

IMPROVING THE INTERAGENCY CONFLICT
ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK (ICAF)
WITH INTELLECTUAL HABITS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Security and Conflict Studies

by

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2012-01

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved</i> OMB No. 0704-0188		
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 08-06-2012		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) AUG 2011 – JUN 2012	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Improving the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) with Intellectual Habits			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S) Major James T. Wilson, U.S. Army			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301			8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT How can the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) be improved in order to better understand the operational environment? The application of the ICAF requires good intellectual habits that encompass an appreciation for abductive reasoning and nuanced causal explanation. Research that enriches and expands our understanding of conflict, political theory, and relevant social science continues to grow. Practitioners must understand the latest theories in order to apply abstract reasoning to better understand what is increasing or decreasing a conflict. Furthermore, they must understand causality so that this understanding is complete. Craig Parsons has broken conventional causality into the four causal mechanisms of structural, institutional, ideational, and psychological. These causal mechanisms are comprehensive and internally coherent. However, in the complex nature of conflict, conventional causality is not enough. William Connolly's understanding of complexity and emergent causality are necessary in order to better understand a conflict. These habits will improve the ICAF and facilitate the best understanding of the conflict and environment.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Interagency, ICAF, Conflict, Causality, Abstract Reasoning, Intellectual Habits					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)
(U)	(U)	(U)	(U)	81	

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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ABSTRACT

IMPROVING THE INTERAGENCY CONFLICT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK (ICAF) WITH INTELLECTUAL HABITS, by Major James T. Wilson, 81 pages.

How can the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) be improved in order to better understand the operational environment? The application of the ICAF requires good intellectual habits that encompass an appreciation for abductive reasoning and nuanced causal explanation. Research that enriches and expands our understanding of conflict, political theory, and relevant social science continues to grow. Practitioners must understand the latest theories in order to apply abstract reasoning to better understand what is increasing or decreasing a conflict. Furthermore, they must understand causality so that this understanding is complete. Craig Parsons has broken conventional causality into the four causal mechanisms of structural, institutional, ideational, and psychological. These causal mechanisms are comprehensive and internally coherent. However, in the complex nature of conflict, conventional causality is not enough. William Connolly's understanding of complexity and emergent causality are necessary in order to better understand a conflict. These habits will improve the ICAF and facilitate the best understanding of the conflict and environment.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the assistance of several people who assisted my research, improved my understanding, and assisted in improving my work. The first is my committee chair, LTC Tino Perez, who has been an outstanding teacher and the most influential person on this thesis. He helped me to organize my thoughts in a coherent and orderly manner. Additionally, I would like to thank Cynthia Irmer, Robert Ricigliano, Nicole Goodrich, COL(R) Jeff Oeser, LTC Eric Walker, and LTC Paul Schmidt for helping me during the course of this paper. Your assistance has been invaluable. Next, I would like to thank my peers in the Local Dynamics of War program for your insight and assistance over the year, Steve Ranieri, Rob Barnsby, David Oakley, Janine Taylor, Jacob Reeves, Iven Sugai, and Chris Rowe. Finally, I want to thank my wife, Kristina Wilson, for listening to my ideas, providing feedback on my paper, and always being there for me.

Any errors in this thesis are my fault, and mine alone. The acknowledged people have made this paper better because of their efforts.

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ACRONYMS

ARMM	Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
CSO	Conflict and Stabilization Operations (Bureau within the Department of State)
DGDP	Directorate of Graduate Degree Programs
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
FM	Field Manual
GDP	Graduate Degree Programs
ICAF	Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah
JP	Joint Publication
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
NGO	Non-Government Organization
PSC	Protracted Social Conflict
SAT	Structural, Attitudinal, and Transactional (causation model discussed by Robert Ricigliano)
SGA	Small Group Advisor
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On 17 December 2010, Mohammed Bouazizi, a fruit vendor, set himself on fire outside of a Tunisian government office. His actions sparked a popular uprising in Tunisia that ousted President Zine el Abidine ben Ali. This change inspired many population groups across North Africa and the Middle East to express discontent with their government. This uprising is known around the world as the Arab Spring.¹ The Arab Spring continues to resonate in many areas and thus far has ended the reign of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Muhammar Kaddafi in Libya. It is not clear what the outcome of this unrest will be. The interconnections between popular unrest, social media, authoritarian regimes, economic despair, and numerous other factors were all causes to some degree in the Arab Spring and will shape development in the region. The understanding of the Arab Spring by the United States (U.S.) policymakers will shape foreign assistance and diplomatic actions around the world.

With regard to the Arab Spring, the U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, the Department of State (DOS) bureaus and embassies, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) missions, and various other U.S. Government (USG) agencies operating in the region need to have a common understanding of what is occurring and how to meet USG objectives. The diverse perspectives and missions within the USG can complicate this effort, and may instead dilute the effects we wish to achieve.

¹Joe Sterling, "A Year Later, Bouzzizi's Legacy Still Burns," *CNN*, 17 December 2011, <http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/17/world/meast/arab-spring-one-year-later/index.html> (accessed 18 February 2012).

Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF)

The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) was developed by multiple USG organizations, including the Department of Defense (DOD), DOS, and USAID “to assess conflict situations systemically and collaboratively and prepare for interagency planning for conflict prevention, mitigation and stabilization.”² This tool has been used in more than 25 countries since July 2008.³ The ICAF can be used as a joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational approach to developing a common understanding of a conflict.⁴ The outcomes of this tool are critical for making decisions of strategic importance. Findings from the ICAF provide justification for action intended to meet USG objectives.

How can the ICAF process be enhanced in order to better understanding the operational environment? It is a tested framework capable of providing a systemic, theory-grounded understanding of a conflict. Furthermore, the ICAF is the result of substantial coordination between multiple USG agencies.⁵ Still, it is healthy to continually evaluate processes and look for improvements that can be made. This paper argues that the application of the ICAF requires intellectual habits that encompass an

²Department of State (DOS), “Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF),” Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/187786.pdf> (accessed 2 December 2011), 1.

³Nicole Goodrich, “What Is ICAF” (Training Presentation to the Local Dynamics of War Scholar’s Group, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 8 February 2012).

⁴DOS, “ICAF,” 5.

⁵Goodrich.

appreciation for abductive reasoning and nuanced causal explanation. Through these habits, the application could be enriched.

The ICAF is grounded in academic theory and based on collaboration by multiple government organizations. It provides a structure for understanding the environment in order to focus our efforts in the areas that will most likely achieve USG objectives. Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, *Interorganizational Planning During Joint Operations*, provides an outline of ICAF for the DOD⁶ and directs the Ground Combatant Commander to “(i)ncorporate, support, and participate in interagency planning processes, such as the . . . Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) to the greatest extent possible.”⁷

An understanding of the ICAF and theories upon which it is based are conducive to understanding a conflict environment. However, an understanding can still be improved upon from this point. As the theories that inform social science continue to grow and mature, our understanding of the conflict environment should do the same. Practitioners can use knowledge of the latest research through abductive reasoning to better understand the conflict.

Furthermore, familiarization with structured causal logics would lend rigor to the examination of a conflict. Craig Parsons has developed a comprehensive map of causation with four logics: structural, institutional, ideational, and psychological.⁸ These

⁶Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, *Interorganizational Planning During Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 24 June 2011), H-1 - H-10.

⁷Ibid., II-10.

⁸Craig Parsons, *How to Map Arguments in Political Science* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press 2007), 12.

causal logics, based on causal mechanisms, serve as building blocks to explain action. Action can be understood to have structural, institutional, ideational, and psychological causes. An inclusion of these causal mechanisms into the ICAF would provide rigor to evaluating causation and ensure there is a thorough understanding of conflict.

There are two tasks in the ICAF: conflict diagnosis and segue into planning. The framework emphasis is on the first task in order to develop a common understanding. The second task is dependent on the various planning processes of the multiple USG and partner organizations, and the desire of the USG elements in the region. The conflict diagnosis task is broken into four steps that are graphically depicted in figure 1.⁹




Figure 1. ICAF Conflict Diagnosis

Source: Adapted from Department of State, “Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF),” Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/187786.pdf> (accessed 2 December 2011), 7.

⁹DOS, “ICAF,” 6-7.

The first step is to analyze the context of the conflict region. The context is those items that do not cause a conflict, but create pre-conditions that create fertile ground for the problems in the region to grow. The environmental conditions, poverty, and history of conflict are possible context attributes in which a conflict is occurring. Context affects and is affected by each of the other components in the ICAF.¹⁰

The second step is to examine the identity groups, their societal patterns, and institutional performance in order to identify the core grievances and social and institutional resiliencies. The identity groups are groups of people who identify with each other along common interests. In a conflict environment, this group may feel their basic human needs are threatened. The societal patterns are how the various groups interact with each other, particularly when there are perceived deprivations, competing interests, or when they add to peaceful conflict resolution. Institutional performance is a performance assessment of formal and informal institutions that should be providing for basic human needs, and they may be improving or worsening a conflict.¹¹

Next in the ICAF process, we look at key actors' motivations and means in order to derive the drivers of conflict and mitigating factors. This step looks at key actors and how they mobilize groups around core grievances or sources of resilience. The drivers of conflict identified in this step can be understood as active energy, while the core grievance identified in step two can be understood as potential energy. Core grievances may not actually cause a conflict, but they are issues around which groups are willing to act upon. They become drivers of conflict when key actors are able to mobilize and

¹⁰DOS, "ICAF," 7.

¹¹Ibid., 8-9.

resource a group to commit violence. Furthermore, mitigating factors can be understood as active energy, while sources of resilience are the potential. Mitigating factors are able to counter core grievances, and sources of resilience actively work to resolve conflict peacefully.¹²

Finally, we look at windows of vulnerability, or periods of time in which a conflict may increase or decrease. The ICAF assessment team will use this understanding of time to prioritize the drivers of conflict and mitigating factors identified in step three. Once the conflict diagnosis task is complete then the outcome feeds into either crisis response planning or conflict prevention planning.¹³

Criticism of ICAF

In practical application, the persons who perform task one are different than the persons who perform task two. The DOS, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) has the mission to “engage in conflict prevention, crisis response and stabilization, aiming to address the underlying causes of destabilizing violence.”¹⁴ They provide the expertise for task one, conflict diagnosis. However, it would be beneficial for other members of the ICAF assessment team conducting task one to have certain intellectual habits. These habits include keeping apprised of the latest academic research, applying abductive reasoning to a conflict environment, and using rigorous causal explanation to understand what is occurring in the environment. They should be familiar

¹²Ibid., 10-12.

¹³Ibid., 13.

¹⁴Department of State (DOS), “Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations,” <http://www.state.gov/j/cso/> (accessed 1 May 2012).

with the ICAF theories and how they inform the ICAF process, social science research, and Parsons's causal logics. They should also be able to apply their understanding of conflict and peace building theories through abductive reasoning to understand the operational environment. Abductive reasoning can also be understood as the diagnostic process.¹⁵ Abductive reasoning will be expounded upon later in this paper.

The importance of having these intellectual habits is particularly true when the ICAF assessment transitions to task two, segue into planning. These habits ensure an ICAF assessment team will be more knowledgeable, and there will be a greater continuity of understanding from conflict diagnosis to segue into planning.

Way Ahead

Chapter 2 of this paper will conduct a literary review of resources used in the analysis of this paper. It will look at research that has been conducted in relation to the ICAF. It will demonstrate a gap in knowledge that this paper addresses. First, it will discuss the academic theories in which the ICAF is grounded and provide a basis of understanding the process. This paper will consider the primary points of the literature and how they are incorporated into the framework. Second, chapter 2 will highlight several pieces of literature that have analyzed different aspects of the ICAF and how the literature relates to this paper. Third, this chapter will review Craig Parsons's causal mechanisms presented in *How to Map Arguments in Political Science*. It will examine each mechanism in depth, to include the differences between each and how it informs

¹⁵Michael Cox, "Advancing the Diagnostic Analysis of Environmental Problems," *International Journal of the Commons* 5, no 2 (2011): 2, <http://www.thecommonsjournal.org/index.php/ijc/rt/prINTERfriendly/273/218> (accessed 30 April 2012).

political action. Finally, this chapter will discuss William Connolly's description of complexity in *A World of Becoming*. It will cover the political theorist's main points of discussion and how they can inform our understanding of the environment.

Chapter 3 will describe the research methodology used for this paper. The Mindanao region of the Philippines will be used as a case study. This will examine how understanding a recent theory through the diagnostic process and causal logic could inform a better understanding of a conflict. Chapter 3 will conclude with some of the shortcomings present in the paper, and how they might be overcome in the future.

Chapter 4 will explore how these habits, knowledge of theoretical study applying abductive reasoning and nuanced causal explanation, will provide an increased understanding of a conflict environment. Next, chapter 4 will examine a case study in the Philippines. It will use an ICAF assessment conducted in 2010, and demonstrate how intellectual habits could bring an increased understanding of the environment.

Finally, chapter 5 will summarize the conclusions from the research and analysis conducted. It will present a framework of intellectual habits with the ICAF in order to better understand the operational environment. It will conclude with some recommendations for future research.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter will review the relevant literature that examines different aspects of the ICAF (Section I). Cynthia Irmer, Robert Ricigliano, and Anthony Poole argue for an incorporation of systems mapping into the ICAF. Additionally, Ricigliano argues for the inclusion of a causation model in the ICAF. Next, this chapter will review the relevant theoretical underpinnings of the ICAF in an effort to better understand the background, intended causal mechanisms, and ethos of the framework (Section II). Then, this chapter will review Parsons's causal logics and Connolly's explanation of complexity (Section III). Finally, this chapter will tie these three sections together, and demonstrate a gap in literature which this paper will address (Section IV).

Section I. Relevant ICAF Literature

There are several pieces written about the ICAF and the need to implement a systems map into the framework.¹⁶ The argument each piece makes is that the conflict environment is complex, and there needs to be a realistic way of looking at the key aspects of the problem in a comprehensive manner. These critiques underline this paper's argument for the importance of having as complete an understanding about a conflict as

¹⁶Cynthia Irmer, *A Systems Approach and the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF)*, http://www.thecornwallisgroup.org/cornwallis_2009/11-Irmer-CXIV.pdf (accessed 20 November 2011); Anthony Poole, *The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework: A Tool for Army Design* (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College 2010), 44-47; Robert Ricigliano, *Making Peace Last* (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Press 2012), 19-39.

possible. Graphically depicting the primary drivers of conflict is an attempt at communicating a more comprehensive understanding of the conflict environment.

Cynthia Irmer, one of the original developers of the ICAF, wrote an article in 2009 that calls for the incorporation of a systems approach into the ICAF. Her argument is that it helps to convey a better understanding of what is happening in a conflict. She cautions against using abstracts and metaphors to describe a conflict, as people will have different frames of reference. Consequently, the intended description by the author may be interpreted as something different by the reader, a dangerous possibility when reviewing how the ICAF is used.¹⁷ A systems map would provide a better understanding of the environment than the use of abstracts and metaphors. This critique also underlines the fact that practitioners who will complete task two, segue into planning, need to have intellectual habits. This will ensure they can understand and appreciate the nuance description of the conflict environment.

Anthony Poole wrote a monograph for the School of Advanced Military Studies on the comparison between Army design methodology and the ICAF.¹⁸ His finding was that the ICAF could be used to complement Army design. However, Poole criticized the lack of “any models or tools to assist team members in developing synthesis of the information being developed or collected for each of these steps.”¹⁹ He concurred with Dr. Irmer’s recommendation as an approach to rectifying this critique. However, while a

¹⁷Irmer.

¹⁸Poole.

¹⁹Ibid., 44.

systems map can help communicate an understanding of the conflict, there needs to be a rigorous approach at examining a conflict environment.

Robert Ricigliano advocated for the need to incorporate systems mapping in a practical application of the ICAF. He argues that the process of building a systems map and working to understand the interconnections between elements within the map will allow a person to appreciate the complexity of the environment. Drawing a systems map forces the group to identify the important characteristics of the environment, and how each element interacts with the other.²⁰ This argument is similar to what was discussed with Irmer.

Ricigliano adds to his call for systems mapping by advocating for an adaptation of W. Warner Burke and George Litwin's model for organizational change.²¹ Ricigliano argues for a Structural, Attitudinal, and Transactional (SAT) model understanding of causality in a systemic peace building assessment. He believes this model will ensure good analytical habits and remove disciplinary blinders. Ricigliano states that the SAT model ensures a more thorough understanding of the conflict, and how best to act in order to move towards peace.²² While he does not critique the ICAF, Ricigliano's call for use of the SAT model directly underlines this paper's critique that the ICAF lacks rigor in its approach to assessing conflict. Parsons claims that his causal mechanisms are all encompassing. Future research would benefit from a comparison between Parsons causal claims in relation to Ricigliano's SAT model.

²⁰Ricigliano, 107-109.

²¹Ibid., 31.

²²Ibid., 81-106.

Section II. ICAF Theory

The ICAF is based on nine theories: basic human needs, conflict transformation and peace building, greed versus grievance, interactive conflict resolution and problem solving, reconciliation, multi-track diplomacy, Protracted Social Conflict (PSC), nested model of conflict, and chosen trauma. These theories could inform the intended understanding of causation and ethos that justifies action. The theories of basic human needs, greed versus grievance, PSC, nested model of conflict, and chosen trauma are a basis of causation. The remaining theories provide a philosophy of how interactions can shape a conflict. However, the focus of this paper is on the application of the ICAF, so each of these theories will look at how it is addressed in the literature that specifies what action will be taken and why.

Basic Human Needs

John Burton discusses the concept of basic human needs and how they relate to conflict. He frames the problem against two prominent theories on the causation of conflict. He explains the first theory as irresponsibility at the personal and group level, “particularly the lack of social conscious.”²³ By this, Burton describes a person or group that has failed to follow accepted customs and norms within a society, and therefore has resorted to conflict in order to achieve their needs. Burton explains the second theory as due to social and structural problems, “such as poverty, long-term unemployment and, at the international level, inappropriate boundaries between nations.”²⁴ This theory can be

²³John Burton, *Violence Explained* (New York, NY: Manchester Press, 1997), 4.

²⁴*Ibid.*

explained as a person or group who are unable to excel in an established set of customs and norms in society and have no choice but to use conflict as a means of attaining basic human needs.

Burton states that these two theories are not that different. Both causation theories call for compliance to social norms at the group or individual level. He asserts that during serious political-social problems, we must “start with a frame in which traditional assumptions give way to ones that reflect far more the human elements in social relations and the shared purposes of social organizations.”²⁵ His argument is that it is the compliance process that must be examined as to why an individual or group is unwilling or unable to follow social norms. Burton asserts that a more holistic approach that examines why an individual or group is unable or unwilling to act within a set of societal customs and norms is needed to understand why a person or group resorts to conflict. Burton concludes that violence is rooted in the “institutional denial of needs of recognition and identity, and the sense of security provided when they are satisfied, despite losses through violent conflict.”²⁶

The idea of basic human needs is evident in the description for identity groups, societal patterns, and institutional performance. Step two describes identity groups as those “who believe others threaten their identity, security or livelihood.”²⁷ This understanding carries through when examining how societal patterns either reinforce cleavages or bring groups closer together. Additionally, this will be either contained or

²⁵Burton, 5.

²⁶Ibid., 38.

²⁷DOS, “ICAF,” 8.

aggravated by institutional performance. These elements could be understood through basic human needs theory as espoused by John Burton.

Conflict Transformation and Peace Building

John Paul Lederach argues for five proposals on how to address conflict and build peace. Additionally, he provides extensive detail, supported through research, on how these proposals could make conflict transformation more effective.

First, Lederach supports a “middle out”²⁸ approach to addressing the conflict in a region. This approach leverages the mid-level leaders to affect both the top-level and grass-roots level leaders in a region. Furthermore, mid-level actors “are uniquely situated to have the greatest potential for constructing an infrastructure for peace.”²⁹

Second, he describes a sub-system strategy to address immediate issues to broader, systemic problems. He refers to the Nested Model of Conflict by Marie Duncan that will be discussed later in this chapter. However, he basically refers to the need to look below the surface of an issue in order to determine what systemic problems exist that caused it to occur.

Next, Lederach expresses the importance of reconciliation in the peace building process. Reconciliation, which is the process by which relationships are built between conflicting groups, must manage three paradoxes. First, reconciliation must allow for the expression of a painful past between two groups, while working towards an interdependent future. Secondly, it also provides a place for truth and mercy.

²⁸John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, DC: United Institute of Peace Press, 2010), 151.

²⁹Ibid.

Reconciliation exposes what occurred in the past and moves beyond these events for a better future. Third, it deals with justice and peace; holding each party accountable for their past actions, while working towards a common future. Lederach highlights that peace cannot be achieved until reconciliation between the conflicting groups has occurred.³⁰

Fourth, Lederach argues for innovation in determining an approach that addresses the roots of a conflict. He underlines the psychological and emotional aspects of conflict between divided societies.³¹

Finally, Lederach explains the need for coordination as a central component to peace building.³² He acknowledges the complexity of long-term conflict and the need for a multi-faceted approach at resolving this.³³

This theory provides an understanding of the environment and how to execute action in an effort to achieve a desired outcome. Lederach describes the environment and how to work within this environment. However, this description is not as encompassing and holistic as Connolly's work. Furthermore, Lederach's ethos is not evident in the ICAF literature that prescribes the application of the model.

³⁰Lederach, *Building Peace*, 30-31.

³¹*Ibid.*, 152.

³²*Ibid.*

³³*Ibid.*

Greed Versus Grievance

Greed versus grievance refers to a study conducted by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. They studied the causes of civil wars that occurred around the world from 1960 to 1999. In this study they juxtapose two competing theories on civil wars. The first theory is that violence breaks out when a rebel group has sufficient grievance to mobilize a population against the state.³⁴ The second theory is that violence is brought about due to economic conditions that make it profitable, or at least sustainable, for a rebel organization to wage violence against the state.³⁵

They defined the variables of grievance as ethnic or religious hatred, political repression, political exclusion, and economic inequality.³⁶ These conditions were measured using established indexes and compared to historic civil wars that occurred in 1960 to 1999. Next, they defined greed or opportunity as sources of financing for rebellions, the cost of a rebellion for personnel, the cost of military equipment for a rebellion, state military capability, and social cohesion.³⁷ The sources of financing were further broken into the ability for rebel groups to use natural resources, donations from diasporas, and financing from other hostile governments.

Interestingly, Collier and Hoeffler found that the greed theory was better supported by historic analysis. They identified four factors that seemed consistent over

³⁴Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56 (2004): 564.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid., 570.

³⁷Ibid., 565-569.

time. First, the availability of some form of financing was consistent during episodes of conflict. Second, the cost of the rebellion seemed to indicate how likely a civil war would be to occur. Third, the state military's capability to reach remote or dispersed population was another indicator of potential conflict. Finally, as a population increases, so does the risk of a conflict. This last factor is attributed to both a greed and grievance cause.³⁸

One other variable that seems to have an effect is the amount of time since a previous conflict occurred. They state in this study that "time heals."³⁹ However, the exception to the time-heals rule is when there is a large diaspora. The diaspora seems to continue to finance rebel groups and delay this healing effect, which Collier and Hoeffler attribute to opportunity.⁴⁰

Greed versus grievance is another example of causation on which the ICAF is based. It can be applied to the identification of drivers of conflict and mitigating factors. Some elements of greed and grievance causality can be understood in this step.

Interactive Conflict Resolution and Problem Solving

Ronald Fisher is an expert in interactive conflict resolution and problem solving. He expanded on the work started by John Burton. Fisher describes interactive conflict resolution as problem-solving dialogue between small groups who represent parties involved in conflict.⁴¹ He provides a definition of interactive conflict resolution as

³⁸Collier and Hoeffler, 588.

³⁹Ibid., 589.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Ronald J. Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2007), 142.

“facilitated face-to-face activities in communication, training, education, or consultation that promote collaborative conflict analysis and problem solving among parties engaged in protracted conflict in a manner that addresses basic human needs and promotes the building of peace, justice, and equality.”⁴²

There are different variations of interactive conflict resolution, such as a psychodynamic approach or intercommunal dialogue. A psychodynamic approach looks at the psychological biases between groups that may be contributing to conflict and an unofficial third party attempts to break down the barriers over time and reconcile their differences.⁴³ Intercommunal dialogue is a workshop intended to bring personnel from two groups together in order to educate them on each other’s perspective.⁴⁴ The approach for interactive conflict resolution will vary on the environment and severity of the conflict this is being addressed. Each has its merits and faults depending on the application, and context to which it is applied. However, each approach is intended to resolve protracted conflict by informing each side of the other’s perspective and developing a commonly accepted approach to resolve grievances.

Ronald Fisher’s interactive conflict resolution and problem solving makes assertions on how to resolve conflict. However, it is not clear how this understanding connects with Lederach’s ontology described in conflict transformation and peace building.

⁴²Fisher, 8.

⁴³Ibid., 98-120.

⁴⁴Ibid., 121-141.

Reconciliation

This chapter discussed reconciliation as interpreted by Lederach in a previous section. However, the ICAF uses an article by Hizkias Assefa from 2001 as the reference for this concept. The two sources are complementary, but Assefa's explanation is further explored in this section.

Assefa describes multiple "conflict handling mechanisms," how they are related, and how effective they are likely to be over time.⁴⁵ Figure 2 depicts the model that Assefa uses to explain his argument. He explains each component and its significance in his article.




Figure 2. Spectrum of Conflict Handling Mechanisms

Source: Hizkias Assefa, "Reconciliation," in *Peace-Building: A Field Guide*, eds. Luc Reyhler and Thania Paffenholz (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 336.

⁴⁵Hizkias Assefa, "Reconciliation," in *Peace-Building: A Field Guide*, eds. Luc Reyhler and Thania Paffenholz (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 336.

Figure 2 offers a spectrum of conflict mitigation possibilities. The left side of the spectrum describes levels where participation is less mutual, and the right side describes levels where both sides of a conflict come to a shared solution. Force means that one side of a conflict imposes a solution on the other side. Adjudication involves a third party imposing a solution to a conflict, and it may be backed by force. Arbitration moves further to the right on the spectrum because both parties in a conflict decide who the third party will be in a conflict resolution. In a negotiation, both parties present their arguments and try to come to an acceptable solution for both sides. However, the negotiation may be slanted by one side's power position and ability to formulate their argument. Mediation is a type of negotiation that is assisted by a third party; however, unlike arbitration both parties have to agree to the resolution. Finally, reconciliation not only involves both parties coming to a resolution, but they work to address issues underlying the conflict and try to develop a cooperative relationship.⁴⁶

Assefa further lists several core elements that are necessary for reconciliation to take place. First, he states that each part must acknowledge the harm and injury each side has inflicted on the other. Second, he says that each side must show sincere regret and remorse for what they have done. Next, each side must apologize to the other for the harm and injury they had caused in the past. Fourth, each side needs to let go of the anger and bitterness they have for what they had gone through. Then, they have to commit to each other not to repeat the injury they had caused in the past. Sixth, they must attempt to

⁴⁶Assefa, 336-337.

redress past grievances and work to correct damage caused to the greatest extent possible. Finally, each side must agree to enter into a new, mutually beneficial relationship.⁴⁷

These core elements are the necessary components to reconcile the trauma and personal anguish each side experienced that both led to and occurred during a conflict. Both Assefa and Lederach express the notion of the need to address emotional wounds that resulted from the conflict over time. Furthermore, they both acknowledge that reconciliation is the most difficult state to achieve.⁴⁸ While the first five possibilities shown on figure 2 involve each side pointing out the faults of the other, reconciliation requires a truthful internal reflection of their role in a conflict. Assefa argues this is the only way for a group to acknowledge their actions and determine how to improve their interactions in the future.⁴⁹

Assefa's reconciliation is an extension of Lederach's work, and builds on how reconciliation would move a conflict towards peace. However, this work does not seem evident in the ICAF literature, and may not be obvious as a goal for actors who are interpreting the assessment.

⁴⁷Assefa, 340.

⁴⁸Ibid., 340-342.

⁴⁹Ibid., 342.

Multi-Track Diplomacy

John McDonald describes the concept of multi-track diplomacy. He explains that most current conflict is intrastate violence, and not interstate violence.⁵⁰ This is supported by other prominent researchers in the field, such as Lederach, Collier, and Assefa. Furthermore, McDonald states that our diplomatic efforts fall short in being able to address intrastate violence.⁵¹

The traditional diplomatic affairs between states are referred to as Track One. The work by the United Nations (UN) and other formal interstate organizations are also categorized as Track One.⁵² McDonald argues that the shortfall of Track One in dealing with intrastate conflict is that it is power-based and formal. The host nation must invite another state to interfere with its internal conflict.⁵³ However, McDonald highlights the importance of addressing internal conflict due to its destabilizing affect in a region and impact on neighboring states.⁵⁴

Consequently, McDonald advocates the use of additional tracks that he refers to in number sequence Tracks Two through Five. He states that Track One is still the track

⁵⁰John W. McDonald, "Further Exploration of Track Two Diplomacy," in *Timing the De-escalation of International Conflicts*, eds., Louis Krisberg and Stuart J. Thorson (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991), 201.

⁵¹McDonald, 202.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Ibid.

most influential on other institutions, and that each track's influence wanes as they increase in number away from Track One.⁵⁵

Track Two diplomacy is referred to as “(u)nonofficial, nongovernmental, analytical, policy-oriented, problem-solving efforts by skilled, educated, experienced and informed private citizens interacting with other private citizens.”⁵⁶ Track Two is the most difficult of the other four tracks. This is because it is the closest to Track One, and because it requires those involved to be informed on the issues driving the conflict and to work to develop solutions. Personnel involved in Track Two must be able to handle the delicate nature of conflict resolution, and understand the sensitivity required.⁵⁷

Track Three diplomacy is described as “businessman-businessman, private sector, free-enterprise, multinational corporation interactions.”⁵⁸ McDonald highlights the importance that business plays in de-escalation of conflict. He states that not only can these partners stimulate the economy and economic recovery of a conflicted region, but it can also help to resolve economic problems that are in conflict areas.⁵⁹

Track Four is the “citizen-to-citizen exchange programs of all kinds, such as scientific, cultural, academic, educational, student, film, music, art, sports, and youth exchanges.”⁶⁰ Examples of this type of diplomacy are Fulbright Scholarships and

⁵⁵Ibid., 204.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Ibid.,

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Ibid., 209-210.

⁶⁰Ibid., 205.

exchanges. McDonald explains that these programs help to expose individuals to different cultures and ways of thinking. They help to expand the perspective of participants in countless areas. Furthermore, these experiences are often positive, and can have a tremendous impact on how participants view the future.⁶¹

Finally, Track Five is “media-to-media based efforts designed to expose and educate large segments of the population in conflict to the philosophy, ideas, culture, and needs of the other national, society, or ethnic group with who they are in conflict.”⁶² McDonald points out that this track is the foundation for Track Four. People often receive their first exposure to other cultures through the various media outlets. Furthermore, the media can humanize the other side in a conflict by educating people on key issues. McDonald also points out that this track can be the starting place for the other tracks as well, educating people on a conflict and the aspects of each side.⁶³

This theory could be understood as an understanding of political action. Similar to Lederach’s premise of middle out approach, McDonald asserts that action along various unofficial channels can determine how a system functions. Furthermore, the ICAF literature does not seem to incorporate this approach in its literature.

Protracted Social Conflict (PSC)

Edward Azar was a Lebanese political scientist who came to the U.S. for graduate school, then quickly became a respected scholar in the field of conflict resolution. In the

⁶¹Ibid., 211-213.

⁶²McDonald, 205.

⁶³Ibid., 214-215.

early 1970s, he published several articles on the concept known as PSC.⁶⁴ Azar worked with other leading scholars, notably John Burton, in the field and continued to refine his theory, eventually publishing *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases*.⁶⁵

Azar posited that PSCs were the result of four variables: communal content, human needs, governance and states' role, and international linkages.⁶⁶ Communal content is the identity groups in conflict. They can be defined through their race, religion, ethnicity, culture, or other factor. Individuals express their interest by joining a group that has similar interests, and can help them in meeting their societal needs.⁶⁷ Azar then argues that this human content has some deprivation of human needs. He defines human needs as security, development, political assess, and identity.⁶⁸ The state has the right to govern its people and provide them with their human needs. However, if the state is either denying particular identity groups or is partial towards one group over another, then the deprived group will likely have some type of protracted social conflict.⁶⁹ Furthermore, the networks of people are subject to political-military linkages from other

⁶⁴Fisher, 77-79.

⁶⁵Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2011), 100.

⁶⁶Fisher, 84.

⁶⁷Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall, 100-101.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, 101.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, 101-102.

states that have an interest in the conflict. This can be a stabilizing or destabilizing effect, but it must be considered when trying to understand a protracted social conflict.⁷⁰

PSC is not mentioned specifically, but it could be understood when examining the core grievance and sources of resilience. An examination of how groups interact along societal patterns and within formal and informal institutions would draw out PSCs that may be driving a conflict.

Nested Model of Conflict

The concept of a nested model of conflict has been widely researched by peace researcher and theorist, Marie Dugan. She identified the need to view the systemic issues that could be driving specific problems in a conflict. She developed a “‘nested paradigm’ as a mechanism for considering both the narrower and broader aspects of conflict resolution and peace building.”⁷¹ Figure 3 depicts the Nested Model of Conflict developed by Dugan.

Dugan’s original purpose for developing the model was to help peace practitioners focus their efforts in a manner that could be most effective in a conflict. She wanted a system that would show the components to a problem. So she built the Nested Model of Conflict to examine the context around an issue. It starts by looking at an issue that may be driving conflict. Next, it looks at the relationship between the groups or individuals surrounding the issue. This relationship can identify biases, inequality, or other underlying issues that need to be addressed. Then, Dugan, states there needs to be

⁷⁰Ibid., 102.

⁷¹Lederach, *Building Peace*, 55.

an examination of the system in which this relationship exists. This may bring out a macro-level of analysis that shows racism or other factors driving the problem relationship. However, Dugan states that a system is often so large that it is not realistic to shape this system directly in order to achieve peace. Instead, she outlines the need to address the sub-systems in order to get at the root problems.⁷²




Figure 3. Nested Model of Conflict

Source: John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, DC: United Institute of Peace Press, 2010), 56.

Marie Dugan's nested model of conflict is discussed in Lederach's theory of conflict transformation and peace building. However, similar to other elements of Lederach's theory, it is not addressed in the ICAF literature. This model is a common

⁷²Lederach, *Building Peace*, 56-58.

output of multiple ICAF assessments in practical application, but it is not clear that these products are fully understood or applied by the recipient of the assessment. This lack of understanding could be attributed to the change of persons between conflict diagnosis and segue into planning.

Chosen Trauma

Vamik Volkan is a psychiatrist, scholar, and researcher who developed the concept of chosen trauma. He started by studying how “large-group trauma”⁷³ shapes political ideology and a sense of entitlement. Volkan described a large group as thousands or millions of individuals. These groups suffer “extreme losses, shame, and humiliation”⁷⁴ from this trauma. The trauma becomes part of the group identity, and the group has difficulty coping with the event. Over time, the groups will, either consciously or unconsciously, pass this trauma to their next generation. This historic trauma may eventually evolve into a chosen trauma, becoming a significant marker in the history of the large group.⁷⁵

An important distinction that Volkan makes is that large groups do not choose to be traumatized. However, they do “‘choose’ to mythologize and psychologize the mental representation of the event.”⁷⁶ This means that the reality of the event can become

⁷³Vamik D. Volkan, “Chosen Trauma, the Political Ideology of Entitlement and Violence,” 10 June 2004, <http://www.vamikvolkan.com/Chosen-Trama,-the-Political-Ideology-of-Entitlement-and-Violence.php>. (accessed 29 February 2012).

⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Ibid.

distorted by the perception of the traumatized group. Additionally, the chosen trauma works to link members of a group as if it were “an invisible spider’s web.”⁷⁷ The trauma can lay dormant in a group for years, but some sequence of events brings it back to the surface, driving groups into conflict.⁷⁸

Chosen trauma is a causal explanation for action. Volkan’s explanation demonstrates how a key actor could use a traumatic event to mobilize a group into action. Traumatic events would be included in the context of the ICAF, thus it would affect each of the other elements in the conflict diagnosis.

Section III. Causal Explanation

Conventional Causality

Craig Parsons wrote *How to Map Arguments in Political Science* in order to explain human action. He studied existing political science and history theories that explain causality in order to derive a common framework. Parsons uses an explanation of psychological, ideational, structural, and institutional causal mechanisms for interaction between groups and individuals. He focuses on the political action, but highlights that his ideas can be used across the social sciences.⁷⁹ Parsons argues that all existing political science and history positing causal claims can be categorized in one or several of his four

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸Volkan.

⁷⁹Parsons, 3.

causal mechanisms. Consequently, if we examine each of the mechanisms, then they will encompass previous explanations of action.⁸⁰

In order to better understand the causal mechanisms, Parsons illustrates them as seen in figure 4. He first distinguishes structural and institutional as logics of position, and psychological and ideational as logics of interpretation.⁸¹ A logic of position interprets action by a group in relation to its environment. People are making rational decisions based on external forces being applied to them. A logic of interpretation views action by a group as a result of their understanding of what is desirable and/or possible.⁸² Therefore, people are acting based on their understanding of the environment, and their expectation of what will happen.

The other distinction Parsons makes in his diagram is that structural and psychological explanations are outside of human control, and that institutional and ideational explanations are man-made.⁸³ This important distinction means that institutional and ideational causes of an action were put in place as a deviation from a preexisting condition. Therefore, their explanation of cause is particular to the existence of an institutional or ideational outcome.⁸⁴ Conversely, one can only have general expectations from structural or psychological causes. Since structural and psychological

⁸⁰Ibid., 12.

⁸¹Parsons, 13.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Ibid., 14.

causes are not man-made, the outcomes are not programmed and can only be generalized.⁸⁵

Parsons explains this distinction by stating:

To the extent that our arguments build in structural or psychological claims, we portray people's actions as the consequences of some given configuration of an external landscape or their internal makeup. These claims may be probabilistic, not necessarily deterministic, but they are about general regularities that follow from given conditions. To the extent that our explanations build in claims about man-made institutions, ideas, or culture as causes, we are making a particularistic argument that the course of history was open until people embedded themselves in distinct new causal dynamics through their own actions.⁸⁶

Parsons describes structural causality as the material landscape within which people must navigate. It is an obstacle course. While structure can be dynamic, people cannot manipulate it. The actors within a structural explanation make rational decisions based on their environment.⁸⁷

⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶Ibid., 14.

⁸⁷Ibid., 64-65.

	General	Particular
Position	1. Structural	2. Institutional
Interpretation	3. Psychological	4. Ideational

Figure 4. Parson's Fundamental Matrix of Explanation of Action

Source: Craig Parson, *How to Map Arguments in Political Science* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), 15.

Conversely, institutional causality is the product of man-made rules and norms that result in an unintended consequence. In order to differentiate an institution from a structural argument, it must be the result of man-made rules and norms. These rules and norms are derived from previous action, but they have secondary, unintended consequences. The outcome is the result of a rational actor making decisions within an institutional environment. The secondary, unintended consequence differentiates an institutional cause from a psychological or ideational cause.⁸⁸

Ideational causality can be traced to "some constellation of practices, symbols, norms, grammars, models, beliefs, and / or identities through which certain people

⁸⁸Parsons, 92-93.

interpret their world.”⁸⁹ Additionally, ideational causes are the result of an actor’s understanding of their environment, and is based on rational action within this understanding. Ideational causality can often be understood as a cultural, religious, or other similar understanding driving the actions of people.⁹⁰

Finally, psychological causality is the hard-wired irrational action people take. Most psychological claims are miscategorized ideational claims. Psychological causality is irrational, and the result of hard-wired biological actions within people, it is more precise than a simple definition of having to do with thought process.⁹¹

Emergent Causality

William Connolly’s *A World of Becoming* eloquently describes an understanding of a world that consists of many open, interconnected systems that resonate along varying degrees of agency with each other over time. As systems draw together, they can resonate and have an unforeseen effect. Connolly’s description ties together the multiple systems of weather, biology, neuroscience, economics, geology, religion, and others into a complex web of reality. These networks of systems operate in space and time, and their interactions affect how each system behaves.⁹²

Connolly argues against individualism or holism, instead referring to a state of connectionism. This means that the world is not made up as a building block of

⁸⁹Ibid., 131.

⁹⁰Ibid., 131-132.

⁹¹Ibid., 161-162.

⁹²William E. Connolly, *A World of Becoming* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 17-42.

individuals acting without the influence of agency. Furthermore, groups do not all act in a consistent manner with all other elements without individual behavior.⁹³ The various elements behave in relation to their connections to other systems, interconnections resonating across multiple systems over time. Furthermore, parts of the system will attempt to correct disequilibrium through autopoiesis, or self-organization.⁹⁴ An example of autopoiesis is when a community works together to find and rescue survivors after a natural disaster. The people may not be trained in rescue or medical efforts. However, the people will band together, self-organize, and do their best to help their neighbors. This could also be understood as having their established systems disrupted, and people are self-organizing in an effort to bring the systems back into equilibrium.

When these systems intersect and the effect is greater than the sum of the parts, this is called emergent causality. Emergent causality cannot be described as chance, but it also cannot be broken into conventional causality. This is often due to incomplete information and the situation is intrinsically complex. The result is an extreme state of disequilibrium and the outcome is not clear.

IV. Conclusion

This chapter examined recent critiques of the ICAF, the ICAF foundation theories, and relevant causation theories. The critiques that exist today call attention to the need of a common framework of understanding and the need to have a diligent

⁹³Ibid., 36.

⁹⁴Ibid., 17-42.

method of determining causality. The ICAF theories were examined to determine how they inform the process and how they are included in the application of the framework.

The next chapter will cover the research method that will be applied to determine the effectiveness of the ICAF and the importance of intellectual habits. Chapter 4 will cover the research and analysis that demonstrates the relevance of these habits. It will conclude with a case study of the ICAF assessment conducted in the Philippines. The case study will demonstrate an example of how these habits can bring a greater understanding of a conflict. Finally, chapter 5 will summarize the primary points of this paper by pulling together all of the concepts discussed throughout. Furthermore, it will address areas where future research would be beneficial.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research methodology for this paper will be divided into two sections. The first section of chapter 4 will examine the different elements of intellectual habits. It will review an example of an updated theory that is relevant to conflict. Also, it will review how abductive reasoning is used in practical application of the ICAF. Then, it will examine how using a rigorously specified causal typology helps to improve understanding. The second section of chapter 4 will apply these habits in a real world ICAF assessment. This application will use just one updated theory to demonstrate an increase in understanding.

The model of intellectual habit will be broken into its three components and each element will be examined. The first component is the practice of staying current with research in the field of conflict, political action, and relevant social science. This ensures that the practitioner is informed as the field of knowledge continues to grow and mature. The second component is to be able to apply abductive reasoning to explain what is observed during an assessment. Action is not always rational, and the actors do not always know what is influencing their behavior. Consequently, it is important that the observer be familiar with the latest research and able to apply abductive reasoning in order to explain an action. The final component of intellectual habit is to apply some rigor to the causal explanations of what is observed. This will ensure a thorough exam of conventional and emergent causality as it relates to an understanding of action. This examination of the model of intellectual habit will show how it will improve the understanding of a conflict environment.

The second section of research will analyze the conflict in Mindanao. It will review the context of the conflict and the findings of the ICAF assessment conducted in November 2010. Then, a new theory by Paul Collier that has matured from his introduction of greed versus grievance theory will be introduced and explained. Finally, using Parsons's causal logics and Connolly's emergent causality, the diagnostic process will be applied to the conflict in Mindanao. Using information that was available to the ICAF assessment team, this model will demonstrate an increased understanding of what is driving the conflict in Mindanao.

The analysis that will be conducted in chapter 4 will depict the model and examine how it increases awareness. Then, a representative theory will be applied to the model of intellectual habit. This will demonstrate an increased awareness.

Abductive reasoning is used in this framework of intellectual habit because it best describes the reasoning method used to determine causality of action in a conflict. Deductive and inductive reasoning are not optimal reasoning methods. Deduction moves from generalities to specifics, and the conclusion comes from the stated premises. Induction moves from specifics to generalities, and draws conclusions from specific events. Abduction is drawing a conclusion based on probabilities of explanation.⁹⁵

Charles Pierce introduced the idea of abductive reasoning. He stated that all lines of reasoning must have a rule (x), a result (y), and a case (z).⁹⁶ In deductive reasoning,

⁹⁵Andrea Franco, "A Simple Definition of Deductive, Inductive, and Abductive Reasoning," *The Wise Ignorant: A Blog of Ideas*, 13 December 2011, <http://thewiseignorant.com/a-simple-definition-of-deductive-inductive-and-abductive-reasoning> (accessed 9 May 2012).

⁹⁶*Ibid.*

you are given a rule and the case, then you obtain the result. For example, if the lawn will get wet when it rains (x), and the lawn is wet (y). Then deductively, it can be stated that it rained (z). Another example is that the lawn is wet (y), and it just rained (z). Inductive reasoning could say that the lawn will always get wet when it rains. A final example is that the lawn will get wet when it rains (x), and it just rained (z). Abductive reasoning would determine that it is probable that the lawn is wet because it just rained (y).

However, there are other possibilities why the lawn is wet.⁹⁷

There are some weaknesses to the analysis that must be acknowledged. They have been mitigated as best as possible, but some elements cannot be avoided. Additionally, future research in this area could be beneficial in improving this understanding.

First, Parsons's causal logics and Connolly's understanding of emergent causality are contestable. They were chosen because both are respected academics in their fields of study. Parsons has built his causal logics against numerous established models that already exist and has demonstrated the utility of his model. Parsons's causal logics are useful because they are comprehensive in their examination of causality, and they are internally coherent. Each logic can be separated and examined without detracting from the others. Connolly embraces a different understanding of causality. He views the world as a complex network of open systems that interact with each other over time. Sometimes events occur that cannot be explained due to their complex nature or because their essence is not fully known. This phenomena does not fit conventional causal logic, but can be better understood through emergent causality. Both Parsons's causal logics and

⁹⁷Cox, 2-3.

Connolly's emergent causality are meant to encompass a comprehensive understanding of causality. However, both theories of causality are disputable.

Second, only one case study is applied to the model of intellectual habit. It is a recent ICAF assessment. It was a thorough examination of the region with multiple interagency partners and host nation participants in the process. Both Cynthia Irmer and Robert Ricigliano were members of the ICAF assessment team and were able to apply a systems map to increase an understanding of the conflict. Furthermore, there is substantial data and research on the Mindanao conflict that can continue to enhance the understanding of the conflict. Still, it is just one example. Multiple case studies over time would lend greater validity to the argument. Furthermore, conducting two case studies of the same conflict simultaneously, with one case study using the intellectual habits framework and the other not, would be a better gauge of validity.

For the purposes of this paper, the deficiencies in analysis cannot be reduced further than they currently are. They are acknowledged, and the hope is that future research will improve on this model. Ultimately, the intent of this research is to improve an understanding of conflicts. This research is sufficient in demonstrating how a framework of intellectual habits could improve the ICAF in practical application.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Peace cannot be kept by force. It can only be achieved by understanding.
—Albert Einstein, *Notes on Pacifism*

The above quote by Albert Einstein acknowledges the importance of understanding the problem. If we do not understand the problem, then we are likely wasting effort or possibly worsening the condition. The ICAF was developed in order to provide a better understanding of a conflict environment.

The members of the ICAF assessment team could vary. It depends on the environment, the circumstances of the conflict, and those persons trying to gain a better understanding of what is occurring. CSO maintains the mission “to engage in conflict prevention, crisis response and stabilization.”⁹⁸ They are the primary agency that oversees the planning and execution of the ICAF. However, the ICAF is also included in JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Planning During Joint Operations*,⁹⁹ and could feasibly be initiated by a DOD element. Furthermore, a DOD representative is regularly involved as a member of the ICAF assessment team. Therefore, members of the DOD should maintain an intellectual habit that would improve their ability to apply the ICAF in the real world. Not only would intellectual habits by military personnel benefit the ICAF process, but would improve their ability to understand and respond to conflict in general.

⁹⁸DOS, “Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations.”

⁹⁹Joint Staff, JP 3-08, H-1 - H-10.

This chapter will provide an examination of how to better understand a conflict environment through the ICAF (Section I). It will provide a model that demonstrates the importance of applying intellectual habit in order to develop a more comprehensive understanding. The chapter will break down the model and the importance of each element. Next, this chapter will look at a case study of the Mindanao conflict in the Philippines (Section II). It will examine the findings from an ICAF assessment that was conducted in 2010, and look at how it might be different today with the application of updated political theories and intellectual habit. It will conclude with a synopsis of what was covered in this chapter (Section III).

Chapter 5 will pull this chapter and the previous chapters together into a summarized conclusion. Furthermore, chapter 5 will examine areas for future research.

Section I. Framework of Intellectual Habits

The ICAF is a framework intended to provide the USG with a common understanding across the interagency and possibly in collaboration with the host nation. An assessment team would benefit from certain intellectual habits. This framework is built on the nine social theories discussed in chapter 2. Social science is a field that continues to grow with research, and the ICAF theories have been improved upon since the inception of the ICAF framework just a few years ago. Consequently, our understanding of conflict and political action has evolved since the creation of the ICAF.

The theories on which the ICAF are based continue to grow and evolve, as does research in conflict, social sciences, and conflict regions. Our understanding of political action continues to grow. Consequently, our assessment of a conflict will evolve as we understand new theories. While the foundational ICAF theories provide an understanding

of the framework, there are updates that can be useful in understanding our operational environment. Thus, as a member of a conflict assessment team, we should apply intellectual habits in order to best understand what is occurring. Finally, this model of intellectual habit will benefit the ICAF process. This process is shown in figure 5.




Figure 5. Model of Intellectual Habit and the ICAF

Source: Created by author.

John Paul Lederach developed the idea of conflict transformation and peace building, one of the ICAF foundation theories. He outlined five aspects to building

sustainable peace that were examined in chapter 2. Since the creation of the ICAF, Lederach has updated his understanding of conflict and peace building. He wrote *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace*, and discusses the need to use imagination and an understanding of “a canvas of human relationships” to create social change that will move destructive conflict to productive peace.¹⁰⁰ Lederach points to the difficulty in using his theory on conflict transformation and peace building to actually apply it in real world applications. He examines a more complex understanding of the environment. Lederach acknowledges that his understanding of conflict and peace building continues to evolve. He describes “the nature of ideas and learning as an indefinite, constantly evolving process.”¹⁰¹

Paul Collier, along with Anke Hoeffler, developed the theory of greed versus grievance. This is another of the ICAF foundation theories. Since then, Collier has expanded his study of how economic conditions can explain conflict.¹⁰² He notes that the bottom billion people in the world live below the poverty line. He explores how the type of government and economic resources correlate as pre-conditions for conflict. He finds that perverse foreign aid incentives lead to corrupt democratic practices in the poorest countries of the world. He also finds that the corrupt democratic practices often lead to internal violence.

¹⁰⁰John Paul Lederach, *The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Building Peace* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press Kindle Edition, 2005), 34-125.

¹⁰¹Ibid., 110-111.

¹⁰²Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007); Paul Collier, *Wars, Guns, and Votes* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009).

The work by Lederach and Collier demonstrate how an understanding of political action evolves over time. As research and new understandings emerge, we find new explanations for conflict. This is an evolution of research by the original authors. There is countless additional research being continually conducted by professors, students, and practitioners that build on the understanding that is already established. This research expands and enriches the original understanding. Furthermore, it may even render the older theories incorrect.

Abductive reasoning provides the most probable explanation for conditions we observe. An outcome from political action is detected. A cause is then attributed to this action based on our understanding of the action. We use abductive reasoning to explain the outcome using our understanding of possible theories.¹⁰³

Familiarity with conflict and political theories provides an academic foundation from which to apply abductive reasoning in order to explain the outcome of violence. Conflict is complex, so there are often multiple causal mechanisms at play. Only through familiarity with research and an understanding of political action can we apply the diagnostic process with any certainty.

An external assessment by a knowledgeable assessment team is required to determine causality in a conflict. The actors who provide feedback to the assessment team may not realize all of the factors shaping their action. There are forces affecting action that are not immediately obvious, and the assessment team must be aware of them in order to look for their existence.

¹⁰³Cox, 3-4.

Shapiro provides three examples of action where the actors do not realize how their action is influenced by different factors. The first example is a wedding ceremony between a man and a woman in the contemporary U.S. The second example is a worker who is unemployed, and thus gratefully agrees to a job in which he receives half the minimum wage. The final example is a battered wife who chooses to return to her spouse knowing that she will face more abuse in the future.¹⁰⁴

In Shapiro's first example, the couple are committing themselves to each other in marriage. This is an act of love and affection, but it is also the reproduction of social structure of the nuclear family. The couple may not be fully aware of the external pressure they feel to perform a wedding ceremony, or why those pressures exist.¹⁰⁵

In the second example, the unemployed worker is taking a job unaware of all of the forces affecting him. He may blame himself for losing his last job, or he may blame the poor economic conditions for lack of other job opportunities. He likely does not analytically examine the causal mechanisms shaping his situation.¹⁰⁶

The final example combines the forces of the first two examples. The spouse may not understand all of the forces that push her back to her abusive spouse. Furthermore, she may have a psychological syndrome that causes her to interpret her husband's

¹⁰⁴Ian Shapiro, *The Flight from Reality in the Human Sciences* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 32.

¹⁰⁵Ibid.

¹⁰⁶Ibid.

abusive behavior as affection. In this interpretation, “she may be inadvertently reproducing an exploitative relationship.”¹⁰⁷

Each of these examples highlights the importance of an external observer to be intellectually aware of the latest theories in social science. Interviews with the actors would not draw the forces affecting action in each situation. The combatants in a conflict will not understand the subtle detail of why the conflict is occurring, but will have personal experiences that convey their internal interpretation of the events. The actors’ interpretations are not wrong, they are just incomplete and do not provide the best understanding of the environment.

The conflict environment is complex. There are multiple open systems that interact with each other over time. Systems affect each other and the canvas of human connections in unforeseen ways.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, there are actions unknown to the actors themselves, resulting in seemingly irrational behavior. There are multiple causal mechanisms that affect behavior.

In order to fully examine possible causal mechanisms at work in a conflict, a rigorous model of causal explanation is necessary. Parsons’s four causal logics of structure, institution, ideation, and psychology are comprehensive and internally coherent. Examined in detail in chapter 2, they cover all possible conventional explanations of causality, and each logic is distinct from the others.

Understanding the structural, institutional, ideational, and psychological causal logics would inform a more thorough understanding of the operational environment.

¹⁰⁷Shapiro, 32.

¹⁰⁸Connolly, 42.

What are the structures at play in the conflict? What are the secondary, unintended consequences of institutional action taking place within the conflict? What ideational factors are creating conditions that contribute to the conflict? What psychological factors are affecting the actors involved in the conflict? Each logic has some role in a conflict, and understanding the theories at play would allow a thorough understanding of how they aggravate or mitigate the conflict.

We also know that complexity prevents us from achieving complete understanding of the operational environment. There will always be a gap between what we know and reality. Connolly borrows an understanding of emergence from complexity. He describes this as “the dicey process by which new entities and processes periodically surge into being--is irreducible to efficient causality.”¹⁰⁹ Simply stated, emergent causality are those actions that are greater than the sum of its parts, and they could not be predicted. An action occurs that was not foreseen and throws other systems into disequilibrium. It can show traces of the systems that it touches, but its action is “irreducible to its precursors.”¹¹⁰

A natural disaster such as a tsunami or earthquake, and the effect it has on groups in conflict, could best be understood as emergent causality. The action will have traces of each system before the disaster, but the event is too complex to be understood with conventional causality. Furthermore, the result of events after a natural disaster will not be evident for some time.

¹⁰⁹Connolly, 44.

¹¹⁰Ibid., 82.

This rigorous causal explanation model with a familiarization of academic research and social sciences allow us to apply abductive reasoning in order to better understand a conflict environment. This understanding is necessary when conducting an ICAF assessment, and will result in a more accurate product. It will shape USG and host nation response to a conflict in a more effective strategy. Task one of the ICAF is conflict diagnosis, and task two offers a segue into planning. This model of intellectual habit will inform the diagnosis during task one, and it will shape possible courses of action during task two.

Military professionals may be members of an ICAF assessment team, and they will likely plan and execute action in a conflict environment. Using intellectual habits is critical to their success. Understanding the operational environment is of utmost importance, and taking action that will achieve USG objectives is essential. This model has demonstrated how to achieve a maximum understanding, and recognize that a gap in knowledge will always exist.

Section II. Mindanao Case Study

History of Conflict

The Mindanao region of the Philippines lays in roughly the lower one-third of the 7,100 islands that comprise the Government of the Philippines (figure 6). The many tribes from Mindanao resisted Spanish colonial rule and their attempts to spread Christianity to the region. The resistance continued against the U.S. after its acquisition of the Philippines following victory in the Spanish-American War in 1898, the Japanese

during World War II, the U.S. again after World War II, and the Philippine national government since they achieved independence in 1946.¹¹¹

A more recent history of the conflict in Mindanao can be understood by looking at the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Dr. Nur Misuari founded the MNLF in 1969 as a political organization with the aspirations to achieve equality for the people of Mindanao in the Philippines. Misuari sought to unify the many tribes of Mindanao under a single banner, which he termed as the bangsamoro, or simply moro, people. Armed conflict between the MNLF and the Government of the Philippines reached a height between 1972 and 1976. During peace negotiations in 1976, Misuari agreed to a semi-autonomous region of the Philippines known as the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) of which Misuari would be the governor. This region of Mindanao is shown in figure 6.

However, many of the leaders within the MNLF and across Mindanao were not happy with the concessions Misuari was making with the Philippine government. Consequently, they broke away and created their own group known as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). This organization continues to rebel against the Philippine government, although as of early 2011 they remain in a cease-fire.

The conflict and fighting in Mindanao has provided sanctuary for other violent extremist groups to form in the Mindanao region. The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) formed in the 1990s with the intention of creating a new state founded on radical Islam.

Additionally, the ASG developed close ties to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), who had a similar

¹¹¹Malcolm Cook and Kit Collier, "Mindanao: A Gamble Worth Taking," 2006, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/pubfiles/Cook_Collier%2C_Mindanao.pdf (accessed 1 May 2012), 2-4.

ideology based out of neighboring Indonesia. Both ASG and JI received external funding from radical Islamic clerics around the world, as well as raised money through kidnappings, extortion, and trafficking. The kidnapping of 24 people, including two Americans, from a Philippine resort, the 2002 bombing of Bali nightclubs, and connections with the Al Qaeda network propelled both ASG and JI to the forefront attention of the USG.



Figure 6. Mindanao Region

Source: Google, “Mindanao Region,” Google Map Earth Version 6.1.0.5001 (accessed 1 May 2012).

Mindanao ICAF Assessment

An ICAF assessment on the conflict in Mindanao was conducted in 2010 at the request of the U.S. Embassy in Manila. It started with a workshop in Washington, D.C. on 14 September 2010 with 22 personnel from U.S. government interagency partners, academics, and experts from think tanks in the area. Subsequently, 17 personnel from across the interagency and several Philippine nationals conducted field research between 26 October and 5 November 2010. The research team conducted focus interviews with over 350 individuals from various backgrounds.

The assessment team spoke to a wide range of individuals from local farmers, indigenous personnel, former combatants, non-government organizations, artists, business leaders, government officials, Philippine military, Philippine national police, local police, and numerous other representatives. Due to security concerns, the team was limited to six key locations spread across the Mindanao region, and Manila. Manila is the seat of national government for the Philippines, and many personnel in the area remain connected with the conflict in Mindanao. After the focus interviews, the team consolidated information and conducted their preliminary analysis between 6 and 9 November 2010. The team presented their findings to Ambassador Thomas at the U.S. Embassy in Manila on 10 November 2010 and to the U.S. Pacific Command on 15 November 2010.¹¹²

While the full report is much more extensive, there were four main diagnostic findings from this ICAF assessment. These findings are derived from the extensive

¹¹²Department of State (DOS), “Philippines: Looking at Mindanao,” *ICAF Report*, January 2011, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/187972.pdf> (accessed 4 May 2012), 5.

interviews and analysis of the situation. The intent of these findings is to identify areas the U.S. government can interject in order to stabilize the region. Furthermore, this ICAF also produced a systems map of the conflict in order to better understand the connections between different aspects of the region. In general, there is no prescribed output from the ICAF process, but the U.S. Embassy for the assessed area typically provides guidelines on what they expect at the end.

The first finding is that “(s)ources of conflict and instability in Mindanao are complex and predominantly not grounded in religious beliefs; the core of conflict and instability revolves around many people’s perception that their ability to meet their basic needs of security, recognition, vitality, and identity is being thwarted by others.”¹¹³ This finding highlights the divide between groups who identify along religious lines, even though religion does not directly drive the conflict. People are aligning with groups along common religious and ethnic boundaries in order to try and attain basic human needs. This divide is particularly evident between the people of Mindanao and the services, or lack of services, from the Philippine national government. This has created a divide between the population in Mindanao and the Philippine central government.¹¹⁴

The second finding is “(a) mixture of separate but interrelated interests in maintaining a condition of ‘no peace, no war’ work against stability, conflict resolution, and widespread development in Mindanao and, at the same time, work to contain violence from escalating into chaos.”¹¹⁵ This finding highlights numerous groups from

¹¹³DOS, “Philippines: Looking at Mindana,” 4.

¹¹⁴Ibid., 6.

¹¹⁵Ibid., 4.

the international to the local level who benefit from an unstable environment. Instability has provided an environment beneficial to corrupt officials, illicit smugglers, political dynasties, and even elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and police. Many people expressed concern that the parties that needed to progress in the peace negotiations between the MILF and Government of the Philippines actually benefitted more from the ongoing conflict.¹¹⁶

The third finding is “(i)n Mindanao, there is evidence of active social resilience and indigenous stability manifesting in the form of leaders who are reforming the social agenda and bridging gaps in public service provisions. Some resiliency also manifests through small and medium sized entrepreneurs and business creating and expanding on opportunities for themselves while benefiting larger segments of society.”¹¹⁷ Many of the businesses, religious, and other influential leaders in Mindanao had an interest in stabilizing the region in order to institute change in the local, regional, and national government. They wanted better opportunities for their communities; however, they felt frustrated by the difficulty in defeating established political families throughout the area.¹¹⁸

The final primary finding is “(i)n the short term, several opportunities present themselves for local, national, and international actors to foster the forces that strengthen indigenous resiliencies and protect against an escalation of conflict and instability.”¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶DOS, “Philippines: Looking at Mindanao,” 6.

¹¹⁷Ibid., 4.

¹¹⁸Ibid., 7.

¹¹⁹Ibid., 4.

There were several periods of time in the future that were seen as possibilities for significant change in the region. Several key national and local elections, fishing harvests, pending judicial proceedings, and national policy engagement were seen as possible windows of uncertainty.¹²⁰

A simplified method of graphically portraying an understanding conflict in Mindanao can be seen in figure 7. This systems map shows the major dynamics seen in Mindanao. The central problem identified is the level of violence and instability in geographic locations across Mindanao and the ability for people to have their basic needs met. This is portrayed through the blue area of the systems map. The red colored loops worsen the level of violence in the region, and the green colored loops help to mitigate some of the problems.¹²¹

¹²⁰DOS, "Philippines: Looking at Mindanao," 47.

¹²¹Ibid., 48.




Figure 7. Mindanao Systems Map

Source: Department of State, "Philippines: Looking at Mindanao," *ICAF Report*, January 2011, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/187972.pdf> (accessed 4 May 2012), 48.

The first negative loop is called the Common Crime Loop. This refers to the inclination for people to resort to common crime in order to satisfy their basic needs. There are reports of theft, extortion, kidnapping, and other criminal activities as a means

of subsistence. These activities increase conflict and work to destabilize the region. Thus, this loop is a vicious cycle of violence and an inability to meet their basic needs.¹²²

The second negative loop is called the Patron-Client/Power Struggle Loop. This refers to the negative influence many of the powerful families have in the region. They control the resources in the area, and people must appease these families in order to be able to receive basic needs. The patrons have such a monopoly on the resources in the area that often the security forces must appease them in order to meet their own needs. This often undermines the legitimacy of the government and nullifies the rule of law. The patrons maintain power in elections through strong-arm tactics, through private armed groups, and intimidation of potential adversaries. The client must appease the patron in order to meet their needs; and the patron uses their client to keep others from attaining power.¹²³

The third negative loop is called the Patron-Client/Identity Exploitation Loop. Similar to the second loop, it describes the patron-client relationships that exist. However, this loop deals with the ability of the patrons to build identity gaps. The patron is the representative in the local government, and will use that legitimate position to alienate him or herself from the national government. The political dynasties maintain tight control over the region, and they describe a lack of concern by the national government for the local population. This further drives a wedge between the people of

¹²²DOS, "Philippines: Looking at Mindanao," 14-42.

¹²³Ibid.

Mindanao and the Philippine national government, reinforcing the need for the population's (client's) dependence on the patron.¹²⁴

The fourth negative loop is called the Disaffection with the Peace Process Loop. This reflects the popular dissatisfied with the peace process in Mindanao. There is a vested interest by many powerful groups within Mindanao in not achieving total peace. These groups have key political and security positions on both sides of conflict. Consequently, they are disingenuous in following through with the peace process, frustrating those who have a desire to end the conflict.¹²⁵

The fifth negative loop is called the No Peace = No Jobs Loop. This describes the negative link between economic investment in Mindanao and the conflict. There is a perception of Mindanao by a large number of economic investors in the Philippines of banditry and chaos. The perception is worse than the actual conditions in Mindanao, but every report of bombing, kidnapping, piracy, or general fighting reinforces the negative perception. This stagnates outside investment in the region. Furthermore, many people participate in common crime or patron-client politics because they do not have other economic alternatives.

There are several positive loops that do help to counteract the five negative loops identified by the ICAF assessment. The first positive loop is called the Peace = Jobs Loop. This loop describes the areas within Mindanao where peace has been sustained. This can be seen in several of the major cities in Mindanao such as Davao, General Santos City, Cagayan de Oro, and Zamboanga City. These areas have been able to sustain

¹²⁴Ibid.

¹²⁵Ibid.

peace, and they have attracted some economic investment. They are starting to see an increase in job growth and prosperity, which in turn has been an incentive for a push for peace throughout Mindanao.

The second positive loop is called the Community Perseverance Loop. This loop seems to be interrelated to the Peace = Jobs Loop. It refers to the culture in Mindanao that has a strong valuation on relationships and the willingness to sacrifice for the common good. There were numerous examples of government leaders, teachers, non-governmental workers, and business entrepreneurs who actively worked to heal emotional and psychological wounds from the conflicts throughout the region. These practices were often attributed to the prosperity in key areas in Mindanao.

The third and final positive loop is called the Social Safety Net Loop. This loop refers to the numerous social institutions that help to provide some level of subsistence to the region. These government and non-government organizations helped the people to meet their basic needs. Furthermore, there was a positive perception of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. They were often seen as a “bridging leadership” that looked out for the interests of the people, ensured the politicians could not exploit the people, and helped to push the peace process forward. Furthermore, there were also numerous accounts of extended families helping each other provide basic needs for each other.

Consequently, many of the academic theories from which the ICAF is based can be seen in the assessment of Mindanao. The final report was much more in depth and provided even further detail; however, these last few pages provide an oversight of what was pulled from this assessment. Another important aspect is that Cynthia Irmer, Robert Ricigliano, and the author were members of the Mindanao assessment team. The

inclusion of the systems map as an output of the ICAF is not dictated, but was based on the positions previously highlighted by Irmer and Ricigliano for a desire to improve communication and understanding of the conflict as a whole.

Model of Intellectual Habits

As an example of how intellectual habits would shape this assessment the Mindanao conflict will be examined with an understanding of Paul Collier's theory that he calls "democracy."¹²⁶ He uses an understanding of greed and grievance in relation to democracy in impoverished countries. This understanding provides a different understanding of causation of violence in Mindanao.

Collier examines the effect poverty has on democracies, particularly young democracies. He builds on a number of other works, including his own, to find that democracies in impoverished countries increases political violence. He states that most western countries incentivize democracy through political pressure and foreign aid.

The theory by most western countries is that violence will be reduced in a democracy through legitimacy and accountability. The voters hold the government accountable. Thus, the government must deliver promises to the people, and there will be fewer grievances by the people against the state. Furthermore, a legitimate government makes promises in order to get elected, and thus acquires a mandate to perform those actions once elected. Consequently, it would be difficult to motivate violent action against the state when these actions are performed. The legitimacy and accountability offered by a democratic institution will reduce conflict.

¹²⁶Collier, *Wars, Guns, and Votes*, 15.

Collier examined all of the countries in the world since 1960. His finding is that middle income and higher countries did support the legitimacy and accountability theory; however, lower income countries did not necessarily follow through with this theory. In fact he found an increase in violence in democratic countries with less than \$2,700 per capita per year.¹²⁷

Collier explained his theory of democrazy by examining the factors that undermine the legitimacy and accountability theory in higher income democracies. First, voters in lower income areas are not as aware of political performance. Secondly, voters tend to vote in blocks along ethnic identities and not based on performance of the politicians. Third, the government is likely not to have much of an effect on the population. Finally, the government may not be able to make large improvements in the economy, but there are perverse incentives for politicians to make personal gains for themselves and for loyal followers. These factors make it likely that politicians will face re-election without having to bother with delivering good performance. If honesty and competence does not give one an advantage in an election, then the honest and competent will likely be discouraged from the electoral process.

Furthermore, Collier examines how politicians in power retain their position in a dysfunctional democracy. The options primarily involve intimidation, bribery, coercion, limiting who can run, and dishonest vote counting. These tactics are why violence increases in a young democracy in the most impoverished countries.

This theory of democrazy was new in publication when the ICAF assessment was conducted in Mindanao. Numerous actors who were interviewed spoke disparagingly of

¹²⁷Collier, *Wars, Guns, and Votes*, 20.

their politicians and the political system. Many of the NGOs commented on the need for them to provide basic services that the government should be providing, but were unable or unwilling to provide. The theory of democrazy would point to the ineffective democratic system as a contributing factor to conflict in Mindanao. The patron-client politics alluded to in the systems map showed some aspect of this, but the idea of dysfunctional democracy as a driver of conflict was not fully addressed.

However, this theory has merit that deserves deeper examination. There are known ties between some politicians and MILF, ASG, and JI.¹²⁸ A report conducted by a Philippine research institution, Brand Labs, stated that “goons, guns, and gold”¹²⁹ were the tools of political families. They called the system of government in Mindanao the “power game”¹³⁰ in which traditional tribal chieftains retained power similar to Collier’s explanation for democrazy. Lady Ann Sahidula is a current Philippine Senator. She was also a former Vice-Governor of Sulu Province, and her husband a mayor for one of the municipalities in the province. Furthermore, she is the cousin of a former prominent ASG leader. During the kidnapping of three International Committee of the Red Cross workers in Sulu Province in early 2009, Sahidula walked into the ASG camp where the workers were being held captive. Her cousin was the primary suspect in the kidnapping, and she was able to come and go in the ASG camp with little effort. She was also a prominent figure in the ransom negotiations for the release of the workers.

¹²⁸*The Mindanao-Sulu Power Game: An Ethnography of Emergent Players* (Manila, Philippines: Brand Labs, 2010), 5.

¹²⁹*Ibid.*, 13.

¹³⁰*Ibid.*, 6.

Lady Ann Sahidula is just one example of many politicians in the area. The Brand Labs report examines many of the interconnections between prominent political families and MILF, ASG, and JI. There have been countless instances of violence in the region, and election periods in Mindanao are known to be especially violent.

Applying this theory along Parsons's causal logics could further bring to light how the democratic system in Mindanao is driving conflict. There are structural, institutional, ideational, and psychological causal mechanisms as understood using democracy theory that contribute to conflict in Mindanao.

A structural explanation of democracy theory in Mindanao is that in order for the political families to maintain their basic human needs, then they must use coercion and violent tactics to maintain their livelihood. If they do not cooperate with the MILF, ASG, JI, and other violent groups, then their opponents will, and thus will have the advantage during elections. These violent groups are part of the informal structure in place that the political families must work through.

An institutional explanation of democracy theory is the understanding that elections are meant to provide legitimacy and credibility to the state. However, the system of governance in Mindanao is replete with examples of increasing conflict in the region. Therefore, there is a secondary, unintended consequence of increasing conflict through the election process.

An ideational explanation could be that Mindanao was traditionally ruled by a Datu system of governance. Datus were tribal chieftains who were responsible for their tribes and tribal regions. When the colonial powers arrived in Mindanao, some Datus were cooperative with the colonial leaders and others led the resistance against them.

Many of the Datus were related through marriages and family connections, including the Datus who were cooperative and the Datus who were insurgents. The Datus retained their power when the electoral system was established, and many kept their allegiance to the insurgent groups. These relationships have evolved today into the relationships between the elected government officials and the MILF, ASG, and JI.

A psychological explanation could be the relative deprivation many Mindanao politicians feel compared to the other politicians in Manila. Mindanao is the poorest region of the Philippines, and the politicians from Mindanao may feel deprived compared to the other politicians they see from other parts of the country. They may feel the need to extract resources intended for their constituents in order to attain the same level of wealth as their colleagues. Consequently, they exacerbate the negative environment and popular despair towards the state.

Emergence would then be used to explain those actions that were unforeseen and are difficult to explain. An example of this could be the Maguindanao Massacre on 24 November 2009. Toto Mangudadatu sent a convoy of personnel including one of his wives, two of his sisters, several lawyers, and approximately 30 reporters to file a certificate of candidacy against one of the Ampatuans for governorship of Maguindanao Province in Central Mindanao. Mangudadatu had received numerous death threats if he were to challenge the Ampatuans in the 2010 elections. Mangudadatu felt that he could safely file the certificate of candidacy by sending women and reporters to file the paperwork. However, one of the Ampatuan private armies stopped the convoy and murdered all 57 people involved and buried them in a mass grave on the side of the road. The legislative outcome of this is still to be fully determined, but the discovery of the

massacre has greatly eroded the political strength of the Ampatuan family. There are reports of them previously using similar tactics, but not to this scale or as egregious as this incident. This act could not be foreseen, and has garnered international attention. The outcome is greater than the sum of its parts and the full result of this action has still not been realized. The resonance of this event is still felt throughout the region, and it can best be understood as emergence.

This examination of Paul Collier's democracy theory using abstract reasoning and a rigorous causal logic has brought an understanding of conflict in Mindanao beyond what was identified in the ICAF. The information examined against Collier's democracy theory was evident in the ICAF assessment. Consequently, this case study has shown that a model of intellectual habit would be useful in gaining a greater understanding of the operational environment.

Section III. Conclusion

This chapter started by examining the importance of maintaining intellectual habits. It is important to understanding the theories that underpinings of the ICAF in order to appreciate each step of the framework. This familiarization will provide a better understanding of the operational environment. Social science is a growing field of study, and continuous research adds to our understanding of political action. Familiarity with the latest understanding of political action allows us to apply abductive reasoning and a rigorous causation model in order to inform and enrich our understanding of a conflict environment.

This model was shown to be valid by examining just one recent theory by Paul Collier on the affect of democracy in lower income regions. This examination of Collier's

democracy theory was meant to show just one aspect of what could be gained by applying numerous other theories of understanding in a similar fashion. In fact this examination did bring to light the importance of the democratic process in Mindanao as a possible contributor to the conflict, which was not identified by the ICAF assessment conducted in 2010. This increased understanding could be of critical importance when looking at the USG strategy for reducing conflict in the region.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This paper examined if the ICAF could be improved in its application. It reviewed the various components of the ICAF, the theoretical underpinnings that inform the process, and critiques that have been written about the framework. The analysis has concluded that the ICAF requires intellectual habits that encompass an appreciation for abductive reasoning and nuanced causal explanation. This conclusion was founded through an examination the intellectual habits of being informed on current research. Furthermore, it was found that current research is necessary in order to abductively reason a better understanding of conflict causality. In turn, this understanding would facilitate an improved response to the conflict and achievement of USG objectives.

Understanding a conflict is essential to planning a response in order to achieve USG objectives. The most efficacious response to a conflict is to leverage all elements of national power, particularly between DOS, USAID, and DOD. The ICAF was designed to provide a common understanding of a conflict environment. This common understanding will allow a unified effort in responding to a conflict environment in order to meet USG objectives. Expertise on the ICAF resides in the DOS, Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. However, it is important that all members of an ICAF assessment team maintain intellectual habits. This will result in a more comprehensive understanding of the operational environment, and will assist in the subsequent planning effort.

Knowing the ICAF process, or even the foundation theories, is not sufficient in achieving the best understanding possible. The body of knowledge in relation to conflict

and social sciences continues to grow and mature. This growth provides a new appreciation for the complexity of conflict and general human action.

A framework of intellectual habits when applied to the ICAF is shown to improve an understanding of the environment. It helps to explore possible causality from the latest academic research and understanding relevant to the conflict environment. This knowledge improves abductive reasoning in determining an explanation for action. Furthermore, this understanding of action will be comprehensive if examined through the lens of Parsons's causal logics. However, we recognize that some actions are so complex in nature that we cannot fully dissect the causal logics that portend the event. Consequently, we must understand Connolly and emergent causality to examine these actions.

Further research on intellectual habits as they relate to other frameworks would be beneficial in solidifying its importance. It seems to be intuitive, but it needs to be examined further. As this paper has already demonstrated, not all understanding that seems to be intuitive is complete. As Shapiro demonstrated, there are elements at play that need to be examined further.

Additional research would be beneficial in examining causality. Ricigliano presents an understanding of causation that he calls the SAT model. This model is based on similar principles to Parsons's causal logics. However, it is not clear all of the similarities and differences. A comparison between the two understandings may provide enrichment to the causal logics.

The improvement of awareness demonstrated in this research was applied to the ICAF process. It has shown that intellectual habits are critical to improving knowledge

and making more informed decisions. This framework of habits can be applied to any framework or model used. This is especially important for military practitioners.

Familiarity with research in political dynamics, conflict, and social science will improve the understanding from the military decision making process, Army design methodology, or even the targeting process. Just as the ICAF foundation theories only provide a level of understanding, Joint and Army doctrine can only provide a foundation of knowledge.

Current academic research enriches the understanding, and improves our ability to apply abductive reasoning to a problem.

It is important for USG personnel, including military professionals, involved in planning how to achieve national objectives to understand causality. This understanding is examined through the lens of conventional and emergent causality. The result is a more enriched understanding of the operational environment. This will allow for more informed decisions in action. Each of the military models begins with an understanding of the operational environment. Consequently, improving that understanding through intellectual habits will improve the overall process.

The findings of this paper concerning intellectual habits are a current shortcoming within professional military education. While there are some opportunities for advanced civilian education to the commissioned officer corps, they are not widespread enough to be considered a pillar within the standard education process of our professional officers. Inclusion of intellectual habits as a standard component for mid-level officers attending the Intermediate Level Education at the Command and General Staff College would address this shortcoming.

This finding is particularly relevant in the context of a recent interview with the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Raymond Odierno. He was asked about the budget constraints being imposed on the Army, and how it will impact the future. He stated the importance of educating the force, particularly on human science and regional expertise. He cited the importance of “understanding the environment, understanding the fabric that’s beneath a society.”¹³¹ The framework of intellectual habits put forth here will ensure the realization of General Odierno’s vision.

¹³¹Raymond Odierno, cited by Doyle McManus, “McManus: A Smaller, Smarter Military,” *Los Angeles Times*, 22 April 2012, <http://articles.latimes.com/print/2012/apr/22/opinion/la-oe-mcmanus-column-odierno-iraq-afghanistan-less-20120422> (accessed 4 May 2012).

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