Interdependence: A Requirement for Success

by

Colonel Charles J. Masaracchia
United States Army

United States Army War College
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Since the declaration of the Global War on Terrorism in 2001, the United States military has been forced to adapt in order to respond to the broad suite of hybrid threats to national security. Over the course of the last twelve years of conflict, the United States military has had to leverage elements of national power that were previously unrealized. Given perhaps the most advanced weapons and unprecedented access to other agencies, the American military has evolved to become an organization that must be capable of addressing the challenges presented by terrorism, criminal gangs and insurgency, in addition to the more familiar threats associated with standing armies and nation states. In an effort to meet these threats a new approach is required. This solution is dependent upon successfully leveraging all elements of Unified Action Partners, defined as our conventional forces (CF), special operations forces (SOF), and interagency partners (IA), in tandem with support from host nation and allied partners. This paper will address the future requirement for successful interdependence as well as lessons taken from the conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
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Colonel Charles J. Masaracchia
United States Army

Professor Penny Abernathy and Dr. Wayne Lee
University of North Carolina, Chapel-Hill
Project Adviser

Dr. William Perry
U.S. Army War College Faculty Mentor

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
Abstract

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Since the declaration of the Global War on Terrorism in 2001, the United States military has been forced to adapt in order to respond to the broad suite of hybrid threats to national security. Over the course of the last twelve years of conflict, the United States military has had to leverage elements of national power that were previously unrealized. Given perhaps the most advanced weapons and unprecedented access to other agencies, the American military has evolved to become an organization that must be capable of addressing the challenges presented by terrorism, criminal gangs and insurgency, in addition to the more familiar threats associated with standing armies and nation states. In an effort to meet these threats a new approach is required. This solution is dependent upon successfully leveraging all elements of Unified Action Partners, defined as our conventional forces (CF), special operations forces (SOF), and interagency partners (IA), in tandem with support from host nation and allied partners. This paper will address the future requirement for successful interdependence as well as lessons taken from the conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
Interdependence: A Requirement for Success

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Background

It is increasingly clear that coping with the future threats to the United States will require unified effort by a variety of combatant and noncombatant elements both within the military and from other agencies of the government. Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the military has taken dramatic steps to ensure unity of effort as conventional forces and special operations forces have increasingly been forced to share battle space to meet mission requirements. Prior to the Global War on Terrorism conventional forces and special operations forces tended to operate in separate operational areas and maintained separate operational focus. The training and execution of operations occurred independently, while each remained limited to the organic capabilities inherit to their organization. Although the last decade of conflict has improved the capability of the Department of Defense to employ both types of forces jointly, the nature of this relationship is still fragile at best. Challenges in integrating conventional and special operations forces still result in missed opportunities, delayed effects, and issues related to command and control.

The US military must consider the potential for military success in a future where modern conflicts are waged within population centers against irregular forces. A shift from traditional warfare paradigms, in which victory is contingent on the destruction of an enemy force, is now required in an era in which the host nation’s population increasingly seems to be the key center of gravity. Not only must CF and SOF continue to learn to cooperate, but all elements of national power must be brought to bear, requiring unprecedented levels of cooperation between both military and nonmilitary organizations. This form of cooperation, referred to as interdependence, allows organizations to minimize organic weaknesses and capability gaps through intentional partnered relationships with other organizations.
Definitions

Asymmetric Warfare: warfare in which opposing groups or nations have unequal military resources, and the weaker opponent uses unconventional weapons and tactics, as terrorism, to exploit the vulnerabilities of the enemy. ¹

Brigade Combat Team: As combined arms teams, brigade combat teams from the basic building block of the Army’s tactical formations. They are the principal means of executing engagements. Three standardized brigade combat teams designs exist; heavy, infantry, and Stryker. Battalion-sized maneuver, fires, reconnaissance, and sustainment units are organic to a brigade combat team.²

Cooperation: The act of cooperating, or of operating together towards one end; joint effort; joint operation; concurrent effort of labor.³

Contemporary Operating Environment (COE): The synergistic combination of all the critical variables and actors that create the conditions, circumstances, and influences that can affect military operations today and in the near- and mid-term.⁴

Conventional Forces: 1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using non-nuclear weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces.⁵

Culture: 1. a particular society that has its own beliefs, way of life. 2. A way of thinking, behaving, or working that exists in a place or organization.⁶

High-Value Target: A target the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. The loss of high-value targets would be expected to seriously degrade important enemy functions throughout the friendly commander’s area of interest.⁷

Hybrid Threat: The diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects.⁸

Integration: The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole.⁹

Inter-Agency: Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense.¹⁰

Interdependence: Proposed Definition-The ability of, units, forces, or organizations to provide complementary capabilities and services, and accept capabilities from other units, forces, or organizations to enable them to effectively operate together to achieve joint effects that could not be produced independently.
Interoperability: 1. The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks. (JP 3-0) 2. The condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users.11

Irregular Forces: Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, policies, or other internal security forces.12

Irregular Warfare: A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.13

Liaison: That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action.14

Professional Military Education (PME): PME conveys the broad body of knowledge and develops the habits of mind essential to the military professional’s expertise in the art and science of war.15

Rules of Engagement (ROE): Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.16

Sensitive Site Exploitation: Systematically searching for and collecting information, material, and persons from a designated location and analyzing them to answer information requirements, facilitate subsequent operations, or support criminal prosecution.17

Signal Intelligence (SIGINT): A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. 2. Intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals.18

Special Operations: Operations requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments and characterized by one or more of the following: time sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, and/or a high degree of risk.19

Special Operation Forces: Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations.20
**Task Force:** A component of an organization organized by the commander of an element or higher authority for the accomplishment of a specific task or tasks.\(^{21}\)

**Unified Action Partners (UAP):** Army forces coordinate operations with unified action partners. *Unified action partners* are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with which Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations. Unified action partners include joint forces and components, multinational forces, and U.S. government agencies and departments.\(^{22}\)

**Unconventional Warfare (UW):** Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.\(^{23}\)
“This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origins – war of guerillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of combat; by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him, it requires – in those situations where we must encounter it – whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a wholly different kind of military training.”

President John F. Kennedy
West Point, June 6, 1962

Although written 52 years ago, President John F. Kennedy’s prophetic words could not more accurately describe today’s common operating environment. The United States was drawn into a “Different Kind of War” after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. This war involves conventional forces, insurgents, criminals and gangs that wage war by suicide bombers, IEDs and ambushes. The enemy seeks to erode U.S. public support and exhaust U.S. economic resources. In the opening days of the Global War on Terrorism, the U.S. fought conventionally, based on the tactics developed for enemy forces that were expected to stand and fight. Strategic thinking focused on the elimination of military threats. Initially, the Department of Defense (DoD) gave little effort to addressing the needs of the population or the power vacuum associated with the disappearance of an oppressive regime’s rule.

To successfully engage this new threat a different approach is required. This approach must maximize the capabilities of Conventional Forces (CF), Special Operation Forces (SOF), interagency partners (IA), host nation, and allied partners. Success will be built upon the synchronization of these capabilities to achieve unity of effort and maximize effects. This new evolving concept must take full advantage of the
unique capabilities of all Unified Action Partners (UAP), reinforced through professional military education programs (PME) and honed in all echelons of training. This article proposes a few ways the U.S. military must adjust to achieve true interdependency. It will briefly describe the problem, define interdependency, offer three approaches and provide examples of successful methods to achieve true interdependence.

Since the declaration of the Global War on Terrorism, the U.S. military adapted and responded to a broad suite of hybrid threats to national security. Lessons taken from the conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the need for multifaceted approaches that leverage the combined strengths and capabilities of Conventional Forces, Special Operations Forces, and interagency elements. In the future operating environment, combat operations will demand increased interdependence between these communities in order to provide a seamless front to enemies and a unified face to allies. The level of successful interdependence will be measured in effectiveness; its success will be clearly visible in both the tangible and intangible metrics associated with armed conflict.

Interdependency is defined by the DoD as “the purposeful reliance by one Service on another Service’s capabilities to maximize complementary and reinforcing effects of both.” While interdependency between the Conventional Forces, Special Operations and interagency communities has steadily improved over the last twelve years, the cause for this cooperation sprung from operational necessity and improvisation rather than from institutional reforms. In the absence of permanent reforms, operational requirements were the driving motivation for interdependence. The U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, ongoing budgetary constraints, and military
downsizing represent a potential loss in momentum and institutional knowledge in the continuing struggle to achieve unity of effort across the full spectrum of operations by the members of these communities.

The critique can begin even with the definitions. The definition generated by the Joint community does not adequately addresses interagency elements in its definition of interdependence despite the clear necessity that U.S. forces must achieve unity of effort with other governmental agencies, multinational forces and host nation partners. This constitutes a profound, but correctable mistake. Doctrine must be conveyed simply; it cannot presuppose levels of professional education that the reader has not achieved. In the case of interdependence, its importance must be understood at the company grade officer level and above for all services. Until professional military education programs like the Captain’s Career Course place greater focus on the subject of joint operations and interdependence, joint doctrine must be written to compensate for these institutional shortcomings.

The ultimate goal of CF, SOF and IA interdependency is to increase operational effectiveness by enabling the joint force to present a seamless front to adversaries and a united front to friends and partners throughout all phases of operations. To dominate any operational environment and provide decisive results across the range of military operations, U.S. national security requires SOF, CF and the interagency partners to blend their capabilities, working together to achieve effectiveness and unity of effort.

Given the continued existence of some basic definitional problems, one must begin with a brief discussion of interoperability, cooperation and interdependence. The proposed definitions that will be the basis of this paper are as follows:
**Interoperability** is most simply defined as the ability of systems to work with adjacent unit systems. Examples of this include the ability of communications platforms to work between service components such as the ability of ground forces to communicate with fixed wing air craft to support maneuver forces.

**Cooperation**: forces working together without a defined or coordinated end-state. Cooperation does not seek to leverage the strengths of an outside organization’s to address internal weaknesses or susceptibilities. Although units may cooperate, their tactical and operational goals may differ. Examples include units coordinating a passage of lines or the deconflicting of direct and indirect fires.

**Interdependence**: the ability of, units, forces, or organizations to provide complementary capabilities and services to, and accept capabilities from other units, forces, or organizations to enable them to effectively operate together to achieve joint effects that could not be produced independently. For interdependence to be achieved units must first have the ability to establish interoperability.

True interdependence will be essential in future conflicts and it must be achieved at four tiers. Tier one, which is the foundation and perhaps the most critical level of interdependence, consists of the interdependence between SOF and conventional forces within a specific service component, and will be the focus of conversation in this paper. The second tier of interdependence occurs between service components, while the third tier of interdependence occurs between the Department of Defense and other U.S. agencies involved in the spectrum of operations. The final tier of interdependence is between U.S. forces and partnered forces, and although it can be doctrinally encouraged and supported by joint country training, it will likely remain a highly
improvised process. The diagram below graphically demonstrates how successful interdependence is a requisite at the lower levels before it can be effectively achieved at higher tiers.

![Diagram showing the SOF Truths]

For the purposes of this discussion, the definition of interoperability will be limited to the capability of systems and equipment to operate together. Further discussion of interoperability is beyond the scope of this paper.

**The SOF Truths: The Requirement for Interdependence**

“The machine gun will never replace the horse as an instrument of war”

Sir Douglas Haig

Commander and Chief, British Expeditionary Forces

December 1915

First written in the late 1980’s, U.S. Special Operations Command published the SOF Truths as a guide for the development and the planning of successful special
operations forces and activities. The first SOF truth: “humans are more important than hardware” provides insights regarding the critical nature of relationships and cooperation. Success in special operations, just as in conventional operations, will ultimately depend upon the human element.

As it relates to achieving interdependence, the second SOF truth provides, perhaps, the most insight: “quality is better than quantity.” This truth is centered on the concept that a few well trained specialists can achieve greater effects than an untrained mass. From the context of achieving interdependence, quality is better than quantity applies to training and exposure prior to combat operations. To be successful, interdependence must be deliberately pursued, trained, and rehearsed to be effective.

Just as the second SOF Truth provided insights into the importance of maintaining a well trained force, the third SOF Truth, “Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced” highlights the requirement for adequate time, attention, and deliberate effort to cultivate a desired operational competence. Just as SOF requires time to develop a mature capability, interdependence requires deliberate effort to be successful. Interdependence must be deliberately pursued as a matter of mission requirement, as opposed to being an operational afterthought.

The fourth SOF Truth, “Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur” conveys the concept that special operators must be prepared in anticipation of a mission set. The foundational concept behind this SOF Truth is that for SOF to be relevant and responsive, SOF must be prepared. The reality is that capability gaps cannot be effectively or efficiently addressed on the field of battle. Mission requirements like interdependence and interoperability must be rehearsed,
relationships must be cultivated, and capabilities must be maximized prior to an identified operational need.

The fifth SOF Truth, “Most special operations require non-SOF assistance” was originally omitted because at the time the special operations community was cultivating a stand-alone culture. According to COL John Collins, the original author of the SOF Truths, the omission of the Fifth SOF Truth encouraged unrealistic expectations by poorly tutored supported commanders and perpetuated a counter-productive “us versus everybody else” attitude. In 2009, Admiral Olson, understanding the nature of future conflicts foresaw the requirement for SOF and conventional force interdependence and resurrected the Fifth SOF Truth as a reflection of the current operational environment. As he explained:

“The SOF Truths have provided time-tested guidance to the special operations community for daily activities as well as long-range planning. When they were originally penned, there was a fifth truth that was never published — ‘Most special operations require non-SOF assistance.’ It’s being included now so that we all understand the importance of force enablers and the contributions they make to mission success. To think otherwise would levy unrealistic expectations as to the capabilities SOF bring to the fight.”

As an example, the SOF Truths and their relationship with conventional forces in the pursuit of interdependence was demonstrated in 2006 when the SOF community requested conventional forces in support of special operations missions in Iraq. These mission requirements, although addressed successfully, demonstrated a violation of the SOF Truths in part due to institutionalized shortcomings associated with training and professional military education. Just as the development of a SOF capability is contingent upon successful adherence to the SOF Truths, similarly, for interdependence between conventional forces and SOF to be successful, time to build necessary
relationships, time allocated to train jointly, and opportunities to rehearse in preparation for potential mission profiles must be acknowledged and provided to ensure mission success.

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**TF Torch Case Study (AUG – DEC 2006): First Tier Interdependence**

“I am a soldier, I fight where I am told and I win where I fight”

*General George Patton Jr.*

The following case study is both an example of both success and of failure in achieving interdependence. The success of TF Torch is a testament to the extraordinary efforts of the men and women that participated in the operation and the personal and professional relationships that were built in the weeks leading up to the deployment.

The time allocated for preparing the force to execute this mission was inadequate for the complexities of the mission profile. Factors contributing to these challenges included the extreme difficulties in achieving interoperability between SOF’s unique communications equipment and the CF’s equipment. To overcome this challenge, SOF operators embedded in the CF formations to ensure mission command could be executed during all phases of the operations. Limited experience in complex Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) operations and evidence collection was another shortcoming that blunted the early success of the Task Force. To address these short falls solutions were generated, often times, during the course of operations and learning through the use of After Action Reviews (AARs). Other critical challenges that had to be overcome included solutions to capability gaps within the convention force in order to address the need to conduct nonstandard MEDEVAC and resupply operations. These challenges
had to be addressed during the brief lead up to deploying and then solidified once on the ground in Iraq.

In July of 2006 the 82\textsuperscript{nd} Airborne Division received a Request For Forces (RFF) in support of the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). The request was for three infantry battalions, each serving four month successive tours and working directly for a Special Operations Headquarters. The Special Operations command in theater conducted raids against High Value Targets (HVT) across Iraq and was in need of additional combat power. The additional manpower needed to be capable of conducting sustained combat operations for up to 72-96 hours, conduct their own resupply operations, and conduct infiltration by air assault, ground convoy and by foot. The primary purpose of the conventional force was to clear large areas and create an operational signature that would cause enemy forces to communicate with one another in an attempt to coordinate their actions. Once communicating, Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) would enable the SOF to target the enemy force.

The 82\textsuperscript{nd} Airborne Division assigned the mission to the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Brigade Combat Team (BCT). It provided the BCT approximately thirty days to train leaders and Paratroopers on the unique mission requirements, establish a command and control structure which could facilitate a continuous operational cycle (Current and Future Operations cells). It also created robust liaison officer (LNO) packages capable of embedding at multiple levels with the forward deployed and Fort Bragg based SOF headquarters (HQs). The training culminated with a certification exercise controlled by the SOF HQs, 82\textsuperscript{nd} Airborne Division leadership and the 2\textsuperscript{nd} BCT.
Due to the inadequacies of doctrine of the time on how to prepare a conventional force for this mission profile, the 2nd BCT Commander, Colonel B.D. Farris relied on his experiences from previous combat deployments and relationships fostered over 24 years of service with officers serving in a multitude of SOF HQs. His initial guidance was that the battalions within 2 BCT must forge both personal and professional relationships with the organizations that they would be attached to. Paramount to Colonel Farris recognized that these relationships would reduce cultural bias or misperceptions of capabilities from both the SOF and CF perspective. Through a rigorous training program with SOF elements, embedded LNOs within the SOF HQs and a certification exercise, Colonel Farris ensured that not only were the battalions prepared to conduct combat operations, but the SOF community had confidence in the capabilities of the battalions of 2 BCT. Through his training and preparation methodology, Colonel Farris provided conventional force units capable of achieving mission success and establishing a level of interdependence as yet unseen at that time. The next section will focus on the details of Colonel Farris’ training program.

Training began immediately after receiving the order from the Division Headquarters with the Army’s Asymmetrical Warfare Group (AWG) sending elements consisting of instructors, operators and LNOs to Fort Bragg, creating habitual relationships with the each of the battalions and the subordinate companies. The training regiment was designed to ensure that paratroopers understood the types of missions that they would be conducting with SOF, the Rules of Engagement while operating as part of a SOF contingent, unique Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), and the communication architecture of the SOF elements that they would be
operating with. The first week of the training focused on individual paratrooper skills starting with basic and advanced rifle marksmanship, building up to advanced room clearing techniques and individual medical proficiency. The second week focused at the squad and platoon level with emphasis on the special skills required to successfully execute direct action raids, procedures for executing Ground Assault Convoys (GACs), Helicopter Assault Force (HAFs) operations, logistical resupply, medical evacuation operations and sensitive site exploitation procedures. The third week of training was dedicated to company level operations designed to ensure that each company could conduct crisis action planning, utilize SOF specific communication equipment, employment of SOF fire support assets, evacuation of friendly casualties and enemy captured personnel. The fourth and final week was established as a certification exercise for the battalions and incorporated a series of missions that would test the capability of the battalions to operate as part of a Special Operations Task Force.

Concurrent with the first three weeks of training, select individuals of the battalion and brigade staffs received classroom instruction by AWG and SOF personnel on unique systems, nodes and functions utilized by the SOF community. Leaders received classes on specific mission requirements, task organization and structure of the deployed SOF contingent and a detailed enemy update specific to the area of operations. The intelligence officers and analysts received classes on SOF intelligence collection capabilities, methods of collection and how to identify/reduce intelligence gaps. Medical personnel were instructed on the medical capabilities that would be available while deployed and the methods of requesting support. Radio Telephone Operators (RTOs) and signal personnel received classes on the installation, operation,
maintenance and trouble shooting of SOF-specific communication equipment in addition to reporting procedures. During the second week of training the affected units exchanged LNO teams and began working in the reciprocal headquarters facilitating reporting between both headquarters.

By the end state of the fourth week of training the leadership of the CF and SOF units confirmed that the Conventional Force battalions and subordinate companies would be capable of successfully executing SOF mission profiles with SOF elements. In addition the staffs possessed the knowledge to leverage the capabilities of SOF systems, nodes and functions and LNO teams were familiar with their duties and responsibilities and could provide timely and accurate information to decision makers.

To clarify command relationships for this mission, 2nd BCT elements were formally attached to the SOF headquarters, meaning that all of their orders would come directly from the controlling SOF command. This simplified command relationships and prevented misunderstanding over the authorities of the higher headquarters, responsibilities for support or the reporting procedures. It was absolutely clear who provided mission command throughout all phases of operations associated with Task Force Torch. Meanwhile, 2nd BCT headquarters remained responsible for continuing the training and certification program for subsequent battalions and utilized the same training methodology. With the next battalion not due for certification for four months, the 2 BCT was able to capitalize on the lessons learned from the first training iteration, modify portions of the training based on experiences from the first mission and continue to build and foster relationships with all organizations involved.
Despite early shortcomings associated with abbreviated timelines and a lack of institutionalized doctrine and Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), TF Torch was unquestionably successful. The Task Force executed over 50 missions resulting in approximately: 100 enemy contacts, 70 enemy personnel captured, 200 enemy personnel killed or wounded, 130 caches found and destroyed, 10 Improvised Explosive Device (IED) facilities destroyed and 5 chemical labs found and exploited for actionable intelligence.

The TF Torch Case study is an example of success at the first tier of interdependency. To sustain this kind of progress in achieving effective interdependent operations even at tier 1 level, the military must implement changes in three critical areas; doctrine, professional military education and training.³⁰

Doctrine: A Road Map for the Way Ahead

“It should be the duty of every soldier to reflect on the experiences of the past, in the endeavor to discover improvements, in his particular sphere of action, which are practicable in the immediate future.”

B. H. Hart
On Strategy, 1967

Before one can understand the value of interdependence to the force, a clear comprehension of its meaning must first be established. What is the difference between cooperation, integration, and interdependence? On the surface, our currently accepted doctrine does very little to differentiate between these critical definitions. The current definitions have been written in an attempt to be all encompassing rather than transparent. The definitions must be clearly understood by the end user for these terms to be effective. Just as the definitions of suppress and destroy invoke different
meanings to a maneuver commander, so to must cooperation, integration and interdependence be understood to be effective.

As stated earlier in this paper cooperation occurs between units, but does not seek to leverage the strengths of an outside organization to address internal weaknesses or susceptibilities. Cooperation between units at its most basic level may align tactical goals, but not necessarily operational goals. Additionally, cooperation requires the least preparation for success between organizations to be achieved.

Similar to cooperation, integration refers to the incorporation of personnel, but not in such a way that necessarily seeks to overcome organic weaknesses. Integration can occur at all levels; whether it is the provision of an additional squad at the platoon level or additional forces provided to a battalion in support of a deliberate defense. Integration of forces does not necessarily occur between dissimilar forces and can, at times, occur simply as a function of manning requirements.

Interdependence on the other hand, is the ability of one organization to provide complementary capabilities and services to and accept capabilities from other organizations to enable them to operate together to achieve joint effects that could not be produced independently. For interdependence to be achieved, integration must occur and interoperability must be established. The alignment of specific capabilities against specific mission requirements must be understood by all of the contributing members; relationships must be formed, capabilities must be rehearsed, and training must occur prior to an identified need.

Interdependence allows a force to overcome its inherent limitations by maximizing its capabilities through partnerships with another force: SOF to CF, CF to
SOF, or IA to everybody. Current doctrine only addresses interdependence superficially, using interdependence synonymously with teamwork, but should instead focus on the operational imperatives associated with interdependence and mission success. If doctrine is supposed to serve as the road map that guides the U.S. military to successful interdependency, then it has to characterize and explain the complex nature of command and support relationships in the interdependent environment. It also has to articulate the means of synchronizing CF, SOF and IA assets for unity of effect and establishment of tasks, conditions and standards for every echelon of training; training which includes focus on individual, collective and leader training. Through the use of doctrine, the institutional Army must implement a strategy of informing the force in the Professional Military Education systems.

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**Professional Military Education**

“The future joint force requires knowledgeable, empowered, innovative, and decisive leaders capable of succeeding in fluid and perhaps chaotic operating environments with more comprehensive knowledge of interagency and multinational cultures and capabilities.”

*U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Officer Professional Military Education Policy December, 2011*

In order to produce a corps of officers that share a common understanding of the cultures, task organizations and unique capabilities of all UAPs, the Department of Defense must institutionalize educational programs based on current and emerging joint doctrine. The current Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) that governs all aspects of PME does not adequately address interdependency training. This deficiency must be addressed in future iterations of the OPMEP, using new doctrine on
interdependency and providing guidance on timelines of institutional instruction. Professional military education that includes interdependence must begin during initial leader’s courses and be sustained through senior leader educational programs. These programs require progressive educational approaches to produce leaders who not only understand the necessity and benefits of interdependency, but who can successfully leverage the resources and capabilities of all UAPs to conduct Unified Land Operations. 31 Each educational course must progressively build upon the last, ensuring that with increased responsibility and authority there is increased rapport, better understanding of different UAP capabilities, and an enhanced capability to employ the force and provide effective mission command. This effectiveness, in many ways, will be based on the validity of doctrine and the strength of the curriculum taught throughout an individual’s career.

The Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC) currently (Fall 2013) has only one SOF qualified instructor assigned to the training team. The limited number of instructors has caused the information regarding SOF capability to become informal in nature and infrequent at best, due in part to the size of classes and number of teams.

In addition, with the creation of Army Special Operations Forces Captains Career Course (SOFCCC) at Fort Bragg, NC all Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Special Force Officers will no longer attend the MCCC at Fort Benning in conjunction with Maneuver Officers. This is a critical opportunity to forge both professional and personal relationships that are required for future success that is now forfeit due to loss of access and placement. This separation of courses has also contributed to the loss of
SOF instructors at the MCCC, and the primary cause of instruction relating to Special Operations units, force structure, capabilities and culture.

This problem is further perpetuated during the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). The existing SOF track at CGSC is restricted to personnel going to or coming from assignments in special operations communities. This requirement exacerbates the separation between SOF and CF communities by widening the knowledge gap and limiting the potential exposures to the SOF community by the future leaders of the conventional force. This problem is further amplified by a lack of institutionalized curriculum devoted to the discussion of SOF-CF integration and interdependence. Without intervention the requirement for interdependence will be regarded as a foot-note rather than as the requirement it will be for future military success.

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**Home station training and Combat Training Centers**

“Twelve years of conflict have resulted in an extensive backlog in our leadership education and training programs, the opportunities lost to train the Army’s midgrade and senior Leaders in CTC rotations, collective training, and institutional education will result in Army leaders incapable of maneuvering units under fire and in combat being promoted to command larger units and organizations.”

   General Raymond T. Odierno

   Comments to The House Armed Services Committee, September 18, 2013

Current Army home station training models generally do not require interdependency; when they do occur they are infrequent. The reason for the lack of interdependent training is a result of the stationing of CF Divisions and SOF elements. Additionally, reductions in training budgets prevent inclusion of all UAPs in training.
exercises. There are several successful examples of interdependent training exercises that could serve as models of success in the future.

The Joint Operational Access Exercise (JOAX) executed by the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 82nd Airborne Division’s Global Response Force is one example of a well-balanced interdependent home station bi-annual training exercise. The JOAX is focused at the tactical and operational level, utilizing an airborne assault / airfield seizure as a means of deploying the force with embedded tasks that include: Weapon of Mass Destruction security, Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations, raids, and a deliberate defense. Similar to the JOAX, Exercise Silent Quest focuses at the strategic level and is designed for United States Army Special Operation Command's (USASOC) Command Support elements and Subordinate Unit Commands. This exercise enables these elements to develop and practice concepts that shape synchronized operations that are integrated into the tactics of unconventional warfare. Both exercises are inherently interdependent relying on SOF-CF-IA capabilities to defeat a hybrid threat in the future operating environment.

JRTC currently provides a Decisive Action Training Environment (DATE)/Unconventional Warfare (UW) scenario incorporating current enemy tactics, combat lessons learned and the Operational Environment of the Future. The DATE/UW scenario employs a hybrid threat that includes guerrilla forces, insurgent cells, criminal elements and conventional forces from hostile states that are assessed as near-peer competitors to U.S. forces. During rotation 13-01 the DATE scenario portrayed a sovereign state with a functioning U.S. embassy utilizing Department of State (DoS) personnel. This scenario forces detailed planning, extensive rehearsals and open
communication between all UAPs and should serve as a model training venue for achieving interdependency. The DATE/UW scenario is an exceptional model that forces interdependency from tactical, operational, and strategic levels. By ensuring that any gaps or seams identified by the threat force are captured as lessons learned for implementation during the remainder of the rotation, cadre are providing a means for the organizations participating in the rotation to continue to improve.

Through numerous rotational observations, combat AARs and leader feedback during combat rotations, the leadership at JRTC developed a guide for units to utilize as they prepare to conduct interdependent operations. The goal of this guide is to provide the unit rotating into training a systematic method of planning, resourcing and executing operations in an interdependent manner. The foundation of this guide is: Acknowledge, Communicate, Plan, Execute, and Analyze (ACPEA).32 Through the use of ACPEA (see annex 1) a commander will have the tools and processes to identify deficiencies in effective command and control, identify underutilized UAP capabilities, and ensure all elements clearly understand the task, purpose and end state of the operation. Ultimately this guide should serve as the basis for changes to doctrine to reflect the importance and challenges of interdependent operations.

Although there are other training venues that potentially offer opportunities to incorporate interdependent training between SOF and CF during other home station training exercises, those opportunities are episodic at best. CF commanders can expect to go through a Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) or National Training Center (NTC) rotation only once during a command tour and the ability to integrate other UAP is subject to their availability and cost.
For interdependence to be understood and accepted at all levels, commanders and interagency partner leaders must provide the time, funding and the external resources required to optimize training that incorporates multiple UAPs. Home station training must force interdependence by challenging leaders with complex operational environments coupled with hybrid threats that cannot be defeated without additional force multipliers. These situations will require leaders to decisively engage the threats with a force that leverages the synergistic effects of an interdependent force.

Conclusion

"Only one military organization can hold and gain ground in war—a ground army supported by tactical aviation with supply lines guarded by the navy."

- General Omar N. Bradley 1951

The window of opportunity for codifying valuable lessons from successful interdependent operations into doctrine is narrow, and it rests with those emerging from years of conflict with the relevant experience. To institutionalize these lessons, the Army must approach this challenge in three ways. The first is that the Department of Defense must codify lessons learned and best practices and integrate these practices into joint and Army doctrine. The second is that interdependency must become an integral part of the Professional Military Education (PME) system to for all leaders. Military education must specifically address the unique capabilities, task organizations and command and control functions of all UAPs.

In order to ensure interdependency is not merely a relationship of necessity born in combat, doctrinal references must ensure the integration of Army CF, SOF, DoS and
DoD entities and be included in training literature. PME curricula must focus on this
discipline to codify, throughout the Army, lessons learned, new concepts and techniques
tested at Home Station Training and the CTCs. Through doctrine, education and
training modifications, cultural differences can be marginalized, and the unique
capabilities of each UAP identified and leveraged to achieve true interdependent
operations.

The final aspect of this approach requires modifications to home station Training
and Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations. These training events must provide more
opportunities to integrate multiple UAPs and force interdependence to achieve the
assigned task and purpose, ensuring mission success. The implementation of these
three approaches will ensure the tactics, techniques and procedures that have been
developed, tested and refined in combat and training will endure during a future of
diminished resources.
Appendix 1: ACPEA is an acronym used to describe the training methodology for successful interdependent training at the JRTC, originally provided by LTC Lawrence. Listed below is an explanation of ACPEA with descriptive bullets to convey its intended meaning for rotational units.

**Acknowledge:**
Unique capabilities of each UAP
The differences in access, placement, mass, firepower, maneuver, unique authorities

**Communicate:**
Establish nodes, systems and functions providing a free flow of information
Utilize Liaison Officers (LNOs) and NCOs at every level (has to be your very best)
Ensure a shared vision is established between all UAPs

**Plan:**
Establish a Combined UAP planning group which is representative of all stakeholders
Develop a plan that takes advantage of each UAPs inherent capabilities

**Execute:**
Ensure unity of effect for all phases of the operation
Ensure all UAPs have access to the same Common Operational Picture (COP) for situational awareness

**Analyze:**
Modify plans based on intelligence and operational success or failure
Ensure all UAPs are involved in the analytical work (each UAPs may be looking for different measures of effectiveness during operations.)
Endnotes


8 U.S. Department of the Army, Hybrid Threat, Training Circular 7-100 (Washington, D.C: U.S. Department of the Army, November 26, 2010), 64.


11 Ibid., 186.


13 Ibid., B4.


19 Ibid., 340.

20 Ibid., 341.

21 Ibid., 268.


27 Ibid., 2.


30 COL Masaracchia, Charles J., I served as the 2 BCT, 82nd Airborne Division Operations Officer from June 2006 – July 2008. In this position I had direct access to operational requirements and training/operational metrics.


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