).

Khost and Paktia provinces, the meetings were held on a monthly basis as of 2010.²⁹ In Khost and Paktia provincial line directors are required to attend the PDC meetings when they do occur. District governors, civil society representatives and key elders have also participated, but attendance was primarily motivated by personal gain. In Khost province, USAID and Civil Affairs Soldiers from the PRT observed the provincial governor only allowing District Governors to the PDC with his permission.³⁰ In contrast, USAID representatives described the Paktia governor encouraging district governors and local leaders to attend the meeting; especially if one of their projects was going to be nominated for PDC approval.³¹ PRT participation at the PDC meetings was routine. Normally, the commander, USAID representative, PRT engineers, and other PRT members depending on the known topics of the PDC, attended these meetings. The purpose of PRT attendance was to provide technical expertise, representation, and liaison for coalition force commanders if needed.

United States Agency for International Development

Of all the US government interagency partners in the PRT, USAID had the most significant role in developing long-term sustainable aid programs. Founded in 1961 during the Kennedy Administration, the purpose of USAID is to be the lead US

²⁹This was based on PRT reports and interviews from USAID and UNDP—source documents are the Khost and Paktia provincial development plans.

³⁰Extracted from interviews from USAID representative and PRT Civil Affairs officers working in Khost province between 2010 and 2012.

³¹Extracted from interview from USAID representative with extensive time and experience as part of the BCT board of directors and knowledge of Khost and Paktia provincial governors between 2010 and 2012.

government organization responsible for the implementation and management of foreign aid abroad.³² Initially, PRTs only had one USAID representative on the team as one of the Board of Directors. Since the beginning of this study, USAID personnel have begun to replace departing PRT military personnel as the ISAF transition commences. In this portion the author will describe the various programs managed by PRT by USAID leads, and a brief overview of the task and purpose of each organization and key implementing partners as they pertain to governance and capacity building programs. Specific programs to be described will be the Performance Based Governor's Fund (PBGF),³³ the Local Governance and Community Development Program (LGCD),³⁴ the Community Development Program (CDP),³⁵ and lastly the Rural Afghan Municipalities Program for Urban Populations Program (RAMP-UP).³⁶ All of the listed programs are specifically designed to develop capacity for Afghan governance or local population involvement in governance. However, these programs vary in Khost and Paktia provinces based on the

³²United States Agency for International Development (USAID), "History and Mission Statement," <http://www.usaid.gov> (accessed November 10, 2012).

³³United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Performance Based Governor's Fund (PBGF), Facts for 2010-2011, <http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID> (accessed November 10, 2012).

³⁴United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Local Governance and Community Development (LGCD), Facts for 2010-2011, <http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID> (accessed November 10, 2012).

³⁵United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Community Development Program (CDP), Facts for 2010-2011, <http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID> (accessed November 10, 2012).

³⁶United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Rural Afghan Municipalities Program for Urban Populations (RAMP-UP), Facts for 2010-2011, <http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID> (accessed November 10, 2012).

security situation, since all programs require, to varying degrees, implementing non-government partners. The most current USAID development planning documents, such as the Tactical Conflict Assessment Planning and Framework (TCAF), and interviews with USAID personnel will be analyzed to evaluate PRT and USAID implemented programs in light of dependency theory.

Provincial Reconstruction Team Khost

In this section, the author will describe personal experiences with the development project nomination and management process. Examples of two PRT Khost USAID-implemented capacity building programs, the Rural Afghan Municipalities Program for Urban Populations (RAMP-UP) program and the Community Based Stabilization Grants (CBSG) will be described and evaluated. The author served as the operations officer for Provincial Reconstruction Team, Khost Province from 2010 to 2011, witnessed the transition of two Brigade Combat Teams, and served with two PRT Commanders. The PRTs in Afghanistan consist of either a Navy or Air Force commander with a board of directors, or representatives, from the State Department, USAID, and USDA. The military commander manages the PRT military forces and is the conduit between the PRT and the BCT, or respective military battle space owner. The PRT is subsequently broken down into District Support Teams (DSTs). DSTs consist of a State Department or USAID representative who is placed at the District level with support from a US Army Civil Affairs Teams. The job of the DST is to mentor, monitor and improve the development of district level leaders as it pertains to governance and development activities.

The RAMP-UP program was implemented in Khost City to develop the capacity of the Khost City Mayor and his staff in order to improve the functioning of municipal capacity as it pertained to Khost City, in contrast to the entire province. The CBSG³⁷ was implemented to provide support to key female business leaders and NGOs in Khost City, and was successful in conducting provincial and district level women's *shuras* with no support by coalition forces for security, and implementing partners to follow up on the progress of the *shuras*. A *shura* is the traditional Afghan means of conducting a meeting with key leaders in a region, based on an agreed subject.³⁸ Those subjects could be security, agriculture, or in the case of the CBSG, a women's *shura*.

The only shortfall with both programs was the lack of involvement of the Afghan provincial government in Khost province. The lack of Khost GIROA involvement is unfortunate because provincial leaders did not have any representatives in the district governments who monitored small-scale developmental activity. The provincial line minister who was the best at project management and tracking was the Provincial Minister for Rural and Rehabilitation Development (MRRD). The provincial MRRD was responsible for ensuring that district project nominations were in accordance to the Khost PDP and following up on the funding of the project.

³⁷United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Case Study: Evaluation of the CBSG in Support of Gender Equality in Afghanistan (ASGP) in Paktia Province, Kabul, Afghanistan, http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID/Article/2393/Out_of_the_Home_Into_the_Economy (accessed November 10, 2012).

³⁸Sadeik Jawad Sulaiman, The Shura Principle in Islam. Shura is the Arabic word for consultation. When Islam came to Afghanistan, the traditional means of consultation to resolve disputes was adapted by the Pashtun culture as the political, social, and humanitarian means to establish consent on pertinent issues. Al-Hewar Center, 1999, <http://www.alhewar.com/SadekShura.htm> (accessed March 1, 2013).

Despite these issues with RAMP-UP and CBSG, PRT programs were still appealing to battle space owners due to the construction capability they possessed. The PRTs have a civil engineering section managed by US Navy construction battalion Sailors (“Seabees”) and US Army Corps of Engineers Soldiers who are professional civil engineers. Civil engineering experience varies amongst PRTs. PRT Khost had civil engineers with road, bridge, and vertical infrastructure expertise, in addition to internal contracting capability. The modular BCT does not have the capability to contract projects, or civil engineers with experience in civil infrastructure development. As a result, the Afghan minister of public works depends on the PRT engineers for all provincial construction. There is no sense of the real ownership and capacity when the minister of public works depends on PRT engineers for actual contracting, construction design, and project management.

Many engineering projects have an immediate impact, and some projects such as the construction of roads affect every member of a village. However, other projects lack an ability to be self-sustaining, such as schools and clinics. Such projects require trained teachers and supplies as well as periodic maintenance. When there is no involvement by the local population in the nomination and quality assurance process, the sustainability of a project will not last beyond a new building. Thus, PRT’s have built infrastructure that cannot be maintained without their support. This creates dependency; the need to keep the PRT, or another group willing and able to provide the needed support, rather than assisting the local community to build and maintain the infrastructure themselves.

Examples of two such PRT projects in Khost Province were the Khost Provincial Hospital and the Khost Government Complex.³⁹ The Khost Provincial Hospital was part of the 2007 Khost PDP, and thus approved by GIRoA at all levels for implementation. Upon completion, the problems that arose were the transfer, maintenance responsibilities, and the distance of the hospital from the city center. The Khost Hospital was transferred to the provincial government in 2012, with still no plan from GIRoA for the source of Afghan medical personal, medical supplies, or the electricity to maintain the building either. The Khost government complex, completed in 2010, continues to sit vacant. The complex was nominated, as part of a PDP, in 2007, but similar sustainment problems ensued upon its completion. Like the hospital, the location of the complex was away from the city center making it too distant from the local populace.

Many of the challenges of the PRT arise from conflicts of interest between the BCT and what they see as the best utilization of the PRT in stability operations, and USAID and implementing NGO partners, which focus on long term viability within Khost and Paktia. A significant question for many is: Why were such projects nominated in the first place, with the understanding that GIRoA could not maintain them? There are three reasons. The first reason is that when developing the PDP, the Khost provincial line ministers did not include a plan for sustaining the infrastructure, nor did they understand what was required. The second reason was the limitations for CERP projects. CERP projects, by regulation, did not include maintenance funds, nor did they include funds to train government officials or doctors to occupy the buildings once they were completed.

³⁹Source is from author and interviews with USAID and Civil Affairs personnel deployed to the region between 2009 and 2011.

The third reason is best described by former US Ambassador and military commander in Afghanistan, Karl Eikenberry “The state that was constructed in 2002 wasn’t in accord with realities on the ground. The participants settled on a unitary national government, even though Afghanistan has never had a strong unitary state. That was an error of the international community and an error of the Afghans.”⁴⁰ Standards for construction and capacity building programs are based on US government models and funding restrictions within also follow American guidelines.⁴¹ So the standard to build a school in Afghanistan is the same standard used to construct a US military facility. The reasons will be examined further in chapter 4 upon completion of the examination of the Khost and Paktia PDPs and the analysis of CERP projects.

Commander’s Emergency Response Fund

The Commander’s Emergency Response Fund (CERP) is the primary source for PRTs to fund their development projects in Afghanistan. The purpose of CERP is to serve as the commander’s civil military tool to influence the local populace with what the Money as a Weapon’s System (MAAWS) guidelines provided by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, specifically state that the “projects and services must immediately assist the indigenous population and that government can sustain.”⁴² Small scale projects

⁴⁰Joel Brinkly, “The Money Pit: The Monstrous Failure of US Aid to Afghanistan,” February 2013, <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/money-pit-monstrous-failure-us-aid-afghanistan> (accessed April 15, 2013).

⁴¹US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned, Handbook no 09-27, *Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Combined Arms Center, April 2009), Chapter 4.

⁴²Ibid.

means projects under \$500,000 USD, and must follow strict guidelines for quality assurance checks, contracting, and technical support that varies based on the complexities of the project. Very few CERP projects provide capacity building, as is indicated in the CERP project trends between 2009 and 2010 in Khost and Paktia provinces. CERP also does not include training or personnel to sustain infrastructure when it is completed. Between 2007 and 2010, coalition forces in Khost province expended 3.8 million⁴³ USD in CERP projects, while Paktia spent between 4.1 million USD.⁴⁴ Of that statistic, PRTs in both provinces spent on average \$60,000 USD per project and about \$3.5 million USD per year between 2007 and 2011, based on reporting from ISAF.⁴⁵ The significance of PRT CERP funding and its relevance to COIN strategy will be further discussed in chapter 2, in the article “More Bang and Less Buck: COIN and CERP.”

⁴³CERP cost data extracted from CIDNE. 2007-2010. Combined Data Information Network Exchange (CIDNE) reports from Regional Command East as of 2010, March 2013, <https://ronna-afghan.harmonieweb.org/Lists/Submitted%20Content/DispForm.aspx?ID=1296> (accessed March 15, 2013).

⁴⁴Gregory Johnson, Vijaya Ramachandran, and Julie Walz, “CERP in Afghanistan: Refining Military Activities in Development Activities,” *PRISM* 3, no. 2 (2010), <http://www.ndu.edu/press/cerp-in-afghanistan.html> (accessed March 15, 2013).

⁴⁵*Ibid.*

Figure 4. CERP Disbursements by Sector in Afghanistan, 2004–2009




Figure 2. ISAF 2010 CERP projects spending by province

Source: Gregory Johnson, Vijaya Ramachandran, and Julie Walz, “CERP in Afghanistan: Refining Military Activities in Development Activities,” *PRISM* 3, no. 2 (2010), <http://www.ndu.edu/press/cerp-in-afghanistan.html> (accessed April 15, 2013).

Dependency Theory

Dependency theory is the center of the problem statement and must be defined in the broad context for those who are not familiar with the term and how it may be applied to Afghanistan. The term “dependency” as used in dependency theory can trace its roots to Marxist theories on Imperialism, but to support the thesis of this paper, the liberal

reform theory of dependency is best applicable for analysis. As it pertains to international development, it was first discussed by Raul Prebisch, Director of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America.⁴⁶ Prebisch evaluated the impacts of economic development programs of developing countries in the 1950s and why they did not lead to economic growth and development at the same rate as those of the Western countries.⁴⁷ Prebisch found that developing countries were mainly primary producers, whereas developed countries were industrial producers. Primary producers can do nothing to add value to the corn, potatoes, copper, lumber etc. that they produce, whereas industrial countries can add value (and increase the price) of cars, planes, machines, engines, etc. So industrial countries grow faster than primary producers, and in essence, exploit them. Investment in developing countries does not equal host nation ownership and ability to maintain any momentum in economic development.

Dependency theory can best be described in the following quote by Theotonio dos Santos:

A historical condition which shapes a certain structure of the world economy such that it favors some countries to the detriment of others and limits the development possibilities of the subordinate economies...a situation in which the economy of a certain group of countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy, to which their own is subjected.⁴⁸

⁴⁶Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, eds., *Commanding Heights*, 2002, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/miniextlo/ess_dependencia.html (accessed November 1, 2012), 232-244.

⁴⁷Raul Prebisch, "The Latin American Keynes," *The Economist*, March 5, 2009, <http://www.economist.com/node/13226316> (accessed October 15, 2012).

⁴⁸Theotonio Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," in *Readings in US Imperialism*, eds., K. T. Fann and Donald C. Hodges (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1971), 226.

A more recent argument in support of dependency theory was conducted by Damisa Moyo, in her book *Dead Aid*.⁴⁹ Moyo discusses dependency theory within the context of failed aid programs in Africa, specifically critiquing foreign government aid to Africa. Moyo's critiques focus on the effects of dependency, which contributes to corruption, local market distortion, increased poverty and a persistent cycle of dependence on foreign aid as opposed to government accountability and fiscal responsibility.⁵⁰

Why is the theory of dependency important to the success of transition in Afghanistan? Afghanistan for decades was one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world, further degraded by invasion, destruction of infrastructure, and internal tribal conflict. The United States involvement in Afghanistan originated out of National Security interest and not economic or humanitarian concerns, as these are explicitly defined in pure Dependency Theory. In the eyes of many Afghans, the main impediment to granting the GIROA legitimacy was the lack of road networks, education, and medical infrastructure to improve the quality of life. In accordance to the FM 3-07, stability operations are those operations that support post-conflict development operations.⁵¹ The non-military term for stability operations is nation building.

Therefore, according to dependency theory, the consequence of nation building is the requirement for the supporting nation (United States) to help the affected nation,

⁴⁹Dambisa Moyo, *Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009).

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008).

Afghanistan, assume self-governing responsibilities, which includes that of economic viability. Dependency theory is important in regards to transition in Afghanistan because prior to the arrival of US forces, Afghanistan was dependent on outside aid organizations for all development activities. The Taliban and Mujahedeen did not possess development expertise. Any professionals in the previous government were imprisoned, killed or impelled to seek political asylum. Since 1978, the governance and development vacuum was filled by aid or military organizations. The high level of illiteracy and the lack of education of an entire generation in Afghanistan further exacerbated the challenges in developing competence in governance and development. This cycle continues with every development project completed by any outside organization in Afghanistan. This study will examine if the effects of development projects to improve governance and development are leaning towards fomenting dependency or self-sustainment.

Completed Studies

The following section will discuss relevant studies about the effectiveness of reconstruction aid, capacity building and support to GIRoA through Provincial Reconstruction Teams. The first two studies focus on the successes of utilizing humanitarian aid and development projects as they pertain to counter-insurgency strategy in Khost and Paktia provinces. The third study evaluated the effectiveness of CERP effectiveness in COIN strategy, evaluating Paktia province as part of the study. The fourth study, the Committee on Foreign Relations, *Evaluating US Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan: A Majority Staff Report*, critiques the strategic implications and long-term effects of development aid in Afghanistan in the form of CERP and PRT-implemented

programs. Following the evaluation of congressional study, the Khost and Paktia 2007 PDPs will be analyzed for trends of PRT project support and development.

Military Operational Perspectives

What is most significant about the two reports is the insistence of the Provincial Reconstruction teams to be the primary Civil Military Operation (CMO) element in the area of operations. The first study, *Holding popular support and buying time-Why ISAF must assume the lead from USAID implementing partners and NGOs in major reconstruction in the contested areas of Afghanistan* by COL Christopher Toner, is a critique of the development activity by USAID and non-government implementing partners due to the lack of security.⁵² His argument is that military units must take the lead in reconstruction until the host nation government and security forces can autonomously assume that role. The following article called *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Regional Command-East (Operation Enduring Freedom-VIII)* focuses more on the integration of PRTs in the post-conflict stabilization operations of the BCT as they relate to COIN. The author, Colonel Sean McCaffrey, praises the PRTs, describing them as the commander's tool for civil military and counter-insurgency operations.⁵³ His philosophy was to integrate PRT training into the pre-mission training of the inbound

⁵²Christopher Toner, COL, US Army, "Holding Popular Support and Buying Time-Why ISAF Must Assume the Lead from USAID Implementing Partners and NGOs in Major Reconstruction in the Contested Areas of Afghanistan" (Master's Thesis, Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2008).

⁵³Sean W. McCaffrey, COL US Army, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams In Regional command-East (Operation Enduring Freedom-VIII)" (Strategy Research Project, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2009).

tactical commanders to meet his intent of integrating the lines of effort of COIN with the stability efforts of the PRTs. Both articles view the PRTs as enablers, or units that help the Army commander retain and stabilize the battle space in order to deny insurgents' access to the local population. Short-term stability was generally achieved, and PRT priorities shifted from GIRoA to those of coalition forces.

Counter-Insurgency and the Commander's Emergency Response Program

The third report, *Less Boom for the Buck*,⁵⁴ is much more critical of PRTs and Agricultural Development Teams (ADT), specifically focusing on CERP funding utilized by the organization. Produced by Daniel Weggeland of the ISAF COIN and Advisory Assistance Team (CAAT), the study evaluated the CERP project planning, implementation and quality assurance checks conducted by the PRT, ADT and other coalition forces in Paktia province. Weggeland developed a method of evaluation as to how the projects supported COIN lines of effort, local involvement, and sustainability and desired COIN effects. He describes military funded projects as falling into four categories: Development, Humanitarian, Short-Term security based, and COIN. The most important attributes of COIN that support longer term sustainability is the nomination and buy-in of the project from the local populace. Weggeland describes this effect as functional transparency, or the area in which transparency facilitates project ownership by key stake holders. Functional transparency is a function of stakeholder capacity and

⁵⁴Daniel Weggeland, Counter Insurgency and Advisory Team Report, *Less Boom for the Buck: Projects for COIN Effects and Transition*, April 2011, http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/docs/Projects%20for%20COIN%20Effects_No_Annex.pdf (accessed April 20, 2013).

project complexity (figure 3). Thus, smaller, less complex projects reinforce transparency and legitimacy of the local government to the local populace. More complex projects managed by outside agents, such as PRTs, ADTs, or NGOs further isolate the populace from the government. Such complex projects further marginalize the population, as the level of expertise required to plan, build, and maintain exceeds indigenous capabilities.




Figure 3. Functional Transparency Logarithm

Source: Daniel Weggeland, Counter Insurgency and Advisory Team Report: Less Boom for the Buck: Projects for COIN Effects and Transition. COIN Advisory Team, ISAF, NATO, Kabul, Afghanistan, April 2011, http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/docs/Projects%20for%20COIN%20Effects_No_Annex.pdf (accessed April 20, 2013), 9.

Challenge to the Provincial Reconstruction Team:
Strategic Implications and Plans

Perhaps the most comprehensive evaluation of PRT-funded projects in Afghanistan was *Evaluating US Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan: A Majority Staff Report by the Committee on Foreign Relations*.⁵⁵ Highlights of the report include

⁵⁵Committee on Foreign Relations, *Evaluating US Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan: A Majority Staff Report*, 112th Cong, 1st Sess., June 8, 2011.

accolades for the National Solidarity program, which was managed by Afghanistan's Ministry of Rural and Rehabilitation Development. The other highlight includes harsh criticism towards the lack of monitoring and evaluation of the Provincial Governor's fund, "Development experts criticized the design of the program because it had no impact on the governor's actual performance. Every governor, even those known to be corrupt, received the funds"--Comments provided to the Congressional report on US Foreign aid to Afghanistan, 2012.

The concluding assessment of the report was that there was a lack of integration and oversight between civilian and military development aid efforts. The committee made two recommendations in response to the shortfalls in accountability. The first was a recommendation for the development of a multi-year civilian assistance strategy for Afghanistan. This civilian assistance strategy would include clearly defined US goals and consider the activity and contributions of the other global partners to de-conflict development aid activity in the region. Secondly, the report recommended that there be a reevaluation of the performance and stabilization standards of development projects in conflict zones. The last point calls for all parties involved to focus on sustainability; and, if the Afghans cannot maintain or sustain the project, then it should not be initiated.

Performance Based Governor's Fund

The Performance Based Governor's Fund (PBGF) is perhaps the most controversial of the humanitarian assistance projects for capacity building is that of PBGF. The purpose of PBGF was to provide immediate funds to provincial governors in order to provide starting salaries and project funds specifically attributed to connecting the provincial governor demonstrating an extension of his influence to the local

populace.⁵⁶ The critique of PBGF was the lack of oversight of the budget allocated to the provincial governors and the wide latitude given to provincial governors to use the money, ranging from their salaries, to new furniture and hiring of personnel. According to USAID, the PBGF “empowers provincial governors by providing them with operational budgets to enhance their relationships with citizens and improve their overall management capacity.”⁵⁷ The challenge with the sustainability of this program is when the PRT no longer operates in those areas the PBGF will cease to exist. As mentioned in the previous section, the PBGF was the development assistance program most scrutinized in the 2011 Congressional Report.⁵⁸ The consensus of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was that PBGF permitted GIRoA to continue to not address fiscal budgeting, since the provincial governors would use PBGF dollars instead of requesting funds.

Local Governance and Community Development

Initially begun in 2006, the Local Governance and Community Development (LGCD) program is managed to assist GIRoA extend its reach to unstable and insecure areas.⁵⁹ This program was developed with the District Stability Framework mode in mind

⁵⁶United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Performance Based Governor’s Fund (PBGF), Facts for 2010-2011, <http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID> (accessed November 10, 2012).

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Committee on Foreign Relations, *Evaluating US Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan: A Majority Staff Report*, 112th Cong., 1st Sess., June 8, 2011.

⁵⁹United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Local Governance and Community Development (LGCD), Facts for 2010-2011, <http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID> (accessed November 10, 2012).

as the method to evaluate its success. An example of the types of projects associated with this program was the construction of radio towers and infrastructure, allowing government officials the capability to communicate with rural members of the populace. The justification of this project had to do with a majority of the local populace being that 77 percent of the rural population relied on long-wave radio for external communications.⁶⁰

Although LGCD provided funding for the content of pro-governance programs, it did not provide the entire physical infrastructure required for district level leaders to maintain. Only about 42 percent of Afghans had access to electricity,⁶¹ and therefore hand-cranked radios were required and thus developed for distribution to rural areas. The radios, known as Radio in a Box (RIAB), were district level radio stations funded and constructed by the US military.⁶² Because local military commanders maintained and managed the RIABs, with varying guidance to the programming, governance programming was not always reach to the local population of interest.⁶³

⁶⁰Eran Fraenkel, *Afghanistan Media Assessment: Opportunities and Challenges for Peace Building Afghanistan Media and Information Survey* (presentation to Commander of International Security Assistance Force, Kabul, Afghanistan, August 2008), http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PW68_Afghanistan_Media_Assessment1.pdf (accessed April 4, 2013).

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Monroe Price, "Radio in a Box: Psyops, Afghanistan and the Aesthetics of the Low-Tech," June 23, 2011, http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/newswire/cpdblog_detail/radio_in_a_box_psyops_afghanistan_and_the_aesthetics_of_the_low-tech/ (accessed April 12, 2013).

Despite the challenges involved with resourcing and maintenance, LGCD projects vary based on the capabilities of the implementing partner and the Afghans benefiting from the project. The emphasis of this program is capacity building utilizing existing community participation to improve the transparency in project management and development at the village level. NGO implementing partners work with the local villagers to develop a project nomination. Once the project is approved by GIRoA and funded, then the NGO and villagers manage the project until the total transfer of authority occurs upon its completion. The facilitation of ownership, acceptance and sustainability are the development attributes that led to the most success in the LGCD program.

Community Development Program

The CDP promotes stability and supports the GIRoA through temporary employment and income generation in twenty-nine provinces to reduce the likelihood that food-insecure and unemployed Afghans will join the insurgency.⁶⁴ The CDP includes cash-for-work type programs that promote stability and reconstruction following military combat operations. The CDP program is usually small in scale, servicing a village of a few hundred people or more, and aims to reduce the gap between the serviced population and the district government. Often, USAID District Support Teams, which were the PRT representatives at the district levels, were the members who would provide oversight of CDP projects.

⁶⁴United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Community Development Program (CDP) Facts for 2010-2011, <http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID> (accessed November 10, 2012).

Rural Afghan Municipalities Program for Urban Populations

The Rural Afghan Municipalities Program for Urban Populations or RAMP-UP is a mentorship program designed to develop governance capacity of local municipal leaders. RAMP-UP targets municipalities of interest in Afghanistan as determined by GIRoA working in conjunction with the PRTs and USAID. The intent of the RAMP UP program is to increase the capacity of GIRoA officials.⁶⁵ In Khost province, the municipality initiated a business registration project and collected data for businesses and properties. The goal of this specific program is an estimated 13,000 businesses will be registered and categorized by the municipality.⁶⁶ An analysis will be undertaken later on to draw up plans for potential new revenue generation opportunities.

Community Based Stabilization Grants

The Community Based Stabilization Grants (CBSG)⁶⁷ was developed specifically to allow women's civil societies at the provincial or district level access to funds 10,000 USD or less to improve gender equality in the form of *shuras* or training programs that enhance knowledge of social justice, legal rights and human rights. Paktia and Khost provinces have had success with the program, with the funds going towards provincial level women's *shuras* with successful participation. The success of the women's *shuras*

⁶⁵United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Rural Afghan Municipalities Program for Urban Populations (RAMP-UP), Facts for 2010-2011 report, <http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID> (accessed November 10, 2012).

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷United states Agency for International Development (USAID), Community Based Stabilization Grants (CBSG) Impact on Women and Girls Final Report, September 2011, <http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID> (accessed November 10, 2012).

depended on four factors, in the following order: the organization making the proposal, government acceptance, tribal leader acceptance, and the local security situation.⁶⁸ First, if the proposal originated with the Director of Women's affairs or an Afghan women's civil society organization, then there were indicators of ownership and responsibility of the *shura* as opposed to the *shura* being proposed by the PRT. Second, if provincial and district governments accept the *shura*, then GIRoA resources such as security, logistics and provincial line director support by ANDS sector can participate to gain the maximum benefit of the *shura* to improve perceptions of the local populace. Third, the *shura* must be accepted by the village elders, who may have to have a *shura* to decide if a women's *shura* will be permitted, discuss associated risks of the *shura* and benefits to their local women. Fourth, the security situation dictated all of these factors, most often the level of risk that male government officials and village elders would be willing to accept by having a women's *shura*.

Criteria

The criteria used to determine the best source documents to evaluate dependency versus capacity were the primary sources of programs that first provided the base line of information to begin the analysis. The National Solidarity Program along with the Provincial Development plans established the baselines, priorities and development principles of GIRoA, with the most recent versions presented in this study dating from

⁶⁸Tobey White, Specialist, US Army Public Affairs, "Afghan Women celebrate women's rights in Khost Province," March 9, 2011, <http://www.dvidshub.net/news/66739/afghan-women-celebrate-womens-rights#.UX2E8u3D-3o> (accessed August 15, 2012).

2008 to 2012. The provincial development plans included a record of PRT member attendance, Afghan and non-government projects occurring in the province by development sector and funding source. The criteria for selecting the two studies on PRTs from the perspective of the Brigade Combat Team was based on the evaluation how the PRTs were utilized to conduct civil military operations during the “build” phase of counter-insurgency. The focus of PRT construction was the improvement of damaged infrastructure upon the completion of combat operations.

The first criterion to be utilized for analysis will be PDP participation and adherence to the PDP priorities of the province. The primary source for the baseline data will be the Khost and Paktia PDPs, and the variable data deriving from the ISAF Combined Data Information Network Exchange (CIDNE).⁶⁹ CIDNE is the central civil military database for all Afghanistan civil military activity. PRTs are required to enter all CERP-funded projects into CIDNE, which increases the quantitative validity of the data. The justification for selecting CIDNE CERP database is to evaluate trends in the types of PRT projects by CERP development category and compare them to adherence to the Khost and Paktia PDP guidelines, using a percentage comparison. A higher percentage of adherences to ANDS development sector priorities indicate increased compliance with the PDP, where as a lower percentage indicates a deviation from the PDP.

Following this assessment of PDP adherence evaluation, the functional transparency of the project management process will be evaluated utilizing trends

⁶⁹Intelligent Software Solutions, Inc., Summary of the Combined Information Database Network Exchange. It is the US Central Command (CENTCOM) directed reporting tool for the majority of operational reporting within Afghanistan and Iraq, <http://www.issinc.com/programs/cidne.html> (accessed April 1, 2013).

extracted from CIDNE CERP project data. The evaluation criteria to assess trends will be the level of GIRoA involvement, village involvement, and project complexity. An increase in GIRoA and village involvement and a decrease in project complexity will indicate a higher level of functional transparency. Functional transparency analysis may determine trends in dependency if it is found that a higher percentage of projects are either more complex in cost and characteristics or have low GIRoA and local involvement.

The justification for selecting the USAID PRT-implemented programs for analysis was due to the focus of capacity building of governance as the long-term goal for transition of responsibilities as the surge in troops would end in 2011. The programs will be evaluated using the District Stability Framework (DSF) project design criteria. The evaluation of dependency will be based on the level of GIRoA, local and NGO involvement.

Literature Shortfalls

Literature shortfalls included a lack of sufficient data from USAID describing effects from a statistical standpoint, and the military CERP data lacking effects based reporting, as indicated in the CAAT COIN and CERP project analysis. The USAID program results summaries present two concerns for the reader: the generalities of the data using limited examples of success and challenges for USAID personnel to conduct appropriate quantitative evaluation due to security concerns between 2008 and 2011. The first concern of evaluating USAID program success is there was no data available from websites or published studies specifically to Khost and Paktia. However, the programs were implemented in those provinces because it is mentioned in the country profile on the

USAID webpage. Therefore, assessment of the programs is based on the evaluation of the program attributes using PRT and NGO implementing partners as opposed to effects based.

The second concern with USAID program data would be that because there is a lack of quantitative data, that there is not a means to evaluate the success or failures of these programs beyond generalities of an increase or decrease in persons trained in a particular activity or participants in *shuras*. Because USAID utilizes the District Stability Framework project design principles for developing their programs, this method was selected to evaluate them from a dependency perspective based on the extent that it fosters Afghan involvement, NGO partnership, or PRT technical assistance.

The challenge of evaluating the effects of CERP projects is that it is not a requirement to report the data in CIDNE. Demographic data presented by CMIC web does not correlate with PRT CERP project reporting because it does not take into account the activities of external organizations, such as NGOs and other military forces operating in the area.⁷⁰ The data extracted from CIDNE reports lacks consistent data entry in the system. CERP data information requirements were limited to those requirements for project nominations. Village data is only entered if it is known. In Paktia, all village data was entered under the village category, whereas in Khost province, the village data was mentioned in the project description. Another data inconsistency was the final funds disbursed to evaluate the complexity and scale of the projects. For this study, the

⁷⁰CMIC web provided demographic data for the periods from 2002 to 2012, consisting of multiple sources that varied from coalition force reports, US Government, to NGOs.

estimated project costs were complete, and were used to fairly evaluate trends of cancelled projects versus completed projects, by development sector and level of village involvement.

Summary

The reports demonstrate that even though the decisions about development projects, in this case those in Khost and Paktia, are made at the tactical and operational levels, the strategic impacts on policy are significant.⁷¹ The evaluation of the PBGF is an example of the extent of dependence of which the Afghan government has on US development funds, and the lack of development that resulted in the fiscal management and distribution cycles managed at the central government in Kabul.

Shortfalls in fiscal commitment were consistently a challenge during the author's tour in Khost province from 2010 to 2011. In 2010, the Khost government returned USD 3 million in funds which were not disbursed because they had received them so late,⁷² with no information as to how much they would receive, and no guidance for prioritization as to what they should submit to the GIRoA (that is, at the Minister of Economy level) in order to receive their funds in an efficient manner. Hence, the dependency on the PRT was created, as there never was a requirement for the PRT to review any project requests or funds through GIRoA. The undermining of the Provincial

⁷¹Charles Krulak, GEN, USMC, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," *Marines Magazine* (January 1999), http://www.au.af.mil/AU/AWC/AWCGATE/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm (accessed February 15, 2013).

⁷²Comment provided from interview from USAID representative and confirmed by Civil Affairs officer with experience in Khost Province. Interview conducted in January 2013.

Development Council process, the lack of budgetary capacity of the PDC, and the PRT presence at every PDC meeting reinforced dependency on the PRT for project nominations and funding.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Research Design

This study evaluated previous studies and statistics provided by ISAF extracted from CIDNE and the Civil Military Information Center (CMIC) for Afghanistan, as well as those statistics provided by USAID and implementing partners. The second part of the research design consisted of interviews conducted in order to examine past experiences and knowledge of personnel with experience in the Khost and Paktia region. The purpose of the interviews was to assess their experiences with PRT projects, methodologies and evaluation of Afghan provincial or local leader involvement in the processes. The evaluation of their responses should support either tendency for there to be more capacity building and reinforcement of Afghan dependence on the PRT. The candidates for the interviews were members of USAID, Civil Affairs Teams, Brigade, Battalion and Company level tactical leaders with previous operational experience in Khost and Paktia provinces. The interviews focused on historical tendencies and findings to reinforce the statistical analysis of the PDPs and program analysis of the PRT USAID implemented programs. Interviews were administered to both military and US Government civilian participants from December 2012 to March 2013 in order to evaluate any trends in responses that are in line with either building capacity for transition or continued dependency on ISAF and implementing partners for support in basic services.

Study Population

The study population for military consisted of senior captains or field grade officers and senior non-commissioned officers with previous deployment experience in Khost or Paktia. The study population representing the other US Government agencies consisted of operators with previous experience working with the military on PRTs or Brigade Combat Teams. The intent was to interview and capture data from a wide variety of organizations, with an emphasis on a response from the Afghan partners themselves, if available. This proved to be challenging, as the only source for such information was psychological operations target audience analysis surveys and surveys conducted by NGOs. No NGOs currently working in Khost and Paktia accepted solicitations for interviews. This limited the external perspective and increased the subjectivity of the interview analysis. The focus of these interviews was on the problem statement as seen by participants, level of engagement of the local populace or government with project development, and trends in PRT operations that demonstrate more capacity building or more dependency-based relationships.

Data Collection

Three methods for data collection were used to analyze dependency trends: (1) analyzing the PDPs to assess trends of dependency in participation and project implementation; (2) analyzing CERP project data from 2008-2010 using the functional transparency assessment methods; (3) and analyzing USAID PRT implemented programs using the DSF project development principles and evaluating dependency tendencies using those principles.

The first method of data collection was the analysis of Khost and Paktia PDPs, initiated in 2007. The PDPs contain the project development plans for each ANDS sector in the form of project nominations. Data collection from the PDPs serves to develop the baseline of analysis of dependency trends. PRT project trends by ANDS sector and cost will be extracted, along with the integration of the PRTs into the ANDS sector development workshops. CIDNE data of PRT projects will be analyzed to compare trends in connection to the PDP, and if the involvement in the sectors indicate a dependency trend.

The second method of data collection was the analysis of PRT CERP project statistical data extracted from the Combined Network Information Data Exchange (CIDNE) databases from 2008 to 2010 published by ISAF, demographic data supporting development trends in Khost and Paktia with in the same time frame. From the PDP data analysis and PRT CERP project analysis, the relationships between the plan, project execution, and impacts on result indicators indicate if there is a correlation with the types and scopes of projects associated with PRTs, versus those provided by outside organizations as represented in the PDPs.

The third method of data collection was conducted by evaluating USAID implemented PRT governance capacity building programs conducted in Khost and Paktia provinces. The fourth method of data collection was the conduct of interviews of personnel from the interagency and US Military based on previous experience in the region from 2008 to 2012. All personnel remained anonymous unless they desired to be known by name in the interview. The topics and questions focused on reconstruction and stabilization projects and activities, with an emphasis on how they lead to capacity or

dependency. There was no personal information collected during the data collection, as demographic data are not being evaluated in this study. Letters of consent and Privacy Act Agreements for interviews were provided prior to any commitment to conduct an interview.

Screening Criteria

There are two screening criteria methods for the research of this paper, as the differences in the availability of data and evaluation methods require distinct screening criteria. The PDP and CERP project analysis will use screening criteria to conduct quantitative analysis of information to assess functional transparency. USAID PRT program evaluation used general screening criteria using the District Stability Framework (DSF) tool.

The screening criteria to evaluate the CIDNE PRT CERP project data⁷³ were to first evaluate only PRT projects of the provinces being assessed. The CIDNE database includes all CERP projects, and the purpose of this study is to evaluate dependency utilizing PRT CERP data, and not that of other coalition forces. Second, only PRT completed or cancelled projects were considered for evaluation. Those projects in the database that do not meet the two criteria were not evaluated. The reports extracted from completed and cancelled projects also provided a quantity of information required to conduct the functional transparency analysis.

⁷³International Security Assistance Force, “Afghanistan, RC East CERP and Reconstruction and Development projects reported in CIDNE,” 2013, <https://ronna.afghan.harmonieweb.org/Lists/Submitted%20Content/DispForm.aspx?ID=1296> (accessed April 1, 2013).

The screening criteria used to evaluate the USAID PRT development programs is the District Stability Framework (DSF) tool is the method of evaluation of the indicators of instability to determine the best development program for the local population. The DSF developed in 2007 as a result of the numerous CERP projects in Afghanistan that were not sustainable or accepted by the local populace. The District Stability Framework tool was developed by USAID in order for military and civilian units conducting stability operations to have a tool to facilitate methods of communication to assess and evaluate the indicators of instability. The sources of instability were derived from the tactical survey questions, which allowed for DSF to be incorporated into COIN doctrine. DSF is driven by analysis of the vulnerabilities of the population, and then determining the best method to resolve the concerns of the local populace. The Tactical Conflict Assessment Planning Framework or TCAF process utilizes the political and military attributes of the local populace in order to understand the operational environment.⁷⁴ The evaluation criteria are: (1) Does the activity support the local government, (2) Does the activity decrease support for anti-government elements, and (3) Does the activity increase institutional and societal capability and capacity? (4) What should be done first to help the village? If any of the programs did not meet these criteria, they were disqualified from the analysis. The USAID programs evaluated for this study were narrowed down to the top five PRT implementing programs that could be fairly evaluated using the DSF project design criteria.

⁷⁴USAID, “The District Stability Framework: Targeting the Causes of Instability at the Local Level,” 2013, <http://www.usaid.gov/work-usaid/partnership-opportunities/us-military/training/district-stability-framework> (accessed March 15, 2013).

Evaluation Criteria

The evaluation criteria for the PDP and CERP project analysis used the functional relationship of transparency comparing the PDP (level of Afghan ownership) and the complexity of the project (a function of the type and dollar amount) to evaluate whether or not there were trends similar to the CAAT COIN effects analysis evaluated in Paktia Province in 2011. The evaluation criteria for the PRT USAID implemented projects consist of seven factors in order for the GIRoA to demonstrate capacity by the execution and retention of the following criteria per the District Stability Framework Tool:⁷⁵ Ensure sustainability by local government institutions, facilitate local ownership, consider the trade-offs between short-term vs. long-term impacts, fit the local and cultural contexts, increase government accountability, leverage/support Other Government Agencies (OGA), Inter-Government Organizations (IGO), NGO, and Host Nation (HN) programs, draw upon readily accessible local resources, and lastly provide flexibility.

The first development principle is to ensure sustainability. Ensuring sustainability means to assess whether or not the project can be and will be maintained by the local populace. This means that the project will endure past the tenure of the program itself, and will continue in an indigenous form for evaluation upon completion. A concern of sustainability described in the CAAT analysis was the level of complexity of CERP funded PRT projects and the impacts they had on the local involvement of key shareholders, or local tribal leaders in Paktia province. What CAAT discovered was there was a trend in the amount of local involvement in the project nomination and

⁷⁵Ibid.

development and the level of complexity of the project being executed. The complexity of a project was based on the ability of the local populace to build and maintain the project with locally available resources and technical capacity. The more external resources and technical training required to build or maintain the project, the higher likelihood that the project was not going to be sustainable and therefore have no lasting effect on the COIN environment.

The second development principle is to facilitate local ownership of the project. This means that the local leaders in the area assume responsibilities for the project from its nomination, execution, and assume a level of responsibility for the success and failure of the project. The GAAT analysis demonstrates that the level of shareholder involvement by key local leaders is directly linked to the success of the project.⁷⁶ If key village leaders are aware and capable of building and maintaining the project with locally acquired materials, then local ownership will increase. The more individuals impacted by the project, such as beneficiaries, individuals involved in the construction and maintenance, the more likely that the project will have a larger base of local ownership and acceptance.⁷⁷

The third criteria for evaluation, consider the trade-offs between short and long term projects is the consideration one takes when developing a project nomination for a large scale project that would only be sustainable for construction over a two year period. The evaluation of the trade-off would be projects developed to establish short-term

⁷⁶Weggeland, 17.

⁷⁷Ibid.

security goals, such as small repair or cash-for-work projects after combat operations. Such projects are meant to provide employment for a brief period of time until a more permanent solution to security infrastructure development was completed. Often this criteria is used to evaluate the difference between stability based programs and long-term development programs. The military tends to execute stability based projects of shorter duration to achieve security gains as part of an effect of a larger military operation.⁷⁸

The fourth criterion evaluates how external organizations are leveraged to support the technical expertise and sustainability of the project. According to the CAAT analysis, the sustainability and transparency of a project decreases when external organizations plan and execute the project.⁷⁹ External organizations exerting Western standards for construction, maintenance and training form the basis of dependency theory. A program will fare better if the external agency is GIRoA as opposed to a NGO or the PRT implementing the project.

The fifth criteria does is fit the local and cultural constructs of the project means the management and development of the project must be respectful and consider cultural implications, such as those projects occurring over Ramadan, or those projects that involve Afghan women. It may seem that a USAID project is inherently respectful to the local culture, especially in Afghanistan. However, often gender or religious based programs have failed and lacked acceptance by the local population, not because it was

⁷⁸Sean W. McCaffrey, COL US Army, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams In Regional command-East (Operation Enduring Freedom-VIII)” (Strategy Research Project, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2009).

⁷⁹Weggeland, 17.

not mutually beneficial but because it was exclusive to a minority group. In *Pashtunwali*,⁸⁰ or the norms of Afghan Pashtun tribes, all decisions involving women's projects must be approved in a *shura* by that village. As mentioned previously in chapter 2, the *shura* is a traditional consensus building mechanism for Afghan local leaders to make decisions that will impact their environment. It is not that Pashtun men in Afghanistan do not want to support women's programs. The *shuras* facilitate the dialogue and discourse to evaluate whether such a program will benefit the population or cause instability,⁸¹ Women's related programs in Pashtun rural areas of Khost and Paktia are difficult to sustain for these reasons.⁸² Therefore, in Pashtun culture, one must evaluate cultural sensitivity of programs from the stand point that they be mutually inclusive of all populations, as opposed to exclusive to minority populations.

⁸⁰Palwasha Kalkar, *The Tribal Law of Pashtunwali and Women's Legislative authority*. The tribal codes of the Pashtun or Afghan tribes, which came together under Ahmed Shah Durrani in 1747 as the confederacy that eventually shaped the modern-day state of Afghanistan. These tribal law codes are called Pashtunwali, and they are widely practiced as a component of customary law, especially in rural Pashtun majority areas. Pashtuns make up the largest ethnic group in Khost and Paktia provinces, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA, 2003, <http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ilsp/research/kakar.pdf> (accessed April 3, 2013).

⁸¹Weggeland, 17. This information is also substantiated by the CAAT study of evaluating the impacts of utilizing implementing partners as a substitute for community involvement in project management. The project used implementing partners, NGOs, to conduct quality assurance checks on a women's project in a rural village in Paktia. The PRT planners did integrate the male populace during the project nomination process. The project was cancelled due to a lack of security of the NGOs implementing the program and no popular support by village elders.

⁸²ISAF Public Affairs, *Women's Shura Convenes for the First Time in Two Years*. Personal operational experience of the author in Khost province and activities with the Director of Women's Affairs. Khost Province, Afghanistan, February 14, 2011, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/women-s-shura-convenes-for-first-time-in-2-years.htm> (accessed August 15, 2012).

The sixth criteria evaluates transparency how the project increases government accountability for the project from its inception to its completion. Government accountability means provincial or district GIRoA leaders are personally involved in the monitoring and evaluation of the project. This also means that GIRoA leaders take responsibility for successes and failures of the project on a consistent basis regardless of the changes in the political or security environment. As indicated in the CAAT COIN analysis, this type of evaluation is difficult when the security situation does not permit GIRoA leaders to become directly involved, or if their safety and security are threatened.⁸³ However, for the purpose of this paper, when provincial, district and local leaders are involved in the project management process, the transparency and accountability will increase. When GIRoA leaders at all levels are not synchronized or involved, the transparency and accountability will decrease. Less transparency means an increased dependency on external organizations for project management support.

The seventh criterion is how the project provides flexibility as conditions and situations change in the village. This is a concern during combat operations, as the security situation can impact construction, quality assurance checks, or the integrity of the project as a whole. Flexibility also supports the CAAT analysis of the level of complexity of a project. Technically more complex projects tend to have less flexibility if a security situation deteriorates in an Afghan village. High complexity projects also

⁸³Weggeland, 17. A grant was awarded to a well-known women's focused Afghan NGO in Paktia; however, problems quickly emerged. ANSF forces were no longer present in the village by the time the project began and USAID implementer staff declared the village a "Taliban town." Independent monitoring became impossible with only the NGO staff able to access the community thanks to an arrangement with a village elder (the father of the local Taliban commander).

require more technical expertise and external assistance. The risk is high for villagers when involving external organizations in a local project, as the association can further deteriorate the security situation. Another point concerning flexibility is the tendency for infrastructure projects by PRTs to be more complex and require external contractor support. If such a project requires a lot of time or is cancelled, it is more difficult for the construction to be converted into an alternative project that is sustainable.⁸⁴

⁸⁴Weggeland, 7. Projects become more difficult to cancel once approved and started. There are often delays between contract award and the identification of problems that creates a sunk costs scenario. Sunk costs become more pronounced especially if funds have been advanced (such as mobilization costs) prior to any observable deficiencies.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Evaluation of Provincial Development Plans

In this section, Khost and Paktia PDPs will be reviewed and compared against CERP project and spending trends and project types to determine if there is a relationship between GIROA project priorities, planning, and execution. Khost and Paktia PDPs developed as a result of the approved ANDS in 2007, the first national level document developed by GIROA that provided specific guidance as to the development priorities for rebuilding Afghanistan.⁸⁵ Prior to the ANDS strategy, development activity in Afghanistan consisted of four types: those activities conducted by NGOs, coalition security forces, PRTs, and foreign government aid organizations. In 2007, both Paktia and Khost conducted a series of planning sessions with their respective PRTs, UNAMA, and local NGOs to develop their initial five year development strategy the years 2008 to 2012.⁸⁶ National level GIROA representatives of each development sector attended the planning sessions, along with each provincial line director, NGOs, UNAMA, and PRT representatives. The PRT members usually included the commander, his senior Civil Affairs officer or CMOC chief, his senior civil engineer, the PRT USAID, USDA, and State Department representative. The involvement of the PRT in the PDP planning demonstrates the baseline for potential dependency. Trends for dependency will be

⁸⁵The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 1387-1391 (2008-2013), http://www.undp.org.af/publications/KeyDocuments/ANDS_Full_Eng.pdf (accessed March 15, 2012).

⁸⁶Ibid.

analyzed based on the various levels of integration by provincial sector, development sector priorities and the evaluation of project proposal trends.

Paktia Provincial Development Plan Analysis

Paktia provincial leaders developed their priorities for development by ANDS sector to be security, governance, agriculture, and education. For each ANDS category, PDP planning group developed the Provincial Development Committees, which consisted of GIROA representation at the national and provincial levels, along with technical expertise from outside organizations, such as the PRT. The trends of participation in the committees are based on capabilities, but are not necessarily developed because of previous development activity in the Paktia province. For example, the Paktia PRT was approved by the Director of Economy to have input in the social safety sector, the agricultural development, infrastructure, and governance sectors. Despite 30 projects related to education, they were not integrated into the education sector development committee. Similarly, no coalition military forces were included in the security sector planning, despite the lack of capacity of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police during this time.⁸⁷

Despite a lack of integration in security and education sector development, GIROA integrated PRT Paktia in half of the PDCs, shown in figure 5. Another planning integration fact extracted from the Paktia PDP was the documented participants by

⁸⁷This information was derived from the provincial development plans, based on the variances of integration of PRTs in security sector mentorship. Until the development of the Security Force Assistance Teams 2006/2007, no such unit existed to mentor ANSF.

external, non-Afghan organizations. PRT Paktia provided four representatives, outnumbering even the ratio of UNAMA representation. Therefore, based on this integration, it can be assumed that PRT Paktia influenced development project planning with provincial line directors from the PDPs initial implementation.

Another planning integration factor was the attempt by GIRoA to consolidate development projects by graphically depicting the project type, location, cost and organization managing the project. In 2007, PRT projects in Paktia province accounted for half of the development activity, with a majority of those projects concentrated on educational development, governance improvement programs, and improvements in infrastructure. A majority of PRT projects are located near the capital city of Gardez and along the Khost-Gardez main highway, whereas NGO and other activities concentrated on the mountainous eastern Paktia and border with Pakistan.⁸⁸ Initially, it appears that minimal duplication of efforts as shown in figure 4, with the comparison of PRT and NGO projects by project type and project costs.⁸⁹

The importance of understanding the differences in development activity by sector, as represented in the PDP, is that it demonstrates the fundamental differences in priorities of PRTs in contrast to NGOs. As part of coalition forces and their mission under ISAF, PRT programs were to enhance the reach and influence of governance.

⁸⁸Islamic Republic Of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy: Paktia Province, 1387-1391 (2008-2013), Map of development projects by ANDS sector, delineating PRT and NGO projects, Kabul, Afghanistan, 2007, <https://ronna-afghan.harmonieweb.org/PDP/.../Paktia%20PDP.pdf> (accessed March 15, 2013).

⁸⁹Ibid., 4.

NGOs, on the other hand, by virtue of their neutrality, conducted no governance improvement programs. Their separation from GIRoA also allowed them to operate in areas otherwise considered hostile to coalition forces. The separation of development sector activities and locations is further reinforced by the project cost difference analysis.

Evaluation of the difference in average cost of projects between PRTs and NGOs further supports the disparities in their locations, technical capabilities, and purposes. The average cost of a PRT project amounts to USD \$60,000 per project compared to the average to USD \$11,000 per project of the same type completed by NGOs. The first assumption would be that NGOs are more efficient than PRTs, and that NGOs conduct more projects for less cost. Varying experience in development may support this assumption, as local economies are known to change upon the deployment of military forces providing development aid.⁹⁰ The second assumption could be that the PRT projects are larger in scale to support the legitimacy and reach of GIRoA. Because of their increased requirement for technical expertise for large projects, the result is higher cost. This can also be an indicator of a lack of functional transparency, assuming that increase project cost is equal to increased project complexity, which is a trend towards increased GIRoA dependency on the PRT.⁹¹

⁹⁰Gregory Johnson, Vijaya Ramachandran, and Julie Walz, “CERP in Afghanistan: Refining Military Activities in Development Activities,” *PRISM* 3, no. 2 (2010), <http://www.ndu.edu/press/cerp-in-afghanistan.html> (accessed April 15, 2013).

⁹¹Weggeland, 9. Transparency often involves making contract or grant details public. Some details, such as gross project costs, are easier for stakeholders to understand while more technically complicated details are difficult to consume. The capacity line is the point at which project complexity prevents a stakeholder from sufficiently contributing, understanding or owning the project.




Figure 4. Paktia PRT and NGO Projects by Sector 2007

Source: Paktia PDP, Afghanistan National Development Strategy: Paktia Province, 1387-1391 (2008-2012) Provincial Development Plan, Kabul, Afghanistan (2007), <https://ronna-afghan.harmonieweb.org/PDP/.../Paktia%20PDP.pdf> (accessed March 15, 2013). Charts created by author.

Provincial Development Committee Formation Approved by the Ministry of Economics (PAKTIA PROVINCE)




Figure 5. Provincial Development Committee Formation, Paktia

Source: Paktia PDP, Afghanistan National Development Strategy: Paktia Province, 1387-1391 (2008-2012) Provincial Development Plan, Kabul, Afghanistan (2007), <https://ronna-afghan.harmonieweb.org/PDP/.../Paktia%20PDP.pdf> (accessed March 15, 2013).

Khost Provincial Development Plan Analysis

Khost provincial leaders developed their priorities for development by ANDS sector were security, governance, road infrastructure, energy sector development followed by agriculture. For the Khost PDC, the Minister of Economy approved the PRT for PDC integration in the social safety sector, the agricultural development, infrastructure, and governance and security sectors. PRT Khost was excluded from the education and public health sectors, despite managing projects in both sectors. PRT Khost was included in the security development sector, in contrast to Paktia.

GIRoA integrated PRT Khost in more than half of the provincial development committees, shown in figure 7.⁹² Based on this integration, it can be assumed that PRT Khost influenced development project planning with respective provincial line directors from the PDPs during its initial implementation. In the PDP participation notes, there was no NGO representation present at the PDP workshops.⁹³ There were only two outside organizations at the PDP planning development, with the PRT providing five representatives and UNAMA providing five persons respectively.⁹⁴ With a lack of additional outside organizations the PRT's strong infrastructure capability could wield more influence to the development planning activities in Khost province. Using technical capacity and increased influence on a PDC planning committee can be assumed to be an indicator of dependency. Despite the lack of participation, NGO activity continued in Khost province and similar to Paktia, provincial leaders attempted to consolidate development projects in accordance to ANDS sector guidance. In 2007, PRT projects in Khost province accounted for about a third of the development activity, with a majority of those projects concentrated on infrastructure development, good governance programs, and social development and agriculture related programs. A majority of PRT projects are located near the provincial capital of Khost City and along the Khost-Gardez main

⁹²Islamic Republic Of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy: Khost Province, 1387-1391 (2008-2013), Chart depicting PDP integration by ANDS sector and provincial line director, Kabul, Afghanistan (2007), <https://ronna-afghan.harmonieweb.org/PDP/.../Khost%20PDP.pdf> (accessed March 15, 2013).

⁹³Ibid., 4.

⁹⁴Ibid., 10.

highway.⁹⁵ In contrast, NGO projects focus on the mountainous areas of north eastern Khost province in the districts of Sabari and Bak and in the western districts of Nadar-Shir-Khot and Spera. Analysis of the average cost of a PRT projects in Khost amounted to USD \$107,730 per project compared to the average to USD \$9,965 per project of the same type completed by NGOs.⁹⁶ This is a significant disparity between NGO project costs and the PRT, however, this can be attributed to the scope and size of the PRT project, as well as the increased cost due to contracting and technical requirements. It is for this reason that by evaluating the disparities in project cost, the requirement for PRT participation to technical expertise, no presence of NGOs at the PDC, and majority of projects being in Khost city, that it can be assumed that there are increased indicators of dependency.

⁹⁵Ibid., 15.

⁹⁶Ibid., 20.




Figure 6. Khost PRT and NGO Project by Sector 2007

Source: Khost PDP, Khost Province, 1387-1391 (2008-2013), The source document for provincial development plans as determined by GIROA and approved by the Afghan parliament. Kabul, Afghanistan (2007), <https://ronna-afghan.harmonieweb.org/PDP/.../Khost%20PDP.pdf> (accessed March 15, 2013).

Provincial Development Committee Formation Approved by the Ministry of Economics (Khost PROVINCE)





Figure 7. Provincial Development Committee development sector areas

Source: Khost PDP, ISAF, RONNA web Afghanistan National Development Strategy: Khost Province, 1387-1391 (2008-2013) Provincial Development Plan, Kabul, Afghanistan (2007), <https://ronna-afghan.harmonieweb.org/PDP/./Khost%20PDP.pdf> (accessed March 15, 2013).

Provincial Development Plans and Project Analysis Trends


The purpose for the analysis of the completed CERP projects is to evaluate the fidelity of the PDP and PRT implementation of the plan. The method of analysis will be the extent that each PRT executes their projects in accordance to the provincial priorities listed by ANDS sector. If the PRT adhered to the PDP, then the tendency will be towards dependency, since it was concluded that both Khost and Paktia PRTs influenced project development from the early planning stages. Between the two, PRT Paktia demonstrates the most fidelity and adherence to the PDP, as indicated in figure 9. The majority of PRT Paktia projects reflect GIRoA priorities of governance, agriculture, and education. PRT

Khost, in contrast, did not adhere to the PDP processes, with a majority of projects deviating from the ANDS priorities. PRT Khost majority projects were in governance, education, and cultural and civic repair.



Paktia PDP ANDS Sector priorities:

1. Security
2. Governance
3. Agriculture
4. Education



Khost PDP ANDS Sector priorities:

1. Security
2. Governance
3. Road Infrastructure
4. Energy Sector Development
5. Agriculture

Figure 8. Comparison of PRT Khost and PRT Paktia completed projects 2008 to 2011

Source: Combined Data Information Network Exchange (CIDNE) reports from Regional Command East as of 2010, Kabul, Afghanistan, March 2013, <https://ronna-afghan.harmonieweb.org/Lists/Submitted%20Content/DispForm.aspx?ID=1296> (accessed March 15, 2013), chart created by author.

Summary of Provincial Development Plan Analysis

Analysis of the both Khost and Paktia PDPs demonstrate the indicators of dependency as a result of the influence in the planning processes, the technical expertise the PRTs provide, and the increased funds the PRTs provide in contrast to competing organizations. The PDPs were the first attempt and assessment for provincial leaders in Khost and Paktia provinces to account for development activity for the first time. The initial PDPs were designed to consolidate and synchronize all development projects by having all stake holders, including PRTs, at the planning sessions to provide input and expertise to the process. Both Khost and Paktia PRTs were influential, as what is demonstrated by the initial project map, the integration into the planning process by sector committee participation as well as the level of representation at the planning conference. CERP project analysis slightly supported PRT Paktia demonstrating dependency tendencies. However, it seems that the failure was in the feedback from the external organization attendees, or GIRoA for not discussing the sustainability and viability of such projects. The top three dependency indicators were direct integration into the PDC planning workshops, the technical expertise allowing them to execute larger projects for GIRoA, and project complexity based the high costs of projects relative to NGOs working in the same development sector.

Project Functional Transparency Analysis

PRT CERP projects for both Khost and Paktia were evaluated based on the CAAT functional transparency indicators: level of community involvement, project technical difficulty attributes, and dollars spent on completed projects. Cancelled and completed projects were evaluated to develop a baseline of trends in types of projects and

attributes of projects to determine if there was a pattern of the types of projects cancelled. Because CERP data is extracted from CIDNE reports and categorized based on project type, funding, justification and project location, data was extracted to conduct a limited evaluation of functional transparency utilizing only raw data from CIDNE.

The first functional transparency indicator evaluated was the level of community involvement. Community involvement is evaluated by the ratio of GIRoA, District, and village involvement. If all three organizations were involved in the project, then the tendency was towards building capacity. If a majority of projects were centrally managed by GIRoA with little community involvement, then the tendency was an indicator of dependency. The comparison charts of Khost and Paktia shown in figure 10. The results of the analysis determined there is a relationship between the level of community involvement and project success.




Figure 9. PRT Completed Project Levels of Community Involvement

Source: Combined Data Information Network Exchange (CIDNE) reports from Regional Command East as of 2010, Kabul, Afghanistan, March 2013, <https://ronna-afghan.harmonieweb.org/Lists/Submitted%20Content/DispForm.aspx?ID=1296> (accessed March 15, 2013), chart created by author.

The second functional transparency indicator evaluated was project complexity by technical attributes. Technical attributes were evaluated based on the three distinct scopes of work extracted from the CIDNE database. The three technical attributes used to evaluate the data were scopes of work requiring heavy construction of infrastructure, training and capacity building, or small repairs. If the attribute is a majority of construction of new infrastructure or infrastructure repairs and requires the help of the civil engineering expertise of the PRT, then the tendency will be towards dependency.

According to functional transparency theory, more technically complex project requires external organization support.⁹⁷ If the dominant attribute is capacity building and training, then the tendency for dependency is lower. Based on the analysis of the charts in figure 11, Khost province demonstrated an increased tendency for dependency on the PRT for minor repairs to local infrastructure at the village level and a majority infrastructure technical attributes as the provincial average. Paktia province demonstrated an increased tendency for infrastructure dependency, followed by capacity training at the village level. As in Khost, Paktia province heavily depended on the PRT for the technical expertise and complexities of construction projects, followed by capacity building training minor repairs. Both project attribute indicators indicate a dependency relationship between the percentages of completed projects falling into the infrastructure category.

⁹⁷Weggeland.




Figure 10. Comparison of PRT Khost and Paktia Project Attributes

Source: Combined Data Information Network Exchange (CIDNE) reports from Regional Command East as of 2010, Kabul, Afghanistan, March 2013, <https://ronna-afghan.harmonieweb.org/Lists/Submitted%20Content/DispForm.aspx?ID=1296> (accessed March 15, 2013), chart created by author.

The third functional transparency indicator evaluated was project costs. Project costs and averages were assessed to determine if there was a relationship between project costs and project complexity, as more complex projects requiring materials, specialized labor, equipment and expertise have increased costs. The more technically complex a project is, the more that the stakeholder will depend on external help to sustain the project. To better understand this relationship, project costs and the level of community involvement were collated and evaluated to determine if there are indicators of dependency. Theoretically, projects with more community involvement at the provincial,

district and village levels will have the tendency to be less complex, and therefore require fewer funds to maintain. Projects with less community involvement will require external support and not be sustainable. Projects that fall into this category are sustainable, and the shareholder is thus less dependent on external support to complete the project.

Khost province followed the dependency trend based on the functional transparency theory. The average cost of projects involving all levels of the community costing an average of \$39,000 USD in contrast to provincial level driven projects, costing an average of \$450,000. Paktia province did not follow this trend except with the provincial level driven projects, where the highest cost was incurred, with an average of \$182,000 USD per provincial project. In contrast to Khost, Paktia had quantitatively more projects involving all three levels of GIROA and local village leaders. Paktia had fifty-seven CERP projects, with attributes of simplicity, short-term in duration, and a variety to project types, ranging from construction to capacity building.⁹⁸ Khost, on the other hand, had thirty-six CERP projects with attributes involving the entire community in the project management processes.

⁹⁸CIDNE data extractions and queries based on project type, description, category, location, province, district, village, and cost.




Figure 11. Khost and Paktia Evaluation of Project Involvement and Cost Analysis

Source: Combined Data Information Network Exchange (CIDNE) reports from Regional Command East as of 2010, Kabul, Afghanistan, March 2013, <https://ronna-afghan.harmonieweb.org/Lists/Submitted%20Content/DispForm.aspx?ID=1296> (accessed March 15, 2013), chart created by author.

Evaluation of Capacity Building PRT Programs

The previous chapter described how the seven program design principles for development by USAID were selected for evaluation, and gave a brief description of the programs, their purpose, and goals for governance capacity building. All programs were conducted in Khost and Paktia provinces with mixed results. A major limitation of the study was that there was no metric developed to compare the effectiveness of capacity

building by province. Only dollars spent and population demographic changes were provided, but these indicators were not used for the analysis of dependency.

This chapter analyzes those coordination structures in the light of seven criteria. It examines sustainability, promotion of local ownership, long-term versus short-term results, support leveraged from outside organizations, political and cultural appropriateness, transparency and accountability, and finally, flexibility. The analysis of the seven development principles will distinguish dependency or capacity building levels of evaluation for each PRT supported USAID development plan. The combination of the PDP analysis, PRT CERP project functional transparency trends, and the development program analysis will then be collated to develop conclusions, and recommendations for this thesis.

Table 1. Sustainability by the Local Government

Sustainability by Local Government and Institutions		
PROGRAM	How dependent on PRT for support?	Capacity building or Infrastructure?
Performance Based Governor’s Fund	High. Completely dependent on PRT funding for support.	Capacity Building program for provincial governors
Local Governance and Community Development	Medium. Depended on implementing USAID NGO partners for technical expertise.	Infrastructure development program
Community Development Program	Low. Afghan led, with minimal implementing partner NGO support.	Capacity building
RAMP-UP	Medium.	Infrastructure and Capacity building
Community Based Stabilization Grants for Women and Girls	High. Recipients had to solicit the PRT directly to apply. Program was temporary.	Capacity building

Source: Created by author.

For the sustainability development principle, dependency on the PRT was assessed in regards to the sustainability of the development program. Sustainability was

rated from high to low based on the level of support required from the PRT, and also whether or not the project was capacity building or infrastructure centric. Dependency was the highest for the PBGF and US AMB CBSG, in contrast to CDP, LGCD and RAMP-UP. It would seem that those activities associated with infrastructure, in particular after the PDP analysis, would be those that were cause increased dependency. On the contrary, because PBGF and the CBSGs were solely funds based with no GIRoA ministry involved in its implementation as well as the programs being temporary in nature there was no real dependency created with them. LGCD and CDC were enduring, and development based to build capacity at the community levels over a longer period of time. With this statement, it is fair to assume that LGCD and CDC, as enduring programs, do foster dependency at the village levels.

Table 2. Promotion of Local Ownership and Institutions

Promoting local ownership putting local institutions in the lead	
PROGRAM	What agency was principally in the lead?
Performance Based Governor's Fund	PRT. Varied the transparency of the provincial governor. The governor was paid based on minimal requirements that measured performance.
Local Governance and Community Development	PRT, with NGOs. Infrastructure based and utilized implementing partners due to lack of technical expertise. Ownership of the project was upon its completion.
Community Development Program	Afghans, with support by NGOs. Led by district and village leaders in conjunction with the Provincial Council of that district, with little PRT involvement
RAMP-UP	PRT USAID and NGOs. Implementing partners, or NGOs, heavily supported the government official who received RAMP-UP assistance.
Community Based Stabilization Grants for Women and Girls	Afghans. The organization receiving the grant was completely responsible for managing and disbursing funds in accordance to their proposal with little or no assistance from the PRT.

Source: Created by author.

The promotion of local ownership category compared and evaluated which agency, either the PRT or Afghans, were in the lead. Afghans in the lead of the implementation of the program meant that they were less dependent on assistance from PRT USAID representatives, who served as the program managers. In this category, it was RAMP-UP, LGCD, and PBGF that tended towards dependency, particularly due to the follow up and quality assurance procedures required with programs that involve infrastructure development to demonstrate government legitimacy to local populace. In the case of RAMP-UP, NGO implementing partners were heavily utilized to assure the success of the program, due to the persistence required to assess the progress of project activity as well as provide mentorship to the city mayor or council member. LGCD also utilized NGOs as implementing partners, such as the Central Asian Development group or CARE, to provide quality assurance and oversight of construction projects, even to the extent of supervising the Afghan labor in absence of a local supervisor at the village level. The US Ambassador CBSG and CDP fared better, as they were completely Afghan led upon being funded, which included oversight of the provincial member in charge of the project.

Table 3. Long-Term versus Short Term Results

Fostering Long-Term versus Short Term Results?	
PROGRAM	Plan Stability or Development based?
Performance Based Governor’s Fund	Stability based, short term program developed until Afghan financial system could pay provincial governors
Local Governance and Community Development	Long-term, development based program with implementing NGO partners
Community Development Program	Long-term, development based local governance capacity building program
RAMP-UP	Short-term, stability based program focused on quick-impact projects and minimal capacity building
Community Based Stabilization Grants for Women and Girls	Short-term, stability based program aimed to jump start women civil societies with small grants under \$5000

Source: Created by author.

The long-term versus short term results category evaluated dependency by assessing the basis for the plan of each program. If the program was stability based, it tended towards dependency because the desired result was short term based, and often required extensive PRT and coalition force involvement. If a plan was development based, then the project was to endure beyond the tenure of the PRT and potentially transition to NGOs or GIRoA over an extended period of time, usually more than two years. LGCD and CDP fared best in this category as the projects were development based with usually an economic, education or rudimentary infrastructure premise that promoted local level population involvement in development activity over longer periods of time. On the other hand, the PBGF, RAMP-UP, and CBSG were temporary and stability based to rapidly develop a capability of a vulnerable GIRoA leader or Afghan women to conduct rudimentary projects or *shuras* to impact a target population. RAMP-UP especially targeted urban populations in the provincial capitals to maintain stability and freedom of movement of GIRoA activities without the threats of kidnapping,

assassination or criminal activity.⁹⁹ Taliban or anti-GIRoA forces often exploit the lack of basic services in order to recruit from at-risk populations and undermine the efforts of GIRoA.¹⁰⁰

Table 4. Leverage of Support from other Organizations

Leveraging support from other organizations	
PROGRAM	Level of implementing partner participation
Performance Based Governor's Fund	Low. No implementing partner participation until 2010, last year of the program
Local Governance and Community Development	High. Dependent on NGO implementing partners.
Community Development Program	Low to Medium. NGO implementing partner was and observer and reported based on shura attendance.
RAMP-UP	High. NGO implementing partners heavily involved in mentoring and assistance with quick impact infrastructure urban projects.
Community Based Stabilization Grants for Women	None. Directly from PRT, USAID or DoS rep and Afghan recipient

Source: Created by author.

The leveraging of support from other organizations evaluated the extent to which the PRT utilized implementing partners, which meant NGOs, in the execution of the program. The level of implementing partner involvement being rated as low to high; with low meaning that there was none or little implementing partner involvement in the

⁹⁹United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Rural Afghan Municipalities Program for Urban Populations (RAMP-UP), Facts for 2010-2011, <http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID> (accessed November 10, 2012).

¹⁰⁰Council on Foreign Relations, "Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, April 2012," May 2, 2012, <http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/report-progress-toward-security-stability-afghanistan-april-2012/p28138> (accessed April 1, 2013).

project and high meaning that there was extensive implementing partner involvement. The results varied. NGO implementing partners did not necessarily lead to dependency just as their lack of oversight, or involvement, did not mean there was no dependency. For example, the PBGF and the CBSG rarely utilized implementing partners as they were meant to be an Afghan managed program. However, the lack of oversight, in particular with the PBGF as noted in the congressional report, demonstrates the problems with not having a consistent implementing partner to provide quality assurance of a program where funds are disbursed directly to the supported GIRoA agency. CDP had implementing partner support, but was focused on monitoring and evaluation of the Afghan led *shuras* and community development activity as opposed to direct supervision and constant mentorship.

Table 5. Politically and Culturally Appropriate

Politically and culturally appropriate	
PROGRAM	Sensitive to Afghans or PRT
Performance Based Governor’s Fund	No. Did not appear transparent to local Afghans.
Local Governance and Community Development	Yes and No. NGO implementing partners fared well, more challenging with PRT members
Community Development Program	Yes. Afghan driven program
RAMP-UP	Yes and No, as it varied based on infrastructure or capacity building projects
Community Based Stabilization Grants for Women and Girls	Yes and no. Sensitive to women, but not in congruence to the male norms in Pashtunwali. Directly supported the source of the grant, and recipients demonstrated capacity and follow-up on the usage of the grant.

Source: Created by author.

Although the category of politically and culturally appropriate may seem as an aspect that would be inherent in a USAID PRT funded program, the results were mixed, and more of the results that leaned towards dependency were those that did not utilize existing GIRA or culturally accepted practices of conducting development activity within *Pashtunwali*.¹⁰¹ In specifically Pashtun culture, decisions are consensually made amongst tribal leaders, which can vary from the types of development projects desired in a community to forms of punishment for crimes committed against Sharia law. The CDP fared the best since it was developed with *Pashtunwali* and the Afghan *shura* system of consensus building amongst tribal leaders to resolve local problems. The LGCD had less success than the CDP, when the PRT civil engineering military elements were involved in the quality assurance checks. Failed LGCD projects tended to be large-scale infrastructure based that exceeded the capabilities of a NGO implementing partner. Implementing partners held *shuras* to discuss proposed development activity with the local populace, whereas the PRT engineers were involved during the actual assessments and quality assurance checks. The problem with this practice was the lack of coordination between NGOs and the danger of them being directly associated with PRT military members in less secure areas. PBGF on the other hand was not culturally appropriate and, unfortunately, increased levels of corruption. Often funds were used to pay salaries, build better living quarters or purchase additional vehicles for the provincial governor, when

¹⁰¹*Pashtunwali* is the legal and moral code that determines social order and responsibilities in Pashtun culture. It contains sets of values pertaining to honor (*namuz*), solidarity (*nang*), hospitality, mutual support, shame and revenge which determines social order and individual responsibility, [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+af0037\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+af0037)) (accessed April 15, 2013).

the purpose was for the provincial governor to provide *shuras* and support to connect the provincial leaders to the district levels. PBGF was a Western-based program that did not perform as planned in Afghan culture. Cultural appropriateness applies to the interaction of coalition forces with other USAID implementing partners, just as it does with the Afghan local populace.

Table 6. Strengthens Accountability and Transparency

Strengthening accountability and transparency		
PROGRAM	Methods of evaluation effectiveness	Acceptance with population
Performance Based Governor’s Fund	Governor improves performance and transparency with daily duties	None. Never included in PDP or PDC.
Local Governance and Community Development	Transition of completed project to local community, numbers of population affected by project, numbers employed	Yes, part of program implementation.
Community Development Program	Numbers of shuras, attendance of government and local leaders, level of involvement of leaders in decision making of villages	Yes, part of program implementation
RAMP-UP	Visible improvements in city, specifically enhanced urban infrastructure	Mixed results based on performance of city officials
Community Based Stabilization Grants for Women and Girls	Attendance of shura, purpose, location, adherence to grant proposal	Yes, part of program implementation

Source: Created by author.

Accountability and transparency is the most difficult category to assess because such an assessment requires constant engagement with the local population to obtain feedback about the purpose of the project, how they feel about their involvement and if they are receiving any benefit. The results are subjective, in particular in Afghanistan, where tribal disputes or ethnic differences can taint opinions, even with the most successful of programs. Dependency on the PRT is seen as less transparent, and to those with allegiance to the Taliban, it could appear that the local government is a puppet of US

influence as opposed to executing their duties for the needs of the local populace. The lack of capacity, in particular, the lack of freedom of movement of GIRoA officials without assistance from coalition forces exacerbated their credibility with tribal leaders.

For this reason, the PBGF fared the worst, in particular with the spending practices of the provincial governors, and the fact that they are centrally appointed without consensus from the population. RAMP-UP had mixed results based on the outputs and existing levels of corruption in the mayor's office, of which were the justification for implementing partners to serve as mentors of the city mayors in order to provide advice on accounting practices and proper management of funds and urban development projects. LGCD, CDP, and the CBSG were more successful in the area of transparency, primarily because of oversight requirements and implementing partners to assure success. LGCD required acceptance and involvement of the local populace through *shuras* with key tribal elders, and CDP was community leader led and involved constant engagement with the local populace. The CBSG, although with direct funds from the PRT, required the recipient to provide details as to the district and tribal elders engaged in the activity and numbers of women participating. It was not uncommon for a USAID NGO implementing partner to attend a *shura* or the women's activity to report externally to verify that the women's organization executed in accordance to their grant proposal.

Table 7. Flexibility

Flexibility	
PROGRAM	Flexibility of project
Performance Based Governor’s Fund	Flexible—if the governor’s performance was poor, then they would reduce or lose funding, but funding varied from salary payment to furniture in buildings
Local Governance and Community Development	Not flexible after construction of projects, especially large scale infrastructure
Community Development Program	Very flexible as it was Afghan run based on existing shuras and driven by local leaders
RAMP-UP	Flexible in order to support small, visible quick impact infrastructure projects, broadly defined
Community Based Stabilization Grants for Women and Girls	Not flexible—grant must adhere to project proposal

Source: Created by author.

Flexibility of a development program means the manner of which a program can adapt to changing circumstances, which was consistently the case, in the dynamic security environment of Afghanistan. A program may have initial success from the beginning, including input from key tribal elders, GIRoA, and be in congruence with the PDP and development principles. However, if circumstances change and that leads to the abject failure of the implementation of said project, then the chances are there was a lack of flexibility, and often sustainability, of the project to begin with. Projects with standards of performance that were Western based tended to fare the worst. In particular, those projects that involve disbursement of cash funds and infrastructure were rarely successful. But more or less flexibility did not lend to dependency. The PBGF, for example, was flexible and contained so many variables and loopholes in order to adapt to the personalities of provincial governors, the winning of their allegiance led to not only dependency on the program, but in some cases direct support to corruption in GIRoA. LGCD is less flexible once the projects are constructed and transferred to local Afghans.

As a result of the extensive planning conducted in *shuras* with key village elders and NGOs with areas of expertise in such projects, the margin of error was lower in contrast to the CBSG, which had to adhere by strict guidelines for reporting purposes. RAMP-UP had much flexibility to allow for small development projects to be executed in a rapid manner so has to have an immediate effect on the local populace, as well as the changing security environment in the urban areas. CDP, like LGCD, was Afghan ran, making it the most flexible of the programs and most accommodating to their sense of the Afghan sense of time and the need for consensus building in the community to allow for acceptance of key tribal leaders through *shuras*.

Summary of Analysis

PDP analysis indicates trends in dependency based on PRT integration into PDP workshop in a majority of PDC committees based on specialized technical expertise in engineering. A comparison of NGO and PRT project activity in 2007 shows large disparities in cost between PRT funded and NGO implemented projects of the same type. A majority of PRT projects are construction and infrastructure based because of specialized skills required to design and build. A majority of Afghans in Khost and Paktia province do not have the technical engineering skill to maintain complex infrastructure on their own. They require additional training and equipment to maintain such a facility. The current MAAWS-A standards do not allow funds to be used for extra maintenance or training for the local populace using the building. Paktia completed CERP projects demonstrate compliance to the PDP, therefore executing the intent of GIRoA. Khost completed CERP projects by project type does not indicate compliance, however it is not conclusive if this was a dependency related relationship reaction or a change in GIRoA

priorities due to the security situation. The primary dependency indicators in the PDP analysis are the increased PRT involvement in the planning implementation, technically complex infrastructure projects and the lack of any of the stakeholders at the planning workshops to discuss indigenous capacity.

The functional transparency evaluation of the PRT CERP projects found a direct relationship between the level of community involvement, dollars spent, and complexity that can indicate the sustainability or a trend towards dependency. Paktia had more villages with sustainable projects than Khost province. Both provinces, however, spent a majority of funds and technical resources on their respective provincial capital cities. Although functional transparency seems like a simplistic form of analysis, it was much easier to determine and evaluate a relationship between two variables, such as the number of community involved to build the water well and the complexity in construction of the water well. These are categories that could be added to CIDNE to facilitate information sharing.

The USAID program analysis determined that the most successful of the programs from a dependency standpoint was the community development program, which has regular involvement of local government officials. The least successful was PBGF, followed by RAMP-UP, CBSG, and LBCD. The factor that increased dependency was the requirement for technical expertise, such as an engineer to conduct quality assurance checks, or that the conduct quality assurance utilized NGO implementing partners in contrast to empowering GIRoA. Also, quality assurance for the capacity building programs that develop key leaders lacked the oversight and depended on government staff or implementing partners to report, and therefore were more susceptible

to corruption. CBSG increased dependency because of the target group consisting of a populace traditionally marginalized in Pashtun culture. . The increased dependency is a result of lack of male leader acceptance of the female shareholder receiving funds directly from the USAID source. Such project management practices tended to be in conflict with traditional Pashtun values in Khost and Paktia provinces.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Governance and development can no longer be considered separate lines of operation. Development consists of picking winners and losers, distributing scarce resources, and requires technical capacity, resource allocation systems and accountability to be effective. Projects can serve to focus governance efforts that thus far seem relegated to meeting government officials and one-off *shura* events with government representatives and the population talking past each other. Project selection, prioritization and execution require key governance capacities, such as negotiations and assuming responsibility and risk, which we seek to cultivate in our partners but have largely retained ourselves. As such, these basics of project management offer a measurable and reproducible method to teach, train, and track critical governance skills, achieve and certify key COIN objectives, and in the process, save millions of dollars that currently buy nothing but a false sense of “doing something.”¹⁰²

— Daniel Weggeland, *Less Boom for the Buck: Projects for COIN Effects and Transition*

Conclusions

In this paper, the effects of PRTs and dependency in Khost and Paktia provinces were defined and evaluated by utilizing four methods of evaluation. Those methods of evaluation were a review of previous literature on PRTs, the relevance to Dependency theory, comparing and contrasting the two principal arguments of the theory based on motivations. An analysis was conducted to evaluate trends of dependency by assessing the level of involvement of PRTs in the Afghan provincial government planning processes. Following the provincial planning assessment, CERP data of PRT projects were analyzed to determine if there were trends and indicators of dependency by using the functional transparency model of evaluating the relationships between community

¹⁰²Weggeland.

involvement and project complexity. The results in this analysis found there was a relationship between completed and cancelled projects, indicators for project sustainability based on government and village involvement in the project, and a correlation with funding and community involvement. Lastly, USAID PRT programs were evaluated utilizing the DSF model for project principles, determining that even with the lead agency for development, there are programs that possess inherent flaws that reinforce dependency as opposed to increased accountability and responsibility of the recipients of the aid.

Trends in the study include, but are not limited to, the fact that reporting mechanisms for CERP and any HA funds must include a connection to a desired effect and information on local community acceptance of the project. Money spent does not indicate success or a level of complexity of a project on its own. Population numbers in a village also do not constitute number of persons affected or as any impact indicator to evaluate effects of projects. But there is a relationship between community involvement, money spent, and the complexity of the project based on its attributes and quality assurance checks requirements. Simpler projects, of less than 6 months in duration, tended to have more success in contrast to those that exceeded a unit's deployment cycle. Projects that were simply in scope and construction were more successful as opposed to those complex projects that require civil engineers, contractors or NGOs that perform as a "middle man" in such operations as opposed to meeting the interests of the local populace. Ownership by the local government with the village leaders is most critical from the point at which projects are nominated and the negotiation process begins. It is also important to manage expectations, and to be realistic and honest to locals if

something cannot be done. The USAID DSF model is a great tool for assisting the development of short-term stability projects and understanding the indicators, but the COIN CAAT model using the functions of transparency is a much easier tool, and uses the COIN impact indicators to evaluate success.¹⁰³ This summarizes the key trends assessed during the study, and areas to improve upon with the tools used to conduct evaluations.

If the intent of counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan was to foster a dependent Afghan populace on PRTs and coalition forces for funds, then we succeeded. If the intent was to be in the build-phase of transition by 2013, with a provincial government completely on its feet to assume all fiscal and project management responsibilities and engagement with district and village leaders, then the results of such a strategy have failed. According to the premise of dependency theory according to Dos Santos¹⁰⁴ is that there was a covert manipulation of the external dominant donor country on the recipient country to force them to become dependent for the economic gain of the dominant country providing the aid. However, according to dependency theory as it pertains to those aspects of the theory developed by Prebisch,¹⁰⁵ the dependency in Khost and Paktia developed differently. In Khost and Paktia the dependency stems from the incentives attached to the purpose of the aid, and that the interests of the host nation

¹⁰³Weggeland.

¹⁰⁴July Dempsey, "Karzai Seeks End to NATO Reconstruction Teams," *The New York Times*, February 6, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/07/world/asia/07munich.html?_r=0 (accessed April 13, 2013).

¹⁰⁵Raul Prebisch, "The Latin American Keynes," *The Economist*, March 5, 2009, <http://www.economist.com/node/13226316> (accessed October 15, 2012).

soliciting the aid is represented by an elite faction of the host nation which is not representative of the population as a whole. Thus, the cycle of dependency is as much self-inflicted as it is externally reinforced by PRT projects .

Did PRTs foster a culture of dependency or develop capacity in Khost and Paktia? In accordance to the quote by President Karzai in March 2011, PRTs are a parallel structure when they control those resources, such as a means of funding and technical expertise in development resources if the goal is to develop and support a national government and structures.¹⁰⁶ A recent comment by Dr. Ashraf Ghani, from the Ministry of Economy, stated that “PRTs began operations in places where national government could not perform certain functions. This effectively created a federal fiscal structure with PRT funds not going through ministries. This was justified by circumstances, but our system is unitary, not federal.”¹⁰⁷ A unitary system of government is highly centralized, with limited or no delegating powers to subordinate states or provinces. Therefore, the fault is as much as GIRoA as it is the PRTs. PRT infrastructure and capacity building programs reinforced the GIRoA desires for rapid development in accordance to ANDS and provincial development plans that were technically complex and resource intensive to maintain.

¹⁰⁶Theotonio Dos Santos, “The Structure of Dependence,” in *Readings in US Imperialism*, eds., K. T. Fann and Donald C. Hodges (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1971), 226.

¹⁰⁷Presentation by Dr. Ashraf Ghani, under the Ministry of Economy, Transition Executive Steering Committee facilitated by NATO on February 11, 2013. Courtesy of USAID interview conducted on March 1, 2013 from Khost province.

Recommendations

There are five recommendations based on the analysis of dependency and PRTS. The recommendations are for military forces to focus on short-term, stability operations, more emphasis on GIRoA leader responsibility, that PRTs be led by a US Government civilian, and that the Department of Defense tools for funding humanitarian and civic assistance be more flexible to the varying environments and dynamics of recent operations.

The first recommendation would be to emphasize the tactical unit's role of stability operations to focus on short-term stability to achieve effects as opposed to long-term development.¹⁰⁸ US Government and DoD planners should delineate lines of effort early, and keep the military, especially maneuver BCTs, out of long-term development assistance and for the focus to be on short-term stability assistance in support of the security sector line of operations. Any military funded civil-military stability projects should be phased in as part of a plan to foster improved relations with the civil populace and prevent civilian interference with military operations. Host nation government structures should be incorporated and supported from the initial plan to the transition of responsibilities, as is the case in the process for nation assistance and military support to disaster response operations.

The second recommendation would be to place responsibility and accountability for provincial development, from the beginning of operations, on GIRoA. Dependency of provincial GIRoA leaders on PRTs for development was a combined result of a lack of a

¹⁰⁸Weggeland.

transition plan with the transfer of projects to GIRoA. One recommendation would be to integrate GIRoA into a civil-military team from the inception of civil-military operation teams like PRTs. This requires further evaluation, but with the emphasis on Security Force Transition Teams (SFAs) and security transition with ANSF, it seems that this may be the next step to improve the process of building the competence and experience of GIRoA leaders at all levels of government. As mentioned in the CAAT study, just as the complexity of a project increases, the interest of the stakeholders will decrease because it exceeds their level of competency of the value of the project.¹⁰⁹

The third recommendation is that US PRTs should be civilian led with military in a supporting role. If PRTs, or Forward Advance Civilian Teams (FACTs)¹¹⁰ are the future for inter-agency stability operations, they should be US Government civilian led by the best government agencies for post-conflict development activity, such as the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO)¹¹¹ under the US Department of State. If the FACT is not co-located with the provincial government they are supporting, then a GIRoA provincial leader should be embedded in the organization to facilitate capacity building, ownership and transition. Military assigned to FACTS should be in a supporting role for security and civil-military relations with adjacent maneuver elements

¹⁰⁹Ibid., 10.

¹¹⁰Field Advance Civilian Teams were the quick response Department of State led interagency team designed to operate in conflict areas as described by the Bureau of Conflict and Stability Operation, an office established by DoS to consolidate diplomatic crisis response actions using the whole of government approach. CSO is also the DoS management lead for the Office of Stability and Reconstruction (S/CRS).

¹¹¹Ibid.

in the area of operations. The military personnel assigned should also have experience working with other federal agencies, understanding their missions, requirements and synchronize their training with the lead agency of the FACT.

The fourth recommendation for future study would be to conduct an evaluation of the various Department of Defense tools for funding humanitarian and civic assistance. Regulations continue to use an outdated DoD Defense Security Operation model of project management.¹¹² Existing funding guidelines for MAAWS and the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civil Assistance (OHDACA) must be revised so short-term projects include funds for maintenance and capacity building activities to transfer responsibilities to the host nation government. A signed agreement between a US Soldier and indigenous community leader is not enough to justify that they can sustain the project. Another consideration is to redefine what is a “small project” and reduce the small project funding cap from \$500,000 to \$25,000.

The fifth recommendation would be to not commit US funds to any provincial development until a cost-value analysis and needs assessment is conducted sensitive to that of the local economy as reported by NGOs and the local populace. The disparity in project costs, on average a US PRT project costing \$50,000 more in comparison to a NGO, demonstrates that PRTs possessed the most resources for district governor’s to exploit with the contractor bidding process. This exploitation with bidding contracts is what was suspected to have raised the costs in Khost province.

¹¹²Rebecca Patterson and Jonathan Robinson, “The Commander as Investor: Changing CERP Practices,” *PRISM* 2, no. 2 (March 2011), www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/prism2-2/prism2-2.pdf (accessed April 14, 2013).

Recommendations for Future Study

Recommendations for future study would be the following five topics: (1) to examine the impacts of PRT transitions in Afghanistan, (2) using the CAAT COIN effectiveness model, evaluate other methods of unconventional warfare, (3) Evaluate the impacts of OHDACA funding and dependency relationships using the CAAT COIN criteria, (4) Evaluation of effects of non-standard pre-deployment training that includes other federal government agencies, (5) Evaluate the impacts of abruptly cutting aid, as in the current situation in Afghanistan with the dramatic reduction of funds.

The first recommended study would be to evaluate the effectiveness and sustainability of US military post-conflict stability operations after US forces withdrawal. PRT Paktia was the first to conduct transition in Regional Command-East to Paktia Province on April 1, 2013.¹¹³ Other previous operations to evaluate would be those military operations in support stability and peace-keeping in the Balkans following the conflicts in 1995 and 1999.¹¹⁴ The recent study conducted on the effects of post-conflict stability operations in Iraq provided valuable insight, from the US government, NGO and most importantly, the Iraqi points of view as to the overall effectiveness of US funded development aid executed by PRT

The second recommended study would be to evaluate the CAAT COIN project and develop Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) for different project types. Compare

¹¹³United States Embassy, Kabul, *Closure of the first US PRT marks success*, April 3, 2013, http://kabul.usembassy.gov/pr_041413.html (accessed April 14, 2013).

¹¹⁴North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Terminated operations and missions in Balkans," April 2013, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52060.htm (accessed April 14, 2013).

functional transparency to other methods of unconventional warfare utilizing similar evaluation criteria. Often studies are saturated with COIN doctrine and effects, as opposed to evaluating other types of conflicts and how to apply similar procedures.

The third study would be to evaluate OHDACA and dependency using the CAAT COIN affects criteria. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency has databases of all humanitarian activities conducted in support of theater security cooperation operations. This would serve as another method of evaluation of the COIN CAAT evaluation criteria and indicators, applying the analysis to other theaters of operation with a history of humanitarian and disaster assistance operations.

The fourth study would be to evaluate the effectiveness of pre-deployment training of military forces involved in stability and civil affairs operations with the US Government inter-agency and NGOs. USAID provides mobile training teams that provide the Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework (TCAF) model of training, which can be coordinated by request from the military liaison at the office of USAID or with a local civil affairs unit. The Harvard Humanitarian Studies Initiative (HHSI)¹¹⁵ as an actual development and humanitarian assistance course designed for NGOs provided by the Harvard Medical School and the Tufts Feinstein International Center. The course provides in an overview and basic understanding of what it is like as a non-profit, non-

¹¹⁵Harvard University Medical School, “Harvard Humanitarian Studies Initiative,” April 2013, <http://hhi.harvard.edu/> (accessed April 14, 2013).

government organization in varying stages of development, and utilizes the Sphere¹¹⁶ Project development principles of basic services following a disaster or armed conflict.

The fifth study would be to evaluate the operational and strategic impacts of abruptly reducing aid used by tactical military commander. Historical examples may include the evaluating the impacts of the withdrawal of US troops in Iraq in 2011, the 1975 withdrawal of remaining US troops from Vietnam, the withdrawal of US troops from Somalia after the UN Peacekeeping operations following the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993. The reason for evaluating historical cases as opposed to only recent transition and aid withdrawal would better evaluate the long term strategic effects in contrast to the limited perspective and scope of recent withdrawals of US led PRTs in Afghanistan.

Significance of Thesis


Understanding the complexities of the development of dependency in relation to PRTs and the effects of their GIRoA provincial counterparts is significant in terms of demonstrating that even with inter-agency representation and military leaders with civil-military expertise, the desire for tangible results through physical infrastructure, number of population supposedly affected, and dollars spent continue to be the metric used to evaluate success of PRTs. This study recommends increased evaluation of PRTs after their transition by those US Government or international agencies that continue operations in provinces having undergone transition. This study also recommends an evaluation of US government inter-agency, intra-governmental and non-governmental

¹¹⁶The Sphere Project, “Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards for Humanitarian Response,” April 2013, <http://www.sphereproject.org/> (accessed April 14, 2013).

training that increases understanding and awareness of implementation of humanitarian and development aid, and impacts of abruptly curtailing aid programs in Afghanistan beginning in 2014.

Lastly, the evaluation of dependency relative to the evaluations of PRTs in Afghanistan also may have relevance to evaluating domestic assistance programs as well as to foreign aid assistance programs. Similar analysis could be conducted to evaluate the efficacy of government assistance programs in the United States, such as subsidized housing, unemployment programs, or welfare programs. The same methods of analysis utilized in this paper could be applied to evaluating these programs at a municipal level. Such an analysis could aid local governments by improving the management of resources allocated to aid programs and refining the criteria for the qualification of beneficiaries of local social programs.

ILLUSTRATIONS



ISAF Regional command and PRT Locations by Province and Coalition Force contributions

Source: International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, “NATO troop numbers by contributions,” March 2013, <http://www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php> (accessed March 13, 2013).


FY 2009-10* Funding Projections based on Afghan Info Reporting			
	FY 2009	FY 2010	FY 2009-10
	Est. FY 2009 Disbursements	Est. Total FY 2010 Disbursements	Est. Total FY 2009-10 Disbursements
RC-E	480,720,702	758,467,495	1,239,188,197
Bamyan	10,389,015	22,308,780	32,697,795
Ghazni	17,991,852	35,118,200	53,110,052
Kabul	272,405,860	410,186,791	682,592,651
Kapisa	1,505,436	9,047,093	10,552,529
Khost	32,134,481	42,036,207	74,170,688
Kunar	13,379,633	16,590,830	29,970,463
Laghman	12,860,013	10,685,955	23,545,968
Logar	5,126,924	11,133,390	16,260,314
Maydan Wardak	3,788,210	10,520,799	14,309,009
Nangarhar	42,227,543	50,431,694	92,659,237
Nuristan	4,494,306	3,062,241	7,556,547
Paktika	20,261,369	19,900,831	40,162,200
Paktya	39,590,071	66,270,711	105,860,782
Panjsher	1,899,901	7,645,293	9,545,194
Parwan	2,666,088	43,528,680	46,194,768
RC-N	110,748,707	234,375,583	345,124,290
Badakhshan	39,585,325	44,481,111	84,066,436
Baghlan	8,730,252	34,011,704	42,741,956
Balkh	22,318,044	42,257,332	64,575,376
Faryab	6,218,225	12,865,349	19,083,574
Jawzjan	10,272,682	12,176,068	22,448,750
Kunduz	9,333,491	54,631,492	63,964,983
Samangan	4,107,738	4,398,427	8,506,165
Sari Pul	3,716,315	11,775,688	15,492,003
Takhar	6,466,635	17,778,412	24,245,047
RC-S	56,289,588	163,930,014	220,219,602
Daykundi	11,039,569	13,765,982	24,805,551
Kandahar	23,998,822	119,865,352	143,864,174
Uruzgan	12,847,026	17,223,968	30,070,994
Zabul	8,404,171	13,074,712	21,478,883
RC-SW	35,527,942	154,517,129	190,045,071
Hilmand	35,111,906	148,450,967	183,562,873
Nimroz	416,036	6,066,162	6,482,198
RC-W	43,153,367	91,143,516	134,296,883
Badghis	3,762,325	6,397,608	10,159,933
Farah	10,194,750	15,344,975	25,539,725
Ghor	5,532,183	14,838,178	20,370,361
Hirat	23,664,109	54,562,755	78,226,864
Grand Total	\$ 726,440,306	\$ 1,402,433,737	\$ 2,128,874,043

*Estimates do not include funds provided to national level mechanisms such as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, projects that provide direct services to USAID (e.g. Audit Firms, Construction Designs, etc.), or program funds attributed to supporting USAID (e.g. PASA, PSCs, FSLs, Embassy Air, etc.). These numbers only reflect USAID resources and not other agencies such as the Dept. of State and USDA.

Congressional Report, Table of Development Funds Distributions
by Province in Afghanistan FY 09-11


Source: Committee on Foreign Relations, Evaluating US Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan: A Majority Staff Report, 112th Cong, 1st Sess., June 8, 2011.

Paktia Provincial Development Plan 2008-2012



Paktia Province Completed and Ongoing Projects Summary 2007

Source: Afghanistan National Development Strategy: Paktia Province, 1387-1391 (2008-2013) Provincial Development Plan, Kabul, Afghanistan (2007) <https://ronna-afghan.harmonieweb.org/PDP/.../Paktia%20PDP.pdf> (accessed March 15, 2013)



Balkh Province Development Plan:
 (TC: It is written BALKH, however it could be KHOST province)

Khost Province Completed and Ongoing Projects Summary 2007

Source: Afghanistan National Development Strategy: Khost Province, 1387-1391 (2008-2013) Provincial Development Plan, Kabul, Afghanistan (2007) <https://ronna-afghan.harmonieweb.org/PDP/.../Khost%20PDP.pdf> (accessed March 15, 2013).

GLOSSARY

Area of Operations: An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 3-0).

Brigade Combat Team: Brigade Combat Team (BCT) is a combined arms, modular organization that provides the division, land component commander (LCC), or joint task force (JTF) commander with close combat capabilities (FM 3-90.06 September 14, 2010).

Capacity Building: The process of creating an environment that fosters host-nation institutional development, community participation, human resources development, and strengthening managerial systems (FM 3-07, Stability Operations).

Civil-military Operations: The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian authorities, and the civilian populace (Joint Publication 3-57).

Coalition Forces: A force composed of military elements of nations that have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose.

Counterinsurgency: Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. Also called COIN (Joint Pub 1-02) (JP 3-24).

Development Aid: Grants or loans to developing countries which are undertaken by the official sector with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective and at concessional financial terms (having a grant element of at least 25 per cent). In addition to financial flows, technical co-operation is included in aid. Grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, from CRS, August 7, 2009).

Host Nation: A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organization organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory (AR 570-9, Host Nation Support, March 2006).

Humanitarian Assistance: Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or

agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. Also called HA (Joint Pub 1-02) (JP 3-57).

Indigenous Actors: Tribal, village, and other host nation leaders and personnel who should be involved with, or even lead, reconstruction and stabilization efforts (FM 3-24).

Jirga: A Jirga is a regional level gathering, usually a tribal assembly of elders, but much larger than a shura. In Afghanistan it can denote members in an official position, such as a parliament and those in elected positions at the regional levels, such as the *Wolesi Jirga*, of which there are two representatives per province and represent their province at the national level, similar to a senator in the United States (RONNA).

Maneuver Unit: Those US Army land component combat arms units that served as the primary means of security stability in Afghanistan (FM 3-0).

National Level: within the context of this paper, the national level refers to the highest levels of GIRoA beyond the provincial levels to the national level ministerial directors of GIRoA. The central government of the host nation (FM 3-0).

Operational Level: Military forces operating at Brigade levels or higher (FM 3-0).

Pashtun: The largest and traditionally most politically powerful ethnic group, the Pashtun (or Pashtun in northern Pashtu dialects), is composed of many units totaling in 1995 an estimated 10.1 million, the most numerous being the Durrani and the Ghilzai. Other major tribes include the Wardak, Jaji, Tani, Jadran, Mangal, Khugiani, Safi, Mohmand and Shinwari. Like a number of other Afghan ethnic groups, the Pashtun extend beyond Afghanistan into Pakistan where they constitute a major ethnic group of about 14 million. The Pashtun have provided the central leadership for Afghanistan since the eighteenth century when Ahmad Khan Abdali of Kandahar established the Durrani Empire. This one-time general in Nadir Shah's Persian army was elected to power in 1747 at a tribal *jirgah*, an assembly which takes decisions by consensus. The legitimacy of his rule was sanctioned at the same time by the *ulama* (religious scholars).¹¹⁷

Pashtunwali: a legal and moral code that determines social order and responsibilities. It contains sets of values pertaining to honor (*namuz*), solidarity (*nang*), hospitality, mutual support, shame and revenge which determine social order and individual responsibility. The defense of *namuz*, even unto death, is obligatory for every Pashtun. Elements in this code of behavior are often in opposition to the Shariah.

¹¹⁷Library of Congress, Country Studies, "Afghanistan: Ethnic Groups," [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+af0037\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+af0037)) (accessed April 15, 2013)

Much of the resistance to the largely detribalized leadership of the DRA stemmed from the perception that in attempting to nationalize land and wealth, as well as regulate marriage practices, the DRA was unlawfully violating the prescriptions of *Pashtunwali*.¹¹⁸

Reconstruction: The process of rebuilding the economic and physical infrastructure of a country or territory where it has been damaged or destroyed to create the foundation for longer term development (The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) Pamphlet, December 2005).

Shura: From the Arabic word meaning “consultation.” In Afghanistan, a shura is gathering or meeting to discuss issues by consensus building among village leaders and key stakeholders. Shuras can have a variety of themes, from negotiating peace among tribes in accordance to *Pashtunwali* or shuras to develop consensus about a local development project.

Stabilization: The process of making a country or territory unlikely to return to conflict or upheaval through the provision of public security (S/CRS Pam).

Stability Operations: Military operations outside the continental United States in conjunction with other elements of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstitution, and humanitarian relief (JP 3-0).

Stability Based Aid: Humanitarian or development aid that is temporary and of short-duration in nature; sometimes referred to as quick-impact projects (USAID).

Strategic Level: The level of planning beyond that of ISAF and theater levels of planning (JP 5-0).

Sustainable Development: a mode of human development in which resource use aims to meet human needs while preserving the environment so that these needs can be met both in the present and for generations to come. The term 'sustainable development' was used by the Brundtland Commission which coined what has become the most often-quoted definition of sustainable development: “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Report on the Commission of Environment and Development, UN General Assembly, December 1987).

Tactical Level: Military forces operating at Brigade, Battalion, and lower levels (FM 3-0).

¹¹⁸Ibid.

Tashkil: From the Arabic word meaning organization or structure. In Afghanistan, the term is used for human resource management to refer to a duty position, either vacant or filled (ISAF/NATO) and often referred to when discussing available positions for Afghan security forces or government employees (ISAF/NATO).

Unified Action: The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations in order to achieve unity of effort (JP 1).

Unity of Effort: Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not part of the same command or organization (JP 3-16).

Village Level: Operations conducted with village and tribal leaders. This includes all aspects of reconstruction and stabilization efforts, whether conducted by DoD or other agencies (FM 3-24).

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