

CIVIL AFFAIRS IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

A Monograph

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ABSTRACT

CIVIL AFFAIRS IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE by MAJ Clayton Douglas Curtis, U.S. Army, 54 pages.

The main problem addressed in this monograph is how to employ U.S. Special Operation Forces Civil Affairs units to support insurgent groups in Unconventional Warfare. The purpose of this research is to identify best practices from the insurgent's perspective, the Viet Cong and Hezbollah, in overthrowing or out-competing the incumbent government that they are fighting against using civil affairs-like tasks such as Support to Civil Administration. The thesis question that this research attempts to answer is can U.S. Special Operations Forces Civil Affairs units plan and conduct civil military operations to support insurgent groups in Unconventional Warfare. The conclusion of this thesis is that U.S. Special Operations Forces Civil Affairs units can plan and conduct civil military operations in support of insurgent groups in an unconventional warfare environment. Moreover, the best task for civil affairs forces is to conduct or focus on is Support to Civil Administration. This is mainly for two reasons including: (1) civil administration and social services helps mobilize the population, and (2) it strengthens the insurgent's shadow government and makes it ready to assume control over the government when they overthrow the incumbent regime.

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Second, I want to thank Captain (CPT) David Carattini who serves with the 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group as their Civil Affairs Planner. He has increased my knowledge and understanding regarding civil affairs support to unconventional warfare. He spent a week with me discussing current and emerging issues and concerns regarding how civil affairs should support unconventional warfare, which better guided me to write this monograph. My intent for this monograph is to provide recommendations to the special operations community to better employ civil affairs assets in response to Captain Carattini's discussion points.

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understand from a Special Forces Officer's perspective of how Civil Affairs (CA) should be employed in support of Unconventional Warfare (UW) operations. Thus, I was able to focus my monograph on a specific task set (e.g. Support to Civil Administration) for Special Operations Forces (SOF) to plan and conduct in UW operations.

Most importantly, I would like to give special heartfelt thanks to my beautiful and loving wife, Hilda Susana Halaburda for encouraging me to apply to the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). If it were not for her, my monograph would not be possible. I also want to thank her for giving me inspiration and encouragement to write a monograph topic that would keep me current with my profession as a civil affairs officer. She continues to challenge me in not settling for mediocrity. She is my true love and treasure.

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ACRONYMS

AO	Area of Operations
AOR	Area of Responsibility
CA	Civil Affairs
CAO	Civil Affairs Operations
CAP	Crisis Action Planning
CAPT	Civil Affairs Planning Team
CAT	Civil Affairs Team
CIM	Civil Information Management
CCDR	Combatant Commander
CF	Conventional Forces
CLT	Civil Liaison Team
CME	Civil Military Engagement
CMEP	Civil Military Engagement Plan
CMO	Civil Military Operations
CMOC	Civil Military Operations Center
CMSE	Civil Military Support Element
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CONPLAN	Contingency Plan
CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
CR	Civil Reconnaissance
CT	Counterterrorism
DIME	A summarized term for the instruments of national power: Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State

DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam
FCC	Functional Component Command
FHA	Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
FID	Foreign Internal Defense
FLA	Farmers Liberation Association
GCC	Geographic Combatant Command
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HCA	Humanitarian Civic Action
IDAD	Internal Defense and Development
IGO	International Governmental Organization
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
IW	Irregular Warfare
JIIM	Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational
JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force
JTF	Joint Task Force
MCA	Military Civic Action
METT-TC	Mission, Enemy, Time, Terrain, Troops Available, and Civil Considerations
MISO	Military Information Support Operations
MIST	Military Information Support Team
PMESII-PT	Political, Military Economic, Social, Information, Infrastructure, Physical, and Time
NA	Nation Assistance
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NLF	National Liberation Front
OGA	Other Governmental Organization

PN	Partner Nation
PRC	Population Resource Control
PRP	People's Revolutionary Party
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction
SCA	Support to Civil Administration
SFA	Security Force Assistance
SAO	Security Assistance Operations
SF	Special Forces
SO	Special Operations
SOF	Special Operations Forces
TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
USAMB	U.S. Ambassador
USASOC	U.S. Army Special Operations Command
USEMB	U.S. Embassy
USG	U.S. Government
USJFKSWC	U.S. John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
UW	Unconventional Warfare
WLA	Women's Liberation Association
WOG	Whole of Government Approach
YLA	Youth Liberation Association

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INTRODUCTION

This monograph takes an enemy perspective of civil affairs-like tasks and operations, which are shown to improve an insurgent group's odds in winning the war and overthrowing an incumbent government. This novel approach was first used in Geoff Demarest's book, *Winning Insurgent War*.¹ This paper builds and expands Demarest's novel approach. The purpose of this paper is to improve U.S. Special Operations Forces Civil Affairs (CA) units' abilities to support resistance movements and insurgencies in an unconventional warfare environment.

This monograph will attempt to answer the following research questions. Can CA units and personnel advise, train, and assist resistance movements to overthrow an incumbent regime or to achieve specified political changes in a limited, protracted, unconventional warfare environment? Do they have the capability today through CA core mission tasks and training programs to integrate CA operations with other U.S. Special Operations Forces and unified action partner goals (e.g. Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational partners) also? Where can the Special Operations Joint Task Force Commander place CA units and personnel to assist in the accomplishment of the UW operational mission?

This monograph will use successful resistance movements' best practices against an incumbent regime to gain power and influence for insight. The Viet Cong insurgency in the 1960s and 1970s in Vietnam and the Hezbollah insurgency in Lebanon from 1982 to today will be used to illustrate how CA units may plan and support resistance movements in the future.

The monograph has three research assumptions. First, the Vietcong and Hezbollah insurgents in the case studies will demonstrate CA-like tasks to support their cause, strengthen their shadow government, and mobilize the population. Second, U.S. Special Operations Forces and other U.S. Government Agencies will lack understanding of CA units' potential to build the

¹Geoff Demarest, *Winning Insurgent War: Back to the Basics*, 2nd ed. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2011).

capacity of shadow governments and mobilize the population through other CA tasks besides foreign humanitarian assistance. Third and finally, many commanders will likely lack the understanding of how, when, and where CA teams can conduct civil military operations in support of unconventional warfare operations.

This research is limited to case studies that demonstrate what shadow governments do in insurgencies and how they demonstrate capacity to effectively govern and mobilize the population. It is important for the reader to understand that there is little evidence of U.S. Special Operations Forces CA units participating in unconventional warfare operations due to either the security classification of UW operations or lack of clarity of what CA forces did in comparison to other special operations units' and other government agencies' activities. Therefore, two case studies from the Viet Cong and Hezbollah will be used to show CA potential in supporting an insurgency.

The importance of this monograph is that the findings in this paper will provide the 95th CA Brigade (Airborne), the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC), and Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) methods and ideas to employ CA units to achieve the United States' operational and strategic objectives in unconventional warfare. This monograph aims to add to the knowledge and understanding of the potential capabilities of Special Operations Forces CA units and personnel. This will lead to better training programs, exercises, tasks, metrics, and SOF integration in support of unconventional warfare operations.

This monograph is very relevant to current and future strategic and operational environments. As the U.S. winds down its operations in Afghanistan in 2014 and returns to steady-state operations much like those prior to September 11, 2011, U.S. Special Operations Forces will refocus on conducting theater security cooperation missions and posture themselves for potential UW operations to check or overthrow hostile and rogue regimes through resistance

movements and insurgent groups that support U.S. interests and international law and order.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This section is organized per the elements of the primary research question, “Can CA plan and conduct civil military operations (CMO) to support a resistance movement in unconventional warfare operations?” First, the literature review will examine current U.S. national strategies and directives on unconventional warfare operations. Then, the review will survey literary sources on insurgencies, the United States in unconventional warfare operations, and CA.

Current U.S. National Strategies and Directives

National strategic documents provide objectives for all military operations. These documents include the National Security Strategy of 2010; the Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense document of January 2012; the National Defense Strategy of 2008; and the Department of Defense Directive regarding Irregular Warfare, DoDD 3000.07. Each of these strategic documents addresses some aspects of CA forces and how the use of unconventional warfare may be necessary to U.S. interests.

The United States conducts UW to protect U.S. interests against hostile regimes, which usually violate international human rights norms. To support this, President Obama states in the National Security Strategy of 2010, “To adversarial governments, we offer a clear choice: abide by international norms, and achieve the political and economic benefits that come with greater integration with the international community; or refuse to accept this pathway, and bear the consequences of that decision, including greater isolation.”² Moreover, the National Security Strategy of 2010 states, “And we will pursue engagement with hostile nations to test their intentions, give their governments the opportunity to change course, reach out to their people, and

²White House, *National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 11.

mobilize international coalitions.”³ Thus, the U.S. strategy to prevent and deter aggression to protect national interests fall in line with conducting UW against those nations who threaten the regional instability and U.S. interests.

The National Security Strategy of 2010 states that the United States will deny sanctuary to violent extremist groups. Several weak, failing, and rogue states in the world have a great potential to provide sanctuary to these groups such as fundamentalist communities involved in the Arab Spring, Iran, and the Tri-Border Area (Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil) in today’s strategic environment. Therefore, the United States may conduct unconventional warfare to change their regimes to deny sanctuary. Furthermore, the United States may conduct unconventional warfare operations to support a shadow or exiled government to overthrow the existing rogue regime. For example, the United States conducted unconventional warfare operations from October to December 2001 in Afghanistan while supporting the Northern Alliance to defeat the rogue Taliban government. The United States participated through its Special Operations Forces and Other Government Agencies in the overthrow because the Taliban government was providing sanctuary for Al Qaeda, which is a transnational terrorist organization that carried out devastating attacks on September 11, 2001 against the United States. This is a great example of how the United States conducted unconventional war to change a hostile, aggressive regime, which led to a general war that is still being conducted there today.⁴

The U.S. Department of Defense National Defense Strategy of 2008 addresses possibilities for the United States to conduct unconventional warfare operations in the future as well by stating, “The security of the United States is tightly bound up with the security of the broader international system. As a result our strategy seeks to build the capacity of fragile or

³Ibid., 3.

⁴Department of the Army, Training Circular (TC) 18-01, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare, 2011* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), 1-7.

vulnerable partners to withstand internal threats and external aggression while improving the capacity of the international system itself to withstand the challenge posed by rogue states and would-be hegemons.”⁵ Moreover, the National Defense Strategy of 2008 specifically addresses countering rogue states that threaten U.S. regional interests and maintaining the capabilities to defeat them by stating, “When we [the United States] are called upon, the Department [of Defense] must be positioned to defeat enemies employing a combination of capabilities, conventional and irregular, kinetic and non-kinetic, across the spectrum of conflict.”⁶ This statement definitely describes the possibility of the United States conducting UW operations if needed by any means available.

The Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense of 2012 signed by President Obama and the Secretary of Defense reestablishes defense priorities and spending over the next ten years.⁷ This document emphasizes the United States’ ability to conduct large-scale operations in one theater and respond to opportunistic aggressors in other regions as well. This will be done by a standing force or through a mobilized one.⁸ Thus, these methods to deter and defeat aggression are paramount to conducting UW operations as these conflicts may arise because of opportunistic extremists seizing control of a failed state. Last, this document specifically states that the U.S. will be, “able to secure territory and populations and facilitate transition to a stable governance on a small scale for a limited period using standing forces,” in

⁵White House, *National Defense Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 6.

⁶*Ibid.*, 13.

⁷Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012) ii.

⁸*Ibid.*, 4.

order to deter and defeat aggression.⁹

The Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Admiral McRaven, states that special operations forces (SOF) are well suited to meet the challenges and opportunities identified in the Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.¹⁰ He states that SOF is prepared to conduct indirect approaches to defeat extremist organizations (could include regimes) by engaging key populations and partners to improve their capabilities to generate sufficient security and rule of law, address their needs, and advance ideas that discredit and defeat the appeal of extremism.¹¹ Moreover, Admiral McRaven explains that CA units such as Civil Military Support Elements (CMSE) are key non-kinetic elements that are essential in conducting continuous indirect operations that are decisive in the global security arena.¹² These CA forces are currently employed in 17 countries and will be operating in more than 30+ countries by FY 2017.¹³ As the general war dies down in Afghanistan, these SOF CA forces will continue to play larger roles in UW operations.

The Department of Defense Directive 3000.07 states that, “it is DoD policy to extend U.S. reach into denied areas and uncertain environments by operating with and through indigenous foreign forces.”¹⁴ Thus, it is favorable for U.S. forces to conduct UW operations by supporting foreign forces such as training and advising guerrilla forces, shadow governments, and

⁹Department of Defense, *Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, 4.

¹⁰Admiral William H. McRaven, USSOCOM Posture Statement before the 112th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, March 2012.

¹¹Ibid, 6.

¹²Ibid., 9.

¹³Ibid., 9.

¹⁴Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare (IW)* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 8.

governments-in-exile to promote U.S. interests and freedom of movement. Moreover, the directive explains that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will, “direct joint education and annual training, exercises, concept development, and experimentation to ensure the U.S. Armed Forces are prepared to plan, conduct, and sustain campaigns involving IW-related activities and operations including unconventional warfare.”¹⁵ Thus, Combatant Commanders (CCDR) and the Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) will identify Irregular Warfare-related requirements and develop capabilities for the United States to reach denied areas working by, with, and through indigenous foreign forces conducting low-visibility operations.¹⁶

Resistance Movements and Insurgencies

Unconventional warfare is an ancient form of warfare that is still used today. It is predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. U.S. Army doctrine explains that UW is, “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla in a denied area.”¹⁷ It includes, but is not limited to activities such as guerrilla warfare subversion, sabotage, and intelligence activities.¹⁸ Unconventional warfare occurs mainly in civil or revolutionary war pitting two rivals for power

¹⁵Ibid., 8.

¹⁶Ibid., 9-10.

¹⁷USASOC Message DTG 301314Z, Jun 09, Subject: UW Definition: Commanders of USSOCOM and USASOC approved the definition in June 2009 which they directed the Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) to rescind the existing UW publications, FM 3-05.130, and publish new doctrine.

¹⁸Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 2009), I-11.

over a territory and people.¹⁹ David Galula describes these conflicts as mainly internal ones although they may have external influences.²⁰

There are many types of insurgencies that have different goals; stress certain causes; develop various strategies to strengthen themselves organizationally; mobilize popular support; and ultimately overthrow or disrupt the incumbent government. Therefore, this monograph will examine each of these through theoretical, historical, and doctrinal literary works. First, the types of insurgencies will be examined as insurgency theorist, Bard O’Neill states, “The first question an analyst must answer is what type of insurgency are we dealing with? In answering that question, we will be aware of the several types, their differences, and their goals.”²¹

The U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s *Casebook on Insurgencies* defines a type of insurgency that will be covered in this monograph, which includes those that seek to drive out a foreign power from their area.²² Examples of this type of insurgencies include the Afghan Mujahedeen against the Soviets in the 1980s; the Viet Cong against the Government of South Vietnam and the United States occupation during the 1960s and 1970s; and Hezbollah against the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel during the 1980s and later.²³ The United States traditionally supported these types of insurgencies in the past especially in World War II

¹⁹David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 1.

²⁰*Ibid.*, 1.

²¹Bard O’Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, 19.

²²Paul J. Tompkins, Jr. and Chuck Crosset, *Casebook on Insurgencies and Revolutionary Warfare: Volume II 1962-2009* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), xiii.

²³*Ibid.*, 426, 427, 459, 525.

by supporting resistance movements against Nazi Germany and Japan.²⁴

Successful insurgencies and resistance movements use military power to achieve political goals as Mao Tse-tung states, “Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military affairs and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other.”²⁵ Therefore, insurgencies and resistance movements must subordinate military/guerrilla force to achieve political goals. These goals are to achieve the insurgency’s or resistance movement’s objectives, which is to mobilize popular support. David Galula calls the population an insurgency’s objective and Mao states there can be no guerrilla warfare without the sympathy, cooperation, and assistance of the people.²⁶ Insurgencies and resistance movements achieve popular support mainly through a cause. David Galula states that an insurgency is formidable with a cause and, “the best cause for the insurgent’s purpose is one that, by definition, can attract the largest number of supporters and repel the minimum of opponents.”²⁷ The cause may be rooted in social, economic, and racial problems.²⁸ Or a cause could be to expel an invading force as Paul J. Tompkins, Jr. explained earlier in this monograph. In either case, an insurgency or resistance movement must apply a strategy to exploit the cause to mobilize popular support and overthrow the incumbent government.

Bard O’Neill describes four insurgent strategies or strategic approaches that insurgencies can use to achieve their goals. Two of these will be discussed in this monograph including the

²⁴Aaron Bank, *From OSS to Green Beret: The Birth at Special Forces* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986), 149-51.

²⁵Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Classic House Books, 2009), 39.

²⁶David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 4; and Mao Tse-tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, 3-4.

²⁷*Ibid.*, 12-13.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 14.

conspiratorial and protracted popular war strategy as they maybe two viable ones for the U.S. in unconventional warfare operations. The first strategy is the conspiratorial strategy which seeks to remove ruling authorities through a limited but swift force like a coup.²⁹ David Galula describes this as a Bourgeois-Nationalist Pattern (unorthodox) or short cut to overthrow a ruling regime.³⁰ The assumption with this strategy is that the ruling party must be overthrown in order to change policies and the political system, which the insurgency deems illegitimate.³¹ This type of strategy was practiced by the Soviets (committees) in the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution where Lenin, the party leader, informed the masses that the ruling monarchy was undergoing a general crisis and it could be overthrown easily.³²

The second strategy is the protracted popular war. This strategy is the most popular strategy in the last 50 years and was prescribed by Mao Tse-tung.³³ Mao used this strategy from the 1930s to 1940s against the Japanese invaders in China in World War II and then against the Chinese ruling party, the Kuomintang.³⁴ This type of strategy is long in duration because it depends on gaining support from the masses and allows military and political forces to develop to a point where they can rival the incumbent government's capabilities. Mao described three overlapping stages to carry out this strategy including strategic defense, strategic statement, and strategic offensive.³⁵ Mao explained that revolutionary political and military forces will start as

²⁹Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, 46.

³⁰David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 39-40.

³¹Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, 46.

³²*Ibid.*, 46-47.

³³*Ibid.*, 49.

³⁴*Ibid.*, 49.

³⁵Mao Tse-Tung, *On Protracted War* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1967), 34.

inferior to the incumbent government power but, eventually through popular support the revolutionary forces would gradually equal and then overpower the incumbent government's military and political forces.³⁶

This monograph will focus on the political effort of the protracted popular war strategy. Bard O'Neill states that Mao used this strategy to detach the people from the incumbent government (stressed in Mao's first stage). Bard O'Neill states that insurgencies do this by, "appealing to population based on their ideology, material grievances, and the insurgent rulers try to provide social services and engage in mutual self-help projects to demonstrate their sincerity and to gain acceptance and support."³⁷ This approach not only institutionalizes insurgent support but also strengthens the shadow government that will provide control of the population.³⁸

Like Mao Tse-tung in Bard O'Neill's explanation of the protracted popular war strategy, theorists such as Zachariah Mampilly emphasize that insurgencies compete against incumbent governments mainly for governance and security.³⁹ He states that insurgent groups and resistance movements organize under a cause that addresses the population's need for better governance or security. Some insurgent groups and resistance movements will attempt to provide the people what the incumbent government cannot provide in order to generate popular support.⁴⁰ At the same time, insurgent groups will use subversion against the incumbent government to highlight the incumbent government's inefficiency and unresponsiveness to answer the needs of the population. Consequently, the incumbent government starts to lose popular support because the

³⁶Ibid., 40-44.

³⁷Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, 51.

³⁸Ibid., 51.

³⁹Zachariah Mampilly, *Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 2011), 8.

⁴⁰Ibid., 8.

insurgent group provides a better alternative. Therefore, resistance movements do more than out-fight an incumbent government militarily, they attempt to out-govern the incumbent government as Bernard Fall, a French counterinsurgency theorist, wrote in 1965 regarding the Vietminh insurgency in French Indochina.⁴¹ Thus, the insurgency and resistance movements may employ their government and political system with further ease after the revolution since they already have a system in place.

Most successful insurgencies and resistance movements attempt to gain outside support. David Galula explains that outside support is a key prerequisite to insurgencies and resistance movements in the middle and late stages of the movement.⁴² He states that forms of external support can be moral, political, technical, financial, and/or military support.⁴³ Support to insurgencies can come from diasporas, nation-states, or nonstate actors. For example, nations such as the Iran, China, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), and the United States have provided funding, material, training, advice, and assistance to support successful resistance movements such as Hezbollah, the Viet Cong, and Afghanistan Mujahedeen, and others.⁴⁴ Insurgents must turn to these sympathizer-nations to gain political and military support in order to maintain or generate support from the population to overthrow incumbent regimes.⁴⁵

Last, David Galula, in his book *Counterinsurgency*, sums up how most successful insurgencies defeat incumbent regimes. He describes this success in a five-step Orthodox Pattern or the Communist pattern. First, they responded or created grievances to act as a vanguard for a

⁴¹David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press), 149.

⁴²David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 28.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 25-26.

⁴⁴Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), 139-152.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 139.

pressing cause.⁴⁶ Second, they strived to organize themselves politically in order to harness popular and political support across a broad front.⁴⁷ Third, they developed and organized their guerrilla forces to fight and subvert the incumbent government's forces.⁴⁸ Fourth, they expanded their territorial and political influence and developed a regular army to fight along with guerrilla forces against the incumbent government.⁴⁹ Fifth, they were able to overthrow the incumbent government through their military assets, strengthened political structure (shadow government), and ability to mobilize the population because the incumbent government was already weakened to the point where it could no longer govern or fight effectively.⁵⁰

In the first through the fifth phase of Galula's orthodox pattern, insurgent groups do more than simply inflict military losses on the enemy but they also destroyed the legitimacy of the incumbent government and established a rival governmental system through the creation of 'parallel hierarchies.'⁵¹ Insurgency groups such as the Tamil Tigers, Taliban, Viet Cong, and Hezbollah created shadow governments to mobilize the population by providing security, rule of law, governance, public services, and economic programs (see Figure 1 below).

⁴⁶David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 11-16, 30-31.

⁴⁷Ibid., 31.

⁴⁸Ibid., 32-36.

⁴⁹Ibid., 36-38.

⁵⁰Ibid., 39.

⁵¹Eqbal Ahmad, "Revolutionary Warfare and Counterinsurgency" In *Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan*, edited by Gerard Chaliand (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982), 241-262. Also see figures 6 and 7 of this monograph that illustrate the parallel hierarchies that the Viet Cong and Hezbollah employed.




Figure 1. Resistance Movement Counter-regime Operations

Source: Created by author.

U.S. Support to Unconventional Warfare Activities

External support is necessary in a well-developed resistance movement and insurgency as theorists such as David Galula, Bard O'Neill, Mao Tse-tung, and Zachariah Mampilly prescribe. The U.S. President may direct appropriate executive branch officials through the National Security Council to provide support to a resistance movement by employing resources within the instruments of national power: diplomacy, information, military, economic, finance, intelligence, or law enforcement.⁵² U.S. military units from the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) are normally assigned to provide support to resistance movements as the military instrument of national power. The United States Army employs units and personnel from the U.S. Special Operations Command (USASOC), which provides Special Operation Forces including Special Forces, Military Information Support, and CA units to advise, train, and assist resistance

⁵²Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-05.130, *Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), 2-1.

movements to gain influence and power. These operations and activities are called UW, which is one of the seven core operations of U.S. Army SOF (see figure 2).⁵³

Core Activities	Core Operations
1. Special Operations Forces Sustainment	1. Unconventional Warfare
2. Interdiction and Offensive Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations	2. Foreign Internal Defense
3. Hostage Rescue and Recovery	3. Counterinsurgency
4. Preparation of the Environment	4. Counterterrorism
5. Civil Affairs Operations	5. Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
6. Military Information Support Operations	6. Stability Operations
7. Special Reconnaissance	7. Support to Major Combat Operations and Campaigns
8. Direct Action	
9. Security Force Assistance	

Figure 2. Special Operations Core Activities and Operations

Source: Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 3-05, *Special Operations* (August, 2012), 2-1.⁵⁴

U.S. Army doctrine describes U.S. Government (USG) support to UW operations. This includes indirect support, direct support, and combat support. First, indirect support is used when overt U.S. support to a resistance movement is undesirable.⁵⁵ Thus, the U.S. government supports coalition or allied partners logistically or through training to conduct UW operations. Second, the U.S. government uses direct support for those UW operations that are less controversial in order to provide training and logistical support to a resistance movement.⁵⁶ Last, the U.S. government may provide combat support to provide both direct and indirect support and combat operations to

⁵³U.S. Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-05, *Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 2-1.

⁵⁴Department of the Army, Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-05, *Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), 2-1.

⁵⁵Ibid., 1-2.

⁵⁶Ibid., 1-2 – 1-3.

a resistance movement.⁵⁷

Next, the U.S. Army UW doctrine describes the characteristics that external actors such as the U.S. seek in resistance movements. Resistance movements have to display a willingness to cooperate with the U.S.; they have to have compatible objectives and ideology with U.S. interests; and they must be capable of resistance leadership before the United States will support them.⁵⁸ Moreover, these doctrinal references give examples of how U.S. forces evaluate the resistance movements to ensure their objectives are feasible U.S. objectives.⁵⁹

Then, the U.S. Army UW doctrine explains characteristics and the ways that the U.S. conducts UW in a general war or limited war scenario.⁶⁰ Unconventional warfare operations in a general war scenario happen when a superpower supports a resistance movement against a regime only to allow the superpower to buy time to engage in a general war immediately afterward. An example of this type of unconventional warfare is when the United States employed U.S. Special Operations Forces to support the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to defeat the Taliban Regime. Immediately following the Taliban's defeat, the United States deployed regular conventional units to engage in a general war against Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Afghanistan from 2002 to today.

The United States has also conducted a limited type of unconventional warfare as well. The limited war is a type of unconventional warfare operation that takes the form of supporting a resistance movement through a prolonged period of time and avoids engaging in general war

⁵⁷Ibid., 1-3.

⁵⁸Ibid., 1-5.

⁵⁹Ibid., 1-7.

⁶⁰Department of the Army, Training Circular (TC) 18-01, *Special Forces Unconventional Warfare* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2011), 1-7 to 1-8.

against the targeted regime.⁶¹ The reasons for a limited war are not only to avoid general war but also to avoid an erosion of internal public support of the superpower conducting it. Superpowers or other powers such as the United States, China, and the Soviet Union conducted these types of wars to spread either democratic or communist ideology for world domination. Examples include China supporting the Vietminh against France in the 1940s and 1950s in French Indochina. These types of wars are mostly protracted wars.

Last, U.S. Army UW doctrine explains the seven phases in which UW operations are carried out. The seven-phase UW framework is a conceptual construct that should not be confused with phase development through which friendly resistance forces progress in an operation.⁶² The first phase is when U.S. forces prepare for UW operations and is known as the preparation phase. The second phase is when U.S. forces make initial contact with the resistance movement and is called the initial contact phase. The third phase is when U.S. forces infiltrate into the targeted country to support the resistance movement and is known as the infiltration phase. The fourth phase is the organization phase where U.S. special operations forces organize, train, and equip the resistance movement. The buildup phase is the fifth phase where U.S. Special Operations Forces assist the resistance movement leaders to expand their organization and influence. Guerrilla and resistance movement forces conduct combat operations until the end of hostilities or link up with regular forces in the employment phase or the sixth phase. Last and finally, the transition phase or seventh phase is where insurgent forces revert to national control, demobilize, and shift to regular forces.⁶³

⁶¹Ibid., 1-7.

⁶²Ibid., 1-8.

⁶³Ibid., 1-9.

Review of the Three Types of CA Units

CA forces are an integral part of army forces. A recent history of CA forces written by Kathleen H. Hicks and Christine E. Wormuth details the historical uses of CA, U.S. CA missions today, and U.S. military capabilities for civil military operations (CMO).⁶⁴ Their report also articulates how active duty and reserve CA forces split.

Prior to 2006, both reserve and active forces and personnel were assigned to the U.S. Army CA and Psychological Command (USACAPOC). In 2006, General Peter Shoomaker made the split between active duty and reserve CA personnel and units. All active duty units were assigned to the U.S. Army Special Operations of Command (USASOC) and reserve units assigned to USACAPOC. The USASOC CA command became the 95th CA Brigade (Airborne), which would eventually have five battalions that support each of the five combatant commanders (COCOM). Therefore, active duty units would support special operations units and would be assigned under a special operations command and the reserve units would support general-purpose (e.g. conventional) forces and be assigned to a general-purpose force unit, USACAPOC.

The main differences between reserve and special operation active duty forces is that reserve officers are specialists and active duty officers are generalists. Reserve officers are specialized in one of the six categorical areas under rule of law, economic stability, infrastructure, governance, public health and welfare, and publication education and information. However, active duty CA forces would soon specialize in the near future.

On September 16, 2011, active duty CA forces split just as the reserve and active duty was split seven years prior. The split of active duty CA forces resulted in an additional CA brigade including the SOF CA brigade, the 95th CA Brigade (Airborne) and the General Purpose

⁶⁴Kathleen H. Hicks and Christine E. Wormuth, "The Future of U.S. Civil Affairs: A Report of CSIS International Security Program," (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), 32-40.

Forces CA brigade, the 85th CA Brigade which is assigned to the U.S. Forces Command (USFORSCOM).⁶⁵ Like the 95th CA Brigade (A), the 85th CA Brigade would have five battalions, in which each battalion supports a Geographic Combatant Command (GCC).

The three CA forces, the reserve component and the two active duty components, train and conduct all five of the CA core tasks. However, this monograph will focus on SOF CA units of the 95th CA Brigade (Airborne) and how they can support unconventional warfare.

METHODOLOGY

This monograph examines the utility of CA units and personnel employed in unconventional warfare (UW) operations. The hypothesis formed by the primary research question is that CA units and personnel can plan and conduct civil military operations (CMO) in UW operations by working with, through, and by revolutionary forces' shadow governments to mobilize the population. It is important to understand throughout this monograph that unconventional warfare is a type of irregular warfare.⁶⁶ The reader will understand the analysis and findings of this monograph better by keeping these differences in mind.

The first part of the methodology describes CA organizations, tasks, and how they integrate and conduct operations with special forces (SF) in unconventional warfare operations. For example, CA companies conduct unconventional warfare exercises with Special Forces battalions and tactical military information support teams (MIST) periodically. These exercises are designed to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures in accordance with doctrine and adjusted nuances of the operational environment. These exercises are also designed to integrate lethal and non-lethal force in certain UW scenarios, which help drive force requirements such as

⁶⁵Rachel Parks, "85th CA Bde activates at Hood," Fort Hood Sentinel, September 22, 2011.

⁶⁶Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 189, 383.

personnel, equipment, and training that are needed to successfully assist revolutionary forces to overthrow a hostile government.

The second step in the methodology is to give examples through case studies of how shadow governments planned and conducted civil military operations using CA-like tasks to compete for governance and mobilize the population. This monograph will use case studies from the successful insurgent movements including the Vietcong in the Vietnam War in the 1950s and 1960s and an insurgency that is succeeding today including Hezbollah in Lebanon. The reason that these case studies are used is because they show how the insurgent leaders built and maintained a strong civil administration and employed programs that out-competed or are out-competing against the incumbent government for popular support.

Third and finally, the last step in the methodology is analyzing the findings regarding the hypothesis: *CA units and personnel can plan and conduct civil military operations in support of insurgencies*. The purpose of this step is to observe insurgent groups' actions in the case study through the lens of the CA task of support to civil administration (SCA) to see if U.S. Special Operations CA may plan and conduct civil military operations similarly (i.e. mostly by advising and assisting). Moreover, this monograph will recommend better tactics, techniques, and procedures based on the findings of the case studies to employ CA forces in UW operations in the future.

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES CIVIL AFFAIRS

U.S. Special Operations Forces Civil Affairs Capabilities

U.S. Special Operations Forces CA units have a unique capability to support resistance movements in unconventional warfare operations. First, Special Operations Forces CA units have tailorable and scalable organizational capabilities to carry out support to other SOF units and revolutionary forces in UW operations. Second, CA personnel have or may attain the cultural knowledge, language abilities, and regional knowledge. Third, CA personnel are trained to plan

and conduct CA operations (CAO) to establish and maintain the relationship between security forces, interagency entities, NGOs, intergovernmental and international organizations, civil authorities, and indigenous populations and institutions to prevent friction and achieve unity of effort.⁶⁷ Moreover, SOF CA forces may assist in conducting activities and functions with other military forces that are normally the responsibility of local government.⁶⁸

Last, CA soldiers are trained to conduct negotiations and mediations, CAO project management, and coordinate with international civilian response organizations. These capabilities make CA forces adaptable and suitable for special operations core operations such as unconventional warfare operations.

U.S. Special Operations Forces Civil Affairs Organization

The 95th CA Brigade (Airborne) from Ft. Bragg, North Carolina provides SOF CA forces to support the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). There are five subordinate battalions in the brigade. Each battalion is aligned to support each Geographic Combatant Commander's (GCC) Theater Special Operations Command (TSOC).

Each of the battalions from the 95th CA Brigade (Airborne) has six companies, which support the TSOC on a rotational basis. These companies consist of six CA teams (CAT) or civil military support elements (CMSE) and a civil military operations center (CMOC). The CA teams and civil military elements provide CA planning, execution, and assessing support to special operation forces and unified action partners (e.g. U.S. Embassy Country Teams, intergovernmental, and multinational partners).

The basic modular structure of a CA Team is composed of four personnel, which include a Captain (38A), Sergeant First Class (38B40), Staff Sergeant (38B30), and CA Medic (68W20)

⁶⁷U.S. Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-05, *Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2012), 2-7 to 2-8.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, 2-7.

as illustrated in figure 3. All members are noncommissioned or commissioned officers that have graduated from the CA Qualification Course (CAQC) or the Special Operations Medical Course. These teams convert in name only to a Civil Military Support Element (CMSE) as seen on figure 4.




Figure 3. Civil Affairs Team Organizational Chart.

Source: Created by author.⁶⁹

A Civil Military Support Element (CMSE) normally conducts shaping operations in theater security cooperation activities for the GCC and TSOC Commander. CMSEs may plan and conduct CMO throughout all of the six phases of joint operations. The Civil Affairs Operations manual, FM 3-57, defines the CMSE as a task-organized CA force that conducts civil-military engagement in a specified country or region. A civil-military support element is composed of a persistent-presence element of CA leaders/planners, and a presence-for-purpose element composed of a CA Team(s) that may include enablers (for example, health service support, engineer, etc.) who are task organized for a specific time to execute a coordinated mission.”⁷⁰ These civil military support elements may be used to support a shadow government or government-in-exile in support to unconventional warfare operations. A CA Team from the CMSE can be detached to support a UW team while the Persistent-Presence Element performs

⁶⁹FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 2-8.

⁷⁰Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, October 2011), 3-27.

other CA tasks to support the UW Task Force Commander. Figure 4 gives an example of a CMSE organizational structure.




Figure 4. CMSE Organizational Chart.

Source: Created by author.

Combatant Commanders and Joint Special Operations Task Force Commanders may employ a combination of both CA Teams and Civil Military Support Elements to support SOF and resistance movements in UW operations. For example, CA Teams can be employed with UW teams in UW Operations while the UW Task Force commander continuously uses the Civil Military Support Element (CMSE) in a U.S. embassy in a neighboring country to integrate other unified action partners to work with the shadow government or government-in-exile in promoting civic action programs or other civil military operations tasks to strengthen their organization and mobilize popular support. If the target country has a permissive environment, then CA Teams may be able to deploy with UW teams in any of the UW phases, if not, then ODA Teams will have to be trained or focused on conducting CA-like tasks guided by the commander and the CMSE.

U.S. Special Operations Forces Civil Affairs Tasks and Operations

CA units can plan and conduct CA operations (CAO) and civil military operations (CMO) in support of UW operations. The U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-57 defines CA operations as:

Those military operations conducted by CA forces that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations.⁷¹

And the U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-57 defines civil military operations as:

The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operation to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated CA, by other military forces, or by a combination of CA and other forces.

The difference between CAO and CMO is that CA forces plan and conduct CAO. Other forces may plan and conduct CMO, however, CA forces normally plan for CMO and other forces conduct it. To get a better understand, see figure 5 as it shows how CAO and CMO are related.

⁷¹Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), Glossary-5.




Figure 5. Civil Affairs Operations Relationships

Source: Created by author.⁷²

CA forces conduct five core tasks that support CMO or CAO in unconventional warfare operations. These tasks include population resource control (PRC), foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), civil information management (CIM), nation assistance (NA), and support to civil administration (SCA).⁷³ CA planners consider these core tasks to plan and conduct CA operations (CAO) and civil military operations (CMO) to support a number of military operations. Some operations may be planned by CA personnel and executed by other joint, international, intergovernmental, or multinational entities. The following are the CA core tasks:

First, population resource control consists of ensuring that the civil population and resources do not interfere with military operations.⁷⁴ Second, civil information management is a process where civil information is collected and used to understand the

⁷²Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-05, *Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), II-18.

⁷³Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 3-1.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, 3-2.

civil component to the operational environment.⁷⁵ Third, nation assistance is civil or military assistance (other than FHA) to a nation by U.S. forces to promote long-term regional stability.⁷⁶ Fourth, foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) is a tasks where humanitarian assistance is given to relieve or mitigate suffering due to a man-made or natural disaster. Fifth and finally, SCA is a military operation to support an established government or by establishing a military authority over an occupied population.⁷⁷

These tasks allow CA teams to support resistance movements and insurgencies through a variety of ways such as advising, training, and assisting them in gaining more influence through each of the five lines of counter-regime operations (see figure 1 on page 14). CA units can help link resistance movement policies to the relevant population through targeted civic action programs such as employment/jobs programs to prove that the movement has an answer to the failing economy. Also, SOF CA units can gain expertise through reserve and general-purpose active duty forces that specialized in governance, rule of law, public services, economic infrastructure and support, and foreign humanitarian assistance (see table 1 below). For example, the 95th CA Brigade (Airborne) has set up contracted training with the University of North Carolina for SOF CA teams and personnel to gain knowledge and experience in these functional specialty areas. These specialized CA personnel can provide resistance movement leadership with policy and administration recommendations to help them provide for the relevant population; mobilize other political organizations to join the resistance; strengthen the shadow government; and cause civil unrest toward the standing regime.

⁷⁵Ibid., 3-6.

⁷⁶Ibid., 3-13.

⁷⁷Ibid., 3-17.

Table 1. U.S. Army Civil Affairs Functional Specialties

Six Civil Affairs Functional Specialties Areas with 14 Functional Specialties					
Rule of Law	Economic Stability	Infrastructure	Governance	Public Health and Welfare	Public Education and Information
International Law	Economic Development	Public Works and Utilities	Public Administration	Public Health	Public Education
	Food and Agriculture	Public Transportation	Environmental Management	Cultural Relations	Public Information
	Civilian Supply	Public Communications	Public Safety		

Source: Created by author.⁷⁸

One of the most important CA tasks that will be stressed in this monograph for CA units and personnel to conduct is support to civil administration (SCA). This task is normally conducted during stability operations; however, it is very useful for CA units and personnel to employ while planning and executing civil military operations in support of insurgent groups in unconventional warfare operations for many reasons. First, support civil administration (SCA) tasks often integrate other CA tasks such as population and resource control, foreign humanitarian assistance, and nation assistance. Therefore, SCA consolidates the other ones into one integrated task system or effort. Second, SCA considers the major components of society that shadow governments and supporting forces must consider to strengthen their ability to address grievances and mobilize the population. Thus, SOF CA forces can aid shadow governments to increase their capability to out-compete with the incumbent government and seize power.

SCA consists of six task areas that coincide with six CA functional areas and eight sub-functional areas. These functional areas include rule of law, economic stability, infrastructure, governance, public health and welfare, and public education. Table 2 below describes the definition of each SCA task component.

⁷⁸Department of the Army, FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 2-18.

Table 2. U.S. Army Support to Civil Administration (SCA) Definitions.

U.S. Army Support to Civil Administration Definitions					
Rule of Law & Law Enforcement	Economic Stability	Infrastructure	Governance	Public Health and Welfare	Public Education and Information
Rule of law pertains to the fair, competent, and efficient development, application, and effective enforcement of the civil and criminal laws of a society through impartial legal institutions and competent corrections systems. This functional area includes judge advocates trained in international and comparative law as well as CA specialists in related subjects.	Economic stability pertains to the efficient management (for example, production, distribution, trade, and consumption) of resources, goods, and services to ensure the viability of a society's economic system. This discipline includes CA specialists in economic development, civilian supply, and food and agriculture.	Infrastructure pertains to designing, building, and maintaining the organizations, systems, and architecture required to support transportation, water, communications, and power. This discipline includes CA specialists in public transportation, public works and utilities, and public communication.	Governance pertains to creating, resourcing, managing, and sustaining the institutions and processes that govern, protect, and bring prosperity to a society. This discipline includes CA specialists in public administration, environmental management, and public safety areas.	Public health and welfare pertains to the systems, institutions, programs, and practices that promote the physical, mental, and social well-being of a society. This discipline includes CA specialists in public health and cultural relations.	Public education and information pertains to designing, resourcing, and implementing public education and public information programs and systems through media and formal education institutions. This discipline includes CA specialists in public education and civil information.

Source: Created by author.⁷⁹

CA forces conduct ten major tasks in SCA in CMO to support to supporting commanders and insurgent groups in UW operations. These tasks include the following per, FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*.⁸⁰

- (1) Identifying, validating, or evaluating shadow government (added by author) essential service infrastructure;
- (2) Assessing the needs of the shadow government (added by author) in terms of six CA functional areas;
- (3) Monitoring and anticipating future requirements of the shadow government (added by author) in terms of six CA functional areas;
- (4) Performing liaison functions between military and civilian agencies;
- (5) Coordinating and synchronizing collaborative interagency or multinational SCA operations;
- (6) Participating in the execution of selected SCA operations as needed or directed;
- (7) Performing quality control assessments of SCA operations as needed or directed;
- (8) Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of SCA operations;
- (9) Coordinating and synchronizing transition of SCA operations from military to shadow government (added by author) control; and
- (10) Initiating or refining CIM process with geospatial projects that depict affected populations and civil vulnerabilities.

The SCA tasks help organize how CA personnel can work with insurgent groups and

⁷⁹Department of the Army, FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 2-16 – 2-17.

⁸⁰Ibid., 3-18.

supporting commanders, organizations, and agencies to maximize the effects of civic projects and programs. Table 3 lists the recommendations, advice, and assistance that CA can provide per each of the six sub-SCA tasks.

Table 3. U.S. Army Support to Civil Administration (SCA) Tasks

U.S. Army Support to Civil Administration Tasks					
Rule of Law & Law Enforcement	Economic Stability	Infrastructure	Governance	Public Health and Welfare	Public Education and Information
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create security & stability for the civilian population by establishing effective and fair administration and enforcement of justice. • Evaluate, assist, or advise shadow government in developing decrees, codes, ordinances, and other measures to bring order. • Evaluate, assist, or advise shadow government re their laws to ensure compliance with international standards • Evaluate legal training to shadow government judges, lawyers, and legal advisors. • Evaluate legal & administrative procedures. • Determine which shadow government office and functions have legal authority to evaluate, reform, and implement the law. • Advise U.S. military commanders and others the status of shadow government legal system and its compliance with international standards and provide recommended reforms. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide recommendations how to assist in the efficient management of resources, goods, and services to enhance the viability of the society's economic system. • Advise and assist in identifying and assessing food and agricultural systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities. • Advise and assist in monitoring and assessing the indigenous economy, economic systems, commercial activities, agencies, services, personnel, and resources. • Advise and assist in identifying and assessing public and commercial supply systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide recommendations and, when appropriate, directions to maintain, sustain, and improve the indigenous public systems and services, such as transportation, utilities, communications, and postal systems. • Advise and assist in identifying and assessing shadow government public and commercial transportation systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources. • Advise and assist in identifying and assessing shadow government/ incumbent government public and commercial works and utilities systems, agencies, services, and facilities. • Advise and assist in identifying and assessing shadow government / incumbent government and commercial communications systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide planning assistance to the supported command in creating, resourcing, managing, and sustaining the institutions and process that govern, protect, and bring prosperity to a society. • Advise and Assist in identifying and assessing shadow government public administration systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources. • Advise, and assist in identifying and assessing indigenous public safety systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources. • Advise and assist in identifying and assessing shadow government environmental and pollution control systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide planning assistance to the supported command in creating, resourcing, managing, and sustaining the institutions and processes through which a society maintains the physical, mental, and social health of it people. • Advise and assist in identifying and assessing indigenous public institution's public and private health systems, animal husbandry systems, sanitations systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities. • Advise and assist on shadow government's social and cultural matters and determine the impact of those matters on social well-being of the society and the possible effects on Civil Affairs Operations or Civil Military Operations (e.g. identifying cultural property; protecting/ preserving/ or restoring cultural property; estab./ maintaining/ operating cultural property. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide planning assistance to the supported command in designing, resourcing, and implementing public education and information programs and systems through media and formal education institutions. • Advise and assist in identifying and assessing shadow government public, parochial, and private education systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources. • Advise and Assist in identify and assessing mass communications themes and the impact on inform and influence objectives.

Source: Created by author (information inside the table is from Department of the Army, FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, Oct 2011).⁸¹

Table 4 gives examples of projects and programs that CA forces can plan and supporting forces and insurgent groups can conduct during UW operations. Consequently, CA units will advise, assist, recommend, and conduct civic action projects and programs that support insurgent group goals. Moreover, the insurgent groups out-compete against the incumbent government for

⁸¹Department of the Army, FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 2-18 – 2-26.

popular support through a clear method, by dividing efforts into six civil functional areas.

Table 4. U.S. Army Civic Action Programs per Support to Civil Administration (SCA) Tasks

U.S. Army Civic Action Programs per Support to Civil Administration Tasks					
Rule of Law & Law Enforcement	Economic Stability	Infrastructure	Governance	Public Health and Welfare	Public Education and Information
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Refurbish courts • Advise and assist in establish court records system. • Refurbish prisons and detention facilities. • Advise and assist in legal correction systems products and components 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase or improve production of animals, grain, or vegetable food products • Insect and rodent control • Transportation of agricultural produce, seeds, and fertilizers • Construction of simple irrigation and drainage systems • Engineering grading operations • Forestry activities such as planting, thinning, and harvesting • Setting up and operating saw mills • Devising and constructing flood controls • Reclamation of land and draining of swamps • Harvesting of crops 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assessment and development of acceptable sand and gravel resources for road work and general construction • Installation, operation, and maintenance of telephone, telegraph, and radio systems • Construction of housing and buildings • Setting up and operating emergency communications centers • Construct, repair, or improve roads and bridges, railway equipment, inland waterways, wharves, and harbors, airfields. • Removal of individuals from disaster areas. • Provide safe water supply systems • Provide advice and assistance on best methods of informing the people through such devices as publications, film, or broadcasting. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide guidance and assistance to public administrators in field of organization, personnel selection, work procedures. • Inspire confidence and enthusiasm for the shadow government through MISO, public information units, military bands, and any organization with a capability for public demonstration of esprit and military effectiveness • Provide guidance and assistance to public safety administrators in their police, fire protection, and civil defense activities, including disaster relief. • Advise and assist in establishing party by-laws. • Advise and assist in production and recording of vital records, civil registration, identification cards, and arms registration. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Eradicate malaria and other insect-transmitted diseases • Teach sanitation, personal hygiene, and first aid. • Prepare plans, surveying, and construction supervision and assistance for houses and community building such as schools, civic centers, churches, orphanages, medical centers, etc. • Sponsorship of worthy community projects such as orphanages, schools, and medical centers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide books for basic education (i.e. reading and writing) • Provide technical training • Provide instructors for schools for basic education to youth and technical training for adults. • Refurbish schools

Source: Created by author (Information inside the table is from Department of the Army, FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 2 May 1957 thru today.⁸²

Case studies of insurgent groups including the Viet Cong and Hezbollah will be covered next. The following case studies will cover how they conducted CA-like tasks such as SCA to strengthen their shadow government and mobilize political and popular support. These tasks will be organized in the six CA sub-tasks or functional areas to illustrate how they conducted their operations to out-compete their opposed incumbent government.

⁸²Department of the Army, FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*, 2 May 1957, 89-92. Note that FM 41-10 information on this table is the same information in the 1962, 1969, and 1972 versions as well. Moreover, CA forces can plan and conduct these projects today.

INSURGENCY CASE STUDIES

The Viet Cong Case Study

The Viet Cong was an insurgent group led by Nguyen Huu Tho, the National Liberation Front Party Chairman.⁸³ The Viet Cong was supported *and really led* by a nation-state called the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), also known as North Vietnam, whose leader was Ho Chi Minh. The political party name given to the Viet Cong was the National Liberation Front. North Vietnam employed the Viet Cong in South Vietnam against the Government of Vietnam (GVN) and the United States during the 1950s through the 1970s during the Vietnam War.

The Vietnam War pitted North Vietnam against South Vietnam and its external supporters, mainly the United States. North Vietnam's goal was to unify both Vietnamese governments under one rule and expel the United States from its territory. North Vietnam had won its independence from France in 1954 by a Geneva Peace Accord.⁸⁴ The Accord split South and North Vietnam along the 17th parallel giving the Vietminh sovereignty over the North and the Government of Vietnam rule over the South. The North Vietnamese government was communist and the United States advised and assisted the Government of Vietnam to deter and prevent the spread of communist aggression.

The North Vietnamese government was communist and the United States feared that communist superpowers such as the Soviet Union and China would achieve regional and global dominance through communism. The North Vietnamese government was supported by these superpowers in material and ideology during the Vietnam War. In turn, the North Vietnamese government led the Viet Cong insurgency politically and militarily through political organization,

⁸³William Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960-1964* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press), 119.

⁸⁴Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam* (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1966), 51.

manpower, equipment, and funding.

The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong strategy was to establish control in South Vietnam and wear down the Government of Vietnam's capacity to govern and defend itself as well as exhaust the will of the United States. North Vietnam and the Viet Cong exercised Vo Nyugen Giap's protracted war strategy, a nuanced Mao Tse-tung approach called the Dau Tranh (i.e. political struggle).⁸⁵ The Dau Tranh strategy was an integrated political and military struggle. The political struggle included three components: Dan Van or action among your people; Binh Van or action among enemy military; and Dich Van or action among enemy's people.⁸⁶ The military struggle strategy also included Mao Tse-tung's three phases of insurgency operations. The first is the strategic defense or the latent phase in which the resistance movement organized and prepared its political and military structure and conducted minor guerrilla warfare operations. The second phase of Mao's protracted war is the strategic stalemate phase or the guerrilla warfare phase. The resistance movement would start committing larger regular forces in conventional warfare while still conducting guerrilla warfare. The third and last phase of Mao's protracted war strategy is the strategic counter-offensive or the conventional warfare phase in which resistance movement starts conducting more conventional or general warfare operations against the enemy.⁸⁷

The Viet Cong executed this strategy politically by creating a broad unified front among the South Vietnamese population under the First Secretary of the Dan Lao Dong (The Vietnam Workers' Party, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's official party), Le Duan.⁸⁸ This political organization oversaw and directed the activities of the National Liberation Front in South

⁸⁵Ibid., 86.

⁸⁶Ibid., 86.

⁸⁷Mao Tse-tung, *On Protracted War*, 34.

⁸⁸George A. Carver, Jr., "The Real Revolution in South Viet-Nam," *Foreign Affairs* 43 (April, 1965), 406.

Vietnam.⁸⁹ The National Liberation Front was the central committee for all Viet Cong political activity in South Vietnam and was broken down into party committee echelons from the central, interprovincial, provincial, district, to the village level.⁹⁰ The central committees at each echelon controlled the provincial, district, and village Farmer's Liberation, Women's Liberation, and Youth Liberation Associations.⁹¹ These associations provided civil administration, ideological enforcement, information/intelligence, and education to the men, women, and children under Viet Cong controlled areas in South Vietnam. The Vietnam Workers' Party controlled each liberation association indirectly under the party's aegis, The People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) under the NLF.⁹² These people's liberation associations were organized at each level of National Liberation Front's shadow government from village to central level. Figure 6 graphically portrays how the Viet Cong's military and political organization was integrated at from the village level to the national level.⁹³

The first main association, the Farmers Liberation Association (FLA), was the fundamental organization that the National Liberation Front central committee (e.g. provincial, district, and village levels) depended on.⁹⁴ It was a revolutionary group of farmers with more members than the other two liberation associations, which was responsible for strengthening the Front while raising farmers' class-consciousness, and spreading the ideology of

⁸⁹William Andrews, *The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh Tuong Province, 1960-1964* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 39.

⁹⁰Ibid., 39.

⁹¹Ibid., 39.

⁹²Ibid., 39.

⁹³Ibid., 39-40.

⁹⁴Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong*, 167.

struggle.⁹⁵




Figure 6. Relationship of Vietnam Workers' Party to the NLF/Viet Cong.

Source: Michael Charles Conley, *The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of Organization and Strategy*, (Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 550-106, 1967).⁹⁶

FLA members had to keep in contact with at least three to four sympathizers, relatives, and friends with whom they could influence, thus widening the sphere of the party's influence. The FLA participated in emulation and movement campaigns (e.g. organized civil disturbance demonstrations); helped solve land tenure problems; and generally improved economic conditions in the village. In liberated areas, members were active in educational and medical programs in an

⁹⁵Ibid., 170.

⁹⁶Conley, Michael Charles, *The Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam: A Study of Organization and Strategy*, U.S. Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 550-106, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1967).

effort to increase farm production.⁹⁷

The second association in the National Liberation Front, the Women's Liberation Association (WLA), was organized in the same way as the Farmers Liberation Association. However, the WLA focused a majority of their efforts to persuade, and educate the masses and to win over the masses in three ways.⁹⁸ First, the WLA and its special-interest groups instituted several revolutionary support programs in which members served as surrogate mothers to the younger members of the guerrilla forces who were away from home. Second, the WLA encouraged soldiers who deserted to return back to the village. Third and finally, the WLA, like the FLA, made each member responsible for recruiting at least four nonparty members into the WLA in order to expand the revolution.⁹⁹

The third association in the National Liberation Front was the Youth Liberation Association (YLA). The YLA was organized in the same hierarchical fashion as the other two associations. The party was open to boys and girls from 16 to 25 years of age.¹⁰⁰ The association emphasized revolutionary roles of youth, declaring that its members were united for the purpose of "struggle against the Americans and Diem with the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam."¹⁰¹ The Youth Liberation Association's bylaws, like the FLA and WLA, outlined the four duties of each member to (1) make propaganda to awaken the young; (2) make education activities for young people and expand the recruitment of new members; (3) guide the young

⁹⁷Ibid., 170.

⁹⁸William Andrews, *The Village War*, 78

⁹⁹Ibid., 76.

¹⁰⁰Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong*, 185.

¹⁰¹Ibid., 184.

people who are nonmembers; and (4) educate and take care of the young people and children.¹⁰² Each cell in the Youth Liberation Association led children in learning revolutionary songs, poems, and stories of revolutionary youth heroes.¹⁰³ The propaganda section of the Central Committee's Civil Affairs (CA) Committee provided the input of cultural and educational materials.

The Viet Cong/National Liberation Party established central committees at each level (i.e. provincial, district, and village) as well, in which each central committee was made up of sections for military affairs, security, military proselytizing, finance, and CA.¹⁰⁴ First, the military affairs section trained and employed village guerrillas. Second, the military proselytizing section, like the FLA and WLA, induced members of the South Vietnamese armed forces to desert and join the Viet Cong. Third, the finance section excised taxes for the National Liberation Front and coordinated logistic support for the village guerrillas and regular forces. Fourth, the security section maintained village surveillance to detect the reappearance of any "reactionary" elements. Cadres reported any mistakes, errors, or evidence of "wrong-thinking" to the village party secretary.¹⁰⁵ Fifth and finally, the Civil Affairs Committee linked all liberation associations to the central committee to ensure their programs and tasks were linked to security and propaganda initiatives and to ensure all liberation associations engaged in the political struggle.¹⁰⁶ To do this, the CA Committee consisted of three sections including the propaganda section, the cultural

¹⁰²Michael Charles Conley, *Communist Insurgent Infrastructure*, 281-282.

¹⁰³William Andrews, *The Village War*, 79-80.

¹⁰⁴*Ibid.*, 94.

¹⁰⁵W.P. Davison, *Some Observations on Viet Cong Operations in the Villages* (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1967), 54.

¹⁰⁶Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong*, 114.

affairs section, and the education section.¹⁰⁷ The NLF party used the CA Committee to strengthen the party/Viet Cong by ensuring unity of effort among the party and its associations at each level. The main purpose of the CA Committee was to expand the NLF influence by mobilizing the population; organizing civil unrest; and identifying, punishing, and reforming internal and external dissenters and their leaders.

The NLF central committee at all levels directed and advertised social and economic programs such as the labor exchange and land reform programs; funeral payment programs, and education and health programs through its sections and associations. The political and military struggle executed by the Viet Cong was integrated and directed to support, observe, and exploit its population, the enemy's population, or the enemy's government and forces. For example, the land reform program divided rich landowner's lands to all party members to seed and harvest more crops. The central committees introduced labor exchange programs, which systematically imposed a collectivism economy by paying worker groups to work the land and conducting agro-engineering projects. The central committee also introduced the funeral payment program, which paid for the families' falling soldiers. Most important, the central committee provided education and health programs by providing materials and constructing schools and clinics.¹⁰⁸

The Viet Cong (NLF) provided the North Vietnamese government a valuable resource to create instability in the Government of Vietnam. The Viet Cong was instrumental in overthrowing the South Vietnamese government and expelling U.S. presence there because of their well-organized shadow government, effective civil administration, and clear strategic goals. It is important to consider how the Viet Cong organized their own strategic hamlet strategy that allowed North Vietnamese forces to build their regular army to eventually defeat the Republic

¹⁰⁷William Andrews, *The Village War*, 94.

¹⁰⁸Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong*, 278-294.

Armed Forces of the Vietnam in South Vietnam. Moreover, the Viet Cong's organized resistance movements allowed General Vo Nguyen Giap to coordinate the 1968 Tet Offensive which became a downward turning point for the United States in the Vietnam war.

Viet Cong programs and projects along with their political organizations and civil administration activities are in the realm of what U.S. Special Operations Forces CA forces can provide to a resistance movement in UW operations. CA forces would execute a majority of the central committee's tasks under the CA core task of SCA (see table 4). Moreover, the Viet Cong's CA Committee's tasks would also fall within the realm of the kind of projects and material donations that U.S. CA forces coordinate to provide today through humanitarian and military civic action and assistance programs.

Support to civil administration (SCA) sub-tasks such as rule of law, economic stability, infrastructure, governance, public health and welfare, and public education and information are all CA-type tasks in which CA units and personnel plan and conduct through CA operations (CAO) and civil military operations (CMO). Mainly, U.S. Army Reserve CA units and personnel specialize in one of the six CA functional areas; however, active duty CA units and personnel such as those assigned to U.S. Special Operations Forces (i.e. U.S. Army Special Operations Command) can (1) assess the needs of the insurgent group in terms of these functional areas; (2) monitor and anticipate future requirements of the insurgent group in terms of CA functional areas; (3) participate in the execution of selected operations in one or more of CA functional areas; (4) perform quality control assessments of costs in these functional areas through, with, and by the insurgent group; and (5) coordinate and synchronize transition of operations in these functional areas from the insurgent shadow government to their eventual government or international transitional government control (see table 4 on page 30).

The Viet Cong established rule of law internal to party members and external to villages as they established courts, law, and law enforcement procedures. The Viet Cong administered

justice at the interprovincial level by appointing a protection assistant at each provincial central committee headquarters, and at other levels.¹⁰⁹ The protection assistant dealt with cases of corruption, bad use of office, and bribery.¹¹⁰ The *kiem thoa* (“criticism-self-criticism session”) sessions corrected errors committed by party members and served as the Viet Cong’s rule of law and enforcement apparatus to control party members.¹¹¹ Party members brought out faults of others in this semi-court venue in which other party members would hear complaints and judge.¹¹²

The NLF’s People’s Court was another method to preserve rule of law and loyalty to the Viet Cong and National Liberation Front.¹¹³ Villagers accused of espionage were commonly sentenced to death through this venue by a twelve-member committee with each liberation association conferring the penalty.¹¹⁴ The Farmers Liberation Association handled civil cases on a quasi-judicial basis and the village liberation associations handled minor or petty crimes in the manner of a police court.¹¹⁵

As shown in table 5, how the Viet Cong organized and conducted CA-like tasks through SCA sub-tasks including economic stability, infrastructure, governance, public health and welfare, and public education and information are self-explanatory. The Viet Cong provided civil administration in their liberated areas to begin making fundamental social changes required for

¹⁰⁹Douglas Pike, *The Viet Cong*, 291.

¹¹⁰*Ibid.*, 291.

¹¹¹William Andrews, *The Village War*, 117.

¹¹²*Ibid.*, 117.

¹¹³*Ibid.*, 115.

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*, 115-117.

¹¹⁵Douglas Pike, *Viet Cong*, 291.

the creation of the new society it was to build in the future.¹¹⁶ This is exactly what CA units and personnel should work toward when planning and conducting civil military operations in support of unconventional warfare operations. In the process, CA units and personnel can strengthen the insurgent group's shadow government and also help it mobilize the population through a well-organized political/revolutionary movement (see table 5).

Table 5. Viet Cong/NLF Support to Civil Administration (SCA) Tasks

Viet Cong / National Liberation Front (NLF) Support to Civil Administration Tasks					
Rule of Law & Law Enforcement	Economic Stability	Infrastructure	Governance	Public Health and Welfare	Public Education and Information
<p>Courts. Protection Assistant investigated and tried crimes of party members at Provincial level.</p> <p>People's Court (Village) – Farmers Lib Association handled civil cases & village committee handled other crimes.</p> <p>Punishment Programs/Law Enforcement. Self-Criticism Program. Reduction in Prestige and Destruction of Oppression programs.</p>	<p>Economic Development (Food and Agriculture). Land Reform (Rent & Access); Collective Labor Exchange Programs; Price Controls exercised by taxation and land reform.</p> <p>Civilian Supply. Used the Emulation Program to increase food production and other needed materials to sustain the villages and military forces.</p>	<p>Public Works and Utilities. Used canal reconstruction programs to increase rice production.</p> <p>Public Communications. Used "jungle" post office system and radios to communicate with cadre at other villages, districts, and provinces. VC used several methods to communicate including mass media (T.V., publications, papers), leaflets, Radio (Voice of NLF), motion pictures to communicate.</p>	<p>Public Administration. Employed a taxation system that taxed agriculture goods, business profits, and property. Prevented GVN of collecting tasks as much as possible.</p> <p>Organized insurgent governmental structure at all levels of government.</p> <p>Employed emulation programs to increase indirectly increase insurgent government revenues.</p> <p>Organized combat hamlet system for control.</p> <p>Provided budget (1964, \$7.5m USD) for all sectors insurgent government and used Inspector Generals for auditing.</p> <p>Government Parties & Associations. All members of the village belonged to one.</p>	<p>Public Health. Villages had clinics, supplies, and trained cadre. Districts and above had elaborate medical installations (hospitals) with medical professionals and supplies (11 in Mekong Delta in 1964).</p> <p>Cultural Relations. The Cultural Liberation Association made up of artists, musicians, actors, poets, and play writers performed live art shows to villages and communicated messages in these shows authored by the DRV. Saw themselves as the defenders of their cultural as well.</p>	<p>Public Education. Established the Patriotic Teach Assoc. with a 30 member-committee to administer the curricula, print textbooks, and teacher selection criteria.</p> <p>Administered an adult education and literacy campaign that improved adult literacy and education.</p> <p>Public Information. Manipulated information beyond censorship. Forbade party members and military forces to listen to enemy broadcasts. Personal mail and newspapers were subject to censorship. The NLF provided a new frame of references for peasants: Radio Hanoi, Radio Peking. Printed papers such as Ap Bac, Nhan Dan. NLF renamed familiar landmarks (villages).</p>

Source: Created by author.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶Ibid., 269.

¹¹⁷The information in the table came from Douglas Pike's *Viet Cong* book from Chapter 15, Liberated Area: Program, and Chapter 16, Liberated Area: Administration, pp. 269-305; and from William Andrew's *The Village War* book Chapter VI Consolidation of Power, pp.104-128.

The Hezbollah Case Study

The Hezbollah terrorist organization began around 1982 in Beirut, Lebanon during the Lebanese civil war. Members of the disenfranchised Shi'a community grouped together to fight the foreign invaders, the Americans, who came to Lebanon to observe and instill peace in Lebanon. Many in Lebanon, especially among the Shi'a population, felt that the Americans were supporting the Christian government of Lebanon, its Christian leaders, and they were upset that the Americans were training and equipping the Lebanese Army which was mostly Christian.¹¹⁸ Therefore in October 1983, members of Hezbollah committed their first terrorist act and attacked the U.S. Marine Barracks at the Beirut Airport in Lebanon and killed 241 U.S. Marines.¹¹⁹ Consequently, the U.S. forces pulled out of Lebanon that same year which gave Hezbollah a strategic victory and elevated their stature among the Shi'a population.

Hezbollah carried on more terrorist acts from 1982 to 1992, mainly through border incursions with Israel. In 1992, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah left Amal, another terrorist organization, to join Hezbollah as their secretary general.¹²⁰ Iran's leader Ayatollah Khomeini and the military, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, provided support to Hezbollah in the form of financing equipment, arms, training, and social services throughout those years. Iran and Syria continue to support Hezbollah today. Therefore, Hezbollah's popular support, political, and military power base increased exponentially as the years passed with Iran's and Syria's financial support.

Hezbollah has transformed from Mao's classification of guerrilla warfare to one

¹¹⁸Max Boot, *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present* (New York, NY: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2013), 502.

¹¹⁹Max Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 501-503.

¹²⁰Augustus R. Norton, *Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul Lebanon* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1987), 104-105, 238.

employed by both guerrilla forces and regular army forces over the years. Thus, they were ready for action against Israel in July 2006.¹²¹ Israel would quickly find out in the 2006 war that Hezbollah would not be the enemy that it was prepared to fight against. Hezbollah transformed into what Mao Tse-tung would call the third phase, the strategic counter-offensive, as Hezbollah had a combination of regular and guerrilla forces ready for combat like the Viet Cong.¹²² Moreover, Hezbollah, in 2005, gained legitimate political power in the Lebanese government by gaining two seats in the Lebanese government cabinet and 14 seats in parliament.¹²³

In 2006, Hezbollah attacked Israel and kidnapped Israeli Self Defense Force (IDF) soldiers. This caused a 34-day conflict with Israel from July to August 2006. The conflict escalated when Hezbollah started firing 1200 Kaytusha rockets into Israel.¹²⁴ In response, the Israeli Defense Forces conducted an air campaign with precision attacks to destroy Hezbollah's rocket sites to no avail. Consequently, the Government of Israel authorized the IDF to conduct a ground campaign 25km inside Lebanon.¹²⁵ Again this was to no avail. The IDF was finally successful in incapacitating the rocket launch sites and the command and control systems of these rockets through their combined air and ground campaign. However, the IDF did more damage to south Lebanese infrastructure which caused thousands of displaced people during the conflict. Hezbollah capitalized on the apparent IDF mistreatment of the Shi'a population in south Lebanon

¹²¹Patrick Porter, *Military Orientalism*, 181.

¹²²Peter Mansoor and Williamson Murray, eds., *Hybrid Warfare: The Struggle of Military Forces to Adapt to Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

¹²³Natasha Lander, "Hezbollah: Organizational Analysis of an Insurgency," *The Michigan Journal of Public Affairs* 7, (Spring 2010), 5.

¹²⁴Patrick Porter, *Military Orientalism*, 181.

¹²⁵*Ibid.*, 172.

through their satellite news station Al-Manar (the Beacon in English).¹²⁶ Moreover, Hezbollah bolstered its image through its satellite broadcasts by showing Hezbollah's army attacking the IDF.

The UN passed a peace resolution in August 2006 to end the conflict. The Israeli Defense Forces withdrew from south Lebanon thus, giving Hezbollah a strategic victory for withstanding the invasion. Afterwards, many Middle Eastern countries donated large sums of money to aid Hezbollah in repairing its infrastructure after the 2006 war. For example, Hezbollah received donations from Iran (\$500 million) and from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (\$800 million). Moreover, Lebanon received \$1.5 billion to help rebuild south Lebanon and give the nation's currency a lift.¹²⁷

Hezbollah effectively controls south Lebanon today. Since the 2006 war, they have repaired the war-torn areas. Hezbollah continually provides social services in south Lebanon. Hezbollah continues to receive financial support from Iran and Syria. An important pillar of Islam also allows Hezbollah to receive religiously motivated donations from their diasporas around the world. This pillar is called *zakat* or act of charity which is a duty mandated by God to take care of the needs of the less fortunate.¹²⁸ It can be argued that the idea of social service or charity is a binding act or duty within this pillar of Islam, which requires Muslims to give 2.5 percent of their

¹²⁶Max Boot, *Invisible Armies*, 512.

¹²⁷Nicholas Blanford and Scott McLeod, "The War for Hearts and Minds." *Time Magazine* (September 2006) <https://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1376237,00>. (accessed February 7, 2013), 22.

¹²⁸Abdullah Yusuf Ali and Riasat Idarat al-Buhuth al-Ilmiyah wa-al-Ifta-wa-al-Dawah wa-al-Irshad (Saudi Arabia), *The Holy Quran: English Translation of the Meanings, and Commentary* (Al-Madinah Al-Munawarah: King Fahd Holy Quran Print, Complex, 1989-1990), 451, Tawbah 60 (verse).

net worth to charity annually.¹²⁹ Because Hezbollah is mainly a religious organization, the members of Hezbollah and the Shi'a sect of Islam believe it is their duty to support the head figure of the Shi'a sect of the Muslim faith, Ayatollah Khomeini (who resides in Iran) and the Hezbollah religious figurehead, Hassan Nasrallah. Therefore, it appears that the religious tones and Hezbollah's message seem to have no end in receiving a strong backing in popular, political, military, and financial support from the Shi'a sect of Islam.

Hezbollah seeks to destroy Israel and make Lebanon an Islamist republic and it has had this goal through its thirty-year old existence.¹³⁰ Its success is due to its organizational efficiency and its financial support from external governments and diasporas and the popular support it receives from under-represented Shi'a Muslims. Its focus is on providing basic services for the Lebanese population.¹³¹ First, Hezbollah's organizational structure will be explained and then, its social service section. Hezbollah has an effective and well-organized shadow government that competes with the Government of Lebanon.

Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General, and Naim Qassem, the Deputy Secretary General, lead Hezbollah through its Leadership Apparatus Shura Consultive Council. Hezbollah's organization consists of a military and a political apparatus (much like the Viet Cong's). The Military and Security Apparatus of Hezbollah is called the Jihad Council. This council is charged with military and security operations within Lebanon and globally to support Hezbollah's political goals.¹³² The Political and Administrative Apparatus provides political purpose, direction, and mobilization support through its Judicial Council, Parliamentary Council,

¹²⁹Ruth Katz, *The Hezbollah Doctrine* (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2006).

¹³⁰Natasha Lander, *Hezbollah: Organizational Analysis of an Insurgency*, 1-2.

¹³¹*Ibid.*, 2.

¹³²James B. Love, "Hezbollah: Social Services as a Source of Power" *Joint Special Operations University Report 10-5* (June 2010), 20.

Executive Council, and Political Council (Politburo). The Executive Council as shown in figure 7 is responsible for social, educational, health, syndication, finance, external relations, and engagement/coordination type functions.

The Hezbollah Shura (consultation in Arabic) Council supports (see table 7) the executive branch by running daily operations of the external relations, finance, and syndicate branches/units.¹³³ The external affairs branch works with Lebanese government agencies, political parties, and nongovernmental agencies in order for Hezbollah to influence them and tie in their support.¹³⁴




Figure 7. Hezbollah Organizational Structure.

Source: Ahmed Nizar Hamzeh, *In the Path of Hizbullah* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004)¹³⁵

¹³³Ibid., 20.

¹³⁴Ahmed Nizar Hamzeh, *In the Path of Hizbullah* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 48, 196.

¹³⁵Ibid., 46.

The finance branch collects, accounts, audits, and spends Hezbollah funds through the approval of the Shura and/or Executive Council.¹³⁶ The syndicate branch provides guidance to Hezbollah's representatives in various professional organizations (medical, legal, and political) with the goal of penetrating all aspects of society.¹³⁷ The syndicate branch influences and ties in support from the Lebanese unions and associates. The Shura not only influences and garners support from the Lebanese's government, unions and associations but also ensures that Hezbollah can be positioned to prevent splintering of their organization and ensures they are in line with their biggest supporter, Iran.¹³⁸ Now that the Shura has been covered regarding how it runs, the daily administration and political decisions of the party will be covered next. Specifically, the Information Council will be examined to explain its role in political and popular mobilization in Lebanon and throughout the world.

The Information Council gives Hezbollah the ability to shape perceptions of the conflict between Israel; gain military and political support; and attain assistance from local noncombatants.¹³⁹ The Information Council uses Hezbollah's vast media network including a satellite television channel, Al-Manar (The Beacon) and two major newspapers, Al-Intiqad ("The Objection") and an-Nour ("The Light) to undermine Israel; criticize the United States; and reinforce its nationalistic credibility.¹⁴⁰ Hezbollah's Information Council was successful in

¹³⁶Ibid., 62-63. The finance unit collects funds from four primary sources: Iran, Wali al-Faqui personal income payments, individual tithing/offerings or *zakat*, and legitimate investments through the free market economy.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 61.

¹³⁸James B. Love, "Hezbollah: Social Services as a Source of Power," 20.

¹³⁹Josh Lyons, "Hezbollah's Use of Arab Media to Galvanize Support," Urban Warfare Analysis Center (July 2008), 2.

¹⁴⁰Ibid., 4-6.

dominating the media war by portraying the Israeli Defense Force as an incompetent and brutal force without regard to humanity in the 2006 war. Conversely, the Information Council portrayed Hezbollah's Information Council continues to publicize two of Hezbollah's most successful initiatives army as organized, heroic, and effective against the IDF.¹⁴¹ Moreover, after the 2006 war, the Hezbollah conducted *Operation Sincere Promise* campaign which was designed to return all captured Lebanese soldiers to their homeland. Hezbollah also conducted the *Jihad for Reconstruction* (i.e. *Jihad Al-Binaa*), which is Hezbollah's outreach civic action program to rebuild south Lebanon from the damage it incurred from the 2006 war.¹⁴² The Information Council also informs Hezbollah's political bodies regarding desires and grievances of the population so Hezbollah may better link their projects and programs to Hezbollah's strategic goals. Hezbollah's Social Services Section puts the deeds in the Information Council's words to ensure that needed services respond to the population's desires and grievances. Thus, Hezbollah mobilizes the population to support Hezbollah above the Government of Lebanon.

The Social Services Section not only helps Hezbollah maintain influence over the population but also, helps Hezbollah garner support from nongovernmental organizations (NGO) to provide aid. Therefore, Hezbollah's social services also provide essential services and humanitarian assistance through NGOs to gain population and political support, strengthen their shadow government, and create civil unrest against their enemies (e.g. opposition groups/governments within Lebanon and outside of it). The Social Services Section helps Hezbollah successfully outcompete with the Government of Lebanon in governance, security,

¹⁴¹Patrick Porter, *Military Orientalism: Easter War Through Western Eyes*, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2009), 182-183. Al-Manar was the third most watched Arabic channel during the 2006 conflict, only behind Al-Jeezera and Al-Arabya.

¹⁴²Lyons, "Hezbollah's Use of Arab Media to Galvanize Support," 7.

services, and economy.

The Social Services Section of Hezbollah's organization received 50 percent of Hezbollah's budget for the social service effort 2007.¹⁴³ Hezbollah's *Jihad al-Binaa* (Jihad for Reconstruction) civic outreach program has been a major driving force in gaining popular support and maintaining political power. Under the Jihad al-Binaa program, Hezbollah has produced or rebuilt numerous schools, mosques, and houses in south Lebanon, especially immediately after the war.¹⁴⁴ Hezbollah aided the poor as a social responsibility of the party by answering the population's urgent needs through its beneficial programs. Hezbollah regularly publicizes that it has worked to the best of its capabilities, cooperating with official institutions to respond to social need.¹⁴⁵ Thus, Hezbollah provides civic action programs to strengthen its regional institutions in order to bring credibility to their organization and represent south Lebanon to an extent that would make other Lebanese citizens desire their services. In south Lebanon, it seems that Hezbollah has outcompeted with the Government of Lebanon in providing services and programs such as establishing better schools and hospitals. Moreover, Hezbollah demonstrates its support to the population by also carrying out programs such as the a martyr's foundation, a foundation for the wounded, and many programs for women. These programs take care of families of martyrs, detainees, resistance fighters and women to champion their rights.¹⁴⁶

Hezbollah and its external supporters such as Iran, Syria, and its diasporas provide great

¹⁴³Interview between MAJ James Love and Jennifer Bane of Special Operations Command's Shi'a analyst. Exact budgetary figures are not available. The annual budget for Hezbollah is within the range of \$500 million to \$1 billion annually. The figures approximations are based off the secondary interviews of MAJ James Love and Jennifer Bane.

¹⁴⁴Josh Lyons, "Hezbollah's Use of Arab Media to Galvanize Support," 7.

¹⁴⁵Naim Qasim and Dalia Khalil, *Hizbullah: The Story from Within* (London: Saqi Books, 2005), 83, 284.

¹⁴⁶James B. Love, "Hezbollah: Social Services as Source of Power," 22, 24.

examples of how U.S. Special Operations Forces CA units and personnel may support insurgencies. CA units and personnel can conduct SCA tasks by coordinating civic action projects and programs with, through, and by resistance movements to gain population and political support are key. Moreover, CA personnel may advise and assist resistance movements such as Hezbollah to improve how these programs and projects can effectively achieve the desired effects such as promoting their shadow government's legitimacy; mobilizing political groups and associations to support them; mobilize the population for support; and create civil unrest or discontent against the incumbent government. Although the United States would never support a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) like Hezbollah, the U.S. could conduct unconventional warfare operations by supporting a resistance movement in the future against a hostile and destabilizing regional regime in order to achieve its national strategic interests. U.S. Special Operations Forces CA units and personnel could plan and conduct civil military operations to support resistance movements that may have a similar apparatus like Hezbollah's through its CA tasks and capabilities.

The CA core task of SCA is one of the most visible that Hezbollah conducts currently in south Lebanon (see table 6). Hezbollah has been able to provide civil administration effectively through the money they get from its diaspora, Iran, and Syria. The method that Hezbollah provides social services through its civil administration is remarkable and is an example of how CA forces and units could provide advice and assistance to support civil administration programs. CA units could provide expertise or pull it in from U.S. Embassy country team members, international governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, or other U.S. governmental agencies.

Table 6. Hezbollah Support to Civil Administration (SCA) Tasks

Hezbollah Support to Civil Administration Tasks					
Rule of Law & Law Enforcement	Economic Stability	Infrastructure	Governance	Public Health and Welfare	Public Education and Information
<p>Courts. Hezbollah uses the Lebanese national court system.</p> <p>Punishment Programs/ Law Enforcement. Hezbollah has Lebanese police working inside its controlled territory.</p> <p>Rule of Law Evasion by Hezbollah. Iranian money and expertise used for financial services designed to evade international sanctions.</p>	<p>Economic Development (Food and Agriculture). The party distributed saplings, conducted field visits, provide provisions of agricultural credit, distributed tractors, fertilization, herbicide spraying, transferred of knowledge for honey production and other cultivation, and setup of guidance and piloting centers. Between 1988 and 2002, the Jihad al-Binna built or renovated 35 schools, 9,000 homes, 800 shops, 5 hospitals, 8 clinics, 100 mosques, 8 cultural centers and 7 agricultural center cooperatives.</p> <p>Economic Financial Support. Hezbollah provides micro business loans (Al-Qard al-Hasan) which now offers about 750 small loans a month).</p>	<p>Public Works and Utilities. Hezbollah financed refurbishments or in stallion of electrical, water, transportation, and trash infrastructure and services, especially after the 2006 war through its Al-Jihad Binna program.</p> <p>Public Communications. Hezbollah has satellite media broadcast from Al-Manar and mass media print publications such as An-Nour and Al-Intiquad which both are accessible on the internet. Hezbollah supports mobile communications technology.</p>	<p>Public Administration. The Shura Council decides on issues over administration, planning, and policy making. Provides governance over south Lebanon. Estimates of Iranian resources flowing to Hezbollah varied from tens of millions of dollars a year to \$1 billion a year and included money; hardware; services of Iranian engineers, doctors, and other professionals.</p> <p>Government Parties & Associations. Hezbollah has 12 members in the Lebanese Parliament and two members in the Lebanese cabinet.</p>	<p>Public Health. Hezbollah funds from Iran built hospitals and clinics in south Lebanon. The hospitals will take any patients regardless of ethnicity and political views. Hezbollah coordinates with several non-governmental organizations to provide health care/civic action as well including the Islamic Health Organization (IHO). Hezbollah provides \$3.5 million a year to fund schools and hospitals. Party's created IHO also manages nine health centers, 16 fixed and three mobile infirmaries catering to fifty-one villages.</p> <p>Cultural Relations. Hezbollah has strong cultural ties to Iran and the religious leader of the Shi'a, Ayatollah Khomeini. Hezbollah sponsors parades and manifestations in Beirut during national holidays and contentious situations</p>	<p>Public Education. Inside Hezbollah areas in Lebanon, Hezbollah builds or repairs schools. The party provided educational support to 16,679 students and assisting with schools fees for 6,355 students. The education unit dispersed over \$14 million in scholarships between 1996 and 2001. Gives to the Burj al-Barajneh vocational institute for women. Hezbollah provides \$3.5 million a year to fund schools and hospitals. Hezbollah administers its own education curricula.</p> <p>Public Information. Hezbollah manipulates Israeli broadcast and print media through Al-Manar. Hezbollah uses its social services to broaden popular support and appeal to its organization (cause) and goals.</p>

Source: Created by author.¹⁴⁷

Comparison of Case Studies and Findings

The Viet Cong and Hezbollah case studies provide evidence for the hypotheses of this monograph: *CA units and personnel can plan and conduct civil military operations in support of insurgencies.* Both insurgent groups have done or are doing CA-like tasks, especially SCA, against the incumbent government in order to out-compete and overthrow it. Both case studies illustrate how the insurgent groups gain popular support and strengthen their shadow government to the point where they can transition to power once the incumbent regime collapses.

U.S. Special Operations CA units and personnel can plan and conduct civil military

¹⁴⁷Much of the information inside the table comes from Naim Qassem, *Hizbulla: The Story from Within*, 83-86 and Augustus Richard Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short Story* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 207), 107-112.

operations similarly as the Viet Cong and Hezbollah have or are doing now, albeit mostly through, with, and by advising and assisting them. CA units have a number of ways to employ their capabilities. They may employ their capabilities either by units, through CA teams or civil military support elements (CMSE) to tie in insurgent objectives and goals with U.S. Special Operations Command and Geographic Combatant Commander's objectives. CA teams and CMSEs could do this primarily through SCA tasks, which integrate other CA tasks such as foreign humanitarian assistance, population resource control, civil information management, and nation assistance.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Successful resistance movements and insurgent groups are conducting CA-like tasks within civil military-like operations to strengthen their shadow governments and their cause, which in effect, is organizing and mobilizing the population to support them. Therefore, the U.S. Special Operations Forces command should employ CA forces and personnel to plan and conduct civil military operations in support of an insurgency much like the successful insurgent groups have done and are doing today. Moreover, U.S. Special Operations Forces commanders should not limit CA operations or civil military operations to just providing and coordinating humanitarian assistance or just doing civic action projects without linking them to desired outcomes. This would limit CA's role and potential as a valuable UW asset to support insurgency groups in overthrowing or checking a rogue incumbent government's power.

CA forces can advise and assist insurgent groups (i.e. shadow governments) to provide a competing governing system and mobilize the population as the findings of the case studies show. The CA core task of SCA is the best one to plan and conduct civil military operations to support revolutionary forces to achieve desired outcomes. Other CA core tasks such as population resource control, foreign humanitarian assistance, civil information management, and nation assistance are all integrated in the SCA task. Therefore, U.S. SOF and OGA leaders must see the

whole gambit of CA forces' capabilities, not just humanitarian assistance and conducting small construction or aid projects (e.g. water wells, small bridges, medical civic action programs, etc.).

There are three recommended ways to improve CA capabilities in planning and conducting civil military operations in support of U.S. SOF, U.S. OGA, and insurgent forces. First, all components of U.S. SOF (e.g. SF, MISO, and CA), and U.S. OGA must continue to train together for unconventional warfare operations. This type of training can occur at national training centers (e.g. Joint Readiness Training Center, National Training Center, etc.), military education institutions (e.g. U.S. John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School), at other government installations and training centers (Fort Bragg, Quantico, Twenty-nine Palms, etc) or during exercises in or out of the United States. CA forces must send an appropriate level of personnel and expertise to design exercise scenarios that bring out SCA and nation assistance tasks across the CA specialty functional areas (e.g. rule of law, economic stability, infrastructure, governance, public health and welfare, and public education and information) in an unconventional warfare exercise scenario when the training is committed.

Second, it is necessary to educate UW task force leaders on how CA units can plan and conduct civil military operations in UW operations. This includes showing them where CA units can be placed to support the operations such as CA teams deploying to the targeted country and civil military support elements (CMSE) assisting the operation in an U.S. embassy located in a neighboring country. Moreover, UW task force leaders must understand how CA forces can advise and assist insurgent groups through SCA tasks that are integrated with other CA core tasks, so they may strengthen their shadow government and gain more popular support.

Third, the findings indicate that CA personnel can be better trained either through civil educational institutions or seminars to advise and assist insurgent or resistant movements in designing effective governance/public administration, public health systems, and public education systems. Moreover, the findings indicate that CA forces must be better than generalists; they must

also be semi-specialists in the six CA functional areas and sub-tasks in SCA more effectively. For example, Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Steve Lewis, the former S-3 and company commander for the 98th CA Battalion (Airborne), had his company attend classes at the University of Carolina in public administration.¹⁴⁸ Professors in these courses taught the students public administration principles and how to look at different government entities such as cities and towns to see if they were practicing good administration techniques. After the classroom instruction, LTC Lewis coordinated with various towns and cities for his CA teams to go out into the field to observe. Then, after the CA teams shadowed public administrators, they would return to the University of North Carolina and report to their instructor/professor their findings and recommendations. This seems to be an effective way to teach CA units and personnel how to conduct SCA duties in the future, especially during unconventional warfare operations.

Fourth and finally, this type of training, as LTC Lewis coordinated, is essential to conduct prior to any exercise or operation. The CA Qualification Course must delve deeper in teaching the SCA subtasks to make CA personnel more knowledgeable and bring more value to U.S. SOF and OGA forces in unconventional warfare operations. Moreover, CA officers and units must share their knowledge to the U.S. John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School's Unconventional Warfare curriculum in order to improve its CA related content and instruction. If none of these measures are taken, then U.S. Special Operation Forces CA forces will be relegated to providing what they are providing today, which is coordinating humanitarian relief and assistance efforts and conducting small civic action projects such as digging a well or building a school. If the case studies that were shown in this monograph did anything, then it was that they explained how insurgent and resistance movements become stronger and influential due to improving their social services programs. They did most of this through CA-like tasks. These

¹⁴⁸LTC Steve Lewis, interview by author, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, March 1, 2013.

programs had and continue to have a lasting profound effect in mobilizing support for their cause and strengthening their rule, and winning the competition of services and security against the incumbent government.

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