Department of Education
Graduate Research Management Office
Research Papers
Academic Year 2009


Bureaucracies at War: Organizing for Strategic Success in Afghanistan

by Donald C. Bolduc COL, USA
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

The collapse of the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001 led to the challenges of creating and then maintaining a stable, safe, and secure environment for the people of that nation. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) and the International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF) failure to organize and establish the unity of command and unity of purpose needed to implement under an effective counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy has resulted in the ISAFs inability to gain and maintain security, prevent a resurgence of the Taliban, and develop an effective infrastructure development plan. This strategy research paper (SRP) examines how poor administration and organization of the political and military effort in Afghanistan has resulted in a lack of unity of command and unity of purpose, which has created an unstable political and military environment and an ineffective Afghan government. This SRP concludes with eleven recommendations to better organize NATOs political and military effort in order for the NATO mission to succeed in Afghanistan.

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Countering Threat Finance as a Critical Subset of Irregular Warfare: An Interpretive Case Study of Northern Nigeria

by Clarence W. Bowman III MAJ, USA
School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS

Islamist violent extremists (VE) and violent extremist organizations (VEO) require a broad range of material, social, and financial support to organize, train, conduct operations, and sustain their ideologies and terrorist/insurgent endeavors. There are several geographic regions and states in the world that are distinctly conducive to supporting Islamist VEs and VEOs, however only a portion of these have direct strategic significance to U.S. interests and national security. The West African country of Nigeria represents one of these strategic states and concurrently exists as an international and regional VE and VEO resource base and safe haven. Northern Nigeria is particularly significant to Islamist VEO financing due to the socio-political and socio-economic conditions and widespread corruption and criminality.
The purpose of this research is to explore the dynamic of threat financing supporting Islamist violent extremists and extremist organizations in northern Nigeria, offer insight into existing and potential conditions that are conducive to threat financing, and highlight existing information gaps particularly regarding Nigerian based VEOs that may serve as accelerators for international foreign terrorist organizations (FTO) and/or their resource networks.
This research will be presented using an interpretive case study of northern Nigeria, highlighting the necessity of an U.S. interagency (IA) approach utilizing an irregular warfare (IW) operating concept, characterized by direct and indirect interventions, engagements, and a focus on relevant populations and partner state capacity building. The research concludes with recommended approaches for U.S. IA elements, USAFRICOM, and USSOCOM to initiate, operationalize, and sustain long-term counter threat finance (CTF) efforts and engagement with Nigeria.

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Operational Detachment-Bravo an In-Depth Analysis of the ODB's Advisory Role in Support of FID/COIN Operations

by Kirk E. Brinker MAJ, USA; Dirk H. Smith Jr. MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

U.S. Special Forces (USSF), with its structure and training, has historically led, and will continue to lead, FID endeavors for the U.S. DoD. Within USSF, Operational Detachment “B”s (ODB) have served, and will continue to, serve as both a command and control (C2) and an advisory element to ensure that USSF FID supports HN COIN strategies. This thesis will refer to the combined effort as “FID/COIN,” although FID and COIN are separate missions under the U.S. military’s IW construct. Given that FID/COIN will be the primary operational role of USSF for the next decade, coupled with the fact that ODBs function as the organizational entity responsible for synchronizing advisory efforts from the tactical to the operational level of warfare, this thesis will examine ODB employment, both past and present, to inform the reader on the ODB’s potential to contribute in FID/COIN operations. This thesis uses USSF doctrine and case studies from four distinctly different FID/COIN operations in: the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Republic of the Philippines (RP) to inform the reader on the ODB’s operational advisory capability with indigenous forces and local/regional government leaders at a level nested above its subordinate Operational Detachment “A”s (ODA).

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Unraveling the Georgian Knot the United States, Russia, and Georgia and the New "Great Game" in the Caucasus

by C. Tim Carlsson CW3, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

The most recent manifestation of a new “Great Game,” or a resurgence of interest in the geopolitical competition taking place in the Caucasus, occurred in August 2008 when Russia invaded and occupied parts of the Republic of Georgia. Russia’s invasion, the first use of force outside its territory since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, has forced a reassessment of U.S. and NATO strategy toward Russia and its relationship with the Republic of Georgia. The United States and NATO have yet to develop a new strategy that balances their enlargement policy of supporting Georgian sovereignty and independence with concerns about growing Russian security interests in the region.

The main purpose of this thesis is to examine Georgia’s national security dilemmas and explain the principal components of U.S. engagement policies designed to manage its strategic predicament. This thesis examines whether these engagement policies contribute to U.S. and NATO interests, bring greater stability to the region, and enhance European security. The study also analyzes how U.S. engagement in Georgia affects Georgian and Russian interests and explores the implications for U.S.-Russian relations in terms of a new “Great Game” of geopolitical competition in the region.

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Human Geography in the Afghanistan - Pakistan Region: Undermining the Taliban Using Traditional Pashtun Social Structures

by John H. Cathell LTC, USA
Naval War College, Newport, RI

The Taliban is a largely Pashtun insurgent movement operating throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan. Much of its ideology is based on Saudi Arabian-influenced Wahabbist thought, and as such is alien to Pashtun culture. It is in direct conflict with the traditional Pashtun social code of Pashtunwali and has subverted the traditional tribal structure of the Pashtun. Coalition Forces should support and strengthen traditional Pashtun tribal leaders and their traditional social structure in Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to isolate the Taliban insurgency, enabling the achievement of Coalition end state objectives.

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Beyond Lawrence: Ethnographic Intelligence for USSOCOM

by Varman S. Chhoeung MAJ, USA; Chad T. Machiela CW3, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Ethnographic Intelligence (EI) is “information about indigenous forms of association, local means of organization, or traditional methods of mobilization” and the collection and processing of information regarding “ties built through kinship connections, tribal relationships, religious education, and other forms of normal, everyday association.” This thesis describes how the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) can employ an organization of ethnographic sensors to develop and maintain long-term, trust-based relationships among target populations throughout the world to improve sociocultural understanding in support of USSOCOM, Geographic Combatant Commander, and Country Team objectives. This thesis also demonstrates why USSOCOM has the most to gain from supporting this low-cost, sustainable solution to redressing a gap in our current collection and analysis.

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A District Approach to Countering Afghanistan's Insurgency

by David S. Clukey MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Since the initial invasion and ousting of the Taliban regime in 2001, International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and the United States (U.S.) military have lost the initiative and become sedentary in Afghanistan. This case study analysis considers if ISAF and the U.S. military are appropriately employing the current disposition of military forces to maximize effects against the insurgency in Afghanistan. This study objectively compares and contrasts the current ISAF and U.S. strategy with a district level FID/COIN methodology. This study explores why it is necessary to approach the problem at the district/village level to enhance the security, control, and influence of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRoA), and to eliminate systematically the conditions that have supported the insurgency in Afghanistan.

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No Child Left Behind COIN Strategies to Deny Recruitment of Adolescent Males in the Southern Philippines

by Herbert A. Daniels MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Severing the link between the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Jolo population is critical to destroying the terrorist organization. The U.S. support to Philippine Security Forces (PSF) has helped to capture or kill the ideological cadre of the ASG but fails to prevent younger rebels from taking their place. While PSF continue to aggressively pursue the ASG, the U.S. has provided abundant assistance to improve the livelihood of the Jolo population. Positive results from the U.S.-supported development can be observed through increased access to healthcare and education. However, the strategy may fail to target a key demographic of the Jolo population, adolescent males, who currently make up approximately 80% of the ASG’s estimated population of 400 rebels. To prevent their recruitment by the ASG, operations and development on Jolo must not marginalize adolescent males. The warrior traditions of the native Tausugs on Jolo present a challenge when it comes to addressing the needs of adolescent males and encourages their participation in the security and development of Jolo vice participation in rebellious or illicit activities.

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Inducing Alignment the Dynamic Impact of Repression and Mobilizing Structures on Population Support

by Brian E. Decker MAJ, USA; Phillip W. Thomas MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

This thesis provides an alternative to the surge theory as a basis for understanding the dramatic change in the security situation in Anbar, Iraq. Typological theory is used to develop a conceptual framework of strategic interaction that explains how different combinations of government and insurgent repression types lead to the alignment of the affected population. Process tracing is used to test our hypotheses of population alignment, to make inferences about how the population reacted to the repression tactics of the government and the insurgent, and ultimately, to construct an explanation for the defeat of AQI through the alignment of the tribal population in the Anbar province of Iraq. Game theory compliments process tracing by verifying the internal logic of the typology and observations. In addition, the development of an agent based model (ABM) verifies the internal logic and extends the external validity of the author’s substantive theory. The model replicates and reproduces the dynamic history of mechanisms and processes by manipulating the parameters that alter the affects of the interaction of repression tactics on population alignment. Then, theoretical predictions are tested against observations from the case study of the Anbar Awakening to assess the degree of congruence between the projections of the conceptual framework and the longitudinal variation of observations. The docking procedure of this research design confirms the utility of channeling for the counterinsurgent against insurgent coercion. However, the findings suggest that this dynamic is heavily dependent on intermediating mechanisms, such as the insurgent’s social embeddedness and the population’s incentive structures. Lastly, the feasibility and potential areas of applications for the models is provided.

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Fostering Foreign Relationships Among Department of Defense Personnel

by Thomas R. De La Garza MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

In various regions around the world, the United States suffers from a significant deficit in operational awareness. In areas like the Middle East, reliable information regarding local attitudes and concerns towards U.S. policy are often unknown or overlooked. U.S. actions and policies can sometimes unintentionally incite anger and resentment among segments of the world community. Additionally, the DoD has scarce few individuals who understand the cultural complexities of a given region and know key persons within. These shortfalls in operational awareness can provide an inadequate understanding of why tensions exist or how to address them properly. As a result, the U.S. is at times surprised by unfavorable events when it should be prepared and have adequate forewarning. To summarize, the U.S. has significant blindspots regarding operational awareness and an insufficient number of persons networked into these obscure regions.

This thesis examines the potential of the Department of Defense (DoD) to increase operational awareness by fostering foreign relationships between DoD personnel and their foreign counterparts. This thesis further analyzes the value of encouraging U.S. military officers and NCOs to establish, maintain, and further develop personal and professional relationships with foreign military and defense civilians throughout their careers. Based upon an examination of the advantages foreign relationships can bring to secure U.S. policy objectives, courses of action and programs will be recommended to maximize the benefits from fostering foreign relationships within the DoD.

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Joint Special Operations Task Force- Philippines

by Stuart L. Farris MAJ, USA
School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS

The Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) indirect approach to irregular warfare (IW) offers senior U.S. policy makers and military commanders a suitable model worthy of consideration for conducting long-term military operations against terrorist networks inside a partner nation’s sovereign territory. However, the indirect approach does not represent a one-size-fits-all solution or approved template for conducting successful IW and defeating terrorist networks abroad. The JSOTF-P’s indirect approach to IW is tailored specifically to the unique conditions of the Philippines operational environment and the regional military objectives established by senior policy makers. The indirect approach employed by the JSOTF-P offers a model for the U.S. military to combat regional/global terrorism inside a partner nation’s sovereign territory under the following conditions: the U.S. has an established Country Team; the partner nation has established armed forces with an existing capacity to conduct counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations; the partner nation’s political establishment is sensitive to a large-scale, overt presence of American military personnel operating within the country or region; or the partner nation has a constitutional or otherwise legal prohibition against foreign military forces directly conducting combat operations within their sovereign territory.

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Defense Support to Public Diplomacy: Options for the Operational Commander

by Harmon Matthew F. LTC, USA
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island

With the end of the Cold War came a uni-polar world in which the United States stood alone as the sole super power. One of the major fallouts of the perceived peace dividend created by the new world order was the thought that the U.S. government no longer needed to actively communicate with the nations of the world. The primary agency tasked with communicating outside the United States, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) was gutted primarily for short sighted fiscal reasons. Communicating globally with friends, foes, allies, and adversaries is as important today as it was in the Cold War. Unfortunately, the coordination and synergy needed for effective public diplomacy has still not been given the necessary priority and resources to be fully effective. On 06 November 2008, the Government Accounting Office issued a press release listing thirteen “Urgent Issues” for the next President and Congress. Number 5 on that list is improving the United States‟ image abroad through public diplomacy and broadcasting. Operating under one central information strategy and theme across the different geographic commands and government agencies will ensure that U.S. policies display images of security, collaborative progress, and hope to the world.

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The Afghan National Police: Turning a Counterinsurgency Problem into a Solution

by David J. Haskell MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

The Taliban have managed to expand their political and military influence every year for the last five years, and if this trend is not stopped and ultimately reversed, the government of Afghanistan will likely collapse. While there is not one solution for victory in Afghanistan, some counterinsurgency precepts are more critical than others. This thesis examines and explains why legitimate police are vital to defeating the Taliban insurgency. Additionally, this thesis identifies and seeks to validate two key recommendations for improving the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan National Police. First, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) need to make the Afghan National Police their number one priority for resources and manpower. Second, the Afghan National Police must be fundamentally restructured in accordance with traditional and cultural precepts to meet the needs of rural Afghan communities. Tailoring police reform to meet the needs of rural Afghans can reverse the Taliban’s influence and legitimacy in Afghanistan’s critical periphery.

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Burma Assessing Options for U.S. Engagement

by Dennis S. Heaney MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

This thesis will provide a background look at Burma’s recent history from World War II to present day to examine how the current state of affairs came about in the country. Burma’s diverse ethnic groups and the nearly continuous insurgencies since World War II will be analyzed relative to a short period of democracy (following British colonial rule) from 1948 to 1962, to repressive military rule from 1962 to today.

This thesis examines how Burma’s military juntas have retained internal control in the face of insurgent and prodemocracy movements. Burma’s geographic location, between the rising powers of India and China, its abundant natural resources, its drug trade, and the government’s human rights abuses, all make the country important to United States’ foreign relations in Asia. This thesis will look at the current U.S. policies toward Burma and explore possible Burmese policy options for the U.S. in the future. The thesis will conclude with recommendations for future policy based on the research to determine if the United States can effect change in Burma.

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Command and Control of Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan: Is Unity of Effort Good Enough?

by Johnson Ronald M. COL, USA
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island

The conflict in Afghanistan is currently in its eighth year and the United States Government and its NATO/ISAF partners are in the process of rethinking their entire strategy. Eight years of counterinsurgency, counterterrorist, and stabilization operations have thus far resulted in an ever steady increase in the level of violence, an unprecedented resurgence of Taliban control and Al Qaeda operations across the entire country, and has arguably brought the entire US and NATO/ISAF effort to the precipice of mission failure. At the forefront of efforts in Afghanistan are US/OEF and NATO/ISAF Special Operation Forces (SOF). The organizational command and control structure for SOF in Afghanistan is a major shortcoming in SOF effectiveness, and does not follow the Principal of War Unity of Command, and only vaguely supports the idea of Unity of Effort. In spite of the similarity of mission, operational focus and capabilities, within the confines of the theater command and control architecture, US/OEF and NATO/ISAF SOF and their mandates are separate and distinct and essentially operate independently of one another. Arguably the most flexible, dynamic and productive force in Afghanistan, changes to the SOF organizational command and control structure could yield significant impact and results.

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Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic of Clandestine Cellular Networks: The First Step in Effective Counternetwork Operations

by Derek Jones MAJ, USA
School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS

Since the events of September 11, 2001 the United States military counternetwork operations, theory, and doctrine have failed to account for the form, function, and logic of clandestine cellular networks used by both interstate insurgencies, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as by global insurgencies, like al Qaeda and its associated movements. The failure to understand the form, function, and logic of clandestine cellular networks has led to the incorrect application of counternetwork theories. Counternetwork operations specifically targeting key leaders, facilitators, individuals with special skills, or highly connected individuals, intuitively seem to be the correct targets for disconnecting clandestine cellular networks. However, there has been little comparative analysis done to verify if these operations are in fact having the overall effect required to disrupt, neutralize, defeat, or ultimately destroy these networks.
Understanding the form, function, and logic of clandestine cellular networks reveals that the removal of single individuals, regardless of function, is well within the tolerance of this type of organizational structure and thus has little long-term effect. At the same time, highly connected nodes violate the principles of clandestine operations since they are obviously highly visible when compared to a competent clandestine practitioner that does not want a discernable signature in order to remain hidden from the counterinsurgent. Thus, by focusing on the highly connected individuals as high priority targets, US efforts have effectively “culled the herd” of poor clandestine practitioners. These two examples provide the two most common errors in the current counternetwork theories and operations, and the errors are all due to a lack of a systemic understanding of clandestine cellular networks.
This monograph uses a modified process-trace methodology to analyze the form, function, and logic of clandestine cellular networks in order to dispel the myths associated with current network and counternetwork theories, and challenge the contemporary thoughts on counternetwork operations. This work concludes with the development of six principles of clandestine cellular networks, along with a myriad of conclusion based on the analysis of the form, function, and logic of these networks, to provide a deeper understanding of clandestine cellular networks. Understanding the form, function, and logic of clandestine cellular networks is the first step to more effective counternetwork operations.

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Robin Sage: The Making of an Unconventional Warrior

by Andrew Quentin Jordan MAJ, USA
Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL

This paper explains how the USAJFKSWCS evaluates Special Forces students on Unconventional Warfare techniques during the Robin Sage Exercise. This exercise takes place in central North Carolina and is supported through the volunteerism of hundreds of residents of North Carolina through support of land resources and role playing.

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Battle of Wills Accepting Stalemate in Internal Wars

by Mark A. Kaperak MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

This thesis examines contributing causes of protracted internal conflicts and recommends ways of overcoming the cycle of war that seems to perpetuate in some countries. Through an analysis of three cases of prolonged internal wars, in the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Colombia, I test two hypotheses and attempt to gain a better understanding of how internal wars become stagnated, protracted, or stuck in a cycle of conflict that does not seem likely to end. A central government’s proximity to the violence in an internal war and, to a lesser degree, desensitization to violence over the course of decades of conflict both contribute to protraction in some internal wars. Political will and the motivations behind political will become deciding factors in the outcome of internal conflicts. Effectively managing the resolve to end a conflict, enhancing government legitimacy, and proportionately employing all of a government’s resources are necessary conditions for a state to overcome the protracted war problem.

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A Clash of Military Traditions Meritocracy, Modernization, and Neo-traditional Challenges to United States Foreign Internal Defense (FID) Policy

by Derek R. Keller MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

In the decades before, and with greater intensity since 1945, the United States of America engaged in numerous ‘nation-building’ efforts around the world; the focus of which was the creation, or the strengthening, of national military establishments in allied-states. With the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act in 1986, Foreign Internal Defense (FID) became a legislatively directed activity of the Special Operations Forces of the U.S. Army. Since 1986, FID has been formally defined by the U.S. Department of the Army as the “participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency” (DA FM 3-05.202, 2007, p. 1-1). This thesis provides an examination of the effectiveness of the U.S. Army’s FID. It argues that FID, or what can also be characterized as foreign army building, has failed more often than it has succeeded. Furthermore, this failure is primarily a result of a clash of military traditions between the U.S. advisors conducting FID and the recipient military establishments. Under these circumstances the FID model needs to be altered. Applying a revised, more flexible version of FID would yield greater success in current and future FID operations.

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Population and Resource Control Measures a Conceptual Framework for Understanding and Implementation

by Vance J. Klosinski MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

An important component of any counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign is the successful use of population and resource control measures. If utilized correctly, PRCMs are powerful operational tools that can be used to break the cycle of insurgent violence and establish the security necessary for all other COIN campaign initiatives. This thesis draws from literatures on social movement theory and COIN to develop a framework that would assist COIN force commanders to better select and implement the appropriate PRCMs for success in their areas of operations. The thesis argues for developing a comprehensive PRCM plan across the U.S. military’s operational spectrum (strategic/operational/tactical) and for factoring in the nature of the local environment and local concepts of legitimacy before proceeding.

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The SMO-COIN Nexus Using Social Movement Theory to Demobilize Insurgency

by Robert Steve Lewis MAJ, USA; Mark D. Metzger MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Victory in irregular war and insurgency is not simply a matter of combat actions and civic aid; it is a matter of population mobilization. Winning the sympathy of the population will do little good for either the state or the insurgent if he fails to mobilize the population in a manner that allows him to reap the resources and legitimacy that either side needs to win. A winning strategy by the state must be one that either limits the insurgent’s ability to mobilize the population or allows the state to mobilize the population more efficiently than the insurgent. The use of social movement organizations offers an effective method for insurgents to mobilize a population during an insurgency. In many cases, the use of social movement organizations is more efficient as a mobilization strategy than are other strategies such as coercion or persuasion. A strategy by the state that disrupts the insurgent’s ability to use a sympathetic social movement organization offers the state an effective means to limit the resources available to the insurgents. In these cases, the state can also create its own social movement organizations to allow it to mobilize the population effectively in support of the government.

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Drafting a New Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication

by Timothy J. Loney COL, USA
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

In May 2007, the United States Government published its U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication. The strategy, authored by the Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication, is the first attempt at coordinating Strategic Communication efforts across the interagency community. Although a good start, the current strategy is preoccupied with the war on terror, presents a miss match in mission and objectives, fails to recognize key strategic audiences, and accepts an adversarial relationship with the media. This Strategy Research Project (SRP) paper reviews the current Strategy in terms of ends, ways, and means and in terms of its suitability, feasibility and acceptability and provides recommendations for drafting the new U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication.

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Special Operations and Conventional Forces: How to Improve Unity of Effort Using Afghanistan as a Case Study

by Grant M. Martin MAJ, USA
School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS

The purpose of this monograph is to offer some practical solutions to building unity of effort between Special Operations Forces (SOF) and conventional forces using operations in Afghanistan from 2001 until 2009 as a case study. The conclusion is that there are three imperatives to ensuring unity of effort between SOF and conventional forces. The first is to ensure that SOF operations and plans are nested with the overall theater campaign plan and if there is no overall theater campaign plan that SOF take the lead in its development. The second imperative is to use liaison officers that are the commander’s representative and are value-added to the headquarters they liaise with. The third imperative is to ensure a command and control relationship between SOF and conventional forces which is flexible, allowing for the most robust support SOF can provide, while at the same time ensuring that forces are not working at cross-purposes. A more long-term and multi-faceted imperative that will take institutional change is that of the education of SOF and conventional forces about their respective branches, as well as prioritizing the integration of these forces during training and operations.

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A Cognitive Approach to COIN: Countering Dangerous Beliefs

by McNeil Jeffrey A. LTC, USA
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island

Counterinsurgency doctrine for targeting host nation popular support lacks a coherent underlying theoretical structure, and this void can result in unfocused and ineffective counterinsurgency planning. The dangerous beliefs model for counterinsurgency can provide a flexible framework to augment current counterinsurgency doctrine. The proposed model can serve as a guide for educating counterinsurgency forces to plan and conduct operations and understand the implications of their actions to gain popular support. While the model is not all inclusive, it does provide a way to conceptualize the underlying beliefs and perceptions that need to be targeted for effective counterinsurgency. Social engagement of the host nation population is also crucial for effective counterinsurgency, thus elements of social psychology and attitude change are integrated into the proposed model. A current and an historic case of counterinsurgency are presented to illustrate the importance of deliberately targeting underlying beliefs in the host nation population. Through proper and early targeting of these underlying beliefs and continuous reassessment of the relevant parameters, the belief targeting model can enhance operations to garner host nation support.

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The Principles of Military Deception and Operation Quicksilver

by Allen Thomas Moore Jr. LTC, USA
Air University, Maxwell AFB, AL

This paper assesses the effectiveness of the principles of Military Deception (MILDEC) in regards to their consideration and application to Operation QUICKSILVER during the preparation for D-Day. Operation QUICKSILVER was a sub plan of Operation FORTITUDE SOUTH, designed to deceive Adolf Hitler and the German High Command as to the exact time and location of the invasion of Europe. The proper application of the six principles of MILDEC made Operation QUICKSILVER a significant accomplishment which directly contributed to the Allied triumph in the D-Day invasion.

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Integration and Interoperability of Special Operations Forces and Conventional Forces in Irregular Warfare

by Jeffrey Ortoli MAJ, USA
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS

Historically a distinct cultural and operational rift has evolved between Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Conventional Forces (CF) that devalued the need for SOF-CF integration and for developing common operating procedures and doctrine. This rift intensified in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and more specifically during Operation Enduring Freedom, and continues today.
The post-9/11 era has seen a dramatic increase in the need for SOF-CF integration and interoperability (I&I). In today‘s Irregular Warfare environment, SOF and CF are required to work side by side, often for long durations and sharing the same battlespace. Successful conduct of operations on today‘s battlefields requires a synchronized joint, combined, and multinational effort. Instituting effective SOF-CF I&I is critical to achieving the required unity of effort. It is incumbent upon higher echelon commanders to provide proper guidance and influence to improve I&I, and it is vital that lower echelon leaders and soldiers alike initiate and advance successful SOF-CF synchronization. This research endeavors to contribute to synchronizing SOF-CF effects on the battlefield and achieving better unity of effort, as well as diminishing the rift between SOF and CF.

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Reorganizing for Irregular Warfare

by David J. Painter MAJ, USA; Mark C. Weaver MAJ, USA; Scott C. White MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

A thorough understanding of Irregular Warfare (IW) and the principles of organizational theory and design will enable the Department of Defense (DoD) to organize efficiently and effectively for operations within the Irregular Warfare Environment, while maintaining its conventional capabilities. We develop our argument for this thesis in several stages. First, we define irregular warfare and differentiate it from conventional warfare through the development of our critical success factors. We introduce organizational theory and design in order to incorporate the critical success factors. We conclude that the DoD should reorganize certain elements of the U.S. Special Operations Command by incorporating existing capabilities, focusing on conducting operations within the Irregular Warfare Environment, and implementing our critical success factors.

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What Makes Fusion Cells Effective?

by Christopher L. Fussell Lt Cdr, USN; Trevor W. Hough MAJ, USA; Matthew D. Pedersen MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Intelligence Fusion Cells (or Fusion Centers) can be an effective means to best leverage the capabilities of various organizations and agencies in pursuit of a particular mission or objective. This thesis will examine what characteristics enable three types (DoD-led, State and Local Fusion Centers, and DOJ/OGA-led fusion cells) of fusion cells to be most effective. There is no set definition for how to measure “effectiveness” across types of fusion cells. This fact created several research issues which are analyzed and discussed at length.

After examining what makes these fusion cells effective, the authors will explore what lessons learned from fusion cells the U.S. Government can apply to the federal level to improve interagency cooperation and efficacy. The lessons from a more micro-level (fusion cells) can be applied to the more macro-level (interagency cooperation).

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Permanent Presence for the Persistent Conflict an Alternative Look at the Future of Special Forces

by Christopher D. Pratt MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

This study addresses two questions: 1) What is the future role for SF in the Long War Strategy; and 2) How will the roles and missions of SF have a strategic impact or high utility function in this current fight and in our future endeavors? This thesis asserts that the future role for Special Forces soldiers rests in a permanent OCONUS presence and engagement, so that SF teams can leverage and refine their unique skills, to include gaining a more comprehensive and deeper understanding of the regions in which they can be expected to operate.

The arguments presented in this thesis are conceptual in nature, and are designed to offer the DoD an alternative approach for persistent presence and engagement. What I am advocating with this argument is a complete and total career commitment to living abroad. SF Groups in their entirety would be forward deployed OCONUS. The roles and posture of SF would change, but the seven primary missions would remain the same. If, as so many people argue, the U.S. needs to move forward with a smaller footprint, a forward-deployed SF would give us a permanent global posture of strategic significance–and one that would certainly help us prosecute the Long War more effectively.

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An Analytical Approach to Educating Future IW Strategists and Campaign Planners

by Scott E. Sill LTC, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

This thesis examines USSOCOM’s proposal to educate IW strategists / campaign planners, and compares it to the existing model utilized by SAMS for educating conventional campaign planners. SAMS is a good comparative model because the SAMS program has a proven record in conventional campaign planning. Simply put, SAMS is a success and a model for other advanced ILE programs. This comparative analysis extracts educational “best practices” from both approaches and makes recommendations for consideration. Even with an optimal approach, implementation is an equally challenging problem. At the end, the thesis identifies future research opportunities for the utilization of USSOCOM’s IW educated officers.

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Socially Embedded Insurgencies

by Alexander V. Simmons MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

This thesis investigates “social embedding,” a condition where the local population and the insurgency share the same goals and methods in securing political control of their environment. Social embedding is an important phenomenon to understand because, once insurgents and the population share the same goals, separating the two becomes exponentially more difficult; in essence, the insurgents have “won” the population. The paper uses social movement theory (SMT) and its three variables (political opportunity, resource mobilization, and ideological framing) to explain the dynamic between the regime, the insurgency, and the population, and how it may lead to social embedding with the population or social rejection.

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House Divided the Splitting of Active Duty Civil Affairs Forces

by Kurt N. Sisk MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

This thesis examines the U.S. Army’s current plan to create an Active Duty Civil Affairs Brigade within U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) to provide direct support to general purpose forces (GPF). This thesis analyzes this new alignment of Civil Affairs forces within the U.S. Army, to determine if this is the best course of action considering the current and emerging operational environment, and possible effects on the Active Duty Civil Affairs branch. Recommendations are given to rectify the problems identified, and to suggest alternate courses of action regarding the placement of Civil Affairs forces and their structure within the U.S. Army. With DoD directive 3000.7 stating that Irregular Warfare (IW) is as strategically important as traditional warfare, and Field Manual 3-0 stating stability operations are equivalent to both offensive and defensive operations, Civil Affairs will have a key role in almost all conflicts in the foreseeable future. DoD Directive 3000.7 makes clear that any new Civil Affairs force structure formed now, will affect the U.S. Army’s ability to confront threats in the coming years.

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Deterrence as the Cornerstone of a Counter-Terror Strategy

by Daniel E. Stoltz LTC, USA
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

This paper offers the option of deterrence as opposed to preemption as part of a broader counter-terror strategy. It by no means proffers that this course of action is the only one that may or may not be feasible, but it does take a hard line approach to solving a seemingly unsolvable problem by a means that many have forsaken. In order to deter, one must be willing to punish. A nation must be willing to accept a certain amount of world condemnation for its actions. If a nation is not steadfast in its belief and assertions to punish those who violate the clear boundaries established, then deterrence is nothing more than an empty threat or a bluff, and one’s enemies will continue to whittle away at your way of life and defenses. If a nation questions its own authority as a world power to hold others accountable, then it must also be willing to abdicate its responsibility and be prepared to subject itself to someone else’s authority to establish the boundaries and hold your nation subservient to them. You either make the rules or you live under those who do; it is that simple.

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Global Insurgency to Reestablish the Caliphate; Identifying and Understanding the Enemy

by David A. Strauss MAJ, USA
School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS

Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States (US) has waged a Global War on Terror (GWOT) based upon the flawed strategy of countering a tactic, terrorism, as opposed to a strategy built on understanding and identifying its enemy. By focusing exclusively on terrorist organizations, the US failed to recognize the broader-based movement of establishing a dominant Islamic world power. Analysis should have been conducted encompassing the ways, means and ends of a known adversary, such as Islamic fundamentalists. Using this group as a source of comparison, this monograph demonstrates how other diverse groups, operating with different ideological ways but using similar means of technology, are attempting to achieve a common ends; the reestablishment of the Caliphate.

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A Comprehensive Approach to Improving US Security Force Assistance Efforts

by Lieutenant Colonel Theresa Baginski, Colonel Brian Clark Lieutenant Colonel Frank Donovan, Ms Karma Job Lieutenant Colonel John Kolasheski, Colonel Richard Lacquement Colonel Don Roach, Colonel Sean Swindell Lieutenant Colonel Curt Van De Walle
United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA

Current operations, the demands of persistent conflict, and the enduring national security interests of the United States underscore the immediate and continuing need to improve US Security Force Assistance (SFA) efforts. The frequency and importance of such activities throughout US history demonstrate that the current requirements are not anomalies. Since 9/11, the United States has been challenged to accomplish key national security goals due to a lack of capability and capacity to effectively advise, utilize and partner with foreign security forces. To meet this challenge, this paper offers recommendations that build upon recent initiatives within DoD to create a comprehensive approach to improve US Security Force Assistance. At the heart of our recommendations is a DoD-level organizational approach to effectively institutionalize SFA activities and facilitate interagency and multinational unity of effort. We intend to adapt current DoD processes that encourage the ad hoc approach and implement a single DoD-level integrating organization.

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SOF Profession of Arms: A Unique Requirement for Special Forces Officers Attending Intermediate Level education

by James M Tennant LTC, USA
School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, KS

The purpose ofthis research was to identify the SOF unique educational requirements for SF Officers attending CGSC's ILE. This question came to the forefront at the Command and General Staff College when the United States Army Special Operations Command requested JPME I credit for Officers attending the Naval Post Graduate School in Monterrey CA. The purpose was to find additional opportunities to develop the SF major in order to meet the changing global environment the SF officer would operate in. The colleges' concern was that the SF Officer would not receive the proper professional development required to prepare them for the remainder oftheir professional career. The heart ofthe issue was the professional development of the SF Officer.

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Causes of Improvement in the Security Environment of Iraq, 2006-2009

by Seth A. Wheeler MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

Popular consensus exists that the 2007 surge of U.S. forces in Iraq led to an improved security environment. The surge was designed to reduce violence and improve security by protecting the Iraqi population—a change in strategy. According to the consensus, the security environment improved due to the surge, measured by the decreasing number of attacks.

For this thesis, the security environment consists of the number of attacks and their lethality, supported by data from the Congressional Research Service. This thesis compares the timelines of the surge forces with the numbers of attacks, the lethality of those attacks, and with factors other than the surge that may have improved the security environment. This thesis argues that the surge and associated strategy may have hastened improvement to the security environment, but they were neither necessary nor sufficient for the improvements in the security environment.

Several theories and conflict models offer insight into how improvement in the security environment occurred: through efforts that countered insurgent sanctuary and social support, and consequently decreased the lethality of insurgent attacks. This analysis reveals that the political efforts of the Iraqi government and grass roots movements were the necessary and sufficient conditions for improvement.

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Opium in Afghanistan Lessons Learned from the Counterdrug Strategies of Colombia

by Scott R. Whittenburg MAJ, USA
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA

The paper conducts an analysis of the current counterdrug operation in Afghanistan and analyzes how these operations affect the counterinsurgent operations against the Taliban. This analysis will be conducted by examining the Taliban’s control of opium cultivation to support their operations, determine how the people of Afghanistan rely upon the profits of opium for their livelihood, and identify possible solutions to the opium trade that will not alienate the people of Afghanistan from the Afghan government or Coalition Forces. This study will utilize a case study on Colombia in order to examine the policies implemented in an attempt to control the country’s illicit cocaine trade. The intent of this study can be explained in four steps. First is to examine counterdrug strategies. Second is to conduct a case study of Colombia in order to examine the strategies used to counter their illicit drug trade. Third is to gain an understanding of what drives the Afghan people to produce opium, and how the Taliban exploits this need. Fourth is the recommendation of a proper counterdrug strategy to be implemented in Afghanistan.

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