Department of Education
Graduate Research Management Office
Research Papers
Academic Year 2013


Interdependence between Army Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces: Changing Institutional Mental Models

by Russell J. Ames MAJ, USA
School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS

Interdependence between conventional and special operations forces is an important topic in future operating environments of constrained resources, adaptive adversaries, and increased demand for Army forces from geographic combatant commands. Through interdependent doctrine, education, and joint activities, Army forces prevent repeating the steep organizational learning curve and poor unity of effort in the early phases of future campaigns. The monograph concludes that interdependence in its current construct suffers from uninformed mental models. Specifically, these mental models consider task-based interdependence, focusing on employment of special operations in the direct approach, versus combined symbiotic interdependence in long-term campaigns. The Army institutional generating force manages the doctrinal and educational processes for improving organizational learning. However, the responsibility falls to special operations organizations to inform doctrine and education with special operations theory, and joint opportunities geared toward an indirect approach to special warfare.

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The Missing Element: How to Integrate Existing Regional and Cultural Understanding at the GCC Level Effectively

by Anderson Curtis T. II LTC, USA
Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA

The recently published Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO), suggests the future security environment will consist of several persistent trends including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the rise of modern competitor states, and an increase in violent extremism, regional instability, transnational criminal activity, and competition for resources. To address these trends, the joint force must develop and maintain deep regional expertise. The ability to understand political and cultural differences, especially when it comes to cooperative security operations, counterinsurgency, and unconventional warfare, will provide the foundations for flexible planning and operational execution.

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Calming the Churn: Resolving the Dilemma of Rotational Warfare in Counterinsurgency

by Andrew P. Aswell MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

The U.S. military currently utilizes a unit-rotational model to provide forces to geographic combatant commanders waging ground wars. This model has its roots in policy and historical perception, not strategy and tactics. When applied to counterinsurgency, weaknesses that undermine long-term effectiveness become apparent. Through an examination of the basis of the current model, its performance in the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and current and historical case studies, this thesis explores alternatives to the rotational model. This thesis finds that a hybrid model that combines the advantages of the current system with historical and current examples from other nations could increase the effectiveness of units in long-term counterinsurgency campaigns.

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Why So Conventional? America's Propensity to Wage Traditional Large-Scale Warfare

by Matthew S. Balint MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

The United States has repeatedly engaged in irregular warfare—including counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, and unconventional warfare—throughout its history. However, despite its familiarity with irregular warfare, there is reluctance on the part of U.S. presidents, military leaders, and even the general public to engage in this form of war.

This thesis asks why the U.S. security mindset is focused on traditional large-scale warfare, even when the threats the United States has faced, and will continue to face, are mostly irregular. To answer this question, this thesis uses Arreguín-Toft’s strategic interaction model—which looks at why same-approach and opposite-approach strategies (direct and indirect) favor strong and weak actors differently—to analyze the U.S. Revolutionary War, when the United States was the weak actor, and the Vietnam conflict, when the United States was the strong actor, and to assess whether the United States implemented the correct forms of strategic interaction in each conflict.

This thesis finds that the United States’ propensity for traditional large-scale warfare is based upon its desire to achieve victory in the shortest amount of time. Furthermore, a preponderance of resources and instruments of war has also impelled the United States to employ overwhelming mass, maneuver, and firepower, instead of irregular warfare with a protracted timeline strategy.

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Border Jumping: Strategic and Operational Considerations in Planning Cross-Border Raids Against Insurgent Sanctuaries

by George E. Berndt MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Cross-border ground raids by state-backed security forces can have a detrimental impact on guerrillas’ ability to wage war. External support in neighboring countries can be an important source of strength to insurgent forces. However, cross-border raids and their security gains come at a political cost. This thesis examines the conflicts in Malaya (1946–1950), Nicaragua (1981–1990), Algeria (1954–1962), Namibia (1960–1989), South Vietnam (1960–1975), and Afghanistan (1978–1992) to identify operational and strategic-level considerations in planning cross-border operations to reduce the political costs of such operations. The study examines the relationship between security gains and political costs, including subsets of factors intrinsic to both variables. The research presents lessons applicable to the contemporary counterterrorism environment and suggests how military and political counterinsurgents can combine lines of effort in conducting cross-border operations against external insurgent sanctuaries.

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Special Operations Commemoration: Monuments, Memory & Memorialization Practices of Elite Organizations

by Michael L. Bineham COL, USA
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

The remembrance and memorialization of warriors has long been a significant element in many societies and cultures. One of history’s earliest records of commemoration is from the Greeks during the Peloponnesian War. The forms and processes of remembering and memorializing have changed, and continue to do so. The United States also has a long tradition of paying special respect to those military members that have given the ultimate sacrifice, their lives, in the service of their county during times of hostilities. This thesis examines the history of military memorialization, but within a specific focus on unique segments of the military and select government agencies. It covers memorialization practices from the Greeks until present day focusing on elite military special operations units. It examines how these national mission forces (NMF) and civilian counterpart organizations have developed and sustained their memorial programs. As military operations in Iraq are now concluded and those in Afghanistan are coming to a close, this thesis seeks to move forward the effort to recognize those fallen warriors from those conflicts in meaningful and lasting ways.

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Maintaining the Momentum: A Counterterrorism Cycle for the Next Decade

by Jon Braga COL, USA and Michelle Schmidt COL, USA
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

Major combat operations will end in Afghanistan, but al Qaeda and other terrorist groups will still pose a threat to the United States beyond 2014. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States government evolved to ensure success against the terrorist threat. Despite these transformations, the evolution of U.S. counterterrorism efforts is not complete. Interviews by the authors with twenty senior counterterrorism officials revealed that U.S. counterterrorism strategy lacks an effective implementation of five essential elements. The authors propose a CT Cycle consisting of the optimization of these five elements and demonstrate that this cycle was present in Iraq from 2005-2009. Although not all operational lessons learned are applicable, the authors call on policymakers to optimize U.S. counterterrorism efforts by adapting all five elements of this cycle at the strategic level in Washington D.C. and in operating environments beyond combat zones: 1) understand the environment; 2) invest despite the risk; 3) maintain a strategy of sustained pressure; 4) decentralize decision-making processes; and 5) reinforce a network of relationships.

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Arranged Marriages: Relationships Between Regular and Irregular Forces During the Early American Revolutionary War in Monmouth County, New Jersey

by Bzdafka Todd S. MAJ, USA
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS

This monograph seeks to answer the question of how the relationship between regular and irregular military forces influenced operations in New Jersey during the winter of 1776-77. Much like an arranged marriage, regular and irregular forces can make the best of the situation and make it work, or hold onto preconceived notions and let the relationship fail. Despite occasional innovations by British commanders in combining regular and irregular forces against the rebels, the marriage ultimately failed. In contrast, the rebels found a way to make the arrangement work. This monograph begins with a discussion of irregular units as a topic in academic and popular literature. The winning rebel side presented the Continental Army and the rebel militia as the force that gained independence, while the existence of loyalist units was intentionally ignored. Next, it focuses on the colonial wars to provide background and context, specifically, King George’s War, 1744-1748, and the French and Indian War, 1754-1763. The interaction between colonists and the British Army during these conflicts established the foundation for relationships during the American Revolutionary War. Then key information about New Jersey and Monmouth County is presented to set the stage for the two case study units, the 1st Battalion, New Jersey Volunteers (loyalist) and the Monmouth County Militia (rebel). These units provide a glimpse into how irregular units were employed and how personal relationships and policies affected operations. Finally, it concludes with a few insights to consider when approaching future relationships. The difficulty and necessity of building positive working relationships between coalition partners remains a challenge for militaries to this day, and is reflected in United States Army and Joint doctrine, such as ADRP 6-0 Mission Command, as a priority for commanders at all levels of war. While relationships existed between British and colonial Provincial units prior to the Revolutionary War, the relationships were not maintained or made official, and thus ceased to be effective after the termination of those conflicts. The experiences of the British Army during the winter of 1776-1777 show there is a need to coordinate and build a positive working relationship with irregular forces. That some sort of relationship between regular and irregular forces exists is a recurring theme in military operations globally. Irregular forces are a component of conflict and bring inherent limitations and advantages. The side that interacts most effectively will benefit, while the side that fails to utilize these forces may experience challenges guiding the situation towards a favorable outcome.

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Droning On: American Strategic Myopia Toward Unmanned Aerial Systems

by Carlos S. Cabello CW4, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Throughout the past decade of wars, the U.S. has deployed unmanned aerial systems, commonly referred to as drones, from Africa to Asia collecting intelligence and targeting adversaries. The nation now stands at a crossroad seeking to develop future American drone policy against an evolving threat while at the same time shaping global norms. The past decade of American drone use focused on short-term benefits, intelligence collection and lethal targeting, rather than on the long-term consequences of technology diffusion, or ethical and legal frameworks. Myopic drone strategies threaten to establish a global precedent that could undermine the stability of international relations, as state and non-state actors (SANSA) have begun to build, arm, and operate lethal unmanned systems at an alarming rate. Unmanned technology development and usage is outpacing international norms, regulations, and policies. These systems will usher in an era of unrestricted drone usage unless international regulations and standards are developed.

This thesis examines whether American drone strategy is myopic and whether it is creating a dangerous international precedent. A qualitative analysis will identify the short-term benefits and long-term consequences of U.S. drone strategy, focusing on unmanned technology diffusion, ethical justifications, and legal frameworks. Examining American drone strategy can help explain why a myopic policy may be beneficial in the short-term, yet may increase threats to national interests in the long-term. The thesis concludes with an assessment of whether strategic myopia has already set a dangerous international precedent, which SANSA will use to justify their future drone programs.

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Effective SOF Employment: Mitigating Causes of Conflict

by Young M. (Dave) Cho MAJ, USA; Brady R. Clark MAJ, USA; Mark M. Lee MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Following two long wars conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan, the American appetite for large-scale and prolonged stability operations may be diminishing. Consequently, employment of United States Special Operations Forces (SOF) may prove an increasingly attractive alternative for the Department of Defense (DOD) in unstable regions because of its unique capability to operate indirectly and with a minimal footprint, particularly in responding to cases of State failure, which is closely tied to outbreaks of conflict between governments and armed insurgents. Hence, the appropriate employment of SOF will be of critical importance to the achievement of U.S.-led efforts’ goals-one of which is building partner nation capacity to mitigate causes of conflict or to prevent conflicts from escalating to cause complete state failure.

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Mass Communication, Advertising, and Marketing Research at the Strategic and Operational Levels of War

by Ralph L. Clayton III COL, USA
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

U.S. Army leaders acknowledge the importance of the Human Domain, and it is therefore in the Army’s best interest to retain the capabilities and knowledge built over the past 12 years. Failure to maintain these capabilities will inevitably mean redeveloping them during the next conflict at the cost of national treasure, e.g. American lives and dollars. Historically, the Army’s improvements in process and technique draw directly from lessons learned in conflict. However, there is value in looking at empirical research drawn from fields with relevant parallels to practices used by influence operators. Within academia, there exists a vast amount of research on techniques and procedures influence operators can utilize. This study sought to identify how Army influence operators can benefit from outside institutions, and not rely solely on our experiences to further our capabilities. Therefore, this paper looked at what mass communication, advertising, and marketing research influence operators can adapt and implement at the strategic and operational levels of war. As a result, this study identified four reinforcing takeaways from the academic literature and two distinct recommendations for implementation, an additional step in the doctrinal process and training for our influence operators in communication strategy design that better supports the military campaign.

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The Russian Way of War: Post Soviet Adaptations in the Russian Military

by Copp James A. MAJ, USA
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian federation has deployed forces for three different large-scale combat operations. These three operations—Chechnya 1994, Chechnya 1999, and Georgia 2008—were conducted facing in each operation, a differently structured opponent. As a result of these different structures, Russian forces were required to conduct both Combat Arms Maneuver and Counter Insurgency. This full spectrum of combat operations provides sufficient material to determine if the military of the Russian Federation has developed a new Russian way of warfare, or if Russian forces are still conducting operations utilizing the same methods as their Soviet predecessors. The determination of a new Russian way of war will be made at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of warfare. As Russia continues to gain wealth from the sale of energy and attempts to expand influence globally, understanding the capabilities and weaknesses of the Russian military will become more important.

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Improving the Leader Development Experience in Army Units

by Douglas C. Crissman COL, USA
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

The Center for Army Leadership’s 2011 annual assessment of attitudes and perceptions on leader development (CASAL) identified “Develops Others” as the lowest-rated leader competency for the fifth year in a row with just over half of Army leaders regarded as effective at developing others by their subordinates. The CASAL further revealed one fourth of those surveyed indicated their units placed a “low” or “very low” priority on leader development activities. Feedback also highlighted varying degrees of leader and subordinate understanding of their individual responsibilities as “givers” and “receivers” of leader development. These trends span multiple years and clearly illustrate a deficiency in the perceived effectiveness of Army efforts to “raise the next generation” in the eyes of its most important audience – today’s junior leaders. The decade of attention and energy demanded by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has diluted the Army’s knowledge and experience base of “what right looks like” in leader development domain. The Army must now seize the opportunity to improve the consistency and effectiveness of its unit-level leader development efforts to deliver capable leaders to the Army of 2020 and beyond.

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Global Connectivity and Government Capacity: Social Networks, Order, Change, and Conflict

by Sean W. Cunningham MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Information and communication technologies (ICT), like all technologies, are catalysts for political change and potential conflict. The “Internet effect” continues to fuel the explosive growth of ICT, and has enduring implications. It has sparked the long fuse of an Information Revolution—and a Social Network Revolution. This revolutionary wave is fundamentally altering both the structure of institutional arrangements and the behavior of bureaucratic organizations by transforming traditional tactics for organizing, communicating, collaborating, and participating in the political system. Does the accelerated rate of systemic change caused by the Internet effect create social cohesion, or cleavages that may lead to increased conflict? The purpose of this study is to determine, by qualitative as well as quantitative means, whether a causal relationship exists between the degree a society is connected via social media networks (Internet and the World Wide Web [WWW]) and the institutional capacities of central governance. Blending theory with data, a statistical regression model is developed to evaluate the degree and measure the magnitude of this relationship. The findings gleaned from this analysis suggest that a conditional causal relationship does exist between social connectivity and state capacity.

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Civil Affairs in Unconventional Warfare

by Clayton D. Curtis MAJ, USA
School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS

The main problem addressed in this monograph is how to employ U.S. Special Operation Forces Civil Affairs units to support insurgent groups in Unconventional Warfare. The purpose of this research is to identify best practices from the insurgent’s perspective, the Viet Cong and Hezbollah, in overthrowing or out-competing the incumbent government that they are fighting against using civil affairs-like tasks such as Support to Civil Administration. The thesis question that this research attempts to answer is can U.S. Special Operations Forces Civil Affairs units plan and conduct civil military operations to support insurgent groups in Unconventional Warfare. The conclusion of this thesis is that U.S. Special Operations Forces Civil Affairs units can plan and conduct civil military operations in support of insurgent groups in an unconventional warfare environment. Moreover, the best task for civil affairs forces is to conduct or focus on is Support to Civil Administration. This is mainly for two reasons including: (1) civil administration and social services helps mobilize the population, and (2) it strengthens the insurgent’s shadow government and makes it ready to assume control over the government when they overthrow the incumbent regime.

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United States Special Operations Command Professional Military Education

by Robert M. Dexter MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

The United States Special Operations Command does not have an intermediate-level professional military education program for its officers. Current service-provided PME programs are not adequately meeting the educational goals for officers as required by USSOCOM. Through the Joint Special Operations University, SOCOM could establish its own PME program for officers of all services who are assigned to USSOCOM. Through the review of formal documents and interviews with senior officers in USSOCOM, an education gap was identified and analyzed. Three courses of action are presented as to how USSOCOM can overcome this education gap and meet Admiral William H. McRaven’s intent to have the best educated force in the United States military.

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Pursuing the Human Domain Risks Reinvesting on the Basics

by Roy F. Douglas COL, USA
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

The U.S. Army’s analysis of its recent wars has generated an emerging term and concept to deal with the drawdown and to remain as an effective force. The “Human Domain” does not lend credence to the fact that land forces have always operated amongst populations. The new term risks diverting the attention of U.S. land forces from concentrating on the essential capabilities, capacities and resources required to fulfill Department of Defense 21st Century priorities. The “Human Domain” inadvertently obscures the negative lessons learned from ten years of conflict, thereby shifting focus from making the right investment choices on Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Logistics, Personnel and Facilities. This paper addresses that the time, money and efforts spent on pursuing the “Human Domain” is wasteful and should cease immediately. The “Human Domain” is an invalid term and it is not equal to the other domains used in the joint lexicon.

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Fighting Dark Networks: Using Social Network Analysis to Implement the Special Operations Targeting Process for Direct and Indirect Approaches

by Erlacher Matthew D. MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States military has been engaged against transnational networks, a domain for which many of its processes were not designed and are not well-suited. A significant part of the militarys struggle of the last decade of war has been a lack of a framework for understanding and measuring changes in social networks, especially insurgent or terrorist networks known as dark networks. This thesis puts forth an experimental framework called the Special Operations Network Analysis Process, or SONAP, to solve that problem. SONAP combines the CARVER target analysis method with Social Network Analysis and a systems framework for identifying and bounding social mechanisms that support dark networks, as well as a means for identifying and evaluating changes in networks. This framework is then applied to a 2006 open-source data set of an Indonesian terrorist network. The result is a demonstrated utility in not only understanding the structure of that dark network, but also in designing an intervention strategy, along with means to measure structural and operational changes in that network.

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Dehumanization and Irregular Warfare

by Alexander S. Ford MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

In the current global environment the practice of dehumanization—the stripping away of common attributes among people that call for respect and constrain violence—and the misperception it creates have resulted in misguided attempts by militaries to influence the center of gravity in irregular warfare, the civilian population. Traditional thought in this matter implies that cultural training is the most important factor in creating more effective influence when dealing in irregular warfare scenarios. By examining dehumanization and the factors that cause it in irregular warfare environments, this thesis will provide a framework for how dehumanization impacts influence operations. My analysis seeks to explain how dehumanization occurs and how it can be prevented, thereby setting necessary conditions for effective population influence.

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Institutionalizing Interdependence: U.S. Army Special Operations Forces / Conventional Forces “No Turning Back”

by Mitchell D. Franks LTC(P), USA
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

The United States Army deployed two separate forces in the operational environment of the 3rd millennium. U.S. Army Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces. This research efforts provides a rationale for greater interdependence of these forces, outlines lessons learned between the forces in combat and current interdependence initiatives.
There are several components to current U.S. Army efforts to ensure interdependence is codified in policy and doctrine. These include CF - SOF interdependence included in recent U.S. Army publications, high level deliberation over recognizing and ultimately adding another warfighting function to U.S. Army doctrine, and the potential addition of a “Human Domain” to the current domain construct for Joint military doctrine. Additionally, the creation of a strategic landpower task force chartered by the United States Army, United States Marine Corps and United Stated Special Operation Command (USSOCOM) to examine their purposes as they intersect in the land domain serves as another example. Further, training that has specifically focused on interdependence between CF and SOF was bolstered in a number of venues.
The resolution and continuation of these efforts will play a large role in institutionalizing interdependence to ensure that the efforts of U.S. Army Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces do not revert to the preexisting conditions before combat operations in this millennium.

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A Resource Network Strategy for Afghanistan

by Ryan J. Hartwig MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

With NATO planning to complete the withdrawal of most troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, both Afghanistan and the Coalition need to define a positive long-term vision for the country. In this thesis, I evaluate a proposed approach to achieving such a vision—something I call the “Resource Network Strategy.” In this approach, Afghan and Coalition efforts to develop the country’s considerable natural resource endowment are integrated with the U.S. Special Operations Forces continuing village stability operations in a way that establishes a sustainable long-term counterinsurgency effort that will defeat the enemy at the village level while securing the support of Afghanistan’s central government and minimizing the costs to the U.S. and its allies.

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The Importance of Leadership and Learning Organizations

by Johnny Hester COL, USA
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

In today’s volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) environment, leaders will be called upon to deal with multifaceted emerging threats within a global context. Leaders will be required to understand, learn and adapt certain requirements to properly perform their duties. The purpose of this paper is to examine military leadership and determine the desired qualities that allow a leader to lead organizations through difficult and challenging environments to solve complex problems. This paper will explore the characteristics and competencies of future leaders in context with Army leadership doctrine and investigate the need for adaptive military leaders and their ability to transform organizations into learning organizations. The paper will also look at shared leadership and the power of the group to solve complex problems. The concepts and approaches described within this paper provide leaders a direction to transform their organizations into learning organizations using the collective systems to change specific Army practices that allow rapid growth, change, and innovation.

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We Want You: It Takes a Village To Market the Army

by Daniel C. Hodne LTC, USA
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

Maintaining the highest quality all-volunteer Army serves a vital national interest; therefore, systems should be in place for it to become a national effort. This process begins with the Army’s deep reflection, followed by its willingness to change its organizational culture. The Army may find itself suited to adopt a marketing culture while maintaining its warfighting edge. Such a transformation might also help the Army establish deeper relationships with the society and nation it serves. This paper will explore the challenges of Army marketing in an environment of increasing fiscal austerity, and recommend an innovative strategy that incorporates a comprehensive approach to achieve national unity of effort.

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Responding to Strategic and Organizational Uncertainty: Developing Army Leaders “after Iraq and Afghanistan”

by David M. Hodne COL, USA
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

This analysis suggests the current Army strategic leadership competencies are necessary but insufficient. Today’s Army leaders constitute the most “combat-experienced force” fielded in recent memory; however, much of this experience reflects a decade of experience in counterinsurgency that may only be partially relevant for other uncertain strategic challenges. In addition, a combination of pressing and complex factors of organizational uncertainty complicates today’s efforts in developing leaders, and more importantly, limits leaders from achieving their strategic potential. This paper suggests leader development efforts reinforce critical thinking and problem solving skills with “bi-lateral mentorship,” accrual of personal knowledge, and “mind fitness” to respond to strategic and organizational uncertainty and preserve the competitive advantage of the U.S. Army.

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PSYOP Needs More Science: The Root Cause of the Branch's Difficulties With Assessment

by Brian R. Horvath MAJ, USA; Jeffrey H. Sharpe MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

The Psychological Operations (PSYOP) branch has the unique responsibility for nesting assessment into every Military Information Support Operation it conducts. This critical element of PSYOP’s operational design is capable of demonstrating psychological effects, identifying behavioral changes, eliminating ineffective programs, and facilitating continuous methodological improvement. Unfortunately, the PSYOP community has struggled for decades with providing valid assessments of psychological operations. Recently, numerous sources have admonished the branch for failing to deliver valid or reliable assessments. Drawing from organizational theory, this thesis develops the Dynamic Capability Alignment Model that supports PSYOP branch’s development of an officer with the professional educational foundation to conduct the core task: assess. The model provided a structured/focused question framework for analyzing the branch’s officer selection, training, career progression, and operational design in an attempt to identify the root cause for the community’s failure to deliver reliable assessments. The analysis identified the absence of a sound scientific foundation as the root cause of PSYOP’s inability to conduct assessment. This fundamental problem is exacerbated by inadequate academic selection criteria and the existence of numerous organizational challenges. This thesis concludes with recommendations for establishment of the appropriate scientific and professional educational foundation for the PSYOP branch to execute its new core task: assess.

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Optimizing DoD Information Capabilities and Closing the Public Diplomacy Gap

by Timothy D. Huening LTC, USA
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

Since the end of the cold war, the U.S. has dominated warfare within the physical domains. However, this success has not translated into dominance of the information environment, despite increased emphasis and funding. If dominating the information environment is vital to achieving our national strategic objectives, the current USG approach is inadequate. The U.S. must not pay lip service to the importance of information, it must treat it with the same regard it treats the other instruments of national power. This will require establishing an organization responsible for coordination and synchronization of Public Diplomacy Information activities at the USG level and consolidating DoD information capabilities into a holistic career field. Without such radical changes, the U.S. will continue to find itself vulnerable to others in the information environment intent on discrediting U.S. efforts abroad. The effects of which could ultimately undermine U.S. national security interests. These changes will require long-term vision and leadership willing to break current parochial paradigms. The bottom line is the status quo is no longer a viable option.

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The Role of the U.S. Army in Air Sea Battle

by Daniel S. Hurlbut COL, USA
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

Combat operations are concluded in Iraq and reducing in Afghanistan while the United States is shifting focus, forces, and capabilities to the Asia Pacific region. This paper explores what the rebalance to the Pacific theater means for the Army. Beginning with a review of current Army missions, the role of the Army in Air Sea Battle is explored and concludes with resource modernization recommendations.

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Golden Arrows: Leveraging Strategic Leadership Potential of Special Operations Leaders

by Robert M. Kirila LTC, USA
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

This paper examines current and future requirements for strategic leadership of the United States Army and identifies Special Operations Forces senior leaders as potential strategic leaders of the Army based upon the alignment their professional attributes and competencies with the future operating environment and the probability of continued irregular and hybrid conflict. First this paper assesses the concept of strategic leadership within the framework of recent historical and future global conditions. Next, an analysis of U.S. Army strategic leaders identifies commonalities of educational, professional development and promotion opportunities. A comparison of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) practices for identification, development and assignment of high potential officers reveals some deviation. Finally, options are recommended for enhancing the strategic leadership of the Army and increasing the potential for future success in volatile and complex situations by including Special Operations officers.

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U.S. Government Interagency Reform Needed in Support of National Security

by David P. Mauser COL, USA
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

The United States faces serious threats from established states, weak and failing states, and non-state actors from around the world. In the current volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous international environment, one in which the U.S. is trying to exercise global leadership, the U.S. government must reform its interagency apparatus to ensure our national security. Effective and efficient interagency coordination is vital to national security. However, the lack of updated or current legislation requiring the integration of capabilities and capacities of the separate U.S. government agencies and departments has led to wasteful spending, mistrust of U.S. intentions, in-fighting for resources and prestige, and failure to implement the NSS and execute effective foreign policy. Congress must mandate interagency reform in support of national security.

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The US Army and Future Security Force Assistance Operations

by Timothy J. McAteer COL, USA
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

al-Qaeda and its affiliates remain a threat to the US and US interests abroad. Their consistent expansion into failed and failing states and other ungoverned regions creates potential safe havens from which the organization can plan and prepare future operations. This paper proposes that Security Force Assistance (SFA) operations represent an enduring approach to denying safe haven to transnational terror organizations like al-Qaeda, by developing the capabilities of partner nation security forces to control activities within their borders and secure their populations. SFA also presents an opportunity for increased employment of Regionally Aligned, US Army Conventional Forces in support of security cooperation efforts. This paper provides a summary of the threat and the conditions of failing states and safe havens. It addresses the recent evolution of SFA doctrine, guidance and authorities, and the role of interagency cooperation related to the future operating environment and security assistance missions. The paper argues that SFA is a relevant military approach and not at odds with historic foreign military assistance efforts. It concludes with recommendations for organizing and training Conventional Force SFA units.

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Character Development of U.S. Army Leaders: A Laissez Faire Approach

by Brian M. Michelson COL, USA
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

The generation and application of military force often presents military leaders with moral dilemmas that are unique to the profession of arms. As the Army fully implements its doctrine of mission command, Army leaders will be expected to make difficult and consequential decisions in ethically ambiguous situations, but to do this with even less guidance and oversight than they experience today. In this environment, the quality of a leader’s character, who they are as a person, and thus their ability to make correct and independent discretionary judgments, matters even more than in the past. Drawing heavily on current Army doctrine and data, this paper examines the Army’s approach to the development of personal character in its leaders. This paper also evaluates the effectiveness of these efforts, provides summary conclusions, and offers recommendations for action.

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Private Motive, Humanitarian Intent: A Theory of Ethically Justified Private Intervention

by Edwin D. Morton III MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

The usual instruments of humanitarian military intervention are the regular armed forces of a state, or a group of states, but even when gross crimes such as genocide are committed and an intervention becomes morally obligatory, states are reluctant to risk the lives of their own soldiers. This moral tension is at the root of the international community’s failure to act in most cases. However, for states to fulfill the duty to prevent crimes against humanity, and at the same time protect their soldiers in the interests of national defense, a third party could be employed. In this thesis, the case will be made that the use of private military companies (PMCs) for humanitarian intervention is morally preferable to the employment of a state’s armed forces. To serve as a moral guideline for the concept, a theory of ethically justifiable private intervention has been formulated based on elements of Just War Theory and James Pattison’s Moderate Instrumentalist Approach to humanitarian intervention. Three case studies are analyzed to conclude that, under certain conditions, humanitarian intervention conducted by PMCs is a morally permissible option.

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Strategies for Countering Terrorist Safe Havens

by Kenneth E. Nielsen MAJ, USA; Robert L. Thomson MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

More than a decade after the attacks on 9/11, United States leadership continues to place a high priority on pursuing terrorists and denying them safe havens from which they can recruit, train, and plan operations. In a time of decreasing budgets and growing sentiment avidly against involvement in prolonged wars, the U.S. must adapt strategies to meet the future threats posed by terrorist safe havens.

This thesis offers strategies for countering safe havens. It begins by arguing that safe havens are not just geographic areas, but that they also include a demographic component that allows terrorists a population among which to hide. The thesis then presents four strategies aimed at denying geographic and demographic safe havens: leadership targeting within safe havens, tactical containment, pseudo operations, and surrogate security forces. The thesis draws from four historical case studies to examine these strategies, including the Peruvian government’s efforts to combat the Shining Path, French containment of the Casbah in Algeria’s war of independence, Rhodesia’s Selous Scouts’ experience with pseudo operations, and U.S. co-option of the Sons of Iraq in Anbar Province.

The thesis finds that no single strategy is sufficient for dealing with geographic and demographic safe havens. Rather, a combination of strategies, properly sequenced, can reduce terrorist safe havens. Furthermore, none of these strategies works without counterinsurgency forces positively engaging the population, setting the necessary conditions for separating insurgents from their demographic and geographic supports.

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Irregular Warfare Centric Foreign Internal Defense

by Michael W. O‘Donnell MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Conflict over the past few decades has changed drastically. Warfare changed with the conflict. Large-scale conventional wars are not today‘s norm. Small non-state actors and terrorist organizations cause havoc on a global scale using unconventional methods and weapons. The United States and its allies need to combat these threats using indirect strategies while maintaining international legitimacy Hizbullah is a terrorist organization operating within Lebanon and the Levant. Hizbullah employs violence, in addition to political means, to achieve its goals. Lebanon and its allies could identify a strategic internal defense and development strategy and implement a comprehensive foreign internal defense training regimen to combat Hizbullah and ultimately disarm the militant wing. Using an indirect method, focusing on a political agreement, increasing social services and providing additional security and stability to southern Lebanon are some of the critical elements the Lebanese government needs to implement to tame Hizbullah and disarm the terrorists. This approach worked for Britain with the Irish Republican Army and it can work for Lebanon with Hizbullah if properly implemented.

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Positive Communications: The Keystone of Counterinsurgency Strategy

by Truc T. Pham MAJ, USA; Michael J. Sieber MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Over the last decade, the United States military has struggled to develop methodologies to assess success in its execution of counterinsurgency operations. By examining Zabul province, Afghanistan, this study offers a quantitative method to measure the effectiveness of positive communications that counterinsurgents conduct as part of their information strategy to mobilize public support for the incumbent government. We test the hypothesis that positive communications play a significant role in shaping popular attitudes and, when conducted by counterinsurgents, influence the population to support the government and deny safe haven for insurgents.

Estimating a variety of regression models, we utilize high-resolution spatio-temporal data to isolate the casual effect of population engagements and radio broadcasts in relation to levels of insurgent violence over time and space. The evidence supports our prediction that positive communications conducted by counterinsurgents reduce insurgent violence.

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A Framework for NGO-Military Collaboration

by Penner Glenn B. MAJ, USA
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS

What do military professionals need to know about NGOs? The literature on NGOs includes very little about NGO-military relationships in troubled areas. Moreover, the U.S. military fails to convey or encourage an adequate understanding of NGOs in its publications and mid-career military education. Drawing abductively from scholarly literature and inductively from case studies and practitioner interviews, I theorize that the efficacy of NGO-military collaboration varies with the type of NGO (INGO or LNGO) and the type of operation. I crystallize this argument into a typology of NGO-military outcomes. I find that military cooperation with international NGOs is most productive during humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief operations, whereas military cooperation with local NGOs is most productive during conflict and post-conflict operations.

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Thickening the Global SOF Network

by Jonathan F. Post MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Emotional intelligence (EI) refers to the competence to identify and express emotions, understand emotions, assimilate emotions in thought, and regulate both positive and negative emotions in oneself and others. EI is a necessary, but not fully sufficient, quality Green Berets must possess to establish, nurture, and enhance effective relationships within the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational arena. As the Special Forces Regiment transitions from intensive participation in operations supporting the Global War on Terrorism to developing the forward-focused Global Special Operations Forces Network, thickening these critical relationships emerges as the foundation of any expected future success. This thesis strives to elucidate the substantial scientific evidence establishing EI as a critical and well-deserving addition to the traditional measures of competence, such as intelligence quotients and general personality. Specifically, the author demonstrates that the skills and abilities associated with EI were deemed most critical by the Office of Strategic Services assessment staff, and that these same skills remain key competencies for accomplishing partner-based special operations today. The author recommends practical changes to the current assessment and selection of Special Forces personnel, as well as for the training and placement of selected Soldiers.

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Enduring Engagement Yes, Episodic Engagement No: Lessons for SOF from Mali

by Simon J. Powelson MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

This thesis examines SOF’s recent experience in Mali and determines where—or to what extent—it should be considered a failure. In addition to analyzing these encounters, a second aim of this thesis is to make recommendations for how SOF might better build partner capacity and capability in the future. The argument made is that enduring engagement is of enduring value; episodic engagement, on its own, is not. Examples of both types of engagement can be found in United States Special Operations Forces’ recent interactions with the Malian military.

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The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly: Selecting and Vetting Indigenous Leaders

by Donald K. Reed MAJ, USA; Matthew P. Upperman MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Determining who is the right indigenous leader for U.S. forces to work with in a complex environment during irregular and unconventional warfare is a complicated endeavor, affected by countless factors. Selecting, vetting, and influencing indigenous leaders in foreign countries has been a key task of U.S. Special Operations Forces since its inception, but to date Special Operations Forces often struggles with mastering this, as evidenced by recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. The primary aim of this thesis is to improve this capability. To assist with the future selection and vetting of indigenous leaders, this thesis introduces a leader selection heuristic. It is the authors’ contention is that to find the “right” individual requires correctly identifying particular attributes, features, and behaviors in both the individual and the environment.

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Developing Capacity or a Culture of Dependency: Are Humanitarian Assistance Projects Initiated by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams Reinforcing Dependency or True Capacity in the Paktia-Khost Provinces of Afghanistan?

by Rosemary M. Reed MAJ, USA
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS

The purpose of this paper is to examine PRT project management practices to determine if those practices resulted in increased dependency of GIRoA on PRTs in Khost and Paktia provinces. Since 2003, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have conducted major reconstruction and governance capacity building projects. The projects assisted the Afghan government to regain territory and credibility with the local population, as part of the Counter-Insurgency (COIN) strategy of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Historical implications and project management practices are examined to identify indicators that contribute to dependency of GIRoA on the PRTs. The relevancy of dependency theory to the effects achieved by the PRTs to legitimize GIRoA with the local populace is examined in addition to the GIRoA and ISAF aid strategies. Three methods of evaluation were utilized to determine dependency trends: Evaluation of the provincial development plans, and analysis of PRT CERP project data and PRT United States Agency for International Development (USAID) capacity building programs. The analysis demonstrated there was a relationship between the level of government and village involvement with the level of complexity of the project that increased dependency on the PRTs.

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Error-avoidance Theory: Sniper Employment for Military and Civilian Law Enforcement

by Joshua D. Roberts MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Sniper operations are high risk, high reward missions with unique traits and distinctive capabilities often resulting in great success or punishing failure. Within nearly all conceptions of sniper operations there is a perceived difference between civilian and military sniper engagements. This thesis presents an error-avoidance theory for guiding successful sniper operations across both domains. Inside sniper operations there are two critical errors that need to be avoided. These errors are defined as Type 1 and Type 2 errors. Type 1 errors are those that result in the death of an innocent individual. Type 2 errors occur when the targeted individual escapes the situation and the mission objective is not met, and thus the threat or potential threat remains active. Naturally, the goal is to avoid both errors. However, the rules of engagement established for any mission must, by necessity, privilege the avoidance of one error type over the other. The evaluation of three critical variables—operational environment, political and social context, and the stakes or risk in the situation—should prioritize which error to avoid. This thesis thereby establishes a theoretical framework that can be universally employed to establish rules of engagement by all those who use the sniper tactic, for both civilian and military operations.

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Optimizing Future Operations for Special Forces Battalions: Reviewing the CONOP Process

by Edward “Judd” Sanford MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Evidence obtained in this study shows that a successful CONOP product contains minimal informational requirements for approval and an effective CONOP procedure is supported by a targeting methodology with lower delegation of authority for CONOP approval.

The CONOP is used by special operations forces (SOF) and other units to gain concurrence for an operation by its higher headquarters. It is typically a PowerPoint slide presentation submitted by a Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (SFODA) or another similar combat unit in order to describe the type of operation, the operation’s level of risk, the assets required to conduct the operation, and when the operation is to take place. Concurrence can typically take up to 72 hours for a high-risk operation or up to 48 hours for a medium-risk operation after the CONOP is submitted through the chain of command. SOF uses the CONOP procedure to deconflict operations, assign resources, and to demonstrate how the operation is nested within the operational priorities of the battle space owner as well as the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) commander. This study examines what makes a successful CONOP and what constitutes an effective CONOP procedure.

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Employing U.S. Army Special Forces to Defeat America’s Emerging Threats

by Alan Joseph Shumate COL, USA
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

Following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. invaded Afghanistan and Iraq while targeting al-Qa’ida (AQ) and other transnational terrorist organizations in order to neutralize America’s security threats. U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) supported Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) by conducting Unconventional Warfare (UW) operations. After the overthrow of the Taliban and Saddam’s government, SF transitioned from UW to Foreign Internal Defense (FID), creating the Afghan and Iraqi Army Commandos who led the way for their new governments’ security. Today, the U.S. and our Special Operations Forces (SOF) focus heavily on Surgical Strike missions, specifically Counter Terrorism (CT) and Direct Action (DA) operations as we continue to target AQ and other terrorist organizations. This focus on Surgical Strike operations and underutilization of SOF in Special Warfare operations such as FID and UW may limit DOD’s ability to defeat emerging threats. This paper will examine Special Warfare operations, specifically FID, Preparation of the Environment (PE) and UW and how the application of these missions can efficiently support long term U.S. national security objectives.

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Al Jazeera and the DoD: The Need for Greater Engagement

by Shawn A. Stroud COL, USA
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

A review of the recently published Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) highlights a complex security environment marked by an ever-changing and easily accessible global information network. Because of this expanding phenomenon, military actions and operations will be conducted under increased media scrutiny and will require greater transparency especially for the international audience. Additionally, U.S. military operations within the Middle East will be widely scrutinized by a global Muslim audience, who has become more distrustful and critical of U.S. policies and military strategy. As such, this necessitates greater engagement with international news networks by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and its military services. In particular, the Al Jazeera Media Network represents one of the fastest growing and most influential news networks among the myriad media who dominate the global information environment. This research highlights the need for the DoD and the Joint Services to examine current communication strategies with the Al Jazeera Media Network and incorporate the findings into its senior leader engagement plan and its leader development strategies for public affairs and communication specialists.

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Smart Defense: Significant Return Opportunity on U.S. SOF Investment

by George K. Thiebes COL, USA
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

Economic austerity and concerns over the United States’ declared shift in focus to the Pacific have served as catalysts in prompting NATO European members to develop better capabilities and reduce military dependency on the United States through prioritization, specialization, and implementation of multinational solutions. This Smart Defense concept is intended to enable NATO to build effective capabilities in order to meet its declared aspirations in the 2010 Strategic Concept, entitled “Active Engagement, Modern Defence.” It affords the United States a cost-effective opportunity to leverage its SOF to maintain relations with European partners, build their capabilities, and support NATO expeditionary operations. This paper examines Smart Defense and some of its challenges. It also reviews U.S. SOF strategic engagement in Europe, identifies opportunities this concept affords the United States, and provides recommendations for using SOF to move beyond NATO’s Smart Defense strategy to a “Smart Security” strategy.

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The Seeds of Mobilization: Emotional Frames and Influence

by Benjamin L. Tipton MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Why is the U.S. not highly effective at influencing the attitudes and opinions of foreign audiences? The constant and almost sole utilization of rational argumentative frames with almost no emotionally resonant appeal for fear of offending foreign sensibilities is the reason why. This study utilizes a survey research experiment to suggest that emotionally resonant messaging is more effective, and that its use should not only be acceptable but requisite to both policy makers and public of the U.S. to influence foreign populations to the benefit of the U.S. and our allies.

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After 2014: The U.S./NATO Missions in Afghanistan

by J.B. Vowell COL, USA
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

President Obama has formally announced the end of combat operations by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) at the end of 2014, and directed ISAF to focus operations until that time on Security Force Assistance (SFA) to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The question becomes what strategy, support, missions and troop requirements will be necessary to keep the gains made in Afghanistan once ISAF withdraws. This paper will evaluate the best way forward to achieve our stated U.S. vital national security interest in the region to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda. By researching the effectiveness of our experiences in Afghanistan, this study will assess the enabling conditions for future success. Focused counterterrorism (CT) efforts from within Afghanistan, continued SFA missions to develop the ANSF, and the provision of coalition enablers to mitigate operational risk will best support our stated U.S. vital national security interest while simultaneously defeating al-Qaeda’s strategy.

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The Information Barber Pole: Integrating White Information and Red Intelligence in Emerging Conflicts

by John M. R. Wilcox MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Militaries operate increasingly in social terrain and must focus on civilian populations as much they do the belligerents that take refuge among them. Current intelligence and planning doctrine fails to meet the needs of the emerging information environments. “Secret” intelligence information and “open source” information must find a means of merging to generate a holistic view of the environment. The failure of the existing system leads to shortcomings in strategy development and operational design, which in turn yields imprecise applications of military power.

To overcome this gap in structure and doctrine, this thesis explores a new methodology that merges information and intelligence where appropriate and develops a common understanding across levels of command. The ‘Barber Pole’ process, as it is termed here, maximizes the use of existing structures, and capitalizes on resident professional military skills.

The Barber Pole is a three-step process that flattens intelligence and information systems for the purposes of ensuring a common and shared understanding of the operating environment. These phases include the collection of information and provision of command guidance, the coordination and interpretation of collected data, and finally the production of plans tailored to the target population.

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“Made in the U.S.A.” CONUS-based Security Force Assistance Approaches in the Middle East and North Africa

by Brian Winski COL, USA
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

The challenges and opportunities in the Middle-East and North Africa demand new approaches in the U.S. Military’s SFA efforts there. This assessment is near universal, but most research and analysis has been focused on advising and assisting partners in their countries, and how to optimize our unit structures and professional competencies to do so. The common belief is conducting SFA “forward” is the best approach, however we have numerous opportunities to conduct SFA more effectively and efficiently here in CONUS. This paper offers ideas on how to conduct SFA activities here in CONUS that are relatively low-cost and low-risk, yet yield a high return in terms of strategic relationship building and influence with our critical partners in the Middle-East. These initiatives and programs will maximize the strategic opportunities presented by the recent transitions of governments and militaries in the region following the “Arab Spring” by influencing the emerging strategic leaders of those countries ultimately building, solidifying, and in some cases repairing, the critical military-to-military relationships that will buttress the strategic relationships we have with countries throughout the Middle-East and North Africa.

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Covert Coercion: A Formal Analysis of Unconventional Warfare as an Interstate Coercive Policy Option

by Luke A. Wittmer MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

In the current global environment, interstate coercion methods are used to compel behavior modification amongst state and state-sponsored actors. Traditional compellence is commonly considered in its overt, diplomatic manifestation. However, in the age of low-intensity conflict where domestic and international exigencies often constrain U.S. coercive policy options, covert methods in the form of unconventional warfare, subversion, sabotage and other associated paramilitary and political actions are occasionally pursued as the means to support the U.S.’s coercive overtures. Under the rubric of covert coercion there are state-level decision frames, strategies, and resistance force alliance conditions that contribute to either the success or failure of covert coercion ventures that utilize unconventional warfare approaches. This analysis utilizes game theoretic models, as well as insights from prospect theory, to explain the conditions under which unconventional warfare could prove a viable U.S. coercive policy option.

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Spatial Mapping of the Mobility-Lifetime(μτ) Product in Cadmium Zinc Telluride Nuclear Radiation Detectors Using Transport Imaging

by Peter J. Young Jr. MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Cadmium zinc telluride (Cd1-xZnxTe) is an important material for room temperature nuclear radiation detectors due to its high stopping power for gamma rays combined with its good electron transport. However, CdZnTe crystals are susceptible to growth defects such as grain boundaries, twin boundaries, and tellurium (Te) inclusions which can compromise desirable energy resolution and electron/hole charge collection properties. The presence of these defects ultimately degrades the effectiveness of the nuclear radiation detector material. The ability to map electron and hole transport properties at high spatial resolution can provide new insight into the roles of individual defects.

Experimentally, this study employs high-resolution (< 5μm) transport imaging to explore the effect of localized crystal defects on the spatial variation of carrier transport properties. The ambipolar diffusion length (Ld) and associated free carrier mobility-lifetime (μτ) product are determined by imaging the recombination luminescence from carriers generated by an electron beam. Localized defects often are marked by regions of low intensity luminescence. At the same time, we observe increasing ambipolar diffusion length in the region immediately surrounding the defects. One explanation is that the gettering of point defects, such as interstitials and vacancies, associated with the formation of microscopic precipitates results in localized increases in the μτ product. Initial results indicate that these variations occur over a region extending ~ 10 μm from the edge of the inclusion.

Mathematically, this study employs the minority carrier diffusion equation to model the 3D diffusion of free charge carriers away from a point source. A non-linear least squares program using exact methods and asymptotic expansion methods is then used to fit this model to transport data imagery. The ambipolar diffusion length (Ld) and associated free carrier mobility-lifetime (μτ) is then determined from t he scanned portion of the sample. A plot of diffusion length versus position is also revealed, which depicts the sample’s spatial variation of carrier transport properties.

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